URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

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DANISH

FOREIGN POLICY

YEARBOOK

2017

EDITED BY KRISTIAN FISCHER AND HANS MOURITZEN

DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017 URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH

FOREIGN POLICY

YEARBOOK

2017

Edited by Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen

DIIS

Danish Institute for International Studies 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00

E-mail: [email protected]

Web: www.diis.dk

Editors: Kristian Fischer ([email protected]) and Hans Mouritzen ([email protected])

Editorial Advisory Board

Clive Archer, Manchester Metropolitan University

Hans Branner, retired

Eric Einhorn, University of Massachusetts

Dan Hamilton, Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

Christine Ingebritsen, University of Washington, Seattle

Tonny Brems Knudsen, University of Aarhus

Henrik Larsen, University of Copenhagen

Sverre Lodgaard, Norwegian Institute of International Afairs

Ove Kai Pedersen, Copenhagen Business School

Sten Rynning, University of Southern Denmark

Helle Rytkønen, Danish Institute for Study Abroad

Bengt Sundelius, University of Uppsala

Ben Tonra, University College Dublin

Linguistic Consultant: Robert Parkin

Graphic design: Mark Gry Christiansen

Printed in Denmark by Gullanders Bogtrykkeri a-s

ISBN (print): 978-87-7605-870-8

ISBN (pdf ): 978-87-7605-871-5

ISSN: 1397-2480

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered from www.diis.dk

he full text of this book can also be found electronically in EBSCO Publishing’s

databases.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Contents

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Preface · 5

Chapter 1: Articles · 7

Abstracts in English and Danish · 7

he International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy in 2016 · 11

Anders Samuelsen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

Denmark in a rapidly changing security environment · 23

Claus Hjort Frederiksen, Minister of Defence

Europe through a crystal ball · 31

Per Stig Møller

Nationalists, National Liberals and Cosmopolitans:

Danish Foreign Policy Debates after Brexit and Trump · 51

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen

he Greenland Card: Prospects for and Barriers

to Danish Arctic Diplomacy in Washington · 75

Anders Henriksen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen

Refugee policy as ‘negative nation branding’:

the case of Denmark and the Nordics · 99

homas Gammeltoft-Hansen

Chapter 2: Selected Documents · 127

Chapter 3: Danish Foreign Policy in Figures · 165

Chapter 4: Opinion Polls · 169

Chapter 5: Selected Bibliography · 185

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Preface

PREFACE

Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook

addresses Danish foreign policy both region-

ally and globally. Apart from the articles by Denmark’s foreign and defence

ministers, this volume includes four academic articles, whose authors repre-

sent only themselves and their expertise (for details of each author, see the

respective articles).

In his article, dr. phil. Per Stig Møller argues that Europe is going down-

wards in the current demographic cycle. Trade routes run parallel with

demography, and in the future they will be moving to the east and south of

Europe. Geostrategically, Europe is experiencing problems with a revanchist

Russia, a highly volatile, possibly Islamist Middle East, and an Africa from

which there will be signiicant growth in emigration to Europe. Not to men-

tion that the EU has problems of its own.

he election of Donald Trump and Brexit both constitute radical breaks

for the ways in which Denmark’s action space is perceived. According to

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the result is three conlicting views of foreign

policy, held respectively by nationalists, national liberals and cosmopolitans.

he national liberal perspective currently dominates debates and policy, but

since it is inding it diicult to formulate new policies, it might have prob-

lems in sustaining itself in the long run.

he term ‘Greenland card’ refers to Denmark’s use of Greenland to

improve its foreign policy position in Washington. Anders Henriksen and

Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen discuss the barriers that inhibit Danish Arctic

diplomacy, including too narrow a focus on contributing to American-led

operations in the Middle East, mistrust between Denmark and Greenland,

and the taboo that surrounds the Greenland Card itself.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

According to homas Gammeltoft-Hansen, the Danish government is

aiming to make asylum and protection conditions in Denmark as unattrac-

tive as possible, thereby indirectly pushing asylum-seekers towards other

countries. Such ‘negative nation branding’ may be an efective strategy in

reducing the numbers of asylum-seekers, but it is likely to create negative

externalities by, for instance, making the country vulnerable to similar policy

developments in neighbouring states, thus reducing the deterrent efect over

time.

hese articles are abstracted in both English and Danish at the outset of

chapter one. After the articles follows a selection of oicial documents that

are considered to be characteristic of Danish foreign policy during 2016.

his is supplemented by essential statistics and by some of the most relevant

polls on the attitudes of the Danes to key foreign policy questions. Finally,

a bibliography provides a limited selection of scholarly books, articles and

chapters published in English in 2016 in the ield covered by the yearbook.

Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook

has been edited by director Kristian Fischer

and dr. scient. pol. Hans Mouritzen.

he editors,

DIIS, Copenhagen

June 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Chapter 1

Articles

Abstracts in English and Danish

Europe through a Crystal Ball

Per Stig Møller

his essay describes the problems facing Europe and the EU by looking back

in history, and also by looking ahead. Its argument is that demography and

world trade have a vital inluence on which civilisations and nations that will

succeed and which will fail. Demography has been described as the great

cycle of history, and Europe is on the way down in this cycle. Trade routes

run parallel with demography and have been to the western hemisphere’s

advantage for ive hundred years. However, there is every indication that

trade routes will move east and south of Europe. Geo-strategically, Europe

has problems with a revanchist Russia, a highly volatile, possibly Islamist

Middle East, and an Africa from which there will be an explosive growth in

emigration to Europe. Furthermore, the EU has problems of its own. Can

our democracies deal with these challenges that face us all?

Essayet beskriver de problemer, Europa og EU står overfor ved at se både bagud

og frem. Dets tese er, at demograien og verdenshandelens veje har en afgørende

indlydelse på, hvilke civilisationer og nationer der går op, og hvilke der går ned.

Demograien beskrives som “historiens store hjul”, og i dette hjul er Europa på

vej ned. Handelsruterne løber parallelt med demograien og har i 500 år været

til den vestlige halvkugles fordel, men alt tyder på, at de i fremtiden bevæger sig

øst og syd om Europa. Geostrategisk har Europa problemer med et revanchistisk

Rusland, et brandfarligt muligvis islamistisk Mellemøsten og et Afrika, hvorfra

en eksplosivt voksende emigration til Europa vil inde sted. Dertil kommer, at

EU står i egne problemer. Kan vore demokratier håndtere alle disse udfordringer,

der ligger foran os?

CHAPTER 1 · ARTICLES

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Nationalists, National Liberals and Cosmopolitans:

Danish Foreign Policy Debates After Brexit and Trump

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen

Danish foreign policy is no longer deined by the activism that set the agen-

da for the post-Cold War years. he election of Donald Trump and Brexit

constitute radical breaks for the ways in which Denmark’s action space is per-

ceived. he result is three conlicting views of foreign policy held by nation-

alists, national liberals and cosmopolitans. For the nationalists the main task

is to defend the integrity of the Danish people against a perceived onslaught

from Islam. he national liberals, by contrast, share a government-to-gov-

ernment perspective, whereas for the cosmopolitans international relations

are irst and foremost relations between individuals in ways that transcend

borders. he article describes the ideas that underpin these views and ex-

plains how they approach the notion of “disruption” in foreign policy in dif-

ferent ways. he national liberal perspective currently dominates debates and

policy, but since this position has diiculties in formulating new policies, it

might have problems in sustaining itself in the long run.

Dansk udenrigspolitik er ikke længere deineret af aktivismen. Efter valget af Do-

nald Trump og Brexit opfattes Danmarks internationale handlerum anderledes.

Aktivisme er således erstattet af tre modstridende synspunkter på udenrigspolitik,

fremført af henholdsvis nationalister, nationalliberale og kosmopolitter. Det nati-

onalistiske perspektiv på dansk udenrigspolitik tager udgangspunkt i synspunktet,

at den vigtigste opgave er at forsvare det danske folk mod, hvad der opfattes som

stormløbet fra islam. De nationalliberale ser derimod udenrigspolitik som en

relation mellem regeringer. For kosmopolitter er internationale relationer først

og fremmest forholdet mellem individer på tværs af nationale grænser. Artiklen

analyserer de ideer, der ligger til grund for disse synspunkter og forklarer, hvordan

de opfatter begrebet “disruption” i udenrigspolitikken på forskellige måder. Det

nationalliberale perspektiv er i øjeblikket dominerende i debatter og politik, men

denne position har vanskeligt ved at formulere nye politikker og dermed ved at

opretholde sig selv i det lange løb.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

The Greenland Card: The Prospects for and Barriers to

Danish Arctic Diplomacy in Washington

Anders Henriksen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen

his article examines how Denmark might use Greenland to inluence the

policies of the United States, based on interviews with Danish, Greenlan-

dic, and American civil servants, politicians, and experts. Greenland is still

important to the United States, but not as important as during the Cold

War. hus, the value of the Greenland Card is fairly limited. However, if the

US-Russia relationship deteriorates, its value is likely to increase. Greenland

and the Arctic therefore constitute an important policy area, which Den-

mark could use to diversify its relationship with the United States. However,

several barriers inhibit Danish Arctic diplomacy, including a too narrow fo-

cus on contributions to American led operations in the Middle East, mis-

trust between Denmark and Greenland and the taboo that surrounds the

Greenland Card. he article inally makes recommendations as to how these

barriers might be reduced.

Denne artikel ser nærmere på Grønlands betydning for Danmarks påvirknings-

muligheder i forhold til USA, baseret på interviews med danske, grønlandske og

amerikanske embedsmænd, politikere og eksperter. Grønland spiller fortsat en

vigtig rolle for USA, men ikke så stor som under den Kolde Krig. Grønlandskor-

tets værdi er derfor i øjeblikket relativt begrænset. Hvis det amerikansk-russiske

forhold imidlertid forværres, vil værdien af kortet atter øges. Grønland og Arktis

udgør derfor et vigtigt område, der med fordel kan opprioriteres for derved at

få lere strenge at spille på i forholdet til USA. En række barrierer vanskeliggør

dog dansk Arktisdiplomati, herunder et for snævert fokus på deltagelse i ameri-

kansk-ledede stabiliseringsoperationer i Mellemøsten, en udpræget mistillid mel-

lem Danmark og Grønland internt i Rigsfællesskabet og det tabu, der omgiver

Grønlandskortet. Artiklen slutter med anbefalinger til, hvordan disse barrierer

kan mindskes.

CHAPTER 1 · ARTICLES

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Refugee policy as ‘negative nation branding’:

the case of Denmark and the Nordics

homas Gammeltoft-Hansen

Once a liberal frontrunner, Denmark today maintains a self-declared hard-

line approach to refugees. In contrast to other deterrence measures blocking

access to asylum per se, the bulk of Denmark’s restrictions on asylum-seeking

aim to make asylum and protection conditions in Denmark as unattractive

as possible, thereby indirectly pushing asylum-seekers towards other coun-

tries. his article conceptualizes such indirect deterrence policies in Europe

as a form of “negative nation branding”. In order to achieve the deterrent ef-

fect of these policies, states are, on the one hand, prompted to advertise new

restrictions actively both in public discourse and through targeted campaigns

towards migrants and refugees. On the other hand, this kind of branding is

likely to prompt critical responses among wider audiences both internation-

ally and domestically. Contrary to the majority of existing scholarship, the

Danish case suggests that, at least under some circumstances, indirect deter-

rence may be an efective strategy in reducing the numbers of asylum-seekers

arriving in a country. At the same time, however, indirect deterrence is likely

to create a number of negative externalities, and the beggar-thy-neighbour

dynamics upon which these policies are premised make individual countries

vulnerable to similar policy developments in neighbouring states, thus re-

ducing, or even reversing, the deterrent efect over time.

Danmark, engang et liberalt foregangsland, har foretaget en gradvis, men mar-

kant kovending i lygtninge- og udlændingepolitikken. Modsat de “hårde” kon-

trolmekanismer, der i dag gennemføres langs EU’s ydre grænser, har de mange

danske stramninger de seneste år primært fokuseret på at få de danske asyl- og

beskyttelsesforhold til at fremstå så uattraktive som muligt i håb om at få poten-

tielle asylansøgere til at styre udenom Danmark. Artiklen begrebsliggør sådanne

indirekte afskrækkelsespolitikker i Europa som en form for “negativ nation bran-

ding”. For at opnå den ønskede efekt forsøger stater som Danmark i stigende

grad at promovere den hårde linje i ofentligheden og gennem målrettede kam-

pagner rettet til migrant- og lygtningegrupper. Samtidig skaber denne form for

branding grobund for stærke reaktioner både internationalt og i den nationale

debat. Modsat hovedparten af den eksisterende forskning peger den danske case

på, at sådanne tiltag godt kan reducere antallet af asylansøgere, et land modtager.

Omvendt har denne form for politik en række indirekte omkostninger, og af-

skrækkelsesefekten risikerer at blive udhulet over tid, hvis omkringliggende lande

gennemfører tilsvarende tiltag.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

The International Situation

and Danish Foreign Policy

in 2016

Anders Samuelsen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

2016, the year of disruption

In 2016, the shock came from within. We were disrupted. Anti-globalisation

and anti-establishment movements surged. he world saw a very vocal oppo-

sition to otherwise widely supported concepts, such as international trade.

he contours had been visible for a while, but in 2016 it came together in

what sometimes felt like a challenge to international cooperation. At the

same time, heinous terrorist attacks made us feel unsafe and insecure. And

many felt a profound concern that the large numbers of refugees and mi-

grants seeking a future in our countries would challenge our welfare systems

and the cohesion of our societies.

he United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. he very Un-

ion which has been the framework for peaceful European co-existence and

growth for 60 years. And in the United States, Donald Trump was elected

president on promises of substantial changes, also in the foreign policy of the

United States. he message of “America irst” resounded around the world as

an omen of a new world order where American leadership and engagement

might take a diferent shape. Similar movements were seen elsewhere chal-

lenging the classic political parties and questioning whether globalisation

would in fact bring peace and prosperity or whether it was something that

should be stopped or avoided.

In the middle of all this, crisis continued in Europe’s neighbourhood and

beyond. While 2016 saw good progress in the ight against Da’esh on the

ground in Syria and Iraq, the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria deepened.

Russia’s entry on the battleield along with long-standing Iranian support

strengthened the regime and seemed to cast even longer shadows on the

prospects for a long-term political solution. Russia continued to be a diicult

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

neighbour with little, if any, progress in the eforts to ind a political solu-

tion in Ukraine and adverse engagement in the wider Middle East region.

Conlict also continued in Libya and Yemen where eforts towards inding

a sustainable political solution seemed to go nowhere. Also the situation in

Afghanistan remained challenged by a fragile security situation and econom-

ic and humanitarian diiculties. Combined with general instability, poverty

and a lack of possibilities in the region and in Africa, large streams of mi-

grants continued to seek a future in Europe.

Denmark must be ready to face the challenges of this diicult interna-

tional setting and welcome its opportunities. Change will come. It will bring

surprises and it will come fast. In 2016, Ambassador Taksøe-Jensen present-

ed his strategic review of Denmark’s foreign and security policy, which point-

ed towards a more interested-based, integrated and focused approach. he

Danish Government also prepared a new strategy for Denmark’s policy and

humanitarian action based on Agenda 2030 and the 17 Sustainable Devel-

opment Goals, which was approved by a broad parliamentary majority in

early 2017. As a follow-up on the strategic review, the Danish Government

will launch a foreign and security policy strategy in 2017. he strategy will be

the irst ever comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy for Denmark.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

A challenged European Union and a

challenged European security order

he result of the referendum in the United Kingdom where the British pop-

ulation voted to leave the European Union came as a surprise – even a shock

– to most in Europe and abroad. Cooperation within the European Union

has created a huge internal market and unprecedented close cooperation and

integration. It has brought peace and prosperity for years or even decades.

For the irst time, a country wanted to leave the Union. Brexit has not only

presented us with a set of diicult questions in relation to the up-coming

“divorce” and the future relations between the EU and the UK – which due

to history, geography and a common outlook on many issues must continue

to be close – but also presented us with a fundamental set of questions about

who we are as members of the European Union and what the European Un-

ion should be in the future. he 60th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty will

be an important opportunity for stock-taking and strategic outlook. And

European cooperation is still very much part of the answer to current chal-

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

lenges. he European countries are not able to solve the migration crisis on

their own. Nor are they able to combat terrorism efectively or negotiate free

trade agreements with some of the world’s biggest economies. In a globalised

world in the midst of the fourth industrialisation wave, the European countries

will only prosper and succeed if we tackle the cross-border issues in concert.

Meanwhile, the European Union continues to seek solutions to the many

issues confronting Europe. We have come a long way since 2015. More than

1 million irregular migrants and asylum seekers

came to Europe. Despite the

substantial decrease in 2016, the challenge of irregular migration continues

to be a matter of the utmost urgency, since the numbers remain far too

high. As a consequence of the EU-Turkey agreement and the closure of the

Western Balkan route, we saw a signiicant decrease in the number of arrivals

along the Eastern Mediterranean route. In the same period, however, irreg-

ular migrants increasingly arrived along the Central Mediterranean route

via primarily Libya. he migration trends in 2016 demonstrated the need

for decisive action through a comprehensive approach. We must secure the

external borders of the EU and look at ways to destroy the business model

of human smugglers. At the same time, we must address the root causes of

migration, in particular poverty, lack of opportunities and rights, population

growth and conlict, while also helping countries of transit to improve mi-

gration management and the protection of migrants.

In 2016, Europe saw and adapted to a

challenging European security order

where external and internal threats were closely interlinked and where threats

to our security played out in diferent arenas and with a somewhat diferent

set of actors than before. 2016 saw heinous

terrorist attacks

in several Euro-

pean cities. Many of the attacks were executed by so-called lone wolves and

conducted with low-technological means, such as trucks. And many were

fuelled by the extremist ideology and brand of Da’esh, which has brought

renewed energy to an ideology that inspires extremists from Afghanistan in

the East to the Sahel region in the West, as well as in Europe. In the previ-

ous years, a signiicant number of Danes and Europeans had left to join the

so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria, thus joining a ight against everything

that Europe stands for. With social media as an arena for propaganda and

radicalisation, the ideology can spread the idea of the caliphate even when

Da’esh is defeated physically on the ground. Military eforts cannot stand

alone against today’s terrorists and are not suicient to destroy the ideology

or address the broader factors behind the rise of terrorism. In light of this, a

comprehensive approach with broad support is needed in order to prevent

the next Da’esh from emerging.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Likewise, the assertive behaviour of Russia prompted a renewed focus on

defence and security cooperation. Within

NATO,

there was an agreement to

further enhance the Alliance’s deterrence, including a decision to deploy an

enhanced forward presence consisting of four battalions in Poland and the

three Baltic States. In an efort to jointly address the tense security situation,

NATO and the EU agreed to enhance their cooperation with a particular

focus on countering hybrid and cyber threats. NATO member countries also

agreed to enhance its focus on its southern borders to support global eforts

to curb terrorism and illegal migration. Denmark supported these eforts

and plans to contribute to NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Estonia

in the British framework with up to 200 soldiers. To further bolster NATO’s

deterrence proile, Denmark will be contributing substantially to NATO’s

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and its Standing Maritime Force in

2017 and 2018.

he increased focus on security was also relected in the

EU’s Global Strat-

egy,

which was launched in June 2016 and focused on the EU’s possibilities

for contributing to the security of European citizens. In a sense, it is natural

that the changing security environment has led to an increased ambition to

reine and make better use of the EU’s security and defense tool box. he

European Commission has also suggested a new European Defence Action

Plan which seeks to establish better conditions for European defence indus-

try. Among the initiatives suggested are mechanisms for Member States to

join forces in the development of defence capabilities which the Member

States do not have the resources to develop on their own. Since the majority

of the EU Member States are also NATO members, such developments will

beneit NATO, since Member States will be able to acquire military equip-

ment at lower cost. Operationally, the EU and NATO have also intensiied

their cooperation during 2016. Based on the joint declaration between the

EU and NATO from the NATO Warsaw summit in the summer of 2016,

the EU and NATO have agreed to take forward practical cooperation in 42

diferent areas. Both NATO and the EU play important roles when it comes

to ensuring the security, safety and defence of Europe against an increasingly

complex landscape of threats, including hybrid warfare, cyber threats, irregu-

lar migration, terrorism and radicalisation. In line with the defence opt-out,

Denmark will not participate in the EU initiatives which serve a military

purpose, but we support an increased defence capacity in Europe, increased

EU-NATO cooperation and a continued strong EU engagement in civilian

crisis management.

he new security environment emerged against very strong signals from

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

the

United States,

declaring that Europe will have to take more responsibility

for European security. It was therefore no surprise that security once again

made it to the front pages in Europe and prompted many countries to con-

sider their response to the security issue. Reactions led to increased focus on

defence spending, eforts to better combine soft and hard power as well as

internal and external actors and instruments. In Denmark, the Danish Gov-

ernment will among other things deal with the new security environment

by pushing for a substantial increase in Denmark’s defence spending in the

upcoming negotiations on a new Danish Defence Agreement.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

Our neighbourhood – deep crisis and

serious consequences for Europe

he conlict in

Syria

is the most serious and complex challenge in recent

times with a simultaneous ight against an oppressive regime and a violent

group of extremists, Da’esh. Denmark has been a signiicant member of the

Global Coalition against Da’esh since its very outset, contributing to all ive

lines of efort. In terms of military deployment, Denmark has deployed a

number of capacities ranging from ighter jets, special operation forces, a

mobile surveillance radar as well as capacity building personnel. Based on

population size, Denmark is one of the largest troop contributors to the

Global Coalition.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria strengthened the regime and

changed the dynamic of the conlict. Many state and non-state regional ac-

tors were also engaged in the conlict, testifying to a complicated web of

alliances, interests and governmental and non-governmental actors in the re-

gion, which has brought the conlict to an unprecedented level of complexity

with international eforts under the auspices of the UN struggling to keep

up. he conlict has caused vast streams of

refugees.

Many refugees headed

towards Europe, but most stayed in the neighbouring countries placing an

already fragile region under immense pressure with the risks of increasing

social, cultural, political and economic tensions between refugees and local

communities. he countries in the region, e.g. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan,

shouldered a great responsibility for the many refugees as did Iraq while also

itself afected by internal conlict and displacement. On this background,

Denmark continued to support the humanitarian eforts in the region with

the highest contribution up to now.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

With the political and institutional crisis in

Libya

and the very dii-

cult security environment, Libya has become the main gateway for grow-

ing numbers of irregular migrants and refugees making their way to Europe

across the Central Mediterranean. Simultaneously, the EU will have to ad-

dress the on-going migration challenge, while actively supporting eforts to

ind a long-term political solution under the auspices of the UN, which can

pave the way for the development of a stable and prosperous Libya. Crisis

continued in Yemen with a severe deterioration of the humanitarian situa-

tion and no tangible progress in the UN-led negotiations. On the

Middle

East Peace Process,

the international community sought to reairm the basic

principles of the two-state solution in the UN Security Council resolution

2234 adopted in the very last days of 2016.

Turkey,

a country of high strategic importance to Europe on a number

of issues, including the ight against Da’esh, also became an essential partner

in the handling of the migration crisis. Internally, a coup d’état was averted

in July 2016. Surprise and shock reverberated in Turkey and beyond over

an attempted military coup in an aspiring EU Member State. here is no

question that perpetrators should be brought to justice, but the aftermath

also caused great concern. he widespread view that the authorities’ reactions

had become disproportionate and in disregard for legal principles of fair trial

and rule of law led to concerns about whether the circumstances were being

used as a pretext to further tighten the space for political freedom, freedom

of the press, civil society, and the voices of the opposition. he many terrorist

attacks aggravated the tense and strained situation.

illegal annexation of Crimea

by Russia as well as Russian aggression

and backing of separatists in Eastern Ukraine continued to challenge the

fundamental principles of self-determination and international law. De-

spite continued eforts of mediation made by France and Germany within

the Normandy-format and by the OSCE in the Trilateral Contact Group,

hardly any progress could be registered in the Minsk process for a solution

to the conlict in Ukraine. As a consequence, EU sanctions against Russia

remained in place. Meanwhile, the international community – in particular

the EU and its Member States – continued both to push for and to support

reforms in

Ukraine.

Denmark continued its strong support for Ukrainian

reform eforts both bilaterally and through the EU focusing on areas such as

anti-corruption, decentralisation, good governance, energy eiciency, civil

society and media. Good progress was achieved on two important issues in

relations between the EU and Ukraine – visa liberalisation and ratiication

of the EU/Ukraine association agreement – increasing the likelihood of both

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issues being inally settled. A stable, prosperous and democratic Ukraine is

in the interest of the Ukrainian people and the wider Europe and is also the

best response to Russian aggression.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

Opportunities, challenges and

international cooperation

Climate change creates new economic opportunities in the

Arctic,

including

possibilities for more eicient maritime transport routes and the extraction

of raw materials. But these new opportunities come with new challenges:

A need for strengthening our cooperation around Search and Rescue, step-

ping up environmental monitoring and sustainable regulation of isheries as

ish species move to the north and the Arctic Ocean opens for commercial

exploitation. A changing Arctic also implies new security challenges. he

ive Arctic coastal states strongly support the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008,

which remains an important tool for maintaining the Arctic as a low-ten-

sion region. At the same time, we have to monitor the developments in the

region closely, not least in relation to Russia, which – like the other Arctic

states – has increased its military presence in the Arctic in recent years, e.g. to

resolve a number of civil-related tasks related to increased economic activity.

he Arctic Council is and should remain the primary international forum

for Arctic issues. Since its establishment in 1996, the Arctic Council has

contributed signiicantly to maintaining the Arctic as a zone of cooperation.

he signiicant shift towards

Asia

in relative power distribution has been

a deining feature of international politics in recent decades. China is in-

creasingly involved in international afairs and during the past year increas-

ingly appeared as a great power that sets strong regional and global agendas.

Being a key beneiciary itself for four decades, China is positioning itself as

a leading proponent of the merits of globalisation and free trade to sustain

economic stability and growth, and a key actor to implement the UN 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate

change. Regionally, China is key to inding a way forward towards a denu-

clearised

Korean Peninsula.

his issue seems more pressing than ever after

a year in which the North Korean regime repeatedly violated the country’s

international obligations not to produce or test nuclear weapons. Regional

disputes related to both the

South and East China Seas

also call for peaceful

settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.

India

has re-

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

mained the fastest growing G20 economy and demonstrated its increasingly

important role in international politics and economy. It is widely believed

that China will be the worlds’ largest economy in 2025. In 2030, India is

expected to come in third after China and the United States.

Emerging economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa have achieved

greater economic and political weight and naturally seek increased inluence

on international cooperation and international values. Both political and

economic cooperation with these countries will become more important, as

will building alliances and engaging on joint values such as women’s equality

and free trade. It will provide challenges but also great opportunities for

those who know how to establish partnerships and make use of new open-

ings for cooperation. During the past year, Denmark’s active engagement

in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa increasingly combined

traditional diplomacy with innovative and dynamic concepts of broad gov-

ernment to government cooperation, including strategic sector cooperation

between government agencies, thereby creating “win-win-win scenarios” and

new synergies for Denmark in political, commercial and intercultural ields.

he development in

Africa

will continue to afect Europe. Substantial

population growth means that very large generations of young people are

now looking for jobs and empowerment. his means great opportunities for

expanding the African economy, but also entails challenges if they do not

have positive perspectives for the future. If the young are deprived of polit-

ical and economic inclusion, they risk putting already poor and challenged

countries under further stress and may choose to migrate towards Europe

in search of better opportunities. he African countries span prosperity and

progress as well as poverty and conlict. Parts of the continent are ridden by

poverty and challenged by poor governance, conlict and climate change.

he conlicts in Africa are increasingly regional and compounded by external

inluences. Eforts to help bring a more positive development to Africa must

continue. Denmark has focused its engagement in both the Horn of Africa

and the Sahel region focusing on democracy, human rights, good govern-

ance, development of the private sector as well as gender equality and stabili-

sation. In addition, Denmark supports the development of regional security

structures and cooperation. Leaving the challenges aside, it should also be

remembered that Africa represents an enormous untapped potential with a

growing middle class and high economic growth in a number of countries.

Returns are high for those who take on the risk of investing in the continent,

but Danish companies are lagging behind our neighbouring countries in

exploiting the African markets. Furthermore, many of the solutions – such

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as Mobilepay – which we now beneit from in Europe, are based on African

inventions. A former war-torn country like Rwanda is today taking the lead

on the continent in using drone technology to support health care delivery.

he imagination and entrepreneurship of the young in Africa should be un-

leashed, to enable them to create a better future for themselves, their families

and their countries.

Isolationist tendencies and anti-globalisation had an inluence on inter-

national cooperation, which nevertheless continued under the auspices of

the

and other international and regional organisations. Where 2015 saw

important international agreements such as the

Paris Agreement on Climate

Change,

the new consensus on the

UN’s Sustainable Development Goals,

and

the

Addis Ababa agreement

on inancing for development, 2016 oversaw the

irst important steps of implementation. hese agreements are strong testa-

ments to the continued relevance of multilateralism and international coop-

eration and give cause for optimism. But we cannot take the commitment to

multilateralism for granted. hrough determined collective eforts we must

strengthen and make the multilateral system more efective, including the

UN, by promoting and undertaking much needed reforms. We need a UN

system that is it to support countries in the realisation of the Sustainable

Development Goals through lexible, efective and eicient solutions.

he new Danish strategy for development policy and humanitarian

action is an important step, which will guide Denmark’s development en-

gagements the next ive years. With the Sustainable Development Goals as

the platform, Denmark will foster multi-stakeholder partnerships and use

development cooperation in new ways to catalyse inancing and expertise

for sustainable development. In 2017, we will furthermore launch an action

plan for Denmark’s follow-up to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals –

efectively placing Denmark in the forefront of the international eforts to

turn the 2030 vision into reality.

Recently,

free trade

and the broader question of economic globalisation

have become the target of much public attention. In 2016, otherwise hardly

noticed and complicated trade negotiations and their enigmatic abbrevia-

tions – CETA, TTIP and TPP – became household conversation topics.

Demonstrations and petitions against trade agreements with Canada and the

US were frequent sight in some EU cities. And in the US, the presidential

election campaign and President Trump’s subsequent decision to withdraw

the US from the Trans-Paciic trade agreement, TPP, has sparked fear that

we could be entering an era of increased protectionism and economic na-

tionalism.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

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Let us go back a moment and consider how free trade has changed the

world we live in today. Free trade has been a tireless engine of growth for the

economies which dared to open themselves to its opportunities. It has pulled

millions and millions of people across the globe out of poverty, brought

better jobs, and propelled technological advances throughout the world to

the beneit of ordinary people. We reap the beneits of free trade every single

day – whether we realise it or not. he EU’s single market is a great ex-

ample of how successfully free trade can unleash economic potential, spark

innovation, lower prices and add consumer choice. Free trade agreements

provide the same beneits. he EU has an ambitious trade agenda. If we are

successful, we will be able to shape the rules of tomorrow’s trade. If, on the

other hand, we choose to step back, others will write the rule book instead.

Others who may not hold the same vision for free and fair trade, workers’

rights, food safety or environmental protection as we do. he EU’s free trade

agreement with Canada, CETA, signed in October 2016, is a case in point.

Despite a very complicated approval process, this state-of-the-art agreement

will now beneit companies, consumers and workers alike.

It would have devastating consequences if the early signs of protection-

ism we saw in 2016 were to get a true foothold in Europe, the US or else-

where. If citizens were to be convinced – against all available evidence – that

building protectionist walls is more efective than tearing them down, we all

stand to lose. Protectionist policies may provide some leeting sense of relief

for those who may feel strained by globalisation, but in the longer term such

policies will only serve to hurt that very spirit of innovation and competitive-

ness that has created jobs, generated wealth and driven forward our societies

for decades. Let us not allow that to happen.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

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THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2016

Closing remarks – globalisation for all

So where does all this put us? On the one hand, we must listen to our citi-

zens and take their concerns seriously. Nothing is hardly ever black or white,

nor is globalisation. In my view, the beneits of globalisation outweigh the

negative consequences, but it is important to acknowledge that some have

experienced negative consequences. We, as politicians, must take this seri-

ously and help ind solutions for those who struggle – regardless of the cause.

As a small, open and advanced economy, the advancement of Danish

society, democracy and not least our economy has been closely linked with

the process of globalisation. And if we are ready to seize the opportunities,

while countering the challenges, globalisation will continue to present us

with enormous opportunities. Conversely, when the pillars of international

cooperation are questioned, we stand to lose.

Nationally as well as internationally, we must make use of the opportu-

nities for economic growth, education and spread of the ideas that globali-

sation represents, such as democracy and human rights. he perspectives

are stunning – from nice and practical things such as driverless cars to the

mind-boggling thoughts of where artiicial intelligence – much higher than

that of any single person – can bring us. To keep ahead of the curve, Den-

mark is appointing a technology Ambassador. Because one thing is for sure:

he future will come fast and we need to be ready. here are people seeking

to exploit the new opportunities for harmful purposes. We have already seen

how Da’esh has recruited and grown via social media and how democratic

elections have been challenged from afar. Much of the future will not be in

our hands, but we must get on board and ensure that globalisation will bring

a positive development to as many people as possible. For this to happen, we

need to get out of our comfort zone and disrupt in our thinking and habits.

It is in times of crisis and change that we ind out who we are. Denmark

is founded on liberal democratic values, human rights and a history of en-

gaging and trading with the world. We believe in a rule-based international

order where decisions are made around a negotiating table. We believe in

peace, freedom and free trade and we will continue to engage accordingly.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

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Denmark in a

rapidly changing

security environment

Claus Hjort Frederiksen, Minister of Defence

DENMARK IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

2016 was yet another year marked by complex threats and diicult security

challenges: Russia in the east, the continued ight against ISIL in the south,

terrorism and cyber warfare.

hese examples constitute elements of an increasingly uncertain and un-

predictable security environment. A setting, that continues to pose new and

demanding challenges and tasks, also for the Danish Defence.

Denmark is centrally placed in two important geo-political regions: he

Arctic and the Baltic Sea. Overall, the developments in those two regions,

combined with challenges from further aield during 2016, underline the

continued need for an active Danish proile end engagement in NATO’s col-

lective security measures, international operations and stabilisation eforts.

NATO remains the corner stone of Danish security policy

NATO remains the corner stone of Danish security policy. he Danish Gov-

ernment is committed to maintaining Denmark’s status as a core country in

the Alliance and to remain a reliable, responsible and active NATO Ally. It

is important that the new Trump-administration has reconirmed the signif-

icance of transatlantic relations and NATO.

In 2016, we accomplished the irst element of the pledge from Wales in

2014, namely to halt the decline in defence expenditure. Moreover, in 2016

there was an increase in Danish defence spending in comparison to previous

years.

Additionally, in 2016 the new Government announced that it intends

to increase defence spending substantially in the coming multi-year defence

agreement 2018-2022. Nationally, political negotiations will take place in

2017 with the aim of achieving this goal and contribute to the collective

security of the Alliance.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Looking ahead, we need to further strengthen and develop military capa-

bilities that are lexible and applicable to the full spectrum of tasks that our

armed forces may encounter. Moving forward, we also aim to reorient and

widen the scope of our defence policy to focus even stronger on collective

defence in a NATO framework.

Yet, spending is not just about money. It is also getting about getting

your money’s worth. herefore, we are constantly striving to keeping costs

low and reducing overheads.

In 2016, Denmark continued to contribute substantially to international

operations. In fact, more than 70% of Danish armed forces and capacities

can be deployed internationally.

he decision in 2016 to replace our ageing F-16 leet with F-35s will im-

prove our ability to protect Denmark and our interests. he purchase ensures

that Denmark, also in future, can uphold and enforce Danish sovereignty,

and remain a committed and able Ally.

In short, Denmark stands by our commitments, and we take action and

will continue to do so.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Security challenges from the east – Russia and the Security

in the Baltic Sea area

Russia’s actions have been of concern since the illegal annexation of Crimea

in the Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s aggressive behaviour along its western bor-

ders, the modernisation and build up of military forces in Western Russia,

snap exercises and deployment of advanced missile systems to Kaliningrad

in 2016, have further added to uncertainty and concern. Such behaviour in-

creases the risk of misperception or miscalculation that in turn may increase

the risk of dangerous incidents.

A stable, rule-based European security architecture and transparency in

the Baltic Sea region and elsewhere, is a core Danish interest. We will work

closely with our neighbours around the Baltic Sea and our allies in NATO

to address our security concerns in a well-coordinated and efective manner.

In response to Russia’s increasingly threatening behaviour, NATO mem-

ber states decided at the Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, to further bolster

the NATO assurance measures already in place by establishing a military

“enhanced Forward Presence” (eFP) in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-

ania.

he initiative serves as a means to enhance NATO’s deterrent and de-

fence posture on its north-eastern periphery.

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In essence, the eFP will establish a multinational battle group to be em-

ployed in each of the four countries, and will conduct training and exercises

together with national defence forces. Subject to parliamentary approval, the

Danish Government plans to deploy a fully mechanized company compris-

ing of up to 200 troops in support of the eFP in Estonia as part of the British

framework in 2018.

We also deliver robustly in other ways. In 2016, approximately 4,300

Danish troops participated in NATO exercises in Eastern Europe in support

of the Readiness Action Plan, and in 2017 more than 1,000 Danish troops

will be dedicated to the enhanced NATO Response Forces on very high

readiness (VJTF).

DENMARK IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Arctic

It is a priority for Denmark to maintain the dialogue and co-operation with

all countries, including Russia, on Arctic matters in respect of the Ilulissat

Declaration and to ensure the Arctic as a region of low tension. It is our

hope and expectation that Russia will continue its dialogue and collabora-

tion with the other Arctic countries especially within the framework of the

Arctic Council.

Arctic Report

In June 2016, the Danish Ministry of Defence presented a comprehensive

and detailed analysis of the future missions of the Ministry in the Arctic.

While the report details a number of risks that may result in greater political

and military tension, the overall conclusion of the report is that in all likeli-

hood, the future of the Arctic will be shaped by cooperation and competition

in rather than confrontation and conlict.

he Arctic missions of the Ministry of Defence include exercise of sover-

eignty, search and rescue operations, marine environmental protection, and

support to the civilian authorities. he analysis recommends that surveil-

lance, command, control and communications and operational units should

be strengthened.

Security challenges from the south

Looking southwards, 2016 was yet another year of active Danish participa-

tion in international operations and stabilisation eforts.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

ISIL

ISIL continued to systematically terrorise the Iraqi and Syrian populations

in 2016, and continues to pose a severe terror threat to the region as well

as to Europe. ISIL’s actions in the Middle East have caused massive lows of

refugees, some of whom embarked on a perilous journey towards Europe.

he ight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria remains one of the Government’s

top international priorities. Since 2014, Danish military units have been

deployed to the Middle East to help ight ISIL. In 2016, an F-16 ighter con-

tribution and a tactical air transport aircraft contribution operated in both

Iraq and Syria in support of the international coalition to counter ISIL. By

the end of 2016, Danish F-16s had been deployed for a total of 18 months

conducting more than 800 missions.

he Danish Defence continues to contribute substantially militarily to-

wards building Iraqi partner capacity with both regular and Special Forces,

in addition to the contribution of a mobile radar and staf oicers.

Besides the military contributions, Denmark is also contributing to the

ight against ISIL through civilian and stabilisation programs. Having a close

link between both the military and the civilian eforts is crucial to ensure the

best possible conditions for bringing about long-term stability.

Terrorism

For many years we have been confronted with a serious terrorist threat and

have therefore maintained a signiicant focus on countering terrorism. 2016

saw new horrible terror attacks in Berlin, Brussels, Nice and elsewhere illus-

trating the gruesome nature of the international terror.

he current serious terror threat is still to a large extent fuelled by the

conlict in Syria and Iraq. In a response to the terrorist threat, the counter

terror eforts and abilities of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service have

successfully been strengthened in recent years.

Stabilisation Programme: Syria and Iraq

he Danish Government launched a stabilisation programme in 2016 cover-

ing Syria and Iraq under the cross-government funding pool: he Peace and

Stabilisation Fund. Under this programme, the Danish Defence supports

UN’s Mine Action Services (UNMAS) in response to the threat of unexplod-

ed ordnances – an efort that is also supported with the capacity building

efort in Iraq.

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Other integrated regional programmes cover the Horn of Africa, Afghan-

istan-Pakistan and the Sahel-region using a broad range of diplomatic, secu-

rity and development aid related instruments.

DENMARK IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

EU’s Capacity building

Denmark supports the development of the EU’s Common Security and De-

fence Policy (CSDP) in complementarity to NATO while fully respecting

the Danish opt-out on the military aspects of the CSDP. Denmark further-

more supports the EU’s ability to eiciently perform comprehensive crisis

management and prevention abroad, especially in the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) region and in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is also in Denmark’s interest that the EU can assist member states

in building societal resilience and defence capacities to counter hybrid and

cyber attacks. Denmark therefore supports the joint NATO-EU declaration

signed in Warsaw on enhanced EU-NATO cooperation in this regard among

other areas.

Danish contributions to NATO’s responses to

threats from the south

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Alliance decided to do more to

counter the threats from the south, including by stepping up the engage-

ment to counter terrorism and eforts to project stability.

Denmark actively supports the implementation of such initiatives, in-

cluding the establishment of a new hub within the joint forces command in

Naples to deal with the security threats and challenges across the Alliance’s

southern perimeter.

Afghanistan – Resolute Support Mission

In Afghanistan, 2016 was a challenging year for the Afghan National De-

fence and Security Forces. Even so, the Afghan Forces stood their ground.

his was due to the training, assistance and advice of NATO’s Resolute Sup-

port Mission, including the Danish contribution to the mission that in 2016

rose from approximately 85 to 100 soldiers, all in Kabul.

In addition to the increased military contribution, Denmark decided to

continue the substantial inancial support for the Afghan National Defence

and Security Forces of 100 million DKK per year until 2020. he interna-

tional co-funding of the Afghan Forces is considered a key condition for the

long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan, and is a clear demonstration of the

international commitment to the future of Afghanistan.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Operation Ocean Shield

he Danish Defence also contributed to NATO’s eforts to maintain security

and prosperity at the high seas. A Danish maritime patrol aircraft was de-

ployed to NATO’s counter piracy mission Operation Ocean Shield to con-

duct surveillance at the Horn of Africa where armed pirates for a long period

have been a major threat for the international shipping in the area.

With no successful pirate attacks since 2012 the NATO countries decid-

ed to terminate Operation Ocean Shield as of 15 December 2016.

Danish engagements to UN missions

Denmark continued the engagement in peacekeeping operations in support

of the United Nations during 2016, most noticeably regarding the peace-

keeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with staf oicers and Special Forces

for 8 months. Additionally, Denmark provided the Force Commander for

MINUSMA for approximately 20 months, before Major General Michael

Lollesgaard ended his term in December 2016.

Denmark has worked actively to support smarter and more eicient ways

of contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. A concrete result was the es-

tablishment of a Nordic rotational arrangement of an air transport capability

to MINUSMA with additional participation of Belgium and Portugal. his

arrangement will ensure critical air transport capacity to MINUSMA until

the end of 2018.

Removal of Libya’s chemical weapon materials

In July 2016, Libyan authorities requested that the UN and the Organisa-

tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) helped to remove

and discard chemical agents from Libya’s former chemical weapons program.

Based on the UN Security Council Resolution 2298 (2016), Denmark

contributed substantially to the overall mission. he Danish maritime con-

tribution facilitated the pickup and transport of the chemical agents from

Misrata in Libya to Germany where the agents were discarded. he Danish

contribution included a transport vessel, a frigate, Special Forces and a team

of chemical specialists.

After concluding the task of removing the chemical weapon materials

from Libya, the Danish Navy took on assignments from NATO as the lexi-

ble support ship, HDMS Absalon, was deployed to NATO’s Standing Naval

Forces in the Mediterranean.

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Cyber threats

A diferent, yet, no less concerning security challenge comes from cyber threats.

Denmark is a profoundly digitalised society. However, in the wake of

digital advantages, there has been an increased vulnerability to the threats

that materialise in cyber space.

he threat to Denmark from cyber espionage and serious cyber crime

is very high. State sponsored actors and professional criminals are attacking

state institutions and private companies on a daily basis. New methods are

constantly being developed with the purpose of stealing valuable informa-

tion and assets or to simply cause disruption and destabilisation. his will

remain a deep concern.

We also see an increasing willingness to use cyber tools to achieve politi-

cal means, including interference in democratic processes. To counter these

threats, we must remain vigilant and make sure that relevant authorities have

the right tools. For this reason, the Ministry of Defence in 2016 has taken

steps on a number of cyber issues. hese include the build-up of a capacity to

conduct military operations in cyber space, the so-called Computer Network

Operations (CNO) capacity, and preparing a new National Strategy for Cy-

ber- and Information Security.

DENMARK IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Nordic cooperation

Denmark held the chairmanship of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NOR-

DEFCO) in 2016.

Together with our Nordic partners we made numerous important

achievements: A secure communications network to enable communication

between the Nordic countries and the signing of the Nordic Baltic Assistance

Programme declaration enabling closer Nordic-Baltic cooperation in sup-

porting third countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine with regards to defence

sector reforms, anti-corruption etc.

Furthermore, the signing of the Nordic Tactical Air Transport (NOR-

TAT) Agreement formalised cooperation and coordination on tactical air

transport. Moreover, steps have been taken to strengthen cooperation within

the defence armament area, e.g. the agreement on joint purchase of combat

uniforms with the aim of reducing costs for the Nordic countries.

Finally, the Easy Access Agreement enabling easier military access to each

other’s territories in peacetime in all domains is a historical underlining of

the close Nordic cooperation that shows the full potential of NORDEFCO.

hese concrete achievements show the vitality of Nordic defence cooper-

ation based on a pragmatic and practical approach.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

The Home Guard and Danish Emergency Management Agency

he Home Guard has made a sizable contribution to Danish security in

the past year. In addition to its numerous everyday tasks, the Home Guard

assisted the Danish police with temporary border control. Since June 2016

some 140 Home Guard personnel have been assigned to assist the police at

the border.

In 2016, the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), in

addition to its national tasks, provided international emergency assistance

and experts to disaster-stricken countries around the world including Haiti,

Equador, Sri Lanka and Iraq.

Conclusion

Partnerships and alliances are of key importance particularly in an increas-

ingly unpredictable and complex security environment. It is our obligation

to adapt and act accordingly. Denmark is committed to our partners and to

the NATO alliance. he many examples of our engagements and achieve-

ments in 2016 are all testimony to this.

Moving into 2017, we are well aware that the pressure on defence will

increase and come from many sides. hat is why the Government has decid-

ed the objective to substantially increase Denmark’s defence spending in the

coming multi-year defence agreement 2018-2022.

his will ensure greater sturdiness and resilience of the Danish Defence

and further strengthen our abilities to meet the challenges facing us together

with our partners and Allies.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

Europe through

a crystal ball

By Per Stig Møller

EUROPE THROUGH A CRYSTAL BALL

Europe is sinking

Europeans’ conception of the place Europe holds in the world today does

not tally with Europe’s actual position. Our idea of Europe corresponds to

the conception Europeans had of their continent prior to 1914, but this con-

ception is a long way from the reality of 2017. In the twentieth century, the

United States took over the position formerly held by Europe as the pre-em-

inent world superpower. Now, in the twenty-irst century, Europe is being

overtaken by China, which in global terms is coming close to regaining the

position it held prior to 1800, when, together with India, it was responsible

for 80% of global production.

Europe is quite simply no longer the global heavyweight it was before

the world was thrown of its axis in 1914. At that time, in territorial terms,

Europe controlled 49% of the world. Today it controls just 24%. In 1914,

48% of the world population resided in Europe, yet today it is barely 10%.

At that time Europe controlled 70% of the global economy. Today this has

shrunk to a mere 30%. Europe was responsible for 84% of global produc-

tion. Today this has shrunk to only 25%. Europe’s armed forces comprised

45% of global military power. Today they make up just 10%. On the other

hand, social spending in Europe amounts to 50% of the global total. Europe

has thus become an ever better place to live, despite the slump it has expe-

rienced in many terms in a global perspective. Europe has not become less

prosperous. he fact is that the other world continents have grown. Europe’s

decline as a world power is only a decline in relative terms, but naturally this

relative decline has geopolitical ramiications. Europe is no longer the heavy-

weight it once was. World trade now takes other routes than Europe. Global

production has moved to other parts of the globe. Europe is nowhere near

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

the dominant global military power it once was. Clearly, Europe no longer

occupies the same position on the global stage as it did in the nineteenth

century, which ended so abruptly in August 1914.

Notwithstanding this relative decline, Europe continues to play a sig-

niicant role globally; irstly by virtue of being the world’s wealthiest conti-

nent, and secondly because of its close relationship and links with the United

States: together, the US and EU-28 account for 50% of global GDP. Yet even

this status is under threat. Global trade routes are changing course, away

from the US and EU-28. Historically, these trade routes have always had

major geopolitical implications.

When the Roman Empire fell in the ifth century CE, Europe was torn

apart by wave upon wave of human migrations from the East and the North

which criss-crossed the continent. he population shrank, and over the

course of the subsequent millennium Europe experienced no lasting stability.

In the meantime the Arab civilization blossomed, and from the seventh cen-

tury onwards expanded exponentially under the inluence of Islam, which in

the space of a century expanded until it extended from Spain, which Arabian

armies invaded in 711, all the way to Afghanistan. European trade ground

to a standstill, while simultaneously it lourished from China to the Muslim

world, which grew in prosperity and power, culminating in the fall of Byzan-

tine in 1453, the Ottoman army’s siege of Vienna in 1529 and wars waged

in Poland and Russia in the seventeenth century. It was only after the defeats

sufered by the Ottoman army near Vienna in 1683 and in Hungary in 1699

that the ultimate decline of the Muslim empire came to pass. Behind this

change in fortunes lay the fact that, from the Early Middle Ages until the Re-

naissance, world trade took place in and between the Near East and Far East

along the trade route known as the Silk Road, which in the ifteenth century

had its terminus in Venice; a situation which allowed the city to prosper and

grow in military strength.

At last, after a thousand years of decline, Europe was starting to coalesce.

States were formed and empires stabilised. he population expanded and

trade blossomed, while in the Arab world population growth stagnated as

the Arab civilisation began to show its age and eased into retirement. In

ifteenth century Europe, the mechanical revolution was underway, followed

by the scientiic revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which

generated new solutions and markets and stimulated economic growth. Eu-

ropeans colonised North and South America, and the centre of world trade

moved from the Silk Road and the Mediterranean to the west coast of Eu-

rope and the Atlantic. his led to economic growth on both sides of the

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Atlantic, which in turn stimulated an expansion of military might, culminat-

ing in the European colonisation of other continents in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries.

If you want to track the rise and fall of civilizations over the course of

history, all you have to do is “follow the money”. Wherever a trade route

runs, economies grow and so in turn does military strength. In the seven to

eight centuries over which trade routes ran east-east, China and the Muslim

world dominated the world stage. However, once new west-west trade routes

supplanted the Silk Road and the Mediterranean, the dominant civilisations

moved to the Atlantic, so that Europe, and later the United States, grew ever

more powerful. hese west-west trade routes dominated world trade until

relatively recently, but now we are witnessing the growth of east-east and

south-south trade.

As recently as 1985 west-west trade routes were responsible for 55% of

world trade, but by 2011 this had fallen to just 30%. In the same period

east-east and south-south trade grew from 10% to 28% of global trade. In

1980, the developing countries, including China and India, were responsible

for 25% of the global economy. By 2010 these countries commanded a 47%

share of the world economy. In 1980 they were responsible for 33% of global

production. By 2010 this igure had grown to 45%, of which China alone

stood for 30%. he World Health Organization estimates that, by 2030,

and within an open global economy, the developing countries will command

57% of the total volume of world trade, while the developed countries will

account for a mere 43%. Moreover, it is likely that these igures are just the

beginning of this development, heralding an even more pronounced shift

of the global economy from the Atlantic to the Paciic. An appendix to the

report

Danish Defence and Diplomacy in Times of Change

(Dansk

diploma-

ti og forsvar i en brydningstid)

forecasts that Asian internal trade alone will

“before 2030 surpass internal trade in the EU”, and with reference to the

World Health Organization, it is predicted that south-south trade, which

in 1990 made up 9% of global trade and today accounts for 25%, will rise

to approximately 30% by 2030. he conclusion is that what is taking place

is “a rerouting of trade lows from the least developed countries towards the

G20 developing countries and away from the more wealthy and developed

countries [...] hus, in 2006, China took over from the EU and the United

States their position as the primary export destination for products from

the least developed countries in Africa, and since 2010 the value of African

exports to China has exceeded the combined exports to the EU and the US”

(p. 80). his means that Europe is being left out in the cold, just as the Arab

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world was when the centre of trade shifted from the Mediterranean to the

Atlantic. It is no coincidence that China is doing everything in its power to

re-establish and develop the old Silk Road of centuries gone by. his is where

the new, aluent and rapidly expanding middle class of the third world is to

be found. he problem Europe faces with respect to this middle class is that,

to an increasing extent they are buying Asian products which are cheaper

but more or less the same as European products. Asia has largely caught up

with European technological advances, and Asians can now aford to buy our

renowned “know-how” and design.

Behind these economic igures there is another, decisive factor: demo-

graphics. Demography is the great wheel of history. Every civilization expe-

riences upturns and downturns. During upswings civilizations experience

growth in population, energy, the economy and military might. Once a civ-

ilization enters decline, economic strength and military capacity contract

accordingly. Following the fall of Rome, the population of Europe shrank,

only to expand once again towards the end of the fourteenth century. Simul-

taneously population growth in the Muslim world stagnated. his remained

the pattern until the era of decolonization in the period after 1945. With the

establishment of the World Health Organization, extensive vaccination pro-

grammes were introduced in the former European colonies, with the conse-

quence that the population of these countries expanded rapidly in a period

when population growth in Europe was stagnating.

here are various prognoses of how the global population will develop

over the course of the twenty-irst century, but forecasts more or less agree

on likely developments up until 2030, given that those people who will have

children over the coming 13 years are already very much in the process of

having them. An appendix to the

Danish Defence and Diplomacy in Times of

Change

(p. 52 f) report states that in 1950 the population of Asia was 2.5

times larger than that of Europe, while in 2015 it was six-times larger, and

in 2030 it is predicted that this will rise to seven-times larger. In 1950, the

population of Africa was half the size of the European population, while in

2015 it was 60% larger, and in 2030 it is expected to have grown to 130%

larger than the population of Europe. In 1990 the EU-28 had a population

of 509 million. By 2025 this igure will have grown to around 540 million,

and this modest population growth will be the result of immigration from

the south. Meanwhile, elsewhere on the European continent, the popula-

tion of Russia is actually expected to shrink. Between 1990 and 2030, the

population of Africa will have grown by more than a billion people, and the

United Nations Development Programme predicts that, by the end of the

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twenty-irst century, almost every other citizen of the world will be African.

And let’s remember, Africa is just across the Mediterranean Sea.

he expansion of the African population will thus be pivotal to the de-

velopment of Europe and its future security. he appendix to the

Danish

Defence and Diplomacy in Times of Change

report estimates that by 2030

the population of North Africa will have grown to 282.4 million, compared

with 171.9 million in 2000. Simultaneously the population of Africa south

of Sahel will rise from 642 million to 1.397 bn. As the report states “Over

the past 15 years, the population of Africa south of the Sahel grew by around

320 million people, corresponding to an increase of approximately 50%.

Over the course of the coming 15 years it is expected that this population

will grow by almost 435 million people; an increase of approximately 45%.”

If these rapidly expanding populations do not ind work, they will become

poorer, and millions of people will migrate north. In the year 2000 the pop-

ulation of North Africa alone amounted to 171.9 million people, a igure

which today has grown to 224 million and is expected to rise to 282.4 mil-

lion by 2030. hese countries have, and will continue to have, increasing

youth-unemployment problems and accordingly will not be able to accom-

modate millions of migrants arriving from the south. In the Middle East for

instance, which is dominated by Islam, the population will have grown from

185 million in 2000 to 321.6 million in 2030, such that the population of

“the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) is expected to expand by

around 125 million people between 2015 and 2030, amounting to a 25%

increase”. his might point to a substantial and ongoing rise in unemploy-

ment, with the resultant unrest, revolt and conlict this will bring, unless the

economies of these countries grow rapidly and employment rises.

On the other side of the Atlantic, key changes will come about, which

will have major geopolitical consequences. By 2030, the population of the

United States will have grown to a not insigniicant 396 million compared

with 314 million in the year 2000, yet in the same period the population of

Latin America – including the Caribbean – will have grown at an even great-

er rate, from 527 to 721 million, a development which, just as in the case

of Africa, will create a need for growth and jobs in order to avoid increased

pressure from immigration to the US. President Trump can no doubt build

a wall along the US-Mexico border to keep these immigrants out, but in the

long run the US will not be able to keep Latin America in check and keep

the “Latinos” at bay without this giving rise to conlict which will cripple

US economic activity in the wider world and moreover allow China to move

into Latin America with economic aid and increased trade.

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hese demographic shifts will naturally have repercussions, as has always

been the case. he rapidly growing populations of these countries will be

dominated by young people under the age of 30 for many years to come.

hey will start families and demand jobs, education and economic progress

in societies which already have high levels of unemployment. Under the

pressure of such tremendous population growth, it will be diicult to avoid

rising levels of unemployment and resultant social unrest, with large waves

of immigrants looding to wealthier parts of the world.

Experience shows that a society in which 20% of the population consists

of 15- to 25-year-olds will experience unrest, if this demographic is unedu-

cated, unemployed or underemployed. In the present decade, countries such

as Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Libya and Afghan-

istan ind themselves in this situation, and trends in the majority of these

countries does not contradict historical experience.

he fact that Europe did not collapse during its period of rapid popula-

tion growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries probably owes much

to the fact that there were new, sparsely populated continents to settle. his

is not an option for the hundreds of millions of people born in the hird

World today. Consequently, there is the prospect of turmoil among the in-

evitable waves of migrants and unrest both between states and internally

within regions and states. his is not least the case in Europe, which, like the

Roman Empire in its period of decline, is home to large groups of people

from other cultures.

Simultaneously, Europe has to face the situation that the US-European

axis, which in the twentieth century preserved Europe’s leading position in

the world, is now showing its age and risks being severed. his threat is

clear from demographics alone. he present population growth in the US is

not the product of the Americans whose ancestors came from Europe, but

rather Americans who are descendants of African, Asian, Central American

and South American immigrants to the US. How much sympathy will these

Americans have for “the old world”? None whatsoever. hey will see no rea-

son to send their sons and daughters to Europe to save it from attack from

Russia or to assist it in a conlict against Islamic countries on the far side

of the Mediterranean. hey will have their hands full dealing with Central

and South America, as well as China across the Paciic. Indeed, in 1916,

Woodrow Wilson was re-elected as President of the United States on the

promise that he would not involve the US in the war in Europe. Franklin D.

Roosevelt made a similar pledge in 1940. In the year following their re-elec-

tion they were both involved in the European war, but would Wilson have

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received his mandate to go to war without the German sinking of American

ships and Secretary of State Zimmermann’s indications of a Mexican attack

on the US? And would Roosevelt have received his mandate to send troops

to Europe if Hitler hadn’t been so kind as to declare war on the United States

in the wake of Pearl Harbour? If Hitler had not done this, Roosevelt may

only have been given a mandate to enter a Paciic war with Japan. Given that

it was challenging enough at that time for the US to come to the aid of a

democratic Europe, with the added factor of population shifts, this would

only become more of a challenge in future. We must face the fact that we will

have to go our own way and look after “our own backyard”.

EUROPE THROUGH A CRYSTAL BALL

The Russia Problem

When the Iron Curtain descended in 1945 and the Cold War commenced,

two defence treaties were established: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. he

opposing sides kept one another at bay with the threat of short-range and

intercontinental ballistic missiles, in keeping with the principle of mutu-

ally assured destruction (MAD). Despite the fact that Ronald Reagan and

Mikhail Gorbachev signed major disarmament treaties, there nonetheless

remained a suicient number of nuclear missiles for the opposing military

alliances to annihilate one another. With the collapse of the Soviet Union

in 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Over the following years NATO,

now the only remaining military alliance in Europe, absorbed the former

Warsaw Pact states, which was made possible by point 8 in the ‘Charter for

European Security’ (Istanbul 1999): “Each participating State has equal right

to security. We reairm the inherent right of each and every state to be free

to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance,

as they evolve”. NATO advanced to the borders of Russia, a situation that

Russia claims it had received assurances would not happen. In spite of the

fact that the West denies having made any such assurances, Russia continues

to see things this way, and since “perception is reality”, NATO’s advance has

had consequences for Russia’s perception of the West. Russia feels it has been

duped and does not want to be duped again.

Since most EU member states are also members of NATO, the EU has

ended up with a very tense relationship with Russia. In the 1990s, we thought

we had a new and peaceful neighbour in post-Soviet Russia, which little by

little would move towards a Western model of democracy and a free market

economy. he various Soviet republics in the Baltic and Central Asia wasted

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no time in declaring independence. As Russians are wont to remark ironical-

ly, during the major political changes and economic downturn in Russia in

the 1990s we pretended that we were helping them, and they pretended that

they were accepting our help, and this laid the basis for bitter anti-Western

sentiment, which with Putin’s accession to power developed into a policy of

outright revanchism. Putin crushed Chechnya and saw to it that no other

state left the federation. In the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia crit-

icised US plans for missile defence with increasing vociferousness, and the

last straw for Russia was when, in April 2008, NATO promised Ukraine and

Georgia that they could become members, albeit not right away. Because of

this unresolved situation, the Estonian foreign minister and I concluded the

meeting of the NRC with speeches in which we predicted that the future

held momentous events in store for Ukraine and Georgia. We predicted that

Russia would make use of the time between the promise of NATO member-

ship and its realisation to thwart the project. And so it came to pass. In Au-

gust 2008, exploiting the situation after Georgia entered a trap by bombing

South Ossetia, Russia invaded Georgia, referring to Western recognition of

Kosovo when it recognised the break-away provinces of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia. Nevertheless, half a year later, President Obama and Secretary of

State Hilary Clinton pressed the “reset button”, whereupon, in 2013, Russia

brought about a new, frozen conlict in Ukraine, and subsequently annexed

Crimea, which Catherine the Great had taken from the Tatars and Khrush-

chev had given to Ukraine. his meant that, for the second time in six years,

Russia broke the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which deines all countries’ right

to “territorial integrity”. Now NATO dares not admit these two states as

members.

he EU now inds itself with an unpredictable neighbour to the east.

How far will things go in Ukraine? How long will Russia allow the conlict

in Ukraine to continue? What in turn would need to happen in order for

Ukraine to pull out of Eastern Ukraine and allow the country to heal and re-

form, and under what terms? One such term would presumably be a pledge

that Ukraine would refrain from applying for membership of either NATO

or the EU, given that, following a referendum in the Netherlands, the EU

has demonstrated itself to be incapable of making good on its promise to

Ukraine in this regard. Ukraine is not simply of geostrategic signiicance for

Russia, it also holds historical and psychological signiicance. he Russian

civilization originated in Ukraine, and in the Russia perception Ukraine has

always been part of the Russian realm. At the very least – so goes the view

– Ukraine should not be forced to be part of Western Europe. With time,

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Russia would like to see Ukraine absorbed into the Russian sphere and par-

ticipating in the cooperation which has come about between Belarus, Russia,

Armenia and Kazakhstan. Without Ukraine, Russia is a signiicant regional

power. With Ukraine, it would be a regional superpower.

Underpinning Russian aggression towards Ukraine and Georgia is a strat-

egy stretching back 300 years; a strategy which received a major a blow with

the departure and declarations of independence of the Baltic states, Ukraine

and Georgia. Russia lost its Baltic Sea coast and vital stretches of the Black

Sea coast, and was left with only the Georgian secessionist province Abkhaz-

ia, which it therefore will not allow to become integrated with Georgia, just

as it will not allow Crimea to return to Ukraine.

Historically, Russia has always sought access to the Black Sea and the Bal-

tic. Peter the Great achieved the latter in the early eighteenth century. Later

in the eighteenth century, Catherine the Great gained access to the Black Sea

coast, and in the nineteenth century Russia acquired the Caucasian stretch

of this same coastline.

Following the First World War, Lenin was forced to surrender the Baltic

states, but after ierce conlict succeeded in preventing Ukraine and Georgia

from leaving the union. By virtue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939

the USSR regained the Baltic states, but in 1941 lost them once again to

Hitler, with Stalin ultimately reclaiming them at the Yalta Conference in

1945. In so doing, he secured power over Poland and East Germany. Just

as in the Tsarist era, Russia was now once again the dominant force in the

Baltic. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, things went wrong (for

Russia) once again. Russia lost its presence in the Baltic and the Black Sea

coast of Ukraine, and was forced to retreat from the seas on which it had had

designs for over 300 years.

Putin’s campaigns in Ukraine are thus not merely an expression of revan-

chism, but the realization of 300 years of strategic thinking. For this reason

we should by no means regard this as a closed chapter in contemporary

history. In one way or another, Russia will continue to seek to gain control

of Ukraine and thereby gain full access to the Black Sea. his brings us to

Moldova, which already inds itself in a frozen conlict in Trans-Dnestra, and

Gagauzia has a Russian-speaking majority that Putin may be able to use to

his advantage.

hen Russian President Dmitry Medvedev coined the phrase “Russia’s

near abroad” and announced that Russia would protect the Russian minor-

ity in the former Soviet republics. As it did in Ukraine, Russia could seek to

galvanize the Russian minority populations in Estonia and Latvia and in this

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way destabilize the countries. It will not be by means of Russian military in-

vasion that these states will fall into Russian hands, for such invasions would

trigger NATO involvement. Instead, it will be via cyber attacks, propaganda

broadcasts on Russian television stations directed at the Russian-speaking

minorities, and with the help of “little green men” which Putin has abso-

lutely no knowledge of. hus, NATO will have no grounds for intervention.

In these circumstances, the European Union will have to step in. On the

strength of work by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the

EU will be able to mobilize both military forces and police forces – but

how strong will these forces be when the UK leaves the Union? And in the

absence of a Russian invasion, the only options will be sanctions and police

involvement. However, the EU lacks the kind of police force which would

be of use in such a situation, speciically a paramilitary police force of the

kind seen in France. It would almost certainly be wise for the EU to begin to

develop such a corps before “little green men” appear on the scene.

We have certainly not seen the last of Russian expansionism. It could also

have an afect in the Arctic. Despite the fact that we entered into an agree-

ment to resolve all conlicts peacefully in accordance with the Convention

of the Law of the Sea and international law as part of the Ilulissat Declara-

tion of 2008, there is a risk that Russia will take the law into its own hands

and expand its territory, for instance by allowing its navy to be permanently

stationed at the North Pole, in light of the verdict of the Commission on

the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that the North Pole is part of

the subaquatic Russian ridge. he verdict on whether it is also part of the

Greenlandic continental shelf – if a verdict on this matter is deemed neces-

sary – will not be reached for another 10 years. And what will we do then,

if Russian cruisers are stationed there? Will NATO react? Will the US? How

did the US react in the South China Sea? Would our own navy be able to re-

pulse them? he Danish Realm would be faced with a political and military

challenge, and Greenland will be thankful that it did not break away from

the Danish Realm, which for its part must be in a position to see of Russian

provocation. At the very minimum, this requires that the Arctic Five is not

allowed to dissolve in the meantime, because within it, in addition to Russia,

Greenland/Denmark are in company with the US, Canada and Norway, all

three of which would likely support Danish rejection of Russia’s claims to the

North Pole until such a time as Canadian and Danish claims are processed

by the CLCS and all subsequent bilateral negotiations have been concluded.

In the initial phase, the task will be to render Russian provocation futile.

When it dawns on Russia that the door has well and truly been closed, we

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can then enter the second phase of our relationship with Russia, since in the

long run it is in Russia’s best interests to maintain a good relationship with

the EU based on mutual trust. Russia foresees and anticipates problems to

the south and the east.

To the south there is the prospect of unrest in the Caucasus, where Dag-

estan, Ingushetia and Chechnya will pose problems for Russia in the event of

the spread of Islamism. he fear of this eventuality is one of the main reasons

Russia entered the conlict in Syria, siding with Assad. To the east, Russia

likewise faces the prospect of a confrontation with China, both in Siberia,

which Russia conquered in the eighteenth century and thereby established a

presence on the Paciic coast, and over dominance of Central Asia, an area in

which both Russia and China have major economic ambitions. Both Russia

and China fear the growth of Islamism and the destabilizing efect this will

have, which has the potential to spread from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the

central Asian republics, and from there bring Islamist unrest to Russia and

the Xinjiang region of China.

Long term, Russia’s western borders are all that are not under threat,

because deep down Russia believes that it has little to fear regarding invasion

from the west. hus, it is in Russia’s long-term interests to establish a sol-

id working relationship with Europe, including good trade relations, based

upon mutual trust. In the meantime, Europe will have to weather the storm

and keep in check Russia’s short-term strategy, and only then can Russia and

the EU embark on a mutual long-term strategy.

EUROPE THROUGH A CRYSTAL BALL

The Middle-East Problem

If the short-term threat to Europe comes from Russia, the hotbeds of Is-

lamism in Middle East and North Africa pose a threat in both the short-

term and the medium-term. herefore, it is imprudent of the Taksøe-Jensen

report

Danish Defence and Diplomacy in Times of Change

to propose that

Denmark should withdraw from engagement in the region, because foreign

policy should always consider the long-term perspective. Dangers which lat-

er unfold with cataclysmic consequences are normally foreseeable well in

advance, even if to begin with they appear minor and peripheral. In order to

avert insigniicant dangers developing into major threats, early intervention

must be made – a stitch in time saves nine.

he increasingly political dimension of religion has been ignored because

of a belief that the world as a whole was moving towards the model of the lib-

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

eral, tolerant, market-oriented democracy. In so doing we failed to see that a

toxic brew was fermenting beneath the covers on the cauldrons of the Middle

Eastern dictators. Indeed, in

he Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of

World Order

(1998) Samuel Huntington hypothesised a future characterised

by a clash of civilisations, while in the conclusion to my book

Den naturlige

orden

(he

Natural Order,

1996), I warned that fundamentalism would turn

out to be modern history’s great ‘spoilsport’, just as Francis Fukuyama had

done in

he End of History and the Last Man

(1992) when he suggested that

Islamism could come to stand in the way of an otherwise bright, democratic

future. Yet up until 11th September 2001 the world seemed to be a peaceful

and promising place.

In the 1990s, Islamist terror attacks were a common occurrence in var-

ious parts of the world, yet no one predicted the internal dynamic which

would play out between Shia and Sunni Muslims. It is nonetheless precisely

this conlict which is at present being fought out in the Middle East: a con-

lict with repercussions for North Africa and Europe. Only once this conlict

has come to a close, the dust has settled and all of the pieces have fallen

into place, will we know the full extent of the threat of the clash of civilisa-

tions across the Mediterranean, and only then will we know what we are up

against. Will it be a fanatical, fundamentalist, combative Islamism, or more

or less democratic or authoritarian governments, more interested in work-

ing together with Europe rather than war and conlict. I once asked Qatar’s

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Afairs how long the Shia-Sunni

conlict will last. His reply was this: “It has already lasted 1300 years, and it

will last another 100-200 years, and there is nothing you can do about it in

the meantime”.

We should not meddle in internal Islamic religious conlicts and power

struggles. To do so would only cause more problems. However, we must

do all that is in our power to support and consolidate the moderate and

modernising political forces in the region, in the hope that they will succeed

in exerting a positive inluence upon the region’s ongoing development, ir-

respective of whether the various countries in question end up as Shiite or

Sunni states. Indeed, this was the thinking that lay behind the ‘Partnership

for Reform and Prograss’

launched by the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of

Denmark in 2003, which continues its work to this day. With its implemen-

tation of the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme and the development aid

sent to the region, Denmark is exercising a ‘soft power’ which takes into

account the long-term perspective, in contrast to ‘hard power’, which can

only be brought to bear in the short-term and can never be deployed in iso-

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lation. For this reason it would be a mistake to phase out the Danish-Arab

Partnership Programme, in spite of the fact that, in truth, the Arab Spring

– with the exception of Tunisia – did not lead to the intended development

of the democratic, constitutional states. To give up this ambition and our

contribution to its realization would, however, be to abandon the possibility

of inluencing developments in the region. And why else does one conduct

foreign policy, if not to this end?

here are many and various lashpoints in the Islamic world, from Pa-

kistan to Nigeria. And each of them was sparked by diferent events and

circumstances. hese are conlicts between fundamentalist and more secu-

lar or modernising governments in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan,

Algeria, Tunisia and Nigeria, and they are not conlicts between Sunnis and

Shiites. In contrast, the Sunni-Shiite conlict is raging in the Middle East,

from Yemen in the south to Sinai in the north, spreading westwards to Libya

in Africa and far south over the Sahel. he fact that this conlict has not

afected Morocco or Senegal must be attributed to the fact that the Maliki

school of Islamic jurisprudence dominates in these countries; for Islam con-

sists of a good deal more than simply the Shia-Sunni conlict, and there are

99 diferent designations for Allah.

he Shia-Sunni conlict triggered a power struggle on the Arabian Pen-

insula between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran is seeking to expand and con-

solidate its power by achieving or ensuring Shiite governments in Yemen,

Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Once this is achieved, Jordan will be next

in line. In order to avoid being surrounded by Shiite, Iran-dominated states,

Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported the Sunni uprising against the Alawite

Shiite, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, suppressed the Shiite uprising in Bahrain

and became militarily involved in Yemen. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is expand-

ing its relations with the Sunni Gulf states of Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab

Emirates and Oman by adding a military dimension; for these states also

face an uncertain future. he very skewed demography of the Gulf States,

with a small, wealthy, native population alongside a very large majority of

disadvantaged foreign workers, makes future internal conlict likely. In ad-

dition to this pronounced demographic and social disparity, Saudi Arabia is

home to a considerable, turbulent Shiite minority. he hitherto peaceful and

wealthy Gulf states may thus ind themselves face-to-face with unrest which

will likely decimate their economies, bring about a fall in oil production, and

thereby create problems for the global economy.

And as if that were not enough, the unresolved situation in Palestine has

the potential to come to the boil once again. his will happen when all of

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the pieces have fallen into place in the Middle East, whereupon the new-

ly-formed Arabian governments will have the wherewithal to focus upon Pal-

estine once again; for the conlict between Iran and Saudi Arabia must come

to an end at some point, with some form of more or less lasting resolution.

Once this has happened the Shiite states, with Iran at their head, will redou-

ble their eforts against Israel, and the Sunni states will then be compelled

to display their true Islamic disposition by following suit. For this reason it

is a historical tragedy for Israel that it did not succeed in sealing a two-state

solution in the 2000s. Soon afterwards, the Arab Spring took hold, and Israel

was left to wait and see where it would all end. Moreover, President Barack

Obama’s conduct towards Israel meant that Israel no longer had faith that

they were under US military protection. Simultaneously, Israel now lacked

any state with which to enter into a lasting agreement, given that President

Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) will be in no position to guarantee Hamas’

peaceful intentions as long as it remains unclear who will ultimately rule in

Syria. Who would be elected in Ramallah in a newly independent Palestine?

Hamas? If so, Israel will ind itself trapped between a Syria dominated by

Shiites, Iran and Russia and a Palestine which seeks the destruction of Israel.

Who will then come to Israel’s aid? he UN? No; such a move would be ve-

toed by the Security Council. he EU? No; a divided Union would impede

this. he US? Israel can no longer depend upon aid from this quarter and so

far President Trump has only indicated that he will leave things to the parties

themselves to solve. hus, at the end of the day, we risk yet another ierce

war in the Middle East, which will send sparks lying throughout global

politics, because the US will not simply allow Russia and Iran to run the

show, and the EU will have to implement sanctions which will be met with

counter-sanctions – and with terrorism and higher energy prices.

Just across the Mediterranean lies North Africa; a region of latent unrest

which risks disintegration, and in its wake the seizure of power by Islamists.

What we are witnessing in Libya could very well come to pass elsewhere. he

North African states ind themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea,

as the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Afairs, Benaïssa, once pointed out to

me. he demographic development in Africa south of the Sahel has the po-

tential to lead to huge waves of migrants to North Africa, and the EU will do

all in its power to stop these migrants from reaching European coasts. If, as

is predicted, climate change also hits Africa exceptionally hard, this will only

lead to even greater waves of migration. Given that North Africa has signif-

icant population growth and youth unemployment, the arrival of hundreds

of thousands of immigrants who then ind themselves stuck in North Africa

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will lead to social conlict and political unrest. his in turn will cripple these

countries, destroy their economies and ultimately lead to the establishment

of draconian governments, whose stance towards Europe is at present dii-

cult to predict. However, if Islamism is victorious in these conlicts, we will

not be facing war across the Mediterranean, so much as terrorism, sabotage

and growing clashes within European countries, the economies of which will

be overstretched, while simultaneously trade across the Mediterranean will

fall and thereby weaken economies yet further. According to al-Qaeda, this

is precisely the aim of their terrorist action in the West.

Irrespective of the fact that – as the Taksøe-Jensen report rightly states

– we are in no position to do anything about the conlicts in northern and

southern Africa, we can nonetheless contribute to preventing them and

thereby inluence the outcome. he EU can still bring a positive inluence to

bear by continuing to send development aid to these countries, by enhancing

trade through a comprehensive free-trade agreement, by promoting political,

military and economic cooperation with the African Union and by imple-

menting the Paris Agreement on climate change. By boosting the economies

of the African nations, we thereby stimulate employment and improve these

countries’ opportunities to develop the educational, social and health sectors

and curb youth unemployment, and in turn this can potentially contribute

to generating support for moderate, cooperative and non-fanatical govern-

ments in the region. his will cost money in the short term, but in the longer

term it will spare us from all of the expenditure and risks entailed for Europe

by a disintegrated North Africa and the resulting massive waves of illegal

migration just a little further down the road. We either have to buy their

tomatoes, or we will have to support them here in Europe!

EUROPE THROUGH A CRYSTAL BALL

The EU Problem

he EU foresees growing problems to the north, east and south. And like-

wise to the west. he UK is on its way out, and on the other side of the

Atlantic, President Obama has spoken of shifting the focus of US foreign

policy towards Asia. He places less emphasis than his predecessor, George W.

Bush, on relations with Europe and was somewhat passive with respect to

Russian expansion in Europe. Nor did he show any particular interest in the

problems in North Africa and the Arab lands. Demographic developments

in North and South America suggest that this trend will be reinforced dur-

ing President Trump’s term, given that Trump only appears interested in US

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involvement when key US interests are in “clear and present danger”.

With President Trump’s election, the free trade agreement between the

US and the EU appears to have been abandoned, in which case the key link

between the US and the EU will be a thing of the past. No doubt the US

and the EU will together continue to comprise the world’s largest trade block

and the strongest global economy with what is probably the world’s largest

military but, if we go our separate ways, neither continent will retain this

position. If US economic interests in Europe fall relative to its interests in

Asia, US military involvement in European afairs will become less certain.

he demographic situation already suggests that the US will have its hands

full dealing with Latin America, and US global strategy suggests that it will

have its work cut out in the face of the challenge from China and associated

problems in South-East Asia. Moreover, if the US then also abandons its free

trade agreement with the Paciic nations, South-East Asia will fall right into

China’s shopping basket. One could scarcely do more to play into China’s

hands than if the US were to trigger a trade war with China, a war which

would damage both the US economy and the global economy. Naturally this

would also damage China’s economy, yet, by virtue of its political system,

China’s leadership will be able to endure such a conlict for longer than the

US democratic government. he upshot of this will be a further-weakened

US and a weaker partner for the EU, which will be hard-hit by the repercus-

sions of a US-China trade war.

In the early 2000s, the US had no interest in a free trade agreement with

Europe. When, at the time, I pointed out the necessity of this to the then

US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellik, he replied that it would never hap-

pen. Fortunately, Obama supported such an agreement, but unfortunately

the negotiations were so protracted that it now appears to be “gone with the

wind”, and the EU bears a major part of the responsibility for this, because

the EU viewed it solely as a trade agreement and did not see its signiicance

for the prospective trade partners’ security policies. Consequently, the ne-

gotiations surrounding every single element of the agreement dragged on

and on. It was not the security aspect which occupied the European Parlia-

ment and the public debate, but rather the prospect of American chlorinated

chicken ending up in European supermarkets, despite the fact that the Euro-

pean consumer would be free to choose not to buy them!

he trans-Atlantic link that has been of crucial signiicance to Western

Europe for hundreds of years is becoming weaker. Demographic develop-

ments and new global trade routes are taking Europe to a peripheral position

on the western outskirts of the Eurasian continent.

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Only a close trans-Atlantic alliance can delay and perhaps even prevent

this development, and only a strong and resolute EU can counteract or at

least slow it down, and yet the EU today is at best in a state of disarray and

at worst in the process of dissolution. Perhaps the EU’s problem, as Valéry

Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt pointed out in their last joint in-

terview, is that with the decision taken at the Copenhagen Summit of the

European Council in December 2002 to expand the EU, the EU came to

encompass too many states. Yet I do not regret that decision, for it was nec-

essary to ensure European security and safeguard the development of the for-

mer Communist states and Soviet republics. In addition, it has strengthened

European economies. And yet we now see an EU that is unable to deliver in

the form of safeguarding these states from Russian expansionism, securing

the borders with the Arab countries and North Africa, improving European

economies and supporting European citizens. A number of member states

are diametrically opposed to increased European cooperation, and a number

of successful European political parties want to dismantle or dissolve the EU.

Yet this will not solve our problems; on the contrary it will lead to a collective

decline. “We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all

hang separately”, as Benjamin Franklin said in Pennsylvania back when the

United States of America declared independence.

Brexit may turn out to be the beginning of the end for the UK and the

EU. In such circumstances, all European states will lose their appeal. Even

the largest European states are mere small fry in a global perspective. Only

united can the countries of Europe play a role and exert geopolitical inlu-

ence. A disbanded European Union will resemble the map of Germany prior

to 1870 and the map of Italy pre-1859: divided up into small principalities

which larger nations need not take seriously. It will not be in a position to

do anything about mass migration. It will not be able to withstand Russian

expansionism. It will not be able to safeguard its interests by means of major,

comprehensive trade agreements, because its prospective trade partners will

have no particular interest in entering into such trade agreements with a dis-

integrated Europe. Europe will no longer be in a position to deliver strong

action on climate change.

If the EU member states are to counter the clear negative tendencies

facing them and guide the ongoing development of the EU in a positive di-

rection, it is vital that the EU igure out how better to cooperate and develop

its ability to convince the populations of the various states of the necessity

of close cooperation. We must acknowledge that only together have we any

hope of retaining the US as part of a broad trans-Atlantic alliance. Only to-

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

gether, in the long term, can we secure Russia’s participation in constructive

mutual cooperation. Only together can we rise to the challenge of the rapid

population expansion in Africa. Only together can we withstand potential

pressure from an Islamist Middle East and North Africa. Only together can

we develop the economies of European states such that they are a match

for their economic rivals in the coming global trade scenario in which a

constantly expanding China is the dominant world power alongside the US,

which has passed its zenith.

he odds are against us here in the EU. On History’s Great Wheel – demo-

graphics – Europe is on its way down. In terms of global trade we are shrink-

ing relative to other continents, and trade routes are shifting away from the

Atlantic, back to the Silk Road. We risk ending up with more imports than

exports and accordingly experiencing diiculty maintaining our welfare

state. Climate change adds to the pressure from Africa. Muslim populations

in several European countries are growing at an exponential rate that will

afect EU states’ foreign policy and in the event of a clash of civilizations

challenge internal cohesion.

If EU member states are to fend of and moreover prevent such a negative

spiral and have any hope of reversing it, they must safeguard the trans-At-

lantic link, promote economic links to Africa, put their foot down hard on

Russia, increase production and kick-start the economy without, in so do-

ing, adding to the ecological challenges facing the modern world, given that

unpaid ecological debts tend to grow.

The Democracy Problem

he EU is facing reorganization and costs which European citizens may not

be the slightest prepared for. Besides the demographic, security, economic

and environment issues the EU is facing, we also have a political problem:

can democracy actually deliver the goods? Will the pro-European govern-

ments that in time will point out the challenges and write the bills, be in any

position to win elections? Is it not likely that those parties which are positive

towards the EU will lose elections to the parties which claim that everything

is the fault of the EU and that the victims and the costs are not at all neces-

sary? It is, on the face of it, easier and more comfortable not to do anything

at all. A European Union in which several member states are eagerly pulling

on the handbrake will bring about a situation in which a group of at least

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nine countries come together in “a strengthened cooperation” whereby the

EU is divided up into a number of circles. Around these core states there will

be a circle of countries such as Denmark, which will probably be involved in

some federal matters, but not others, and outside of this circle will be coun-

tries such as Norway, which is not a member, but nonetheless is involved

in some matters, and outside of them will be the UK, with which the EU

enters into agreements. Such a European Union will be able to function, but

it would not be strong, either in terms of trade policy or security policy, and

accordingly this will contribute to accelerating Europe’s decline.

Will democracy be able to endure the protracted economic setbacks and

crises which the future has the potential to inlict? he development of world

trade and the global economy is giving rise to large, intermediate groups, pri-

marily in Asia, but in time in the Middle East and in Africa, with an abun-

dance of disposable income; groups which, we must hope, demand democ-

racy. However, if the goods they purchase are produced in the east and the

south, EU exports will fall, while imports will rise. Can our society survive

such developments? Can our democracies? In the 1930s they were unable to

do so. Back then, for Europe’s new democracies, economic depression meant

being supplanted by authoritarian regimes. A range of opinion polls show

that a steadily growing section of European voters would in fact be happy to

see democracy replaced by strong men or women. When asked whether they

would like a strong leader who was willing to break the rules, 80% of French

respondents replied “Yes”. he same applied for 68% of Italians, 50% of

British, 40% of Americans, 23% of Swedes and 21% of Germans according

to a survey in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 31 January 2017.

Can democracy survive long periods of terrorist activity? Or will counter-

measures to tackle terrorism – in the form of increased surveillance – erode

state legislatives and due process? Are democracies able to function socially

with a growing, unintegrated population group and growing illegal immi-

gration, or will our society disintegrate into opposed and competing parallel

societies? Will European democracies be able to endure a long-term conlict

with Russia, for which ever more parties and governments are displaying a

growing sympathy. With Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria in mind, one

might also ask whether our democracies are even remotely capable of defend-

ing themselves or going to war. Can European democracies in any way be

reformed? Is resistance to change not so deep-seated that reforms will prove

impossible? And inally: how are our democracies being shaped by modern

communications technology, which promotes short-sighted group thinking

and weakens the supply of coherent information, debate and dialogue. Is

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

representative democracy in the long run able to function alongside direct

democracy, which time and again undervalues the former? Is it at all possi-

ble to enter into international agreements with such democracies? Who will

abide by such agreements when no one is accountable for them?

In summary: It is about time we Europeans began to take ourselves and

our democracy very seriously and look the new reality in the eye. But will

we? Can we? Dare we?

Notes

Among other Danish ministerial posts, dr.phil. Per Stig Møller (conservative) has served as

Minister for Foreign Afairs 2001-2010.

In Danish known as ‘Det arabiske Initiativ’.

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Nationalists, National Liberals

and Cosmopolitans: Danish

Foreign Policy Debates after

Brexit and Trump

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen

he windows at the Marriott Hotel ofered a stunning view of Copenhagen

harbour as the sun rose on 9 November 2016, but of the more than two hun-

dred people gathered in the ballroom for the US Embassy’s traditional Elec-

tion Breakfast, few showed much interest in the view. Instead they focused

on the television screens, as CNN declared the US presidential election for

Donald Trump. Even if the guests were not as distraught by the result as their

host, the US Ambassador, they moved with the hushed awkwardness of peo-

ple who have risen early to unwelcome news. While television crews pursued

the politicians in the crowd for comments on the result, the rest of the guests

quietly polled each other for an assessment of the situation. As they drank

their cofee and nibbled their breakfast rolls, the business people, diplomats,

journalists and other of the Ambassador’s guests not only discussed the elec-

tion of Trump but also the British vote for Brexit in June. hese events con-

stituted a break with the fundamental conditions for Danish foreign policy

as they had existed since the end of the Cold War. And even if ‘wait and see’

was probably the slogan of the morning, the guests were in no doubt that

they were in for a change when they emerged in the pale November light

outside the Marriott after the breakfast.

Even if the long-term efects of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump

have yet to play themselves out, they have created a new international en-

vironment in which Denmark has to operate and a new set of expectations

of foreign policy on the part of the Danish public. According to a poll of

February 2017, 59 percent of Danes felt less safe after the election of Don-

ald Trump – terror and Russia scored 35 and 33 percent respectively.

Even

though these numbers might relect the nature of the Danish debate on the

state of American politics as much as they relect the actual insecurity created

by the US presidential election, the fact that the United States was viewed

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as a problem for Danish foreign policy constitutes a signiicant break with

the notion that Denmark was a kind of junior partner to the United States

in creating a new, better and more secure world order, which has dominated

post-Cold War debates in Denmark on international afairs. his seems to

suggest that when the Danes have done waiting and seeing what the election

of Trump and Brexit will mean, Denmark will choose a new approach to its

foreign and security policy. he present article will describe three approaches

to Danish foreign and security policy – nationalism, national liberalism and

cosmopolitanism. I have previously argued that Danish foreign and security

policy can be understood in terms of a strategic culture constituted by a di-

alectic debate between defencism and cosmopolitanism (Rasmussen, 2005).

his explains the extraordinary consensus behind foreign policy ‘Activism’ of

the post-Cold War era. he era of Activism is over, however.

In power political terms, Activism was based on an international order

dominated by the United States ,which actively intervened politically and

militarily in world afairs in order to uphold a liberal, Western order. Eu-

ropean integration was an essential part of that order. In ideological terms,

Activism was grounded in a conception of globalisation that argued for a

closer integration of democratic nations in a free market for goods, services

and ideas based on universal values. hese values were institutionalised in the

UN, NATO and, most deeply, in the EU. Neither the power-political nor

the ideological premise holds true anymore. he election of Donald Trump

and Brexit are the tombstones that mark the end of the power-political and

ideological foundations of the post-Cold War, US-dominated world order

known as globalisation (Rasmussen, 2002).

In the post-globalisation world, Activism makes no more sense for Danish

policy-makers than neutrality did after the Second World War. he question

is how to make sense of this new world and determine which world views

will shape Danish policy. Whereas the end of the Cold War was marked by

a desire to seek a new and stable world order, current international afairs

seem to be deined by disruption. his is also true in Danish politics, where

the government’s platform from November 2016 has adopted the concept

of disruption as a guide to understanding and dealing with changes in the

economic structure of Danish society and their consequences for the labour

market. he government’s platform from 27 November 2016 thus refers to

‘an age of disruption’ (en

brydningstid):

‘this is a crucial time when a great

displacement in power relationships and security conditions are taking place.

At the same time, the world ofers many positive opportunities for a coun-

try like Denmark.’

How is Denmark to deal with the challenges and op-

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portunities of disruption? he discussion over disruption questions existing

practices and conceptions of how to conduct policy the most efectively. It

is also a term that might merit a more speciic deinition. Joseph Bower and

Clayton Christensen argue that disruption is only supericially about the in-

troduction of new technologies; what the introduction of a new technology

really disrupts is determined by its ‘performance attributes’ (Bowe and Chris-

tensen, 1996: 44). New technologies make it possible to do new things, but

they do not necessarily do old things well. If a company insists on maintain-

ing old-style business procedures and producing the pre-disruption products

in the new circumstances, it will be even worse of than before. he problem

for companies, Bower and Christensen points out, is that the customers are

often quite satisied with their old products and existing service agreements.

Bower and Christensen conclude that big companies fail to innovate when

they follow the management textbook’s prescription for giving the customer

what she wants (1996: 45). To deal with disruption management needs to

re-image not only products but also the customer relationship. In terms of

Danish foreign policy, disruption is about, irstly, the increasingly irrelevance

of previously efective policies. Activism was an efective strategy in the post-

Cold War world, but many of the practices of activism are not relevant in

the new political reality created by the election of Donald Trump and Brexit.

Secondly, the new environment of action will only become manifest after

disruption has run its course: during the period of disruption itself it is by no

means clear what the new conditions will be, and actors have a wide scope of

action in shaping the new environment. For this reason, there will be ierce

competition between diferent notions of what is actually happening and

how best to operate under the new conditions. hirdly, disruption means

new ‘customer relationships’ or, in terms of international relations, new

frameworks of institutions and alliances. How to cope with these three issues

will present itself in the form of diferent business strategies, or, in politics,

political ideologies that present a comprehensive guide to a new practice. In

the following I will present three such competing views of the performance

attributes of Danish foreign and security policy in an age of disruption.

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Denmark First: The Nationalist Approach

A world view can only shape policy if you are not the only one in the world

to hold that view. he Danish People’s Party (known by its abbreviation,

DF) has never had a strong foreign-policy platform for precisely that rea-

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son. Established in 1995, the party was born in opposition not only to the

cosmopolitan consensus, but also to the prevailing Western discourse on the

merits of globalisation (Trads, 2002). his was a time when the British Prime

Minister, Tony Blair, was declaring that ‘globalisation is a fact and, by and

large, it is driven by people’.

With a completely diferent conception of

what constitutes a people and what drives them, the Danish People’s Party

had little to ofer to that agenda. Even if the party accepted Danish for-

eign-policy activism and the military interventions that followed, they did

so with ideological caveats. Brexit and the election of Donald Trump reverse

these circumstances completely. Within a year, it was the established parties

that seemed out of tune with a world view among the states with which the

Danes identify the most. While the centre and centre-left parties struggled

to ind a position on Brexit or the election of Donald Trump, the DF felt

vindicated. In 1999, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen had deemed

them too foul-mouthed to be part polite conversation.

Today, Rasmussen’s

talk about choosing to build windmills to harness the power of globalisation

in the same spirit as the windmill giant Vestas builds windmills all over the

globe seemed a metaphor way past its sell-by date,

while the President of

the United States was elected on a promise to build a wall on the border to

Mexico. With this in mind, DF Chairman Christian hulesen Dahl seemed

like a paragon of restraint when he described Donald Trump as a ‘breath of

fresh air’.

For surely the election of Trump was a triumph for the Danish

People’s Party.

‘For too long,’ President Trump said in his inaugural address, ‘a small

group in our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of government while the

people has born the cost … the establishment has protected itself but not

the citizens of our country’.

President Trump’s political project was deined

by this wish to take back control from political elites perceived as working

for their own interests in collusion with other global elites. Trump thus em-

braced Nigel Farage for having been the irst to break this consensus in Brit-

ain. During the campaign, the President referred to Brexit as ‘a great thing’

because the British people had ‘taken back their country’.

‘We’ve seen Brex-

it,’ Nigel Farage replied on 9 November 2016 after Trump’s victory: ‘We’ve

now seen this and don’t be surprised to see this political revolution elsewhere

– perhaps in Europe next year. here is a general feeling that big, funda-

mental change and genuine democratic accountability is needed’.

For the

same reason, President Trump expected Brexit to be the irst of several exits

from the Union: ‘I believe others will leave. I do think keeping it together is

not gonna be as easy as a lot of people think the EU to last.’

he collapse

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of consensus on globalisation and the imminent collapse of the EU are per-

ceived as a crisis by the establishment. he real crisis, according to President

Trump, is not the collapse of either globalisation or the EU, it is globalisation

and international organisations like the EU which have created the crisis – or

‘carnage’, in the words of Donald Trump – in the lives of ordinary people

by robbing them of the opportunity for employment because globalisation

leaves ‘rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of

our nation.’ By describing the American condition in such Gothic terms,

President Trump makes crisis the deining issue of his presidency. In Trump’s

political rhetoric the invocation of crisis serves to prove that the current

situation is so much worse than recognised by the elites, and having thus

established that the elites are part of the problem rather than the solution,

the severity of the situation legitimises the radical solutions ofered by Presi-

dent Trump. By rising to face the ‘real’ problems, he argues, a ‘truer’ political

community can be created, and he promises that ‘a new national pride will

stir our souls, lift our sights and heal or divisions’. Morten Messerschmidt,

an MEP for the Danish People’s Party, followed the same line of argument

when he suggested that ‘the truth reveals itself by means of a crisis’. Where

President Trump focused on NAFTA, TPP and TIPP as speciic examples of

the globalisation he wanted to disrupt, Messerschmidt focused on the EU:

‘the inancial crisis revealed the truth about the ideological project called

the Euro, and now the immigration crisis show us the realities of the open

borders and Schengen. More and more areas demonstrate the reality that the

way the EU is constructed today will not stand and should be fundamentally

changed.’

he parliamentarian and the president share a belief that crisis

reveals a truth which cosmopolitan elites have tried to hide and that this

truth in turn points to a truer policy, a type of policy which is more capa-

ble of addressing the real issues than the issues deined by the consensus in

Washington, Brussels or Davos. ‘he time has come,’ Pernille Vermund of

the new right party concluded, ‘for politicians to decide less in order to give

responsibility and freedom back to the Danes.’

A true policy, a policy that speaks not only the language of the ordi-

nary man, but also addresses his problems, will thus entail a very diferent

set of priorities than that deined by the elites. Marie Krarup (DF’s spoke

person on defence and daughter of the Reverend Søren Krarup, who has

been a highly inluential in the party’s ideological debates) thus criticised

the Danish Defence Intelligence Service for overestimating the danger posed

by Russia. he Intelligence Service’s conclusion that Copenhagen would be

within range of the nuclear-capable Iskander missiles Russia was deploying

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to Kaliningrad and that Russia had increased its military presence and adopt-

ed a more aggressive military posture in the Baltic region was not challenged

by Krarup, but she dismissed the notion that these actions should be viewed

an aggressive intent by Kremlin.

It seemed that Krarup’s main issue with

the Intelligence Service’s analysis was related to whether Russia wanted to

disrupt European and Western unity. he Intelligence Service concludes that

‘Russia is very aware of the EU’s vulnerabilities and dividing lines, and Rus-

sia is actively trying to deepen divisions in the EU countries, between the EU

countries and in transatlantic relations’.

In other words, Russia had tried

to disrupt Western institutions and deepen the crisis. Was that such a bad

thing? ‘I want the EU dead and buried and replaced by free trade. hat is our

policy’, Marie Krarup stated in August 2016; ‘if Putin or Marine Le Pen can

help achieve this goal, then that is ine with me’.

President Trump made

no secret of his admiration for President Putin and even welcomed Russian

hacking of Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Perhaps Krarup was warier of the

Russian President, but she shared Trump’s sentiment that, in ighting the

elites, one could not be too picky in choosing one’s allies. he sense of crisis

reinforces the notion that, to save the nation, one had to do what needed to

be done. Krarup thus alluded to Winston Churchill’s boast that he would

have something favourable to say about the Devil if he was an ally against

Hitler when she said that she was ready to ally herself with the ‘the devil

himself ’ if that was what it took to get rid of the EU.

he religious references to the devil are by no means coincidental. As

Messerschimdt noted, the EU stands in the way of perceiving and addressing

the real crisis, namely the challenges of Muslim immigration and of terror-

ism committed by groups like IS – two distinct phenomena which are often

linked in this narrative. If there is some reluctance to accept Vladimir Putin

as an ally in the assault against the EU, there is no hesitation in expressing

admiration for the Russian ability to ight Islam. Marie Krarup thus praised

the Russian foreign service by saying that ‘the Russian foreign service is fan-

tastically skilled … they understand how other people think. he can do

what EU and NATO is not able to’.

From this perspective, making an

enemy of Russia is robbing yourself of a capable and determined ally in

the most important ight – the civilizational struggle against Islam. While

the West, at least until the election of Trump, refused to see the wars in the

Middle East as a clash of civilizations, the Russian government is quite ex-

plicit in its conception of international relations as a civilizational struggle.

‘For the irst time in modern history,’

Russia’s National Security Strategy to

2020

from 2009 states, ‘global competition takes place on a civilizational

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level, whereby various values and model of development based on universal

principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete

against each other. Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world becomes

more and more manifest.’

his statement relects an organic conception of

the state as the manifestation of a certain natural will which is distinct from

that of other nations and destined to wage a perpetual struggle against other

nations. his Hegelian conception of society and history rings true with the

Right’s conception of Denmark as well.

When Putin’s government is praised for its efective foreign policy by

Krarup or for its determination by Trump, this praise should not be regard-

ed as a treatise on comparative politics. his is not an in-depth analysis of

Russia, but rather a determined plea for policies which should be adopted

in Denmark or the United States. In the words of the

New York Times,

such

praise is a rhetorical ‘dog whistle’

which only their electorates can hear the

true meaning of. In this narrative, Russia becomes a mythical place where

right-wing ambitions are realised in the same way as the DDR was a mythi-

cal place where left-wing ambitions where supposed to be realised before the

end of the Cold War. he reality of everyday life in Putin’s Russia is beside

the point in an argument which is primarily about establishing a template

for approaching politics in a diferent way and with far greater ruthlessness.

In the debate on the right of Danish politics, praising Putin thus serves to

demonstrate your anti-establishment credentials. his is especially important

for the Danish People’s Party at a time it is being challenged from the left

by the social democrats and from the right by Ms Vermund’s New Right.

Saying ‘Denmark irst’ is a prescription for a diferent kind of policy than

saying ‘America irst’. Denmark cannot indulge in populist lights of fancy

in the way the United States can. Yet, what might be a light of fancy for the

United States quickly becomes a condition of policy for Denmark. In that

sense, the foreign-policy discourse in Washington matters greatly for how the

government in Copenhagen deines its scope of action. Given that Danish

foreign policy has previously depended on a broad consensus on ‘Activism’,

there is great scope for changing elements of Danish foreign policy simple

by adhering to another world view, especially if that world view is shared, or

at least partly shared, by the occupant of the White House. Following this

line of reasoning, one might argue that, if the Danish government wanted to

continue the policy of following Washington’s lead, then it should adopt the

narrative presented so forcefully by Krarup, Vermund, Messerschimdt and

others. Such a policy would give access to the British as well as the American

governments at a time when the new administrations in London and Wash-

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ington are anxiously looking for allies on an otherwise hostile continent.

A ‘Denmark irst’ policy would be anti-Islam. It would provide an ideo-

logical context to the tough Danish immigration laws which previous gov-

ernments have largely avoided giving an ideological foundation to. If the

Danish government were to embrace the clash-of-civilisation rhetoric of

President Putin, however, it would ofer a new foreign-policy narrative that

would defuse the conlict with Russia in a single speech. Marie Krarup is of

course right that from a Russian perspective the West is creating the con-

lict, and thus the conlict can be largely defused by accepting the Russian

world view and granting Kremlin the inluence it desires. Krarup describes

this as a ‘realist’ foreign policy which ‘recognises that diferent countries and

cultures hold diferent values’ (Krarup, 2017: 45). From this ‘realist’ per-

spective, the concessions the West would have to make to Russia are either

trivial compared to the perceived clash with Muslim civilisation or helpful

in undermining the EU. he Denmark-irsters are probably more anti-Islam

than the Russian government, which has been careful not to alienate its very

large Muslim minority.

his is not to say that putting Denmark irst would mean invoking Ar-

ticle 50. here is no majority in Parliament, nor currently any majority in

the electorate for leaving the EU. On the other hand, there is no appetite

for more integration either. Patience will therefore probably be the ‘realist’

strategy, as the Denmark-irsters wait for either new proposals for further

integration, which can be exploited to generate more opposition to the EU,

or wait for the UK to reach an agreement with Brussels under Article 50,

which will then present a real alternative to membership. Faced with either

an ultimatum or an alternative, the electorate would be much more open to

Denmark-irst arguments. In practical terms, this means an unsteady truce

on European integration; security and defence policy is another matter en-

tirely because it is hard to imagine the Danish People’s Party underwriting

an increase in the defence budget which is explicitly based on a greater threat

from Russia. Defence might thus become a contentious issue for the irst

time since 2003, when the current structure of the armed forces was de-

cided and DF became part of the Defence agreement. here is room for

compromise, however. Conscription will be a powerful bargaining chip for

the Denmark-irsters, who would like to increase conscription because they

believe that military service instils Danish values in the younger generation.

A marked increase in conscription could be made part of a rearmament initi-

ative and thus interpreted by some parties as a measure against Russia and by

others, including DF, as a way to strengthen the nation in ways with which

Putin would sympathise.

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A Friend in Berlin: The National Liberals

If the nationalist position is based on a perception of a crisis which the elites

ignore at their peril, then the national liberals perceive the nationalist surge

to be the crisis. he national liberal label is an old one in Danish politics, the

name under which the progressive forces that wrote the 1849 constitution

operated. While they argued for free trade and deregulation of the economy,

they also pursued a nationalist policy toward the German minority that led

to the 1864 war. he national liberal movement was defeated in Copenha-

gen when the Danish army was defeated at Dybbøl. Ever since no one has

wanted to be associated with the national liberal brand. hus I use this label

with some irony, but also in recognition of the fact that at the present time

the only way to be a liberal at the centre of Danish politics is to be Den-

mark-irst. he national liberals are no less impressed by a sense of crisis than

the nationalists are. heir perception of the nature of the crisis is radically

diferent from the Denmark-irsters, however. Where the nationalists feel

vindicated, the national liberals have a sense of a project that is collapsing.

Where the nationalists regard the crisis as the erosion of the nation state’s

ability to defend itself against Islam because of a careless cosmopolitan elite

and see Brexit and the election of Trump as a response to this crisis, the

national liberals regard the election of Trump and Brexit as the crisis itself.

Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen has thus expressed the fear that the

EU might collapse within three to ive years.

By arguing in this way, Sam-

uelsen is setting his goals for his period at the Foreign Ministry in terms of

what should be avoided. It follows from his statement that Denmark should

do its best to avoid such a collapse. Yet, having recognised that this is indeed

a real possibility, he is also indirectly making an argument for disruption. If

one believed without hesitation in the survival of the Union, then Danish

policy should continue within the EU set-up, in which case there is a clear

path to follow. Having recognised the possibility of collapse of the European

project, however, the foreign minister tacitly recognises that European pol-

itics are moving beyond the normal into new and more turbulent waters.

How to navigate these rougher waters then becomes the real question for the

minister and his civil servants to answer. hat answer must include alterna-

tives to the EU. he minister thus recognises that ultimately Denmark might

have to operate in a European environment in which the EU no longer ex-

ists. his sense of crisis echoes the nationalists’ notion that this is an age of

disruption where old policies cannot address new problems. However, the

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

perspective is very diferent. While in opposition, the current Minister for

Higher Education and Science, Søren Pind summed up this perspective of

crisis by arguing that:

‘at present it’s our way of life which is under severe pressure from

two sides. Many people are starting to believe that authoritarian

capitalism, represented by China, is the way forward instead of

our democratic capitalism. Regarding the Islamic threat, many

believe that it might be it that overwhelms us all. It is important

that the democratic institutions will ight for themselves. hus

this is not merely a matter of idealism, but also of self-recogni-

tion, power and reality.’

Whereas Marie Krarup regards the new authoritarianism as an ally in the

struggle against Islam, Søren Pind regards both neo-authoritarianism and

Islamism as enemies of ‘democratic capitalism’. he real crisis for Pind is thus

whether the institutions of democracy can defend themselves. he national-

ists are thus a part of the problem rather than of the solution in Pind’s per-

spective. Anders Fogh Rasmussen applied this argument to Donald Trump

(at least before the election – Rasmussen seemed to soften his view on Trump

somewhat after the election): ‘supporting the forces that seek the fragmen-

tation of Europe, Trump represents a new, dangerous and protest-like view.

One can fear that when Trump says “America First”: this means a return

to the isolationism of the United States in the 1930s which led to world

catastrophe.’

his is a crisis in the algorithm that has deined Danish foreign poli-

cy since the end of the Cold War. his activism was based on the simple

premise that, if Denmark closely followed the lead set by the United States

and the United Kingdom, then it would be in the vanguard of globalisa-

tion. Activism was thus a prescription for how to act rather than what to

do because the content of policies was to be decided in Washington and

London. With Brexit and the election of Trump, London and Washington

have explicitly stated that they will now be focusing on their own interests

rather than pursuing the interests of a globalised West. Copenhagen can no

longer expect that its close allies will formulate policies and take initiatives in

which Denmark can be part, nor be sure that it will agree with Washington’s

policies. Former Minister of Finance and present Defence Minister Claus

Hjort Frederiksen thus commented on Donald Trump: ‘What he says seem

very insensitive. It goes against a lot of what we have been working for. I have

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been passionate about free trade, growth and better welfare for many years.

Apparently, he follows a diferent tune, talking about walls and that sort of

thing.’

So what is Denmark to do if its major allies start playing a diferent

tune? First, it will lead to a recognition that there is no longer any one global

liberal project and that each nation must pursue its own policies. ‘We have

to recognise’, argues Anders Samuelsen, ‘that foreign policy is determined

by the member states [of the EU]. We are diferent nations. here are areas

where we can cooperate – e.g. peacekeeping missions, but when it comes to

agreeing on which Russian civil servants to block by sanctions we can hardly

agree.’

he government’s platform from November 2016 relects this sen-

timent when it states that ‘the government will actively pursue Denmark’s

interests through strong European cooperation.’

his formulation made

European integration a vehicle for pursuing Danish interests and thus for us-

ing foreign-policy activism in a new context: instead of activism being about

Danish participation in a common efort, activism was now about using a

common efort to realize Denmark’s goals. his was also true of the govern-

ment’s position on Brexit: ‘in the negotiations between the EU and Britain,

the government’s focus will be to pursue Denmark’s interests’.

To the gov-

ernment the main question was thus to pursue the Kingdom’s interests, but

what exactly are they? Perhaps it is no coincidence that the government’s

most clearly articulated formulation of its interpretation of Danish interests

came in November 2016 when Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen vis-

ited Berlin and was ofered the rare honour of speaking to the

Bundestag

Volkstrauertag,

when Germany remembers the victims of war:

‘Europe is facing a deining moment in time. A 100 years after

the Battle of the Somme in the First World War – a tragedy of

senseless killing – we are united in a union of peace. But also a

union under pressure. We face cowardly terrorist attacks – at-

tempting to break down our free and democratic societies. We

face slow economic growth with millions of European citizens

out of jobs. Nationalism and protectionism are becoming false

symbols of hope. his must not lead to further division. Instead,

we must stand together. Safeguard the immense achievements of

European cooperation. And Europe needs Germany to keep on

leading the way.’

he Prime Minister identiied the success of the European project with Ger-

many’s willingness to lead. In Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s account, European

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integration is neither the self-perpetuating process which functionalist stu-

dents of European integration believe it to be, nor the product of a common

purpose in creating a new political reality which federalists believe. he Dan-

ish Prime Minister believes that European integration depends on German

leadership. hus in structural terms, his analysis is not very diferent from

President Trump, who believes that the EU is ‘a vehicle for Germany’.

But

even though Rasmussen and Trump agree on the centrality of German pow-

er for the EU, they view the way this power is used very diferently. Trump

regards the EU as a vehicle of German power, whereas Rasmussen would

like Germany to use its power to safeguard the Union. Rasmussen does not

fear German hegemony as much as he fears German disengagement, which

would leave small European states like Denmark without the tutelage of

the European Union. Nationalists would certainly see this as a conirmation

that the European integration project is an alliance between national elites

against a sceptical electorate. However, the government has been clear that

the EU is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Securing German

support is a way to prop up European integration, but it is also an insurance

policy against the foreign minister’s fear that the EU might collapse in ive

years being realized. Denmark is thus in the process of replacing the United

States and the UK with Germany as a key ally so as to redeine the nature of

Danish foreign-policy activism. In so doing the government is following a

well-known script: it has just replaced Washington and London with Berlin

in the leading role. One might argue that in so doing the government is

bringing Danish security policy in line with other aspects of foreign policy

which have long been following the German lead. Even so it is a crucial

diference, since the links with London and Washington gave the Danish

government greater scope for action than an exclusive focus on Berlin will

allow. his is to a large extent a question of imagination, since Berlin’s out-

look is much more Europe-focused than Danish foreign policy has been

since the end of the Cold War. he Danish government is thus regionalising

its foreign-policy agenda.

he precariousness of this policy is relected in the government’s aim

of pursuing Danish interests in a strong Europe. One answer to Brexit is

to give a new impetus to integration. In his state of the union speech on

14 September 2016 in Strasbourg, which was followed by a meeting of the

heads of state and government in Bratislava two days later, the President of

the European Commission thus announced that ‘Member States must build

a Europe that protects’.

In the Bratislava Roadmap the European agenda is

deined in terms of internal and external security. Youth unemployment was

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added to the document almost as an afterthought. On a continent where 20

percent of people under 25 are unemployed, any political priority which is

put above ighting youth unemployment must be truly important. Perhaps

this prioritization is the clearest indication that the EU plans to use security

rather than the economy as the vehicle for further integration after Brexit.

he Danish government’s problem is that it is neither part of the European

Security and Defence Policy nor the Euro. hus because of the roadmap

decided by the European leaders, Denmark simply cannot pursue an active

policy to create a stronger Europe. he Danes’ most vital contribution will

be not to stand in the way. his means that the government must gravitate

towards securing Danish interests by making sure that increased integration

in the areas in which Denmark has opt-outs does not make Danexit a reality

by default. For this purpose, the Danish government needs Berlin to put in

a word for Denmark and make sure that any new initiatives leave a role for

the country. he fact that Denmark secured a working arrangement with

Europol despite the rejection of membership in a referendum is one example

of this.

Even though it might change over time, the current national liberal ap-

proach is thus to replace the United States and the United Kingdom with

Germany, but otherwise to continue pursuing a liberal foreign policy. In

many ways, Chancellor Merkel is the last Western leader who believes in

the values that have deined Danish foreign-policy activism. From this per-

spective, the re-orientation towards Berlin seems to be the least disruptive

approach open to Danish foreign policy. his also constitutes the inherent

challenge in this approach, namely that Germany and Denmark do not hold

similar beliefs on European integration. On value-related issues like immi-

gration, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Rasmussen represent very

diferent views. his was demonstrated in the serious disagreements between

Berlin and Copenhagen in 2015 when Denmark responded to the surge of

refugees in Europe by closing its borders to the consternation of the German

government, which insisted that it could manage the inlux of refugees. On

this as on many other issues Denmark continues to be closer to London than

Berlin. On neither integration nor immigration does the Danish government

have much room for manoeuvre, however, and that means that Copenhagen

has very little to ofer its new best friends in Berlin. During the 1990-2015

period, Danish foreign-policy activism was sustained by continuous military

engagements supporting Anglo-American interventions. Cooperation with

Berlin cannot be sustained in this way, but if Denmark has little to ofer

in terms of contributing to European integration, it is diicult to see how

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the renewed alliance could be deepened. Perhaps it is on this issue that the

national liberals prove that they are indeed liberals, since cooperation with

Berlin is based on the premise that international cooperation carries its own

reward and on the liberal belief that progress will eventually overcome the

problems of the present. In short, the national liberal strategy is to hope for

the best.

he Danish government might ind that taking out an insurance policy

against future changes in the European order in Berlin is too narrow a for-

eign-policy goal to constitute a real alignment with Berlin. Denmark will not

be a central part of any efort Germany might undertake to strength the Un-

ion, and Berlin and Copenhagen might quickly ind themselves on diferent

pathways. he best Copenhagen can hope for is acceptance of a multi-speed

Europe, but where would that leave Danish foreign policy? A Danish foreign

minister should also want to set agendas, rather than just taking notes on

what goes on in Brussels while he is not there. Paradoxically, this might lead

to a revitalisation of the Anglo-Danish relationship. he UK will be in the

same situation as Denmark, namely looking for new initiatives to constitute

a post-Brexit foreign policy, and while the UK would like to deine an ex-

tra-European foreign policy, it is actually returning to northern Europe with

an enhanced forward presence and other deterrence measures against Russia

in a way not seen since the end of the Cold War. In terms of security, there is

thus room for Copenhagen and London to continue the defense cooperation

they established during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. he UK will surely

be looking for ways to use defense cooperation as bridge to other types of

cooperation at a time when London needs all the European allies it can get.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

A Global Denmark: The Cosmopolitans

he national liberals are attempting to continue Danish foreign-policy activ-

ism under the new conditions created by Brexit and the election of Donald

Trump. heir greatest challenge is to ensure continuation of the EU and the

global trade regime in the face of disruption. he nationalists are the agents

of disruption and have nothing but contempt for what they perceive as the

elites clinging to the rigging of a sinking ship. he cosmopolitans applaud

the collapse of the globalization agenda and rejoice at the demise of Danish

foreign-policy activism. Activism began as an uneasy compromise between

cosmopolitans and defencists (Rasmussen, 2005), but the Iraq War and sub-

sequent military engagements alienated the cosmopolitans from Activism,

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which they considered had degenerated into kneejerk militarism, a milita-

rism that was inspired by lofty, liberal ideas which it in practice was unable

to deliver on. he author Carsten Jensen has emerged as the most eloquent

critic of the Danish involvement in Afghanistan, and in 2013 he summed

up the cosmopolitan assessment of activism: ‘I see good intentions combined

with ignorance, incompetence and an unlimited supply of weaponry’.

historian Paul Villaume described activism as an ‘unrelective adjustment to

Washington’s security policy’.

hese critics shared the nationalist’s suspi-

cions of the EU and NATO and also agreed with the nationalists that a con-

frontation with Russia was the result of an expansive Western foreign policy.

In other words, they believed that many of the problems which present-day

foreign and security policy is supposed to address have been created by that

very same foreign-policy paradigm. Activism is part of the problem rather

than part of the solution. By abandoning activism and declining to follow

the United States into its various military adventures, it is argued, a more

comprehensive security will be achieved than following the present course.

While the cosmopolitans agree with the nationalist’s critique of activism,

they are not arguing for the same alternative policy. Whereas the nation-

alists claim to be speaking for the Danish people and its true interests, the

cosmopolitans want to leave the parochial conception of national interests

behind in favour of a world view that places Danes in a community with the

other peoples of the globe. he Alternative Party’s spokesperson on foreign

afairs, Rasmus Norqvist, summed up this view when he called for ‘making

Denmark the best country

for

the world’.

Denmark should no longer ask

how best to realise Danish interests, but rather how Denmark could act for

the greater good.

At the heart of the very diferent policy prescriptions that follow on from

the nationalists’ and cosmopolitans’ critiques of activism is a radically difer-

ent conception of what constitutes the Danish nation and how that nation

is related to the outside world. According to the nationalists, a war is being

fought to maintain the Western, including the Danish, way of life under the

joint onslaught of Muslim immigration and Islamite terrorism, which are of-

ten regarded as two sides of the same coin. his war takes many forms – some

of them armed conlict, some a social struggle over identity – but in each

and every case the Danish people are seen as being pitted against outside

inluences. he cosmopolitan perspective is increasingly being formulated as

a response to this conception of a clash of civilisations. From a cosmopolitan

perspective, foreign policy was one of several policies causing ‘many refugees

or descendants of refugees [to] feel alienated religiously and ethnically in

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Denmark’, as the poet Yayha Hassan put it during his brief spell as a politi-

cian. He mentioned one example of this: ‘As opposed to Denmark, Sweden

is not a member of NATO and the military coalition that drops bombs on

civilians. Sweden has also recognized Palestine, thus sending an important

signal and bringing the population together by recognizing minorities’.

pointing to Sweden, Yayha Hassan is also pointing to a counterfactual for-

eign policy – a world in which Denmark did not enter the path of military

activism after the Cold War but remained true to the Scandinavian notion

of a harmonious society with fellow-feeling and cooperation among persons

and classes (Østergaard, 1992). his was the traditional point of departure

for Danish cosmopolitanism. Foreign minister P. Munch

claimed that the

starting point for foreign policy should be ‘the fellow-feeling and cooperation

between persons, classes and states, not the blind struggle for power where

one believes only in getting ahead at the expense of others’ (Munch, quoted

in Pedersen, 1970: 412). he cosmopolitans are thus speaking to an older

notion of Denmark’s place in the world which was almost lost in the period

after the end of the Cold War, but the homogenous, liberal Danish society

which produced that perspective hardly exists any longer. Today, cosmopoli-

tanism is about multiculturalism, which connects Danes of many faiths and

ethnicities to the rest of the world. he fact that Denmark did not intervene

in the civil war in Syria appalled Haifaa Awad, who could not recognise her

own values in the policies of the Danish government in relation to the civil

war raging in her ancestral Syria. She wrote that she was unable to recognise

‘my Denmark’ in the discourse and policy on Syria, and continued: ‘he

number of refugees are at its highest since the Second World War, the blood-

bath in Syria continues mercilessly and the Syrian people is squashed be-

tween Islamists and an ice-cold regime. And in Denmark we only do ice-cold

calculations in order to keep the refugees out. Problems are to be solved in

the region, they say.’

For Haifaa Awad, the distinction between the Middle

East and Denmark makes little sense: her identity is deined by both. Hence

the distinction between the ‘ice-cold’ calculation of interests in the Foreign

Ministry and her own motivations, which are driven by the white heat of

emotions. Awad’s notion of ‘a Denmark’ naturally implies the existence of

diferent ‘Denmarks’, or, more precisely, diferent notions of Danish identity.

Her anger at the lack of empathy and involvement in the Syrian civil war is

also a reaction against the national assertion that the fates of the Syrian and

Danish peoples are not related when they are clearly linked in her biography.

From this perspective, the debate is not about foreign policy but about who

can count themselves Danes and how Danish identity is constructed in rela-

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tion to the rest of the world. his is especially controversial in relation to the

Middle East: is the relationship with the Muslim world deined by a conlict

between Western values and Islam, or is it rather a family relationship with

similar people moving between diferent societies?

From the cosmopolitan perspective, Carsten Jensen’s description of Dan-

ish foreign and security policy should be turned on its head. hus, instead of

being deined by good intentions, ignorance, incompetence and an unlimit-

ed supply of weaponry, policy should be formulated on the basis of knowl-

edge, skill and civilian capacity. Knowledge is the most important element,

knowledge in the form of cultural understanding and concrete experience

with life as it is lived in other places on the globe. Knowledge becomes the

ability to operate in a world that is deined by your biography rather than by

borders. From the cosmopolitan perspective, such knowledge should be seen

as the antithesis of the perceived ignorance of the nationalist perspective.

Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton have made a similar critique of British

foreign policy, arguing that Britain is failing to exploit the fact that it is the

hub of a post-colonial network because British elites do not imagine Britain

having a global reach. According to Barkawi and Brighton, British strategy is

informed by a nationalist reading of history rather than a cosmopolitan one

(Barkawi and Brighton, 2013). hey argue for a ‘Brown Britain strategy’;

Danish cosmopolitans could – though tongue in cheek – argue for a Dark

Denmark strategy, which would put civilian networks rather than military

power at the centre of foreign and security policy. Danish cosmopolitans

have always questioned the utility of force. A Dark Denmark strategy would

emphasise the use of NGOs to link diasporas in Denmark with their breth-

ren in other places in the world. In that way, cultural understandings could

be exploited to make much more efective strategies for development and

assistance in the third world. he focus would be much less Eurocentric

and much less cautious about getting involved because from a cosmopolitan

perspective the interrelationships between societies mean that involvement

is unavoidable in global afairs. his focus on involvement based on mutual

agreements and understandings constitutes a rejection of the liberal notion

of global values, as well as a rejection of the perceived need to enforce a

global liberal order by military force. hese cosmopolitans are thus highly

critical of the United States, and the election of Donald Trump will only

have boosted this. From a cosmopolitan perspective, his insistence on the

will of the American people as opposed to other peoples will make Trump

as problematic as Vladimir Putin. From that perspective, however, the EU

does not necessarily fare much better because it is perceived as a community

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

that insists on creating a European identity at odds with the cosmopolitan

relationships of Dark Denmark.

Conclusions

Activism deined Danish foreign policy with reference to a speciic set of

values, and even though these values were hotly disputed, they nonetheless

formed the basis of an algorithm of how to debate and decide on foreign-pol-

icy issues. hat algorithm no longer adds up, as the activist perspective has

been replaced by three competing perspectives on Danish foreign and securi-

ty policy. he nationalist perspective on Danish foreign policy takes its point

of departure in the belief that the main task of foreign policy is to defend

the integrity of the Danish people against the perceived onslaught from Is-

lam. he national liberals share a government perspective regarding foreign

policy as a government–to-government relationship. Where the nationalists

have an organic notion of the state and thus believe that government should

express the ‘will of the people’, the national liberals focus on the national

interest consisting in a longer term commitment to free trade and interna-

tional institutions which transcend the current Euro-sceptic climate. his is

the position which the cosmopolitans regards as ‘cold’. Taking their point

of departure in individuals, the latter engage in a type of identity politics

which is fundamentally at odds and in many ways a creation of nationalist

identity politics. To the cosmopolitans, international relations are irst and

foremost relations between individuals interrelated in ways that transcend

borders. Whereas the national liberals want to defend the state and its in-

terests against the whims of the electorate and the nationalists want to take

over the state in order to make it a vehicle for the popular will as they deine

it, the cosmopolitans prefer initiatives that link civil societies together in the

search for speciic solutions to speciic problems.

he three perspectives thus deal with disruption in diferent ways. he

nationalists regard the disruption caused by Brexit and the election of Don-

ald Trump as an opportunity to replace the liberal international institutions

that support the national liberal order with a more nationalistic mode of

governance. he national liberals seek to strengthen existing institutions by

mobilising Germany to underwrite them. In their view, the disruption is a

temporary crisis which can be overcome by investing politically in the EU

and other international institutions. Because cosmopolitans embrace disrup-

tion, they will, albeit with trepidation, welcome the havoc caused by Brex-

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

it and the election of Donald Trump. In their analysis the events of 2016

demonstrate that the current political system in the West is unsustainable.

Like the nationalists, they see the crisis as an opportunity to fundamentally

rewrite the code of political DNA, but they see the nationalists as part of the

corrupted code which needs to be removed if a healthy body politics is to

be restored.

he national liberals dominate Parliament and the Foreign Minister with

the support of the press and most public intellectuals. hey have the polit-

ical capital that the two other perspectives lack. Some of that can be spend

on compromises that continue the tradition of activism by accommodating

national and cosmopolitan concerns in joint projects. On the conceptual

level the fact that the liberal, integration-friendly segment has morphed into

a national liberal position is a major concession to the nationalists. Still, the

centre that the national liberals defend might not hold under the onslaught

from nationalists and cosmopolitans combined. In fact, the dominance of

the national liberal view among increasingly unpopular elites constitutes that

position’s greatest weakness. his conceptual weakness is enforced by the fact

that current events are also weakening the national liberal position. As op-

posed to the Activism years, Parliament and the Foreign Ministry no longer

set the agenda and thus can no longer use speciic foreign-policy events to

shape a foreign-policy discourse. Most of these events seem to be undercur-

rent to the narrative the national liberals would like to promote, for each

trade treaty the United States annuls, each foreign policy-gain by Russia and

China, each crisis in Brussels and each election of nationalist leaders under-

mines the idea of a current crisis that can be overcome. In the inal analysis,

the national liberals have no answer for what to do if the EU collapses, if the

United States withdraws from NATO, if Russia becomes the dominant pow-

er in the Baltics or if Angela Merkel is not re-elected as German chancellor.

Cosmopolitans and nationalists do have something new to ofer, even if na-

tional liberals reject their ideas as catastrophes in their own right. his means

that they will often steal a march on the national liberals, who are forever

destined to react, rather produce ideas for a pro-active policy.

A political idea is not destroyed because the projects it informs are un-

successful; a political idea is destroyed when it is no longer able to inform

new projects to deal with new problems. What disruption really disrupts is

the algorithms of political ideas – the prescriptions for formulating and im-

plementing political projects. he national liberals are defending a European

order and insisting on Denmark’s continuing commitment to it, though it

seems unable to deal in new ways with new problems. Nationalism and cos-

NATIONALISTS, NATIONAL LIBERALS AND COSMOPOLITANS: DANISH FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES AFTER BREXIT AND TRUMP

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

mopolitanism embrace disruption and are thus able to suggest new ideas and

point to new political projects. It is this ability to innovate, rather than the

quality of their policy suggestions, that could give them the upper hand in

the debate on the future of Danish security and defence policy. he nation-

alists and cosmopolitans should be careful what they wish for, however. It is

one thing to long for disruption; it is another to live in a world created by

disruption.

Notes

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen is a professor at the Department of Political Science, University

of Copenhagen, where he currently serves as the Head of Department.

Ny måling: Folk er mere utrygge ved Trump end terror.

http://nyheder.tv2.dk/2017-02-13-

ny-maaling-folk-er-mere-utrygge-ved-trump-end-terror (accessed: 18 February 2017).

Danish Government,

For et friere, rigere og mere trygt Danmark,

Regeringsgrund-

lag Marienborgaftalen 2016. Available at: https://www.regeringen.dk/media/2703/

regeringsgrundlag2016_inal_upload.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2017), p. 41. All quotes

translated from Danish by the author.

he Guardian (2001)

Full text: Tony Blair’s speech (part one).

Available at: https://www.

theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6 (Accessed: 27 January

2017).

Statsminister Poul Nyrup Rasmussens replik ved åbningsdebatten i Folketinget den 7. Oktober

1999

(2008) Available at: http://www.stm.dk/_p_7628.html (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Tag os!

(2016) Available at: https://dansketaler.dk/tale/tag-os/ (Accessed: 27 January

2017).

hulesen Dahl: Trump er forfriskende

(2017) Available at: http://nyheder.tv2.dk/

politik/2017-01-16-thulesen-dahl-trump-er-forfriskende (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

he inaugural address

(2017) Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address

(Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Buncombe, A. (2016)

Brexit: Donald Trump says British people have ‘taken back their

country’.

Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/brexit-donald-trump-

says-british-people-have-taken-back-their-country-a7100726.html (Accessed: 27 January

2017).

10 McTague, T. and Oreskes, B. (2016)

Nigel Farage: After Brexit and trump, Europe could

be next.

Available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/nigel-farage-after-brexit-and-donald-

trump-europe-could-be-next/ (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

11 Stewart, H., Yuhas, A. and Walker, P. (2017)

Donald Trump’s irst UK post-election in-

terview: Brexit a ‘great thing’.

Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/

jan/15/trumps-irst-uk-post-election-interview-brexit-a-great-thing (Accessed: 27 January

2017).

12 ‘Får lygtningekrisen EU til at kollapse – eller til at rykke tættere sammen?’

Politiken,

September, 2015. Available at: http://politiken.dk/udland/fokus_int/Flygtningestroem/

article5589715.ece (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

13 Vermund, P. (2016)

Giv ansvaret for Danmark tilbage til danskerne.

Available at: http://

ekstrabladet.dk/opinionen/pernillevermund/Giv-ansvaret-for-Danmark-tilbage-til-

danskerne/6333205 (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Kontroversielt angreb på dansk efterretningstjeneste.

Available at: http://jyllands-posten.

dk/indland/ECE9312855/dansk-folkeparti-i-et-kontroversielt-angreb-paa-dansk-

efterretningstjeneste/ (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

15 Danish Defence Intelligence Service,

Intelligence Risk Assessment 2016,

Available at:

https://fe-ddis.dk/eng/Products/Documents/Intelligence%20Risk%20Assessment%20

2016.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2017), 11.

DF-ordfører: EU er en større trussel mod Danmark end Putin er

(2016) Available at: http://

nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2016-08-22-df-ordfoerer-eu-er-en-stoerre-trussel-mod-danmark-

end-putin-er (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Marie Krarup om Udenrigsministeriets diplomater: ‘Kan de overhovedet læse?’

Available at:

http://www.b.dk/politiko/marie-krarup-om-udenrigsministeriets-diplomater-kan-de-

overhovedet-laese (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

18 31 December 2015, Russian Federation Presidential Edict 683 approving appended text

of ‘he Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy’. Available at:

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-

National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

19 Feuer, A. and Higgins, A. (2017)

Extremists turn to a leader to protect western values:

Vladimir Putin.

Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/

alt-right-vladimir-putin.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=sto-

ry-heading&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_

r=0 (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

DF-kender: ‘Dansk Folkeparti beinder sig faktisk i en dyb krise’.

Berlingske. Available at

http://www.b.dk/politiko/df-kender-dansk-folkeparti-befinder-sig-faktisk-i-en-dyb-

krise?referrer=RSS&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter (Accessed 18 February

2017)

Samuelsen: Vi har 3-5 år til at redde EU.

Available at: http://www.altinget.dk/eu/artikel/

samuelsen-vi-har-3-5-aar-til-at-redde-eu#.WIG6h57zrng.facebook (Accessed: 27 January

2017).

Pind: Dansk udenrigspolitik er kynisk og lagrende.

Available at: http://www.b.dk/politiko/

pind-dansk-udenrigspolitik-er-kynisk-og-lagrende (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

23 Jørgensen, A.J.S. (2016)

Fogh advarer: ‘Trump kan betyde, at EU og NATO bryder sammen’.

Available at: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/fogh-advarer-trump-kan-betyde-at-eu-og-nato-

bryder-sammen (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

24 Jørgensen, A.J.S. (2016)

Claus Hjort om ‘ufattelige’ trump: Det vil få ubehagelige konse-

kvenser, hvis han vinder.

Available at: http://www.b.dk/globalt/claus-hjort-om-ufattelige-

trump-det-vil-faa-ubehagelige-konsekvenser-hvis-han-vinde (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

25 Holm, A.L.T. (2014)

Samuelsens europæiske kovending.

Available at: http://www.b.dk/poli-

tiko/samuelsens-europaeiske-kovending (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

26 Danish Government,

For et friere, rigere og mere trygt Danmark,

Regeringsgrundlag

Marienborgaftalen 2016. Available at: https://www.regeringen.dk/media/2703/

regeringsgrundlag2016_inal_upload.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2017), p. 44.

(44, https://www.regeringen.dk/media/2703/regeringsgrundlag2016_inal_upload.pdf )

27 Danish Government,

For et friere, rigere og mere trygt Danmark,

Regeringsgrundlag

Marienborgaftalen 2016. Available at: https://www.regeringen.dk/media/2703/regerings-

grundlag2016_inal_upload.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2017), p. 45.

Prime minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s address at the Volkstrauertag on 13 November 2016

(2016) Available at: http://www.stm.dk/_p_14444.html (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

NATIONALISTS, NATIONAL LIBERALS AND COSMOPOLITANS: DANISH FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES AFTER BREXIT AND TRUMP

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

29 ‘Donald Trump takes swipe at EU as ‘vehicle for Germany’. President-elect stokes Europe-

an fears for the future of transatlantic alliance’,

Financial Times,

Available at: https://www.

ft.com/content/1f7c6746-db75-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

30 COMM (2016)

he state of the union 2016: Towards a better Europe – A Europe that

protects, empowers and defends.

Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-

3042_en.htm (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

Carsten Jensen: Politikernes fyrtårn af håb er sønderskudt, og lyset virker ikke.

Available at:

http://politiken.dk/debat/debatindlaeg/art5431599/Carsten-Jensen-Politikernes-fyr-

t%C3%A5rn-af-h%C3%A5b-er-s%C3%B8nderskudt-og-lyset-virker-ikke (Accessed: 27

January 2017).

32 Villaume, P. (2016)

Aktivisme – eller tilpasning til USA.

Available at: http://www.informa-

tion.dk/125076 (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

33 Nordqvist, R., Krarup, M. and Petersen, M.H. (2016)

Danmarks udenrigspolitik skal gøre

Danmark til det bedste land for verden – Politiko.

Available at: http://puls.politiko.dk/

danmarks-udenrigspolitik-skal-gore-danmark-til-det-bedste-land-for-verden/ (Accessed:

27 January 2017).

Yahya Hassan: Danmarks udenrigspolitik har konsekvenser for os selv.

Available at: http://

www.bt.dk/politik/yahya-hassan-danmarks-udenrigspolitik-har-konsekvenser-for-os-selv

(Accessed: 27 January 2017).

35 P. Munch was a social liberal member of Parliament from 1909-45, minister of defence

1913-20 and minister of foreign afairs 1929-40.

36 Awad, U. (2016)

Jeg kan ikke længere kende mit Danmark.

Available at: https://www.infor-

mation.dk/udland/2015/06/kan-laengere-kende-danmark (Accessed: 27 January 2017).

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

NATIONALISTS, NATIONAL LIBERALS AND COSMOPOLITANS: DANISH FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES AFTER BREXIT AND TRUMP

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

The Greenland Card:

Prospects for and Barriers

to Danish Arctic Diplomacy

in Washington

THE GREENLAND CARD: PROSPECTS FOR AND BARRIERS TO DANISH ARCTIC DIPLOMACY IN WASHINGTON

Anders Henriksen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen

Globalisation and climate change have made the Arctic region an increas-

ingly important area of global concern. Greenland is part of the Kingdom

of Denmark, which makes Denmark one of only eight Arctic states, ofering

Copenhagen ample opportunity to exert its inluence on a region of increas-

ing strategic importance. As Ambassador Peter Taksøe-Jensen noted in his

2016 assessment of Danish foreign policy, Denmark is ‘an Arctic great pow-

er’ (Taksøe-Jensen 2016: i).

he Arctic region is important to the United States, and Greenland has

historically served American strategic purposes, in particular during the Cold

War, when the island constituted a vital node in NATO’s nuclear deterrence

system

vis-à-vis

the Soviet Union. he United States is also an important

Danish ally, and Copenhagen’s willingness to allow the United States to con-

struct and operate military installations in Greenland during the Cold War

gave Danish governments the so-called Greenland Card (‘Grønlandskortet’),

which could be played in exchange for certain beneits both in Washington

and within NATO (Danish Foreign Policy Institute 1997; Danish Institute

for International Studies 2005; Lidegaard 1996; Ringsmose 2008; Villaume

1996). In light of the fundamental changes occurring in the Arctic, it is

pertinent to ask whether the Greenland Card still exists. To what extent can

Denmark use Greenland to enhance its inluence over American policies on

matters of interest to Denmark? What are the immediate barriers to Danish

Arctic diplomacy in relation to the United States?

he present chapter is a study of the interests of Denmark, Greenland

and the United States in Greenland and the Arctic and the perceptions of the

triangular dynamics involved among policy-makers in the three countries.

Studying the perceptions of these dynamics helps us explore whether there

are barriers inhibiting Danish Arctic diplomacy in Washington. he chapter

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

is based on interviews with relevant politicians, diplomats and experts from

Denmark, Greenland and the United States conducted in the course of 2016

in Copenhagen, Nuuk, Brussels and Washington.

Most of our interview-

ees participated on the condition of anonymity, and although we give some

background information on each interviewee, we have ensured that they

cannot be identiied. We are aware that many of our interviewees may have

their own agendas and, when possible, we have sought to verify the content

of their statements from numerous other sources.

he chapter takes its point of departure in Denmark’s and Greenland’s

respective interests, which sometimes conlict. As a small country located in

a geopolitically precarious site, maintaining a good relationship with and

inluence in the United States are crucial goals of Danish foreign policy.

Greenland ofers an opportunity to gain leverage and access that may be

utilised for other purposes (Henriksen and Ringsmose 2011; Rahbek-Clem-

mensen 2014).

Greenland, by contrast, strives to achieve full independence from Co-

penhagen in the long term. For the time being, however, due to its current

iscal situation, the island will remain dependent on the substantial annu-

al economic block grant (DKK 3.7 billion (roughly USD 530 million) in

2016, excluding services) that it receives from Denmark (Statistics Denmark

2016, p. 474; Economic Council of Greenland 2016, p. 26). To improve

its economy, Greenland is seeking to ind as many sources of revenue as

possible, most importantly investments by foreign irms, including Chinese

companies. Furthermore, Greenland is seeking to obtain as much interna-

tional recognition and political autonomy as possible within the framework

of the Kingdom of Denmark (Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2016).

We start our analysis with an overview of the United States’ interests

in Greenland before we present the various ways in which Denmark and

Greenland can beneit from the American engagement in the Arctic. In the

inal part of the chapter, we discuss the existing barriers to improving Den-

mark’s Arctic diplomacy in Washington.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

American interests in Greenland

In modern history, Greenland has primarily been of interest to the United

States due to its geographical location on the shortest route as the crow lies

between Russia and North America. he United States has always sought to

protect its north-eastern lank and to ensure that foreign powers cannot use

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

the island as a launchpad for operations in the vicinity of the United States.

Even before the United States emerged as a global superpower, Washington

sought to understand and exercise control over the far north, including sev-

eral attempts to purchase the island from Denmark in the nineteenth centu-

ry and around the two world wars. During World War II, the United States

sought to obtain a foothold in Greenland to prevent Germany from using

the island to construct weather stations and to land aircraft

en route

to North

America. he American government struck a deal with Henrik Kaufmann,

the then Danish Ambassador to the United States, who granted the United

States extensive rights to utilise Greenlandic territory for military purposes.

he agreement between Denmark and the United States was considered to

be a Danish contribution to the allied forces during the war. In the Cold

War period, American military installations in Greenland played an impor-

tant role in America’s nuclear early-warning system and in monitoring and

countering Soviet naval activities in the North Atlantic (Berry 2016; Dan-

ish Foreign Policy Institute 1997; Danish Institute for International Studies

2005; Lidegaard 1996).

Although geostrategic interests still inform the overall American posi-

tion, ‘the opening of the Arctic’ has also helped increase American interest in

Greenland. In practice, the United States’ interests in Greenland can be di-

vided into three broad categories that we shall examine in more detail in this

section: military-strategic interests; the opening up of the Arctic region, and

political stability in Greenland. American interests in the region are far from

static, and ample opportunity exists for exerting inluence on the American

political agenda.

THE GREENLAND CARD: PROSPECTS FOR AND BARRIERS TO DANISH ARCTIC DIPLOMACY IN WASHINGTON

Military-strategic interests

he United States’ military-strategic interests in Greenland are derived from

Greenland’s geographical location between North America and Russia. hus,

the island’s strategic importance to the United States is closely related to

the latter’s relationship with Russia. When Russia is perceived to be a threat

to the North American continent the United States is more interested in

Greenland, and

vice versa.

In the words of one interviewee, the United States

considers Greenland ‘through the lenses of Russia. It is primarily about ge-

ography and the ability to operate in that area … Greenland is nice because

of its location.’

As already noted, the American military installations in Greenland, most

notably hule Air Base, constituted a vital element in the American nuclear

deterrence system during the Cold War. However, the strategic importance

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

of the installations in Greenland declined substantially after the collapse of

the Soviet Union. It is sometimes claimed that hule Air Base could also

play a role in the defence of North America against missile threats from

rogue states, such as North Korea (Danish Ministry of Foreign Afairs. 2003;

Dragsdahl 2003), but we found no evidence for concluding that such threats

increase Greenland’s importance signiicantly. As Greenland’s strategic im-

portance to the United States is linked to US-Russian relations, Greenland’s

strategic signiicance may increase if that relationship were to deteriorate.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its support for pro-Russian mili-

tants in eastern Ukraine worsened the relationship between the West and

Russia and at the time of writing (March 2017), the United States is still

participating in the sanctions regime that was imposed on Russia in 2014.

It is not yet clear what concrete policies the Trump administration will

pursue in relation to Russia. In his presidential campaign, Trump spoke in

favour of improving American–Russian relations, but he also indicated that

he would seek to strengthen American missile defence capabilities, which

would be considered a hostile move by the Russians.

Either way, the Arctic may end up playing an important role in US-Rus-

sia relations. In case of an American-Russian rapprochement the two govern-

ments are likely to search for areas of cooperation, and the Arctic would be a

good place to start. After all, the region has remained an area of low-tension,

even during the height of the Ukraine crisis, and it would therefore be a

natural place to resume diplomatic relations (Oliker and Kurtunov 2017).

While Greenland would become less important to the United States, Denmark

could play a constructive role by facilitating Arctic cooperation with Russia.

Increased tensions between the United States and Russia, on the other

hand, are likely to lead to an enhanced focus on the seas between Greenland,

Iceland and the United Kingdom – the so-called ‘Greenland-Iceland-Unit-

ed-Kingdom Gap’ (GIUK gap). he GIUK gap is a bottleneck of strategic

importance to the ability of Russian submarines to operate in the North

Atlantic, and surveillance of the area is set to remerge as an American priority

and a task for Western defence in the event of a crisis between the United

States and Russia (Hicks et al. 2016; Gramer 2016). To monitor the GIUK

gap efectively, the United States is likely to rely on its local allies, most no-

tably Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom, but Greenland could also

play a constructive role. For example, bases in Greenland could be utilised,

and Danish forces could contribute capabilities designed for anti-submarine

warfare (Hicks et al. 2016: 23). As was the case during the Cold War, the

Faroe Islands could also play a substantial role (Jensen 2004: 13–40, 59–76).

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

The opening up of the Arctic

American interests in Greenland are not limited to the island’s important

strategic location and its military-strategic relationship with Russia. Climate

change and the accompanying ‘opening up of the Arctic’ and the seas in the

North Atlantic have also drawn American attention to the region. In recent

decades, regional organisations, such as the Arctic Council, have gradual-

ly become more important to the United States, and the 2015 American

National Security Strategy explicitly refers to climate change as a security

concern (United States Coast Guard 2013; White House 2015: 12; 2013:

4; Danish Ministry of Defense 2016b: 48). he increase in American in-

terest in the polar region and the Arctic Council is not solely a result of its

chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015. For instance, while the United

States used to be represented in Arctic forums by Under-Secretaries or Dep-

uty Secretaries of State, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began to prioritise

her own participation in high-level meetings in Arctic forums, such as the

Arctic Five meeting in Chelsea, Canada, in 2010 and the Arctic Council

Ministerial in Nuuk, Greenland, in 2011, years before the US chairman-

ship. John Kerry continued this trend by participating in the Arctic Council

ministerials in 2013 and 2015 and by visiting Greenland in 2016. President

Obama’s 2015 visit to Alaska probably represented a new high in American

interest in the Arctic.

he Obama Administration sought to put climate change on the political

agenda in Washington, and Greenland often served as a symbol of the severe

implications of climate change and the melting of the icecaps. Forces both

within and outside the American administration recognise the importance of

pushing for a pro-active climate policy and the potential for using Greenland

as an example of how climate change will have repercussions for infrastruc-

ture and public services. As an American civil servant put it, ‘Greenland is

ground zero for rising sea-levels… his is a problem that requires long-term

thinking… he problem is to capture people’s attention.’

he opening up of the Arctic region has led to an increased America

interest in acquiring Arctic coastguard competences and capabilities. At pres-

ent, the ability of the United States to operate in the Arctic is fairly limited.

he United States government is therefore keen to learn from states famil-

iar with operating in the Arctic environment. he American Coast Guard

is actively seeking to develop the capacities required for the surveillance of

Arctic waters, the conduct of search and rescue operations and efective envi-

ronmental protection. he Coast Guard struggles to gather information and

acquire maritime domain awareness in this region, and there is also an acute

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lack of reliable information about weather conditions and iceberg frequency

in the seas around Greenland. he Coast Guard has tried to gather informa-

tion and experience from other Arctic nations, including Denmark, Finland,

and Norway, in its efort to train oicers and develop new capabilities. Amer-

ican oicers have, for example, been deployed on board Danish vessels in the

Arctic to gain a irst-hand impression of Arctic operations.

he Trump administration’s 2017 budget proposal indicates that it will

be less interested in the Arctic and that both climate change and the Coast

Guard are likely to face signiicant cuts (Enge 2017). Although this indicates

that Denmark will ind it harder to cooperate with the new administration

in the Arctic, it also ofers new opportunities for Danish Arctic diplomacy in

Washington. Political forces within the civil service, Congress, and the think

tanks will still push for a more active climate policy. For instance, Secretary

of Defence Mattis has stated that he views climate change as a potential

source of conlict that should be mitigated (Revkin 2017). Denmark can use

Greenland and its position in the Arctic to support this agenda in Washing-

ton. Furthermore, less funding could mean that the US Coast Guard will

become more interested in cooperating with the Danish Armed Forces.

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Political stability and Chinese investments in Greenland

he United States has no interest in becoming involved in the sensitive con-

stitutional relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen. American policy-

makers are happy with the current arrangements and the fact that it is Co-

penhagen that is their entry point to the entire Danish Realm. For instance,

former American diplomats who participated in the negotiations that led

to the 2004 Igaliku Agreement, in which Greenland participated as a third

party in the negotiations, noted that they had found it confusing to deal with

both Greenland and Denmark.

But while the United States prefers not to become involved in the in-

ternal debate between Denmark and Greenland, the American government

is at times dragged into this debate due to its presence on the island. he

contract for providing services to the hule Air Base serves as an illustration

of this dynamic. he Danish-American Defence Agreement stipulates that

services on the base, which makes up roughly 1.5 per cent of government

income (Bruun & Hjejle 2015: 74; Statistics Greenland 2016: 30), should

be provided by a Danish company as deined by the Danish Ministry of

Foreign Afairs (Government of Denmark and Government of the United

States of America 1951). Due to a concern about potential violations of

EU regulations, in 2013 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Afairs (with the

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permission of the Government of Greenland) delegated the competence to

ind the proper service provider to the American government, which then

gave the service contract to a Danish subsidiary of the American company

Vectrus. Both Denmark and Greenland hold the view that the subsidiary

is a shell company and that the contract was

de facto

given to an American

irm. If that is the case, it would constitute a violation of the terms by which

the certiication authority was moved to the United States (Bruun & Hjejle

2015). Similarly, the Danish and American governments have refused to

clean up the area at Camp Century, an American under-ice Cold War facility

near hule. Camp Century appears to contain substantial hazardous materi-

als that may contaminate the surrounding areas as higher temperatures melt

the ice around it (Hannestad 2016a). Although the Greenlandic government

typically blames Denmark for such incidents (Olesen 2017), it has also been

very critical of the United States and indicated that it will bring cases before

international courts or demand an American withdrawal from Greenland

(Hannestad 2016b).

he United States is fully aware that Greenland is gradually moving in

the direction of greater independence from Denmark, and Washington re-

spects Greenland’s right to self-determination. All of the Americans we in-

terviewed stressed that the United States does want to interfere in the Dan-

ish-Greenlandic relationship or in the manner in which Greenland exercises

its right to self-determination. As one interviewee noted, ‘we don’t take up

a position on how other states should handle their regions.’ A high-ranking

American diplomat conveyed the same message: ‘dealing with Greenland is

the problem of the Kingdom of Denmark. hat is their concern.’

hough the United States accepts Greenland’s right to independence,

such an event is still viewed as an unpleasant source of uncertainty that could

jeopardise Washington’s position on the island. For instance, one American

expert emphasised that the United States ‘would be worried about how an

independent Greenland would allow us to use that bit of geography. We

would lose a bit of territory that we leverage for a very important task.’

his concern is also relected in leaked cables from the American Embassy

in Copenhagen. hus, in a 2006 cable to the State Department, leaked by

WikiLeaks, the American Embassy in Copenhagen reported:

‘… Should Greenland ever strike oil and achieve independence,

the United States would have as a host nation for hule a country

inclined to be sympathetic to NAM [Non-Aligned Movements]

positions rather than one of our staunchest allies [Denmark].’

(Olesen 2017)

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In this context, the reference to the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’ means that an

independent Greenland could potentially loosen its ties to the United States

and thus jeopardise the future of the hule Air Base (ibid.).

he prospect of Chinese investments in Greenland is another issue where

the United States may well ind that it is being dragged into the afairs of the

Kingdom of Denmark. he Danish Defence Intelligence Service has stat-

ed that Chinese investments in Greenland would potentially constitute a

signiicant portion of the local economy and that China would therefore

be able to exert a substantial inluence over Greenlandic politics (Danish

Defence Intelligence Service 2015: 34–35). Potential Chinese investments

could therefore have notable consequences for Denmark’s foreign and secu-

rity policy, most importantly its relationship with the United States. Wash-

ington diplomats have adopted a wait-and-see approach to this issue. For

now, at least, the impression in Washington is that China is interested in

Greenland’s natural resources and rare minerals, not in establishing a more

permanent and physical presence in the region. It was also noted, however,

that the United States is paying close attention to Chinese activities and that

it is aware of the power and inluence that massive foreign investments may

have in a small economy like that of Greenland. As one American noted,

there is ‘a little bit of concern; be sure you pay close attention to how this

will play out.’ Another American expert similarly noted that a day may come

when the United States would ‘tell the Danes that they should start paying

attention to the inluence foreign investments will have on local politicians.’

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

Setting the agenda in Washington

It is important to recognise that neither America’s interests in nor its knowl-

edge of the Arctic region are static, and that it is therefore an ongoing chal-

lenge to ensure that American policy does not move in a direction that is at

odds with Danish foreign policy goals. US policymakers who work on Arctic

issues see foreign governments as important allies that can help spread aware-

ness of the region and push the Arctic agenda. As a Congressional stafer

formulated it, ‘there is a lot of learning needed in Washington about what it

means to be an Arctic nation. We are way behind the curve on this one.’ his

means that even a small nation like Denmark can have a signiicant inluence

through public diplomacy.

Congress seems to ofer an unexplored avenue through which Denmark

can inluence US Arctic policy. Congressional stafers usually cover more

than one topic and have only limited time on their hands. hey are therefore

often willing to listen to concrete and easily understandable suggestions for

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improvements in policy they can bring to the attention of their relevant su-

periors. Furthermore, when people from Congress (whether stafers or poli-

ticians) are promoted into more senior positions within the administration,

they bring with them the information and advice that is given to them while

in Congress. For example, one American expert noted that Hillary Clinton’s

decision to make the Arctic one of her priorities as Secretary of State was

inluenced by her visit to Svalbard in 2004 as a member of Congress.

Norway’s thorough and extensive approach to Arctic agenda-setting il-

lustrates how Denmark under-prioritises this dimension of Arctic diplomacy

and it also provides a set of easy steps that Denmark could follow. he Nor-

wegian approach consists of three basic elements. he irst is to organise an

annual trip to Norway, often with a stopover in Tromsø and Svalbard in the

Norwegian Arctic, for politicians and civil servants in Congress. At the time

of writing, more than 150 Americans, including Hillary Clinton and John

McCain, have participated in such trips. hese trips give Norway a unique

opportunity to inluence American policy-makers and to provide them with

a thorough understanding of the particular conditions that govern the high

north. It is not unusual for members of Congress who have shown no prior

interest in the Arctic to begin pushing high north-related initiatives after

they themselves or members of their staf have been on a trip to the region

with the Norwegians. It is also worth noting that Norway remains in contact

with the American participants after the trips, thus giving Norwegian diplo-

mats a valuable alumni network that may prove useful later on.

he second way in which Norway seeks to set a political agenda in Wash-

ington is to arrange a wide range of formal and informal seminars and events

that target Congress, think tanks and the media. Norwegian politicians,

ministers and high-ranking civil servants often show up for meetings with

American civil servants, even when the latter are formally not at the same

level of seniority. he Norwegians also ensure that high-ranking Norwegian

politicians and civil servants come to Washington and take part in various

seminars with American counterparts and experts in the relevant think tanks.

he third element in Norway’s approach has been to ofer funding to

American think tanks that focus on the Arctic. In the 2000s, the Norwegian

decision to prioritise the Arctic was supplemented with an emphasis on Arc-

tic-related research, and Norwegian research institutions began to support

several think tanks in the United States, thus creating a platform from which

Norwegian policymakers and experts can reach American audiences.

he Norwegian approach has been made possible by a political decision

to prioritise the Arctic and to develop a long-term strategy. In 2005, Norway

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

made ‘the Northern areas’ (‘Nordområdene’) its most important foreign-pol-

icy issue, and Norwegian governments have allocated resources accordingly,

as well as developing a long-term perspective that enables diplomats to ield

initiatives that will only pay of many years down the line (Norwegian Prime

Minister’s Oice 2005). he Norwegian case thus shows what can be gained

when a state prioritises Arctic diplomacy and the importance of a coherent

strategic approach. As we shall see later, Denmark has yet to do these things.

How can Denmark and Greenland beneit

from the United States’ interest in the

Arctic?

We saw in the previous section that the United States has certain interests

in Greenland that Denmark can seek to translate into beneits. he purpose

of this section is to examine what output there is for Denmark

vis-à-vis

the

United States in relation to Greenland. As mentioned above, Denmark has

historically been able to use the American interest in Greenland to strength-

en its often weak position in NATO. Changing circumstances have reduced

the importance of this dimension of Danish-American relations, but other

beneits have become available, most importantly defence cooperation and

access to American decision-makers.

Denmark’s negotiating strength in NATO

Although historians disagree about the exact value of the Greenland Card

during the Cold War period, most agree that Greenland helped secure Den-

mark’s position in NATO, despite the fact that Denmark’s contribution to

the alliance was rather meagre (Villaume 1997). To counter the worst crit-

icisms of its contribution, Danish government representatives consistently

argued that the calculation of Denmark’s contribution to the alliance should

take account of its generous foreign-aid program and the annual block pay-

ment provided to Greenland (Danish Foreign Policy Institute 1997: 105;

Ringsmose 2008: 147, 229–34, 242, 251–3; Lidegaard 1996: 578-88). As

Jens Ringsmose has noted, the Danish rationale was that Copenhagen’s will-

ingness to allow the United States to operate more or less freely in Greenland

should be considered a Danish contribution to the alliance. Both Copenha-

gen and Washington knew that Denmark’s decision to let the United States

use Greenland was far more important to the alliance than a potential in-

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crease in Danish defence spending, and the United States therefore accept-

ed Danish free-riding in other domains (Ringsmose 2008: 147, 211, 231;

Danish Institute for International Studies 2005, vol. 1: 666-9; vol. 4: 693-6;

Danish Foreign Policy Institute 1997: 33, 562-8). As one interviewee, who

had occupied a central position in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Afairs

during the Cold War, put it,

‘We used it shamelessly in NATO negotiations. … I would al-

ways tell [the American government], “you can’t just look at [raw

defence spending]. You also have to look at our development aid

and our block grant for Greenland. hat had to be included in

the calculation.” hey would snicker a bit, but they also knew

that it was not completely wrong.’

his source also stated that he found it perfectly acceptable to tell the Amer-

ican government that Denmark wanted to be compensated for the policy

towards the United States in Greenland. He also noted that the Danish ap-

proach worked because Washington adopted a less critical stance.

Within the Danish Realm, Denmark’s explicit reliance on the Greenland

Card in NATO negotiations was met with demands from Nuuk that Den-

mark reimburse Greenland an amount that corresponded to the ‘discount’

that Greenlandic policymakers believed Denmark received from NATO by

playing the Greenland Card. hese demands were never met by Denmark

(Ringsmose 2008: 337 n. 374). It must be noted, however, that both Den-

mark and Greenland beneitted from the arrangement, because the sheer

size of Greenland meant that Denmark was unable to defend it without

American support.

he Greenland Card came at a price during the Cold War, in particular

for the Greenlandic people. A notable example was the controversial decision

to move the local population out of hule in the 1950s to make room for an

American military base (Kristensen and Christensen, 2009). Furthermore,

Denmark’s willingness to let the United States establish and operate military

bases in Greenland also remained a sensitive issue in Danish-Soviet relations

(see, for instance, Danish Institute for International Studies 2005, vol. 1:

297; Danish Foreign Policy Institute 1997: 562).

he value of the Greenland Card has fallen substantially since the end of

the Cold War, and none of the Danes or Americans we interviewed indicated

that the American presence in Greenland plays a signiicant role in current

debates in NATO about Denmark’s low defence spending. It seems, in other

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words, that Greenland is no longer a card that Denmark will try to ‘play’ in

Brussels in order to delect American criticism.

here appear to be two reasons for this. First of all, as noted in the pre-

vious section, the ability of the United States to operate military bases in

Greenland is simply not as strategically important as it was during the Cold

War. he less signiicant Greenland and the North Atlantic is to the United

States, the smaller the value of the Greenland Card will be. As an American

expert stated: ‘I don’t think there is a Greenland Card to play right now, be-

cause it has not been the perception that there is a security issue up there.’ A

former Danish Minister of Foreign Afairs similarly noted that hule is not

as important as it used to be. Technological developments, such as the devel-

opment of new types of sensor (including space and sea-based sensors), may

also have lessened the strategic importance of the hule radar installation.

Secondly, the Greenland Card is less relevant in a NATO setting be-

cause Denmark no longer needs to play it. As mentioned above, during the

Cold War, the Card was meant to compensate for Denmark’s reputation as

a free rider that did not contribute to the collective security of the alliance.

Since September 11, 2001, however, Denmark has made substantial military

contributions to a range of military operations in the Middle East, Central

Asia and North Africa (Mouritzen 2007; Rynning and Ringsmose 2008;

Rasmussen 2005), and this has had a positive impact on Denmark’s reputa-

tion. he contributions to the American-led military operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan had a particularly noticeable efect on Denmark’s standing as a

loyal ally (Henriksen and Ringsmose 2011). As one American put it: ‘Danish

participation in the Middle East is worth more to us than Greenland because

it is more to ask for.’ Another American expert similarly noted: ‘right now

it is the Middle East that gives Denmark the most inluence in DC … he

scales right now tilt towards the military activism. We need your frigates and

your troops.’

he diminishing value of Greenland and the increasing emphasis on mil-

itary contributions to operations around the Middle East, Central Asia and

North Africa has obviously been noted in Denmark. A former Danish Min-

ister of Foreign Afairs told us that there is

‘no doubt that Greenland is of importance to the United States.

But it is probably about ten per cent. It is nothing compared to

our presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. All the stuf about

‘punching above our weight’ is about Danish military activism

and not so much about the Arctic.’

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Another former Minister of Foreign Afairs similarly noted that it was the

Denmark’s military contributions that are the reason why there is not more

criticism of Denmark.

THE GREENLAND CARD: PROSPECTS FOR AND BARRIERS TO DANISH ARCTIC DIPLOMACY IN WASHINGTON

American support for development and operations

in Greenland

he more practical challenges associated with the opening up of the Arc-

tic region also mean that Denmark can beneit from cooperating with the

United States. he Danish Ministry of Defence expects increasing activity

in the North Atlantic, which entails several challenges for Arctic Command,

including better maritime domain awareness (Danish Ministry of Defence

2016a: 31-32, 95, 157). he Ministry’s recent Arctic analysis concludes that

‘there is a large and mostly untapped potential for cooperation with the

United States regarding Arctic tasks and Arctic development’ (ibid. 222).

Whereas Denmark may be able to ofer practical advice to American agen-

cies, United States agencies, most importantly the Coast Guard, can ofer

access to technological capabilities that can improve Denmark’s ability to op-

erate in the Arctic, for instance, satellite imagery of sea traic around Green-

land and various surveillance and search and rescue platforms (ibid.: 222).

However, there is little consensus over what Greenland can get out of the

Greenland Card. Many Greenlanders argued that the United States should

assist Greenland in developing local infrastructure and the local economy.

Some of the Greenlanders we talked to said that the Joint Committee that

was established under the 2004 Igaliku Agreement to promote cooperation

within education, research, tourism and environmental protection should

be revived.

Several Greenlanders also indicated that the United States should com-

pensate Greenland inancially for the American presence in hule, in par-

ticular after the Danish-Greenlandic company Greenland Contractors

(co-owned by the Government of Greenland) lost the contract to provide

services on the hule Air Base to an American company. Our Danish and

Greenlandic interviewees gave diferent estimates of the United States’ will-

ingness to compensate Greenland inancially and of Denmark and Green-

land’s bargaining power in negotiations with the United States. While several

of the Greenlanders argued that the base in hule is diicult to relocate and

that American compensation ought to be possible, most of the Danes we

talked to appeared to be of the belief that the American government would

move the base elsewhere if it became too costly.

Apart from the areas mentioned above, it was not clear from our in-

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

terviews what sort of American contributions Greenland would like. How-

ever, our American interviewees were reluctant to be directly involved in

developing Greenland, and one former American diplomat emphasised that

the commercial opportunities in Greenland do not appear very tempting to

American companies. Unlike Chinese companies, American companies are

privately owned and thus more focused on short-term gains.

Access to decision-makers in the United States

Access to decision-makers in the United States is in and of itself a beneit

for a small country like Denmark because it provides an opportunity to gain

valuable information about American positions and priorities on current is-

sues and to inluence American policy in a direction that correlates with

Denmark’s interests (Henriksen and Ringsmose 2011: 24). Earlier studies

have shown that Danish politicians, diplomats and civil servants generally

enjoy good access to relevant decision-makers in the United States, and our

interviews conirmed that Denmark’s access in America had improved as a

result of Denmark’s military contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghani-

stan (ibid.: 20-4). But while a study by Ringsmose and Henriksen indicated

that this increased access made it easier for Denmark to persuade the United

States to sign the 2008 Illulisat Declaration (ibid.: 26) that could not be

conirmed in our interviews.

In general terms, however, Greenland clearly has a positive impact on

Denmark’s formal and informal access to Washington and the United States.

Greenland gives Denmark

formal

access to the United States because Den-

mark has a seat in a range of exclusive Arctic forums where the United States

is represented, most notable the Arctic Council. he Council has become of

increasing importance, and its eight member states have begun to send very

high-ranking governmental representatives to its meetings. As mentioned

previously, the United States has sent its Secretary of State to Arctic Council

ministerials since 2011.

Greenland also generates

informal

access to high-ranking decision-mak-

ers in the United States. Visits to Greenland by foreign politicians and of-

icials provide Danish politicians and diplomats with the opportunity to

conduct informal conversations and to establish personal ties that may prove

useful in other settings. A former Danish Minister of Foreign Afairs put it

this way: ‘you get a decent amount of time together. You stand by the rail and

talk. Such conversations are very useful, and you get to talk without the civil

servants around you.’ In practice, therefore, Denmark and Greenland beneit

from Greenland’s status as a very attractive and rare destination.

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Challenges for Danish Arctic Diplomacy

here is potential for Danish Arctic diplomacy in Washington. Unlike Nor-

way, where the Arctic has been the number one strategic priority for more

than a decade, Greenland and the Arctic have only recently become one of

several strategic priorities in Danish foreign policy. It is indicative of the dif-

ference in emphasis between Denmark and Norway that Denmark has not

followed Norway in building an extensive Arctic public diplomacy apparatus

in Washington aimed at Congress and relevant think tanks.

However, a stronger emphasis on the Arctic will give Denmark more

options to inluence the United States. For the time being, Washington is

focused on military contributions to stabilisation operations in the Middle

East and elsewhere, and we have already noted how Denmark has been able

to exploit that focus. But the American agenda may change, and it is not

unlikely that Washington will begin to place less emphasis on military oper-

ations. he Trump administration has brought uncertainty to the direction

of American foreign policy, and Trump was highly critical of America’s wars

in the Middle East during his presidential campaign. As noted previously,

substantial uncertainty also surrounds American policy

vis-à-vis

Russia. Ear-

ly indications suggest that Trump will seek a better relationship with Russia,

but other aspects of his foreign policy could antagonise Moscow.

his uncertainty underscores how important it is that Denmark does

not place all of its foreign policy eggs in just one basket. By forging alterna-

tive relationships with the United States, Denmark can avoid being caught

lat-footed if American foreign-policy priorities change. A stronger emphasis

on Greenland and the Arctic would be a natural way of diversifying the

transatlantic relationship between Copenhagen and Washington. As previ-

ously described, the Arctic ofers policy opportunities for Denmark in Wash-

ington, regardless of the Arctic policy of the new administration.

here is a gap between the resources Denmark allocates to the Arctic and

the strategic signiicance of the region. Most of the Danes we interviewed

(including individuals who do not work directly with Arctic afairs and who

would therefore not beneit directly from them) argued that the Ministry of

Foreign Afairs should put greater emphasis on the high north. In his 2016

assessment, Peter Taksøe-Jensen similarly recommends that more human re-

sources be allocated to the Arctic (Taksøe-Jensen: 35).

It is important to note that a strategic focus on the Arctic is not solely

about the allocation of more inancial resources, but also about identifying

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how Denmark can utilise the Arctic in better ways than are currently the

case. It is, in short, about developing a coherent strategy for managing all of

Denmark’s various interests in the Arctic. Several of our interviewees were

critical of how Denmark thinks strategically about the region. here is cur-

rently very little strategic debate about the Arctic, and there is no coherent

strategy clearly deining how Greenland can be used to gain political rewards

and political inluence. In the absence of a coherent strategy, there is a risk

that Danish policy will be dominated by ad-hoc solutions and that diferent

branches of government will pursue diferent goals. One high-ranking Dan-

ish diplomat stated that the on-going internal debate about Greenland never

reaches the highest political levels in Denmark. As a result, Greenland simply

becomes yet another area that must be managed. he diplomat also noted

how Denmark had never had a strategic debate with the Greenlanders about

their mutual relationship.

In the course of our interviews, we tried to identify what Greenland itself

actually wants to gain from Denmark and the United States. However, aside

from the issue of inancial compensation for the hule Airbase, the Green-

landic agenda was very vague. A number of Greenlanders we talked to noted

that Greenland is a very young country with limited experience in foreign

policy and international afairs. Clearly, it would be useful for Greenland to

adopt a more systematic and holistic thinking about strategic priorities.

Why is strategic thinking about the Greenland Card not more focused?

We believe that part of the answer lies in Copenhagen’s current focus on

sending military contributions to operations in the Middle East, Central

Asia and North Africa. As noted earlier, our interviews conirmed that Den-

mark’s military contributions have strengthened its standing in Washington.

here is a risk, however, of the success of military activism coming to stand

in the way of developing the potential that the Arctic and Greenland seem to

have

vis-à-vis

the United States. One American expert noted that Denmark

has not done a very good job of selling the Arctic in Washington, and that

this appeared to stem from a Danish perception that the military contribu-

tions were suicient. As the expert put it: ‘in the public policy environment

in DC, Denmark has disappeared a little bit.’ He emphasised that the Dan-

ish approach will be vulnerable if the United States begins to focus less on

those areas where Denmark contributes. Like other sources, the American

expert found it hard to identify the longer-term Danish foreign-policy ambi-

tion. As he noted: ‘what are you for today? It was very clear in the ‘00s, but

it has not been formulated very clearly by Copenhagen.’

he lack of trust between Greenland and Denmark also complicates the

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development of a strategic debate. Denmark’s approach to the Arctic is re-

active, not proactive or strategic, because of a fear that new initiatives will

antagonise Greenland. Diplomats shy away from discussions of priorities or

long-term plans because they may lead to unwanted friction in Denmark’s

relationship with Greenland. It is not the constitutional situation that is the

biggest challenge: everyone we spoke to understands and accepts the fun-

damentals of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship, and there is widespread

acceptance of the Greenlandic ambition to gain greater independence. he

Danish sources all stressed the importance of ensuring that Copenhagen take

care of Greenland’s interests.

Instead, the problem is a lack of

trust

between Nuuk and Copenhagen.

Several of the Greenlanders we talked to stated that they are not sure that

Denmark really looks out for Greenland’s interests, and they feel left out

and without access to relevant decision-making processes. Many Greenlan-

dic sources mentioned the 2004 Igaliku agreement as an example, where

promises had been made but were never kept. Danish sources, on the other

hand, expressed the view that Greenland had been unable to exploit such

opportunities as arise, such as after the Igaliku agreement, and that Denmark

is often used as a scapegoat to cover for Greenlandic incompetence.

Another problem concerns seemingly diferent perceptions of how val-

uable Greenland really is to the United States. Greenlandic policymakers

clearly believe that the Greenland Card is of greater value than our Danish

sources, whose estimates were in line with the policymakers we met in Wash-

ington. For instance, one Greenlandic civil servant argued that the Green-

land Card has sometimes given Denmark a large ‘discount’ in NATO that is

equal to the diference between the Danish defence budget and NATO’s two

per cent guideline, which would equal several billion dollars. Consequently,

the source argued, it would only be fair if Copenhagen increased the annual

block grant to Greenland. As mentioned earlier, similar Greenlandic claims

were also made – and rejected – during the Cold War. Here it is worth noting

that this estimate misunderstands the dynamics of NATO burden-sharing.

he United States has also accepted low contributions from NATO mem-

bers that do not have a card like Greenland to play, which means that one

cannot simply assume that the Greenland Card is worth the diference be-

tween actual defence expenditures and the NATO guidelines. Furthermore,

Greenland tends to forget that it also beneits from American protection of

its territory and from being a part of NATO.

An additional barrier to developing a more focused strategy for Green-

land’s role is the taboo that appears to surround the Greenland Card. Many

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of our Danish sources were very opposed to public discussions of how Co-

penhagen may exploit Greenland to improve its inluence in Washington,

as they believed that such debates would make Greenland lose trust in Den-

mark. A former Minister of Foreign Afairs explicitly stated that Denmark

must not give Greenland the impression it is merely a tool. While it is ob-

vious that no population wants to be reduced to a pawn in a larger strategic

game, it is important to emphasise that all our sources, in both Copenhagen

and Nuuk, were not only aware of the existence of a Greenland Card, but

also felt that it was acceptable for Denmark to use Greenland to seek bene-

its and inluence in the United States. No one argued that this was illegit-

imate: on the contrary, one high-ranking Danish diplomat compared the

Danish-Greenlandic-American relationship to a three-legged chair where all

legs are required for the chair to stand. All parties must feel they are getting

something out of it.

It is our impression, however, that the taboo that surrounds the debate

about the Greenland Card has the opposite efect – that it

increases

the dis-

trust between Denmark and Greenland and that it exacerbates the diferent

estimates of Greenland’s international value. Several of our Greenlandic in-

terviewees argued that Greenland is extremely important to the United States

and that Denmark reaps a lot of beneits from the arrangements, which,

however, Copenhagen does not want to acknowledge because it would then

have to compensate Greenland. When asked about why that would be the

case, our Greenlandic sources referred to earlier experiences when Denmark

and the United States kept secrets from Greenland. As one Greenlandic in-

terviewee put it, ‘there is a historical precedence, where we are not told the

whole truth… We have a reason to ask critical questions.’ Ironically, the

Danish silence about the Greenland Card, which Danish civil servants and

politicians believe will diminish tensions with Greenland, reminds Green-

landic decision-makers of the silence they met during the Cold War, when

Denmark and the United States did actually collude sometimes to circum-

vent the Greenlandic government. he taboo thus exacerbates the mistrust

and tensions within the Danish Realm.

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THE GREENLAND CARD: PROSPECTS FOR AND BARRIERS TO DANISH ARCTIC DIPLOMACY IN WASHINGTON

Conclusion and recommendations

While the Greenland Card still exists, its value is currently not very high.

Denmark’s contributions to American stabilisation operations in the Middle

East and elsewhere continue to be more important for the United States. In-

stead, the Greenland card is important because it allows Denmark to diversi-

fy its transatlantic relationship with the United States, making it less vulnera-

ble to shifts in American foreign-policy priorities. It is therefore unfortunate

that the Arctic still is only one of several Danish foreign-policy priorities and

that Denmark’s Arctic diplomacy is dwarfed by that of other comparable na-

tions, such as Norway. In that light, it makes sense to strengthen Denmark’s

Arctic diplomacy by allocating more personnel and resources to the area.

Denmark lacks a general strategic conversation about the Arctic and

Greenland, and this lack of strategic debate inhibits its ability to develop a

coherent and proactive strategy for how to push the Arctic agenda in Wash-

ington. Instead, Denmark’s high-north policy tends to become reactive and

preoccupied with day-to-day afairs. Greenland too lacks long-term for-

eign-policy visions.

Several factors seem to be inhibiting the strategic conversation about the

Arctic. First, contributing to American stability operations in the Middle

East and elsewhere has become a cornerstone of Danish foreign policy and

has made Denmark a treasured ally in Washington. However, it has also

come to overshadow other important foreign-policy priorities, including the

Arctic. Secondly, the complex relationship and mistrust between Denmark

and Greenland also seem to limit strategic debates. he fear of ofending

Greenland is a barrier to the strategic debate about the Arctic, and more

could be done to create a better common understanding of the internation-

al dynamics that surrounds both states and their relations with the United

States. Greenlandic policymakers do not feel included in decision-making,

and they suspect that Denmark has not been entirely truthful when it comes

to its relationship to the United States.

One of the most important sources of mistrust seemed to be the taboo

that still surrounds discussions of the Greenland Card. Danish civil serv-

ants and politicians argue against open discussions of Greenland’s role in

Danish-American diplomacy, as they fear that it will cause consternation

in Greenland. However, Greenlandic policymakers are all well-aware of the

existence of the Greenland Card, and they interpret the Danish silence to

mean that Denmark and the United States are colluding to keep Greenland

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out of the loop. Although the taboo on mentioning the Greenland Card is

intended to improve Danish-Greenlandic relations, our interviews indicated

that it has the opposite efect.

he Danish government has several options for improving its Arctic di-

plomacy in Washington. First, it should allocate more resources and man-

power to the Arctic portfolio in the Ministry of Foreign Afairs, as recom-

mended in Ambassador Taksøe-Jensen’s 2016 foreign-policy report. More

resources and the explicit prioritisation of the Arctic will give the bureau-

cracy a chance to develop a more strategic approach. Secondly, Denmark

should consider whether there are elements of the Norwegian approach to

agenda-setting that may be worth replicating. For instance, Denmark should

consider bringing more Danish politicians, civil servants and experts on

the Arctic to seminars and events in Washington where they can meet their

American counterparts. Denmark should also consider arranging an annual

trip to Greenland for American policy-makers. hirdly, Denmark should

try to improve relations with Greenland and reduce the taboo surrounding

debates on the Greenland Card. Danish agencies and the Danish parliament

should also do more to include their Greenlandic counterparts in debates,

hearings, and reports. Another possibility could be to establish a coordinat-

ing unit within the Danish administration – for instance, a Danish minister

for Arctic afairs or for Danish Realm afairs – to ensure that Greenland and

the Faroe Islands are properly heard. Finally, as the current Arctic Strategy

runs out in 2020, the process of updating the strategy provides an ample

opportunity to include Greenland and the Faroe Islands in a joint process.

he new document should also acknowledge the diferent interests of all

parts of the Danish Realm and thereby bring debates on the Greenland Card

out into the open.

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THE GREENLAND CARD: PROSPECTS FOR AND BARRIERS TO DANISH ARCTIC DIPLOMACY IN WASHINGTON

Notes

his chapter elaborates and expands an analysis that was irst presented in Danish in An-

ders Henriksen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen:

Grønlandskortet – Arktis’ Betydning for Dan-

marks Indlydelse i USA,

Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies. Text and arguments are

reused with permission of the publisher. he authors are grateful for the feedback provided

by the Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook editors and reviewer and the inancial support

provided by the Carlsberg Foundation.

Anders Henriksen, PhD, is an associate professor at the Department of Law, University of

Copenhagen. Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Department

of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark.

he chapter focuses on Greenland and does not examine what role (if any) the Faroe

Islands play in Danish Arctic policy or in the Danish-American relationship, and we also

steer away from any substantial discussion of the various disputes that have afected the

relationship between Denmark and Greenland over the years. To the extent we do refer to

these disputes, we do so because they may help inform our understanding of the triangular

relationship between Denmark, Greenland and the United States. Furthermore, we do

not engage in any normative discussion of the existing constitutional coniguration of the

Kingdom of Denmark, including the extent of the current level of devolution, and we do

not seek to convey any particular position on whether it is acceptable or not for Denmark

to use Greenland as leverage in relation to the Americans. Our analysis simply takes its

point of departure in existing political realities. he existing literature on Danish policy

in the Arctic tends to use the terms ‘Danish Realm’ (‘Rigsfællesskabet’) or the ‘Kingdom

of Denmark’ to illustrate that Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands internationally

act as a single legal entity (e.g. (Denmark et al., 2011)). One of the points we are trying

to make is the importance of recognising that the diferent parts of the Realm have difer-

ent competences, interests and concerns. We therefore refer speciically to ‘Denmark’ or

‘Greenland’ when it is necessary to understand the role the individual entity plays.

Among the 35 interviewees were four former Danish ministers of foreign afairs, a former

Danish minister of defence, a former prime minister of Greenland, a former American

ambassador to Denmark, senior diplomats and civil servants in Denmark, Greenland and

the United States, as well as experts from leading American think tanks and former and

current diplomats from other Arctic nations.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

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Refugee policy as ‘negative

nation branding’: the case of

Denmark and the Nordics

homas Gammeltoft-Hansen

REFUGEE POLICY AS ‘NEGATIVE NATION BRANDING’: THE CASE OF DENMARK AND THE NORDICS

Introduction

Historically Denmark has been held up as a liberal frontrunner when it comes

to asylum policy and the protection of refugees. For example, it chaired the

negotiations of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,

which it was the irst country to sign and ratify. Along with the other Nordic

countries, Denmark has been an important donor to the UNHCR and a

long-standing and active member of its Executive Committee. When the

‘asylum crisis’ in the 1980s led other states to adopt more restrictive poli-

cies, Denmark introduced its 1983 Aliens Act, at the time claimed to be the

‘world’s most liberal asylum legislation’ by several international observers.

Today, however, this picture has changed dramatically. In recent decades,

Denmark has imposed a series of restrictive policies with regard to both

asylum and immigration. Last year, it hit the international headlines after

passing a bill restricting access to family reuniication for Syrian refugees for

up to three years and allowing the police to search refugees and seize their

assets.

Following the surge in the numbers of those seeking asylum over

the summer of 2015, Denmark ran an anti-refugee ad campaign in Ara-

bic-language newspapers warning the refugees against going to Denmark.

Later that year, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen suggested that the

1951 Refugee Convention should be revised.

While the Danish govern-

ment subsequently expressed support for the Convention during the special

UN summit on migration and refugees in the autumn of 2016, it simul-

taneously announced its intention to investigate the possibility of limiting

the inluence of the European Court of Human Rights during Denmark’s

presidency of the Council of Europe in 2017, not least with regard to issues

of immigration.

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100

he present article takes Denmark as a paradigmatic case in examining

the current reactions of Nordic and European states to the recent rise in

asylum-seekers. he irst part of the article locates Denmark’s policy develop-

ment in its historical context. Despite its liberal branding historically, Den-

mark has consistently pursued diferent policies of deterrence with regard to

refugees, in several instances serving as an inspiration for subsequent Euro-

pean and international developments.

he second part of the article compares the most recent wave of restric-

tive policies in Denmark with those in force in other Nordic and European

countries. It is argued that we are currently seeing a re-emergence and ex-

pansion of

indirect

deterrence. Rather than preventing access to asylum

per

se,

policies of indirect deterrence are designed to make the asylum system

and protection conditions appear as unattractive as possible, thereby achiev-

ing a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ efect in pushing asylum-seekers towards other

countries. In that sense, indirect deterrence may be characterised as a form of

national reputation management (Angell and Mordhorst 2015) or deliberate

‘negative nation branding’.

he third and inal section considers the impacts of indirect policies of

deterrence. It is often argued that indirect deterrence serves largely symbolic

or domestic political purposes. Much existing scholarship argues that indi-

rect deterrence has no or only a limited impact on the number of asylum

applications a state receives. Looking at developments in Denmark, Sweden

and the EU in general over the past sixteen years, however, the Danish ex-

ample seems to challenge that assumption. While Denmark has not been

able to insulate itself from the general trend towards increasing number of

asylum-seekers in Europe in the past ten years, the restrictive approach with

regard to asylum and immigration seems to have had an efect in lowering

asylum applications in the past ifteen years. Other factors, however, should

cause states to consider carefully whether to embrace indirect deterrence as

a domestic policy strategy. Indirect deterrence not only impacts on the core

rights of asylum-seekers and refugees, it is also more likely than other forms

of deterrence to afect eforts at integration negatively. More fundamentally,

in the long or even medium term the efectiveness of indirect deterrence

is questionable, and the current return to unilateral deterrence and border

controls across Europe in many ways recalls the competitive and more un-

predictable policy environments of the 1990s.

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REFUGEE POLICY AS ‘NEGATIVE NATION BRANDING’: THE CASE OF DENMARK AND THE NORDICS

Denmark’s asylum and immigration policy:

an overview

he cornerstone of Denmark’s current asylum and immigration policy was

laid down by the 1983 Aliens Act. his Act replaced the Foreigners Act,

which, with a few changes (mainly the 1973 curtailment of the labour im-

migration schemes of previous decades), had been in force since 1952. he

starting point for consultations over the 1983 Aliens Act was to improve

legal guarantees for foreigners, in particular asylum-seekers. At the time,

Denmark was not experiencing a signiicant inlux of asylum-seekers, and

acceptance rates remained high. Hence, the political motivation for the 1983

Aliens Act was not to establish a substantively more liberal policy, but rather

to provide greater legal clarity, avoid the arbitrary administration of diferent

cases and ensure that Danish law was more explicit in setting out rights with

regard to asylum, family reuniication and the circumstances under which

asylum-seekers could be removed from the country (Jensen 2000; Brøcker

1990: 336-7).

In the legislative drafting of the Act, two issues nonetheless emerged.

While agreeing to insert a right to asylum, both to refugees covered by the

1951 Convention and on broader grounds to so-called ‘de facto’ refugees, a

majority on the drafting committee was concerned that formulating rights

too broadly would undermine Denmark’s ability to control immigration gen-

erally. Administrative competences to issue detailed rules were thus inserted.

For example, an emergency brake was proposed to reject asylum-seekers at

the border in cases of mass inlux, and a provision to deny asylum under cer-

tain conditions was also introduced. Most importantly, the majority’s legisla-

tive proposal did not contain a legal entitlement to family reuniication, but

left it to the Ministry of Justice to regulate this administratively depending

on actual developments. he minority, on the other hand – among others

the Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Bar and Law Society – ar-

gued that too much administrative lexibility not only undermined the legal

standing of asylum-seekers and immigrants, it would enable the government

to introduce wide-ranging changes without parliamentary consent (Chris-

tensen 2010. 97; Brøcker 1990: 338).

In a surprising turn of events, and following the mobilization of a broad

range of Danish civil-society organisations by the Danish Refugee Council,

an alternative proposal was subsequently adopted by Parliament. he new

Act now contained a positive right to family reuniication and a number

101

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102

of legal guarantees with regard to the removal of asylum-seekers from the

country.

In most areas concerning asylum, the Act simply sought to regulate ex-

isting practice properly. A right to asylum was established for both Refugee

Convention and ‘de facto’ refugees. he latter category was directed at groups

such as regime defectors and conscientious defectors, many of whom would

today fall within the ambit of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status

of Refugees. he Act further ensured rights for persons granted this form of

subsidiary protection alongside those aforded to Convention refugees. he

right to family reuniication was similarly granted to both categories of ref-

ugees, and a procedure established whereby the specialised Refugee Appeals

Board could hear appeals against adverse decisions.

Since its adoption, however, the 1983 Aliens Act has been subjected to

well over a hundred amendments.

he pace of amendments is remarkable

and bears witness to the growing politicization of this issue, especially in the

last ifteen years. From 2002 to 2016 the Act was amended 93 times, a rate

of just over one amendment every two months. In comparison, the Act was

amended 25 times from 1986 to 2000, an average of one or two amend-

ments a year.

Figure 1.

Amendments to the Danish Aliens Act

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

-2

-1

-2

As is to be expected, a signiicant number of these amendments relate to

more technical matters or relect a requirement to adopt international law, in

particular EU law. Although Denmark maintains a legal opt-out with regard

to EU cooperation in the areas of justice and home afairs, a protocol means

that Denmark is nonetheless a member of the Schengen area and, through a

parallel agreement, of the Dublin System as well. Moreover, developments in

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

the laws governing free movement in the EU and international human rights

have both had an impact on Danish immigration law, especially with regard

to family reuniication and the removal of foreigners.

Beyond these factors, however, a trend towards the introduction of more

restrictive measures has been emerging. From a uniquely liberal starting

point, Denmark has introduced numerous forms of deterrence or

non-entrée

policies (Hathaway 1992). Deterrence can be deined as policies intended

to discourage or prevent migrants and refugees from either arriving in the

territory of a prospective destination state or accessing its asylum system.

Deterrence policies became a favoured response of developed states from the

1980s onwards, responding to a world in which proxy wars and globalization

were creating new lows of mixed migration, while the economic crisis and

the end of the Cold War simultaneously reduced the economic and ideologi-

cal incentives to receive refugees (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan 2017).

As argued elsewhere, certain trends have emerged in the types of de-

terrence states employ. In the 1980s many states introduced legal measures

to prevent refugees who had already arrived in their territory from enter-

ing the ‘procedural door’ (Vedsted-Hansen 1999). hese included, for ex-

ample, time limits for submitting asylum applications and legal concepts

such as ‘irst country of arrival,’ ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third coun-

try’ as grounds for rejecting asylum applications from applicants who came

from or through such countries (Hurwitz 2009; Gil-Bazo 2006). From the

1990s onwards a stronger focus was also placed on extraterritorial migra-

tion control and the outsourcing of migration management to private actors

(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). he last decade and a half has seen deterrence

policies extended to cooperation with states of transit and origin. From Aus-

tralia’s ‘Paciic Solution’ to the European Union’s current eforts to secure

agreements with countries like Turkey and Libya, these arrangements tend to

link cooperation on border control to broader foreign policy arrangements

regarding transnational crime, development assistance, trade privileges, la-

bour immigration quotas and visa facilitation (Gammeltoft-Hansen and

Hathaway 2015).

Denmark has been part and parcel of each of these developments, in

some cases clearly inspiring other countries to implement similar deterrence

policies. A particular novelty of the 1983 Aliens Act was the introduction

of a ‘irst country of asylum’ clause. In the hope that other countries would

follow suit, a reciprocity clause was similarly inserted, granting access to asy-

lum-seekers with a special connection to Denmark in order to avoid ‘refu-

gees in orbit’.

Denmark was also the irst country to incorporate an explicit

REFUGEE POLICY AS ‘NEGATIVE NATION BRANDING’: THE CASE OF DENMARK AND THE NORDICS

103

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104

legislative provision with regard to ‘safe third countries’ in 1986, allowing for

pre-procedure rejections at the border. his became known as ‘the Danish

clause’, as it was replicated throughout Europe (Hunt 2014: 504). It was

also a direct response to concerns that the new Aliens Act would allow West

Germany to ‘wave on’ asylum-seekers from East Germany, leading to a sig-

niicant spike in asylum-seekers, from 332 in 1983 to 4,312 the year after

the Act was passed. Denmark was among the irst to introduce carrier liabil-

ity legislation and to post immigration liaison oicers to transit countries in

order to block onward travel by asylum-seekers.

Since 2006, Denmark has

similarly actively contributed to joint operations under the auspices of the

EU’s border agency, Frontex.

Existing literature on deterrence tends to focus on wider measures un-

dertaken by, for example, the EU and on the various forms of migration

control carried out by frontline states for irregular migration, such as the

United States and Australia (e.g. Mann 2016; Moreno-Lax and Papastavrid-

is 2016; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Magner 2004; Koh 1994). It is none-

theless instructive to examine the Danish case in order to understand how

non-frontline states in the EU enact deterrence and respond to the current

inlow of asylum-seekers into Europe. Denmark shows that physical and

legal geography both play an important role in determining which kinds

of deterrence policies are favoured where. As a Nordic country, Denmark

is on the one hand geographically removed from the direct pressure that

several south and east European countries face from irregular immigration,

and it is at least partially insulated from the efects of secondary movement

of asylum-seekers due to the Dublin System. On the other hand, as a Scan-

dinavian welfare state subject to the EU’s law of free movement and wedged

between Germany and Sweden – two of the most popular destination states

in Europe for asylum-seekers in recent years – Denmark remains particularly

vulnerable to secondary movements of asylum-seekers within Europe. Last

but not least, the Danish EU opt-outs in the areas of justice and home afairs

arguably provide certain comparative advantages when it comes to adopting

deterrence measures. Several of Denmark’s policies on asylum and family

reuniication would not have been possible if it had had to comply with EU

law in this area (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2010).

For Denmark, the response to the current rise in numbers of asylum-seek-

ers and the consequent breakdown of protection capacity and/or will in sev-

eral EU frontier states has thus been twofold. First, like Austria, Germany,

Sweden and Norway, in January 2016Denmark reintroduced temporary bor-

der controls despite being in the Schengen area . he temporary controls at

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the Danish-German land border and Danish ports with ferry connections to

Germany have been extended several times, most recently until May 2017.

While such controls may have a deterrent efect, not least for asylum-seekers

hoping to transit through Denmark in order to reach Sweden or other Nor-

dic countries, they have not prevented asylum claims being submitted to the

Danish authorities at the physical border. In comparison, the absence of a

land border between Denmark and Sweden has allowed Sweden to employ

another well-known form of deterrence, namely carrier sanctions, meaning

that private companies must now perform controls on all passengers crossing

Øresund via public transport, rejecting onward passage to anyone without

proper documentation

before

they have a chance to apply for asylum with the

Swedish authorities.

he other response has thus been to engage in and intensify unilateral

eforts to deter asylum-seekers

indirectly.

Contrary to other deterrence pol-

icies, indirect deterrence does not physically or legally restrict access to seek

and obtain asylum. Instead, indirect deterrence involves measures designed

to discourage asylum claims or divert them to other countries by making

conditions for asylum-seekers and recognised refugees less attractive. Since

2015 Denmark has introduced a range of new policies that fall into this

category. A new tertiary protection status, ‘temporary protection status’, was

introduced in 2015 for those leeing general violence and armed conlict.

Under this provision, residence permits are initially granted for a period of

one year only, ensuring that cases are regularly reviewed to assess continued

protection needs. For other categories of refugees, the duration of initial

residence permits has similarly been reduced from ive years to two years

(Convention refugees) and one year (protection status).

Access to family

reuniication for those granted ‘temporary protection status’ has also been

removed during the irst three years of residence unless special considera-

tions apply.

he grounds on which asylum-seekers can be detained have

been increased, and an option has been introduced to waive the ordinary,

automatic right to habeas corpus for detained asylum-seekers in cases of mass

inlux.

Social beneits for refugees have been cut by 50%, and child care

support and pensions for refugees are now graduated based on the length of

the applicant’s stay in Denmark.

Legislation has been adopted granting the

police the authority to search and seize funds and assets from asylum-seekers

in order to cover costs related to accommodation and other beneits.

Fees

have similarly been introduced in connection with applications for family

reuniication and permanent residence for refugees. he latter is further sub-

ject to new requirements with regard to language and employment, and the

waiting period for permanent residence has been extended to six years.

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Indirect deterrence policies as negative

nation branding

While Denmark may be considered a frontrunner in this area, the surge in

asylum applications across Europe in recent years has led several European

states to follow suit and adopt similar policies of indirect deterrence. hese

measures cover a broad range of issues, including mandatory detention, lim-

itations on family reuniication, cuts to social beneits, and granting more

temporary or subsidiary forms of protection, with fewer rights attached. he

scope of current changes suggest that indirect deterrence has become a sys-

tematic response of European states in connection with the current political

crisis over asylum in Europe, a development that may fundamentally reshape

the dynamics of political cooperation regarding asylum in the EU.

Perhaps the most signiicant policy changes can be observed among Den-

mark’s Nordic neighbours. Despite a long-term commitment to a liberal

asylum policy (Stern 2014), the record number of asylum-seekers arriving

in Sweden in 2015 led the country to implement a string of restrictive meas-

ures. Like Denmark, a dual strategy of border control and indirect deterrence

was pursued. Under the new rules, those aforded subsidiary protection are

now granted shorter residence permits of thirteen months, and family reuni-

ication is limited to exceptional cases. Also, a new maintenance requirement

means that, in order to obtain family reuniication, refugees must be able

to provide adequate housing and economic support for family members.

Almost simultaneously, Norway adopted its own restrictive measures, many

directly mimicking similar provisions in Danish and the revised Swedish law

in regard to family reuniication, including requirements regarding age, as-

sociation with Norway, economic support and the ability to refuse family re-

uniication to persons aforded subsidiary protection. In the area of asylum,

Norway goes even further than its two neighbours, having introduced an

emergency measure to deny access to asylum-seekers at the borders of other

Nordic countries and ‘safe third country’ measures to reject asylum-seekers

entering Norway from neighbouring Russia.

Germany has similarly replaced inancial beneits for asylum-seekers with

coupons which they exchange for food and clothing.

It has also introduced

a ban on entry from safe countries,

higher requirements to obtain perma-

nent residency and limited access to family reuniication for persons aforded

subsidiary protection.

In France, a combination of year-long processing

times, bureaucratic hurdles and a lack of access to work and social welfare

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during the asylum process has been proposed to serve as a deterrent for asy-

lum-seekers.

Delayed or protracted processes to determine refugee status may also be

used as a deterrent in some instances. Administrative backlogs in both deci-

sions on asylum and family reuniication can be an unfortunate but inevita-

ble consequence of situations of mass inlux. In Europe, the current backlogs

of asylum claims recall the levels of the early 1990s (Gibney 1994). Yet, in

some countries, applying administrative caps on the processing of asylum

applications or restricting access to submitting them appear to be part of a

deliberate strategy to deter them. hus Austria introduced a cap of eighty

asylum applications per day in 2016, Belgium a cap of 250 applications per

day.

Greece and Italy have similar been reported to block physical access to

submitting asylum applications temporarily.

A number of European states, including Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy,

Macedonia and Malta, have inally stepped up the systematic detention of

asylum-seekers.

Mandatory detention of asylum-seekers is another long-

standing practice to deter further arrivals. Australia has long had a policy

of mandatory detention of asylum-seekers arriving by boat and has actively

encouraged Indonesia to introduce such a policy (Nethery et al. 2013). Israel

places irregular migrants for up to a year in the Holot centre located in the

desert, from which residents are unable to leave.

he resort to these kinds of indirect deterrence may to some extent be

seen as a strategy by European states to recover sovereign manoeuvrability

in areas which, unlike measures directly blocking access to asylum, are less

heavily circumscribed by EU and international law (Gammeltoft-Hansen

2014). However, indirect policies of deterrence often impact negatively on

other rights under EU, refugee and general human rights law, including free-

dom of movement, non-discrimination, access to employment, public edu-

cation and housing. While the right to family reuniication is not guaranteed

under the 1951 Refugee Convention, year-long waiting periods arguably

violate the right to family life as established in general human rights law.

Asylum-seekers may legitimately be detained for identiication or security

reasons, yet widespread policies of detention are not consistent with the pro-

hibition against penalizing illegal entry or stay under Article 31 of the Ref-

ugee Convention and under EU law. he recast EU Asylum Procedures Di-

rective similarly sets a six-month time limit for the duration of irst-instance

asylum decisions, though diferent exceptions can be made in complex cases

or situations of mass inlux.

Several indirect measures of deterrence may also be challenged on dis-

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crimination or socio-economic grounds. In 2012, the German Constitution-

al Court ruled that refugees are entitled to the same level of welfare beneits

as German citizens.

In 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court

of Human Rights ruled that an important component of Denmark’s restric-

tive family reuniication rules, namely the requirement that couples must

have a stronger joint association with Denmark than with any other coun-

try, constitutes indirect discrimination since it does not apply to applicants

who have been Danish citizens for 26 years or longer.

As has been shown

for other forms of deterrence, however, states often react to successful legal

challenges by simply adapting or developing their policies further (Gam-

meltoft-Hansen 2014).

More fundamentally, what unites these very diferent policies is their

underlying logic. Indirect deterrence works by making the country’s asy-

lum system and protection conditions appear as unattractive as possible.

If successful, a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ efect is thereby achieved, pushing

asylum-seekers towards other countries. As such, indirect deterrence may

be characterized as a form of national reputation management or nation

branding (Anholt 1998; Dinnie 2008; Browning 2007; Angell and Mord-

horst 2015). Yet, rather than building a positive image in order to attract,

for example, investors, tourists and highly-skilled labour migration (Anholt

1998), the goal here is quite the opposite, namely to employ a broad range

of political measures in order to project a negative image of countries like

Denmark towards a particular group of unwanted migrants, asylum-seekers.

However, for policies of indirect deterrence to achieve their objective, it

is essential that prospective asylum-seekers know of an intended destination

country’s restrictive approach before launching an asylum application there.

Underscoring this point, substantial eforts have been made to ‘market’ spe-

ciic deterrence policies or to brand countries as generally ‘unwelcoming’

towards a target audience. Many countries have translated and tried to com-

municate pedagogically the impact of new restrictive measures in the lan-

guages of major groups of asylum-seekers. Belgium and Norway have both

run Facebook campaigns to dissuade particular groups of asylum-seekers.

Denmark made the decision to take out advertisements in newspapers in key

countries of transit in the Middle East, warning prospective asylum-seekers

about its new and more restrictive policies.

Similar initiatives have also

been adopted by certain non-European countries. Notably, Australia adver-

tises throughout the Paciic region that asylum-seekers coming by boat will

not be able to make Australia their home.

Negative branding could be argued to share some similarities with warn-

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ing campaigns towards irregular migrants. Both the EU and individual mem-

ber states have sponsored campaigns in North Africa to dissuade prospective

migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. In 2016, Italy and the Inter-

national Organization for Migration (IOM) launched the ‘Aware Migrants’

initiative, aiming to raise awareness about the dangerous journeys and risk

of exploitation by human smugglers through videos showing migrants nar-

rating their own experiences.

Yet, warning campaigns of this kind tend to

focus on the dangers or risks associated with processes of irregular migration.

In contrast, the Danish and Norwegian initiatives warn about the diiculties

in obtaining legal asylum and family reuniication, as well as the plights that

asylum-seekers and refugees will have to endure in those two countries. he

campaigning country, which portrays itself negatively to the target group, is

itself the object.

While such measures, as well as transnational networks, may be rea-

sonably efective in disseminating the deterrence message, information and

communication gaps are likely to persist. Interview studies show that, while

asylum-seekers may have an overall idea of diferent asylum states as more

or less welcoming, few have more speciic and in-depth knowledge of the

conditions they are likely to face in them (Brekke 2004). In other cases, de-

liberate misinformation and ‘overselling’ regarding certain asylum countries

can be a strategy used by human smugglers with access to particular routes or

who stand to make a larger proit by organizing longer routes.

Beyond concrete initiatives, states may thus also seek to brand them-

selves more generally as ‘hard-line’ countries when it comes to asylum and

immigration. Assuming imperfect information among asylum-seekers, such

branding may potentially be much more important than any speciic meas-

ure of deterrence. Denmark has long openly justiied its more restrictive

asylum policies with reference to its desire to avoid asylum-seekers. When

Norway introduced its most recent series of deterrence measures, one of the

government parties, the anti-immigration Fremskrittspariet, made a particu-

lar point in the national and international media of stressing that this would

make Norway ‘the most restrictive country in Europe’ when it comes to

asylum policy.

At the same time, negative nation branding reaching wider audiences

may of course impact perceptions of a given country more generally. In 2016

Denmark made headlines in newspapers around the world when it proposed

the so-called ‘jewellery law’, allowing police to search and coniscate valua-

bles from asylum-seekers in order to help pay for their accommodation.

he provision was one among several deterrence measures, many of which

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were much more serious in terms of the human rights issues involved. Yet,

an emotive link was made by several commentators, comparing the Danish

proposal to the coniscation of valuables from Jews during the Second World

War. he ensuing press attention led the Danish government to nuance the

initial proposal, setting a threshold of EUR 1,350 and underscoring that

personal assets such as wedding rings would not be seized.

Similarly, these particular kinds of deterrence policies may provoke polit-

ical dilemmas. As Rebecca Stern has pointed out (2014), both international

and national criticism and domestic opposition to restrictive immigration

measures may provoke national dilemmas with regard to a particular coun-

try’s self-image and wider nation branding to other countries. For a long

time, the uneasy balance between liberal values and deterrence policies was

seen as a form of institutionalised schizophrenia (Gammeltoft-Hansen and

Hathaway 2015; Gibney 2004). An elaborate rights regime was maintained

for those lucky enough to arrive, while at the same time developed states

were doing everything in their power to ensure that the vast majority of the

world’s refugees would never reach their territories. Shifting migration con-

trol to the sea, to third states and to private actors further creates an ‘out of

sight-out of mind’ efect, conveniently shielding the majority of deterrence

practices from the host populations (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011).

With the increasing reports and pictures of desperate or dead refugees

along Europe’s borders, however, this bifurcation becomes harder to sustain.

Moreover, policies of indirect deterrence represent a signiicant departure

from the trend to shift the less palatable aspects of sovereign authority away

from the state. he current range of indirect deterrence measures are imple-

mented ‘at home’, towards those who are already here, and they often create

visual nodal points, such as tent camps, queues and news stories about sep-

arated families, destitution and rigid requirements. hey are also measures

which need to be openly marketed in order to work. It is thus not surprising

that indirect deterrence has prompted intense political discussions, often

deeply dividing both the public and policy-makers in terms of diferent vi-

sions of ‘the nation’ and ‘national values’.

Nordic countries can be seen to deal with these dilemmas diferently

and at diferent paces. Most commentators identify 2001 as a major turning

point in Danish asylum and immigration policy. Regardless of the fact that

numerous deterrence measures had been implemented in previous decades,

it was the formation of a right-wing government with political support from

the Danish People’s Party that signalled a change in overall rhetoric and a

speeding up of deterrence measures during the past ifteen years.

In con-

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trast, the anti-immigration party, the Swedish Democrats, have been polit-

ically isolated, and major agreements on Swedish asylum and immigration

have been reached with the explicit aim of limiting the impact of xenophobia

(Stern 2014). Whether this will change in the years to come remains to be

seen. Conlicts of self-image, however, appeared to play a role when an evi-

dently emotional Åsa Romson, Deputy Prime Minister, announced Sweden’s

new restrictive asylum and immigration measures in November 2015.

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Is indirect deterrence effective?

An important remaining question is whether indirect deterrence works. All

the Nordic countries saw a signiicant drop in asylum applications in 2016

compared to the year before. From some 163,000 arriving in 2015, only

28,939 people applied for asylum in Sweden in 2016. In Norway, some

23,000 applied for asylum in the last four months of 2015, compared to

under 1,200 in the irst four months of 2016 after the new legislation was

announced – a drop of 95%.

hough less pronounced, the trend in Den-

mark is the same – from 21,316 in 2015 to 6,235 last year. Policy-makers

in these countries have not been slow to claim a link between the drop in

arrival numbers for 2016 and the recently adopted deterrence mechanisms.

According to the Danish Minister of Immigration, Inger Støjberg, ‘Our re-

strictive policies have deinitely worked. he government has implemented

forty restrictive measures and closed about forty asylum centres.’

In refugee scholarship, it is often argued that many asylum-seekers do

not actively choose their country of destination (Havinga and Böcker 1999).

Interview studies further indicate that asylum-seekers tend to have limited

or erroneous knowledge of conditions in the country of arrival (Gilbert and

Koser 2006). More fundamentally, a number of studies suggest that other

factors than asylum and immigration policies remain more important in de-

termining which country an asylum-seeker chooses to lee to. hese include

historical and cultural links, including language ainities, postcolonial links

and current political ties (Robinson and Segrott 2002; Neumeyer 2004,

hielemann 2006)). Other factors include information and travel routes

available to asylum-seekers during diferent sections of their journeys and the

role of human smugglers (Gilbert and Koser 2006; Papadopoulou-Koukoula

2008). Personal networks also play a major role: existing diasporas or pre-

vious lows of refugees make it much more likely that more asylum-seekers

from the same country or region will arrive in the same country (Robinson

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112

and Segrott 2002; Hatton 2004; Neumeyer 2005; Jennissen et al. 2009). Fi-

nally, conditions in the country of asylum may be important, but these typ-

ically relate to more general and structural factors, such as job opportunities

(Hatton 2004, hielemann 2002; 2006), economic and social conditions

(hielemann 2002; Holzer and Schneider 2002; Neumeyer 2004), and over-

all assessments of whether the country is ‘safe’ and has a good human rights

record (Neumeyer 2005, hielemann 2006; Moore and Shellman 2007).

On this basis, most scholars conclude that the asylum policy of the par-

ticular country plays only a minor role, if any, in determining asylum-seek-

ers’ choice of destination. Perceptions of the particular country’s asylum

policy or human rights record more generally are also likely to be relatively

generic, possibly drawing some asylum-seekers to a particular region, but

incapable of explaining variations between neighbouring countries in Eu-

rope (Robinson and Segrott 2002: 62). In this perspective, the particular

measures of indirect deterrence discussed above would be unlikely to impact

on asylum arrival numbers, and in any case they are less likely to deter than

other aspects of asylum policy, such as the country’s recognition rate for

diferent groups of asylum-seekers or rates of returns to particular countries

under the Dublin procedure.

Indeed, the signiicant drop in asylum-seekers in Denmark, Sweden and

Norway in 2016 seems to relect a number of mainly international factors.

First of all, the reintroduction of border controls in all three countries is likely

to have blocked onward movement for many asylum-seekers hoping to reach

Norway and Sweden in particular. Secondly, falling arrival numbers may be

partly or wholly ascribed to wider European developments, either blocking

access to the EU as such or containing asylum-seekers in the irst countries of

arrival. Both the EU-Turkey agreement, ensuring Turkish cooperation with

regard to border controls and readmissions from Greece to Turkey as a ‘safe

third country’, and the individual border closures of several Balkan countries

fundamentally changed migratory patterns from 2015 to 2016. Reports of

refoulement

and violence against asylum-seekers at the Hungarian-Serbian

border have similarly limited access to the EU,

and several initiatives have

been introduced aimed at preventing secondary movement from irst coun-

tries of arrival in the EU, such as Greece and Italy. While complete data on

the arrival of asylum-seekers in the EU is still lacking at the time of writing,

similar falls in arrival numbers in other member states, such as Germany

(from more than 890,000 in 2015 to around 280,000 in 2016), support the

conclusion that these factors may be more important in explaining the most

recent development in the Nordic countries.

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A slightly longer perspective on the Danish case, however, suggests that

asylum policy is not unimportant in determining arrival numbers. Figure 2

shows annual trends in asylum applications in Denmark from 2000 to 2015.

As can be seen, the overall trends in Denmark and in the total number of

asylum applications in the EU are roughly correlated. Denmark, like the EU

overall (Figure 3), saw a peak in applications in 2001, after which numbers

dropped for a number of years. Denmark has also seen a general increase in

asylum-seekers from 2006 onwards, which corresponds to similar develop-

ments in the EU more generally.

Figure 2.

Asylum applications submitted in Denmark

Thousands

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113

120

-120

Asylum seekers

Change in percentages

Figure 3.

Asylum applications in the EU

Thousands

120

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

-40

Asylum seekers

Change in percentages

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

114

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

In contrast to the EU trend, however, Denmark experienced a much more

signiicant drop in asylum applications from 2002 onwards, which time-wise

corresponds with the general change in policy following the 2001 elections

and the various deterrence measures adopted in the following years.

he diferences between Denmark and neighbouring countries become

even more signiicant when relative developments of Denmark and Sweden

are compared with the EU overall (Figure 4, below). Taking 2000 as the

baseline year, Denmark and Sweden saw markedly diferent developments

throughout the 2000s, the relative trend in Sweden having been much more

erratic than in Denmark or the EU generally.

Figure 4.

Relative development in asylum applications in the EU overall,

Sweden and Denmark

1,000

800

600

400

200

Sweden

Denmark

Index year 2000 =100

hat Denmark’s more restrictive policy is indeed an important factor behind

this fall is also the conclusion reached by Jan-Paul Brekke in a 2004 article

comparing data for Norway, Sweden and Denmark:

‘here is little doubt that the restrictions implemented by Den-

mark in 2002 had an efect. hat was the intention behind the

shift in policy and [it] worked. he country’s government pulled

all the brakes at the same time and two years later the train of

asylum seekers nearly came to a stop.’ (Brekke 2004: 34)

Brekke’s analysis indicates not only that domestic policies can be efective in

deterring asylum applicants, but also that the result of such deterrents can

create a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ efect by diverting asylum-seekers to oth-

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er countries. Tracing developments for diferent groups of asylum-seekers

across the three countries between 2001 and 2003, relative falls in arrivals of

asylum-applicants from Afghanistan, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia in

Denmark occurred in parallel to an increased number of applications from

those same nationalities in Norway and Sweden (Brekke 2004: 33).

As hypothesised in the previous section, the efect of indirect measures

of deterrence on asylum applications may further depend on how the coun-

try more generally is

perceived

by prospective asylum-seekers, their families,

personal networks and human smugglers (Brekke 2004: 45). As interview

studies conirm, the level of information about conditions in the country

of asylum is neither perfect, nor necessarily correct. Hence, it matters how

states introduce and communicate policy changes. When Denmark signalled

a more general policy change in 2001 and subsequently introduced a broad

package of deterrence measures, this can be seen to have had an efect. In

comparison, Norway introduced a set of thirteen restrictive measures in

2008 in the hope of deterring further arrivals. In this case, however, the

number of asylum applications did not drop signiicantly. In a follow-up

study entitled ‘Why Norway?’, Brekke and Aarset point to fragmented con-

tent, unclear communication and internal disagreement in the government

as some of the reasons why this policy change did not have the desired efect

(Brekke and Aarset 2009: 94).

In conclusion, the Danish case emphasizes that indirect deterrence meas-

ures may, under some circumstances, have an impact on the number of asy-

lum-seekers a country receives. his is also the conclusion reached by two

other studies regarding Norway (Brekke and Aarset 2009: 91) and the Neth-

erlands (Jennissen et al. 2009: 179). his does not mean that indirect deter-

rence measures necessarily trump the other factors mentioned above, such

as personal networks, structural economic factors or accessibility, nor that

governments can simply insulate themselves against general luctuations in

asylum numbers through domestic policies. Indeed, the increase in asylum

applications in Denmark in the second half of the 2000s took place regard-

less of the general change in policy and the numerous deterrence measures

adopted during this period. Yet, the tendency of some scholars to write of

indirect deterrence as merely symbolic or as populist politics intended to

show domestic constituencies that the government ‘is doing something’ is

problematic. Rather, indirect deterrence may well be a rational policy strat-

egy to reduce arrival numbers on a par with measures to prevent direct ac-

cess to asylum through, for example, immigration control. Much depends,

however, on a country’s ability to brand itself successfully to prospective

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asylum-seekers (Brekke 2004: 45). his in turn links concrete deterrence

measures to a particular illiberal political rhetoric. he more explicit negative

branding by the Norwegian government as part of the deterrence measures

introduced last year, like the openly restrictive approach of Denmark, may

thus form part of this strategy.

here have been several notable disagreements on this issue within the

scholarly literature. Several factors may explain this. First, the experience of

diferent countries is likely to vary signiicantly, as indicated above. Second-

ly, knowledge among refugees and migrants may change over time, or vary

among diferent groups, again being related to the knowledge and commu-

nication of personal networks and human smugglers facilitating migration.

hirdly, conclusions drawn from individual cases may not match broader

comparative studies (hielemann 2006). Methodological diferences may,

however, also be part of the explanation. A number of the studies cited above

rely on survey data collected from interviewing either asylum-seekers or rec-

ognised refugees upon arrival in the host country. Various questions may be

raised in this regard. Are sensitive preference statements of this sort neces-

sarily reliable? And are there likely to be important variations depending on

background, nationality or whether or not interviewees have been granted

status or not? More fundamentally, such studies are likely to sufer from ‘sur-

vivor bias’ in that they exclude the majority of those who did not choose that

particular country, whether due to deterrence policies or for other reasons.

Likewise, quantitative or mixed methods studies may rely on overly broad

or faulty indicators. For instance, the use of development aid as an indica-

tor for how liberal a country is can be problematic (Brekke 2004: 45; inter

alia hielemann 2002). On the other hand, political discussions of refugee

policy in Denmark are often framed as an either-or choice between granting

asylum or helping refugees in their regions of origin; restrictive domestic pol-

icies may therefore go hand in hand with increased budgets for humanitarian

aid and development assistance abroad.

More generally, the fact that policies of indirect deterrence can have

an isolated efect in terms of lowering arrival numbers does not mean that

there are no other compelling reasons why states should think twice before

embarking on this path. Most obviously, the kinds of measures currently

adopted place additional burdens on asylum-seekers and refugees who have

already arrived that raise questions in regard to both international law and

political proportionality. Syrians in Denmark aforded the new temporary

protection status are faced with a diicult choice between ensuring their

own safety and that of any children or spouses still remaining in Syria or

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irst countries of asylum. Such measures may also have an arbitrary gender

bias: the majority of persons granted the new temporary protection status are

women and children, since most Syrian men and their families are granted

Convention status as conscientious objectors.

Indirect deterrence policies are also more likely than other forms of de-

terrence to impact on eforts to ensure the integration of refugees who are

already in the country than other forms of deterrence. his is particularly

the case for policies involving deliberate delays in processing asylum claims,

a lack of access to labour markets during the asylum phase, automatic na-

tional dispersal policies and short-term residence permits, which have each

been shown to impact negatively on the later employment opportunities and

economic performance of those who are subsequently aforded protection.

Similarly, economic destitution and a lack of access to education and work

experience may negatively impact on decisions by rejected asylum-seekers to

return voluntarily and by refugees to agree to repatriation.

Indirect deterrence may further create negative externalities in respect

of other issues. Both domestic and international law place certain limita-

tions on the design of indirect deterrence with regard to non-discrimination,

making it diicult for governments to design policies speciically targeting

certain groups or nationalities. he desire to maintain strict rules in respect

of, for example, family reuniication may thus inadvertently impact on a

country’s ability to attract wanted labour migration or necessitate restrictions

on a wider group of national citizens. Moreover, high-proile policies, such

as the Danish ‘jewellery law’, show that the kind of negative nation branding

inherent in this form of deterrence may be diicult to maintain in relation

to wider audiences. While notoriously diicult to gauge, indirect deterrence

may ultimately impact on perceptions of the country more generally.

Last but not least, policies of indirect deterrence are by design prem-

ised on a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ efect that fundamentally challenges their

continued efectiveness in the long or even medium terms. Once pur-

sued, surrounding states are likely to respond with similar policies – either

pre-emptively or once they experience the displacement efect in ways that

may reduce, nullify or even reverse the intended efect in the irst country to

introduce them.

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118

Concluding remarks

Few other European countries have signiicantly changed course with regard

to their asylum and immigration policies as Denmark, from adopting the

liberal Aliens Act in 1983 to becoming a self-declared hard-line state today.

As the present article shows, however, this development has been neither

sudden nor unique. From the mid-1980s onwards, Denmark has imple-

mented numerous policies of deterrence, in several cases setting the pace for

and inspiring similar developments in other countries. hat may be partially

true of the restrictive policies pursued the last decade and a half as well, many

of which have been partly or wholly taken over by other Nordic countries

in recent years.

More generally, the current drive towards unilateral asylum and immi-

gration measures across Europe constitutes a distinct form of deterrence in

its own right. Rather than legally or physically blocking access to asylum,

these policies restrict access to rights and beneits for asylum-seekers and ref-

ugees who have already arrived with a view to discouraging further arrivals.

Designed to make the prospective asylum country appear as unappealing

as possible, these policies may be considered a form of target reputation

management or negative management branding that are prompting states

to advertise restrictive measures actively towards prospective asylum-seekers

and their information networks.

Denmark’s consistent and pervasive pursuit of indirect deterrence sug-

gests that domestic policy, at least under some circumstances, can impact on

arrival numbers. Rather than simply symbolic politics, indirect deterrence

may thus be a strategic response by member states seeking to recover their

sovereign manoeuvrability in an area where European states feel increasingly

constrained by both EU and international human rights and refugee law. Le-

gal geography plays an important role in this respect. Because of its opt-outs

on justice and home afairs, Denmark enjoys greater freedom of manoeuvre

in introducing sovereign deterrence measures than other member states, as

does Norway as a non-member of the EU.

Pursuing these deterrence policies may, however, mean a number of in-

direct costs for the states involved. he policies of indirect deterrence ex-

plored above not only have an impact on the core rights of asylum-seekers

and refugees, they are also more likely than other forms of deterrence to

have a negative impact on integration eforts. More fundamentally, the beg-

gar-thy-neighbour dynamic upon which these policies are premised make

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

individual countries vulnerable to similar policy developments in neighbour-

ing states that are likely to reduce, or even reverse, the deterrent efect over

time.

he current European context makes this point particularly acute. he

widespread resort to unilateral border closures and deterrence mechanisms

in many ways represents a return to the competition-oriented environment

that characterized Europe in the 1990s, creating a downward spiral and a

more unpredictable policy environment (Hunt 2014: 504; Byrne et al. 2002:

360). he historical solution to this collective action problem at the time

was further harmonization and institutionalization, eventually leading to the

Common European Asylum System. In contrast, the current wave of indi-

rect deterrence and border controls appears, at least partly, to be borne out

of a sense of frustration among many member states with the inability of

the current EU system to deal with the current situation. As such, it is less

self-evident that member states will accept further harmonization as a viable

policy option today.

REFUGEE POLICY AS ‘NEGATIVE NATION BRANDING’: THE CASE OF DENMARK AND THE NORDICS

119

Notes

Research Director, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law;

Honorary Professor, Aarhus University Law School. he research conducted for this article

forms part of a project on ‘‘Nordic Branding’’ funded by UiO:Nordic.

Interview with former executive staf of the Danish Refugee Council.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/denmark-debating-seizing-valuables-from-migrants-

1452689275

http://www.thelocal.dk/20150907/denmarks-anti-refugee-ads-published-in-foreign-

papers.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/un-backlash-against-call-to-scale-back-

geneva-convention-on-refugees

Politiken,

‘Ny task force skal udfordre konventioner’, 9. november 2016.http://politiken.

dk/indland/article5649898.ece

Denmark has a long tradition of minority governments.

See diagram 1 below. See further Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jørgensen 2014.

Source: http://www.retsinformation.dk and Christensen 2010.

10 While the ‘irst country of asylum’ concept has since been widely adopted by other coun-

tries, the reciprocity measure has not and was abandoned in 2002. See Kjærum 1992: 517;

Melander 1978.

11 he legislation was passed in 1986, but it only came into force in 1989 (Cruz 1995).

12 Amendment to the Danish Aliens Act, Law No. 153, 18 February 2015.

13 Amendment to the Danish Aliens Act, Law No. 102, 3 February 2016.

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120

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

14 he moratorium on family reuniication was originally for one year, but was subsequently

extended. Amendment to the Danish Aliens Act, Law No. 102, 3 February 2016.

15 Amendment to the Danish Aliens Act, Law No. 1273, 20 November 2015.

16 Amendment to the Danish Aliens Act, Law No. 1000, 30 August 2015.

17 he authorities may coniscate funds or assets estimated to have a value above DKK

10,000 (approximately EUR 1,350). Personal assets with a particular sentimental value,

such as wedding rings or religious artifacts, are exempt. Amendment to the Danish Aliens

Act, Law No. 102, 3 February 2016.

18 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/immigration/asylum-regulations-in-norway/in-

sight/tightening-of-norways-asylum-rules/id2465829/

19 Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz [Act on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures],

Oct. 20, 2015, BGBl. I at 1722, http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bun-

desanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl115s1722.pdf,

archived at

http://perma.cc/K4YQ-

VWNS.

20 Gesetz zur Neubestimmung des Bleiberechts und der Aufenthaltsbeendigung [Act to Re-

deine the Right to Stay and the Termination of Residence], July 27, 2015, BGBl. I at

1386, http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav? startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jump-

To=bgbl115s1386.pdf, archived

at http://perma.cc/6HSW-G3PM.

21 ECRE/ELENA, ‘ Information Note on Family Reuniication for Beneiciaries of Interna-

tional Protection in Europe’, June 2016, available from: http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/

uploads/2016/07/ECRE-ELENA-Information-Note-on-Family-Reuniication-for-Bene-

iciaries-of-International-Protection-in-Europe_June-2016.pdf

22 http://newirin.irinnews.org/non-merci-why-refugees-avoid-france/

23 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35365603; https://euobserver.com/migration/

130120

24 UNHCR, ‘Dozens queue every week in Athens to apply for asylum’. UNHCR News sto-

ry, 23 March 2012. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4f6c8b6a6.html; AIDA, Country

Report Italy: Fourth Update, December 2015, available from http://www.asylumineu-

rope.org/sites/default/iles/report-download/aida_it_update.iv_.pdf

25 Global Detention Project, he Detention of Asylum Seekers in the Mediterranean Region,

April 2015; AIDA Country Report, February 2015, available at http://www.asylumineu-

rope.org/sites/default/iles/report-download/aida_-_hungary_thirdupdate_inal_febru-

ary_2015.pdf.

26 UNHCR is concerned at new Amendment to Israel’s Law on the Prevention of Iniltration.

Brieing Notes, 10 January 2014 http://www.unhcr.org/52cfe2a09.html

27 Notably Art. 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Art. 8 of

the European Convention on Human Rights. See e.g. UNHCR Regional Representation

for Northern Europe, ‘UNHCR Observations on the proposed amendments to the Dan-

ish Aliens legislation, L 87: Lov om ændring af udlændingeloven’, Stockholm, 6 January

2016. See more generally Edwards 2005; Cholewinski 2002; Rohan 2014.

28 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-court-rules-beneits-for-asylum-

seekers-are-inhumane-a-845066.html

Biao v. Denmark,

European Court of Human Rights, Appl. No. 38590/10, 24 May 2016.

30 http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/09/29/as-belgium-turns-to-facebook-to-deter-iraqis-

more-arrive-daily/;

http://www.thelocal.no/20151108/norway-launches-anti-refugee-

facebook-page

31 he text of the ad was subsequently criticized by the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman

for being misleading in that it suggested that the new restrictions regarding family reuni-

ication apply to all types of refugees.

URU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 229: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017

32 https://www.border.gov.au/about/operation-sovereign-borders/counter-people-smug-

gling-communication

33 http://www.iom.int/news/iom-italy-launch-aware-migrants-campaign

34 http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/norge-far-europas-strengeste-asylpolitikk/60461396;

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-number-of-asylum-

seekers-arriving-in-norway-drops-by-95-a7114191.html.

35 https://www.wsj.com/articles/denmark-debating-seizing-valuables-from-migrants-

1452689275;

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/26/danish-parliament-

approves-plan-to-seize-assets-from-refugees

36 See in particular Chapter 6: ‘Hic Abundant Leones: the institutional reach of refugee

protection’.

37 In that sense, indirect deterrence may thus be compared to similar discussions around

Danish nation-branding following the Danish ‘cartoon crisis’ in 2005 (Angell and Mord-

horst 2015: 189-90).

38 See above, Fig. 1.

39 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/refugee-crisis-sweden-deputy-prime-minis-

ter-cries-as-she-announces-u-turn-on-asylum-policy-a6749531.html

40 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-number-of-asylum-

seekers-arriving-in-norway-drops-by-95-a7114191.html. It should be noted, however,

that arrival numbers in Europe generally vary depending on the season due to migratory

possibilities, and hence that it is diicult to directly compare the last four months and the

irst months in a year.

41 ‘Vores stramninger har helt klart virket. Vi har gennemført 40 stramninger og lukket

omkring 40 asylcentre.’, http://www.b.dk/politiko/inger-stoejberg-nu-letter-asylpresset-

paa-danmarks-graenser

42 In Sweden, for example, the drop in Iraqi asylum-seekers around 2008 has been attributed

to a change in asylum practice and resultant lower recognition rates. Brekke and Aarset

2009: 42

43 Human Rights Watch, ‘Hungary: Migrants Abused at the Border’, 13 July 2016, available

from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/hungary-migrants-abused-border

44 he exception were asylum-seekers who did not wish apply for asylum in a particular

country, but due to a lack of opportunities to move onwards or risk of being returned by

its authorities nonetheless did so.

45 he World Bank, ‘Forcibly displaced: toward a development approach supporting refu-

gees, the internally displaced, and their hosts’, Washington DC, September 2016, availa-

ble from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25016

46 Ibid., pp. 89f.

47 However, a media analysis conducted in June 2016 concluded that recent Danish policies

did not signiicantly impact on perceptions of Denmark by respondents in the United

States, the United Kingdom, Sweden or Germany. Infomedia, ‘Strømninger i lygtnin-

gedebatten’, 3 June 2016, available from: https://infomedia.dk/indsigt/folkemoedet-2016/

download-whitepaper-lygtningedebatten

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122

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Chapter 2

Selected Documents

CHAPTER 2 · SELECTED DOCUMENTS

127

Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s speech at

the Syria conference on 4 February 2016 in London · 129

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Prime Minister

Speech delivered by Foreign Minister Kristian Jensen to

the Danish Foreign Policy Society on 4 February 2016 · 131

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

The foreign minister’s speech at a seminar on 21 April 2016

at a meeting of NB8 [Nordic-Baltic Eight] in Riga · 141

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s toast at

President Obama’s State Dinner on 13 May 2016 · 143

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Prime Minister

The Foreign Minister’s speech at ‘Women Deliver’,

the Womenomics conference in Copenhagen on 18 May

2016 · 146

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

The Foreign Minister’s speech at the 3GF summit in

Copenhagen on 6-7 June 2016 · 148

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

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128

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

The Foreign Minister’s speech at the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs’ trade policy conference on 22 June 2016 · 151

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

Op-ed by Minister of Foods and the Environment Esben

Lunde Larsen in cooperation with Minister of Business and

Growth Troels Lund Poulsen, published in

Hufington Post

on 23 September 2016 · 158

Esben Lunde Larsen, Minister of Foods and the Environment

Speech by the Foreign Minister at the ‘Yalta European

Strategy’ conference in Kiev on 15 September 2016 · 160

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

The Foreign Minister’s speech at President Obama’s

Leaders’ Summit on the global refugee crisis on

20 September 2016 at the UN in New York · 163

Kristian Jensen, Minister for Foreign Afairs

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CHAPTER 2 · SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Migration will be the biggest challenge of

the 21st century

129

Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s speech at the

Syria conference on 4 February 2016 in London

Your Excellencies, Distinguished delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

hanks to our ive hosts for this very timely and well-focused conference.

Yesterday, the UN Special Envoy announced a temporary pause in the in-

tra-Syrian talks in Geneva. In the weeks ahead, I urge all Syrian parties to

create a constructive environment before the resumption of the talks on

February 25. In this regard, a particular responsibility lies with the regime

and its supporters, who must meet their obligations in accordance with UN

Security Council Resolution 2254. Resuming talks later this month ofers an

opportunity that must be seized. Political transition is the only way to end

the horriic human suferings and counter Da’esh.

But while we push for a political solution, we must keep up the pressure on

all parties to ensure humanitarian access and respect for international law.

And we need to step up eforts to create a better future for the many chil-

dren, women and men caught in the conlict.

We must increase funding. We must improve living conditions locally for

the many refugees and the host communities in the region. We must ensure

protection and create more jobs and better access to education, health and

other services.

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130

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2017

All this requires a better link between humanitarian assistance and develop-

ment eforts. And it requires a broader involvement of all actors – including

governments, civil society and the private sector.

his is why we gather here today. his is why Denmark contributes substan-

tially to the MADAD-fund [‘Madad’ is Arabic and means ‘helping together’,

eds.]. And this is why Denmark has taken lead on the European Regional

Development and Protection Program for Syrian refugees and host commu-

nities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. A program that helps refugees and locals

to ind relevant jobs, to create new jobs, to upgrade their working skills, to

start a new business, and to be informed on their legal rights and to avoid

child labor – in close dialogue with the host authorities.

I am pleased today to commit 100 million US dollars or 688 million Danish

Kroner in 2016 to address both the immediate and longer term needs in and

around Syria. his includes the expected Danish contribution to the EU

Turkey Facility.

Denmark truly wishes to contribute substantially to alleviate the human suf-

ferings in and around Syria. Denmark will remain an active and committed

partner in the years to come. hrough humanitarian relief, through devel-

opment eforts, and by strengthening the link between the two – in order

to improve living conditions for the many families and local communities

afected by the conlict.

hank you.

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CHAPTER 2 · SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Speech delivered by Foreign Minister

Kristian Jensen to the Danish Foreign

Policy Society on 4 February 2016

131

Dear listeners, dear Foreign Policy Society, dear Lykke and the University of

Copenhagen. I am really happy to see so many people interested in foreign

policy here today. And there is certainly enough to be interested in!

I would like to begin with Awer Mabil. Awer Mabil is 20 years old. He got

his debut with FC Midtjylland’s premier league team – my team – on Oc-

tober 16, 2015 playing against Randers. He is a technical player – perhaps

the new Pione Sisto? And like Sisto, he is not born in my neighbourhood.

Awer Mabil is South Sudanese and was born in 1995 in the refugee camp

Kakuma, which is located in Kenya close to South Sudan. In Kakuma, he

began playing football from an early age, because there was – according to

him – not much else to do. He lived in Kakuma until 2006, when his parents

were granted permanent residence in Australia, where he is now a national.

On Wednesday December 16 last year – exactly two months after Awer Ma-

bil’s debut for FC Midtjylland – I found myself in Kakuma. here are about

180,000 people living there – the same amount of people living in Odense.

It was my irst visit to a refugee camp and what I saw there was need and des-

peration. On average, people have lived there for 18 years. And they do not

have much to do. I spoke with a newly arrived family who had led abuse and

conlict. And I witnessed the poor conditions existing both in- and outside

the camp. But I also witnessed hope and the will to live. I saw young people

who held meetings on democracy and peaceful conlict resolution. I saw the

single mother who, despite having seven children of her own and two of

her sister’s, also took care of an orphaned child. And the young rappers who

sang about the same challenges as other teenagers around the world. I also

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witnessed the great job that Danish and other NGOs were doing here – just

as they do elsewhere in the world.

Kakuma – and Kenya and Africa in general – showed me that the way we

handle the refugee crises, migration and its root causes, will be the greatest

global challenge of the 21st century. We can see it with the naked eye and we

can see it when we study the igures for how the world will look in 2050. It

is at the top of the agenda for the world’s leaders. And it is the one political

topic that is of most concern to Danes.

In 2050, there will be twice as many people in Africa and the Middle East

than today. he large youth populations in Africa and the Middle East pres-

ent both a challenge and a solution. If managed wrongly, they can become

a ticking time bomb beneath stability and prosperity – also in Europe. If

managed correctly, they can become the key to growth, stability and devel-

opment.

Migration afects us all. Both the countries that are losing people; the coun-

tries through which the migrants are passing; and the countries in which

the migrants settle down, if they get that far. Right now, migration is af-

fecting the Europe we know and love – a Europe with freedom of move-

ment, beneicial economic integration and a high degree of security.

Migration also afects our values. European societies are changing character,

both because the newcomers are bringing other values and thought patterns

with them, and also because we may change our attitude towards the world

when faced with massive challenges. And values matter.

My message is clear: We have a responsibility to ensure Denmark’s security,

growth and prosperity – not to mention our values – in this situation. And in

order to do that, we need to use our entire foreign policy toolbox – security

policy, EU policy, development policy, policy of growth and value policy.

Before I elaborate further on migration, I will briely give you my view of

2016 from a foreign policy perspective, and of this year’s major challenges

for Danish and European foreign policy. Since I became Minister for Foreign

Afairs, I have dealt with a great deal of the topics on the global agenda, but

I will not be able to name all of them here today. his does not mean that

they are forgotten.

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here are many heavy challenges in the world of 2016. Within our own

neighbourhood, we must ensure that Denmark will get solid agreements

with the EU after the “no”-vote last year, so that we can ensure the safety of

Denmark. We must do our best to ensure that the UK remains in the EU.

We need to work for freedom and security for Ukraine, while hopefully it

will become possible to create a better relationship with Russia with full

respect for maintaining a uniied EU position on this matter. And we need

to continue to prioritise the Arctic and peaceful cooperation in the region.

A little further away, we must work for stability in the neighbouring areas.

We must strengthen the ight against ISIL; despite being under pressure on

several fronts, their horror organisation continues to spread to still more

places in the Middle East and North Africa. And we must actively counter

the threat of extremism and terror that hit Europe and the rest of the world

so hard in 2015. A political solution to the conlict in Syria and increased

stability in the Middle East are crucial priorities in 2016.

We must work towards concluding the negotiations on the free trade agree-

ment between the EU and the US to the beneit of our economies and our

consumers. And we must continue the struggle for human rights, for the

eradication of poverty and for a world-order based on the rule-of-law and

freedom.

hese are heavy, hard and challenging agendas. And I cannot blame anyone

for feeling pessimistic. But we must not forget that the world in many areas

also has become a better place. here are also progress and bright spots.

he world can actually come together on important global decisions. his

was demonstrated by the adoption of the new sustainable development goals

in New York in September and the climate agreement in Paris. In both in-

stances, Denmark and the EU played a constructive part. Also, the previous

2015 goals have resulted in a sharp decline in child mortality rates and a

large reduction in the number of people living in absolute poverty.

In 2015, the world community and Iran – with the EU in the forefront –

signed an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. Regardless of regional ten-

sions, the agreement provides a perspective for a more peaceful world as well

as economic opportunities for Danish companies.

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Democracy made advances in several places in 2015. Tunisia appeared as a

democratic ray of light in a region where democracy has diicult conditions.

We have to support that. Burkina Faso maintained democracy despite severe

pressure from coup-makers and, most recently, terrorism. Solid progress was

made towards a peace agreement in Colombia and a fairly democratic elec-

tion was carried out in Venezuela. We also saw a democratic development

with the election in Myanmar.

In the midst of all the gloom, opportunities and chances are also to be found.

hese must be promoted and seized, all the while we handle the challenges

as good as we can. hat is the essence of Denmark’s foreign policy. We do

not dictate where the world should go. But if we act wisely and prioritise

correctly, then our eforts might help to set the agenda and tip the balance

and the development in the right direction.

Migration will – in a broad sense – become the greatest global challenge of

the 21st century. And we cannot solve this challenge on our own, no mat-

ter how many fences, we may put up. Since World War II, Denmark and

Europe have made enormous progress, thanks to the four freedoms: free

movement of goods, services, capital and labour. We have thus ensured both

peace and the market economy. he four freedoms are the foundation of this

success – and I do not wish to see European progress be undermined. I will

therefore make a number of initiatives in the near future.

Firstly: We must manage migration in order to safeguard the Danish welfare

society and to ensure that the Nordic Region remains an open and attrac-

tive region. A lot has been said and written about Denmark recently. Not

everything has been accurate and not everything has been fun to read. I

would therefore like to make clear that Denmark is a country that is aware

of its responsibility. We have nothing to be ashamed of, when you take into

consideration that last year Denmark received 21,000 asylum seekers and

is one of the countries that provide the most humanitarian aid to Syria and

other neighbouring areas per capita.

But our society is not equipped for mass immigration. We have a very col-

lective public social support system, which only functions when everyone

in Denmark work within their abilities and contribute with high taxes. At

the same time, we have a society with many unwritten rules and norms and

mutual trust. It is a big challenge if you do not know the unwritten rules.

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his is why there is a limit to how many refugees and migrants Denmark can

integrate. And it is why we have sharpened the course and taken the required

steps forced upon us by the special circumstances. But it is important that we

do not allow the enormous challenges we are facing to make us abandon the

values that are speciic for Denmark and worth preserving. Openness, trust,

freedom, tolerance and equality. he solution is not to close the borders and

restrict our international relations. he solution is to adapt our institutions

to function better and cooperate more eiciently internationally with rele-

vant countries and regions.

he situation has led to Danes and Swedes for the irst time in over 50 years

not being able to cross our common border freely. If we are to realise the

full economic potential of the Nordic countries and the Øresund region, we

must re-establish the free passage in the Nordic region and maintain Den-

mark and the Nordic countries as open and attractive to those people and

businesses, we would like to settle here.

Denmark needs to be able to attract highly qualiied labour in order to de-

velop our economy and ability to compete – and thus our welfare society.

he government’s platform clearly states that we will ensure Danish compa-

nies easier access to skilled foreign labour. Here, too, the government and I

are of course aware of the foreign debate on Denmark’s immigration policy.

It is important that we spread the facts about the Danish measures, in or-

der to debunk the any myths. And we must continue to highlight Danish

strengths and the international responsibility that Denmark takes.

Secondly: We must manage migration, to ensure that we do not lose some

of the key beneits of EU cooperation. he number of asylum seekers in the

EU doubled from 2012 to 2014 and doubled again from 2014 to 2015. In

2015, around 1.3 million people came to Europe. his has put the EU under

tremendous pressure; EU’s external borders, the Schengen area and the EU’s

decision-making power and solidarity. It is vital that we ind common Euro-

pean solutions and that we not squander the progress which we have fought

to achieve for more than 50 years. Young Danes have never experienced an-

ything else than open borders, that are easily crossed, and I think that many

overlook the fact that the four freedoms rest on several generations of hard

work. hey are freedoms that we might risk losing again.

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Right now the biggest problem is that EU’s external borders are not func-

tioning. his must be at the top of EU’s agenda and all countries have a

responsibility to ensure that EU’s external borders work. he EU is consid-

ering how to give the EU more instruments to secure the external borders

and the government is open to looking at better working solutions. he

EU could also consider adding more vessels to the patrol of the EU’s exter-

nal borders and to give the EU a more robust mandate to reject unjustiied

asylum applicants and send them back. One thing is certain – the internal

problems cannot be solved properly until the EU’s external borders are se-

cured. If the community cannot solve the problems, the individual countries

will try on their own.

he EU should also lead a much more coherent neighbourhood policy. he

EU and its member states need to spend more money to counter the reasons

why people lee and be ready to use political muscle in getting partner coun-

tries to take back more of their nationals, who hasn’t been granted asylum.

But the EU must also be ready to open its markets much more to countries

in the neighbourhood, controversial as it may be.

Here lies one of the keys to solving the problems. If goods are not allowed to

cross the borders, then people – and at worst soldiers – will do so too a much

greater extent. Free trade helps to ensure thriving communities worldwide.

hirdly: Conlicts create refugee lows and refugee lows create conlicts. We

need to deal with the world’s conlicts at an early stage and in a much more

fundamental way, to prevent conlicts and fragile states from creating more

refugees, more migration, crime and terrorism.

4.2 million people have led Syria. And more than 125 foreign ighters have

travelled there from Denmark. In Afghanistan the Taliban are ighting to

come back, driving people on the run, just as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram

are doing in Africa. In Burkina Faso terrorists can suddenly strike, although

the country has undergone the most promising democratic development in

the region. And the conlict in Libya makes it easy for smugglers to send

people from all of Africa over the Mediterranean.

It is within the security policy interest of Denmark to combat this and we

will need to have a robust security policy if we are to make a diference.

Demark must continue to deliver militarily to the resolution of the conlicts

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in the Middle East and Africa. We need to be present in both Syria, Iraq

and Afghanistan – and other places where the refugee- and migration lows

originate. herefore, operations “further down” in Africa such as the Horn

of Africa and Mali are absolutely necessary – and we will eventually see more

such operations. Mali is only one border away from Europe and unrest in

Mali afects our security.

At the same time we need to think further ahead – Danish foreign policy

should also help to stop and prevent the next conlict, which has not yet

occurred!

Denmark is good at contributing to stabilisation in conlict areas, because we

take a comprehensive approach, combining all of our instruments – military,

political and diplomatic, civilian reconstruction, training of local authorities,

humanitarian aid and development aid, to counter the causes of conlict and

create growth in the EU border regions. We need to push for the UN and

the EU to take a comprehensive approach as a standard procedure in conlict

resolution and prevention.

Taking a comprehensive approach involves diicult choices and signiicant

risks. It is always – and this should not be misinterpreted – relatively easier

to bomb from the air. However, on the ground the choices are harder. We

must be prepared to cooperate more with all actors – except for terrorist

organisations.

I would also like to see us spend more of our resources to support risky

projects such as police training in Aleppo and the delivery of services by local

authorities in Afghanistan. We must take risks to get involved, despite of

diicult conditions. For I believe that it will lead to bigger rewards and more

security for the local populations – and for the Danes.

Fourthly: We must contribute to emerging and developing countries making

sustainable choices for their societies, enabling them to handle climate chal-

lenges and demographic changes.

here are major migration challenges both in emerging countries in Asia and

in developing countries in Africa. he emerging countries are among other

things pressured by climate change, the soaring need for resources, changes

in demography, and mass migration from rural to urban areas. Today nearly

4 billion people are living in the world’s cities, by 2030 that number will be

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around 5 billion. And towards 2030, the global middle class will grow by up

to 3 billion.

his presents emerging and developing countries with considerable challeng-

es. It also ofers signiicant opportunities – for them and for Denmark. hese

countries need to make strategic choices about how to renew and improve

their societies. And this is where Denmark must be ever more ready to help

– as we are currently doing it in for example Asia. Danish solutions – many

of them green – are in high demand and so are Danish companies. Within

urbanization, energy, environment, food stufs, health, welfare technology

and so on.

he government is therefore very focused on Africa. In Africa, we bring all

our instruments into play. Our ambition is to use a larger proportion of our

development aid in Africa and to focus it more towards the UN Develop-

ment Goals and combating the causes of migration. To raise more money for

investments in Africa through public-private cooperation such as the Cli-

mate and Agriculture Investment Funds. To focus more on the creation of

social and legal frameworks for growth and development. All the while not

forgetting the fragile states, the poorest countries and the poorest segments

of the populations. We focus on Africa – but we do not forget about the rest

of the world.

My overall message about migration and the refugee crisis is that it is the big-

gest global challenge of the 21st century and that these challenges, broadly

speaking, will come to deine the foreign policies of Denmark and Europe.

his will also be apparent when we present a new strategy for development

policy later this year. But within these challenges there are also opportunities

for Denmark, if we manage them properly and if we use the entire foreign

policy toolbox.

Denmark must protect the traditional alliances that have meant so much

to Denmark’s security and economy – NATO and the EU. We need to

strengthen cooperation with emerging countries, especially in Asia, both po-

litically and in terms of societal solutions. We need to have development aid,

and while it may have been reduced it remains world class, and we are in the

process of developing it. We need to strengthen Denmark through free trade

and exports.

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hree indicators are important for me to inish with:

First, we need to ind the right balance between interests and values – two

things that I do not see as opposites. We also need to ind the right balance

between realism and idealism. Henry Kissinger was right when he said that

the world needs both realists and idealists. Because a cynical realist has no

goals. And a naive idealist has no means to achieve his goals. I prefer to be

a realist with idealism intact. I know where I’m going. And I know which

means I can use to get there.

Secondly, that I, as a Liberal, value mankind’s pursuit of happiness and great-

est possible number of options. Freedom and equality are the best means to

ensure the individual’s right to choose freely his or her own life and future.

his is central to me.

hirdly, we must defend the right of every country to freedom and to choose

for themselves their future and alliances. Inspired by the words of Woodrow

Wilson, spoken in 1917, it is about making the world safe for democracies

everywhere, especially small democracies like Denmark.

I would like to conclude with Awer Mabil from Kakuma and South Sudan.

He began in a refugee camp and ended up in Denmark. His family got the

opportunity and his talent did the rest. But Denmark and Europe cannot ac-

cept everyone who, because of conlict or poor conditions of life, are seeking

a better life. What we can do with our foreign policy is to create a framework

for a better life with less conlict, more freedom, more options, and better

prospects for the millions of young people who grow up, particularly in Af-

rica and the Middle East, in the coming decades.

his is the great challenge, it is not easy and there is much at stake! It is on

the basis of how well prepared we were to handle this great challenge that

we will be rated. his is the great challenge that will come to deine Danish

foreign policy in the coming years.

hank you.

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140

Communication and media relations

with Russia: platforms for debate, or

hybrid warfare?

The foreign minister’s speech at a seminar on 21 April 2016 at

a meeting of NB8 [Nordic-Baltic Eight] in Riga

hank you very much for inviting me to speak here in Riga on this impor-

tant subject.

Only 25 years ago Latvia and the Baltic states fought for and got their

freedom. And Denmark and my predecessor, Ufe Elleman-Jensen, stood

irmly with you then as we do now. Today, we ight together for security,

free trade and better lives for our people. You have become a close ally in the

Baltic region, in the EU and in NATO. What a development!

In many ways the world has become a better place since the Cold War.

But lately the Baltic States and people have felt insecurity once again. his is

due to Russia’s unacceptable behavior in Ukraine, their hybrid warfare and

crude propaganda. We understand the insecurity people here feel and we

have reacted. Our response has been military reassurance, closer cooperation

and an increased efort to counter Russian propaganda and misinformation.

Propaganda is not new. You know that from the KGB during the Cold

War, from the terrible war in Yugoslavia in the 90’ties – and from ISIL today.

But never before has misinformation or propaganda been used to the extent

and with the level of sophistication that we see in today’s Russia.

he internet has become the most important battleield but Russia is also

using its state controlled media platforms, including Sputnik and Russia To-

day, all across Europe. Fortunately, the eforts to drive a wedge into the EU

cooperation and stir up conlict by using propaganda and misinformation

have not succeeded.

As a reaction to Russian propaganda, Denmark and three other EU coun-

tries took the initiative to put strategic communication on the EU agenda in

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January 2015. One of the results was the establishment of the East Stratcom.

I am pleased to see Mr. Jon Kyst here today. He plays a key role in that unit.

And I know he has a good Latvian and Estonian colleague. Denmark has

also promoted strategic communication in NATO and in the Nordic-Baltic

cooperation. I am happy that Latvia is at the forefront of the regional eforts.

We are slowly beginning to see good results of the many counter in-

itiatives. Today, I believe it has become more diicult for Russian media

to successfully spread lies and myths in the international arena. People are

becoming more aware of the methods used for propaganda purposes. he

many examples of Russian misinformation exposed by Western media and

authorities have contributed to stronger media literacy.

his we saw in the story of 13 year old Lisa from Berlin. Her alleged

rape by refugees was supplemented by media coverage that included footage

from the Tahrir Square in Cairo and YouTube images from 2009. Even for-

eign minister Lavrov intervened. But in the end the story backired because

German media and authorities actively countered and exposed the Russian

misinformation and falsiication. Lisa was not raped but spent time with a

friend.

he EU’s East Stratcom unit is playing an important role – so important

that it is called EU’s Special Forces by Russian authorities. he unit high-

lights examples of Russian misinformation. From actors pretending to be

Ukrainian Azov ighters threatening the Dutch people with terror attacks

before the 6 April referendum to allegations that the Brussels terror attacks

were staged. We need to strengthen the East Stratcom unit with more per-

manent staf and resources.

he NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence here in Riga has also done

good work. In the tragic case of Malyasia Airlines MH17 it carefully docu-

mented how Kremlin-funded hybrid trolls were active on online-media as to

the shooting down of MH17.

here are other things we can do beside strategic communication. We

need to strengthen our support for critical journalism and open debate. he

establishment of the Baltic Centre of Media Excellence contributes to this

end. We also need to enforce media pluralism and access to quality media to

all groups of society, also minority groups. We should invite Russian journal-

ists to visit our societies and engage with Western journalists. And welcome

when Russian media settle down outside Russia to report more freely and

independently – such as Medusa here in Riga.

Let me end by making it very clear: Russian misinformation or prop-

aganda is a dangerous weapon. It promotes hatred and intolerance. It can

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divide people and polarizes societies. It undermines trust in the media. And

it blurs the lines between what is real and what is fabricated. here are peo-

ple who can fall victim to this – also here in the Baltics. herefore we must

counter it and promote objective and free media.

his is actually not a battle for the truth. It is a battle against propaganda

that pollutes the truth. his makes our work diicult, but it also makes it so

much more important for our free and democratic societies.

hank you.

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Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s

toast at President Obama’s State Dinner

on 13 May 2016

143

Mr. President, irst lady, dear colleagues from my neighboring counties, dis-

tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

“Once I was seven years old, my mama told me,

Go make yourself some friends or you’ll be lonely.”

hose lyrics are from Danish singer Lucas Graham’s no. 1 hit-song here

in the U.S.

And I’m a lucky guy, because my predecessors didn’t wait for this song

to be released before they actually followed this advice. And therefore I am

so privileged and happy to be here tonight – surrounded by good friends.

From the Nordic countries, but irst and foremost – you, Mr. President, your

fantastic and dedicated wife Michelle, and all your fellow Americans. he

United States is truly one of Denmark’s closest friends.

he irst time you invited me into the Oval Oice, Mr. President, you

said that Denmark is punching above our weight. It made me proud. It made

us Danes feel a little special.

Now – some six years later – I understand that not only Denmark but all

the Nordic countries punch above our weight. Nevertheless, I’m still proud.

And I truly believe the same goes for my colleagues. You can count on us.

You know that. And that is probably why we are all invited here tonight.

We will continue to punch above our weight – and after tonight’s splendid

dinner we will deinitely step up into a whole new weight class...

he ties between the United States and the Nordics are strong and go

way back. Nordic Vikings crossed the Atlantic centuries ago and discovered

amazing America.

Ever since, millions have left our rainy and windy countries – looking for

a new start in America. Many of them settled in... Minnesota. I guess the

weather there made them feel right at home.

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144

he Nordic settlers took part in making America bright and beautiful.

Scarlett Johansson, of Danish descent, is a living proof of that.

he Swedes, Finns and Icelanders did their part too. Contributing to the

gene pool that gave you Julia Roberts, Matt Damon, and Uma hurman.

And the Norwegians – well... hey gave you Karl Rove. Among many

other things.

So I guess it true to say that we have had a certain impact un America –

in many diferent ways. he question is. Can we Nordics still contribute to

America? And the answer is as simple as it is famous: Yes. We. Can!

Nordic architects, like Bjarke Ingels, contribute to transforming Amer-

ican cities with projects like the New York Dryline and the redesign of the

Smithsonian here in Washington. Based on a vision of making urban areas

more liveable, smart and sustainable.

Both the US and the Nordic countries try to set positive standards for the

world of tomorrow. Taking the lead.

Speaking of taking the lead – it’s easy to see the importance and value of

your leadership, Mr. President. Without interfering in American politics I

can truly and without a doubt say that: You have been the best president –

Europe never had.

Now your presidency is coming to an end. And I must admit: I’m very

fond of Donald, too... I support him as president. He’s really smart. Shows

great leadership skills. A true visionary. here’s no doubt that Donald...

Donald Tusk, that is – our Polish President of the European Council – in

your absence – is the best president Europe could have.

Being a role model is not always easy...so I’ve heard.

But you – Mr. President – have come to represent a dream for millions of

Americans, and people across the world.

We share a common vision of securing good, afordable healthcare to all.

And I greatly respect your achievements in this regard.

Your leadership was also key to the Paris-agreement on Climate Change

last year. Well both of us were disappointed after Copenhagen, but then

worked hard, and inally in Paris we succeeded. And we continue our work

together on the green transition.

Recently, you swept the White House in the rainbow colours. Being the

irst country on earth to allow same-sex partnership, Denmark admires and

supports your ight for diversity and equal rights.

Nevertheless – your presidency is slowly coming to an end. Congress will

probably try to block most of your initiatives in the time to come. hat can

be frustrating. Believe me – Being leader of a small minority government I

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know that from personal experience.

And if I may – allow me to give you a piece of personal advice: When I

get too frustrated I let of steam by... cooking. I can recommend that.

And if you do take my advice, I think you could be inspired by the New

Nordic cuisine. It already involves edible rarities such as moss, bark and

living ants. But maybe you could be helpful in our search for a recipe for

lame duck.

Mr. President, you are a great friend and ally. Solrun and I will always be

very happy to welcome you and your family in Copenhagen.

And Denmark would – as all the Nordic countries I believe – be honored

to receive one of the most inspirational and charming igures in America.

Along with her husband, of course.

So, dear Michelle. Mr. President. Ladies and Gentlemen.

Let me propose a toast for the strong relations between our nations. he

very special cross Atlantic friendship between US and the Nordic.

To friendship...

hank you.

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The Important Role of Women in

Developing Markets

The Foreign Minister’s speech at ‘Women Deliver’, the

Womenomics conference in Copenhagen on 18 May 2016

hank you to the organizers, and Tine Willumsen, for inviting me to talk

about an issue close to my heart: he role of women in developing markets.

Women are not just wife and mothers, or just consumers or just entre-

preneurs or political leaders. hey are all those things. And they should have

the right to be just that. To be free of discrimination, traditions and norms

preventing them from living the life they want.

hat is, however, not the case. More than 120 countries have laws that

treat men and women diferently. Making it impossible for a woman to ob-

tain an ID card, own or use property, access credit, get a job. hese are re-

strictions that are fundamentally unjust. But also, as we have come to learn,

economically unwise. For the societies to develop, and the economy to grow,

we need everybody involved.

In addition to legal restrictions, girls and women are also – in many

places around the world – faced with a fundamental lack of access to crucial

services. Lack of access to education and to key health services that prevent

girls and women to reach their full potential.

his is not only unfair and unjust – it is also from an economic perspec-

tive unwise. We need to be clear that to engage women in the labor market,

or help her set up a small business. We need to work to help girls and women

overcome these barriers and be empowered to make their own choices.

In spite of these challenges, women show incredible resourcefulness. hey

set up saving clubs to overcome their inancial constraints. hey make use of

modern technology such as mobile phones to obtain information about food

prices and igure out the best time to sell their products. And they move into

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the labor market as employees.

here are some quick ixes and easy solutions – and they should be used.

Yesterday I visited a photo exhibition organized by the Federation of Danish

Industries showing that when you engage in a discussion with female em-

ployees, ask them about their needs and try to accommodate them – every-

body wins. Special transport service, lexible work hours, kindergardens at

the workplace were some of the examples of how Danish companies engage

to adapt and improve working conditions for women. To the good of their

employees – but also for the company.

I encourage the private sector to take it upon itself to engage and take

responsibility to deliver for girls and women. We know it will beneit society

– but I am convinced it will also beneit each company that commits to do

this.

At the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa last year

– a new agenda for how to inance the new global agenda was agreed. One

of the very clear messages was that strong involvement of the private sector

in inancing the new Global Goals is required. Financing from the devel-

oping countries themselves and development assistance from countries like

Denmark cannot do it. We need the private sector to help us achieve all the

wonderful intentions in goal number 5 which holds so much promise for the

girls and women of the world.

So today I would like to urge all of you to engage for girls and women.

Not only for their sake – also for your own. And I promise that Danish de-

velopment cooperation will continue to be a strong supporter of the health

and rights of girls and women. I look very much forward to partner with

Danish private sector to deliver just that.

hank you.

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148

The Foreign Minister’s speech at the 3GF

summit in Copenhagen on 6-7 June 2016

[3GF means Global Green Growth Forum, eds.]

Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am truly delighted to have this opportunity to express my admiration for

your dedication and hard work over the last two days. Together, you have

showed a strong collective commitment to promote sustainable green growth

on a global scale – a commitment to turn the global promises into action.

Over the last two days you have laid the foundation for concrete action that

will unleash the dynamics of cities as drivers of the green economy. You have

advanced solutions to increase access to energy and water. You have tak-

en steps to accelerate inancial investments in sustainable growth. And you

have shown how we can act in partnerships to support the aspirations of the

emerging middle class while embracing sustainable living around the world.

When we deined the purpose of 3GF summit 2016 it was obvious to work

on implementation following on from last and previous years’ negotiations.

We invited you all with a call to Action. So what has been achieved over

the last two days? hrough your active engagement, the 3GF platform has

delivered substantial results.

he Kenyan government and Bidco Africa joins the vital work of the

2030 Water Resources Group with the launch of a new national platform to

address a predicted 30% gap between water supply and demand by 2030.

he call for action is to deeper collaboration on sustainable use of water

across Africa, Latin America and Asia.

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Partners have launched a global standard for measuring food loss and waste

that will help us reduce the enormous amount of food that goes to waste.

he call for action is immediate uptake of the standard by afected sectors.

To address the 51 trillion dollar gap to 2050 to meet global infrastructure

needs, partners committed to take forward a Sustainable Infrastructure Reg-

istry to provide investors with a clear understanding of the speciic charac-

teristics of sustainable and resilient infrastructure investments. he call for

action is the creation of an international Sustainable Infrastructure Registry.

hese are just a few of the more than 30 partnerships that have been initiated

or accelerated at 3GF this year.

he Sustainable Development Goals call for a hugely ambitious transition

over the next 15 years. To a world in which extreme poverty is eradicated,

growth is made inclusive and sustainable, and climate change is being efec-

tively mitigated while we at the same time adapt to expected changes.

he 2030 and the Climate Agenda do not stand in the way of economic

growth. Afordable, scalable solutions are now available to enable countries

to leapfrog to cleaner, more resilient economies. he pace of change is quick-

ening as more people are turning to renewable energy and a range of other

measures that will reduce emissions and increase adaptation efort.

he political momentum from global agreements of 2015 will only last if we

actively engage in this transition and bring the solutions into play. 3GF has

been actively contributing to this for ive years and counting. But we must

realize that the world has changed since 3GF was launched in 2011. We now

have a strong framework for sustainable development and combating cli-

mate change that the entire international community has agreed on. And we

are no longer the only international forum to discuss sustainable and green

public-private solutions. he partnership approach that 3GF champions is

now widely employed as a means to secure real and tangible change.

Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is time to rethink the Global Green Growth Forum. We need to ensure

that 3GF remains a relevant platform for the private and public partners

driving the green transition – and continue our contribution to accelerating

businesses’ involvement in reaching the ambitious SDGs and climate goals

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We have built bridges and formed alliances across regions and sectors. De-

veloped and supported innovative, sustainable and green solutions – with

one aim in mind – to create real impact – at scale. We have gathered unique

experience and knowledge, we have a strong platform, and we have seen our

partnerships continue to operate and develop innovative solutions. We have

an excellent point of departure for rethinking 3GF. And we need your ideas

and continued engagement.

Let this be a call to all 3GF partners to contribute views and ideas on

what should be the future path of the Global Green Growth Forum.

I want to thank you for the stimulating dialogue and your active participa-

tion today and yesterday. he results of our eforts have been summarised in

the “Charter of Action” which I recommend that you all take with you on

the way out. A more detailed report relecting the results and the discussions

will soon be available.

his year’s summit has provided new inspiration, new ideas, and new con-

crete solutions. I for one leave the 3GF Summit feeling encouraged and

full of conidence that we are on the right path. We have the framework,

we know the solutions, and it is people like you here in this room that will

secure the actual results – at speed and scale. Now let’s get to work!

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The Foreign Minister’s speech at the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ trade policy

conference on 22 June 2016

151

I would like to welcome you all to our Trade Policy conference. Welcome to

our distinguished guests, especially WTO Director General Roberto Azeve-

do, Deputy USTR Michael Punke, EU General Director Jean-Luc Demarty

and also to the speakers of the second panel. It is timely to ask ourselves

“What’s next for Global Trade Policy?”

Free trade is a hot topic: Free trade is under pressure in many places, among

politicians and ordinary people in the US, Europe and in the Emerging

economies. In the UK, trade is a central theme in the deining yes-no ref-

erendum tomorrow.

But why does free trade matter? he answer is simple: If two sides decide to

close a deal, it’s to the advantage of both. Both win, both become richer. Free

trade is one of the most ingenious inventions of man. History proves that

wealth and human development has been propelled by free trade. And in

short: If goods pass borders, there is less likelihood that soldiers will.

hat will be my main messages today: Free trade matters, free trade must

be promoted, and the WTO must keep delivering results – new results – to

the beneit of our economies, creating jobs and growth.

People in many countries are becoming more sceptical. Protectionism is

creeping forward – in the form of barriers and limits to free trade. he idea

that open trade is a threat – and that you need to cut yourself of from the

world – is wrong. It’s the opposite way around: Free trade creates growth and

underpins employment. In Denmark, more than 700.000 jobs – one in four

jobs – depend on our exports. Worldwide, it has lifted hundreds of millions

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152

of people out of poverty. Just look at China and other Asian countries – and

Africa is aiming to go next.

I am a free trader. But I am not – and we should not – be blind to the chal-

lenges connected with trade: Trade beneits society as a whole, not least the

silent majority of consumers. But sometimes there is negative impact on

some companies, workers or communities when markets open to competi-

tion.

It is an important task for governments to mitigate negative efects and

assist workers to adapt to a more competitive environment. Protectionism

will never be the answer – it will make us all poorer!

Free trade is often blamed for much misery in this world – which is com-

pletely unfair. But free trade needs a better reputation – better PR so to

speak. One way to achieve this could be by identifying visible and quantii-

able targets for our free trade agreements. Ambitious performance goals for

our trade agreements.

Like in the area of climate change where hard targets have mobilised political

will, I propose that we set a political target. We could agree on a “Headline

Trade Goal”. Why not say that multilateral and bilateral free trade agree-

ments over the coming 15 years should lift 200 million people out of poverty

and lift GDP worldwide with 3 percent? We can always discuss the numbers

but let’s be ambitious! It is clearly within reach for an ambitious international

trade agenda to deliver on those goals so why not be open about it?

he WTO has also seen many challenges. But it is the best defence against

protectionism. Here, everybody sits at the same negotiating table, setting the

rules of trade, creating a level playing ield, and settling disputes. he com-

mon rules of the WTO beneit all nations, in particular the Least Developed

Countries of the world. But we must do more.

he WTO does deliver results – step by step. Trade negotiations are compli-

cated. he WTO trade facilitation agreement from 2013 cuts red tape and

delays at borders. When ratiied, it will reduce trade costs up to 15%. hat

counts.

Last year in December, I was at the WTO ministerial conference in Nai-

robi. Here we agreed to eliminate export subsidies – the largest agricultural

reform in 20 years and a long-lasting wish from developing countries. Also,

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a big group of WTO countries shook hands and decided to remove custom

tarifs on a range of IT products representing 10% of world trade. hat also

counts.

he global economy is changing shape: global value chains are spreading,

new economies are emerging, technology and the digital economy is trans-

forming the way we live and trade. In the WTO, many members are engaged

in bilateral and regional trade negotiations.

Firstly, this means that the WTO has to work on new policy areas. We

need to look at issues like e-commerce, investment, and at expanding the

rule book of trade.

Secondly, we have to address some of the Doha issues on their own mer-

its. For instance, within agriculture, domestic support could be explored. I

believe that we should aim for a solid package at our next ministerial con-

ference in 2017, covering both new and old issues, with a special focus on

the poorest countries. he discussion started in Nairobi, and now it’s time

to focus more.

We can pursue trade liberalisation through several channels: Multilateral-

ly – or plurilaterally, meaning in a group of interested WTO countries. Done

smartly, these diferent roads can support each other and lead us to the same

destination: fewer trade barriers.

Plurilateral negotiations can deliver good results. For example, the current

negotiations on environmental goods can provide growth as well as envi-

ronmental beneits. I would like to see an agreement this year, which would

show that we can deliver.

At the same time, the European Union – and Denmark as part of the

EU – has an ambitious bilateral trade agenda.

he TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership] negotiations

are important for both EU and the US. An agreement will set standards and

give an important boost to American and European economies. And it will

beneit our consumers with more choice and more money to spend. We need

to get this positive message across.

TTIP is also important politically. It will strengthen the already close ties

between EU and the US.

he public debate about TTIP is very lively. his is positive, as we get the

best agreement when we challenge each other – like today. But much of the

debate is based on myths and not facts. Neither EU nor the US want to use

TTIP to lower standards for environment, food safety or consumer protec-

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tion or limit governments’ scope to regulate. hese are clear red lines – and

in no one’s interest.

In closing, let me return to the basic argument for free trade. Trade is not

the problem, it’s the solution. he best way to prove that is to deliver results,

to deliver better lives, and to deliver development to countries and people.

How? By providing good deals that make trade easier, by setting fair rules,

by upholding high standards and by keep working to include everybody.

he WTO and a strong global trading system is a big part of that answer. We

need more free trade – not less.

I would like to welcome you all to our Trade Policy conference. Wel-

come to our distinguished guests, especially WTO Director General Rober-

to Azevedo, Deputy USTR Michael Punke, EU General Director Jean-Luc

Demarty and also to the speakers of the second panel. It is timely to ask

ourselves “What’s next for Global Trade Policy?”

Free trade is a hot topic: Free trade is under pressure in many places, among

politicians and ordinary people in the US, Europe and in the Emerging

economies. In the UK, trade is a central theme in the deining yes-no ref-

erendum tomorrow.

But why does free trade matter? he answer is simple: If two sides decide to

close a deal, it’s to the advantage of both. Both win, both become richer. Free

trade is one of the most ingenious inventions of man. History proves that

wealth and human development has been propelled by free trade. And in

short: If goods pass borders, there is less likelihood that soldiers will.

hat will be my main messages today: Free trade matters, free trade must

be promoted, and the WTO must keep delivering results – new results – to

the beneit of our economies, creating jobs and growth.

People in many countries are becoming more sceptical. Protectionism is

creeping forward – in the form of barriers and limits to free trade. he idea

that open trade is a threat – and that you need to cut yourself of from the

world – is wrong. It’s the opposite way around: Free trade creates growth and

underpins employment. In Denmark, more than 700.000 jobs – one in four

jobs – depend on our exports. Worldwide, it has lifted hundreds of millions

of people out of poverty. Just look at China and other Asian countries – and

Africa is aiming to go next.

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