REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 189: Publikation: The trouble with counter-Narratives

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DIIS REPORT 2017: 1

THE TROUBLE WITH

COUNTER-NARRATIVES

REU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 189: Publikation: The trouble with counter-Narratives

This report is written by Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen

& Karin Ingrid Castro and published by DIIS.

Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, PhD, is a researcher at DIIS.

Karin Ingrid Castro MSc. Security Risk Management,

is a research assistant at DIIS.

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: [email protected]

www.diis.dk

Layout: Mark Gry Christiansen

Printed in Denmark by OnPrint.dk

ISBN 978-87-7605-858-6 (print)

ISBN 978-87-7605-859-3 (pdf)

All DIIS publications are available for free on DIIS.DK

©Copenhagen 2017, the authors and DIIS

THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTER-NARRATIVES

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Contents

Abstract

Challenges

Recommendations

Background

The Danish approach

The evidence for the utility of counter-narratives as a method

The risk of side-effects when addressing the many to reach the few

The challenge in attempting to construct counter-narratives is that

we do not know how and why the narratives work

Conclusion

Literature

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THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTER-NARRATIVES

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ABSTRACT

Counter-narratives are routinely suggested as responses to the vast amounts of

propaganda available online, from groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda; and

the idea of using them to prevent terrorism is gaining momentum. International or-

ganisations such as the EU and UN are including them in their CVE strategies, lead-

ing to a push for member states to do the same, in spite of a great deal of criticism

and lack of any actual evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method.

Taking its point of departure in three counter-narrative initiatives introduced in the

third Danish national action plan on countering and preventing extremism and radi-

calisation, this report explores the challenges related to using counter-narratives

within the Danish preventive framework in particular and in CVE strategies in general.

The report finds that broad counter-narrative campaigns are neither necessary nor

appropriate, and that the potential negative side-effects are not acceptable when

measured against the expected benefits. The report ends by suggesting alternative

approaches.

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CHALLENGES

Actual evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method of minimising

the impact of narratives and of preventing acts of violence is lacking.

Counter-narratives are in essence reactive; using them is therefore in practice a

recognition of the terms laid down by the declared opponents. In being so, they

may in practice reinforce the very narratives they are attempting to stifle.

Confrontational counter-narratives, which engage directly with a narrative to

expose, correct or ridicule it, run the risk of being automatically rejected.

Broad counter-narrative campaigns are not necessary, as the propaganda of

groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State only attracts few individuals, and

addressing the many in an attempt to reach the few is a scattergun approach

that carries the risk of unwanted or even counter-productive side effects.

The lack of knowledge about why and how the narratives and propaganda of

groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State attract audiences, makes it difficult

to construct attractive counter-narratives, even if the relevant audiences could be

identified.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recognise that no single response can ever be constructed, as there are many

different pathways to acting violently with reference to an ideology, and many

different reasons why, individuals or groups become attracted to extremist prop-

aganda and its narratives.

Learn from experiences with other types of preventive work that attempting to

prevent future problems is accompanied by risks. Always weigh these risks and

their probability against the expectable positive effects and their probability.

Break down the ambitious project of preventing terrorism into manageable

sub-projects, which have clearly identified audiences, sub-objectives, methods,

designated actors, and that take into account the potential risks.

Clearly differentiate between violent acts and radical ideology, as there is no

documented causal relationship between them.

Instead of attempting to counter extremist propaganda and its narratives by

engaging with them, counter them by providing alternatives.

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With regard to individuals or groups that are already attracted to extremist narra-

tives or propaganda, the grievances that the individual or group is currently seek-

ing to address through the ideology, must be identified on a case by case basis.

These may be foreign or domestic political grievances, individual or personal

grievances, and may be real or perceived. Then corresponding alternative ways

of addressing them can be provided.

Inspiration for providing ways of addressing individual and personal grievances

may be found in the methods already being employed in Denmark. Yet, there is

also a need to develop societally acceptable ways of addressing foreign or do-

mestic political grievances that can serve as real alternatives to what groups

such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State currently present.

In the broader population, the focus should be on bolstering general resources

through capacity-building and inclusion; embracing diversity, openness, and free-

doms to avoid feelings of marginalisation and the polarisation of society;

strengthening critical thinking and knowledge about how propaganda works; and

addressing real social or individual issues that may in the long run leave individ-

uals vulnerable to any risks, including but not limited to involvement in extremist

milieus.

On this general level, provide alternatives by facilitating open debates about diffi-

cult subjects, such as violent conflicts and international politics, where construc-

tive and productive ways of engaging with them can be presented.

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BACKGROUND

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Counter-narratives or counter-propaganda are routinely suggested as responses to

the vast amount of propaganda from groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda

that is readily available online, and the idea of using counter-narratives as a way to

prevent terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation is increasingly gaining momentum.

International organisations such as the EU and UN are increasingly including coun-

ter-narratives in their Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategies, leading to a

push for member states to do the same, in spite of a great deal of criticism and the

lack of any actual evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method for such

purposes.

Counter-narrative

is a broad and ill-defined concept that is used in very different

ways; consequently, actual counter-narrative campaigns differ greatly. Gemmerli

(2015) identifies three main categories of counter-narratives currently being promot-

ed, namely

direct counter-narratives,

which confront the ideology and lifestyle of ex-

tremism;

positive alternatives,

which, among other things, support moderate voices;

and

improving digital competences and the ability of vulnerable people to reflect criti-

cally.

Many more could be added to these, including but not limited to promoting

non-violent ways of addressing political grievances, promoting a narrative about a

given society as full of opportunities and promoting narratives about the victims of

terrorism. However, the present report is primarily concerned with the category that

Gemmerli labels

direct.

In line with Biggs & Feve (2013), here we use the concept counter-narratives inter-

changeably with counter-propaganda to refer to intentional and direct efforts to de-

construct, discredit or demystify violent extremist messaging through ideology, log-

ic, fact, or humour. Following Ferguson (2016), we add that these efforts take place

within a political, policy, or military context and that they are in essence reactive.

Using them is therefore in practice a recognition of the terms laid down by the de-

clared opponents. In doing so, they may in practice end up reinforcing the very nar-

ratives they are attempting to stifle.

The present report takes its point of departure in three new counter-propaganda ini-

tiatives introduced in the national action plan, ‘Forebyggelse og bekæmpelse af

radikalisering og ekstremisme’ (Countering and preventing radicalisation and ex-

tremism), put forward by the Danish government in October 2016. It explores the

challenges related to using counter-narratives that engage directly and confronta-

tionally with a particular ideology to expose, correct, or ridicule it, within the Danish

preventive framework in particular and the challenges of using them in CVE strate-

gies in general.

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In the Danish 2016 action plan, one action point concerns countering extremist prop-

aganda and preventing online radicalisation through seven new initiatives (Govern-

ment of Denmark 2016, 29). While the first three of these initiatives deal with the

physical mapping, restriction, and prosecution related to material content, the re-

maining four address the assumed radicalising power of the propaganda and its

narratives by engaging civil society in counter-narrative campaigns.

The four new initiatives

New pedagogical tools for strengthening critical thinking and digital literacy among

children and young people.

civil-society actor-driven corps of ‘digital voices of reason’, to seek out and engage

critically with relevant online forums and thus challenge extremist views.

support and training programme providing professional assistance for civil-society

actors wishing to develop campaigns against extremism and radicalisation.

strategic cooperation to mobilise and empower young people to use online media

as platforms to present alternatives to extremist propaganda.

Evidently, the first initiative falls under Gemmerli’s category of

improving digital com-

petences and the ability of vulnerable people to reflect critically,

whereas the remain-

ing three fall under the category of

direct counter-narratives that confront the ideolo-

gy and lifestyle of extremism.

The introduction of these three initiatives indicates a

deviation from the underlying logics that have so far informed and shaped the Dan-

ish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation, which is

somewhat surprising, given how little evidence there is of counter-narratives being

an effective method.

This report first briefly introduces the Danish approach to countering and preventing

extremism and radicalisation, including the new initiatives introduced in the govern-

ment’s national action plan from 2016. It then goes on to summarise the evidence of

the utility of counter-narratives as a method and from there engages with the many

challenges related to this method, particularly when counter-narratives are formulat-

ed as direct confrontational campaigns that directly engage with a narrative to ex-

pose, correct or ridicule it, and when the many are addressed in an attempt to reach

the few.

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The report finds that such counter-narrative campaigns are neither necessary, nor

appropriate, and that the potential negative side effects and their probability are not

acceptable when measured against the expectable benefits and their likelihood.

While this report primarily highlights the potential pitfalls

involved in counter-narrative work, it also suggests alternative

approaches to countering the propaganda and narratives of

groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which revolve around

providing alternatives.

Strategies to counter and prevent extremism and radicalisation not only aim to de-

tect and foil planned terrorist attacks, they also aim to proactively minimise the num-

ber of individuals who are ready, willing, and able to carry out such attacks. This can

be done in many ways, and trying to contain the effectiveness of propaganda by

countering it may appear to be an unproblematic, soft alternative to harsher meth-

ods. The trouble is, however, that it can easily turn into a

scattergun approach,

which

can lead to unintended or even counter-productive side effects.

While this report primarily highlights the potential pitfalls involved in counter-narra-

tive work, it also suggests alternative approaches to countering the propaganda and

narratives of groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which revolve around pro-

viding alternatives.

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THE DANISH

APPROACH

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The Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation, is

based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service pro-

viders, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, and the intelli-

gence and security services. It includes state, regional, and local actors, and is struc-

tured around efforts targeted respectively at the wider Danish society, extremist

individuals and groups, and individuals involved, or in imminent danger of becoming

involved, in illegal activities. The initiatives developed for individuals primarily revolve

around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling, and exit pro-

grammes, whereas the initiatives developed for the wider Danish society, primarily

revolve around capacity-building in order to improve general conditions on both the

societal and the individual level.

For a more thorough introduction to the Danish approach, see Ann-Sophie Hem-

mingsen,

An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extrem-

ism and radicalization,

DIIS Report 2015:15.

In Denmark, efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism are increasingly being

framed within the so-called

Prevention Pyramid,

a tool for identifying different target

groups and appropriate ways of addressing them. In the government’s national ac-

tion plan (2016), the pyramid identifies the following target groups and correspond-

ing efforts.

INDIVIDUALS IN

EXTREMIST MILIEUS

Targeted level:

Intervening efforts

Specific level: Anticipatory efforts

INDIVIDUALS AT RISK OF

RADICALISATION

General level: Strengthening efforts

EVERYBODY

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As a tool, the prevention pyramid has been borrowed from prevention programs in-

volving health issues, substance abuse and crime, indicating another central aspect

of the Danish approach, namely the incorporation of experiences from the preven-

tion of other issues in other contexts. Drawing on experience from preventing, for

example, crime and substance abuse does not necessarily imply the assumption

that violent extremism is the same or even comparable, but it does imply an as-

sumption that social dynamics – particularly on the general level – may be the same,

regardless of the potential problem one is attempting to prevent from ever arising in

the future.

For the three target groups identified in the pyramid, we can identify implicit sub-ob-

jectives, applied methods for reaching them, designated actors, and perhaps most

importantly in relation to the present report, the potential risks.

Visualising the Danish approach in the table on the following three pages, enables us

to identify gaps and potential methods that are not yet included, to which we shall

return in the final section of the present report. It also enables us to identify the po-

tential risks that are directly relevant to the use of counter-narrative campaigns, as

suggested in the 2016 action plan. We shall return to these after a short clarification

of the evidence for the utility of counter-narratives as a method, which is relevant to

an assessment of whether the potential risks are proportional and therefore accept-

able.

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TARGET

GROUP

HOW

EXISTING METHODS

ACTORS

SUB-OBJECTIVE

NEW METHODS

IN THE 2016 ACTION PLAN

POTENTIAL RISKS

Individuals

in extremist

milieus

Dissuade

Mentoring on making

personal changes

Therapy

Prison and

Probation

Service

Mentors

Coaches for

parents

NGO centre for

counselling

Professionals

who already

have a good

relationship

Police

Interrupt

Exit programs to facilitate

disengagement from

violent extremist milieus

THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTER-NARRATIVES

Preventing

terrorism in the

near future by

interrupting plots

and convincing

individuals to

leave extremist

milieus

Support

disengage-

ment from

extremist

milieus

A support and training

programme providing

professional assistance for

civil-society actors wishing

to develop campaigns

against extremism and

radicalisation

Civil-society actor-driven

corps of ‘digital voices of

reason’ to seek out and

critically engage with online

forums and challenge

extremist views

Security and

Intelligence

Service

Aggravating

Pushing further

underground

Making investigations

more difficult

Pushing individuals or

groups to do exactly

what one is trying to

avoid

Compromising freedom

of speech or religion

Providing arguments for

groups or individuals

with an interest in

identifying double

standards to promote

polarisation

Provide

alternative

ways to

address

grievances or

desires

Coaching relatives to

support the individual

A strategic cooperation to

mobilise and empower

young people to use online

media as platforms for

presenting alternatives to

extremist propaganda

Advice on gaining access

to resources available to

all citizens (e.g. housing,

employment, career

advice, therapy, medical

assistance)

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HOW

EXISTING METHODS

NEW METHODS

IN THE 2016 ACTION PLAN

ACTORS

POTENTIAL RISKS

TARGET

GROUP

SUB-OBJECTIVE

Individuals

at risk

Coaches for

parents

NGO centre for

counselling

Professionals

who already

have a good

relationship

Change risky

behaviour

Mentoring on making

personal changes

Mentors

Distortion of proportions

Stigmatisation

Marginalisation

Polarisation

Pushing individuals or

groups to do exactly

what one is trying to

avoid

Compromising freedom

of speech or religion

Providing arguments for

groups or individuals

with an interest in

identifying double

standards to promote

polarisation

Preventing

terrorism in the

future by

convincing

individuals to not

join extremist

milieus

Provide

alternative

ways to

address

grievances or

desires

Coaching relatives to

support the individual

Advice on gaining access

to resources available to

all citizens (e.g. housing,

employment, career

advice, therapy, medical

assistance)

Civil-society actor-driven

corps of ‘digital voices of

reason’ to seek out and

critically engage with online

forum and challenge

extremist views

Promote

desired

behaviour

A strategic cooperation to

mobilise and empower

young people to use online

media as platforms for

presenting alternatives to

extremist propaganda

A support and training

programme providing

professional assistance for

civil-society actors wishing

to develop campaigns

against extremism and

radicalisation

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TARGET

GROUP

HOW

EXISTING METHODS

ACTORS

SUB-OBJECTIVE

NEW METHODS

IN THE 2016 ACTION PLAN

POTENTIAL RISKS

Everybody

Panic

Build

capacity and

resilience

Already existing general

social interventions

New pedagogical tools for

promoting children’s ability

to participate in social

relations and critically reflect

Professionals

in day-care,

primary and

secondary

schools

Distortion of proportions

Mistrust

Stigmatisation

Marginalisation

Polarisation

Pushing individuals or

groups to do exactly

what one is trying to

avoid

Compromising freedom

of speech or religion

Providing arguments for

groups or individuals

with an interest in

identifying double

standards to promote

polarisation

THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTER-NARRATIVES

Preventing

terrorism in the

distant future by

minimising

vulnerability to

any risk, including

engagement in

extremist milieus

Promote

well-being,

social

cohesion,

and active

citizenship

Teaching materials on

digital literacy, critical

sense and propaganda

techniques for primary

and secondary school and

after-school clubs

A strategic cooperation to

mobilise and empower

young people to use online

media as platforms for

presenting alternatives to

extremist propaganda

A support and training

programme providing

professional assistance for

civil-society actors wishing

to develop campaigns

against extremism and

radicalisation

Building a critical sense

and understanding of

individual and human

rights through primary and

secondary school

Civil society,

including

family,

community,

associations,

clubs, etc.

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THE EVIDENCE FOR

THE UTILITY OF

COUNTER-NARRATIVES

AS A METHOD

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In a recent study of the existing academic and grey research literature relevant to the

development of media and communications strategies to counter violent extrem-

ism, Ferguson (2016), concludes that the focus on counter-narratives as a strategy

to prevent terrorism, is tied to the underlying assumption that consuming violent

words will lead to committing violent deeds (2016, 9), in other words, that ideas

cause violent actions and therefore that ideas are the root cause, which must be re-

moved. This leads to the sub-assumptions that, since propaganda is crucial to mo-

bilisation, counter-propaganda must be crucial to countering it, and that real-world

violent acts can be prevented by removing or falsifying ideas.

Evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method for

intervention is absent.

Ferguson finds that the scientific support for these assumptions is sparse and that,

although ‘there is some evidence suggesting patterns of discourse and communica-

tion such as hate speech, dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives (or propa-

ganda) can contribute to conditions where IBV [Identity Based Violence] or VE [Vio-

lent Extremism] becomes more likely, the causal relationship remains unproven’

(2016, 10), and further, that evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method

for intervention is absent.

With regard to the central assumption that ideas cause action, Ferguson concludes

that the literature does not support it, but rather shows that ‘it is possible for individ-

uals to hold, express, and consume extreme views, without transgressing to vio-

lence’ (2016, 11). In other words, the same pathway, such as the adoption of an ex-

treme ideology, can lead to different outcomes, what is known as

multifinality.

In addition to the lack of evidence that radical ideas always lead to violent acts, re-

cent research also indicates that radical ideas are not always preconditions for vio-

lent acts, which are justified by reference to them.

The assumption that ideas precede and cause action is tied to a specific under-

standing of radicalisation to violence, which supposes an intellectual process

through which an individual or a group is convinced by and adopts an ideological

cause, thereby overcoming their assumed natural aversion to the use of violence

and resulting in the acceptance and ultimately the use of violence to advance the

cause. Recent Scandinavian research, however, questions this understanding, indi-

cating that this is not the only process through which individuals or groups can

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come to act with reference to an ideology. In other words, different pathways can

lead to the same outcome – for example, violent acts – which is what is known as

equifinality.

Nesser (2015), offers a typology of core members of jihadi terrorist cells in which

four distinct types are identified: entrepreneurs, protégés, misfits and drifters. In this

typology, two general clusters of pathways into involvement in terrorist plots are

identified, namely an ideological-political one (the entrepreneurs and their protégés)

and various more personal ones (the misfits and the drifters).

Hemmingsen, Crone & Witt (2016), have suggested that the intellectualist under-

standing of radicalisation should be supplemented with other understandings of the

processes through which individuals come to act violently with reference to ideolo-

gy. To understand how individuals with a violent, criminal background transform

their criminal violence into political violence, they introduce the concept of

the politi-

cization of violence.

Related to this, Crone (2016), suggests ‘that ideology is not necessarily a precondi-

tion for violence, but that prior experience with violence is more often a precondition

for engaging an extremist ideology’ (2016, abstract). Crone argues that not only pre-

vious experience of violence through crime, but also the attraction of violence and

attempts to gain access to it by travelling to conflict zones, ‘may pave the way for an

extremist engagement, sometimes including a loose or superficial affiliation with an

extremist ideology’ (2016, 594).

Expanding on this work, we suggest that there are at least three different pathways

through which individuals and groups come to act violently with reference to an ide-

ology:

Intellectual radicalisation into violent extremism.

A process through which an indi-

vidual or group becomes convinced by an ideological cause and, after accepting the

use of violence to promote it, actually acts violently. This implies a change of attitude

followed by a change of behaviour.

Politicisation of violence.

A process through which an individual or group for whom

violence is already part of the communication repertoire adopts an ideological cause

and begins to frame and/or understand violence as more noble. This implies a change

of attitude, but not a change of behaviour.

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Utilitarian attachment of ideology.

A process through which an individual or a group

attaches an ideological cause to their own agendas, whether political or personal, in an

attempt to legitimise them. This does not necessarily imply a change of behaviour or

attitude, as the attachment of an ideological cause may be superficial or even purely

rhetorical.

We are not suggesting that ideology, narratives, and propaganda are irrelevant, but

rather that they may play several different roles and that this leads to a need for

several different responses; some of which are not focused on the ideology, narra-

tives, or propaganda themselves, but rather on the purposes for which they are

adopted or attached.

Although we speak of different pathways through which indivi-

duals and groups come to act with reference to an ideology, it is

worth mentioning that individuals very rarely travel alone or in

a vacuum. Rather, this almost always takes place in interaction

with broader constituent environments that frame violence with

reference to ideology as more prestigious or legitimate.

Although we speak of different pathways through which individuals and groups

come to act with reference to an ideology, it is worth mentioning that individuals very

rarely travel alone or in a vacuum. Rather, this almost always takes place in interac-

tion with broader constituent environments that frame violence with reference to

ideology as more prestigious or legitimate.

Finally, it is worth noting that the focus on narratives and counter-narratives as rele-

vant to preventing terrorism also appears to be tied to the underlying assumption

that becoming convinced by an ideological cause (intellectual radicalisation) is a

process through which the individual or group is manipulated or even brainwashed

with misinformation. Counter-narratives are therefore intended to involve correc-

tions of misunderstandings and lies. Granted, there may be specific cases where

vulnerable individuals have been manipulated by recruiters, and the notion of brain-

washing may be fed by the ex-post rationalisations of individuals who regret becom-

ing involved in a particular cause. Yet, we should be very careful not to overestimate

the extent to which this is actually documented.

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If becoming convinced by a cause is not always the starting point or the reason why

individuals or groups act violently with reference to an ideology, then perhaps the

cause, the ideology, the narratives, or the propaganda should not always be at the

centre of attempts to prevent terrorism. If a group or an individual is not convinced

by an ideology but rather seeks it out to use it for other purposes, then exposing,

correcting or ridiculing the ideology is unlikely to change anything.

In such cases, the focus should be on uncovering the purposes for which individuals

and groups are using the ideology and then attempting to provide alternative, soci-

etally more acceptable ways of serving those purposes. In some cases, addressing

the ideology or the narratives may be exactly what is needed, but in others it may be

a waste of time. Even in cases where addressing the ideology or the narratives may

be relevant, it is unlikely that doing so in a confrontational manner by correcting, ex-

posing or ridiculing it will have the desired effect.

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THE RISK OF

SIDE-EFFECTS WHEN

ADDRESSING THE MANY

TO REACH THE FEW

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There is nothing to indicate that the ideology, narratives, or propaganda of groups

such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, appeals to the general population or has the

potential to mobilise the masses. Rather, it appears to resonate with only a small

selection of those exposed to it, and when it does resonate, it does so in different

ways and for different reasons.

Recent studies by Gendron (2016) and Rudner (2016), have revealed that, like other

marketing campaigns, extremist narratives and propaganda have various aims and

objectives such as information, recruitment, training, and financing; is delivered in an

array of different formats such as text, speech, videos, pictures, etc., through various

mediums for example, websites, magazines, and social media platforms; and is

aimed at specific target audiences. Although some of the mediums are open for all

to view, in most instances a search effort is required on the part of the audience.

This to a much lesser extent includes international news media reproductions of narra-

tives and propaganda, which falls outside of the scope of this report. For discussion of

this aspect, see Magder (2003) and Thussu (2003).

In the recently published collection of papers on

Violent Extremism Online,

edited by

Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen (2016), several of the authors discuss how the receiv-

ing process is an active one, where each individual has his or her own reasons for

seeking out and interacting with violent extremist content. As such, the response to

narratives and propaganda differs from one audience member to another. Our lack

of understanding of how the interpretation and construction of meaning differ from

recipient to recipient will be further discussed in Section 5. For the moment, it is im-

portant to note that this knowledge would also aid us in understanding why only few

individuals, although exposed to the same messages as many others, respond with

active participation in violent acts (Aly 2016, 108).

The activity of the audience also determines what narratives and propaganda they

are exposed to. Research on violent extremism online by Gendron (2016), Weimann

(2016), and Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen (2017, 4–5) reveals that the interactivity

of social media, such as interest groups on Facebook, allows terrorist groups to

identify individuals who sympathise with them and, by viewing their profiles, to deter-

mine what parts of their messaging will have most resonance. This indicates that

recipients of extremist propaganda are not necessarily random, naïve individuals

who are brainwashed upon contact, but active individuals who, for an often complex

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combination of reasons, interact with such narratives and propaganda (Aly 2016;

Sageman 2014). This further illustrates three points. First, extremist propaganda

only appeals to individuals who are already open to it. Secondly, such individuals in-

teract with these narratives and propaganda from first contact, sometimes to the

point where they become part of their production and even distribution. Thirdly, if an

entire population were exposed to the same violent extremist message, only few in-

dividuals would begin to interact with it.

Recipients of extremist propaganda are not necessarily random,

naïve individuals who are brainwashed upon contact, but active

individuals who, for an often complex combination of reasons,

interact with such narratives and propaganda.

Returning to the three direct Danish counter-propaganda initiatives that were intro-

duced in the national action plan presented by the Danish government in October

2016, they appear to be attempts to reach the few by addressing the many. This

might look like an easier option than attempting to identify the individuals and groups

who are actually susceptible to the propaganda and addressing only them, but that

may be a risky attempt to cut corners.

civil-society actor-driven corps of ‘digital voices of reason’, which is to seek out and

critically engage with relevant online forums, challenging extremist views.

support and training programme providing professional assistance to civil-society

actors wishing to develop campaigns against extremism and radicalisation.

strategic cooperation to mobilise and empower young people to use online media

as platforms to present alternatives to extremist propaganda.

As mentioned in Section 2, experience with the prevention of health issues, sub-

stance abuse and crime has previously been incorporated into the Danish approach

to countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation. Not least the ambitious

Ringsted Project by Balvig, Holmberg & Sørensen (2005) and Balvig & Holmberg

(2006), which was a large-scale study of young people’s use of legal and illegal sub-

stances and the effects of preventive campaigns, is a point of reference. This project

followed all young people between the ages of 11 and 24 living in Ringsted munici-

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pality from 2001 to 2004. The project confirmed that campaigns aimed at preventing

young people’s risk behaviour through information, scare campaigns, or education

rarely have a positive effect; that social exaggerations can affect behaviour; and that

attempting to prevent a problem by directly addressing it, may lead to distortion of

proportions both in the eyes of those attempting to prevent the problem and in the

eyes of the target group. With regard to the potential counter-productive side-effects

of addressing the many with counter-propaganda in response to the propaganda of

groups such as Islamic State or al-Qaeda, this is particularly relevant.

In the Danish approach, the earliest type of prevention, aimed at everybody, has pre-

viously revolved around the notion of social cohesion, that is, building on those ca-

pacities in society that make the population resilient to negative forces. Specifically,

the aim has been to strengthen norms, mutual trust, and social networks within the

nation as a whole, local communities and organisations, as well as personal net-

works and families. The aim being to enhance the ability of society, to dominate and

expel unwanted disturbances and abnormalities by reinforcing positive social norms

and values such as inclusion and democracy, thereby minimising the likelihood that

members of society look elsewhere for a place to belong and in doing so become

susceptible to for example, propaganda.

As part of this, some initiatives that are designed to affect only a specific group,

deemed vulnerable and at risk of for example, radicalising, have been implemented

for the whole population so as to avoid both real and perceived discrimination, mar-

ginalisation, and polarisation of society.

The project confirmed that campaigns aimed at preventing

young people’s risk behaviour through information, scare

campaigns, or education rarely have a positive effect; that

social exaggerations can affect behaviour; and that attempting

to prevent a problem by directly addressing it, may lead to

distortion of proportions.

Considering the counter-propaganda initiatives in the Danish 2016 action plan, cer-

tain problems arise. Firstly, they revolve around providing alternative narratives,

where certain attitudes, beliefs, forms of religious practice, etc., are highlighted as

normal in relation to the Danish society’s values and political structure. The problem

is that it risks having an exclusionary effect in terms of how such a normality is de-

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fined in our modern heterogeneous society. The risk is that those who do not recog-

nise themselves in this normality are left feeling even more marginalised and stifled,

as described by Gemmerli (2016a, 2016b). Since these initiatives are directed at

everyone, this could potentially affect more people than the few who would have

been attracted to the propaganda had they been left to themselves.

The risk is that those who do not recognise themselves in this

normality are left feeling even more marginalised and stifled.

Related to the above, broad counter-narrative campaigns inadvertently risk strength-

ening assumptions that anything outside the ‘normal’ is negative. This is in direct

contrast with the aim of bolstering societal cohesion through generalised targeting.

As such, counter-narrative campaigns risk being counter-productive to the attempts

to support the positive potential of vulnerable and ‘at risk’ groups and to draw them

together with those communities that are considered strong. At the general level,

diversity and social cohesion should be promoted in various forms and through var-

ious mediums, separately from counter-terrorism and -radicalisation agendas, while

at the same time paying attention to the risk of other activities compromising such

efforts.

Given the risks of marginalisation and polarisation, an alternative way of minimising

the appeal of the narratives and propaganda of groups such as al-Qaeda and Islam-

ic State by addressing the entire population could be to ensure that the media of a

given society reflects its diversity, providing young people in particular with recogni-

tion and positive images of interrelationships.

Another risk with such broad counter-narrative initiatives is that they may make the

‘problem’ appear bigger than it is. Forcefully waging counter campaigns may pro-

vide a counter-productive illusion of presence, impact and frequency, which can lead

to intensified curiosity among individuals who would not otherwise seek out materi-

al or environments where these narratives are present.

In the hope of affecting the few among the many through a broad counter-narrative

campaign, it is crucial to remember that individuals are attracted to and use extrem-

ist propaganda for a wide variety of reasons. Some individuals may be attracted to

radical and extreme ideologies, rejecting moderate perspectives on, for example,

religion. Others may reject or want to escape from normative restraints; experience

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feelings of marginalisation in relation to advocated ‘normality’; be thrill-seekers; or be

attracted by violence itself. In these cases, the acceptance of narratives and propa-

ganda can simply be a way to rationalise and legitimise their behaviour. Consequent-

ly, it is difficult to employ broad counter-narratives and impossible to select ‘voices

of reason’ that are appropriate and that will have a countering effect for everyone.

Therefore, even when the government encourages non-state actors to take part in a

counter-narrative campaign, this will most likely be ignored for a whole series of

reasons.

Additionally, in launching campaigns that involve religion, the risk is not simply the

failure of such a strategy, but that the government’s involvement in supporting and

promoting, for example, a ‘moderate Islam’ will be construed as partisan and dis-

criminatory, contradicting the declared secularism of the state and thereby becom-

ing a symptom of double standards, again risking further marginalisation and polar-

isation. Rather than trying to formulate a standard counter-argument that fits all, the

focus should be on exploring how different individuals use extremist propaganda

and for what purposes.

It should now be clear that broad counter-narrative campaigns are not necessary, as

extremist propaganda only attract few individuals, and that addressing the entire

population to reach the few is risky. The question that remains is whether directing

counter-narratives at specific target groups is even an option. As indicated in Section

3, evidence that counter-narratives are an effective method is absent. However, this,

of course, does not mean that they cannot be effective. The trouble, however, is that

we do not know enough about why individuals are attracted to such propaganda,

what parts of it they are attracted to or how they consume it. This means that any

counter-narrative would essentially be based on guesswork.

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THE CHALLENGE IN

ATTEMPTING TO

CONSTRUCT COUNTER-

NARRATIVES IS THAT

WE DO NOT KNOW

HOW AND WHY THE

NARRATIVES WORK

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Echoing the general lack of support for assumptions about a simple causal relation-

ship between ideas and actions described in Section 3, Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet & Raga-

zzi (2014) caution that, while so-called ‘self-radicalisation’ associated with the Inter-

net constitutes a main area of concern for European law enforcement agencies and

intelligence services, the impact and role of new technologies for recruitment and

propaganda purposes should not be overestimated. Although the use of these tech-

nologies to communicate narratives and propaganda cannot be denied, there is a

lack of support for the assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between

online (violent) extremist narratives and propaganda and offline violent acts.

According to Aly (2016), there is a lack of studies on how audiences receive, inter-

pret, decode, internalise, and in some cases act on the messages embedded in vio-

lent extremist narratives and propaganda. As previously described, the focus on

counter-narratives as a way to prevent terrorism is tied to the erroneous assumption

that terrorist messages reach and influence a submissive audience. As such, broad

and generic counter-narrative campaigns that attempt to portray a ‘true reality’ and

correct the lies of the propaganda, risk sending the signal that the target audience is

regarded as ignorant and naïve individuals who have been fooled. That is not neces-

sarily a constructive starting point for convincing the target audience to listen with

an open mind.

Instead, since it is increasingly recognised that radicalisation to violence is a dynam-

ic and complex process, it is imperative to consider the significance of audience

members and their social and political contexts. The same narrative will, for various

reasons, be received, interpreted, and processed differently from one person to the

next, and possibly from one moment to the next.

Since varying and complex combinations of factors play into radicalisation to vio-

lence, narratives and propaganda may appeal to different individuals in different

ways. Different parts of the same propaganda may attract different individuals, de-

pending on what he or she is listening for, and different individuals may be attracted

to the same specific part of the propaganda for different reasons.

Looking at past cases, certain themes emerge, which could offer some clues to the

underlying motivational factors that make violent extremist narratives and propa-

ganda attractive, with the caveat that the categorisation is not in any way absolute

nor applicable to all cases; there are many different reasons why individuals are at-

tracted to the narratives and propaganda of groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic

State. While some similarities to Nesser’s typology (2015), and the pathways devel-

oped in Section 3 can be found, the reader should be aware that those concern the

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pathways through which individuals and groups come to act violently with reference

to an ideology, whereas the present refers to the attraction of narratives. This implies

that we are speaking of an engagement with the narratives and propaganda, which

does not necessarily imply acting violently. Nor does it mean that there is a straight-

forward connection between why individuals are attracted to the narratives and their

reasons for committing acts of violence if they do so.

Since it is increasingly recognised that radicalisation to violence

is a dynamic and complex process, it is imperative to consider

the significance of audience members and their social and politi-

cal contexts.

Propaganda answers to a pre-existing dissatisfaction or complaint, feelings of alien-

ation, isolation, marginalisation, and a search for belonging.

Individuals who already

feel displaced socially may seek an external explanation for this. This may include

individuals with poor social skills and relations; individuals who have experienced

personal failures for example, at school or place of employment; youths from broken

or troubled families; individuals from mixed ethnic backgrounds or the children of

immigrants, who find it difficult to balance and navigate different cultures and tradi-

tions simultaneously; persons with a mental illness or affliction; and so on. Common

to such individuals are that they are socially and/or economically vulnerable. Exter-

nal influences can reinforce these feelings and perceptions, as well as direct the

vulnerable person’s attention to an explanatory cause. A negative, media-fuelled pub-

lic discourse about refugees can, for example, attune individuals with grievances to

the narratives and propaganda of both the extreme right and militant Islamism. Such

influences can naturally also derive from personal relations, social settings, etc.

Once a course is set, the individual typically pursues the narratives and propaganda

actively both on- and offline. However, this does not necessarily mean that the indi-

vidual will come to accept and use violence as a means of expression, nor does it

rule out that these individuals are already using violence as a means of expression.

It does also not mean that the individual will stay loyal to the extremist cause. Ac-

cording to Roy (2008) and Hemmingsen (2010), there are examples of youths who

have jumped between different extremist environments to support different causes

as a means to express their grievances. Therefore discrediting the ideology they are

adopting or attaching is unlikely to have the desired effect. Instead, it is necessary to

identify what the underlying problems are in order to address them directly, and offer

alternative solutions and provide the resources required to use them.

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Propaganda answers to a longing for adventure, a need to commit heroic deeds, or a

willingness to commit violence.

For some, it is the thought of adventure and commit-

ting heroic deeds that is the attraction of extremist propaganda. Here it is important

to separate those who simply admire, for example, the fierceness of Islamic State’s

warriors, from those who are ready to join them and actively participate in the vio-

lence. As a way to address the former, one constructive approach might be to distort

the image that terrorists are heroes. Roy (2008) suggests avoiding depicting terror-

ists as powerful evils, as to certain audiences this can solidify their heroic image.

Instead he suggests that their failures and weaknesses be highlighted. As for individ-

uals who are actively seeking adventure, with a readiness to commit heroic deeds,

they might be offered alternative and societally more acceptable ways to achieve

this. For others, the violence itself is the draw. In other words, the violence in the

narratives and propaganda is the initial attraction, sometimes followed by an ideo-

logical commitment. Roy (2008) refers to this as ‘aftermath rationalisation’, where

the given ideological narrative is used as a means to justify and rationalise the main

motivator, namely violence. While for some individuals the ideological commitment

will develop over time, others will never be true believers. This nuance is crucial to

work into any attempted counter-measures, as it will determine whether to focus

solely on countering the fascination with violence as a means of expression, or

whether it is necessary to consider an ideological aspect as well.

Propaganda answers to a sense of indignation, perceived injustice, or solidarity.

such a situation, extremist propaganda may speak to those who perceive some sort

of injustice against certain groups or individuals, causing feelings of indignation. It

may also inspire a sense of solidarity with the perceived victims. This could, for ex-

ample, be blaming Western governments for civilian deaths in Iraq and Syria or a

perceived imperialism, as suggested by Roy (2008), where Muslim ‘brothers and sis-

ters’ must be freed from Western oppression. In such cases, the violence is justified

in terms of an already existing war, and solidarity is expressed by answering the call

to arms. Similarly, extreme right narratives and propaganda may play on the refugee

crisis and militant Islamist attacks in Europe to incite violent uprising. According to

DuVall (2008), those who are motivated by fighting oppression should be deflected

from using violent means. The public discourse that justifies violence as effective or

necessary should be publicly challenged and questioned, and the promotion of civil

resistance as a powerful force for change should be legitimised and supported by

states, the international community, and news media. In such a context, it is crucial

to identify what parts of the narrative or propaganda strike a chord, so the appropri-

ate alternative actions can be suggested. In short, alternative and societally more

acceptable ways of addressing the injustices, be they perceived or real, should be

provided.

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Propaganda answers to a pre-existing ideology.

The extremist propaganda can also

speak to those with a pre-existing ideological commitment. Using the example of

militant Islamism, some of these individuals will only have a basic knowledge of Is-

lam in general, while others are more proficient. Individuals who only have a superfi-

cial connection with or a basic knowledge of Islam are more easily convinced by a

charismatic individual claiming to have better knowledge, while those who have in-

depth knowledge can be more critical of such individuals. It is thus important to

identify the personal level of knowledge and ideological commitment in order to of-

fer appropriate challenges and alternatives. Due to the graduations of the pre-exist-

ing ideologies, some may already hold very conservative or radical views, simply

promoting a moderate view of Islam as the truth will not be effective and risks being

automatically rejected. Roy (2008) suggests that we should stop speaking to Mus-

lims through the lens of terrorism, promoting good versus bad Islam. Instead, we

should de-couple religion from violent acts and highlight secularism by seeking to

accommodate Islam as simply another religion in a Western context. In other words,

the focus should be on inclusion and tolerance of different ideologies and rejection

of unlawful and violent behaviour. At the general level, we should also ensure that

there is access to education in religion and politics, as well as available resource

persons who have wide knowledge in these fields, and can answer questions that

youths may have. At a personal level, we should make an effort to identify the de-

grees of ideological commitment and actual beliefs in order to provide educated

challenges from sources well versed in that particular area.

While ideology, narratives and propaganda are not necessarily

the primary motivator or cause of becoming involved in violent

activities, they can help qualify a context in which individuals are

able to participate on their own, varied, terms. Any counter-effort

should thus aim to identify the actual attraction in the specific

case and offer alternatives accordingly.

The variety and complexity of reasons for the appeal of (violent) extremist narratives

and propaganda should now be clear. While ideology, narratives and propaganda are

not necessarily the primary motivator or cause of becoming involved in violent activ-

ities, they can help qualify a context in which individuals are able to participate on

their own, varied, terms. Any counter-effort should thus aim to identify the actual

attraction in the specific case and offer alternatives accordingly.

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It is also crucial to consider how narratives and propaganda are being distributed.

Recently there has been a heightened focus on dissemination through Internet plat-

forms, which have undeniably become central sites for accessing violent extremist

material. However, according to Ferguson (2016), it is still personal, offline contact

that is the most effective tool of violent extremist recruitment, not online narratives

and propaganda. Individuals may consume and interact with online material, but

according to Ferguson that is not the determining factor. Therefore, offline interac-

tions should not be lost sight of in the current focus on online distribution. Broad

counter-narrative campaigns are not equipped to address, for example, the relational

and emotional aspects of physical person-to-person contact.

The online structure can nevertheless be an enabler in terms of access. For exam-

ple, in the case of militant Islamism, physical meeting points are most often gen-

der-segregated; whereas online platforms such as Twitter reach all genders simulta-

neously. This is an example of what Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis & Chen (2017, 2) refer to

as the Internet’s ‘capacity to expand reach and influence’. According to Weimann

(2016) the technology is also useful in the sense that it allows encrypted interaction

through, for example, WhatsApp, Skype, the use of encryption keys etc. Additionally,

activity can be moved to the Deep or Dark Web, where initiated users can become

further engaged with violent extremist material, which can prove difficult to identify

and reach for outsiders, including those engaging in counter-narrative activities.

Shutting down surface websites should therefore be done with caution, as such

places could offer opportunities to identify, observe, and collect information that

may be useful not only in security service and law enforcement activities, but also in

the strategic formulation of constructive alternatives.

Social media sites are popular venues for communicating narratives and propagan-

da due to their interactive nature. While the volume of activity on specific sites such

as Facebook and Twitter can be observed and documented, their actual effect is not

yet known. A mixture of writing, pictures, audio and video clips, etc. are posted on

each of these sites. While one can count the number of interactions, this says noth-

ing definitive about the number of consumers, nor does it reveal which of these

mediums has the most influence. We know that the Internet allows for an interna-

tional audience, but we do not yet know what difference, if any, it makes that specific

communications are translated into local languages or if, for example, certain com-

binations of delivery sites and mediums have a particular influence.

It is also uncertain who the distributers of the narratives and propaganda are. Online

dissemination offers the option of anonymity, as well as the marketing of personas.

This means that it is often uncertain from whom the narratives and propaganda

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actually originate. It would, for example, be possible for extreme right groups to cre-

ate false militant Islamist social media profiles, or vice versa, to incite polarisation in

society. Most social media platforms also allow users to comment on and share

material, and at present we do not fully understand the effect this has on the audi-

ence. From mere observations, it is impossible to know whether, for example, it is the

original post itself or the comments and shares that influence the interactively en-

gaged audience the most.

From mere observations, it is impossible to know whether, for

example, it is the original post itself or the comments and shares

that influence the interactively engaged audience the most.

The final challenge to address here is whether it is possible to actually identify the

few. As argued above, the narratives and propaganda of groups such as al-Qaeda

and Islamic State do not appear to find resonance in the general population or mobi-

lise the masses, but they can play various roles for those who, for various reasons,

are willing to listen to and actively seek them, as well as engage with them. In the

process of shedding light on the many challenges related to counter-narrative work,

not least the risks associated with attempting to reach the few by addressing the

many, we have attempted to suggest alternative ways of addressing the few. The

question is, however, how do we actually identify such individuals and analyse their

motivations so that appropriate alternatives can be provided?

Returning to the prevention pyramid provided in Section 2, the targeted (top) level

and the specific (middle) level include individuals in extremist milieus and individuals

deemed to be at risk of radicalisation. It is implied that such individuals are open to

violent extremist narratives and propaganda, which in theory should make targeted

counter-narrative work straightforward. Yet, challenges remain.

Both levels rely on the identification and categorisation of individuals and groups as

vulnerable, at risk and involved in extremist milieus. The question is how these cate-

gories are defined, as well as how individuals are sorted into them. Recognising that

radicalisation to violence is not only a complex and dynamic process, but also rela-

tive to the given context surrounding an individual, it will rarely be the exact same

combination of factors that causes a person to become vulnerable, become an ex-

tremist, or accept violence as a means of expression. Similarly, individuals will have

different reasons for being open to narratives and propaganda, and have varying

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degrees of receptiveness. Additionally, the external expressions will vary. Categoris-

ing individuals within the prevention pyramid will therefore be a question of judge-

ment from one case to the next.

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CONCLUSION

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Countering extremist narratives and propaganda has numerous challenges, and

whether counter-narratives are constructive methods to preventing terrorism re-

mains questionable. Taking its point of departure in three new counter-propaganda

initiatives, introduced in the third national action plan on countering and preventing

extremism and radicalisation presented by the Danish government in October 2016,

the present report has shed light on the risks involved in addressing the many to

reach the few and argued that these risks are disproportional to the expectable ef-

fects of broad counter-narrative campaigns. It has also shed light on the many chal-

lenges related to confrontational counter-propaganda, which engages with ideology

and narratives by exposing, correcting, or ridiculing them. Lastly, it has explored how

and why narratives are attractive to different audiences and how this poses chal-

lenges to counter-narrative and counter-propaganda campaigns.

Countering extremist narratives and propaganda has numerous

challenges, and whether counter-narratives are constructive

methods to preventing terrorism remains questionable.

Although we conclude that counter-narratives and counter-propaganda are prob-

lematic and not in line with the underlying logics that have so far informed and

shaped the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicali-

sation, we do recognise that extremist propaganda and narratives will remain a pol-

icy and security focus for the foreseeable future. We have therefore suggested alter-

native, more targeted, and more qualified ways of attempting to counter them, which

would fit better with the Danish approach and minimise some of the challenges.

Although we identify clear weaknesses in the Danish approach, we recognise that it

is presently among the most progressive CVE strategies available. We also believe it

holds potential for the development of more qualified and targeted ways of counter-

ing the narratives and propaganda of groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State,

which revolve around providing alternatives instead of engaging with it. Although we

find the prevention pyramid to be simplistic and constraining, we acknowledge that

it is an established, recognisable, and practical preventive frame that offers a way to

organise and systematise counter-efforts. We also feel that it could be a point of

departure for developing a tool – or a business plan – to help break down the ambi-

tious project of preventing terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation into manageable

sub-projects, which have identified sub objectives, methods for reaching them, des-

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ignated actors, and which take into account the potential risks. Below, we therefore

collect our suggestions within the framework of a revised version of the prevention

pyramid.

While narratives and propaganda are not necessarily the primary motivator for indi-

viduals who commit acts of violence, they do offer a space wherein individuals can

qualify a context and be able to participate on their own, varied, terms. Instead of

engaging with the ideology by attempting to expose, correct or ridicule it, attempts

should be made to identify and provide alternative ways of serving the purposes,

which the ideology is used to serve. Any counter-effort should therefore aim to iden-

tify the actual attraction in the specific case and offer alternatives accordingly. Some

inspiration for more targeted and qualified approaches can be found in the methods

already being applied in Denmark, but even here there is potential for improvement.

First of all, the prevention pyramid must be modified, separating those who indicate

a willingness to use violence as a means of expression from those who do not. This

will add another level to the triangle and thus another category to use in the identifi-

cation of how and why the audience members are listening to the narratives and

propaganda, what the sub-objectives are, and how they can be achieved.

INDIVIDUALS/

GROUPS ASSESSED

AS VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS

ASSESSED AS EXTREMISTS

INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS ASSESSED

AS VULNERABLE AND AT RISK

EVERYBODY

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On the three top tiers of the pyramid, the focus must be on providing alternative

ways of addressing the grievances that the individual or group is currently seeking to

address through the ideology. These can be foreign or domestic political grievances,

such as the violent conflict in Syria or politics in Denmark, or more individual or per-

sonal ones, such as a search for action and adventure, a place to belong, or a way to

become a hero.

At present, the Danish approach includes several methods for providing alternative

ways of addressing personal and individual grievances, but alternative ways of ad-

dressing political grievances are scarce.

We strongly recommend focusing on developing societally more

acceptable ways of addressing foreign or domestic political

grievances, which can actually serve as real alternatives to the

ways currently presented by groups such as al-Qaeda and

Islamic State.

Being fully aware that this is a sensitive and contentious subject, we strongly recom-

mend focusing on developing societally more acceptable ways of addressing for-

eign or domestic political grievances, which can actually serve as real alternatives to

the ways currently presented by groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State.

To provide alternatives for both types of grievance, we suggest focusing on relation-

al approaches, building trusting human relations with individuals who are assessed

to be violent extremists, extremists, or vulnerable. Such relations can potentially

draw on both offline and online communication.

Returning one last time to the three new direct counter-narrative initiatives intro-

duced in the Danish 2016 action plan, this implies that the ways in which they are put

into practice will determine whether they become constructive, problematic, or sim-

ply irrelevant.

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civil-society actor-driven corps of ‘digital voices of reason’ to seek out and critically

engage with relevant online forums, challenging extremist views.

support and training programme providing professional assistance for civil-society

actors wishing to develop campaigns against extremism and radicalisation.

strategic cooperation to mobilise and empower young people to use online media

as platforms for presenting alternatives to extremist propaganda.

If these voices of reason and young people have the necessary knowledge and are

able to thoroughly analyse the underlying motivations of those with whom they crit-

ically engage, they may be able to introduce real alternative ways of addressing

grievances, whether political or personal, real or perceived, making them a construc-

tive addition. If not, then they will at best be irrelevant and at worst make matters

worse, particularly if they fall into the trap of attempting to expose, correct, or ridicule

the ideology, or simply promote their own normality as superior.

At the bottom of the pyramid, the aim should be to build general resources within the

general population, particularly children and youth. The focus should therefore be on

capacity-building and inclusion, embracing diversity, openness, and freedoms in or-

der to avoid feelings of marginalisation and polarisation of society; on strengthening

critical thinking and knowledge about how propaganda works; and on addressing

real social issues that may in the long run leave individuals vulnerable to any risks,

including but not limited to engagement in extremist milieus.

On this general level, we also recommend providing alternatives by facilitating open

debates about difficult subjects, such as violent conflicts and international politics,

where constructive and productive ways of engaging with them can be presented. It

is crucial in this context that these alternative ways must be real and have real po-

tential for actually making a change.

The present report has shed light on some of the challenges related to counter-nar-

ratives and to the counter-propaganda initiatives introduced in the Danish action

plan, put forward in October 2016, as well as offered suggestions for improvements.

This is, however, a vast and underexplored area that requires more research to ena-

ble the development of effective and proportional ways to counter extremist propa-

ganda and its narratives within the Danish preventive framework, as well as within

other frameworks.

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THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTER-NARRATIVES

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DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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