L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Erhvervs-, Vækst- og Eksportudvalget 2015-16
L 38 Bilag 1
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L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Finans og Leasing

Interesseorganisation for danske finansieringsselskaber

Torveporten 2, 4. sal

DK-2500 Valby

Telefon: +45 40 38 29 87

[email protected]

www.finansogleasing.dk

CVR nr. 75 36 12 11

28. oktober 2015

Til

Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen

Att.: Morten Simonsen (fremsendt pr. mail)

Udkast til forslag om ændring af betalingstjenesteloven

Finans og Leasing har modtaget styrelsens brev af 19. aug. 2015 med anmodning om

bemærkninger til ovennævnte lovudkast.

Finans og Leasing har bemærket, at EU´s forordning om interbankgebyrer indeholder

mulighed for, at Danmark i en 3-års periode kan undtage mindre aktører med en

markedsandel under 3 pct. fra forordningens kapitel II. Vi har endvidere bemærket, at det

svenske lovforslag om samme emne indeholder en sådan undtagelse. For at understøtte

konkurrence på området, foreslår vi, at Danmark også gør brug af denne undtagelse, med

henblik på at mindre aktører får tilstrækkelig tid til at indrette sig på forordningen. Det vil

efter vores opfattelse også stemme bedst med regeringens strategi om i videst mulige omfang

at undgå administrative byrder for danske virksomheder.

Med venlig hilsen

Christian Brandt

Direktør, Finans og Leasing

Torveporten 2, 4. sal

2500 Valby

Mobil +45 40 38 29 87

[email protected]

www.finansogleasing.dk

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Jeanette Nielsen

Fra:

Sendt:

Til:

Cc:

Emne:

David D Courtnage <[email protected]>

14. september 2015 12:14

1-DEP Erhvervs- og Vækstministeriets officielle postkasse

Richard J Lomas; Helena E Forsgardh Alstrup

American Express - Comments on Interchange Fees Regulation

Thank you for the opportunity to submit written comments on the Interchange Fees Regulation.

American Express strongly encourages the government to implement the exemption from price caps for

three-party schemes with licensees (Article 1, paragraph 5):

“When a three party payment card scheme licenses other payment service providers for the

issuance of card-based payment instruments or the acquiring of card-based payment transactions,

or both, or issues card-based payment instruments with a co-branding partner or through an agent,

it is considered to be a four party payment card scheme. However,

until 9 December 2018 in

relation to domestic payment transactions, such a three party payment card scheme may be

exempted from the obligations under Chapter II, provided that the card-based payment

transactions made in a Member State under such a three party payment card scheme do not

exceed on a yearly basis 3% of the value of all card-based payment transactions made in

that Member State.”

This exemption recognises the disproportionate impact of the price caps on smaller players, who should

not be subject to the same rules as the dominant players, at least for a transitional period. These smaller

players, such as American Express, operate unique business models, and make a positive contribution to

competition and consumer choice. Unlike the dominant four-party networks, they have no previous record

of competition law violations in Europe or of dealing with the consequences that such violations bring in

terms of pricing commitments. In short, in the interest of competition and fair play, these schemes need a

transition period.

The exemption would allow three-party schemes, such as American Express, to negotiate with partners, so

that they can continue to compete effectively and challenge the dominant players during this transitional

period. It would also allow them time to prepare for the new regulatory environment set out in the

legislation. Indeed, the ability of the much smaller three-party schemes to work with partners is an

important commercial freedom enabling them to compete with the dominant networks. This is particularly

important given the ubiquity of the four-party schemes, and the fact that they work with thousands of banks

with broader banking relationships and branch networks, which provide the four-party schemes with far

greater distribution channels. Invoking the exemption would therefore ultimately increase competition and

provide more innovation and choice for consumers and merchants, which are among the overriding

objectives of the legislation.

It is critical that three-party schemes retain the ability to work with partners where they do not do so today.

For example, Denmark is an extremely important country in our European operations, although American

Express currently only operates a proprietary business here. However, if American Express were free to

negotiate a commercial relationship with a financial partner in Denmark, this would increase cardholder and

merchant choice. This is a strategy we have been able to deploy in other member states, such as the U.K.

for example, where we have a licensing presence that provides an alternative to the dominant players.

Invoking the exemption would mean we could also compete more effectively in Denmark. This is especially

important in the payments sector, which has suffered from the overwhelming duopoly power of the

dominant networks for decades.

We understand there is a view that by invoking the exemption, the Government would be handing three-

party schemes an unfair advantage. In fact, far from granting an unfair advantage, the exemption explicitly

recognises that smaller players should not be subject to the same rules as the dominant schemes – a point

which has already been extensively debated at European level.

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Importantly, invoking the exemption would not have any impact on our merchant pricing. This is because

the direct relationships we have with merchant customers with whom we negotiate the cost of card

acceptance are completely separate to our licensing relationships. At the same time, American Express

would in any event be indirectly impacted by the price caps set out in the Regulation, as our merchant

pricing is always subject to commercial negotiation, and merchants only work with American Express

based on the value we deliver, relative to our competitors.

In addition, in its ruling against MasterCard in May 2012, the European General Court expressly rejected

MasterCard's argument that regulation of its multilateral interchange fees would unfairly harm its business

in favour of three-party schemes.

[1]

We are also aware of concerns that granting the exemption could create an opportunity for our competitors

to circumvent the pricing caps. In reality, with many thousands of member banks, inter-bank schemes

would not be able to negotiate and manage bilateral arrangements with each and every member bank.

We therefore urge the government to exempt three-party schemes with licensees from price regulation, as

permitted in Article 1, paragraph 5.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this topic with you at your convenience.

With kind regards

David Courtnage

[1]

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=123081&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1192532

________________________________________________________________________________

David Courtnage

International Government Affairs

American Express, 76 Buckingham Palace Road, London, SW1W 9AX

44-1273 216669 |

[email protected]

[1]

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=123081&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1192532

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

HØRING

Høringssvar vedrørende udkast til forslag om ændring

af betalingstjenesteloven (loft over interbankgebyrer,

tilsyn mv.)

Finansrådet har den 19. august 2015 modtaget udkast til forslag om æn-

dring af betalingstjenesteloven i høring. Finansrådet værdsætter mulighe-

den for at kunne kommentere på lovforslaget.

Finansrådet kan støtte erhvervs- og vækstministerens hensigt om ved be-

kendtgørelse at benytte sig af muligheden for i en periode på 5 år og 6 må-

neder fra forordningens ikrafttrædelse at lade udbydere anvende et gen-

nemsnitligt interbankgebyr på højst 0,2 pct. af den gennemsnitlige årlige

transaktionsværdi af indenlandske debetkorttransaktioner inden for hvert

enkelt betalingskortsystem.

Finansrådet finder det i den forbindelse positivt, at der med lovforslaget ikke

er fastsat et procentloft for interbankgebyret pr. transaktion, der er lavere

end de 0,2 pct., som fremgår af forordningens artikel 3, stk. 1.

Det fremgår af lovforslaget, at selve forslaget ikke har økonomiske og ad-

ministrative konsekvenser for erhvervslivet m.v. Finansrådet skal dog be-

mærke, at der for de virksomheder, som er omfattet af forordningen, vil

være økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser forbundet med at over-

holde reglerne.

Tilsynet med forordningens bestemmelser om interbankgebyrer placeres i

henhold til forslaget i Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen. Finansrådet skal

i den sammenhæng foreslå, at det undersøges, om tilsynet med overholdel-

sen af forordningens lofter for interbankgebyrer primært rettes mod beta-

lingskortordningerne og deres regler. Hvis det sikres, at betalingskortord-

ningernes regler overholder forordningens regler om størrelsen af inter-

bankgebyret, kan det undgås, at hver enkel udsteder og indløser pålægges

en større indberetningsforpligtelse.

Forordningen gælder umiddelbart i medlemsstaterne og skal derfor ikke im-

plementeres i national lovgivning. Det er dog Finansrådets opfattelse, at der

fortsat udestår en del fortolkningsspørgsmål i relation til forordningens defi-

nitioner og regler. I sagens natur besværliggør dette Finansrådets medlem-

mers mulighed for at leve op til forordningens krav og bestemmelser. Fi-

nansrådet indgår derfor gerne i dialog med Konkurrence- og Forbrugersty-

16. september 2015

Finanssektorens Hus

Amaliegade 7

1256 København K

Telefon 3370 1000

[email protected]

www.finansraadet.dk

Kontakt Louise Fjord

Direkte +45 3370 1193

[email protected]

Journalnr. 111/28

Dok. nr. 542461-v1

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

relsen om dette. Da centrale dele af forordningen træder i kraft i december

2015 skal Finansrådet opfordre til, at der snarest tages initiativ til dette.

Side 2

Med venlig hilsen

Journalnr. 111/28

Dok. nr. 542461-v1

Louise Fjord

Direkte +45 3370 1193

[email protected]

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen

Carl Jacobsens Vej 35

2500 Valby

Att. Morten Simonsen

Den 14. september 2015

Høring over udkast til forslag om ændring af betalingstjenesteloven

Generelle kommentarer

Betalingskortmarkedet har længe været præget af manglende konkurrence, hvilket har ført til højere priser for

både detailhandlen såvel som for forbrugere. Forbrugerrådet Tænk og Dansk Erhverv ønsker et

betalingsmarked kendetegnet ved en højere grad af konkurrence og transparens til gavn for

betalingsmodtagere og i sidste ende forbrugerne i form af lavere priser og øget grad af innovation.

Den såkaldte ”Betalingspakke” fra EU er med reguleringen af lofter over interbankgebyrer i kombination med

den kommende revision af betalingstjenestedirektivet et skridt mod et mere reguleret og effektivt europæisk

betalingsmarked. På den baggrund hilser Forbrugerrådet Tænk og Dansk Erhverv forslaget om at fastsætte et

loft over interbankgebyrer for debet- såvel som kreditkorttransaktioner velkommen. Vi ser ligeledes meget

positivt på, at den såkaldte ”Honour all cards”-regel (HACR) ophæves, samt på bestemmelserne om

betalingsmodtageres mulighed for at tilskynde forbrugeren til at benytte et bestemt betalingsinstrument.

Eftersom transparens på de europæiske betalingsmarkeder har været afgørende i forbindelse med

formuleringen af den nye lovgivning på området, mener vi, at det er meget uhensigtsmæssigt, at overvæltning

af gebyrer (surcharging) ved betaling med dyre og omkostningsineffektive kort forbydes i forbindelse med

fastsættelsen af et loft over interbankgebyrer. Det strider direkte imod intentionen med de nye regler om at

skærpe priskonkurrencen og øge gennemsigtigheden på markedet. Konsekvensen kan i værste fald blive et

mindre gennemsigtigt og dyrere dansk betalingskortmarked end det nuværende, da flere forbrugere forventes

at skifte til betaling med dyrere kreditkort og debetkort tilknyttet diverse bonusordninger o.l., da

omkostningerne hertil vil være skjult for den enkelte. Hertil kommer, at det regulerede loft kun dækker en del

af det samlede gebyr, som betalingsmodtager betaler til indløser. Forbrugerrådet Tænk og Dansk Erhverv,

havde foretrukket et loft over det samlede gebyr forretningerne betaler for en betalingskorttransaktion (MSC)

og mener ikke, at de nuværende lofter kan erstatte incitamentsstrukturen i ”Splitmodellen”.

Specifikke kommentarer

Det er afgørende for et sundt og omkostningseffektivt dansk betalingsmarked, at de nye regler ikke fremmer

brugen af ineffektive betalingsinstrumenter frem for billigere alternativer. De foreslåede differentierede

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

maksimum lofter for debet- og kreditkort kan medføre at kortudstedende banker fortsat vil fremme brugen af

ineffektive betalingskort på bekostning af eksempelvis Dankort. På den baggrund er det Forbrugerrådet Tænks

og Dansk Erhvervs opfattelse, at lofterne over interbankgebyrer skal nedsættes yderligere, for at undgå en

skævvridning af konkurrencen til skade for dankortsystemet.

Forbrugerrådet og Dansk Erhverv mener at:

•

Det er meget positivt, at der langt om længe gøres op med HACR og indføres fri mulighed for

betalingsmodtageren til at tilskynde forbrugeren til at vælge omkostningseffektive kort.

De danske maksimum lofter over interbankgebyrer skal nedsættes yderligere end de foreslåede 0,2

pct. og 0,3 pct.

At der som minimum indføres ens loft over danske interbankgebyrer for debet- og kreditkort for at

sikre udstedende banker ikke fortsat tilskyndes til at fremme brugen af de dyrere kreditkort.

•

At det fælles loft for interbankgebyrer nedsættes til det niveau, der gælder for de tilsvarende betalinger

i dankortsystemet.

Art. 3 og 4

Med de nye regler fastholdes differentieringen af interbankgebyrer til den kortudstedende bank for hhv.

forbrugerrelaterede betalinger med debetkort (0,20 pct.) og forbrugerrelaterede betalinger med kreditkort

(0,30 pct.). Forbrugerrådet Tænk og Dansk Erhverv finder denne differentiering uhensigtsmæssig, da

udstedende banker dermed fortsat har et incitament til at fremme brugen af dyrere kreditkort på bekostning

af billigere kort.

Derudover mener vi, at lofterne skal sænkes yderligere, for at få reel effekt på det danske betalingskortmarked,

der er kendetegnet ved lave interbankgebyrer i forhold til resten af EU. Niveauet for interbankgebyrer i

dankortsystemet er ikke tilgængeligt, men det vurderes, at det er på mindre end halvdelen af loftet på 0,20 pct.

for debetkort. Det betyder, at udstedende banker fortsat har en stor økonomisk interesse i at fremme

ineffektive kort på trods af implementeringen af de nye regler i Danmark.

Forbrugerrådet Tænk og Dansk Erhverv står naturligvis til rådighed for yderligere uddybning af ovenstående.

Med venlig hilsen

Vagn Jelsøe

Forbrugerrådet TÆNK

Henrik Hyltoft

Dansk Erhverv

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

Høring over udkast til forslag om ændring af betalingstjenesteloven

Visa Europe welcomes this opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to the Danish Payment

Act (Lov om Betalingstjenester) in order to implement certain aspects of the Interchange Fee

Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751).

Visa Europe takes note of the intention to grant the powers to the Minister for Business and Growth to

apply the exemptions for domestic debit rates in Denmark as set out in article 3 of the Interchange Fee

Regulation. Visa Europe warmly welcomes the articulated intention for the Minister to allow the use of

a weighted average for domestic debit transactions for a period of 5 years and 6 months. It is of

utmost importance that such exemption should apply to all debit schemes operating in Denmark in

order to ensure a level playing field. We would urge the Minister to use such powers to allow the of

use a weighted average for all Danish domestic debit card transactions, as quickly as possible, in order

to provide sufficient time for market participants to make any necessary changes.

Visa Europe believes that the weighted average approach need not be complicated and notes that it

has been monitoring weighted average rates for over a decade. The calculation of the average rate is

straightforward, put simply, a scheme (and/or processor) needs to total all the interchange fees

paid/received and divide this by the total of the transaction value at merchants.

If you need further information please contact Peter Møller Jensen

[email protected].

About Visa Europe:

Visa Europe is a leading European payment card system and the only European member-owned,

Europe-wide payment system open to all regulated institutions. As a membership association Visa

Europe is owned and governed by its European members which issue Visa cards and acquire Visa

transactions. Visa Europe is independent of Visa Inc, a publicly traded US company, from which it has

an exclusive, irrevocable and perpetual licence to operate in Europe. As a dedicated European payment

system Visa Europe is able to respond quickly to the specific market needs of European banks and

their customers - cardholders and retailers - and to meet the European Commission’s objective to

create a true internal market for payments.

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

MasterCard - Consultation response, Interchange Fee Regulation

Konkurrence & Forbrugerstyrelsen Interchange

Fee Regulation: Consultation Response

MASTERCARD

MasterCard Worldwide ('MasterCard') is a public-listed, global payments technology company that

connects billions of consumers, thousands of financial institutions, millions of merchants,

governments and businesses in more than 210 countries and territories around the world.

We own a family of well-known brands, including MasterCard®, Maestro® and Cirrus® and licence

financial services providers to use those brands in conducting payment transactions. MasterCard

operates the world’s fastest payments network to facilitate the processing of payment transactions in

more than 150 currencies, including authorisation, clearing and settlement. Our ‘open’ system delivers

solutions for consumers, businesses and governments who seek faster, more secure and smarter

payment methods for the widest possible range of goods and services.

PROTECTING DENMARK’S ECOMMERCE AND PAYMENTS SECTOR

MasterCard welcomes the opportunity to share its views with Konkurrence & Forbrugerstyrelsen

regarding the future regulatory and supervisory regime, and the areas of permitted national discretion

associated with the Interchange Fee Regulation ('IFR'). In our view, this provides an opportunity for

the government to protect the thriving Danish cards industry and the consumers and businesses it

serves by limiting the negative impacts of the IFR and to avoid unintended adverse consequences.

SUMMARY POINTS



Regulatory and supervisory regime:

The design of the overarching Danish regulatory and

supervisory regime does not pose concerns for MasterCard. However, the regulatory regime

in Denmark should mitigate concerns associated with implementation of specific articles in the

IFR.

Domestic debit interchange level:

MasterCard acknowledges that the Erhvervs- &

Vaextsministeren will be given the competence the set the domestically applicable debit

interchange, and welcomes the information that the Minister is likely to set it at 20bps.

Weighted average rather than absolute cap for domestic debit:

MasterCard is of the

opinion that a weighted average for domestic debit transactions is not in the best interest of

the Danish market and therefore would suggest to set an absolute cap of 20 bps for domestic

Danish debit transactions.

Domestic credit interchange level:

MasterCard welcomes the decision not to set the

domestic credit interchange level below the 30bps indicated in the Interchange Regulation.

Third party schemes exemption:

MasterCard welcomes the Danish stance in favour of

equal treatment by not exempting three party schemes that behave as four party schemes for

a time period of three years. This decision provides a framework that will further competition

on equal terms.



DOMESTIC DEBIT INTERCHANGE FEES

MasterCard is supportive of a flat rate of domestic debit Interchange fee:

We believe that a flat

0.2 percent domestic debit interchange fee cap provides the best means to maximise card usage and

acceptance, and minimise cash usage in Denmark, as well as providing certainty and parity for

merchants.

Enabling simple compliance and monitoring, and cost management:

Under the right conditions a

weighted average can be the best approach for a given market. That said a weighted average can be

L 38 - 2015-16 - Bilag 1: Høringssvar- og høringsnotat, fra erhvervs- og vækstministeren

MasterCard - Consultation response, Interchange Fee Regulation

cumbersome to enforce from a compliance perspective. For instance, there is the questions of who

will monitor the overall blend of transactions across the EU and how to deal with fluctuations of the

blend (i.e. if the mix between low- and high-value transactions changes). A hard cap will enable

straight-forward monitoring and compliance, and will provide merchants with the certainty to plan

ahead for associated business costs.

Card products with a weighted average are already present in the UK market (Visa Europe applying a

0.20 percent + £0.01, capped at £0.50 per transaction). This brings higher interchange fees for low

value transactions. Therefore, this model would penalise low value transactions and fail to create

certainty and parity for merchants which is contrary to the objectives set out above.

Based on these experiences from the UK, MasterCard support a flat 0.2 percent domestic

interchange fee cap in Denmark. This will enable the delivery of the objectives outlined above by

encouraging card acceptance regardless of payment value and will ensure that no merchant is

arbitrarily penalised as they are today under the existing Visa weighted average model.

DOMESTIC CREDIT INTERCHANGE FEES

The detrimental effect of the IFR.

The impact on issuer revenue as a result of capping credit

interchange at 0.3 percent will be substantial. MasterCard therefore strongly supports the

government's proposal not to implement domestic consumer credit interchange fees at a cap below

0.3 percent.

By setting interchange fees at the appropriate levels, MasterCard is able to achieve a balance that

delivers maximum value to consumers and merchants at the lowest costs possible to each party. The

IFR will fundamentally alter the economics behind card payments. Like any valuable service with

advanced technology behind it, and where innovation and development is vital, flexibility in fees is

essential to ensure the service keeps pace with the needs of all stakeholders. The IFR has essentially

removed this flexibility and the impact on schemes, participants and end-users is likely to be profound

and highly detrimental to the payments sector as a whole.

THIRD PARTY SCHEME EXEMPTION

Creation of a level playing field:

MasterCard welcomes that Konkurrence & Forbrugerstyrelsen is

not proposing to implement the optional exemption under Article 1(5) of the IFR for certain three-party

card schemes that would otherwise be subject to the interchange fee caps under the regulation.

All card types should be included in any market threshold calculations:

In the few Member

States that are currently considering to provide an exemption under Article 1(5), it is crucial that the

three percent threshold is applied accurately in accordance with the text of the IFR. The three percent

threshold, as prescribed by the IFR, accounts for market share of transactions across all card types.

Therefore also all transactions within a three-party scheme that qualify as a de facto four-party

scheme should be included in the calculation. This includes any domestic transactions involving

licensees, co-branding partners and agents together with all other domestic transactions under the

relevant three-party scheme.

All American Express cards operating under a ‘de-facto four-party scheme’ should be subject

to the IFR regulation:

To avoid creating further market distortion and detriment to end-users and the

real economy, American Express should not be granted an exemption from the interchange fee caps.