Udenrigsudvalget 2016-17
URU Alm.del Bilag 265
Offentligt
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REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
JAMHUURIYADDA SOMALILAND
WASAARADA ARRIMAHA DIBEDDA
& ISKAASHIGA CAALAMIGA AH
441ll 4»1t L.)hJt 4Jt &)t»
Legal Case
Legal Case, Sustainability, and Contributions
Legal Case for Sovereignty
Somaffiand claim of sovereignty and 23 ycars’ pracuce of independence suffer from lack of proper
information, pervasive misunderstanding, and anxiety of opening up a Pandora’s Box. Considering objectively
Somaliland’s case for sovereignty and diplomatic recognition dispels these problems.
> Somaliland’s claim for independence is based pdmarily on historical tide:
o As a British Protectorate,
it
had a colonial history different from that of the former ftahan
colony of Somalia;
o It attained independence from Britain in 1960 before
it
voluntarily entered into the failed
union with Somalia;
o The universal referendum of the Somaffiand citizens affirmed by an overwhelming majority
(over 97%) Somaliland’s decision to reclaim its independence.
> Britain granted and recogrnzed the mdependence of Sornaliland m 1960 before Somaliland opted as a
sovereign nation for unification with Somalia—Somaliland like other countries (Egypt and Syria,
Senegal and Mali, Senegal and Gambia for instance) should be allowed to opt out of the failed union
Somaliland’s independence restores the colonial borders of the former British Protectorate of
Somaliland and therefore does not violate the OAU Charter or the Consuhative Act of the African
Union principle that ftrmer colornal borders should be maintained upon independence.
The validity of the 1960 Act of Union was decply flawed;
o In June 1960, representatives from Somaliland and Somalia each signed different Acts of
Union agreeing to different terms of umfication,
o The official Act of Union was passed retrospectively in January 1961 by the new National
Assembly in which Somalia was overrepresented,
o In the referendum of the new Constitution of the Somali State held in June 1961, the
Somaffiand population did flot vote due to discontent with its intent, method, and
management. Only less than
l7%
turned out and an overwheln-iing majodty of them voted
against the so-called Act of Union.
The unification of Somaffiand and Somaha failed to meet domestic or international legal standards
for treaty formation; the Act of Union fails short of the Vienna Convention’s legal requirements for a
valid international treaty.
> Somaliland meets the cdteria for statehood as set by the 1993 Montevideo Convention, generally
considered a norm of customary international law:
o A permanent population1
Somaliland has a population of approximately 3.5 million of nomadic, agradan, and commercial sectors.
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o A defined territory2
o Effective Government3.
o Capacity to enter relations with other States4
The
population of Somaffiand suffered chromc inequity and injustice during the union with Somalia;
opposition by discontented
military officers
to
the
union that started
in
1961, less
than
a
year
after
the
union, gathered mass support m the 1970s
and
led to armed opposition
fri
the 1980s.
The indiscriminate bombardment of the
mifitary
regime on population centers and the genocide that
followed
fri
1988 resulted
fri
the 18
May
1991 reciamaflon of independence and affirmation of the
right for seif-determination
Sustainability and Contribution to Peace
Granted that history and legal
case
alone do not confer sovereignty, Somaliland is sustainable economicaily,
politicafly, and if necessary militarily. Somaffiand has large oil, coal, and mineral deposits which thus far
remain unexploited.
While
the international community deployed massive material and human tesources on
Somalia since 1991 with little success in bringing peace and political order, Somaliland has during
this
period
restored peace, democratic seif-govemance, and thriving economy in its territory. It also contributes to
regional and international weilbeing by:
> Living in peaceful co-existence with its neighbors and hosts a significant flow of economic or
political
refuges;
Plays a critical role in regional security and provides a center of relative calm at one of the world’s
most troubled and
threatencd
regions;
Because of its democratic seif-governance, its government enjoys legitimacy and peaceful transifion
of power;
> By national commitment and practice, it entrenches democracy in the Horn of Africa, offering
inspiration and example for a region known for military
tyranny and
violence;
> Afthough non-recognition prevents other states and international organizations from providing
necessary
military
assistance, Somaffiand effectively controls with its navy and armed fofces pdvacy,
terrorism, people and arms trafflcking, financial crirnes, and other crimes,
Its population and government takes senously the principle of co-existence with others and carry out
in spirit
as well as letter with agreements
they
enter with other states, companies, and individuals,
Somaliland’s bottom-up and indigenous method of conflict resolution can offer a missing solution to
Somalia’s problems
Acknowledged Rights of Somaliland
The
Treaties
in
the
late 1 9’
century
established the territory of Somaliland Protectorate, Britain granted independence
in 1960 to
the
population of
this
territory, confirming its borders.
Somaliland has a central and legitimate government which exercises effective control over
the
majorit ofits territoiy.
It has held internationally recognized free and fair elections, most recently in June 2010, and has effecdvc government
instimtions including a constituflon approved by a popular vote, a democratically elected President, national parliament,
and an independent
judiciary
2
Despitc its unrecognizcd statcs, Somaliland has entercd into informal and formal rclationships with a number of other
states, including Ethiopia,
the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Kenya,
and
Djibouti.
It also
has achieved
de facto
recognition from a number of other nations in the world.
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Tbere is a
growing
body of expert opinion baciting greater international recognition of Somaliland and
changes to the status quo of non-recognition. For mstance,
> In 2003, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs issued a legal opinion affirming “it is
undemable that Somaffiand does indeed qualify for statehood, and it is incumbent on the
international community to recognize
it.”
In 2005, the African Union fact-flnding mission to Somaliland reported that Somaffiand is a unique
one which should be judged “from an objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-i-vis the
aspirafion of the people.” The mission recommended that the African Union should “find a special
method for dealing with Somaliland” and confirmed that Somaliland’s status was “not linked to the
notion of opening a Pandora’s Box” in Africa
> In 2006, the International Crisis Group Report stated “The African Union’s chalienge is to provide
timely, neutral leadership in order to ensure a just, peaceful and enduring settiement [for Somaffiand
and Somaliaj before confrontadon and violence becomes the only option imaginable for botli
parties.” The International Crisis Group recommended that at least Somaliland should be given an
AU Observer “interim status analogous to the observer status is has granted 31 non-African
states or
the status of the Palestinian Authority at the UN.
> In 2008, the African Union sent a follow-up fact-finding mission to Somahiand and found a
similar
widespread conviction arnong Somalilanders of their country’s “irreversible” mdependence and
outright rejection of the notion of union with Somalia.” It added: “For Africa, Somaliland’s
recognition should flot threaten a ‘Pandora’s box’ of secessionist govemance” and that “recogmtlc)n
[of Somaliland], far from being source of insecurity, can bc a source of enhanced state capacity.
Cost of Continued Neglect
The people of Somaliland waited patiently for over 23 years for African countries and generally the
international commumty to diplomatically recognize Somaliland as a sovereign
state by
history, legal grounds,
and rcciprocal intcrest. The people and their government shall continue to do ali they can to attain their
legitimate rights by peaceful means, as they have done for nearly a quarter of a century. But there is a national,
regional, and international cost of continued neglect of Somaliland’s rights of self-determination and
construcfive role in the region. Diplomatic recognition allows Somailland to:
Obtain direct aid and loans to build on its successes; lack of diplomatic recognition leaves it starved
c)f international assistance, cooperatlon, and investment
Participate in the international forums as a legitimate member; lack of participation freezes
it
as a
state with de fact but flot de jure state
> Allows one successful model of Afncan conflict resolution and democratic seif-governance to thrive;
denying recognition longer snuffs it in the hud;
> Contribute peace and co-existence in the region; continued non-recognition not only diminislies this
contribution but also threatens the very existence of peaceful and democratic Somaffiand.
Given these facts, can the people of Somahland accept in equanimity the international commurtity’s justice
and goodwill?
When the so-called Government of Somalia that does flot control its capital city even with the heip
of foreign peacekeeping forces enjoys diplomatic recognition, giving its officials unlirnited access to
the benefits of recognition,
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While Somaffiand that effectively controls its territory, successftilly practiccs democracy, and
contributes regional peace is kept diplomatically unrecognized and denied participation in the African
Union and other organizations.
Lastly, is
it
flot a tragic or laughable irony when:
> the President of Somalia—locked
ni
his palace ni Mogadishu, protected by foreign peacekeeping
forces—claims to the world, with neither modesty nor shame, that he alone is the sovereign of
Somaliland that on its own restored peace, controls its terntory, and has governed itseif
democradcally for over 23 years?
Stil, since 2012 the Somaliland Government continues to engage in peaceful dialogue with Somalia’s
representatives to settie the question of sovereignty ni the hope of turning a new chapter of co-existence,
mutual respect, and collaboration.
We shall see if Somalia’s Government controffing only a sliver of its colonially defmed territory has
the will and wisdom to give up the wish to keep “hostage” the people of Somaliland. The wish finds
support neither legally nor obectively but by the diplomatic recognition conferred to it yet denied to
Somaliland.
> The Somaliland Government works patiently until the international community sorts out the
facts of
history and on the ground from thefidion conveniently exploited against its existence and interest.
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