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Briefing

December 2015

ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional'

weapons of terror

SUMMARY

The European Union and its Member States must prepare for the possibility of a

chemical or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled 'Islamic State' in Iraq

and the Levant (known variously as IS, ISIS or ISIL, and by the Arabic acronym 'Da'esh').

Since the beginning of October 2015, terrorist attacks in Ankara, the Sinai Peninsula,

Beirut, Paris and Tunis, for which ISIL/Da'esh has claimed responsibility, have cost the

lives of 500 people. Immediately following the latest attack in Paris, the jihadist

terrorist group threatened further attacks in European cities.

ISIL/Da'esh has vowed that future strikes will be more lethal and even more shocking.

This has prompted experts to warn that the group may be planning to try to use

internationally banned weapons of mass destruction in future attacks. On

19 November 2015, the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, raised the spectre of

ISIL/Da'esh planning a chemical or biological attack. At present, European citizens are

not seriously contemplating the possibility that extremist groups might use chemical,

biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials during attacks in Europe. Under

these circumstances, the impact of such an attack, should it occur, would be even

more destabilising.

European governments and EU institutions need to be on alert, and should consider

publicly addressing the possibility of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological,

radiological or even nuclear materials. The EU institutions have devoted considerable

efforts to preventing a CBRN attack on European soil and preparing worst-case

scenarios. However, some gaps remain, in particular with regard to information-

sharing among Member States.

In this briefing:



The ISIL/Da'esh threat



The likelihood of future attacks



Non-conventional weapons



ISIL/Da'esh – motivation



Threat scenarios and

ISIL/Da'esh’s capacity



The situation at the EU level



The role of EU Member States



Outlook



Main references

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Beatrix Immenkamp

Members' Research Service

PE 572.806

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ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror

The likelihood of future attacks

Since the beginning of October, terrorist attacks in Ankara, the Sinai Peninsula, Beirut

Paris and Tunis, for which ISIL/Da'esh has claimed responsibility, have cost the lives of

500 people. The attackers’ weapons of choice so far have been explosive devices,

including car bombs and suicide belts, and automatic weapons.

Immediately following the attacks in Paris on 13 November, the group announced that

further attacks would take place in the immediate future, in Paris and other capital

cities. Washington DC, London, and Rome were specifically mentioned, as well as

targets in Belgium.

Rob Wainwright, the head of Europol, the coordinating organisation of EU countries'

police forces,

confirmed

during a hearing in the European Parliament on 19 November

that Europe was likely to face new ISIL/Da'esh attacks after those in Paris the previous

week.

According to Wainwright, 'We are dealing with a very serious, well-resourced,

determined international terrorist organisation that is now active on the streets of

Europe. This represents the most serious terrorist threat faced in Europe for 10 years.'

He noted ISIL/Da'esh’s determination to export 'its brutal brand of terrorism to Europe',

which was backed by serious capabilities in terms of resources and manpower.

Non-conventional weapons

Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as weapons of terror

Several experts

have warned that there is a genuine risk of

ISIL/Da'esh using chemical, biological, radiological or even

Chemical weapons

are defined

nuclear materials in the context of future attacks on

as non-living, manufactured

European targets. It has been suggested that the group’s

chemical agents combined with

next weapon of choice could, for example, be an

a dispersal mechanism that,

activated,

produce

improvised explosive device containing chemical or

when

incapacitating, damaging or

radioactive materials.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Associate Fellow in Chatham House's

International Security Department, noted in 'What

if ISIS

launches a chemical attack in Europe'

that 'there is a very

real risk of Isis using unconventional weapons in Europe

and beyond'.

Wolfgang Rudischhauser, Director of the Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO

Headquarters in Brussels, states in his article 'Could

ISIL go

Nuclear?'

that 'ISIL actually has already acquired the

knowledge, and in some cases the human expertise, that

would allow it to use CBRN materials as weapons of terror.'

Known use of chemical weapons

ISIL/Da'esh is documented to have used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq.



lethal effects on human beings,

animals or plants. Chemical

agents are dispersed in three

different forms: gas, solid

(aerosol), or as a liquid, and are

delivered through inhalation,

ingestion or absorption by the

skin. A distinction is made

between choking agents (e.g.

chlorine), blistering and tissue-

injuring agents (e.g. mustard),

blood agents (e.g. cyanide), and

nerve

agents

(organo-

phosphorus compounds).

The group appears to have manufactured rudimentary chemical-warfare shells, and

used them to attack Kurdish positions in Iraq and Syria at least three times in June

and July 2015.

According to investigators, this involved toxic industrial or

agricultural chemicals repurposed as weapons.

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

ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror

In June 2015, Australian Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, claimed that ISIL/Da'esh had

used chlorine in combat.

In late August 2015, Médecins Sans Frontières

and the Syrian-American Medical

Society (SAMS)

reported suspected ISIL/Da'esh use of mustard gas in Marea,

northern Syria.

Biological weapons

are complex

systems that disseminate disease-

causing organisms or toxins to harm

or kill humans, animals or plants.

They generally consist of two parts –

a weaponised agent and a delivery

mechanism’. Almost any disease-

causing organism (such as bacteria,

viruses, fungi, prions or rickettsia) or

toxin (poisons derived from animals,

plants or microorganisms, or similar

substances produced synthetically)

can be used in biological weapons.

Historical

biological

weapons

programmes have included efforts to

produce:

aflatoxin,

anthrax,

botulinum toxin, foot-and-mouth

disease, glanders, plague, Q fever,

rice blast, ricin, Rocky Mountain

spotted fever, smallpox, and

tularaemia, among others.

ISIL/Da'esh – motivation

Ideological shift

ISIL/Da'esh is considered to be particularly dangerous

because of its radical ideology and its declared intention to

shock: the group has used 'shock tactics' effectively to

attract new recruits. The US intelligence community is

reported

to have warned in August that ISIL/Da'esh may be

working to build the capability to carry out mass casualty

attacks, a significant departure from the terror group's

earlier focus on encouraging 'lone wolf' attacks.

Expertise

Threats can emanate from highly qualified individuals who

have access to sensitive information and materials, and

who possess the necessary expertise. ISIL/Da'esh has

recruited and continues to recruit hundreds of foreign

fighters, including some with degrees in physics, chemistry,

and computer science, who experts believe have the ability

to manufacture lethal weapons from raw substances. The

Commission has drawn particular attention in this respect

to returnees from Syria and other radicalised individuals,

who have access to, or work in, sensitive areas.

Control of territory and access to funding

The group controls large swathes of territory, approximately the size of

Belgium,

stretching, in Syria, from near the Turkish border to close to the Lebanese border, and

to the east, in Iraq, to close to Baghdad. This gives the group a significant strategic

advantage. It offers it a haven in which it can function freely, and shelter from third

parties seeking to disrupt its activities.

Through activities centred in the parts of Syria and Iraq that are under its control,

ISIL/Da'esh has access to 'extraordinary' levels of funding. A Reuters

study

published in

October 2014 estimated that ISIL/Da'esh possessed assets of more than US$2 trillion,

with an annual income amounting to US$2.9 billion.

The group earns about US$40

million a month from illicit oil sales.

In addition, ISIL/Da'esh reportedly taxes minorities,

farmers and lorry drivers; confiscates property and livestock; sells foreign fighters

passports; kidnaps civilians for ransom payments, and loots antiquities. The group also

organises fund-raising events for its supporters, in the territory it controls and abroad.

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Radiological weapons

combine

radioactive material with a means

of dispersing it among a target

population, resulting in the

inhalation or ingestion of, or

immersion with, radioactive

material. The resulting exposure

to alpha and beta particles,

gamma rays and neutrons

produces incapacitating or lethal

effects through external and

internal radiation. Dispersal could

take place through combining

radioactive

material

with

conventional explosives in a ‘dirty

bomb’, by dispersing it in the

form of aerosols or liquids, or

even by contaminating water or

food supplies.

Media strategy

In its effort to attract new recruits and consolidate its

position, the group is using a very effective media

strategy. Shocking images of beheadings, the burning

alive of an enemy pilot, the mass executions of

opposition fighters and other gruesome pictures are

part of this strategy. Even though this did not happen

during past attacks, it is conceivable that ISIL/Da'esh

would deliberately use social networks to distribute

disturbing images of victims of any future attacks in

Europe.

Threat scenarios and ISIL/Da'esh’s capacity

Access to raw material in Syria, Iraq and Libya

In the past, the difficulty of accessing and handling

the 'raw material' for CBRN attacks has stopped

terrorist groups, including Al Qaida, from using them

in actual attacks.

However, over the past few years, ISIL/Da'esh is

reported to have had several opportunities to gain access to CBRN material in Iraq and

Syria, and most recently Libya.

In Syria, some chemical weapons material, including

traces of sarin-type chemical weapons and ricin-type biological weapons,

is believed

still to be in the country and potentially accessible to ISIL/Da'esh. In Iraq, the group had

access in 2014 to bunkers from the past Iraqi chemical weapons programmes, including

mustard agents. Nerve agent rockets may also still be available in Iraq. In July 2014, the

International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed that militants linked to ISIL/Da'esh seized

low-grade nuclear material from Mosul University in northern Iraq. Following its

expansion into Libya, ISIL/Da'esh may have access to chemical materials from previous

programmes.

In August 2014, a laptop owned by a Tunisian physics and chemistry graduate fighting

with ISIL/Da'esh in Syria was found to contain a 19-page document on how to develop

bubonic plague from infected animals and turn it into a weapon.

Availability of CBRN material in Europe

According to the 2014

Communication of the European Commission on a new

EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks,

there are ample

opportunities for a determined terrorist outfit to access CBRN material:



Thefts and misplacements of CBRN material occur on

hundreds

of occasions

each year;

There is a particular risk that terrorists might use sarin, ricin or anthrax;

More than

150 cases

of trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials are

reported annually to the Incident and Trafficking Database of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);

CBRN substances have been carried undetected into the European Union;

Interpol’s monthly CBRN intelligence reports show numerous examples of

attempts to acquire, smuggle or use CBRN materials.

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Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)

Many chemicals used in industry for a very wide variety of purposes are toxic. These are

generally referred to as toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). The lethal toxicity of TICs is

lower than that of chemical weapon agents – between 10 to 100 times. At the same

time, there are approximately 70 000 TICs compared to 'only' approximately

70 chemical weapons agents.

Extremely dangerous chemical agents are produced and stored

in relatively poorly secured civilian industrial facilities and

transported around the globe. TIC transport or production

sites could become targets of an attack aimed at releasing

chemicals into the environment. Non-state actors might also

divert large amounts of dangerous chemical agents and use

this material as the basis for chemical weapon attacks.

Attacks on infrastructure

The

Communication on the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E

risks

(covering CBRN plus explosives) highlights the danger that

radicalised individuals who have access to and work in

sensitive areas might use their insider knowledge to strike

against critical infrastructure, such as, for instance, a water

purification plant. Other potential targets include nuclear

power stations or large chemical factories.

Nuclear weapons

consist of

nuclear explosives and the

means for their delivery.

Nuclear explosives are

based on self-sustained

nuclear reactions which

transform

the

nuclear

structure of atoms and in

the process release great

bursts

energy.

Devastating

damage

accrues

through

combination of effects

comprising a powerful blast

wave, thermal radiation,

and initial and residual

radiation.

Preliminary conclusions

Orchestrating a CBRN attack that would kill hundreds or thousands of citizens still poses

a significant technical and logistical challenge. However, ISIL/Da'esh has very important

financial resources, proven success in recruiting skilled university graduates, and access

to CBRN material, at least in Iraq and Syria, and possibly in Libya. It also has an unknown

number of sympathisers in Europe. This increases the probability that the group could

carry out a CBRN attack on European soil.

The situation at the EU level

It is primarily the responsibility of Member States to protect the population against

CBRN incidents. There is no EU legislation specifically targeting or seeking to control

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances that could be used as

ingredients of weapons of mass destruction.

EU legislation has so far been restricted to controlling the use of chemicals as explosives

precursors.

Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives

precursors,

which is based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU), provides for the approximation of laws in Member States which

have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. The

Regulation establishes harmonised rules concerning the manufacture, possession and

use of substances or mixtures that could be misused for the illicit manufacture of

explosives, with a view to limiting their availability to the general public, and ensuring

the appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain.

At the same time, the EU export rules that form part of the EU common commercial

policy under Article 207 TFEU regulate the export of 'dual-use items' – items that have

both commercial and military or proliferation applications.

Regulation (EC) No 428/2009

sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of

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dual-use items. The Regulation derives from international commitments to counter the

proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as of items with

potential military end-use.

Several Directorates-General of the Commission – including DG Trade, DG Home,

DG Sanco, DG ECHO and DG Devco – are engaged in efforts to prevent CBRN from

becoming a threat, to detect misuse of CBRN substances, and to develop disaster-

response capabilities to respond to any CBRN-related crisis.

EU long-term strategies

In the decade after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international

community paid particular attention to the threat of non-state actors gaining access to

CBRN material. The spectre of 'loose nukes' and 'orphan' radioactive sources, as well as

the dangers posed by disbanded research institutes, led to the ratification of a series of

legal instruments aiming to contain this threat. The 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in

New York in 2001 intensified fears of the use of CBRN in the context of spectacular

suicide terrorist attacks aiming to generate mass casualties. At EU level, the first

coordinated response to this new threat was the

European Security Strategy,

adopted

by the European Council on 12-13 December 2003. It specifically highlighted the

dangers of terrorists acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. It noted that the

most frightening scenario would be one in which terrorist groups acquired weapons of

mass destruction. It added that such an event would allow a small group to inflict

damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies.

With the aim of tackling terrorists’ access to weapons and explosives, ranging from

components for homemade explosives to CBRN material, the EU formulated the

EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(2003) and the

European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy

(2005).

The EU’s long-term response to the threat has three elements: legal, political and

operational. EU Member States are signatories to the international treaty regime of

non-proliferation conventions concerning nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In

addition, the EU actively promotes the universalisation of these conventions. At the

political level, the EU has been part of several global initiatives, including the adoption

UN Security Council Resolution 1540,

which establishes legally binding obligations on

all UN Member States to have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against

the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the setting up of The

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the G7 Non-Proliferation

Directors’ Group and Global Partnership, and the Nuclear Security Summit.

At the operational level, in 2010, the EU launched the Chemical Biological Radiological

and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (EU

CBRN CoE)

and adopted

the CBRN Action Plan and the EU Policy on Enhancing the Security of Explosives. There

are eight CBRN centres of excellence around the world, seeking to strengthen the

institutional capacity of countries outside the European Union to mitigate CBRN risks.

Three of these are located in the southern neighbourhood (Morocco, Algeria and

Jordan), one in Africa (Kenya), and one in the Gulf (United Arab Emirates).

EU CBRN Action Plan and the EU Policy on Enhancing the Security of Explosives

In November 2010, the Council adopted a plan to strengthen chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear security in the European Union over a five-year period

(EU

CBRN Action Plan).

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The action plan proposed three types of action, including prevention, detection, and

preparedness and response. It seeks to ensure that unauthorised access to CBRN

materials is as difficult as possible, that Member States have the capacity to detect

CBRN materials in order to prevent CBRN incidents, and that they have the capacity to

respond to incidents involving CBRN materials and to recover from them as quickly as

possible.

Under the action plan, Member States have:



established three lists of high-risk CBRN materials;

identified good practices in security training and education;

developed EU guidelines for minimum security training requirements;

developed scenarios in the CBRN detection field; and

improved emergency response plans.

The Commission is looking at the CBRN risk in conjunction with the risk of misuse of

explosives. In 2008, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted an EU Action Plan on

Enhancing the Security of Explosives, which aims to reduce the possibility of the misuse

of explosives for terrorist purposes. This was followed, in 2013, by the adoption of the

above-mentioned

Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives

precursors.

Following the 2012 progress reports under the EU CBRN Action Plan and the Action Plan

on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, extensive consultation took place with Member

States. The progress report on the CBRN action plan found that implementation was

uneven, but that Europol played a strong role as facilitator for the exchange of

information and good practice, the organisation of joint training exercises, data

collection, and distribution and actions related to early warning.

A new CBRN-E Agenda was defined, to focus on key priorities to be addressed at

EU level.

In Conclusions adopted on

11 December 2012,

the Council stressed the need to identify

areas with insufficient security arrangements and step up common efforts to enhance

the security of production, storage, handling and transport of high-risk CBRN and

explosive materials. However, no new legislation has been proposed to date.

The Commission is currently reviewing the CBRN Action Plan, with input from the

Member States, with a view to proposing a new action plan early next year.

Programmes and funds to address the CBRN threat

In 2004, the Commission published a

Communication on Security Research.

In the initial

period, 2004-2006, €65 million was allocated to such research.

Subsequently, the EU’s research and innovation funding programme for the

2007-2013 period, the Seventh EU Framework Programme (FP7), allocated

€1 350 million to research on security. The key FP7 activities in this area relate to

restoring safety and security in case of crisis.

Important EU counter-terrorism projects under the

FP7 focusing on CBRN

include (data

from 2014):



DECOTESSC1,

a project seeking to identify the gaps between the existing

situation and an optimal counterterrorism system against CBRNE;

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

ISIS,

a project developing an integrated intelligent sensor system for improved

security of water;

SECUREAU,

a project focusing on the decontamination of drinking water

distribution systems following a deliberate contamination;

BIO-PROTECT,

a project focusing on the development of a fast alert, easy-to-use

device for detection and identification of airborne bacteria, spores, viruses and

toxins;

REWARD,

a project developing a real time wide area radiation surveillance

system and

SCINTILLA,

a project developing detection capabilities of difficult to

detect radioactive sources and nuclear materials;

SNIFFER,

a project developing capabilities for securing the food chain – from

primary production and animal feeds to consumer-ready food – against major

deliberate, accidental or natural CBRN contamination;

CATO,

a project developing a comprehensive open

toolbox

for dealing with

CBRN crises caused by a terrorist attack using non-conventional weapons or on

facilities with CBRN materials. This project, in particular, addresses the key

management challenges arising in the context of a CBRN incident;

EDEN,

a demonstration project involving a consortium of 36 members in 15 EU

countries, aiming to develop and ensure the resilience capacity of European

societies, by looking at the whole CBRNE cycle, including prevention,

preparedness and response. This project, in particular, integrates and

coordinates existing EU capacities and competences to deal with the challenges

of the CBRNE threat;

CAST,

a project conducting a comparative assessment of security-centred

training curricula for first responders on disaster management;

BRIDGE,

a project developing a system to support interoperability – both

technical and social – in large-scale emergency management.

The current EU Framework Programme for the period 2014-2020, Horizon 2020, has

increased the amount allocated to security to €1 695 million.

Under the 2007-2013 prevention and fight against crime programme (ISEC), the

Commission’s Home Affairs Directorate-General funded 27 projects in the area of CBRN,

to a total amount of €14 million, and a further 22 projects in the area of explosives

security, to a total of €8.7 million.

As part of the active implementation of the above-mentioned 'EU Strategy against

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', the Council adopted a

Decision

30 November 2015 to contribute €4.6 million to support special missions in the context

of the joint investigative mechanism of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations (UN). The joint investigative mechanism was

established by UN Security Council Resolution 2235(2015), to identify the perpetrators

of chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Emergency Response Coordination Centre

The Commission has set up an Emergency Response Coordination Centre within the

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO), to support a coordinated and

speedy response to disasters inside the European Union. The ERCC allows for a coherent

European response during emergencies, with the aim of cutting unnecessary and

expensive duplication of efforts.

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The centre draws on the resources of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which was

established in 2001 to foster cooperation among national civil protection authorities

across Europe. The mechanism currently includes all 28 Member States (plus six

neighbouring countries).

Action at EU level dealing directly or indirectly with the threat of CBRN use by terrorists

is divided among a number of institutions, including the External Action Service and

several of the Commission’s Directorates-General.

Genuine cooperation among EU Member States to address the CBRN threat is

hampered by Member States’ reluctance to share information, often from intelligence

sources, for example by using the communication tools that the Commission puts at

Member States’ disposal.

The role of EU Member States

The EU CBRN Action Plan explicitly recognises that it is primarily Member States'

responsibility to protect the population against CBRN incidents. According to the

Commission’s own assessment, the EU and the Member States have already done a lot

to address the CBRN threat.

On 14 November, the day after the latest terrorist attacks in Paris, the

French

government authorised

the use of atropine sulfate, which can be used as an antidote in

the event of chemical attacks.

Antidotes have been distributed to emergency medical

services and firefighting teams that might be called upon to respond to a chemical

attack.

On 19 November 2015, in a

speech

to the French Parliament, the French Prime

Minister, Manuel Valls, warned that ISIL/Da'esh may use chemical and biological

weapons in the future. The French Prime Minister’s office stressed that his mentioning

the possibility of a chemical weapons attack was 'not new information on the status of

the threat, just a realistic observation'. 'Middle East experts know that [ISIL/Da'esh]

seeks and uses chemical weapons,'

a spokesman told Le Monde.

'To not consider this

possibility would be a mistake.' Security around Paris’s water supply has also been

increased in response to concerns that it might be vulnerable to a non-conventional

attack. Eau de Paris, the capital's state-run water company, has banned access to six key

sites to all but essential staff, after the authorities declared a state of emergency for

three months.

Outlook

As part of ongoing efforts to monitor returning foreign fighters and radicalised

individuals in EU Member States (see EPRS briefing on 'Foreign

fighters'),

there may be

scope for intelligence services to screen and monitor these individuals for specialist

CBRN knowledge.

Platforms made available by the Commission could present an

opportunity to share this information among Member States.

The example of the French Government may prompt other EU Member States,

particularly those most

concerned

with jihadist threats following the Paris attacks, to

openly address the possibility of a terrorist attack involving non-conventional weapons.

Is it time for EU governments to routinely equip emergency crews with antidotes to an

attack involving non-conventional weapons and to increase security around key

installations, for example? Do Member States need to consider the possibility of raising

the public’s awareness of the possibility of terrorist attacks involving CBRN material and

inform the public of specific measures that have been taken to protect it?

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Main references

Nomi Bar-Yaacov, 'What

if ISIS launches a chemical attack in Europe?',

The Guardian,

27 November 2015.

Wolfgang Rudischhauser, 'Could

ISIL go nuclear',

NATO Review Magazine, May 2015.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov, 'Achieving

Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Middle

East',

Survival, Vol. 57 No 6, December 2015–January 2016, pp. 161–182.

Endnotes

See Nomi Bar-Yaacov, 'What

if ISIS launches a chemical attack in Europe?',

The Guardian, 27 November 2015;

Wolfgang Rudischhauser, 'Could

ISIL go nuclear',

NATO Review Magazine, May 2015; Weimeng Yeo, 'Salafi

Jihadists and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Terrorism: Evaluating the threat',

Risk Management

Solutions, 24 August 2015.

C.J. Chivers, 'ISIS Has Fired Chemical Mortar Shells, Evidence Indicates', New York Times, 17 July 2015; Associated

Press in Iraq, 'Islamic

State used chemical weapons against peshmerga, Kurds say',

The Guardian, 14 March 2015.

See Julie Bishop, 'Address

to Australia Group Plenary',

5 June 2015.

See Médecins Sans Frontières, 'Syria:

MSF Treats Patients With Symptoms of Exposure to Chemical Agents',

25 August 2015.

SAMS, 'SAMS

Hospital Sees Mustard Gas Victims in Mare’e, Aleppo',

press release, 23 August 2015.

Communication of the European Commission on a

new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E

risks,

COM(2014)247 final, page 3

Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, 'Islamic

State: The Economy-based terrorist funding',

Thomson

Reuters, October 2014.

Matthew Levitt, How do Isis terrorists finance their attacks? The Washington Institute, 18 November 2015

Wolfgang Rudischhauser, 'Could

ISIL go nuclear',

NATO Review Magazine, May 2015.

Anthony Deutsch, 'Weapons Achieving Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Middle East | 179.

Inspectors Find Undeclared Sarin and VX Traces in Syria – Diplomats', Reuters, 8 May 2015

Harald Doornbos, Jenan Moussa, 'Found:

The Islamic States terror laptop of doom',

Foreign Policy, 28 August 2014

Communication of the European Commission on a

new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of

CBRN-E risks,

COM(2014)247 final, 5.5.2014.

Tim Sweijs and Jaakko Kooroshy, The Future of CBRN, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Future Issues No

12/3/10.

Weimeng Yeo, 'Salafi

Jihadists and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Terrorism: Evaluating the threat',

Risk Management Solutions, 24 August 2015.

Arrêté du 14 novembre 2015 autorisant l'utilisation de sulfate d'atropine, solution injectable 40 mg/20 mL PCA

antidote des neurotoxiques organophosphorés.

Caroline Piquet, 'Les

cinq choses à savoir sur les attaques chimiques',

Le Figaro, 19 November 2015.

Sam Webb, 'Paris

on alert for attack on city’s water supply',

The Mirror, 22 November 2015.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov, 'What

if ISIS launches a chemical attack in Europe?',

The Guardian, 27 November 2015.

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