REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism

Retsudvalget 2016-17
REU Alm.del Bilag 370
Offentligt

DIIS REPORT 2017: 05

Europe’s Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism

AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Table of Contents

Executive summary

Introduction

Assumption one: Refugees as vulnerable to

radicalization and recruitment

Radicalization and recruitment of refugees

Refugees as an opportunity to spark polarization

Assumption two:

Refugee lows as a back door to Europe

Migration as a back door

The French-Belgian network of foreign ighters and

the impact of migration routes

European border control: a failure to detect

This report is written by Manni Crone, Senior Researcher, DIIS, and

Maja Felicia Falkentoft, Research Assistant, DIIS, with the contribution of Teemu

Tammikko, Senior Research Fellow, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

We would also like to thank Nauja Kleist, Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Lars Erslev

Andersen for valuable comments.

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: [email protected]

www.diis.dk

Layout: Lone Ravnkilde & Viki Rachlitz

Printed in Denmark by Eurographic

ISBN 978-87-7605-874-6 (print)

ISBN 978-87-7605-875-3 (pdf)

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered from www.diis.dk

Identifying border management as part-problem, part-solution

The risk of introducing new solutions to new problems

The risk of addressing transnational problems nationally

Conclusion

Notes

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2015, the challenges of migration and terrorism have become increasingly

interlinked both in public debates and on political agendas. When, in early 2015,

Islamic State threatened to iniltrate migratory routes and weaponize migrant flows,

the idea of a nexus between migration and terrorism gained political momentum

and coalesced into two main assumptions that now deine European debates on

migration and terrorism:

■

Refugees as vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.

■

The refugee flow as a back door for terrorists.

This report examines these two assumptions and concludes that a large majority of

those behind the terrorist attacks perpetrated within the last decade were EU

citizens.

If we focus merely on the period between January 2016 and April 2017,

four asylum-seekers were involved in terrorist incidents, but no actual refugees

However, this does not mean that a nexus between migration and terrorism can

be dismissed as events are still unfolding. Moreover, in the second half of 2015,

European foreign ighters who had joined Islamic State in Syria managed to travel

along migration routes to reenter Europe undetected, sometimes posing as refu-

gees. Exploring these incidents in a policy-oriented context, this report suggests

that engaging with the vulnerabilities of the EU’s Schengen border policies and

management will be central in addressing the challenges arising from the inter-

section of migration with terrorism. In conclusion, the report identiies the vul-

nerabilities in EU border management and proposes ways forward for the EU and its

member states. The aim of the report is not to produce a reliable threat assessment,

but to inform and qualify policy debates on the links between migration and

terrorism, as well as to point out possible solutions.

Main indings

■

The great majority of individuals involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks in

Europe within the last decade have been EU citizens. Many have been foreign

ighters, and most were already known to the European authorities.

■

Between January 2016 and April 2017, four asylum-seekers (three of whom

had their asylum requests rejected, and two of whom arrived before the onset

of the refugee crisis in 2015) but no refugees were involved in four attacks in

Europe.

■

Attacks perpetrated by European foreign ighters are generally more organized

and have more casualties than those committed by asylum-seekers.

■

Since January 2015, the terrorist threat related to refugee flows primarily

stems from European foreign ighters who have traveled along migration

routes to reenter Europe undetected.

■

Schengen border policies and management are pivotal in addressing the

challenges arising from the intersection of migration with terrorism.

■

The main challenge in the detection of ‘flagged’ suspects not only stems from

too little and too poor data in EU information-sharing data bases, but also from

a lack of operational and technological capacities on the part of front-line staff

in border states to put information-sharing databases to use, particularly in

‘real time’.

■

A majority of refugees are fleeing from areas where terrorist groups are

operating, such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan.

Between January 2016 and April 2017,

four asylum-seekers were involved in terrorist

incidents, but no actual refugees.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Recommendations

VOCABULARY

■

Before introducing new measures regarding borders and cross-border

cooperation, the EU and its member states should focus on lessons learned

and seek to overcome the vulnerabilities in existing border management,

especially in identifying individuals flagged as suspects in EU databases.

■

To overcome vulnerabilities concerning real-time data- and intelligence-sharing

at the EU’s external borders and within Schengen, the allocation of funds to

improve human and technological operational capacities should be prioritized.

■

EU member states should prioritize the pooling of resources to build capacity

on the EU’s external borders in border states, as these constitute unique

‘hotspots’ where terrorist suspects can be identiied and interrogated before

entering the Schengen zone.

■

The increased focus on preventing terrorism through border management

should not compromise the protection of vulnerable refugees.

■

The EU and its member states should make sure that the temporary

establishment of enhanced internal border police is aligned with SIS II efforts

as part of the overall solution to ighting terrorism effectively, namely through a

more collaborative EU.

■

When addressing the topics of terrorism and migration, European

governments, public authorities, and journalists should make an effort to

distinguish between ‘refugees’, ‘asylum-seekers’, ‘migrants’, ‘irregular migrants’,

and ‘foreign ighters’, as such distinctions are key to achieving informed and

qualiied debates.

Resident:

Returnee:

A foreign ighter who travels back, or returns, to his or her

country of origin.

A foreigner who has been granted a residence permit.

Irregular migrants:

Migrants without a regular residence permit or other documents

authorizing their stay in a foreign country.

Foreign ighter:

A person who has traveled or migrated to another country

to ight.

Migrant:

The term ‘international migrant’ refers to a person who spends

a signiicant period of time outside his or her country of origin.

Migrants may move to ind refuge from conflict or to improve

their lives by inding work, accessing education, pursuing family

reunion or for other personal reasons. According to the UNHCR,

migrants are supposed to move voluntarily, to be able to return

home safely and, upon their return, be able to receive the

protection of their own government.

Asylum-seeker:

A person who, on the grounds of being forced to flee, has for-

mally requested asylum in a foreign country. ‘Asylum-seeker’ is a

broad and inclusive category. In principle, any non-EU citizen can

make an asylum request in the EU.

Refugee:

Generally, a migrant who is forced to flee to a foreign country or

power to escape armed conflict or persecution. In this report,

however, we consider ‘refugee’ as a legal status and category

alone: a migrant or an asylum-seeker must be recognized as a

‘refugee’ by the relevant authorities in the country of destination

in order to gain the status and entitlements of being a ‘refugee’.

Cf. Europe and the refugee situation: The human security consequences,

DIIS Report 2017:03.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

INTRODUCTION

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Since 2015, when EU countries received over 1.2 million asylum applications,

the

challenges of migration and terrorism have become increasingly interlinked both in

public debates and on political agendas in Europe. In particular, the discovery that the

terrorists who committed the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris travelled along the

eastern Mediterranean migration route in their attempts to exit and reenter Europe

undetected has moved counterterrorism debates in the direction of examining

whether the threat of terrorism in Europe is connected with migration flows towards

Europe. Here, two main assumptions – namely ‘refugees as vulnerable to radica-

lization and recruitment’ and ‘the refugee flow as a back door’ – have structured a

range of concerns linking terrorism with the refugee situation. Could refugees be

recruited by terrorists en route or in asylum facilities? Are refugees more vulnerable

to radicalization? Could terrorists enter Europe by ‘disguising’ themselves as

refugees? In sum, are current migration flows to Europe exacerbating the threat that

terrorist organizations pose to Europe? Given the importance of these questions for

current public and policy debates, this report inds it prudent to adopt an approach

that neither cynically exaggerates nor completely dismisses the potential risks posed

by refugees and migrants who come from areas where terrorist groups operate.

This report starts by addressing questions and concerns related to migration and

terrorism by examining the two main assumptions outlined above. In order to

evaluate the urgency or otherwise of these assumptions in a policy-oriented context,

the report then proceeds to discuss the ways in which a perceived link between the

threat of terrorism and the ongoing refugee situation has been translated into new

policy initiatives and legislative measures in the European Union (EU). Such recently

established measures include:

■

The extension of the role and capacity of Frontex (which in April 2016 was

renamed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency)

■

The extraordinary establishment of temporary national border controls by

some member states

■

The EU’s March 2016 partnership agreement with Turkey

■

The provisional establishment of a EU Passenger Name Record directive in

April 2016

■

The simultaneous creation in January 2016 of a European Counter Terrorism

Centre and a European Migrant Smuggling Centre

Although these measures were conceived to tackle not merely terrorism, but

migration more broadly, they nevertheless present the threat of terrorism through

migration as urgent, unprecedented and high. But is the threat really one of excep-

tional character, requiring the introduction of a host of new measures, or has it been

exaggerated, in fact being manageable through the enhancement of already existing

measures? Such policy questions are often neglected in political discussions on

counterterrorism, as these are generally occupied with addressing the nature of the

threat. To discuss the policy changes that stem from the perceived link between

terrorism and migration, this DIIS report uses a combination of statistics, articles,

reports and a newly established database

to interrogate the two assumptions

already noted above: ‘refugees as vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment’ and

‘the refugee flow as a back door’.

Are current migration lows to Europe exacerbating

the threat that terrorist organizations pose to Europe?

Starting with interrogating these two assumptions provides a basis for understanding

the logics and evidence that inform them, as well as for evaluating new policy

measures against those already in place. Moreover, it allows us to discuss in what

way new and already existing measures are responding to such logics and evidence.

Rather than discussing why terrorist attacks are committed – an approach that

often structures debates on counterterrorism – this report questions how terrorism

has been committed and what can be done to mitigate it.

The report proceeds in three parts. First, it discusses the assumption that migration

flows into the EU constitute a pool of individuals who are particularly prone to

radicalization and recruitment. Secondly, it examines the assumption that terrorists

have used migration flows as a back door through which to enter the EU. Thirdly, it

reviews these assumptions in the light of new and already existing EU policies and

measures that aim to address the perceived nexus between migration and terrorism.

In conclusion, the report suggests that the focus on new counter-terrorism initiatives

in the EU risks overshadowing the inherent vulnerabilities in existing measures

whose optimization is key to countering the threat of terror from migration. As this

speciic threat has often materialized because of vulnerabilities in already existing

measures, the management of the threat does not necessarily require ‘new’

solutions so much as investing in and building the capacity of already existing

measures.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Assumption one:

REFUGEES AS VULNERABLE TO

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

In 2015, the EU received almost 1.3 million asylum applications, of which nearly half

a million were from Syrian citizens and the other half from citizens from Iraq,

Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. Given that in 2015 almost three-quarters of all

deaths from terrorism globally took place in these countries of origin,

a clear

connection can already be made between the activities of terrorist organizations

and the EU’s refugee situation. Although we do not know these migrants’ precise

motivations for seeking asylum in the EU, it is undeniable that they are fleeing from

areas where terrorist groups operate. This link, or disassociation, is underpinned by

METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

In this report, we only focus on attacks that were actually carried out. The number would

probably have been higher if we had included failed or disrupted plots. We have decided

not to include such plots because we ind the quality of accessible information to be in-

suficient. As failed plots are not necessarily revealed to the wider public, it is impossible

to obtain reliable information about their real number and scope. Similarly, as the report

examines two assumptions related to the recent wave of migration, we have only count-

ed refugees and people who have registered as asylum-seekers (whether their request

is pending, accepted or rejected). Hence, we have not included attacks perpetrated by

residents or migrants who have never registered as asylum-seekers, since these cate-

gories also include people who have resided in Europe for decades.

the efforts of Islamic State (IS) to dissuade people from fleeing their control. Since

2015, the organization has used provincial media outlets in Syria, Iraq and Yemen to

engage with large-scale propaganda campaigns portraying those who flee the

Caliphate as ‘inidels’ seeking refuge in un-Islamic lands, instead of defending their

Muslim allies.

The relationship between IS and migration provides an example of some of the

complex intersections between Europe’s refugee situation and terrorism. However,

views about how this connection should be understood and should inform policies

vary greatly. On the one hand, threats by Islamic State to use ‘migrants as a

“psychological weapon”’ have made far-right politicians across Europe, including the

Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman, argue that refugee flows form part of an

‘organized invasion’ of radicalized Muslims to Europe, necessitating a closure of

borders. On the other hand, international humanitarian organizations have opposed

such claims by emphasizing that refugees are fleeing terrorism rather than engaging

with it. The report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism

and human rights, issued in September 2016, concludes that ‘there is no evidence

that migration leads to increased terrorist activity’. Rather, the report warns,

perceptions that link migrant flows to an increased threat of terrorism might produce

‘migration policies that are restrictive or that violate human rights … [and] create

conditions conducive to terrorism’.

In the following section, the report examines to what extent refugees and migrants

have actually been radicalized or recruited for involvement in recent terrorist attacks

in Europe. It then discusses IS’s interest in using refugees to spark polarization in

Europe.

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT OF REFUGEES

The December 2016 Europol report,

Changes in Modus Operandi

of IS revisited,

presents the possibility of elements of the Syrian diaspora becoming vulnerable to

radicalization through hostile conditions in Europe as ‘a real and imminent danger’.

The German authorities gave weight to this concern, as they reported receiving

about three hundred reports of terrorist-related attempts to recruit refugees in 2016.

Whether migrants’ resentment towards their receiving country grows, or whether

they already harbor some hostility towards the West, attempts by Islamic extremist

recruiters to iniltrate asylum-seekers and asylum facilities should therefore be

expected, if not for their successful recruitment, then at least for the politically

divisive and polarizing impact of such activities. It has long been recognized that it

is in IS’s interest to cast suspicion on refugees and inflame the refugee situation in

order to turn EU populations against refugees seeking asylum, thus creating an

environment of fear that could strengthen the potential for radicalization and

recruitment.

So far, IS’s suspected ‘weaponization’ of refugee

lows towards Europe has been greatly exaggerated.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

So far, IS’s suspected ‘weaponization’ of refugee flows towards Europe has been

greatly exaggerated. This does not mean that IS and other groups have not

attempted to recruit refugees in Europe, nor that refugees have not, at their own

initiative, plotted attacks in Europe. Yet, by using open source material and only

considering attacks in Europe carried out between January 2016 and April 2017, it

TERRORIST ATTACKS COMMITTED BY ASYLUM-SEEKERS

FROM JANUARY 2016 TO APRIL 2017

■

Würzburg train attack, 18 July 2016: Riaz Khan Ahmadzai (aka Muhammad Riyad).

Pakistani asylum-seeker, arrived in Germany in 2015.

turns out that out of four terrorist incidents in Europe four asylum-seekers (of whom

three have had their asylum requests rejected) and no refugees were involved. We

have taken 2016 as our starting point, since this was the irst year after the large

influx of refugees in 2015. The attacks that involved asylum-seekers occurred in

Würzburg, Ansbach, the Berlin Christmas market – all in Germany in 2016 – and

Stockholm in April 2017. As a rejected asylum-seeker is strictly speaking a migrant,

we could present the overview differently and conclude that no actual refugees, one

asylum-seeker and three irregular migrants who have had their asylum request

rejected, were involved in four terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe in this period.

■

Ansbach bombing, 24 July 2016: Mohammad Daleel. A Syrian asylum-seeker. Reg-

istered as a refugee in Bulgaria, but arrived in Germany in 2014, where he sought

asylum. The German authorities rejected his asylum request on 2 December 2014

and sought to deport him back to Bulgaria. The deportation could not be carried

out due to his psychiatric condition, which had led him to attempt suicide.

■

The Berlin Christmas market attack in December 2016: Anis Amri, Tunisian citizen,

came to Italy in 2011 to escape a prison sentence in Tunisia. In July 2015, after

spending years in an Italian prison, he traveled to Germany. In April 2016, he

applied for asylum under a false name. The request was rejected, and the German

authorities tried to deport him back to Tunisia.

TERRORIST ATTACKS COMMITTED BY REFUGEES

FROM JANUARY 2016 TO APRIL 2017

■

Stockholm attack, 7 April 2017: Rakhmat Akilov. Uzbek citizen. Arrived in Sweden

April 2014. His asylum request was rejected.

None

Summing up:

As three of the four asylum-seekers have had their asylum request

rejected, they were strictly speaking no longer asylum-seekers but irregular migrants.

Hence, considering the period from January 2016 to April 2017, no actual refugees,

one asylum-seeker and three irregular migrants were involved in four terrorist attacks.

Considering attacks in Europe carried out between January

2016 and April 2017, it turns out that out of four terrorist

incidents in Europe four asylum-seekers (of whom three have

had their asylum requests rejected) and no refugees were

involved.

As the above account shows, distinguishing those who have acquired refugee

status from asylum-seekers and migrants can make a big difference in terms of

assessing the threats that can be linked to the supposed nexus between refugees

and terrorists. It is vital not to conflate categories, but to be very precise about

whether an individual is a refugee, an asylum-seeker, a migrant or a foreign ighter

(Vocabulary page 7). The category of asylum-seeker is a very broad and inclusive

one, since anyone who is not an EU citizen can in principle make an asylum request.

In comparison, ‘refugee’ is a much more exclusive category. In this report, we treat

‘refugee’ as a legal category. It is the relevant authorities of the receiving country

who decide whether an asylum-seeker can actually be granted the status of a

refugee or not.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

We have suggested that four asylum-seekers were involved in the attacks that were

committed in the period under consideration. Since the category of ‘asylum-seeker’

is a very inclusive one, in principle allowing any non-EU citizen to ask for asylum, the

cases included need to be further unpacked and qualiied. In doing so below, we will

also mention whether the attacks had any direct relation to IS.

The Würzburg attack is the irst example of an asylum-seeker carrying out a terrorist

attack in Europe in 2016. On 18 July 2016, a Pakistani, Riaz Ahmed Khan Ahmadzai,

attacked several people in a train in Würzburg, injuring four people before he was

killed. Ahmedzai had made an asylum request as an Afghani minor in Germany in

2015, but it later turned out that he was probably from Pakistan, a country considered

a refugee country only exceptionally. Shortly before the attack, he was in contact

with an IS member in Saudi Arabia,

and IS did not hesitate to claim responsibility

subsequently.

On 24 July 2016, a Syrian asylum-seeker, Mohammad Daleel, detonated a suicide

bomb outside a wine-bar in Ansbach, killing himself and wounding several

bystanders. Daleel had made an asylum request in Germany, but the request was

rejected, since he had irst registered as an asylum-seeker in Bulgaria in 2013. It

later turned out that Daleel had also been in contact with an IS member in Saudi

Arabia,

and IS later claimed responsibility for the attack. The case of Daleel differs

from the Würzburg attack, since Daleel suffered from mental illness and had

attempted suicide on several occasions. The German authorities had tried to deport

him to Bulgaria, but the deportation had been postponed because of his health.

Finally, the perpetrator of the Christmas market attack in Berlin in December 2016,

Anis Amri, had also made an asylum request, which was turned down as unfounded.

Amri came to Europe in 2011 to escape a prison sentence in Tunisia and arrived on

the island of Lampedusa, where he participated in a violent riot at a temporary

migration facility. Subsequently he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.

Upon his release in July 2015 he travelled illegally to Germany, where he registered

as an asylum-seeker in April 2016. He had pledged allegiance to IS, and for a while

the German security services kept him under surveillance. Amri is an example of an

irregular migrant – one with a serious criminal record – who, after ive years in

Europe, decided to register for asylum under a false name. At the time of the attack,

the German authorities were trying to deport him back to Tunisia. Amri’s case

exempliies the range of the category ‘asylum-seeker’. Although he was formally an

asylum-seeker, he had spent ive years in Europe before making the request under a

false name. We therefore consider him a liminal case.

It is noticeable that two of the mentioned asylum-seekers arrived in Europe before

2015, when Europe’s refugee crisis is oficially considered to have begun. This

leaves the Würzberg attack as the only terrorist incident perpetrated in Europe that

involved an asylum-seeker from the 2015 influx of migrants.

REFUGEES AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPARK POLARIZATION

While there are, as mentioned, examples of asylum-seekers who have been involved

in terrorist attacks in Europe, the idea that refugees constitute ‘a Trojan horse’ of

potential terrorists appears exaggerated, if not completely unfounded. Moreover,

Two of the mentioned asylum-seekers arrived in Europe

before 2015, when Europe’s refugee crisis is oicially

considered to have begun.

there is proof that asylum-seekers and migrants coming to the EU from areas where

terrorist groups operate are not only potentially vulnerable to radicalization, but also

prepared to report attempts to recruit them or cases of suspected radicalization.

In all circumstances, the surge in the number of incoming refugees and asylum-

seekers in 2015 and 2016 cannot be causally linked to the surge in the number of

In April 2017, an Uzbek citizen, Rakhmat Akilov, drove a truck into a department

store in Stockholm killing four people. Akilov came to Sweden in 2014, where he

made an asylum request. His request was rejected, and he subsequently disappeared

before carrying out the attack. Although he pledged allegiance to IS, there is so far

no evidence of any direct link to this group.

terrorist attacks in the same period. Rather, it was European citizens, some of them

‘returnees’ who had joined IS or al Qaeda in Syria or elsewhere to ight, who were

behind the great majority of attacks and responsible for most of the casualties in

Europe in 2015 and 2016.

Indeed, this was also the case in the last decade.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Yet, we should not underestimate the ability of terrorist organizations like IS to

capitalize upon the mere suspicion that refugees are being radicalized and

weaponized. Such suspicion feeds into such organizations’ broader interests in

being able to trigger political and social reactions rather than actual physical harm.

Also, we should not neglect how IS had and still has an interest in using the ongoing

refugee situation in Europe and the way it is managed by European authorities to

magnify fear, enhance political and social polarization, and create conditions

favorable to recruitment and violent radicalization.

Although one asylum-seeker, three irregular migrants and no refugees were involved

in terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe from January 2016 to April 2017, IS thus

has a clear interest in presenting refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants as

terrorists in order to spark polarization and create a basis for recruitment and

radicalization.

Asylum-seekers and migrants coming to the EU from areas

where terrorist groups operate are not only potentially

vulnerable to radicalization, but also prepared to report

attempts to recruit them or cases of suspected radicalization.

IS’s claim in January 2015 that they had sent 4,000 ighters to Europe via Turkey,

for example, clearly highlights their interest in misrepresenting refugees to European

public opinion. While this number is unrealistically high, the mere spreading of num-

bers like these contributes to the securitization of refugee flows and helps create

refugee-hostile environments that might facilitate recruitment and radicalization.

Hence, Europe’s so-called ‘refugee crisis’ poses a range of exploitable opportunities

for IS to provoke polarization. The mere suspicion, which proved unfounded that

asylum-seekers were behind the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris divided political

debates on refugees in Europe and were probably signiicant in terms of provoking

subsequent attacks on refugee camps in Germany, France and Sweden. Such

divided and violent reactions give IS political leverage and create the fear and

division from which the organization hopes to beneit in terms of recruitment and

radicalization.

It was European citizens, who were behind the great

majority of attacks and responsible for most of the

casualties in Europe in 2015 and 2016.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Assumption two:

REFUGEE FLOWS AS

A BACK DOOR TO EUROPE

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

As the refugee flows put severe strains on EU’s external borders in September 2015,

speculation about the weaponization of migration flows by IS was complemented

by fears that chaotic conditions and a lack of the capacity to process asylum-

seekers at the EU’s external borders would provide terrorists from IS-controlled

areas outside the EU with an opportunity to ‘iniltrate’ refugee flows as a way to gain

undetected entry into the EU. These fears were later conirmed by the discovery that

a large number of the November 2015 Paris attackers, as well as those involved in

the March 2016 Brussels attack, had succeeded in entering the EU using fraudulent

papers and Syrian passports to register as asylum-seekers or travel via migration

flows towards Hungary and further on to Belgium.

MIGRATION AS A BACK DOOR

Recent revelations that IS since 2014 has assembled teams of foreign ighters in

Syria to carry out ‘revenge’ attacks ‘back’ in Europe has formed part of shedding light

on how European foreign ighters who were on European watch lists exploited irregular

migration routes to return to Europe undetected. According to the Soufan Group,

some 27,000 foreign ighters – 6,000 estimated to be Europeans, most of whom are

from France, Germany and the UK – have travelled to Syria and Iraq.

As foreign

ighters emigrate and cross borders, they are, as such, migrants. If European foreign

ighters intentionally exploit irregular migration routes to reenter the EU to engage in

terror-related activities, it posits a link between migration flows and terrorism.

The question arises to what extent the threat of terrorists

entering the EU through lows of migration necessitates

introducing extraordinary measures to control migrants

and borders.

The threat seems to reside in a combination of returning

foreign ighters who are European citizens or residents,

and a lack of oicials’ capacity to detect them.

According to Frontex’s 2016 annual risk report, ‘The Paris attacks in November 2015

clearly demonstrated that irregular migratory flows could be used by terrorists to

enter the EU.’ Former French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve similarly stated

that IS had created an entire ‘industry’ out of making false travel documents and

using passports stolen in Iraq, Syria and Libya.

Such statements have since

formed part of an increased securitization of migrant controls and border policies.

In August 2016, for example, Europol sent a counter-terrorist team to Greece with

the task of singling out potential jihadists from among the 60,000 migrants in the

country’s migrant camps. Yet the question arises to what extent the threat of

terrorists entering the EU through flows of migration necessitates introducing

extraordinary measures to control migrants and borders. Exploring how migration

routes can appeal to terrorists, including the conditions that allowed the Paris

attackers to re-enter the EU undetected, provides a starting point for assessing the

threat of terrorists using migration flows as a back door to Europe, and for suggesting

relevant policy changes in order to mitigate such a threat.

For European foreign ighters, who are often already known to the authorities and

under surveillance, migration routes and the status of asylum-seeker may present

desirable pathways to reenter Europe in order to carry out attacks. Chaotic asylum

processes or the lack of means for border staff to investigate identity papers upon

arrival can allow known foreign ighters and terrorist suspects to reenter Europe

undetected. Using false identities, they can avoid the prospect of being arrested

upon their return by using their knowledge of and networks in Europe. Although IS is

currently under pressure in Syria and Iraq, the possibility of European returnees

trying to iniltrate migration routes is still a relevant issue. Europol’s December 2016

press release suggested that the coalition’s weakening of IS’s strongholds in Syria

and Iraq could lead foreign ighters to ‘try to enter the EU at a higher rate’. In May

2017, Jean-Paul Laborde, head of the U.N. Security Council’s counterterrorism

agency, warned that European countries estimate that the rate of return for foreign

ighters has increased and that these returnees could be ‘more dangerous’. A clear

link between migration flows and terrorism is thus discernable. Again, IS’s political

interest in showing that they can use migration routes and that they are actually

doing so should not be underestimated. However, the primary threat does not

appear to be one in which an increased refugee intake equals an increased risk of

terrorism in the EU. Rather, the threat seems to reside in a combination of returning

foreign ighters who are European citizens or residents, and a lack of oficials’

capacity to detect them.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

THE FRENCH-BELGIAN NETWORK OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ROUTES

To show in practice how migration flows to Europe can be used as a back door for

foreign ighters and terrorist suspects, the French-Belgian foreign-ighter network,

which among other things instigated the Belgian Verviers plot in January 2015, the

13 November 2015 Paris attacks and two attacks in Brussels in March 2016,

presents a case in point. With the exception of two Stade de France suicide bombers

and the explosives expert Ahmad Alkhald,

all of the Paris accomplices and all ive

attackers in the Belgian plots were European citizens, many of whom had gone to

Syria as foreign ighters and returned to the EU to commit attacks. None was a

refugee. As European foreign ighters holding European passports, many of which

were flagged as suspect in EU information exchange data bases, the French-Belgian

network started systematically iniltrating migration routes in order to bring its

members back to Europe undetected from June 2015 and onwards.

In the second half of 2014, IS established a wing for external operations to plan and

carry out attacks in Europe. The francophone network of foreign ighters in the

Syrian town of Raqqa was particularly active in this respect. The irst large-scale

action in Europe planned by this network was the foiled Verviers plot in Belgium in

January 2015. The majority of the IS returnees who were involved in this plot had

traveled back to Europe via Turkey and Greece, probably using false Belgian

passports. Only one of the Verviers plotters, a French citizen, Walid Hamam, is

known to have posed as a Syrian refugee in Greece before travelling on to Belgium.

In June 2015, Macedonia decided to grant migrants a 72-hour transit permit to

travel from Greece to Serbia. The opening of this ‘Balkan route’ constituted a turning

point in allowing the francophone IS network to travel systematically along the

migration routes to get back into Europe. It enabled the network to dispatch

experienced foreign ighters whose identities were already flagged on European

watch lists back into Europe undetected by using fraudulent Syrian passports. As a

result, ‘nearly all the Paris and Brussels attackers came back to Europe using forged

Syrian passports and iniltrated the refugee flow.’

Map of migration routes

300

600

Nor-

way

Sweden

Baltic

Sea

Finland

New borders

Membership:

Both EU and Schengen

Only EU

Only Schengen

Moscow

Migration routes:

Western Balkan

Eastern Balkan

Western Mediterranean

Central Mediterranean

Eastern Mediterranean

In June 2015, the main coordinator of the network, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, dispatched

a scout to map out the ‘Balkan route’ in detail by checking border controls and

smuggling possibilities. Once the route had been cleared, Abaaoud himself traveled

along it in August 2015, from Syria via Turkey to Greece and then onwards via

Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary and Austria. Others involved in the future Paris and

Brussels attacks subsequently returned to Europe in small groups, travelling along

the same route. Some registered as refugees on the Greek island of Leros (the two

Stade de France bombers and the explosives expert, Alkhald), while others are irst

Caspian

Sea

Est.

Latvia

Ireland

Denmark

Atlantic

Ocean

Calais

Nether-

lands

Hamburg

Belg.

Lith.

Russia

Belarus

Germany

Poland

Ukraine

Hungary

Moldova

Lux.

Frankfurt

Czech Rep.

Munich

Slovakia

France

Switz.

Austria

Milan

Romania

known to have registered in Hungary. Once they had managed to get into Europe,

they were picked up by Salah Abdeslam, the logistician of the network, who had

stayed back in Brussels. Abdeslam provided them with false Belgian passports and

drove them back to Belgium. Between August and October 2015, Abdeslam travelled

Alb.

Portugal

Bulgaria

Black Sea

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Spain

Rome

Italy

Ceuta

Melilla

Mediterranean

Sea

Lampe-

dusa

Malta

Istanbul

Turkey

Athens

Mersin

Iran

Syria

Baghdad

Homs

three times to Hungary and once to Germany (Ulm) to pick up ighters who were to

participate in the Paris and Brussels attacks.

In light of this case, we suggest that it is worth examining the EU’s police and border

Morocco

Tunisia

Greece

Cyprus

Beirut

Lebanon

Israel

Iraq

Algeria

Tripoli

Libya

Benghazi

Jordan

Egypt

Cairo

Saudi Arabia

cooperation, as this appears to have been an aspect of what could have prevented

already known and suspected European citizens from registering as refugees with

fraudulent papers and subsequently getting into Europe without being detected.

Note: 1) Slovenia - 2) Croatia - 3) Bosnia Herzegovina - 4) Montenegro - 5) Serbia - 6) Macedonia.

Source: Europol, ICMPD, IGM, UNHCR.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

EUROPEAN BORDER CONTROL: A FAILURE TO DETECT

The Paris attacks were a wake-up call for Europe in terms of the measures that are

necessary to counter migration linked to terrorism. Eight of the Paris suspects were

already registered as radicalized or suspects on surveillance lists and in EU

databases. Two of the Stade de France attackers, for example, carried stolen Syrian

passports and fraudulent papers that matched their registrations in a refugee

registration center on Leros, Greece. Yet none of these checks and registrations

succeeded in revealing that the passports were listed as stolen by Interpol or that

the papers were fraudulent. Similarly, after the Paris attacks, French gendarmes

stopped the car of one of the main suspects – Salah Abdeslam – at the Belgian

border and held him for thirty minutes before he was released. The Belgian

authorities had only entered information on his criminal past, not his links to militant

Islamism, in the EU’s shared information database, the Schengen Information

System (SIS).

Illustrating this ‘failure to detect’ in the February 2015 edition of IS’s magazine

Dabiq, the main coordinator of the Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, bragged

about how he had made several journeys between Syria and Belgium undetected,

despite being a terrorist suspect targeted by both the French and Belgian intelligence

services. Abaaoud, who was the subject of both a European and an international

arrest warrant, managed to travel from Belgium to Syria via Egypt in March 2013

before returning to Europe.

While there is no conirmed evidence that he actually

succeeded in going all the way back to Belgium before August 2015, he had no

dificulty entering the Schengen area, as proved by the fact that he had monitored

the Verviers plot from an apartment in Athens.

It later turned out that, upon his

return to Belgium in August 2015, he also managed to travel to the UK, probably by

ferry to Dover.

THE SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM (SIS)

SIS is the most widespread system of information exchange on border management

and security in Europe. It provides information on, among other things, individuals who

do not have the right to enter or stay in the Schengen area, wanted individuals and lost

or stolen property, including identity papers and data necessary to locate individuals

and conirm their identity. One of the advantages of the SIS database is that it can be

used in real time, that is, when a policeman or border guard is checking identity papers

of those seeking to cross an EU border. In 2017, SIS was updated to SIS II. Compared to

SIS I, SIS II should increase the amount and improve the quality of data that is imported

to it. However, SIS II still does not take into account differences in national legislation

surrounding data use, nor the capacity of the individual police oficer or border guard to

put the database to use.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

IDENTIFYING BORDER MANAGEMENT

AS PART-PROBLEM, PART-SOLUTION

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

The way in which foreign ighters already known to authorities and flagged in

international information-sharing databases were able to travel undetected, despite

registering at EU asylum facilities and border crossings, underlines the fact that

there is a role for border management

to play at the intersection of migration and

terrorism. This report argues that border policies and management occupy unique

positions in addressing the challenges arising from this nexus. As the report has

pointed out, terrorists seldom operate from ‘one place’ but depend on being able to

pass borders – or migrate – between terrorist organizations’ strongholds abroad

and already existing networks in Europe that can provide logistics and facilitate

organization.

The fact that foreign ighters and potential terrorists migrate across borders could

be used to link the risk of terrorism not only with migrants but also with freedom of

movement in general. However, making such links would be an over-simpliication

and would risk introducing extraordinary measures that place too much trust in the

effectiveness of border controls. As is well known, most terrorists are ‘homegrown’

or residents with legal permits, a situation that places limits on what the exceptional

closing or tightening of borders can actually do. Furthermore, a tightening of borders

can increase organized transnational crime and push returning foreign ighters on

to more illegal entry routes that are harder to control.

However, the fact that

terrorists cross borders and are often under surveillance and known to national

security services does make law enforcement, the police and border cooperation

and processing unique means of detection and recognition.

The EU has taken several measures acknowledging the pivotal role of information

exchange and border management as an aspect of counter-terrorism efforts in

recent years. Yet, the speed and novelty with which such counter-terrorism initiatives

are introduced, entails the risk of overshadowing the need to invest in aligning and

THE RISK OF INTRODUCING NEW SOLUTIONS TO NEW PROBLEMS

Combined, these examples point out two key challenges. The irst is a lack of

operational staff and frontline technological capacity to process and detect

anomalies such as stolen passports in migrant flows at the EU’s external borders.

The second example, that of Abdelslam, shows the unaligned or lack of interna-

tional information-sharing available to national police and security services on the

road as well as in ofices. Summing up, a key vulnerability in relation to returning

foreign ighters and terrorist suspects appears to be a lack of or strained opera-

tional and technological capacity to use and cross-check suspects with already

existing and available information-sharing resources within the EU. This vulner-

ability is relevant in evaluating and improving both the front-line staff at the EU’s

external borders and the police and national security services inside Schengen.

Most terrorists are ‘homegrown’ or residents with legal permits,

a situation that places limits on what the exceptional closing or

tightening of borders can actually do.

Terrorists seldom operate from ‘one place’ but depend on

being able to pass borders – or migrate – between terrorist

organizations’ strongholds abroad and already existing

networks in Europe that can provide logistics and facilitate

organization.

enhancing already existing measures like SIS at the EU’s external borders and in

Schengen.

The 2015 Paris attacks are helpful in pointing out the vulnerabilities that can be

exploited at the EU’s external borders. Most illustrative of these vulnerabilities is

perhaps the ability of one of the Paris attackers to pass Greek front-line staff with a

passport that had already been registered as stolen in Interpol’s database. Another

example is how, in the immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks, Abdelslam was

able to pass controls at the French-Belgian border, despite being known, suspected

and registered in the EU’s SIS database.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

NEW LEGISLATIVE MEASURES IN THE EU SINCE 2015

TO CONTROL MIGRATION AND TERRORISM

■

PASSENGER NAME RECORD (PNR)

PNR, which was adopted in April 2016, facilitates the use of passenger data for the pre-

End of 2015 to early 2016: Several EU countries introduced extraordinary internal

EU border controls

vention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. It obliges airlines

to hand over passenger data on passengers who enter or depart from EU countries.

This is supposed to enhance the control of travel flows at the external borders of the

Schengen area.

■

January 2016: Creation of European Counter Terrorism Centre and European

Migrant Smuggling Centre

■

March 2016: Partnership agreement with Turkey

Early March 2016: The so-called Balkan route was declared shut when Macedonia,

Croatia and Slovenia closed their borders

EUROPEAN TRAVEL INFORMATION AND AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM (ETIAS)

ETIAS was founded in order to strengthen security checks and information-gathering

■

April 2016: Provisional establishment of an EU Passenger Name Record directive

(PNR)

on visa-free travelers coming to Europe. Visa-free travel has been the most common

way for criminals, including terrorists, to travel into the EU from the outside. ETIAS is

supposed to contribute to the more eficient management of the EU’s external borders.

■

October 2016: Extension of the role and capacity of Frontex, renamed the

European Border and Coast Guard

■

April 2017: An amendment to the Schengen border code comes into force that

introduces systematic database checks on all persons, including Schengen

citizens, when they cross external borders

The EU’s approval of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive in April 2016 is

one of the most signiicant achievements regarding the control of travel in and from

the EU in the past few years. The decision facilitates the use of passenger data in

the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. It

obliges airlines to hand EU countries the passenger data they gather on passengers

Since the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015 and 2016, security and law enforcement

cooperation are among the areas that have received the largest amount of funding

and are evolving the most in the EU. The EU’s 2017 spending budget dedicates a

total of six billion euros – 11.3 percent more than in 2016 – to tackling the migration

situation and reinforcing security and counter-terrorism activities related to the EU’s

border management.

A range of policy initiatives centered on improving and

expanding information-sharing databases have been set in motion, including the

provisional establishment of a Passenger Name Record in April 2016, a new version

of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the establishment of a Europol

terrorist center with ‘updated powers’.

entering or leaving the EU. In addition, the European Travel Information and

Authorization System (ETIAS) was established in November 2016 to strengthen

security checks and information-gathering on visa-free travelers. Since April 2017,

all travelers crossing the external borders of the Schengen area are checked in the

SIS II database, including EU citizens. These are important measures, since so far

visa-free travel has been one of the commonest forms of travel for criminals,

including terrorist suspects, who have entered the EU from abroad. The EU’s control

of non-visa refugees and migrants travelling within its borders has also been

enhanced at the physical borders of the main entry routes, currently in Greece, Italy

and eastern Europe. Here, the EU has invested in making the European border

institution, FRONTEX, stronger by enhancing its operational capabilities and powers,

in particular through collaboration with national border and coastguard staff.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Finally, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was updated to SIS II by 2017. SIS II

allows two national-security oficials, such as, on the one hand, police, border guards

and customs oficials, and on the other European institutions like Europol and

Eurojust, to record information on wanted individuals and items (such as criminals

and terrorists, stolen identity papers and cars) and receive real-time information and

alarms when necessary. This system is essential in increasing and aligning

information-sharing and in making this information actionable in real time by

immediately transferring data entered into SIS in one country to the central system,

which can then alert relevant searches in other countries. SIS II thus has the

potential to enable EU countries to reduce the undetected travelling of known

terrorists and potentially dangerous individuals by being able to detect stolen

passports or suspected individuals in real time.

However, it is still unclear whether these new and updated initiatives will succeed in

addressing the signiicant technical and human obstacles that, until recently,

impeded the effective use of information-sharing databases. There is indeed a risk

that the challenge the EU faces in detecting terrorist suspects not only lies in a lack

of or unaligned data, but that it also originates in the absence of or different

operational and technological capacities among member states themselves – in

particular Italy and Greece – to act on already available data in real time. It is one

thing to have the technological possibility, quite another to be able to use it.

members, Italy and Greece’. Many of the Paris attackers were registered in

international databases but were not detected or did not have their fraudulent or

stolen identity papers detected by national border staff at the EU’s external borders.

As such, databases existed and were informed. However, during the large influx of

refugees in 2015, EU member states with an external border suffered from a

signiicant lack of the technological capacity and human resources required to put

these databases to use when processing and registering incoming migration flows

and asylum requests.

The EU’s borders are only as strong as those of its

Mediterranean members, Italy and Greece.

When it comes to countries such as Greece and Italy, providing more data without

providing the human and technical resources to make such data actionable does

not seem to be an eficient policy response. New and increased data-sharing

initiatives do not automatically solve more systemic vulnerabilities in the EU’s

ordinary border management. Apart from a lack of resources in some countries,

these vulnerabilities also include different practices, competencies and capacities

on the part of national law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and border

controls in various member states.

SIS II thus has the potential to enable EU countries to reduce

the undetected travelling of known terrorists and potentially

dangerous individuals by being able to detect stolen passports

or suspected individuals in real time.

THE RISK OF ADDRESSING TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS NATIONALLY

The reasons for the lack of joint investment in the operational dimensions of the

EU’s external borders are manifold and complex, yet one of the most obvious is

probably the fact that law enforcement and border management have for a long

Speaking at a trio meeting of EU commissioners on 21 December 2016, the EU

security commissioner, Julian King, told reporters in Brussels that ‘We are only as a

strong as our weakest database’, later underlining that ‘SIS is only as good as the

data that is registered in it’. Similarly, the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs

and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, said on 14 September 2016: ‘Enhancing the

exchange of information will enable us to ight terrorism more effectively.’ However,

it might have been more appropriate to say ‘We are only as strong as our weakest

member state’s capacity to use information-sharing databases’. Or even more

precisely, ‘the EU’s borders are only as strong as those of its Mediterranean

time been considered the responsibility of national security agencies and legislation.

This point is underpinned by the fact that different border states have had different

methods of administration, registering and screening, at times making information

uploaded to international databases unaligned and inconsistent. This is aggravated

further by the absence of a common EU system of document inspection. In this

respect, the EU’s recent focus on strengthening cooperation around information-

sharing can be interpreted as an easy way to avoid uncomfortable issues related to

the different practices, competencies and capacities of national law enforcement

and border control between member states.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Thus, the EU’s focus on information-sharing between states over the joint capacity-

building of internal security providers and cross-border operational cooperation can

be interpreted as stemming from issues of national sovereignty. This challenge is

underlined by the trends of EU member states to turn increasingly to national

frameworks in order to strengthen their own security and border management, as

with Brexit, member states’ re-imposition of temporary national border controls and

the general reluctance of national security services to share data. These examples

of a return to national frameworks constitute attempts to uphold national security

through the sovereign management of national borders and to prioritize national

law enforcement over the joint efforts of the EU and agencies such as Europol

and Eurojust. This trend increases rather than addresses the vulnerabilities that

allowed the Paris attackers to travel undetected, namely the various, unaligned and

often absent capacities of EU member states – in particular, EU border states and

their national border staff – to process, register and operationalize the available

information-sharing databases at border crossings.

Increased reliance on national security frameworks and a

turning away from EU initiatives and agreements, is highly

unsubstantiated.

In relation to this, the argument that the Paris attacks are an example of how

terrorists can ‘sneak’ into Europe as refugees and how this attack necessitates not

only the securitization of refugees, but also increased reliance on national security

frameworks and a turning away from EU initiatives and agreements, is highly

unsubstantiated. An increased turn towards strictly national security solutions will

most probably impede member states’ capacities to prevent terrorism. As terrorism

is most often transnational, it must also be countered through transnational

collaborative efforts. Consequently, more operational, technological and admini-

strative joint support to the EU’s external borders, ensuring electronic connection to

relevant Interpol and Europol databases and eficient migrant processing at all

external border crossings, should be emphasized as the eficient response, next to

new data-sharing initiatives.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

CONCLUSION

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

The EU faces a multi-faceted threat from terrorist organizations like Islamic State

and al Qaeda. The challenges that arise from the intersection of these organizations’

activities and the ongoing influx of refugees into Europe are largely new, unpre-

cedented, and therefore highly uncertain. Terrorist groups like IS rely on adapting

their modus operandi to vulnerabilities and changes in their environment. In this

way, concerns about a dangerous intersection of terrorism with the EU’s continuing

influx of refugees are legitimate, as is the attempt to continue adapting policies to

these concerns.

Moving on to discuss possible solutions, the report has examined how our two main

assumptions have fed into EU measures and policies introduced to address the

possible exploitation of migration routes and migration flows by terrorist groups. To

this end, this report has argued that policies and measures related to border

management have a unique potential when it comes to preventing some of the

ways in which terrorists have occasionally been able to exploit migration flows.

If we consider the long term, we also have to raise the question

of whether and to what extent radicalization is a problem of

second generations of migrants. This is a question that needs

further research.

A strengthening of external Schengen border controls to detect

potential terrorists or returning foreign ighters should never

compromise the protection of refugees in need.

The report has also suggested that new international and national policies

and legislative measures concerning borders and cross-border cooperation risk

overshadowing the extent to which existing vulnerabilities in ordinary border

This report has explored the ways in which terrorists can exploit migration flows

through two main assumptions: ‘refugees as vulnerable to radicalization and recruit-

ment’ and ‘the refugee flow as a back door’. It has concluded that the great majority

of individuals involved in terrorist attacks in Europe have been EU citizens or

residents, but also that European foreign ighters who had joined IS in Syria have

used migration routes to reenter Europe undetected. No refugees, four asylum-

seekers (three rejected) were involved in carrying out attacks in Europe from January

2016 to April 2017. Although in the short term the terrorist threat in Europe does not

stem directly from refugees but clearly from EU citizens, residents and to some

extent asylum-seekers, less linear effects of mass immigration and the potential

links to terrorism cannot be excluded in the longer run. Disenfranchisement and a

perceived or real lack of opportunity and justice make recruitment within vulnerable

groups of refugees or asylum-seekers possible. If we consider the long term, we

also have to raise the question of whether and to what extent radicalization is a

problem of second generations of migrants. This is a question that needs further

research.

management need to build up capacity. These vulnerabilities, which were ultimately

of a sort exploited by the Paris attackers, entail a difference in the methods,

capacities and motivations whereby member states share and operationalize

international information-exchange databases in national border management and

law enforcement.

A strengthening of these vulnerabilities will not just be overcome by more data-

sharing or new measures such as a tightening of national borders. Rather, they

necessitate EU-supported human and technological investment in the ordinary and

operational management of external borders as a joint rather than a national project.

Such investment would not only be beneicial in identifying often already known

terrorist suspects, it would also make the processing of incoming asylum requests

more eficient. A strengthening of external Schengen border controls to detect

potential terrorists or returning foreign ighters should never compromise the

protection of refugees in need.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

NOTES

www.diis.dk/en/activity/database-of-materialized-islamist-terrorplots-in-the-west

The time of writing.

At the time of the attack, none of the four perpetrators had obtained legal status as a refugee. Three

have had their asylum requests rejected.

Eurostat (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/

www.diis.dk/en/activity/database-of-materialized-islamist-terrorplots-in-the-west

These ive countries accounted for 72% of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. See http://www.

visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/iles/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202016_0.pdf for terrorism

index, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.

pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6 for 2015 asylum numbers.

http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/documents/Eurostat-AsylumApplicationsintheEU-

ThirdQuarter2016.pdf = shows how Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis constitute the biggest group of

asylum-seekers to Europe. It is not possible, however, to state whether they have fled from terrorist

groups or for other reasons.

BBC News (2015), ‘Islamic State video campaign urges migrants to stay’: http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-middle-east-34291726

Europol, 2016, ‘Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited’, p. 9.

26 Soren Seelow (2016), ‘Les deux erreurs qui ont permis à Salah Abdeslam de partir en cavale’,

Le Monde, July 6.

27 The Guardian (2017), ‘EU taskforce highlights security failings that facilitated terror attacks’,

March 14.

28 Brisard and Jackson (2016), ‘The Islamic State’s External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus’,

CTC Sentinel, November/December.

29 The Guardian (2017), ‘EU taskforce highlights security failings that facilitated terror attacks’,

March 14.

30 ‘Border management’ is a broad term, covering state, EU and private guards. It matters who the

border agents are, as accountability is more dificult when control functions are outsourced by state

authorities to private companies. Cf. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyeberg Sørensen

(2013), The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of Internal Migration, Oxford: Routledge.

31 See e.g. Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht’s 2017 report for DIIS ‘Europe and the

Refugee Situation: Human Security Implications’ or Migration Policy Institute’s 2014 report ‘Securing

Borders: The Intended, Unintended, and Perverse Consequences’ for an elaboration.

32 Euractiv 2016: http://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/2017-eu-budget-adopted-

with-more-for-migration-security/

33 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

10 Le Galès, Patrick, and Desmond King, Reconiguring European States in Crisis, Oxford University

Press, 2017.

11 It is still too early to draw unilateral conclusions, as events are still unfolding. The large influx of

refugees to Europe could have more indirect effects on public opinion, which potentially could enable

various forms of violent extremism.

12 Ulrich, Andreas (2016), ‘German Attackers had contact with suspected IS members’, Spiegel Online, 5

August.

13 SITE ‘IS’ Amaq Says Axe Attack on German Train Carried out by IS ‘Soldier’.

14 Ulrich, Andreas (2016).

15 Se Reuters, July 2016: https://www.rt.com/news/353649-denmark-isis-refugee-center/

16 www.diis.dk/en/activity/database-of-materialized-islamist-terrorplots-in-the-west

17 www.diis.dk/en/activity/database-of-materialized-islamist-terrorplots-in-the-west

18 Funk and Parkes, 2016. ‘Refugees versus Terrorists’, European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS),

January 2016: http://www.europarl.gr/resource/static/iles/refugees-versus-terrorists.pdf

19 Jean-Charles Brisard and Kévin Jackson (2016), ‘The Islamic State’s External Operations and the

French-Belgian Nexus’, CTC Sentinel, November/December, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

the-islamic-states-external-operations-and-the-french-belgian-nexus

20 The Wall Street Journal (2016) ‘Islamic State Said to Have ‘Industry of Fake Passports’’: https://www.

wsj.com/articles/isis-has-created-industry-of-fake-migrant-passports-says-french-

minister-1453741792

21 The Soufan Group, December (2015) ‘Foreign Fighters: An updated assessment of the flow of foreign

ighters into Syria and Iraq’: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_

ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf

22 Soren Seelow and Jean-Pierre Stroobants (2017), ‘L’artiicier en chef des attentats de Paris et de

Bruxelles a été identiié’; Le Monde, March 8.

23 Brisard and Jackson (2016), ‘The Islamic State’s External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus’,

CTC Sentinel, November/December.

24 Ibid.

25 For detailed information, cf. Brisard and Jackson.

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM – AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

Photos

Coverphoto: iStock, BalkansCat

Page 8-9: iStock, AshleyWiley

Page 12-13: iStock, Joel Carillet

Page 22-23: iStock, F Stoplight

Page 30-31: iStock, Alicia Garcia

Page 40-41: iStock, Joel Carillet

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

The Danish Institute for International Studies is a leading public institute for independent

research and analysis of international affairs. We conduct and communicate multidisciplinary

research on globalisation, security, development and foreign policy. DIIS aims to use our research

results to influence the agenda in research, policy and public debate, and we put great effort into

informing policymakers and the public of our results and their possible applications.

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 370: DIIS Report 2017:05: Europe's Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - An extraordinary threat?

DIIS· DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Østbanegade 117 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark www.diis.dk