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Progressio Report

PROGRESSIO

O4ANGVG LINDS

OM4NG L1V

Published Janualy 2006 by Progressio

Unit 3, Canonbury Yard

190a New North Road

London Ni 7BJ

www.progressio.org.uk

Progressio is the working name of the

Catholic Institute for International

Relations (ChR). ChR is registered m

the UK as a charity (number 294329)

and a company (number 2002500).

ISBN i 85287 318 3

Adan Yusuf Abokor, Steve lUbbie,

Mark Bradbury, Haroon Ahmed Yusuf

and Georgina Barrett assert their

right under the Copyright, Designs

and Patents Act 1988 to be identified

as the authors of this work.

Cover photo: Women queuing to

vote. Photo: Georgina Barrett.

Design: Twenty-five Educational

About the authors:

Adan Yusuf Abokor is the Progressio

country representative for

Somaffiand.

Steve Kibbie is Progressio’s advocacy

coordmator on Afflca/Yemen.

Mark Bradbury is a writer and analyst

on Somaliland and East Africa.

Haroon Ahmed Yusuf is a programme

advisor for AcilonAid m Somaliland.

Georgina Barreft is an International

Peace and Security masters graduate

with a keen interest ni African affairs,

parficularly in Somahiland and

southem Sudan.

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Further steps

to democracy

The Somaliland parliamentary elections, September 2005

Coordinating authors:

Adan Yusuf Abokor,

Steve Kibbie

Contributing authors:

Mark Bradbury, Haroon Ahmed

Yusuf,

Georgïna

Barrett

With assistance

from:

Michael Wails, Conrad Heine

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Acknowledgements

Progressio wishes to thank the Government of Somaliland, the National Electoral

Commission, the Special Protection Unit of the Somaliland Police Force, the

political parties and their candidates, and in parficular the people of Somaliland

for their hospitality, openness and patience throughout the period that the

international observers were in Somaliland. Progressio of course also extends its

thanks to the international observers themselves for their commitment and good

humour throughout the time they were in Somaliland. It also gratefully

acknowledges the logistical support provided by international non-govemmental

orgamsations (NGOs) which made it possible for the observer team to travel

throughout Somaliland. finally Progressio wishes to tliank the British Embassy in

Addis Ababa for funding the international election observation team, and indeed

this publication.

Note on terminology

The Catholic Institute for International Relations (ChR) adopted Progressio as its

working name in January

2006.

The name CHR has been used throughout this

report because this was the name used by the organisation during the period

covered by the repoft.

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Contents

tntroduction

Democratisation in Somaliland

Build-up to the parliamentary election

Conduct of the electïon

The role of the international election observers

Recommendations of the international

election observers

Analysis of the election resuits

Beyond the elections

Conciusion

Appendix: Media coverage of the election

Notes

inside back cover

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Introduction

On 29 September 2005 the people of the Republic of

Somaliland, an mtemationally-unrecognised country in

north-west Somalla, elected a new parliament. These

parliamentary elections, the first to be held in the Somali

region since 1969, were the latest and, arguably, most

important step in establishing a constitutionally-based,

democratic govemmental system in Somaliland.

Since brealdng away from Somalia in May 1991, the

people of Somaliland have souglit to build a new state by

charting a path away from violent confflct to a

competitive and democratic political system. The process

began with a constitutional plebiscite in 2001, and since

2002 all of Somaffiand’s key poiltical institutions disfrict

coundis, the presidency and vice presidency, and, with

these latest efections, parliament itselft have been

subjected to popular vote. The successful staging of tliese

three elections has important implications for Somaliland

and the political entity for entihes) that emerge from the

wreckage of the Somali state, and for the region in general.

These varlous elections have consolidated Somaliland

as a territorially-defined political entity, with ali the

regions within its borders having elected councils and

elected representatives in government. The introduction

of universal suffrage and the creation of polifical parfles

that are not based on dan mark a significant aftempt to

move away from the kinship-based politics of the past

two decades. furthermore, the establishment of an

elected parliament has the potential to restore a more

equitable balance to political authority, by curbing the

excesses of the executive and the increasing corruption of

political life that had begun to corrode the political

project in Somaliland.

The process of establishing an elected government in

Somaliland has occurred in parallel with regional and

international efforts to restore a national government to

Somalia. TIils has involved the formation of the

Transifional National Government in 2000 and the

Transitional Federal Government (TfG) in 2004. Indeed,

progress towards forming a national government for

—

Somalia galvanised Somaliland’s government into

holding the constitufional referendum in 2001. The

subsequent elections and the demonstrated commitment

of Somaliland’s people to peaceful democratic pracfices of

governance presents an enormous political challenge to

Somalia’s TFG and a dilemma for ifiose in Somalia and

the international community who oppose the aspirations

of people in Somaliland for independence. At the same

time the three elections demonstrate what can be feasible

elsewhere in Somalia, should conditions allow.

The elections also have regional connotations. The

peaceful manner in which the polls were conducted

contrasts with the violence that accompamed elections

ifl neighbouring Ethiopia in 2005. They also provide

inspiration for civil activists advocating dernocratic

change elsewhere in the region, such as in Djibouti and

Eritrea.2 Some analysts regard Somaliland’s expenences

and achievements as a model for the new government of

South Sudan.3

ChR and the international

election observers

ChR (known in Somaliland as International Cooperation

for Development ICD’) has been acfive in Somaliland

smce 1995 (see box). In December 2002 and March 2003

it organised a small team of international observers and

supported local NGOs to monitor the council and

presidential elections. In July 2005, the Somaliland

National Electoral Commission (NEC) formally invited

CIIR/ICD to organise and facilitate a team of

international election observers (lEOs) to cover the

parliamentary elections.

CIIR/ICD fielded a small team to observe the

preparafions for the po11 and the parties’ campaigns and

to monitor media coverage. The elections themselves

were witnessed by a team of 76 observers from 20

countries, namely Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa,

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Germany,

—

Further steps to dernocracv

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Introduction

France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Denmark,

Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States of

America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Among

these were several Somalilanders from the diaspora in the

UK, Sweden and Canada.

A week prior to the poll, the peaceful election

campaign was interrupted by a serious security incident,

involving a gun battie between police and a group of

alleged Islamic militants in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s

capital. Imtial fears that this marked a plot to disrupt the

elections were assuaged when it was discovered that a

plan to free prisoflers awaiting trial for the murders of

foreigners in Somailland was behind the incident. Several

of those detaiiied by police have since been convicted of

the murders, and sentenced to death.

The elections themselves and the observation mission

were flot affected, and the lEOs went on to visit 361

polling stations around Somali]and on the polling day

itseif (over one-third of the total of 982 stations).

Elecfion day saw a tumout of over 600,000 voters. The

lEOs were able to conciude that despite many procedural

problems (lack of a census and registrafion process;

breaking of the voluntary code of conduct by political

parties; a lack of secrecy in some ballots; complicated

ballot papers; attempts at mulfiple voting; and unequal

representation of women) the elections were conducted

in a ‘reasonably free and fair’ fashion.5 Within days of the

poll, but before the final resuits were confirmed, ChR

issued a report to this effect to the NEC (otlier missions

among the lEO team also issued their own assessments of

the elections).

This final report provides a more considered

assessment of the elections, the resuits and the

democratisaUon process in Somalitand. White the report

incorporates some recommendations and insights of

other lEOs, it does flot necessarily reflect their opinion,

and its authors assume responsibility for the analysis and

for any enors of fact or interpretation.

CHR (flow Progressio) in Somaliland

Since 1995, CUR has wotked alongside nascent local

NGOs (LNGOs) which have played a crucial role in

providing services to marginalised communities

ifl

Somaliland. Through ts skill-share programme CIIR

provides experienced international development workers,

ificiuding those from the diasporas, who work directly

with

partner LNGOs. ChR has as5isted ts LNGO partners

by directhy building their capacity to work on issues

concerning education, health, disabihity, young people,

human rights and HIV and AIDS in Somahiland, and by

supporting minority groups, induding youth and

disabihity groups and women’s organisations, in advocacy

initiatives. Partner LNGOs work directly with government

officials, other NGOs, community and rehigious leaders,

respected elders and other members of the community

and have helped guide Somahiland towards addressing

issues around poverty, reconstruction and

democcatisation.

For more information on ChR’s (now Progressio’s) work in

Somahihand, see www.progressio.org.uk.

Furtlier steps to democracy

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1: Democratisation in Somaliland

The

Republic of Somaliland

The ‘Republic of Somaffiand’ was created on 18 May 1991,

when leaders of the Somali National Movement (SNM)

and elders of the northern Somali dans meeting at the

‘Grand Conference of the Northem Peoples’ in Burco

bowed to public pressure and revoked the 1960 Act of

Union, which had jomed the former colonial temtories of

Italian Somalia and the British Somaliland Protectorate

into the Somall Republic.

The new state incorporated the temtory of the former

British protectorate, whose borders with Djibouti to the

west, the Gulf of Aden to the north, Ethiopia to the west

and Somalia to the east were delineated by international

treaties between 188$ and

1897.6

This inciudes the former

regions of north-west Somalia Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed,

Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool.7 A sixth region Saaxil was

aeated in 1996. Hargeisa became the designated capital

and the seat of government. Since 1998, Somaliland’s

authority over eastem Sanaag and Sool regions has been

contested by Puntiand State of Somalia in north-east

Somalia.8

The people of Somaliland are etlinic Somali and share

with other Somalis a common language and religion

(sunni Islam), and a tradifional livelihood system based

around nomadic pastoralism. There has been no census in

Somaliland for almost 20 years. War, displacement, urban

migrafion and the nomadic nature of the populafion

make it difficult to determine the population with any

accuracy. Current estimates vary greatly, from 1.7 to 3.5

million, with an urban population of between 748,000

and 1.2 million.9

The SNM leadership inherited a region devastated by a

10 year war

whicli tens of thousands of people were

kifled, half the population was dlsplaced, the main cities

of Hargeisa and Burco were destroyed, and the

countryside was left littered with mmes and unexploded

ordinance.

Over the ensuing 14 years, the people of Somaliland

have successfully managed a process of recondliation,

demobilised fighters, restored law and order and created a

constitutionally based government. Somaliland has

emerged as the most stable polifical unit within the

territory of the former Somali Republic and smce 1997 it

has

been one of the most peaceful areas in

the

Horn of

Africa, experiencing seven years without intemal conflict

or military confrontation with neighbouring countries. A

brief miitary clash with Puntland in late 2004, in which

100 people were kified, hlghlighted

the

dangers of

unresolved issues. Nevertheless,

the

general state of

security prevailing in Somaliland means that it has ceased

being a refugee-produdng area, and most of those who

—

had fled to neighbouring countries have retumed.

The relative stability sustained over the past decade has

enabled international aid organisations to support local

efforts to restore essential services and

infrasfructure,

clear

land mines, reintegrate dispiaced populafions, demobilise

mffitia and build the capadty of new civil society

organisations. Human development indicators in

Somaliland are generafly better than in other regions of

Somalia, although levels of under-five and matemal

mortality, adult literacy,

primary

school erirolment and per

capita income remain among the lowest in

the

world.’0

Constructing a new state has brought many

challenges. Between 1992 and 1996 the country was

twice embroiled in civfl wars. A ban on imports of Somali

livestock by Saudi Arabia since 2000 has deprived the

country of a key source of revenue. Demographic and

economic pressures are affecting the environment and

fuelling rapid urban migration, which in

turn

straining

the capacity of urban infrastructurc. There is also

evidence of growing disparities ifl wealth between social

groups, between the east and west of the country, and

between urban and rural populations. Critically, after 14

years Somaliland’s

sovereignty

claim remains

unrecognised by Somalis in Somalia or any foreign

government and is contested by people in eastern

Somaliland.

The lack of international recognition has deprived

people in Somaliland of the

type

of governance support

that many post-conffict countries receive. It also restricts

the possibilities for developing international trade

relations and encouraging inward investment. With

meage levels of international assistance, recovery has

largely been achieved from the resources and

resourcefulness of Somalilanders themselves. The main

sources of finance have been the produchon and export

of livestock, trade, and the remittances sent by Somalis

living abroad. This has served to forge a separate identity

and a feeling of self-reliance and has enabled

Somalilanders to craft a political system suitable to tlieir

needs.

Unrecognised internationally, Somaliland has many of

the attributes of a sovereign state,

with an elected

government that provides secunty for its population,

exercises some control over its borders, retains

stewardship over some public assets, levies taxes, issues

currendy, and formulates development policies. It has

also adopted many of the symbols of statehood,

including a flag, its own cunency, passports and vehicle

license plates. The latest pliase in this process of state

building has involved submitting its legislature to

democratic elections.

further

steps to democracy

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1: Democratisation in Somaliland

Demc5tion and state-building

The parliamentary elections of 29 September

2005

fulfihled a long term commitment of people in

Somaliland to establish a democratic state. This

commitment was arUculated in the manifesto of the SNM

and fought for in their armed struggie against the

military regime of Siyad Barre. Secession in May 1991

created an opportunity to break with the past 21 years of

corrupt and repressive dictatorship and to establish a

democratic system of government. The SNM leadership

was given the mandate to govem the country for two

years as the sole party, to draft a constitution and to

prepare for democratic elections. This was an ambitious

and unrealistic task and one on which the SNM

government, bereft of revenue and any external support,

failed to deliver.

In 1992 the political consensus began to fracture and

sporadic conflicts erupted ni Burco and over Berbera port.

As the country slipped into war, dan elders, backed by

civil society activists and business people, stepped in to

restore order through a series of locally managed and

financed dan peace conferences (shir beeleed).” These

meetings culminated ni the 1993 Borama conference,

which proved to be a watershed in Somaliland’s political

recovery. The conference, which lasted several months,

oversaw the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM

government to a civilian government headed by

Mohamed Haji Ibrahim EgaL12 It also produced a

Transitional National Charter and Peace Charter that

defined the political and institutional structures of

government for a three year period, until a constitution

could be adopted.

One of the important legacies of the Borama conference

was the way it insfitutionalised the role of dans and their

leaders m the system of government. The political system

established in 1993, which became known as the beet (or

community) system of govermuent, fused indigenous

forms of social and political organisation with western

style institutions of government. Described as a ‘dynamic

hybrid of western form and traditional substance’,’5

government consisted of an executive president and a

bicameral parliament, comprising an upper house of elders

(Gotaha Guurtida) and lower house of representatives

(Golaha Wakiitlada), whose members were nominated on a

dan basis by an electoral college of elders.

This cian-based power-sharing system provided the

basis of government for eight years and, despite two years

of civil war between 1994 and 1996, brought a high

degree of stability to Somaliland. During this period the

country experienced considerable economic growth,

refugees returned and were reintegrated, and much of

Somaliland’s urban inftastructure, municipal services and

systems of education and health were restored.

The civil war was brought to an end in 1997 by a

second national reconciliation conference held in

Hargeisa. The conference extended the government’s

period of office for a further live years and re-elected

Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as president. The conference also

replaced the National Charter with a draft constitution

which, after years of wrangling between President Egal

and the parliament, was eventually subjected to a

plebiscite on 31 May 2001. A major impetus for holding

the referendum was the formation of Puntland State of

Somalia in 1998 and the Transitional National

Government of Somalia in August 2000, which both

threatened Somaliland’s sovereignty.’4 The fhst articie of

the constitution affirrns Somaliland’s independence

status, and its approval by the majority of the electorate

in Somaliland provided a clear statement of people’s

aspiration to protect that.

‘

The adoption of the constitution also put in place the

necessary steps to change the political system in

Somaliland from a form of clan-based consociational

government to a restricted form of multi-party

democracy. The constitution infroduced universal

suifrage, enshrining the right of women to vote. Tt

provides for local government and the national

legislature and executive to be subjected to regular

elections. But it also restricts the number of political

parties to three. The restricfion on parties is intended to

promote the formation of national organisations that

will represent a cross-section of the population and avoid

the sectarian politics that occurred in 1969 when over 60

parties contested the election.

Although the public overwhelmingly endorsed the

constitution, there was considerable unease about the

move to multi-party democracy. Critics of the beet system

blamed it for entrenching nepotism, stifling issue-based

politics and exduding women from politics, whule its

defenders argued that it was unnecessary to change a

system that had worked for 12 years a period longer

than Somalia’s previous experience of democratic

government. President Egal linked the adoption of the

constitution to Somaliland’s desire for international

recognition, stating that the international community

would flot recognise Somaliland’s independent status

unless it adopted a democratic system. His critics were

concerned that it was simply a ruse by hs administration

to extend its stay in power.

Egal’s

sudden death in May

2002

changed the context and persuaded former

opponents of the changes to paiticipate

the electoral

process.

The change from a system of selected representation to

elected representation in Somaliland’s political

instilutions has occuned

iii

three steps. The first involved

the election of 23 district councils in Somaliland’s six

regions in December 2002. Six political organisations

fielded candidates

ifl

these elections, of which three won

sufficient support to become acaedited national parties:

UDUB (United Demoaatic People’s Party), Kulmiye

(Unity Party) and UCID Uustice and Welfare Party).

UDUB, founded by the late president Egal and headed by

his successor Dahir Riyale Kahn, was the clear winner

receiviflg 41 per cent of the total votes, with Kulmiye

second and UCID third.’6 Elections for the offices of

president and vice-president followed four months later,

in April

2003,

at which the incumbent president, Dahir

—

further steps to democracy

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1: Den

ccratsation

in Somaliland

Riyale Kahin, succeeded m retaining his seat, beating his

ciosest rival Ahmed Mohamed ‘Silaniyo’, chairman of

Kulmiye, by a margin of only 214 votes.17

The elections brought a numbef of changes and

challenges to Somaliland. Somaliland demonstrated that

it had the capacity to hold peaceful elecfions which were

deemed reasonably free and fair in the eyes of

international observers, and the

NEC

proved

its

credibility in overseeing the democrafic process.” The

fad that the elections were largely funded by the

Somaliland government, with addifional support from

foreign donors,’9 demonstrated a commitment by the

political elite to a form of constitutionally-based

democracy. Furthermore,

the

peaceful resolution of the

fightly fought presidential eledions showed that there

was a determination in Somaliland to seffie political

differences through constitutional means rather than

fesorting to violence.

The

elections established political parties as an

alternative form of political association to the dan,

although voting pattems highlighted the continuing

influence of dan polidcs, with marked regional

vanations m support for the political parties.

The

eledion of district councils established, for the first time

in Somalia, the

structure for a decentralised

form of

government that is accountable and responsive to the

local electorate. At the same time, the

majority

of votes

were

cast

in the urban areas, which reflected the Tapid

process of urban seffiement in Somaliland.

The formation of eleded district councils that

recognise the auffiority of the government in Hargeisa,

and pay taxes to it, reinforced

the

intemal legitimacy of

Somaliland’s political institutions and leaders and helped

to consolidate the boundanes of Somaffiand. The election

of a non-Isaaq president gave credence to the claun that

Somaliland was a multi-dan polity. At

the

same time

the

non-participation of most of

the

population of Sool and

eastem Sanaag regions served to slirink the size of the

polity

and

make Somaliland politics more inciusive.

furthermore, the change from inciusive consensual

politics to a majoritarian electoral system resulted in the

exclusion of

minority

groups and women from eleded

positions. Despite the large turn-out of women voters,

only

two

women were elected to the 379 council seats.

The

elections also gave the mhng party UDUB sweeping

control over Somaliland’s political institutions, a

situation that could only be redified through

parliamentary elections.

further steps to democraq’

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2: Build-up to the parliamentary election

2: Build-up to the

parliamentary election

1t had ongmally been intended to hold the presidentïal

and parliamentary elections together in 2003. However,

disagreements on the number and distribution of

parliamentary seats, the delineation of constituency

boundaries,2° the absence of a census and register of

voters, and procrastmation by the sitting

parliamentarians and the cabinet, delayed the

introduction of the necessary electoral law for two

years.2’ The elections were postponed twice more until a

formula was agreed for distributing the 82 parliamentary

seats to Somaliland’s six regions: Woqooyi Galbeed

(Hargeisa region) was given 20 seats, Awdal 13, Saaxil 10,

Togdheer 15, Sanaag 12, and Sool 12. The parties

presented 246 candidates for the 82 seats, of which

nine were ‘reserved seats’ (in the contested regions of

Sool and eastern Sanaag and Buhodle district in

Togdheer) to be apportioned to parties on the basis of

their overall regional vote.

As with the

district

and presidential elections, the

parliamentary elections were organised and managed by

the NEC with external technical support. This was a

major undertaking, with 1.3 million ballot papers to be

printed; 1,500 ballot boxes (bags) to be distributed; 962

polling stations to be identified and equipped; 4,000

polling station staff, 6,000 party agents, 3,000 police and

700 domestic observers to be trained; and 76

international observers to be coordinated. The

government again contributed to the cost of the

elections. But having financed two elections, and due to

declining revenues and increased military expenditure on

the tenitorial dispute with Punttand, it was only able to

provide 30 per cent of the projected costs; the balance

was bom by international donors?

In order to ensure a smooth, orderly and transparent

process, the

NEC

was asked by the European Union to

identify an international partner through whom funding

could be channeled. The Hargeisa-based Academy for

Peace and Development, an affiliate of WSP

International, was chosen. It assembled an international

team to provide legal, technical and logisfical expertise

and to develop a database to manage the information

generated by the process.2’

As in the previous elections, the parfies signed a code

of conduct prepared by the NEC covering the conduct of

the campaign, the use of public finance, compliance with

electoral law and measures to deal with existing gaps in

the law. The media similarly signed a voluntary code of

conduct for their coverage of the elections. In addition,

an Election Monitoring Board (EMB) was established with

representatives from civil society to independently

monitor the election, mediate disputes and provide a

formal public assessment of the elections.

The candidates

The democratisation process m Somaffiand was intended

to mark a progression from cian-based politics to party

politics. This has flot occurred. Mthougli dan and

religious-based parties are proscribed by the constitution,

the district and presidential elections both ilustrated the

continuing iniluence of lineage politics in the multi

party system. The system chosen for the parliamentary

election, whereby the electorate voted for the candidate

rather than the party, served to reinforce this. If the

presidential election was primarily about the parties and

party leaders, then the parliamentaiy election was more

about establishing dan representation in parliament.

Although the NEC scrutinised the qualiflcations of the

candidates, according to established cntena of age,

dtizenship and education, it was in the interests of the

parties to have candidates who could deliver the votes of

their constituendes. The dan leadership tlierefore played

a key role in selecfing the candidates and ni financing

their campaigns.

The motivations of the dans were various. Better

access to government resources, jobs, and better services

were ali incentives to see their candidates elected.

However, as government resources are limited, with

revenues of only US$20 million per year, to increase the

prestige and political relevance of the dan was just as

important.25

Another key factor in candidate selection was the

ambition of the candidates themselves. Some invested a

signiflcant amount of tlieir own resources ni theii

campaign, while others relied on their dan. Some refused

to stand for the party that their dan supported, which

split the dan. As some joined or switched parties at the

last minute, their party loyalty was uncertam. It was

difficult for some party candidates to fight on the

platform of a party that they had only recently joined.

There was a great deal of tacticat selection of

candidates and votirig. In some cases the parties sought

to undermine support for opposition candidates by

selecting a close relative as their own candidate. Many of

the ministers prornoted their own candidates from

within ffieir own dans. One minister is even alleged to

have supported three candidates for

the

three parties

from

within

his dan.

The selection of candidates required dan leaders to

assess the numbers of votes that they could muster, as it

further steps to democracy

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2: Build-up to the parliamentary eledion

would seem to be seif-defeating to have too many

candidates from one sub-lineage. However, it did liappen

that some sub-cians had several candidates and because

the vote was spread too thinty they did flot gain any seats.

The candidates and their dans were therefore the

driving forces in the campaigns, rather than the parties

from whom they received very little financial support. It

was reported that some candidates spent as much as

US$200,000 on renting premises for their supporters to

meet, on campaign advertismg, on qat, and in some cases

on buying support by paying off debts of voters?A

considerable number of the candidates came from the

diaspora, with money and support from abroad. Running

such a campaign required personal wealth or resources

within the dan, which discriminated against potential

candidates who were less well off, those from ‘minority’

dans, and women.

There were very few examples ot candidates who

stood outside the territory of their dan mi a so-cafled

‘national Ucket’. One example was the owner of the

Ambassador Hotel, who could draw on his personal

wealth to nin his campaign. But most stood for election

in the regions where tlieir dans are populous and

campaigned in the districts where their dans are a

majority. Prior to the election the candidates and their

parfies moved large numbers of people to vote in the

region of their dan, parficularly out of Hargeisa. As dan

territories extend across the border to Ethiopia, it is

reported that the candidates and parties campaigned

there and organised significant numbers of people living

there to vote in Somaliland.

selected by the parties rather than proposed by the dan,

but as women could flot guarantee to win the vote of

their dan there was no incentive for the parties to select

female candidates. Therefore, out of the 246 candidates

in the parliamentary elections, only seven were women.27

The election campaign

The election campaign started on 30 August.

Campaigning was peaceful, If a little disorgamsed. One

fatal mddent was reported, on the day before the po11,

involving a dispute within one party over the allocation

of fuel. When campaigning became too frenetic in

Hargeisa, the parties were allocated specific days for

holding rallies. There were allegadons of government

misuse of funds in support of UDUB and of unfair use of

media time on state-nin television and radio (see the

appendix for a summary of the condud of the media),

and crihcisms of government for appoiriting new

ministers of state to curry favour with clans. Ministers

in pafficular were critidsed for using government

vehicles and other resources in support of their preferred

candidates. The EMB was suffidiently concerned at the

government’s actions that they issued several press

releases and the NEC upheld tliese complaints. As a result

media coverage became more equitable, but it proved

difficult to control the use of government funds.

In terms of tlieir policies there was little substantive

difference between the parfies. AU held similar positions

on Somaliland’s independence and the dispute with

Puntland and ali espoused a liberal economy. The thmst

of the parties’ campaigns, therefore, revolved around the

delivery of social and economic progress. for individual

candidates the key issues were around tmst and

leadership and their ability to deliver benefits for their

dan constituendies.

The ChR pre-election observation team conciuded

that, despite some obvious problems of cominission and

omission, the conditions were such that a reasonably free

and fair election was possible.

The large number of candidates in the elections and

the active partidpation of the dans did give a sense of

broad public partidipation ni the elections. The nature of

political debate ensured that these elections linked local

district and regional politics to national politics. Rather

than Hargeisa dominating the national debate, local

politics had an iniluence on national-level politics, m a

way that was flot dissimilar to the dan conferences in the

1990s. Conversely, the results of the eledions will impact

on political relations at a local level.

Women

candidates

Inevitably women candidates were one of the casuafties

of this kinship poliUcs. Women in Somaliland have

slowly been making inroads into representative politics.

One criticism of the bee! system of government was that

it discriminated against the participation and

representation of women in politics; no women had held

decision-making roles ur the national peace conferences.

With universal sufftage enshrined in the constitufion,

the adoption of electoral democracy gave women m

Somaliland the right to vote and hold public office. Since

2002 there have been three women members of the

cabinet, but of the 379 councillors elected in the district

elections only two were women. A proposal to amend the

electoral law and grant women a quota in parliament

failed to win parliamentary approval lrs October 2004,

leaving women with no alternative but to stand for

elechon. Unlike the male candidates the women were

Further steps to dernocracv

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3: Conduct of the election

Like the previous two elections, the election day passed

peacefully. People tumed out in large numbers to vote

horn early mornmg. Attempts at double vofing, under

age voting and some transporting of people by the

parties was observed in most regions, altliough flot in

sufficient numbers to

aifect

the outcome. In parts of

Hargeisa, there were some tensions reported among the

large

crowds queumg to vote, but on the whole the

public was disciplined, the security sewices maintained

order, and yoUng procedures were largely followed.

There were some incidents involving violence one of

which in Burco the day before polling involved loss of

human life. This was an intemal party dispute over the

allocation of fuel to candidates. However other incidents

appear often to have been due to inexperience. Other

problems related to the complicated and cumbersome

ballot paper. This was in certain instances compounded

by lengthy procedures for a largely illiterate population

in a situation where there was no census and therefore

no registration process. Checks on those who voted were

varied and in some cases persons who appeared younger

than 16 were apparently able to vote.

Equally police took action to detain those who

attempted to vote more than once which seemed to

suggest the system of ultra-violet light checking was

mostly working. It also suggests over-enffiusiasm on the

part of some political party supporters or possibly those

seeking to illegally increase their dan representation.

The question of appropriate enforcement for what

often appeared to be a game for young women and men is

one that needs to be pursued. Observers in Hargeisa were

present when police arrested two young women and took

them to the police station. Some of those arrested were

—

released in mid-aftemoon whether they ified to reoffend

is not known. Observers in certain places noted that such

offenders had their shoes and beits removed and were

made to sit outside or in a group, as a sign of community

disapproval.

In hot weather tempers did get raised

Ofl

occasion,

although the day was largely marked by enthusiasm and

tolerance. On some occasions those wlio had flot m fact

voted were deemed by the inexperienced staif to have

done so perhaps due to the ink bemg passed horn

person to person inadvertently. On occasion in Hargeisa

NEC staif were called in to arbitrate.

Queues were very long, especially in the mommg and

latter part of the afternoon. In Hargeisa, the majorily of

voters appeared to be mostly women and young people,

while elsewhere it appeared queues were evenly split

between male and female.

In some parts of Togdheer, heavy rain impeded both

the conduct of the p011 and the ability of the

international election observers (lEO) team to observe as

many polling stations as it would have wished.

There were some polling stations, especially in

Hargeisa, where law and order on occasion appeared to

be on the point of breaking down. The deployment of

additional security staif seemed to calm the situation. In

one station

NEC

replaced the chairman where

inefficiency and various allegations appeared to be

causing problems.

Overall, however, the lEO team was satisfied that,

despite some difficulties with lack of secrecy, in part due

to high illiteracy, the manner in which the poll was

conducted was reasonably ftee and fair (see box

page).

—

Furtlier steps to democracy

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3: Conduct of the election

Positives

• Rural and many urban stations had calm and organised

queues.

• Huge voter turnout, with enthusiastic participation.

• No ot very little intimidation of voters.

• The counting process was transparent and meticulous in

most piaces, with few discrepancies.

• Widespread recognition of the value of the elections and

the democratisation process.

• Voters mainly understood the ballot paper and could

identify the candidate of their choice.

• A substantial number of women participated as polling

station staff, domestic observers and party agents.

• Many of those attempting to multiple vote were turned

away.

• Widespread commitment to abide by electoral law by

voters and staif.

• Party agents were good at following the process and

represented ali parties at each station usually with two

people per party.

• Illiterate, remote nomadic and elderly voters were

prioritised and assisted to vote in a transparent and well

intentioned way.

• Good distribution of ballot materials and procedures.

• In the majority of cases the equipment and materials

functioned well.

• Most polling stations opened on time, or thereabouts.

• Equal access to polling stations was allowed to both men

and women.

• The ‘no weapons’ policy was adhered to.

• Good voter registration.

• Mostly secret voting (except those that needed

assistance).

• Generally good organisation by local NEC offices,

inciuding supply of extra ballot papers on demand.

• Security for international election observers was weil

organised.

• Weil trained chairmen and polling station staif in most

cases.

• Awareness and support of women candidates, in

principle.

—

Negatives

• Lack of female candidates.

• Attempts at voter fraud and muitipie voting.

• lnadequate number of polling stations overall.

• Some polling stations were too small for effective voting

process, were not in neutral locations and/or lacked

security in rural areas.

• Lack of census/voter register had implications for voter

identification.

• Secrecy of the vote was compromised in many cases due

to illiteracy or lack of voter confidence, particularly of

women.

• Some instances of organised transport by political parties

were reported. Reports of big trucks ferrying voters to

polling stations.

• Some rural polling stations lacked local observers and/or

effectivestafftraining.

• Some polling stations lacked adequate lighting.

• Red pens were not distributed to ali polling stations

(Sheik Uistrict).

• Reported cases of ultra-violet light flot working at some

polling stations.

• Poor usage of ink or wrong ink used at some poiling

stations because of lack of effective training on how to

use the invisible ink or decant it effectively.

• Transference of ink between voters potentially prevented

legitimate voting in some cases.

• Lack of clarity about opening and ciosing times for

poiling stations, particularly when people were stil!

queueing after 6pm.

• Fatigue of ali staif, in particular the polling station

chairman, due to pressure of logistical issues, long

working hours and large number of responsibilities.

• Reported cases of voters from across natioflal borders.

• Reported cases of observer teams and members of the

Special Protection Unit of the Somaliland Police Force

causing disruption.

• Reported cases of party agents doing the duties of

poliing statiofi staif.

• Campaign materials were evident near the polling

station in a minority of cases.

• Lack of familiarisation of poiling stations by party agents

reported by an observer and NEC headquarters.

• Communication problems between ali levels of election

administration on polling day and beforehand.

• in a minority of cases, queues were disorderly.

• Women often received less voter education than men,

especially

ifl

rural areas.

—

further steps to

democracy

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4: The role of the international election observers

4: The role of the international

election observers

The lEO mission was fruly international in its

composition, thus reinforcing its overall credibility as a

voice of the international community. Particular

positives were the inciusion of many women, several

members of the Somaliland diaspora, and observers from

Africa itseif namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique,

South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The logisfical coordination of the 76-strong mission

was also effective, particularly as it was undertaken under

significant resource and time constraints. Ali lEOs were

given appropriate training and brieftng about their roles

and responsibilities and the international standards by

which they were to conduct their observation. This was

vital to ensure that observers adhered to the principles of

election observation and did flot inappropriately engage

in the election process. Equally they were briefed or came

with prior knowiedge of the contextual situation. The

regional focus of the organisation ensured broad

observation across most of Somaliland, reinforcing

accuracy of assessments.

The mission covered the whole elechon process

mcluding the pre- and post-election period ifl-country.

This inciuded an assessment of the campaigning

processes, adherence to the party and media codes of

conduct, and mechanisms for complaints and upholding

of the electoral law.

On the ground, there were some issues concerning the

interaction between local people and the lEOs. Voters

and polling station officials were often aware of the

mission’s overall role, but on occasion seemed unclear as

to where the boundary between observer and participant

lay. Guards from the Special Protection Unit (SPU) of the

Somaliland Police force, who provided security for the

lEOs, would have benefited from more training about

their role during the observation period. While they did

flot directly interfere with the process, on occasion they

failed to understand that their presence within the

polling booths or their acfions did impact on the process.

Some problems arose because of the NEC’s failure to

—

ciarify effectively and m a timely manner their

expectations of the roles and responsibilities of their

own

body and that of the ChR mission. As a result, ChR was

often left to take responsibffity, financially and

practically, for elements of the processes which the NEC

should have been responsible for.

Poor communication and infonnation-sharing by the

NEC made the logistical organisation of the lEO teams

more difficult and complex than it should have been. It

put a great stram on ChR’s resources and therefore

blurred the lines of responsibility.

Without up-to-date and accurate maps, particularly of

the mral regions, lEO teams were heavily dependent on

local knowiedge when planning their polling station

routes. More accurate information (from the NEC) about

polling station locations and the distance between them,

even without maps, miglit have facilitated this

preparation.

Recommendations for future election

observation missions

ChR’s role balanced the need for eftective coordination

of lEO teams with the institutional independence

required by organisations participating in the lEO teams.

If future election observation missions are conducted in a

similar manner it is highly recommended to continue to

have a single coordinating body.

A greater number of observers would increase coverage

of the country and reduce the number of polling stations

that each team visits. This would enable lEOs to spend

more time at each station and enhance coverage and

analysis. Equally, as the mission focused on the period

leading up to poffing day, polling day itseif and the

immediate aftermatli, this left little scope for a

continuous, directly observed assessment of the

situation. Both points require greater financial

commitment from donors and greater logistical

coordination and resources.

further steps to dernocracv

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5: Recommendations of the international election observers

5: Recommendations of the

international election observers

While overall the elections were conducted m a

reasonably free and fair manner, there is scope for

improvement, and a number of recommendations have

been made. These inciude;

• greater civic education and

training

for candidates,

election staif and voters

• stronger measures to encourage female candidates

• a higlier degree of preparation and establishment of a

permanent electoral commission

• more resource support from

the

international

community.

It is also recommended that a national census be held as

soon as possible. This would enable a voter registration

system to be establislied (and would in turn enable

accurate esfimations of tum-out). lt could also heip

eliminate the biggest problem: attempts at multiple

voting. These were observed on frequent occasions by the

lEO teams. However, it is pleasing to note they were

often detected, and were by most accounts far less

numerous than in 2002’s local elections and

the

presidential election in 2003.

local training and political engagement, these offices

needed to be fully functioning. This, again, relies heavily

the

sourcing of funds.

The NEC needs ‘more

teeth’.

needs

to be able to

hold people to account for their achons when they

violate

the

electoral law or codes of conduct.

Perhaps most importantly, the

NEC

needs to develop a

system of voter registration and/or to campaign for a full

country census of Somaliland.

Main points

• Inaease number of poffing stations and improve

accessibility in mral areas.

• Need for greater civic education and poffing

staff/candidate training on all aspects of voting

process.

• Need to begin preparations for

future

elections earlier

inciuding funding.

• Need to take message back to donor/international

community that without their support and

commitment Phase Two of the European

Commission’s Somali democratisation programme

(covering ali Somalla but beginning in Somaliland) is

unlikely to happen.

• Need for a national census

and

a voter registrafion

system wfflch will help solve many difficulties.

• Need for a permanent electoral commission with a

dedicated section dealing with domestic and

international observers.

• Need to ensure that more women are involved in the

election as a whole.

• Improve campaign chances of women by affirmative

action, including conaete examples, such as provision

of vehicles for women candidates.

• Investigate how quota systems for women (and

minorities) have worked elsewhere (eg Uganda).

• Strict adherence to eiectoral law and code of conduct

would expedite the elechons.

Recommendations to the NEC

Where Somaliland’s own electoral organisation is

concerned, more polling stations will be needed in

future,

particularly in mral areas where people

are

expected to travel great distances. Improved equipment

(eg ligliting) needs to be provided to the polling stations.

Communication Iinks between

NEC

headquarters,

local and district level

NEC

offices and with lEO teams

need to be improved to ensure clarity on roles and

responsibilities and to facilitate logistical arrangements.

The

NEC

needs to consider additional ways of assisting

illiterate voters during polling day so that secrecy of

voting is flot compromised.

The intemal capacity of the NEC itself needs to be

increased, with the support of external donors and

practitioners where appropriate, to ensure greater

organisation, effectiveness and transparency of their

work.

This

would also reduce their dependence on

external organisations to undertake tasks. Such capacity

building should include staff kaining, Umetabling, voter

education (particularly of female voters) and preparation

of ballot papers and candidate lists.

The

NEC

should maintain local/regional

NEC

offices

beyond election periods. At present they are scaled back

and closed down until

the

next election/referendum.

However, to maintain genuine capacity development,

Identification and multiple voting

• Ideally, full voter registration should take place, and

voters be issued with ID cards.

• Review options for marking fingers and ballot paper.

The use of invisible ink appeared to work technically,

but it was not obvious to voters, espeaally young

adventurous ones, that there was any marking hence

aftempts at yoUng again were perhaps mofivated by

curiosity about the system of marking.

• Show voters the

ink

under the light on arrival, to

discourage those who are aftempting to double vote

—

Further steps to dernocracy

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5: Recommendations of the international election observers

•

because of the novelty of invisible ink.

Standardise the inking procedure, with specific

instructions on where to apply ink, and on applying

ink on the way in to the polling station to give time

for the ink to dry.

Consistent and

stricter

sanctions on those attempting

to vote more than once, such as detention, and

perhaps sanctioning parties as well as individuals.

Notices to be posted about tliese penalfies in polling

stations to deter parties/would-be multiple voters.

NEC

to fransmit messages about the consequences of

mulfiple voting throughout its campaign.

• Increase efforts to have more ballot papers on hand

and readily available when requested.

• Diagrammatic instructions posted inside the voting

booths would heip voters and ensure greater secrecy.

• Soldiers and the SPU need greater guidance on their

role in particular, about flot engaging in the voting

process

fri

any

way and staying outside

the

pollmg

stations.

• Training is needed for polling staif on transport

procedures for the ballot boxes to go to

district/regional level once vofirig

has

been completed

and votes counted.

—

•

Staif

ing

• More gender balance of polling station chairpersons.

• Chair over-burdened; she/he should take a

coordinating role only.

• Second person other than chair to assist iliterate

people m marking ballots.

• Consider reducing party agents to one per party at any

one

time

some polling stations were very small and

overcrowded.

• Review criteria for selecting polling stations.

• Consider having a day and a mght shift for aH staif, or

other measures to reduce faugue.

• Ensure food and drinks available for polling station

staff.

• Examme options in relation to qat chewing in polling

stations which can be intimidating and flot helpful for

performance of duties.

—

Education, training and information

• More civic education (of course this has funding

implications) which until now has mostly been done

by civil

society

when funds were available.

• Civic education and awareness campaign for electorate

on individual choice with greater emphasis on

multiple voting being both wrong and illegal.

• Provision of sample ballots and voter education

matenal outside polling stations to assist voters.

• Clearer training for pollmg station staft on the

followmg

points:

setting tip of polling stations; inking

procedure; how to seal the ballot bag; the counfing

process, eg use of record book; return of ballots to the

district office; and culture of respect towards voters.

• Male candidates using women’s faces as

symbols

should be discouraged as this Jeads to possible

confusion as to the gender of the candidate.

—

Polling station Iogistics

• Need for more appropriate buildings for polling

stations, especially in terms of size and lighting

(voting could take place outside in mral areas

although this is flot feasible during

the

rainy season).

• Separate entrance and exit doors on polling stations,

where feasible.

• Need for increased supplies of pens with larger tips

and lighting equipment; also a magnifying glass for

each polling station.

• Pens should be fastened to the table in the voting

booth.

• Black felt tip pens more useful than red especially

when some regional ballot papers were pmk.

• Two voting booths to be in place, as per electoral law.

• Ballot papers should be reduced in size.

• Replace serial numbers on ballot papers

with

random

numbers or bar codes, to avoid possibility of tradng

voters through register (funding would be required).

• Ideally, ballot bags should flot be used agaÏn. (The

ballot bags used were chosen because they could be

readily iniported from Ethiopia, but they proved

impractical.) If ffiey are, ballot bags should be bigger;

frames should be provided; they should be centrally

located in the line of sight of observers; and seals for

the ballot bags should be distinguished by different

colours.

• Voter tum-out in this election should be the basis for

distribution of ballot papers in the next election if

there has not been a census and registration process.

—

Ciosing and ballot counting procedures

• More clarity about closing procedures, with the

NEC

taking overall responsibility at national level, and the

chair announcing imminent closing at polling station

level. This would comply with electoral provisions that

those

in the queue at 6pm should be allowed to vote,

but flot those joining the queue after that.

Transport

• More transport to be made available to the NEC for

supplying material, replenishing ballot papers and

transporting ballot boxes.

• Enforcement of prohibition of vehicie movement;

fining parties for transporting voters on election day.

• However, consideration should be given to the

possible need to provide transport for disabled and

remote nomadic voters.

Recommendations to the international

community

Donors, inciuding the new United Nafions Democracy

Fund, should recognise the requirement for sustained

funding for:

• A permanent

NEC

with hill time staif and sustained

training programmes.

• A nationwide census to aid voter registration, ballot

paper distribution and

the

reduction of multiple

voting in time for the planned 2007 local government

elections.

furtlier steps to democracv

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Reccmrnendations

of the international election

observers

• Logistical support inciuding transport, short term

polling stations building purchase from the private

sector, additional staif and polling station materials (eg

ballot boxes).

• Support for women’s participation in the civic and

electoral process.

• Support for parties’ reflections on lessons learned and

options for changes and improvements inciuding the

possibility of exposure and exchange visits.

• Investigating how best to respond to ideas emanating

from uvil society (see section below).

—

Donors might also investigate possibilities of providing

information to parliamentarians and parties on how to

develop coherent policy initiatives and form sustainable

policy-oriented parties (inciuding clear processes for

promoting internal party discipline).

Recommendations to political parties

• Engage with party supporters, local civil society and

international donors on how to develop coherent

policy initiatives and form sustainable policy-oriented

parties.

• Examine ways of increasing women’s participation in

the dvic, electoral and parliamentary processes.

• Undertake with others reflections on lessons leamed

and opfions for changes and improvements including

the possibility of exposure and exchange visits.

—

Recommendations arising from dialogue

with civil society

• Civil society groups need practical training materials,

manuals and posters to further voter education.

• Ability to learn from other counifies such as Uganda

on electoral practice.

• Training for civil society in lobbying and advocacy

techniques.

• Coordination of election training activities between

civil society, political parties, NEC, government and

parliament. (This could lead to a joint plan of action.)

• Greater involvement of civil society in post-election

activities.

• Funding to civil society well before the elections.

terms of whether she is representing her family dan or

the dan of her husband.

The draft eledoral law submitted by consultants in

early 2005 suggested that a quota or other form of

positive disaimination would be needed to address the

issue of women’s partidipation and representation in the

eledoral process. However, the parliamentary committee

which oversaw planning for the elecfion refused to even

discuss the idea.

Women were flot engaged in the drafting process of

the new multiparty system. Eftorts should flow be made

to review the eledoral laws and structures with the

promotion of women’s participation m mmd. This may,

for example, lead to quotas for women candidates or a

framework to increase thek participation. But providing

the means for women to participate is not on its own

enougli. Women must want to be candidates, and must

feel that they can compete on equal terms and must

genuinely be able to do so. This will require awareness

raising, advocacy work and fraining of women so that

they are effective as candidates and potential MPs.

Women voters need to be given the freedom to vote as

they wisli and flot be forced into dan/family lines. This

issue is made even more difficult to address because of

the illiteracy levels among women. M a resutt, in many

cases, when they voted their votes were read out and

shown to people. This may have ensured transparency

but it failed to give women the voting seaecy which may

have enabled them to vote more freely.

Tramning should be given to political parties and MPs

to make them aware of the need to secure women’s votes

and also integrate women into their own parties and

management and policy struduies. If they could see the

benefits of having women candidates it might secure

greater support for women candidates.

Greater efforts need to be made to educate women and

girls in rnral areas where they have less access to the

media and resources available in Hargeisa and other

urban centres. Radio could play a key role in this process

and the capacity here needs to be increased.

—

Reflections on the recommendations

Women’s participation

Despite the relative progress in women’s participation in

Somaliland, women still remain largely excluded as

representatives in parliament. Voters in the

parliamentary elections were encouraged, for example, to

support male candidates, particularly if in the same dan.

Mthough many of the party agents and local observers

were women as were the maj ority of voters the

political parties did not do enough to promote women

candidates. The strong inftuence of dan support for

particular candidates, combined with the fad that dans

are male led and male dominated, means men are put

forward as candidates. In addition, with a female

candidate, the issue of dan loyalty is complicated in

—

Transport

Traveffing is banned on polling days for security reasons

and in order to minimise attempted multiple voting.

There is, liowever, a clear need for better transport for

voters, particularly those who are elderly, disabled or live

ifl

rural areas.

Transport by political parties is flot uncommon in

other countries and does not necessarily determine

which way people vote in a secret ballot. However, if

political parties or candidates are allowed to provide

transport, there is the danger that those with more

money and access to greater resources, especially those

from the governing party at the time of the election,

might be given an unfair advantage. Here botli electoral

law and its implementation are crncial. An alternative

possibility is to increase the number of polling stations to

reduce the need for transport on polling day.

Ballot papers

Distribution of ballot papers was based on voting

pafterns in the last election but was still difficult to gauge

further steps to democracy

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5: Recommendations of the international election observers

as people moved around the country before polling day

in ordet to vote for their favoured candidate (and so garn

dan advantage ifl particular areas). The issue of the

breakdown of communication between polling stations

and the district levels where additional ballot papers were

needed needs to be addressed.

Parties also expressed concems that taking large

numbers of ballots to the bordet polling stations

kicreased the risk of fraud.

Originally there were to be pictures of candidates to

assist illiterate voters but tliey were flot clear so symbols

were introduced (not without controversy). Some male

candidates used women’s faces as symbols. This should

be discouraged as it could lead to confusion as to the

gender of the candidate (althougli there is no evidence

that this was the intended outcome).

process. They often became drawn into the voting

process in some way and did flot adhere to the electoral

law by staying outside the polling stations (although it is

flot obvious that any intimidafion occurred).

Invisible ink was chosen for voter identification as a

result of the widespread use by Somaliland women of

henna (which is difficult to remove). The decision was

taken only the month before the election and training

was necessarily limited on use of

the

ink, when to apply

it, what to look out for in terms of mk being transferred

and indeed the novelty factor. As a result, for example,

although poiling station staif were told to apply the ink

upon entry to the stations, some applied it upon exit.

In addition to staif

fraining,

voter education will be

necessary to help resolve these and other problems.

Chairs of the polling stations were overworked, with

responsibilities inciuding assisfing the illiterate and

disabled voters. Diagrammatic instructions, like those

printed in the voter training manuals, would

clearly

posted inside the voting booths help voters in making

more seaet and independent voting dedsions and reduce

the chair’s workload. It would also heip if in future the

chair focuses more on coordination and supervision,

leaving the more administrative tasks to a deputy

although this obviously would require more resources,

train

ing and staif.

—

Train ing

The NEC had only from 2 July (when it received money

to carry out training) to

train

people in their different

roles. This was a serious constramt and needs to be

rectified in future. In particular, there were problems

when the number of polling stations was suddenly

increased after staif trainrng had been completed, making

it very difficult to arrange everything in these additional

places on time.

25,000 sample papers were issued for training

purposes, but seem to have disappeared which gave some

cause for concem, especially when fake ballot papers

were intercepted at Hargeisa airport.

There is a need for increased party agent training and

also fraining of others on the role of party agents so that

they are flot asked to fadlitate the voting process other

than within their defined role. Similarly, soldiers and the

SPU need to be properly informed about their role in the

Ongoing outside support

A national census and a voter registration process,

bearing in mmd the impending local elections scheduled

for 2007, would both need considerable extemal funding.

Outside assistance in terms of long temi work rather

than the usual short term consultancies is also needed

to heip build and maintain stmctures, systems and skilis

in good governance after the elections.

—

Further steps to democracv

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6: Analysis of the election resuits

6: Ana lysis of the election resuits

Counting the votes

M happened in the previous presidential election,

disputes between the parties emerged once the ballot

counting started, with calis for recounts and the

disqualffication of ballots in some areas. One reason for

this is that the process for counting and reconciling

figures was flot followed precisely according to the

election law. The law required the ballots to be counted

in the polling stations overnight, and the resuits to be

immediately sent to the regional office of the NEC and

then transmitted to the national NEC office in Hargeisa.

Given that most poffing stations finished counting ifl

one night, it should have been feasible to tabulate ali the

resuits in Hargeisa within four days. Instead it was flot

until 14 October that the final resuits were announced,

two hill weeks after polling day.

Voting patterns

After three

elections it is possible to identify some

regional paftems of voting (see table i and chart 1). In

each election the western regions of Woqooyi Galbeed

(Hargeisa region), Awdal and Saaxil have accounted for

over 60 per cent of the votes cast, reflecfing the

concentration of Somaliland’s population in the west. The

fact that the largest number of votes were cast iii Woqooyi

Galbeed further attests to the concentration of the

population in this region and the growth of the capital

Hargeisa since the war These regional patterns of voting

also reflect historic socio-economic differences between

Somaffiand’s regions. Better transport and infrastructure,

shorter distances for voters to travel, better media

coverage, more intense campaigning and voter education

and a more sedentary population also facifitated a higher

tum-out in the west. The smaller number of votes in

Somaliland’s three eastem regions of Togdheer, Sanaag

and Sool can, in part, be accounted for by the smaller

population and the fact that the population is more

nomadic than m the west of the country.

The lower poll in the east is also a consequence of the

non-participation of parts of eastern Sanaag and Sool

regions in the elections. The very low number of votes

counted in Sool region, ranging from one to tliree per

cent of the total vote, illustrates this. Nevertheless, in

line with the rest of the country, there has been an

increase in the numbers of votes counted in Sool in the

course of three elections. This may represent an

incremental increase in partidipation by people in Sool,

albeit at a time when representation in parliament is

dedilning.

Other patterns worth noting are differences in the

regional votes between the three elections. Fkst, there

has been a decline in the total vote in Woqooyi Galbeed

compared to other regions, from 42 per cent of the total

vote in the district eledtions to 35 per cent in the recent

parliamentary election. The decline probably reflects the

Turn-out

The resuits of the 2005 parliamentary elecfion were

announced by the NEC on 14 October, and were

confinned by the Supreme Court on 1 November? A total

of 670,320 valid votes were counted in the parliamentary

elecfion. This was lower than some had speculated and less

than half the 1.3 million ballot papers that were printed

for the election. Nevertheless, the tum-out was

considerably higher than in the previous two elections;3°

over 182,000 more votes were counted in the

parliamentary eledon compared to the presidential

election. The higher turn-out for the parliamentary

election can partially be accounted for by the increase in

polling stations from 900 in the presidential election to

982 for the parliamentary election. Seasonal factors also

meant that pastoralists were grazing m Somaliland dunng

the parliamentaiy election. A substantial number of people

may have aossed from Ethiopia to Somaliland for the

election, which may also account for regional variations in

voting, although hard evidence for this does not exist.

Table

Regional votes n Somaliland’s three elections

Region

Distnct 2002

186,383

W/Galbeed

Awdal

100,495

Saaxil

27,234

Togdheer

66,598

Sanaag

53,096

Sool

6,261

Total

440,067

Sources: Bradbury et

al, 2003;

NEC, 2005.

Presidential 2003

208,864

65,934

30, 53 7

115,064

57,938

9,702

488,039

Parliamentary 2005

253,229

133,026

52,479

121,751

89,286

20,557

670,328

Further steps to democracy

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I’

6: Analysis of the election resuits

Chart

1: Regional distribution of votes in Somaliland’s three elections

300,000

250,000

District 2002

200,000

• Presidential 2003

150,000

• Parliamentary 2005

100,000

50,000

I-

REGIONS

large movement of people from Hargeisa to vote in other

regions prior to polling day. Based on figures from

previous elections, as many as 35,000 people may have

left Hargeisa to vote

fri

offier regions. This movement

happened peacefully and required considerable

organisation by the candidates, their dans and the

parties.

Second, there is a significant change in the scale of

voting in Awdal and Togdheer regions between the three

elections. In Awdal region the vote has swung from 23 per

cent of the total vote to 14 per cent and back up to 24 per

cent in successive elections. While the overall vote in the

parliamentary election has increased compared to the

presidential election, the mcrease has been by far the

largest in Awdal region, which records 6 7,092 more votes

than in the presidential election; this compares to an

increase of 44,365 in Woqooyi Galbeed. As reports on the

previous elections noted,3’ Togdheer is almost the mirror

opposite of Awdal. There the vote has swung from 15 per

cent of the total vote in the district elections to 24 per

cent in the presidential election and back to 17 per cent

in the parliamentary election. These two regions are

politically significant, given the importance of the vote in

Awdal for UDUB and in Togdheer for Kulmiye. The large

swings in the scale of the vote cannot be accounted for by

seasonal variations in the timhig of the elecfions, or the

movement of people from Hargeisa or from Ethiopia

wlnch should have affected Awdal and Togdheer equally.

At the very least, the large variation m the scale of the

voting in these two regions reinforces the need for voter

registration.

The political parties

The mling party UDUB repeated its successes in the

district and parliamentary elections by galning the largest

number of votes, retuming 33 MPs, with Kulmiye second

with 28 and UCID third with 21 (see table 2). UDUB is

therefore the largest party fri parliament, but with the

opposition having 49 seats it does not command an

overall majority. This makes Somaliland the only place in

Africa where parliament is not controlled by the

government.

Ali three parties saw their vote increase (see table 3),

but the proportion of the popular vote for each party

changed (see chart 2). In terms of the popular vote, UCID

has been the main gainer fri the parliamentary elections,

increasing its overall vote by 103,118, compared to an

increase of 55,854 for UDUB and 22,813 for Kulmiye.

This is a significant development for UCID wfflch came a

poor third in the district elechons.32 Its growing

Table 2: Parliamentary election resutts

Party

Total votes

% of vote

100

Parliamentary

seats

UDUB

261,449

Kulmiye 228,328

UCID

180,551

Total

670,328

Source: NEC, 2005.

Further steps to dcmocracv

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6: Analysis of the election resuits

Tabte 3: Votes for

parties

by region

in the presidential and parliamentary elections

UDUB 2003

79,328

43,347

17,554

38,105

23,359

3,715

187

205,595

UDUB 2005

81,552

74,691

21,793

39,529

34,727

9,157

261,449

Kulmiye 2003

81,585

16,607

10,271

63,506

27,830

5,524

192

205,515

Kulmiye 2005

95,881

26,837

12,355

47,639

36,652

8,964

228,328

UCID 2003

47,951

5,976

2,712

13,453

6,749

463

129

77,433

UCID 2005

75,796

31,498

18,331

34,583

17,907

2,436

180,55 1

W/Galbeed

Awdal

Saaxil

Togdheer

Sanaag

Sool

National Level

Sotirce:

NEC,

2005.

Chart 2: Party share of the

vote in

presidential

and parliamentary elections

Party representation

in parliament

UDUB hoids the largest number of seats in parliament,

but by a small margin of only five seats over Kulmiye. In

contrast a combined opposition can command a sizeable

majority of 16 seats over UDUB (see table 4). This has

removed the moflopoly that UDUB has held over

Somalilafid’s political institutions since

the

district

elections and means that parliament can, If it chooses,

hold the executive to account.

As political parties were not represented in par]iament

prior to these elections, it is difficult to link changes hi

dan representation in the parties and in parliament. The

results, however, do point to a bedrock of support for

UDUB from the Habr Yunis and Gadabursi, for Kulmiye

from the Habr Jeclo’ and Habr Awal (mostly Sacad Muse)

and for UCID from the Habr Yunis (see table 5).

•

Kulmiye

•

Presidential

Parliamentary

election

2005

election 2003

importance is apparent from the fact that it won

parliamentary seats in ali regions and beat Kulmiye into

third place in Saaxil. One of the reasons for the increase

in UCID’s popularity has been a shift in support to them

from UDUB by the Habr Yunis dan. Another is that

candidates who were unable to get onto UDUWs list

chose to join UCID instead.

In terms of the popular vote, Kulmiye appears to have

lost ground in the parliamentary elections, with UCID

making marginally more gains from Kulmiye than

UDUB. While Kulmiye gained support in Woqooyi

Galbeed, it appears to have lost support to the other

parties in Saaxil, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool regions. In

Togdheer its support declined by over 15,000 votes, whule

UCID’s increased by over 21,000 votes. The comparative

decilne in the popular vote for Kulmiye probably reflects

the strength of the Habf Yunis dan which increased its

number of parliamentary seats (see below). However,

Kulmiye holds a majority of parliamentary seats from

Togdheer,

and

perhaps more importantly has

the

majority from Woqooyi Galbeed, includmg

the

capital.

Compared to the presidential elections UDUB lost

some support in

the

parliamentary elections in Woqooyi

Galbeed

and

Togdheer, but gained in Awdal. The largest

single increase in the regional vote for a party was for

UDUB in Awdal, where it received 31,344 more votes

than m the presidential election.

The

importance of this

high vote in Awdal vote is clear, given that UDUB won a

majority of seats in only Awdal and Sool (see table 4).

Winners and losers

As noted, although multi-party democracy in Somaliland

was intended to move Somaliland away from clan-based

politics, the influence of dan politics on the elections

remains apparent. The parliamentary elections did flot

produce any dramatic changes m popular support for the

parties, but the dan composition of the parliament has

changed (see table 6). The adoption of a majontarian

voting system has produced winners and losers.

The most obvious change is that Isaaq representation

in parliament has increased by nine seats to 57, whule the

representafion of the Haiti and

‘ininorities’

has fallen.

The increase in Samaroon (Gadabursi) representation

from 11 to 13 seats was predictable given the regional

distribution of seats agreed by parliament for this

election.

The biggest losers have been

the

Haiti (Dhulbahunte

and Warsengeli) people of Sool and eastem Sanaag

regiofis whose representation in parliament has fallen

from 14 to 10 members. The attitudes of the Haiti

towards the election have been mixed. Some parficipated

in the election, while others rejected it. The results which

leave parlament dominated by

the

Dir (lsaaq and

Samaroon) will only increase their sense of

marginalisation within Somaliland.

Further steps to democracy

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6: Analysis of the election resuits

Tabte 4: Seats won

the politicat

parties by region

UDUB

Kulmiye

UCID

Total Ali Parties

Hargeisa

Awdal

Saaxii

Togdheer

Sanaag

Sool

Total Seats

Sotirce: NEC, 2005.

Tabte 5 Distribution of seats by dan and party

UDUB

Xuimiye

UCID

Total Seats

Sacad Muse

Ciise Muse

Habr Yums

Ciidagale

HabrJelco’

Arab

Ayb

Gadabursi

Cuse

Warsengeli

Dhulbahunte

Hawiye-Fiqishini

Total Seats

Sottrce: interviews, Hargeisa 2005.

Tabte 6 Change in dan family composition in parliament

Cian families

Old parliament

Isaaq

Samaroon

Ciise

Dhulbahunte

Warsengeli

Hawiye/Fiqishini

Minorities

Source: interviews, Hargeisa 2005.

New parlament

The Cilse have also seen thek seats reduced from five

to one, but largely as a result of five Ciise candidates

withdrawing from the election a week before polling day.

The

‘minorities’, who gained representation in

Somaliland’s second parliament, have lost ali

bar

one of

their seats in the legisiature.

Within

the

majority lsaaq dan family,

the

three largest

dans have ali seen an increase in their number of seats.

Together, the Habr Awal (Sacad Muse and Ciise Muse),

Garhajis (Habr Yunis and Ciidagale) and Habr Jecio’ hold

51 seats. On the other

hand, the

smaller Isaaq dans have

both seen a reduction in their number of seats: Arab

(five), Ayub (one).

Within the Isaaq

the

most significant change has been

an increase in the representation for the Habr Yunis in

parliament (up from seven to 17 seats); together with the

two

Ciidagale seats the Garhajis have over 20 per cent of

the seats in parliament. They have representation from

across Somaiiland, with the exception of Awdal region,

and are potentiaily the singie largest ‘dan block’ of votes

in parliament. Even m Hargeisa three Habr Yunis

candidates were elected, which is surprising given that

they are more populous in Togdheer. The shift in Habr

Yunis allegiance to UCID has made it mto a serious

third

party. In 1994 the perception by the Habr Yunis that they

were under-represented in parliament was one of

the

further steps to democracy

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6: Analysis of the election resuits

Table 7: A profile

of parliament

Parliamentanans

Age

30/40 years

40/50

50/60

60/70

Gender

Professional

backgrounds

Old

parliament

82 men

Ex-security services

Administrator

Business person

Carpenter

Teacher

Banker

Politicïan

Lawyer

Econornist

Civil engineer

Agronomist

Mechamc

Driver

New parlïament

80 men; Z women

Ex-security services

Business person

Nurse

Teacher

Pohtician

Lawyer

Economist

Civil engineer

Diaspora

Vet

Journalist

Graduate

grievances behind the civil war in Somaliland. The

equitable representation between the three major Isaaq

dans should mihgate cian-based ructions in Somaliland.

Otlier changes are apparent at the level of sub-clans,

with some of the larger lineages

and

politically stronger

lineages losing ground to smailer lineages. This is partly

due to the larger lineage fielding too many candidates.33

The impact of these changes, if any, will only become

apparent over time.

The

new parliamentarians

Only 18 parliamentarians stood for re-election, of which

14 were re-elected.

The

elections have therefore brought

a wholesale change m the members of parlament, as well

as party and dan representation.

In general the new MPs are younger than in the old

parliament, with 56 under the age of 50 and 12 under the

age of 40, and only one over

the

age of 60. This compares

to only live under

the

age of 40, and 16 over the age of

60 in the old parliament. But, given that many of the old

parliamentarians became MPs in 1993, the average age of

the current intake is probably similar to that of 12 years

previously.

In terms of professional background there are slightly

fewer MPs in the new parliament who were former

members of the

security

services, or former politicians,

and slightly more professionals and civil society actors.

There are also more new members from the diaspora.

Women had everything to gain from the

partiamentary elections: with no elected women in any

previous Somali parliament, the presence of even one

would be progress. In

the

end

two

of the seven women

that stood in the elections gained seats. One was elected

as a Kulmiye candidate in Awdal, and the other, from

eastern Sanaag, got in on a reserved seat. The lack of

wider success has been a

difficult

lesson for those

advocating for women’s participation in polifics. It has

convinced them that while the dan system remams so

infiuential women will flot get elected to parliament.

They have concluded that it

will

be better to advocate for

a quota system, which has given women in Puntland and

Somalia a larger representation in their parliaments. In

tlieir assessment of the elections civil society groups

stated:

[ml

a cian-based society strugglirig to transform

itself into a multi-party democracy a quota for

women is

the

only solution to advance

the

partidpation of women who essenilally

contributed to peace building and economic

reconstruction and rehabilitafion of this country.’

Further steps to

demouracy

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7: Beyond the elections

The

road to a popularly and

directly

elected government

in Somaliland

has

been long and difficult. Since

unilaterally declanng independence from Somalia m

1991, the people have been thiough

civil

war, they have

lost the main market for the key livestock trade, they

have had to cope with the reintegration of huge numbers

of refugees

and

displaced people, and they have had to

rebuild their tattered infrastmcture. Whule the lack of

international recognition

and

limited support for

reconstruction has been detrimental in many ways, it has

given people a certain freedom to aaft a model of

government suitable to tlieir needs. This has combined

indigenous forms of social and political organisation

famously described as a pastorat democracy within a

liberal democratic ftamework. Furthermore, given the

minimalist role that government plays in people’s affairs,

the Somaliland state is flot something that has been

imposed from above, but is rooted in popular

consciousness. Whule Somaliland’s independence is

contested extemally and intemally, for the majority of

the people the desire to be treated separately from

Somalia is very real. The staging of district, presidential

and parliamentary elections was an expression of

the

people’s desire and ability to manage their own affairs.

The

parliamentary election was a critical event in the

transition to democratic government in Somaliland. But

it is not the end of the process, and Somaliland faces

many challenges in putting democracy into practice.

—

minefields of post-war politics and state-building. There

are many sources of legitimacy and authority in societies

and although the authority of the

Guurti

is not based on

a popular vote it is no less legitlinate for that.

There is a general consensus among

the

parfies,

the

NEC and the public that the

Guurti

should

remain a

nominated body.

And

the

country

cannot afford another

election.

The

Guurti

can be a place where imbalances in

political representation as a result of elechons can be

restored,

with

seats being made available for

minority

dans and possibly even women. Meanwhule, following the

2005 elections, the Guurti

will

certamly have an important

role to play in assisting the new parliament to settie in.

functional parlia ment

A measure of Somaliland’s democracy will be the way in

which Somaliland’s elected institutions functfon and are

utilised by the parties and the public.

The

first few

months of the new parliament are likely to be a

turbulent time, as its members and the parties negotiate

their relationship with each other and with the

executive. Somaliland will be the only country in Afnca

where parliament is not controlled by the government.

The maj ority of the

MPs

will be new, and while many of

them will be better educated than their predecessors,

they will lack experience and be unfamiliar with the

functions of parliament. Achieving political consensus

has been the cornerstone of stability

fri

Somaliland, to

the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been

made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition

are likely to form an alliance and challenge the

government on a number of fronts.

The opposition agenda for parliament includes:36

• Revoking the emergency laws.

• A review of the constitution, to curb the powers of the

executive, to review the size of parliament, and to

review the restrictions on polifical parties.

This

might

include a proposal to aeate a post of prime minister.

• Impeach the president. Mthough openly discussed in

the elections, opposition party leaders have cooled this

fervour. There may be a push for early presidential

elections, although this is likely to be rejected on

grounds of cost.

• Measures to reduce the size of the cabinet from 50 to

between 12 or 1$ ministers. It is likely that the

parlament will exercise its powers to reject cabinet

appointrnents

and

may push for the removal of

certain unpopular ministers.

• Measures to increase fiscal accountability and

transparency in the executive, through greater control

and oversight over the national budget, a review of

The

house of

elders

First, there is

the

matter of the upper house of elders (the

Guurti). This remains an unelected legislative institution.

Its mandate is due to expire in 2006

and

a decision will

need to be made on whether it should become an elected

chamber or remain an appointed one. As people in

Somaliland experiment with democratic multi-party

politics, they will be challenged to maintain and

incorporate the positive attributes of a pastoral

democracy consensus budding, mediation, arbitration

within the system of government, while minimising its

negative influences. The

Guurti

provides a mechanism for

this. Although

the

chamber has been criticised for

becoming too insfitutionalised and reliant on

government to be able to

act

the

objective mediator

fri

Somaliland’s national politics, it remains a unique

institution that has been at

the

heart of cian-based power

sharing and consensual politics in Somaliland, linldng

modern political institufions to

the

traditional political

organisation and, by extension, inter-communal politics

to national politics. The public recognises the role that it

played in mobilising the population in

the

war against

Siyad Barre and in shepherding Somaliland through the

—

further stcps to democracy

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7: Beyond the elections

foreign investment contracts, a review of fishing

concessions, a review of the management of Berbera

port, and the establisliment of a commission to tackle

corruption.

Measures to open up and stimulate the economy,

inciuding plans for the leasing of Berbera port.

A review of the media law.

An open debate on Somaliland’s relationship with

Somalia, and the status of the contested eastern

regions.

A review of the security sector budget, with the alm of

cuffing it and putting more resources into social

services.

Voter registration and census, which is seen as

essential flot only for holdmg elections but as pait of

the state-building process (by defining and counting

one’s citizens).

A review of electoral law, to consolidate and iron out

contradictions in the existing legislation.

Strengthen local government laws for the

decentralisafion of government.

A review of the role of the

Guurti,

and its

appointment.

Renewal of the mand ate of the NEC, whicli has

another year on its mandate.

opportunity to get their message across to the public.

This will make it much harder for the parties to enforce

disdpline.

The parties’ links with and control over members

elected in their name to the district councils has been

tenuous. The regional stmctures that existed disappeared

once the parliamentary elechon campaign started. In the

presidential election the parties operated as united

poliucal forces, with funding and campaigning

centralised. A major constraint facing the parties has

been resources. In the parliamentary election they

received only a limited amount of public funding from

the governnient for core salary costs, and were reliant on

the patronage of dan and businesses. The leaders of the

parties did not themselves stand in the election, and they

are likely to find it difficult to enforce adlierence among

their MPs to the party or its policies. For the candidates

the parties were a legal mechanism for entering

parliament. The sitting MPs may seek to reform the

parties, by insisting that they become members of the

parhes’ executive committees. Some may decide to join

other parties. One of the few forms of leverage that the

parties have over their MPs is for the party to refuse to re

nominate a candidate who does flot follow the party line.

The parties will also be under pressure from women

and civil society organisafions to review their policy on

women candidates, and ensure that changes are made to

their structures, poliUes and political agendas that will

affirm the participation of women and minorities in

politics.

A debate continues in Somaliland on the validity of a

three party system in a plural democracy. Some argue

that the restricted system is a sensible solution to dan

based politics, to prevent social cleavages or parties

becoming a reflection of the dan. Offiers argue that the

restriction on the number of parfies is a direct

contradiction of the right to free association. The

constitution also effectively gives the parties eternal life.

While the parties are unlikely to pusli for a change, there

is likely to be popular pressure to review the restriction

and allow for an increased number of parties or a

mechanism that would enable the de-selection of a party

that fails to deliver.

•

The opening of the new parliament on 28 November did

flot set a good precedent. The task of electing a new

speaker and deputy speakers for the new parliament

resulted in scuffies within parliament, and a

postponement of the next session for several days. The

crisis was resolved by the

Guurti

who mediated between

the parties; the opposition’s candidates were duly elected

as the speaker and hs two deputies.

The practice of government

Having committed itseif to an elected government, the

government needs to demonstrate its respect for civil

liberties, human rights standards and the rule of law that

are expected in a democratic society. Since 2002,

Somaliland’s reputation for this has been called into

question by some high proffie legal cases, creeping

corruption, and an increasmg investment in internal

security.37 Immediately after the elechons, the

government demonstrated agam its intolerance of

anyone that it does flot agree with, by deciaring the

European Union delegate to Somaliland

persona non grata.

Such arbitrary action will not win Somaliland foreign

friends.

Civil

society

Another challenge will be how the relationship between

civil society groups, the political parties and government

develops. Civil groups in Somaliland are acfively

organising on issues of gender representation, human

rights and social service provision. Although parliament

includes several MPs who were formerly active in civil

society, it remains to be seen whether it proves to be

more amenable to extemal advocacy or will actively seek

opinion from civil society groups.

The political parties

The new parliament will be an important test for the

system of multi-party politics. The parties are weak

insfitutions that, to date, have showri little life outside

the elecfion campaigns. They appear as vehicles for their

leaders, their internal constitutions are weak, and there is

little democracy practised within them. Dunng the

campaign the parties did flot bring their candidates

together to formulate policy and they missed the

Democratisation and state-building

In 1999, President Egal argued that democratisation

would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland.

However, while the parties campaigned on a pro-

further steps to democracy

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‘

7: Beyond the elections

mdependence platform and many voters themselves saw

voting as a patriotic act, these elections were not put on

for external purposes. Tliey were about changing the

internat balance of power. Nevertheless, the

parliamentary election was also another step in building

an independent state and it has implicafions for the

status of Somaliland and its relationship with Somalia.

The parliamentary election serves to reinforce the

contrast between Somaliland’s elected administration

and the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia,

which is struggling to sustain a sembiance of

parliamentary consensus. Reactions by people in Somalia

to the parliamentary election in Somaliland were mixed.

Somaffiand received messages of support from southem

civil society groups atter the election and in November

2005 the prime minister of the TFG, Mohamed Geedi,

made the extraordinary statement, in an interview with

the BBC, that ‘if the international community recognises

Somahiand then we will have nothing against that’.

However, the statement caused a furore, with the prime

minister accused of treason,3’

and

was rescinded.

Having staged three elections, the commitment of

the

Somaliland people and

the

political elite to a democratic

form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored.

To do so would make a mockery of the West’s

commitment to support democracy. As one

parliamentary candidate remarked:

Something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to

kiil

100

people to be recognised by the

international community as a ‘player’. But you do

flot get any recognition if several thousand people

vote for you here.4°

A lack of support for democrafic Somaliland would flot

go unnoticed in neiglibouring countries. And to ignore

what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country

would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to

countries m the region and the Middle

East.

The international community has, to date, shown its

support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding

the elections. And fotlowing the etections, Somaliland

received messages of congratulafions from several

countries and international bodies. These mclude the

Arab League, whose representative visited Hargeisa in

October 2005, and the US government which issued a

press release from the State Department that made

favourable reference to the poii. The United Nations

through the Secretary General’s Special Representative for

Somalia, Ambassador Fraiicoise Lonseny fall,

commended people in Somaliland for the progress tliey

have made towards security and democracy. But words

alone will be insufficient.

The

institutions in place to

sustain a democratic system in Somailland need

assistance: these inciude the NEC, partiament, the

judiciary, and the government itseif. It will also be

important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of

democracy by investment in the country’s infrastructure

and services.

In the Somali National Peace Conference in Mbgathi,

the strategy of regional and international mediators was

to ‘park’ the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the

stability in that region. The message from Somaliland’s

leadership is that the international community should of

course support a resolution to

the

crisis ni the south, but

in a way that does flot hold Somaliland hostage to

developments there. Moves by the African Union earlier

in 2005 to investigate Somaliland’s claim for

independence indicate that other African govemments

are flot averse to giving

this

serious consideration. In the

meantime, the message from the elections is that people

in Somaliland are gelting on with building a state

and

hope that the international community will accept

and

support them in this.

further steps to democracy

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Condusion

Conciusion

Somaliland has been engaged since 1991 on a joumey to

build systems of legifimate and accountable govemance

with some form of social contract with civil society. Lack

of international recognition has given Somalilanders the

opportunity to build their own system. Their hfstory of

confflct resolution has involved a boftom-up approach to

building societies from local communities upwards,

gradually widening the arena of political agreement and

political consensus.

The government signed the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, saw peace restored, demobilised former

combatants, brought social and economic rehabilitation,

and oversaw the draffing of a consbtution based on

universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi-partyism.

More recently Somaliland has been in transition, seeking

to move from traditional institutions of dan govemance

to western-style governance structures. The

future

is by

no means determined, but despite some setbacks the road

to democracy has at Jeast been mapped out although

there are some concems over cormption, commitment to

human rights standards, fair representation for women

and minorities, and indeed how Somaliland is

responding to the war on terrorism.

These latest elections were, yet again, carried out

peacefully in contrast with the situation in some of

Somaliland’s neighbouring territories. It is apparent that

the process in Somaliland has had exemplary if

unintended consequences in Mogadishu and Puntland,

and may be a useful lesson for the region’s people ni

pushing for a voice in their govemance.

Despite some major problems of resources, time and

organisation, the NEC (lielped by their extremely

hardworking consultants) ran a good election.

The

diaspora also played a visible role in this election and

contributed extensive experience of the democratisation

process. However, there were some problems. As with the

2002 elections, transparency was rated more highly than

secrecy of the ballot. Problems related to a lack of census

and registration process; a laigely illiterate population

and very complicated ballot papers with symbols for ali

candidates; governing party use of money, vehicles, fliel,

and airtime; aftempted multiple voting; and above ali,

the very unequal representation of women.

Nevertheless, the conduct of the eiection demonstiates

the commitment of Somalilanders to expressing their

democratic wishes.

The

question flow anses: how much

does Somaliland have to change to come to terms with

its

own

democratisation process? following the

referendum of 2001, local elechons of 2002, presidenfial

eledilons of 2003

and

flow

the

parliamentary elechons of

2005, many are still assessing how these democratic gains

and intentions are worldng out against the background

—

of dan, patriarchal and business interests (and indeed

some tensions emanating from political lslam).

ni a sense ffiis is a wider story about how

the mix

of a

traditional (and therefore understood) structure and a

liberal democratic one changes, and at what speed,

and

about wlio controls and wants to control the process.

The

mix of dan system and autocracy means

the

government’s authority is weak and dependent on its

management of dan relations and the patronage of

Somaliland’s big businessmen.

Given that this was the fkst parliamentary election in

36 years (and the first time women have been

demoaatically elected to a Somali parliament),

Somaffiand has some claim to be making a llttle progress

on representation of women. But can a patriarchal dan

system, with the strengths and weaknesses that that

provides, flow listen and respond to the voice of women,

and recognise flot only the rightness of

the

case but also

the

economic power that they wield? The idea of set

quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament is being

increasingly vociferously raised.

Now that the formal building blocks of democracy are

in place, how do the people of Somaliland ensure that

their voice is organised, represented

and

responded to?

Civil society outside dan stmctures is busy orgaflising

itseif in terms of gender representation, provision of

social services, tracking budgets, human rights practice.

How will political parties and government respond to

stronger and better organised civil society? How do they

see coalition-building, internal discipline, holding the

executive to adcount? Do we yet see signs of

differentiations between

the

parties, thek intemal

dynamics as well as programmes and policies? What

steps need to be taken to ensure an nidependent and

trained judiciary? How will the government deal with the

economically powerful diaspora and its links to

uncontrolled urbanisation? How will the donors react?

Economic development is often said to be the key,

given that currently the dan is the support system and

that the government has not shown itseif capable of

providing support for society. Until that situation

changes, is a move away from dan lines possible? Can

civic education enable voters to pick their

own

candidates/leaders witliout sticking to dan lines?

Some of the key actors are begmning to move the

hybrid form along to reflect more clearly

the

developmg

Somaliland women’s groups, civil society, urban youth,

some of the business sector. How the more traditional

elements exemplified perhaps by the

ruling

party

UDUB and a number of dan leaders read to such

movement will ni reality shape the Somaliland post

eledion path.

—

further steps to dernocracv

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Appendix

Appendix:

Media coverage of the election

ChR retained the services of a respected local journalist,

Adam Musse Jibril, to monitor elechon coverage by pnnt,

radio and television media in Somaliland. As lie noted,

‘One of the key elements for realising peaceful, free and

fair elections depends on

the

neutral, impartial and

positive role of the local media, both state-nin

and

private.’

Echoing the code of conduct signed by the three

political paffies Articie 26 of which affirms that the

political paffies shall have equal access to the state

owned media during the election campaign, and

prohibits abuse of state resources by any party a media

code of conduct was signed by local media

representatives. The document provided a legal and

moral basis for monitoring media fairness, its impartiality

and objectivity.

The media monitor assumed ifis role with the official

nationwide launch of campaigning on 30 August, and

continued unfil 27 September,

two

days before the

electïons. Inciuded in the monitoring were:

• The Mandeeq media group comprising: the Somali

Daily

News,

an English language daily paper;

Horn of

Africa,

an English language weekly paper; and

Al-qami

Ifriiqi, an Arabic language weekly paper.

• The Jumhuuriya media group comprising:

Jumhuuriya,

a Somati language daily paper; and

The Repubtican,

English language weekly paper.

• The Haatuf media group comprising:

Haatuf,

a Somali

language daily paper;

Somaliland Times,

an English

language weekly paper; and

Al-HaatufAl-arabi,

Arabic language weekly paper.

• Somaliland National TV (SNTV) which is a

government-nin

institution,

broadcasting mainly in

Somali.

• Hargeisa Radio which broadcasts pnmanly b Somali

with additional proglarnmes in English, Arabic and

Amliaric. Programming is confined to news and

commentary, reflecting government viewpoints.

• Somaliland TV (SLW), a private-sector enterprise, and

according to the media monitor, a more professional

and efficiently nin organisation than its state-owned

competitor.

• The BBC Somali service.

—

Early

media coverage

the

pre-elecfion period the momtor noted that

the

three political parties, UCID, UDUB

and

Kulmiye, started

campaigning vigorously, utilising extensive resources. For

example, one UDUB candidate was said to have

mobilised 80 buses and tmcks in

the

early days of the

campaign. After three days, it became clear that the

parties would lie unable to sustain this momentum and

cross-party agreement was reached that activity would be

scaled down.

Early media coverage seemed balanced, inciuding

coverage from state media. The monitor noted that

Abdilahi Geel-jire of Kulmiye phoned Somaliland

National TV to thank them for their unbiased coverage of

his

party’s public rally on the second day of the

campaign coverage described as in line with

the

media

code of conduct. At the same time, Omar Abdi fidin, a

member of the executive commiftee of UCID party, said

it was a good beginning ‘the government-mn media

has given larger space to the opposition than was

expected’. Not ali agreed that there was complete

neutrality, but the general feeting fin

the

words of the

monitor) was that in the first three days of campaigning,

‘all stakeholders have shown reasonable levels of

tolerance, broadmindedness and patience’.

—

The broadcast media

Thereafter, however, the picture changed, with

SNTV in

particular adopting a far more pro-government stance.

The monitor’s assessment

was

that

‘SNTV

flot only tilted

towards UDUB but became a forum for government

propaganda for campaigning’. He instances that in the

programme ‘Candidate’s Forum’ (Masraxa Murashaxa),

Abdulqadir Ismail Jirdde of UDUB

was

given 55 minutes

airtime compared to Sheikh Abdulaziz Samaale of

Kulmiye, who received 13 minutes. fifteen minutes had

been nominally allocated by the NEC for each party

candidate.

On 13 September,

SN1V

devoted the entire evening

programme to UDUB. As a result, the Elecfion

Monitoring Board (EMB) issued a strong statement on the

following day, wambig ministers (without mentioning

them by name) to stop ‘provocations’ and warning

the

SNTV

authorifies to desist from violating

the

code of

conduct. However the same programme was broadcast in

the same way the following evening and a furtlier

waming produced an ‘intemperate reaction’ from the

director of SNW. The

NEC

responded with an official

letter to the director, copied to

the

Somaliland president

and the three chairs of the political parties, stating that

It must be noted that the influence of ali forms of

national media, including the

two

television stations, is

confined mainly to Hargeisa.

further steps to democracy

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Appendix

the director of

SNTV

was flot abiding by the code of

conduct. This did result ifl some improvement.

SLW

aie

thought to favour

the

opposition and

Kulmiye in particular, but their coverage was markedly

more neutral,

‘giving

space to the ruling party’.

Radio Hargeisa did hold to the code of conduct and

give each political party some airtime, but this was flot

entirely equal. This was particularly the case in the

programme ‘Be acquainted with your candidate’ (Baro

Murshaxaaga) in which candidates from different

regions, parties and dan affihfations were interviewed. On

13 September in a manner strongly reminiscent of

SN1V

coverage Abdulqadir Ismail Jirdde of UDUB was

given 46 minutes airtime, while Sheikh Abdulaziz

Samaale of Kulmiye was allowed only 13 minutes, Iess

than the required 15 minutes. Another case in point was

that on 16 September, Ms Ikran Haji Daud, a Kulmiye

candidate, got only 12 minutes airtime, whereas Ms

Hodan Abdi Husein of UDUB got 21 minutes.

the

opinion of the monitor, the BBC Somali service

offered notably fair and impartial coverage. He notes that

‘as a result the BBC Somali section has acquired a furtlier

excellent reputation amongst Somalilanders’.

—

General comments

There was a general faliure to give equal broadcast

airtime or equitabie print coverage to ali parties,

reflecfing the fact that different media organisafions owe

their allegiance to different political camps.

The

Jumhuuriya and Haatuf media groups and Somaliland 1V

tended to favour the opposition, whufe the state-owned

media, such as the Mandeeq media group and

Somaliland National TV generally leaned towards the

‘government party’.

The media code of conduct, though signed by ali

parties, was flot fully respected. However, it created legal

and moral grounds for dealing with those who attempted

to avoid fuffilling their agreed obligations, thus reducing

tensions and contributing to a dilmate of relative

tolerance.

The

local media in general played a positive

influence that was reflected in the public’s enthusiastic

attitude towards the elections, and the high tum-out.

However, media coverage of women’s participation was

‘at

the

minimum scale’ despite each female candidate

being interviewed by Radio Hargeisa and Somaliland 1V.

Boffi

SNTV

and

SLTV

publidsed a debate on women’s

rights, organised by local NGO

the East

African Human

Rights Initiative, and funded by

the

Africa Educational

Trust.

Newspapers

Both Jumhuuriya and ffaatuf are private newspapers

inclined towards the opposition and

critical

of the

government, but ‘playing a positive role in the democratic

process’. Their coverage of the UDUB campaign was

reasonable, although critical of the government’s partisan

role in the campaign,

and

also of the use of national

resources in support of the ruling party.

Recommendations

Local media staif are under-trained and most lack higlier

education. further educational and professional training

and guidance on acceptable practice are needed to

achieve and maintain imparfiality and fairness. In

particular, the independent private media organisations

need capacity building assistance.

The new parliamentarians will also need training in

order to raise their legal

and

political consciousness

that they are aware of

the

importance to the

democrafisation process of a free and impartial media.

further steps to democracy

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Notes

The September 2005 elections were to the house of representatives. The

upper house of padiament

—

the house of elders or Guurti— is flot at present

17 This final figure approved by the Supreme Court was an increase on the

margin of 80 votes originally announced by the NEC.

18 Abokor, A, et al (2003)

‘Very

much a Somaliland-mn election’: A

report of

the Somaliland

Iocal elections of December2002,

ChR, London.

19 Several European donor governments and the US government provided

matching funds for the district elections and the presidential elections, and

the European Commission supported the district and padiamentary elections.

20 Since 1991. 20 new districts and one new region (Saaxll) have been created

by the government in Somaliland due to patronage pohitics. Many of them

have flot been fonnahly accepted by parhiament.

21 The elections were postponed in 2003 when MPs from Gadabursi walked

out when they calculated that the regional distribution of seats would leave

them with fewer seats to contest than they currently enjoyed.

22 At the last minute five Issa candidates from Zaylac area withdrew from the

elections when they were refused a quota of seats in padiament.

23 Ifl addition to financing the costs of the NEC and technical support to it,

donors funded the training of election staif. voter education through local

NGOs, and the traifling of political parties.

24 WSP International’s support for the Somahiland elections is part of a

democratisation project for the whohe of Somahia.

25 Interviews, Hargeisa and Gabiley, September and October 2005.

26 Interviews, Hargeisa and Gabihey, September and October 2005.

27 UCID 3, UDUB 2, Kulmiye 2.

International

E(ection Observation team interim report on the Somaliland

eledions to the House of Representatives 29 September2005 (see note 5).

29 The constitution ahlows for a period before the final confirmation during

which partiet can raise objections.

30 See Bradbury, M, Abokor, A, and Yusuf, H (2003) ‘Somahiland: Choosing

pohitics over violence’ in

Review ofAfrican Politica! Economy

No.97:455478,

ROAPE Pubhications Ltd. 2003.

31 Bradburyet ah (2003).

32 Bradbury et al (2003).

33 Ihere is some evidence that the honger lineages

flaandheere),

often

considered the more powerful hineages, may have host out to the shorter

hineages (Iaangaab) due to the former fielding too many candidates.

34 NEGAAD Umbrella et al (18 October 2005) ‘A joint appeal of civil society

groups towards improving the pohitical position of women in Somahiland’,

Hargeisa.

35 For an exposition of this refer to the classic monograph by Lewi5, 1(1961) A

pastoral democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the northem

Somali of the Horn ofAfrica,

Oxford University Press, London.

an elected body (see chapter 7 for more on the Guurt,).

Advocates of political change in Djibouti have been dosely following

developments in Somaliland believing that

provides a model for Dibouti

(interview, Ltargeisa, October 2005).

lqbal Jhazbhay, South Afncan election observer.

ChR was known in certain countries (induding Somahiland) as International

Cooperation for Development (ICD). From January 2006 ChR has adopted

the working name Progressio.

International Election

Observation team interim report on the Somaliland

eledions to

the House of Representatives 29 September2005, issued 7

October 2005, available at www.progressio.org.uk. The findings and

recommendations of the interim report have been incorporated in this final

report

Somalihand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 2002) Ilse case for

Somaliland’s international recognition as

an independentstate,

Somaliland

Government, Hargeisa.

The five regions had been de5ignated districts under the Somaliland

piDtectorate.

For more in-depth histories of Somaliland see; Bradbury, M (1997) Somaliland

country report, ChR, London; WSP-International (2005) Rebuilding

Somahland: Issues and possibillties, Red Sea Press, Hargeisa/Lawrenceville, Ni.

The Somahiland Ministly of Planning estimates the population to be three

million, giving a population density of 22 people per square kilometre. See

Ministry of National Planning and Coordination Somaliland

fri

figures

2004,

Hargeisa. The voter turn-aut in the distnct elections suggest the population

may be nearer to 1.7-1.8 million in the areas that voted.

10 UNDP (2001) Somalia Human Development Report,

2001,

United Nations

Development Programme, Nairobi.

11 Some 33 dan peace conferences took place in Somaliland between February

1991 and 1996.

12 See Bradbury (1997) for a description of the Borama conference.

13 See WSP International (2005) for a description of this system.

14 Puntiand State of Somahia was created in 1998 asa non-secessionist state in

north-east Somalia and is based on a confederation of Harti dans that

include the Dhulbahunte and Warsengeh people in eastern Somahiland.

Puntiand consequently daims sovereignty over eastern Sanaag and Sool

regions of Somaliland. The Transitional National Government of Somalia

chaimed sovereignty over the whole of Somahia including Somaliland.

15 While it is not disputed that the great majority of the public endorsed the

constitution,

the administration’s claim that 1.18 million people voted and

97.9% approved the constitution is highly questionable, given the limited

voting that took place in Sool and eastern Sanaag regions and in light of the

smaller turn-outs in the various subsequent elections.

16 For a description of the district and presidential elections see Bradbury, M.

Abokor, A, and Yusuf, H (2003) ‘Somahiand: Choosing pohitics over violence’

ifl

Review ofAftican Poli&aI

36 Interviews, Hargeisa, October 2005.

37 African Rights (May 2003) Somaliland: Shadows of the past as human rights

deteriorate, Discussion paper no ii, Hargeisa.

38 NEGAAD Umbrehha et al (18 October 2005) ‘A joint appeal of civil society

groups towards improving the pohitical position of women in Somahiland’.

Hargeisa.

39 Abdi Ismaeh Samatar (2005 November) Somali prima

minister: An

act of

betrayal, venality, and

incompetence!

University of Minnesota.

40 Interview, October 2005.

Economy No.97:455-478, ROAPE Publications

Ltd, 2003; and International Crisis Group Uuly 2003) Somaliland:

Democratisation and

itt

discontents,

Africa Report No 66, NairobifBmssels.