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Spring 2016

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada

REPORT 5

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada

Performance audit reports

This report presents the results of a performance audit conducted

by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada under the authority

of the

Auditor General Act.

A performance audit is an independent, objective, and systematic

assessment of how well government is managing its activities,

responsibilities, and resources. Audit topics are selected based on their

significance. While the Office may comment on policy implementation

in a performance audit, it does not comment on the merits of a policy.

Performance audits are planned, performed, and reported in accordance

with professional auditing standards and Office policies. They are conducted

by qualified auditors who

• establish audit objectives and criteria for the assessment of performance,

• gather the evidence necessary to assess performance against the criteria,

• report both positive and negative findings,

• conclude against the established audit objectives, and

• make recommendations for improvement when there are significant

differences between criteria and assessed performance.

Performance audits contribute to a public service that is ethical and effective

and a government that is accountable to Parliament and Canadians.

The Report is available on our website at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca.

Ce document est également publié en français.

by the Auditor General of Canada, 2016.

Cat. No. FA1-2016/1-5E-PDF

ISBN 978-0-660-04916-8

ISSN 1701-5413

Table of Contents

Introduction

Background

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Focus of the audit

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Guidance on preparing for missions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Army Reserve units and groups were not fully prepared for domestic missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Sustainability of Army Reserve units

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Army Reserve units did not have the soldiers they needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Army Reserve funding was not designed to be consistent with unit training and other activities . . . . . . . . . . 16

Training of Army Reserve soldiers

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Army Reserve soldiers received less training than Regular Army soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Army Reserve and Regular Army unit training were not fully integrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Conclusion

About the Audit

List of Recommendations

Appendix

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

iii

FOU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 321: Spm. om en redegørelse for de internationale erfaringer med anvendelse af enheder bemandet fortrinsvist og for nogles vedkommende udelukkende med reservepersonel/deltidssoldater i form af tidligere tjenstgørende personel, til forsvarsministeren FOU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 321: Spm. om en redegørelse for de internationale erfaringer med anvendelse af enheder bemandet fortrinsvist og for nogles vedkommende udelukkende med reservepersonel/deltidssoldater i form af tidligere tjenstgørende personel, til forsvarsministeren

Introduction

Background

Canadian Army Reserve

5.1

National Defence is composed of the Department of National

Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Canadian Army, including

its Army Reserve, is the component of the Canadian Armed Forces that

conducts missions on land. The Army Reserve is fully integrated into

the Canadian Army’s chain of command. When Army Reserve members

put on their uniforms or volunteer for training or deployment, they are

required, like all other members of the Canadian Armed Forces, to carry

out their missions without reservation, regardless of personal discomfort,

fear, or danger.

5.2

The Army Reserve is the largest component of Canada’s Primary

Reserve Force. As of August 2013, it had provided almost half of

the Canadian Army’s 40,143

soldiers.

The Army Reserve consists

predominantly of part-time professional members of the Canadian

Armed Forces who contribute to the defence and security of Canada.

These part-time members must balance the demands of their military

activities with their civilian lives.

5.3

Training and operating the Army Reserve costs about $724 million

annually, based on figures from the 2013–14 fiscal year. Army Reserve

units train to be ready to support domestic and international missions.

In recent years, Army Reserve units and soldiers have contributed to

domestic missions involving fighting floods and forest fires. Army Reserve

soldiers have also served on international missions, including deployments

to Bosnia and Afghanistan. According to the Canadian Armed Forces,

Army Reserve soldiers completed 4,642 deployments to Afghanistan.

Sixteen of these soldiers died and 75 were wounded in action. In addition,

between 2012 and 2015, Army Reserve soldiers were deployed 150 times

on 16 other international missions. At the time of our audit, Army Reserve

soldiers were deployed to international missions in Europe, Africa, the

Middle East, and the Caribbean.

Army Reserve units conduct

training to prepare their soldiers

for combat and non-combat

operations.

Photo: National Defence

Soldiers—All

persons who are enrolled in the Canadian Army, including officers and

non-commissioned members.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Focus of the audit

5.4

This audit focused on the ability of National Defence to organize,

train, and equip its Army Reserve soldiers and units so that they are

prepared to deploy as part of an integrated Canadian Army.

5.5

This audit is important because National Defence has determined

that the Canadian Army needs the support of the Army Reserve to

successfully conduct domestic and international missions.

5.6

We did not examine other components of Canada’s Primary Reserve

Force, such as the Navy Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, or the Military

Police Reserve.

5.7

More details about the audit objective, scope, approach, and criteria

are in

About the Audit

at the end of this report (see pages 28–30).

Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Guidance on preparing for missions

Overall finding



5.8

Overall, we found that Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on

preparing for major international missions. We also found that although

the Army Reserve had clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions,

formal confirmation that they were prepared was not required. In

addition, Army Reserve units and groups lacked access to key equipment

on deployments and training exercises.

5.9

This is important because National Defence needs the Canadian

Army, including a fully integrated Army Reserve, to organize, train, and

equip land forces to meet

Canada First

Defence Strategy missions.

Context

5.10

The Army Reserve is organized into 123 units and 10 brigade

headquarters in 117 communities across the country (Exhibit 5.1). The

Appendix identifies these units and their local communities. The purpose

of these units is to organize, train, and equip their member soldiers to

work as cohesive teams so that they are prepared to deploy and

accomplish assigned missions.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Exhibit 5.1

The Army Reserve is organized into units across the country

Distribution of Reserve units

1 unit

2 to 4 units

5 to 10 units

5th Canadian Division

3rd Canadian Division

2nd Canadian Division

4th Canadian Division

Note: The 1st Canadian Division is not responsible for specific Army Reserve units.

Source: Based on information from National Defence

5.11

The Canadian Armed Forces is expected to conduct domestic and

international missions, as identified in the 2008

Canada First

Defence

Strategy (Exhibit 5.2). The Canadian Army must be prepared to deploy

land forces that are capable of both combat and non-combat missions.

Exhibit 5.2

The 2008

Canada First

Defence Strategy identifies six core missions

• Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic.

• Support a major international event in Canada, such as the Olympic Games.

• Respond to a major terrorist attack.

• Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada, such as a natural disaster.

• Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period.

• Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.

Source: National Defence

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.12

The Canadian Army has stated that it needs the Army Reserve and

the Regular Army to be fully integrated in order to carry out all of these

missions, which may occur simultaneously. In 2014, the Commander of

the Canadian Army set out what the Canadian Army must do to build an

integrated Army Reserve, including the following:

• ensure that the Army Reserve is prepared for domestic and

international missions;

• provide Army Reserve soldiers and units with access to the

equipment that they need to train themselves;

• recruit and retain Army Reserve soldiers to accomplish

Canada First

Defence Strategy missions;

• fully fund all activities, including training, that Army Reserve units

must undertake;

• optimize individual occupational training for the Army Reserve;

• integrate collective training of Army Reserve soldiers and units into

the three-year training cycle of the Regular Army; and

• assess the effectiveness of the Canadian Army’s training system.

Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions

What we found

5.13

We found that the Canadian Army had not given Army Reserve

units clear guidance as to how they should prepare soldiers and teams to

contribute to major international missions. Although the Canadian Army

had given Army Reserve units guidance on general training requirements,

it had not identified what it expected the units to do to organize and train

their soldiers in preparation for international missions.

5.14

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• guidance for international missions.

Why this finding matters

5.15

This finding matters because Army Reserve soldiers and teams are

essential to the Canadian Army’s ability to conduct international missions.

Recommendation

5.16

Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at

paragraph 5.22.

Analysis to support

this finding

5.17

What we examined.

We examined Canadian Army planning

documents and reports. We also interviewed senior Canadian Army

commanders, command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve

soldiers who would be expected to contribute to international missions.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

5.18

Guidance for international missions.

The Canadian Army expects

Army Reserve units to provide up to 20 percent of the soldiers deployed

on major (large-scale, extended-period) international missions. This

means that after Regular Army soldiers are deployed on the first rotation

(planned for up to eight months), Army Reserve units will provide about

1,000 trained soldiers for each subsequent rotation of the mission. These

soldiers could be placed in existing Regular Army units or be part of

dedicated Army Reserve teams of up to 150 soldiers that will undertake

one of the following key tasks:

• Influence Activities,

• Convoy Escort,

• Force Protection, or

• Persistent Surveillance.

5.19

We found that the Canadian Army has directed Army Reserve units

to train soldiers to work in teams of 25 to 40 soldiers so these small teams

can work together in teams of up to 150 or more soldiers. As a result,

more training is required before Army Reserve soldiers and teams can

deploy on major international missions. Individual Army Reserve soldiers

placed in existing Regular Army units are to be given this additional

training when they join these units for their pre-deployment training.

5.20

On major international deployments, the Canadian Army expects

that dedicated Army Reserve teams will perform specific key tasks.

However, we found that individual Army Reserve units had not been given

clear guidance on the training that is required for the key tasks of Convoy

Escort, Force Protection, and Persistent Surveillance until a mission has

been identified. The Canadian Army plans for Regular Army soldiers to

perform these tasks until dedicated Army Reserve teams have been

trained for deployment. In our opinion, the absence of guidance for these

key tasks is inconsistent with the Canadian Army’s expectation that

Army Reserve soldiers will be prepared to provide these tasks as part of

dedicated Army Reserve teams during major international missions.

5.21

We found that the Canadian Army did provide clear guidance for

one key task: Influence Activities. This task coordinates support between

military forces and civilian authorities and shapes the opinions and

perceptions of target groups, be they friendly or hostile. The Army Reserve

is responsible for training almost all of the soldiers needed for the

Canadian Army’s Influence Activities task. At least one Influence

Activities team of 52 soldiers is to be prepared to deploy without delay

with the Regular Army for

Canada First

Defence Strategy missions.

5.22

Recommendation.

National Defence should provide individual

Army Reserve units with clear guidance so that they can prepare their

soldiers for key tasks assigned to the Army Reserve for major international

missions.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Providing the necessary training

to soldiers before they participate in international deployments is of

paramount importance to the Canadian Army. Guidance regarding the

required training is provided in the Army’s annual operation plan. Once

Reserve participation in a given expeditionary operation is announced,

specific direction is given with respect to the training required for

individuals and for designated Reserve Teams (to conduct tasks such as

Convoy Escort, Force Protection, and Persistent Surveillance). Every Team

is “confirmed” through a deliberate process before being given the green

light to deploy. The Army will work toward improving its guidance for

anticipated key tasks for major international missions.

Army Reserve units and groups were not fully prepared for domestic missions

What we found

5.23

We found that the Canadian Army had provided the Army Reserve

with clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions. However, we also

found that when Army Reserve units and groups deployed on domestic

missions, they did not always have access to key equipment. Furthermore,

we found that the Canadian Army did not require formal confirmation in

writing that Army Reserve brigade groups were prepared to support

domestic missions.

5.24

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• guidance for domestic missions, and

• formal confirmation that Army Reserve groups were prepared to

support domestic missions.

Why this finding matters

5.25

This finding matters because the Canadian Army needs the Army

Reserve to be organized, trained, and equipped so that it is prepared to

support civilian authorities in their responses to major domestic events

and to carry out other domestic missions, including sovereignty exercises

in the Arctic.

Recommendation

5.26

Our recommendations in this area of examination appear

at paragraphs 5.32 and 5.34.

Analysis to support

this finding

5.27

What we examined.

We examined Canadian Army planning

documents and reports. We also interviewed senior Canadian Army

commanders, command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve

soldiers who would be expected to contribute to domestic missions.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

5.28

Guidance for domestic missions.

We found that the Canadian

Army had given clear guidance to Army Reserve units on preparing for

domestic missions, except for equipment needs. This guidance included

the number of soldiers required, their organization into teams, their

training requirements, and when they needed to be prepared to deploy. For

example, each unit is expected to contribute a specific number of trained

soldiers to assemble groups of 400 to 600 soldiers within three days of

being notified of a domestic mission.

5.29

We found that the Canadian Army has not defined the list of

equipment that all Army Reserve units should have for training their

soldiers and teams for domestic missions. This means that Army Reserve

units may have to rely on other Canadian Armed Forces units to provide

this equipment, but we were told that it is often not available. In our

opinion, this limited access to equipment impedes the ability of units

to train their soldiers and teams.

5.30

We also found that between 2013 and 2015, the Army Reserve

contributed to three domestic missions involving fighting floods in Alberta

and Manitoba and fighting a forest fire in Saskatchewan (Exhibit 5.3).

After each of these missions, the Army Reserve brigade groups and units

conducted a lessons-learned exercise to report on the planning and

conduct of these missions. When we reviewed these reports, we found

many instances of key equipment lacking, such as reconnaissance

vehicles, command posts, and communications equipment.

Exhibit 5.3

The Army Reserve helped prevent flood damage in Alberta

During the severe flooding in southern Alberta in 2013, the Canadian Army

deployed 2,300 Regular and Reserve soldiers to assist civil authorities. In that

deployment, the South Alberta Light Horse regiment, an Army Reserve unit located

in Medicine Hat and Edmonton, was called out to prevent damage in the City

of Medicine Hat. Working with citizens, soldiers filled and installed more than

17,000 sandbags in a single day to create a berm to stop flood waters. The action

was reported to have prevented significant damage to the city’s power and water

treatment plants. Soldiers also assisted other emergency responders in pumping

out water from the Canmore hospital. Their combined efforts allowed the hospital

to establish normal access in two days.

Source: Based on information from National Defence

5.31

In 2013, the Canadian Army directed Army Reserve units to provide

about 500 trained soldiers for four specialized Arctic operations groups

by 2016. The Canadian Army provided these Army Reserve groups with

guidance to train for these operations, including sovereignty exercises.

This guidance included a list of equipment necessary for these Arctic

operations groups to train and deploy in the Arctic. However, following

recent training exercises, these groups reported that they did not always

have access to the equipment they needed to be self-sufficient, such as

reliable communications and vehicles larger than light snowmobiles.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.32

Recommendation.

The Canadian Army should define and provide

access to the equipment that Army Reserve units and groups need to train

and deploy for domestic missions.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. A procurement plan is under way to

address the shortages within certain fleets. The Canadian Army has defined

and provides the equipment required to conduct domestic operations.

The majority of this equipment is held either within the unit or with the

Canadian Brigade Group. When a specific requirement or gap is identified

that is not within the Brigade Group, the Division will reallocate from within

its own resources or will request additional items from national stocks.

5.33

Formal confirmation that Army Reserve groups were prepared to

support domestic missions.

We were told that Army Reserve groups were

not required to formally confirm in writing that they were prepared to

support domestic missions. We found that some brigade groups did

formally confirm that they were prepared to support domestic missions

whereas others did not. In our opinion, given the importance and

significant cost of large-scale training exercises, the Canadian Army needs

to formally confirm in writing that Army Reserve groups are prepared for

domestic missions.

5.34

Recommendation.

The Canadian Army should require Army

Reserve groups to formally confirm that they are prepared to support

domestic missions.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army will review the

process and develop a better-documented confirmation method. The Army

conducts training on an annual basis for the 10 Territorial Battalion

Groups and the four Arctic Company Response Groups. This training may

be verbally confirmed through the chain of command, which is found to be

sufficient for training objectives.

Sustainability of Army Reserve units

Overall finding



5.35

Overall, we found that Army Reserve units do not have the number

of soldiers they need to train so that soldiers and teams are prepared to

deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers has been

steadily declining because the Army Reserve is unable to recruit and retain

the soldiers it needs. We found that the Canadian Army does not know if

Army Reserve soldiers have the current qualifications they need to deploy

for domestic and international missions. Furthermore, we found that the

Army Reserve units did not have the funding they needed to fully support

all required unit activities.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

5.36

This is important because Army Reserve units need enough trained

soldiers and adequate funding if they are to organize and train soldiers and

teams to be combat-capable and prepared for deployment.

Context

5.37

The

National Defence Act

established the Reserve Force as “a

component of the Canadian Armed Forces . . . that consists of . . .

members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military

service.” This means that most members of the Army Reserve are

part-time professional soldiers. Army Reserve soldiers may also voluntarily

sign contracts for full-time employment with National Defence. This

full-time employment may be for domestic or international deployments

or for other positions within National Defence. The only time consent

for full-time service is not required is through an order signed by the

Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet.

5.38

Army Reserve units and groups are responsible for training their

own soldiers so that they can be deployed as part of an integrated Army on

domestic and international missions. To accomplish this, Army Reserve

units need a sufficient number of soldiers to participate in unit activities,

including training exercises.

Army Reserve units did not have the soldiers they needed

What we found

5.39

We found that National Defence has determined that about

29,000 positions in the Army Reserve in the 2014–15 fiscal year would be

its ideal size. This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand

when increases to funding are authorized. During the same period, the

Canadian Army provided funding for 21,000 full- and part-time Army

Reserve soldiers. However, we found that the average number of trained

and attending soldiers in the Army Reserve was 13,944, and that 12 of

the 123 Army Reserve units had fewer than half of the soldiers needed for

their ideal unit size.

5.40

Between the 2012–13 and 2014–15 fiscal years, the number of

Army Reserve soldiers declined by about five percent per year, as a result of

several factors. In particular, we found that the National Defence

recruiting system was not able to recruit the number of soldiers needed by

the Army Reserve, and that Army Reserve units had difficulty retaining

their trained soldiers.

5.41

It is critical that the Canadian Army know whether its soldiers are

prepared to deploy for domestic and international missions. However, we

found that the information system used by the Canadian Army to verify

the status of individual soldiers showed that soldiers had low levels of

current qualifications.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.42

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• size of the Army Reserve,

• number of Army Reserve soldiers,

• terms of service,

• medical care, and

• information about qualifications needed for deployment.

Why this finding matters

5.43

This finding matters because having the right number of trained

Army Reserve soldiers prepared to deploy is critical to the Canadian

Army’s ability to perform assigned missions.

Recommendations

5.44

Our recommendations in this area of examination appear

at paragraphs 5.57, 5.62, 5.65, and 5.70.

Analysis to support

this finding

5.45

What we examined.

We analyzed data from the information systems

at National Defence that identified the number and current qualifications

for deployment of Army Reserve soldiers. We also reviewed the terms of

service and the use of contracts for full-time employment of Army Reserve

soldiers. We examined National Defence documents, guidance, and

internal analysis. We also interviewed senior departmental and Regular

Army officials, and commanders and soldiers of Army Reserve units.

5.46

Size of the Army Reserve.

We found that National Defence has

determined that about 29,000 positions in the Army Reserve would be its

ideal size. This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand

when increases to funding are authorized. (The Appendix shows the

strength of each Army Reserve unit as a percentage of the unit’s ideal size.)

5.47

We also found that for the 2014–15 fiscal year, the Canadian Army

had budgeted $334.9 million for about 21,000 Army Reserve soldiers.

This means that the Army Reserve was funded for about 72 percent of its

ideal size: $202.4 million to cover the pay for 19,471 soldiers on part-time

service, $91.3 million for 1,500 full-time soldiers, and $41.2 million for

operating and maintenance costs.

5.48

In the 2014–15 fiscal year, the average number of part-time and

full-time soldiers in the Army Reserve was 19,544. Of that number,

1,732 had not taken part in unit training or other activities in the previous

six months, and 3,868 were undergoing or had not completed the first

phase of their occupational training. This means that approximately

70 percent of the soldiers in the Army Reserve, 13,944 on average, were

trained and had attended unit activities in the previous six months

(Exhibit 5.4).

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Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Exhibit 5.4

The Army Reserve had about 14,000 active and trained soldiers

in the 2014–15 fiscal year

29,000*

Ideal size

21,000

Number of funded positions

19,544

Average number of soldiers

1,732

Average number who had not taken part in unit

training or other activities in the previous six months

3,868

Average number who were undergoing or had not

completed the first phase of occupational training

13,944

Average number of active and trained soldiers

* This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Source: Based on information from National Defence for the 2014–15 fiscal year

5.49

All Army Reserve units are responsible for training their soldiers

and sustaining their day-to-day operations, such as managing human and

financial resources and maintaining their equipment. We found that 58 of

the 123 Army Reserve units were at less than 70 percent of their ideal

unit size. Of these, 12 Army Reserve units were at less than 50 percent of

their ideal unit size. In our opinion, when units get this small they are not

able to train effectively because they lack the qualified instructors, leaders,

or soldiers they need to train in teams of 25 to 40 soldiers. The Canadian

Army recognizes that smaller units are limited in what they can do and

therefore groups them with other units to complete their training to work

in teams.

5.50

Number of Army Reserve soldiers.

We found that between

the 2012–13 and 2014–15 fiscal years, the number of Army Reserve

soldiers had been declining at a rate of about five percent, or about

1,000 soldiers per year.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.51

We found that the National Defence recruiting system did not

recruit the number of soldiers needed by the Army Reserve and that Army

Reserve units had difficulty retaining their soldiers. National Defence

officials stated that the current Reserve recruiting system does not work—

it is too slow and does not recruit the number of Army Reserve soldiers it

needs, given the present rate of attrition.

5.52

Each year, National Defence sets recruitment targets for all components

of the Canadian Armed Forces. We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year,

the recruiting system’s objective was to deliver 2,200 recruits to the Army

Reserve—far fewer than the 3,000 recruits needed. National Defence has

recognized that it needs to reform the recruiting system.

5.53

We found that National Defence has not developed a retention

strategy for the Army Reserve. For example, in order to train their soldiers,

units must retain a sufficient number of qualified instructors, such as

master corporals or sergeants. We found that units have had difficulty

keeping the qualified instructors they need. For example, from 2012

to 2015, the number of master corporals in the Army Reserve declined

from 1,971 to 1,770, and the number of sergeants declined from 1,645

to 1,593.

5.54

We also found that during the 2012–13 to 2014–15 fiscal years,

almost half of the 7,200 soldiers who left the Army Reserve did so before

they had completed their first level of occupational training. This

represents a lost investment in recruitment and training.

5.55

The Canadian Army knows it needs to take steps to improve

retention in the Army Reserve. The Canadian Army has recognized that

providing challenging, exciting training will help improve retention.

Furthermore, the Canadian Army does not facilitate the transfer of

Regular Army soldiers to the Army Reserve. Doing so would enable the

Canadian Army to retain valuable skills within the Army Reserve acquired

by Regular Army soldiers.

5.56

In late 2015, National Defence set a goal to increase the Army

Reserve by 950 soldiers (five percent) by 2019. In our opinion, this goal

will be difficult to achieve given the present rate of attrition.

5.57

Recommendation.

National Defence should design and implement

a retention strategy for the Army Reserve.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Retention enables Canadian Armed

Forces’ operational and institutional excellence. National Defence will

develop and implement a Canadian Armed Forces retention strategy that

will ensure retaining our members in uniform is a fundamental aspect of

how we manage our people, and is given equal, if not greater, prominence

in our attraction and recruiting efforts. Our approach going forward will be

comprehensive and incorporate the Regular and Reserve Force, creating

greater mobility between these components and accounting for the range

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

of requirements inherent in each. While consideration will be given to

transactional requirements in the areas of compensation and benefits,

National Defence will develop effective measures including, but not

limited to, career management, family support, mental health and

wellness support, and diversity requirements.

The Canadian Army is developing a retention strategy for the Army

Reserve, and is in the process of updating the strategy based on Chief

Military Personnel initiatives.

5.58

Part-time Army Reserve soldiers serve and train on

a voluntary basis. Therefore, it is not possible for unit commanders to know

if all their soldiers will take part in scheduled activities, including training.

For example, in 2015, when Army Reserve units met for their annual

large-scale collective training events across Canada, only 3,593 soldiers

(26 percent of trained and attending soldiers) attended these exercises.

5.59

Army Reserve soldiers (and any other Reservists) may accept

contracts for full-time service with their units, with Army headquarters,

or elsewhere in National Defence. These contracts are for periods

of 180 days to three years, and can be renewed for much longer periods.

While Army Reserve soldiers working under such contracts for up to

three years could be regarded as not employed on a continuing full-time

basis, in our view, Army Reserve soldiers engaged on such contracts for

more than three years are employed on a continuing full-time basis. This

is inconsistent with the

National Defence Act,

which states that Primary

Reserve members are enrolled for other than continuing full-time military

service when not on active service undertaking emergency duties for the

defence of Canada or deployed on international missions. National

Defence has, in effect, created a class of soldiers that does not exist in the

Act. Furthermore, these soldiers receive 85 percent of the salary and lesser

benefits than Regular Army soldiers would receive for the same work.

5.60

We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year, as many as 1,704 Army

Reserve soldiers were on full-time contracts beyond 180 days with the

Canadian Army. This means that the Canadian Army spent about

27 percent of its overall Army Reserve pay and operating expenses on these

full-time contracts, leaving less available for other Army Reserve activities.

5.61

In 2011, a National Defence report on the employment of full-time

Reserve soldiers noted the need to determine the legal and policy basis for

these full-time contracts. The report recommended that a full regulatory

review of Reserve full-time employment be completed immediately. At the

time of our audit, National Defence had not concluded this review.

5.62

Recommendation.

National Defence should review the terms of

service of Army Reserve soldiers, and the contracts of full-time Army

Reserve soldiers, to ensure that it is in compliance with the

National

Defence Act.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Armed Forces will

review the framework for the Reserve Force terms of service and the

administration of Reserve Force service to ensure it complies with the

National Defence Act

and the regulations enacted under it.

5.63

Medical care.

National Defence policy requires Canadian Armed

Forces personnel to report any injury, disease, illness, or exposure to toxic

material, whether it is service-related or not. We found that over the 2012–13

to 2014–15 fiscal years, Army Reserve soldiers filed about 3,250 reports.

We used representative sampling to examine 846 of these reports and found

that 35 percent of incidents happened during individual or collective

training and 37 percent occurred during physical fitness activities.

5.64

A 2008 report by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Department

of National Defence and the Canadian Forces found that there was

significant confusion throughout the Canadian Armed Forces about

medical care entitlements for Reservists serving in Canada. We found that

access to medical care for Reservists was still not clear. For example, Army

Reserve soldiers do not receive regular medical assessments as Regular

Army soldiers do. Also, if Army Reserve soldiers injure themselves during

physical fitness training to meet Canadian Armed Forces fitness

requirements, Canadian Armed Forces’ medical services do not always

provide for care unless that training was formally pre-approved by their

commanding officer.

5.65

Recommendation.

National Defence should review its policies and

clarify Army Reserve soldiers’ access to medical services.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Forces Health

Services Group Headquarters is actively advancing a number of initiatives

to review and support policies for medical assessments that contribute to

Primary Reserve soldiers’ overall readiness for training and deployment, and

that clarify access to medical services, including

• issuing a communiqué to establish the priority for Reservists to receive

medical assessments from Headquarters (released October 2015);

• updating the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chapter 34,

Section 2 (Medical Care of Officers and Non-commissioned Members),

currently with the National Defence Regulations Section for

amendment drafting, with estimated anticipated approval six months

after Section work is complete. In 2009, Health Services Group

Headquarters published interim guidance on entitlement to health

care for Reserve Force personnel. This was also communicated to

members in correspondence dated 2011 from the Vice Chief of the

Defence Staff, along with an accompanying guide. Annual reminders

are issued to health care providers with regard to entitlement rules;

• assessing courses of action proposed in the joint Canadian Forces

Ombudsman/Health Services Group study, “The Feasibility of

Providing Periodic Health Assessments to All Primary Reservists”

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

(June 2015) and other potential tools to determine medical fitness

and conduct periodic health assessments, through a Reserve Medical

Readiness Working Group. It is anticipated that alternatives will be

developed by August 2016 and implemented in the fall of 2016.

5.66

Information about qualifications needed for deployment.

It is

critical that the Canadian Army has information on personnel and

training deficiencies that would constrain its ability to be prepared to

deploy for domestic and international missions. National Defence

maintains a Personnel Readiness Verification system that records soldiers’

current qualifications that are required for deployment.

5.67

We examined reports from the Personnel Readiness Verification

system of the qualifications required for Canadian Army soldiers before

being deployed. These reports listed the following levels of qualification in

place in December 2015 for Army Reserve soldiers:

• defence against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats (5 percent

up to date);

• handling of personal weapon (7 percent up to date);

• first aid training (19 percent up to date);

• physical fitness (55 percent up to date); and

• medical requirements (65 percent up to date).

We found that the system does not capture civilian qualifications such as

language and cultural skills, which Army Reserve soldiers could bring to

the Canadian Army when they are deployed.

5.68

However, senior Canadian Army officials told us that the

information recorded by the Personnel Readiness Verification system was

not up to date and produced information that could not be relied upon.

They also told us that Army Reserve units were not updating this system

because the units had a heavy burden of administrative tasks. In our

opinion, the Canadian Army does not have the assurance that Army

Reserve soldiers have the current qualifications that they need to be

prepared for deployment.

5.69

Before their deployment on any mission, Army Reserve soldiers

must update qualifications that are not current or must receive a waiver.

In 2015, Army Reserve soldiers were deployed to support provincial

authorities in Saskatchewan to fight forest fires, which was a potentially

hazardous mission. However, the commander of the operation waived the

requirement for medical and physical fitness assessments. In the same

year, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Department of National

Defence and the Canadian Forces noted that the practice of deploying

without an assessment of medical fitness may cause soldiers or their team

members harm and increase the potential liabilities of the Canadian

Armed Forces.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.70

Recommendation.

National Defence should ensure that it has

up-to-date information on whether Army Reserve soldiers are prepared for

deployment. This information should include civilian qualifications held

by Army Reserve soldiers.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Work is ongoing through the Military

Personnel Management Capability Transformation project to maintain

all Reserve Force personnel readiness using the future military personnel

management tool, Guardian. As part of the project, investigation and analysis

will take into account the possibility of including civilian qualifications.

The Canadian Army will make every effort to utilize existing human

resource systems to keep data up to date in relation to readiness.

Army Reserve funding was not designed to be consistent with unit training and

other activities

What we found

5.71

We found that the annual planned funding for the Army Reserve

was not consistent with the actual activities undertaken by Army Reserve

units. We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year, $13.5 million in unspent

funds from the Army Reserve budget was reallocated to uses other than

those of the Army Reserve. We also found that in the 2013–14 fiscal year,

National Defence attributed a cost of $166 million to the Army Reserve

for the operation of Canadian Army bases through a calculation that was

not based on actual use and may have overstated reported expenses of the

Primary Reserve.

5.72

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• annual Army Reserve funding, and

• financial reallocation and reporting.

5.73

This finding matters because the Canadian Army needs to fully fund

Army Reserve units’ activities, including training, if the Army Reserve is

going to support the Canadian Army. In addition, National Defence needs

to clearly understand Army Reserve spending if it is to effectively manage

those activities and plan for the future needs of the Canadian Army.

5.74

Our recommendations in this area of examination appear

at paragraphs 5.80 and 5.84.

5.75

What we examined.

We examined annual Canadian Army and Army

Reserve operating plans and directives, National Defence financial analysis,

and reviews of financial practices. We interviewed National Defence senior

managers and command teams of Army Reserve units and brigades.

Why this finding matters

Recommendations

Analysis to support

this finding

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

5.76

Annual Army Reserve funding.

Since 2000, the Canadian Army

has budgeted annual funding for the Army Reserve on the basis of each

soldier participating in unit activities, including individual and collective

training, for 37.5 days per year. Annual funding also supports a

further 7 days of training, during which the unit trains collectively with

other units. Funding for this 7-day training is calculated at a participation

rate of half the total number of the unit’s soldiers. More funding for

external individual training courses is made available through the

Canadian Army’s national training system.

5.77

Local Army Reserve unit activities that are expected to be covered by

the 37.5 days of funding include

• individual and collective training within the unit;

• training on National Defence policies, such as sexual harassment

and workplace health and safety;

• preparation of training courses;

• administration;

• civic duties in the local community; and

• ceremonial duties.

5.78

We found that the budgeted annual funding for the Army Reserve

is not consistent with the actual activities undertaken by Army Reserve

units. In 2013, an internal Canadian Army analysis was presented for

information purposes to senior Army officers, showing that the 37.5 days

was at least 10 days fewer than what Army Reserve units actually used for

individual and collective training and other activities. For example, the

analysis found that 5 additional training days that were spent on preparing

for domestic missions were not included in the allocated 37.5 days. This

analysis was not endorsed, and no action has been taken to either

acknowledge or address this discrepancy.

5.79

Furthermore, an analysis by the Canadian Army of training in

the 2014–15 fiscal year found that at least 44 percent of Army Reserve

soldiers had participated in fewer than 25 days of training or other unit

activities. We were told that units used some of these unspent funds to

increase spending on the activity of other soldiers or other unit activities.

This analysis questioned whether the present method of funding Army

Reserve units was appropriate and accurate.

5.80

Recommendation.

National Defence should ensure that budgeted

annual funding for Army Reserve units is consistent with expected results.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army assigns

resources to ensure that all mandated tasks are funded. We will monitor

whether these tasks are consistent with the results expected of them.

5.81

Financial reallocation and reporting.

We found that in

the 2014–15 fiscal year, the Canadian Army reallocated $8.2 million

in unspent funds from the Army Reserve budget for other purposes

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

within the Canadian Army and returned another $5.3 million of the

planned budget of the Army Reserve to National Defence. However,

during visits to Army Reserve units, we were told that many needs were

not being met for training. These included equipment, ammunition,

travel, and administrative support.

5.82

National Defence reported to Parliament that it spent $1.2 billion

to train and operate the Primary Reserve in the 2013–14 fiscal year.

According to the Canadian Armed Forces, $724 million of this amount

was to train and operate the Army Reserve. Of that amount, $166 million

was attributed to the Army Reserve for the operation of Canadian Army

bases. This amount was calculated based on a ratio of the number of

Army Reserve soldiers to the number of Regular Army soldiers, not on the

use of base facilities. The Canadian Armed Forces does not maintain

information on the Army Reserve’s actual use of base facilities. In our

opinion, the $166 million estimate is not well supported and may result

in providing incorrect information to Parliament by overstating the

reported expenses of the Primary Reserve.

5.83

In 2015, to better show the Minister of National Defence the total

amount spent on the Primary Reserve, the Chief of the Defence Staff

directed that an account be used to record how much money is given to,

and spent by, each Reserve Force. National Defence also intends to

establish a separate reporting process that will connect assigned funding to

expected results.

5.84

Recommendation.

National Defence should complete planned

changes to the way it reports its annual budgets and the expenses of the

Army Reserve, so that National Defence can link assigned funding to

expected results.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. National Defence utilizes a

financial reporting structure to record how much is allocated to and

expended by the Primary Reserves. Commencing 9 February 2016,

expenditures related to the Reserve Program were incorporated in the

financial reports briefed to senior management. This approach will provide

greater visibility on funding and expenditures, and will support enhanced

reporting and performance measurement.

Training of Army Reserve soldiers

Overall finding



5.85

Overall, we found that the Canadian Army had designed its training

so that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of physical fitness

training and were not trained for the same number of skills as Regular

Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had not

acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed. We also

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

found that Army Reserve soldiers had lower levels of training as cohesive

teams. Furthermore, we found that collective training for Army Reserve

units was not well integrated with the training of the Regular Army units.

5.86

This is important because the Canadian Army needs physically fit,

well-trained soldiers who can be deployed, either as individuals or in

teams, to meet the challenges of the modern battlefield. Without the

complete range of skills, Army Reserve soldiers and their teams are put at

risk. Furthermore, the flexibility that commanders need to meet the

challenges of domestic and international missions is limited by the skills

and experiences of the soldiers under their command.

Context

5.87

Training to build a strong and effective fighting force is the primary

task of the Canadian Army. Army Reserve training should prepare soldiers

and units to adapt quickly to various types of combat operations,

sometimes within minutes. This training should also prepare Army

Reserve soldiers to perform effectively on non-combat missions, including

domestic deployments (Exhibit 5.5).

Exhibit 5.5

Training should prepare soldiers and units to adapt quickly to various types of non-combat

and combat operations

Stability operations

• Support civilian

infrastructure and

governance

• Assist other government

agencies

• Provide security

and control

• Support disarmament

and demilitarization

• Support reform of

security services

Enabling operations

• Reconnaissance

• Advancing forces to

engage the enemy

• Transportation and logistics

• Security of locations and

personnel

• Relief of troops in combat

• Retirement

• Withdrawal of forces

Non-combat and

combat operations

Defensive operations

• Defend positions

• Delay enemy forces

• Prevent enemy

movements

Offensive operations

• Attacks

• Raids

• Pursuits

• Deception movements

• Demonstration of strength

• Breakout from

encirclement by

the enemy

Source: Based on information from National Defence

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.88

Canadian Army training is an innately dangerous activity. The

Canadian Army must balance the risks of training against those of not

being fully prepared to deploy on missions. This requires that all soldiers

maintain the highest level of physical fitness and that training be

systematic and progressively more complex, through individual and

collective training, so that soldiers can acquire and confirm their skills.

Army Reserve soldiers received less training than Regular Army soldiers

What we found

5.89

We found that neither legislation, nor a program designed to

support Reservists while on duty or deployed, covered them for all types

of occupational skills training. We also found that compared with the

training for Regular Army soldiers, occupational skills training courses for

Army Reserve soldiers were not designed to provide all of the skills needed

to quickly adapt to various types of combat situations. We further found

that pre-deployment training of Army Reserve soldiers for international

missions did not always address all known gaps in individual occupational

skills training.

5.90

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• support to attend training courses,

• compensation for employers,

• training programs for individual occupational skills, and

• training for deployment on international missions.

Why this finding matters

5.91

This finding matters because differences in skills and physical

fitness between Regular Army and Army Reserve soldiers limit the ability

of Army Reserve units and soldiers to be prepared for missions. These

differences also increase the risks of injury to soldiers when they train or

deploy. The Canadian Army recognizes that it needs to identify and

address these differences before Army Reserve soldiers can deploy on

missions and be capable of operating in an integrated Army.

Recommendations

5.92

Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at

paragraphs 5.96, 5.98, and 5.106.

Analysis to support

this finding

5.93

What we examined.

We examined what steps were taken to enable

Army Reserve soldiers to attend training courses. We also examined and

compared the individual occupational training programs of the Regular

Army and the Army Reserve for infantry, armoured crewmen, and

electrical mechanical engineers. Furthermore, we examined Army

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Reserve soldiers’ records of training for deployment on international

missions. We examined documents, observed training, and interviewed

senior managers and command teams of Army Reserve units as well as

instructors and trainees at training schools.

5.94

Support to attend training courses.

National Defence has taken

several steps to enable Army Reserve soldiers to attend training courses.

For example, National Defence works with the Canadian Forces Liaison

Council to encourage employers and educational institutions to provide

leaves of absence when necessary for training and deployment. The

Canadian Army also uses training modules, simulation training, and

distance learning to help Army Reserve soldiers balance their training with

their civilian schedules. However, we found that from 2011 to 2013,

47 training courses were cancelled, 23 because of a lack of candidates.

5.95

National Defence noted that job protection legislation for Army

Reserve soldiers who take time off from civilian employment for military

training or duty differs across the country. We found that federal

legislation does not provide job protection for all Army Reserve training.

The

Canada Labour Code

and the

Reserve Forces Training Leave

Regulations

under the

National Defence Act

permit absences for some

types of training, such as annual training with the soldier’s unit, training

for a specific deployed operation, or leave to attend training for promotion.

However, the Code and the Regulations do not provide leave for Army

Reserve soldiers to undertake all types of occupational skills training.

5.96

Recommendation.

National Defence should work with

departments and agencies that have responsibility under the

Canada

Labour Code

and the

Reserve Forces Training Leave Regulations

consider including coverage of absences to attend all types of occupational

skills training into the Code and the Regulations.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. National Defence will consult with

the Public Service Commission of Canada and other applicable agencies to

determine whether changes to federal job protection legislation can be

justified.

5.97

Compensation for employers.

In November 2014, National

Defence announced that it planned to introduce a program to compensate

civilian employers and self-employed Reserve personnel to help offset

costs incurred by employers when a person in the Primary Reserve is

absent from work on designated domestic or international deployments.

The amount is about $400 for each week of absence. We found that this

program did not compensate employers when a Reserve Force soldier

attends occupational skills training. The compensation program is thus

not able to support the full participation of Army Reserve soldiers in

training for Army missions.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.98

Recommendation.

National Defence should consider amendments to

its proposed Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program to include

absences for all occupational skills training of Army Reserve soldiers.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Only once the original program is

fully implemented and institutionalized will National Defence undertake

an evidence-based feasibility study on the expansion of the Compensation

for Employers of Reservists Program to include leave for occupational and

career training courses, including associated training activities required for

career progression.

5.99

Training programs for individual occupational skills.

The

Canadian Army has taken steps to align standards for individual

occupational skills training received by Army Reserve and Regular Army

soldiers to allow all of them to acquire the same level of competence for a

particular skill. However, we found that individual occupational courses

for Army Reserve soldiers were designed so that they graduated from their

initial occupational courses with fewer professional and leadership skills

than their Regular Army counterparts.

5.100

For example, Regular officers’ initial military training is 70 days.

Its objective is to produce an “operationally focused and physically robust

graduate who will be able to perform their responsibilities” as a

professional soldier and leader of a small team in simple operations.

However, the course that Reserve officers attend is 32 days and has

significantly less training in important skills such as physical fitness,

administration, and leadership of operations and subordinates. Similarly,

a Regular Force non-commissioned member receives 60 days of training

that include developing leadership skills and extensive physical fitness

training. An Army Reserve non-commissioned member receives 23 days

of training that does not include these elements.

5.101

Army Reserve soldiers are trained for a specific occupation, such

as infantry, armour, artillery, logistics, communications, or electrical

mechanical engineering. However, we found that this training was often

limited to a narrower set of individual occupational skills than the training

provided to Regular Army soldiers. For example, the Army Reserve

infantry training course that provides non-commissioned members

(excluding officers) with fighting skills requires 35 training days, compared

with 62 training days for their Regular Army counterparts. This difference

means that these Army Reserve infantry soldiers are not certified to use

several weapons (anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons) that the

Canadian Army considers necessary for infantry teams of 25

to 40 soldiers (Exhibit 5.6).

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Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Exhibit 5.6

Non-commissioned Army Reserve infantry soldiers receive less initial weapons training than

Regular Army infantry soldiers

Weapons training provided during infantry training course

for non-commissioned members (excluding officers)

Personal weapon (rifle)

Pistol

Light machine gun

General-purpose machine gun

Hand grenades

Grenade launcher

Short-range anti-armour weapon (light)

Short-range anti-armour weapon (medium)

Command-detonated explosive

Source: Based on information from National Defence

Regular Army

infantry training

Provided

Reserve Army

infantry training

Provided

Not provided

Provided

Not provided

5.102

We also found that this lack of individual occupational skills training

continued through later career courses. For example, courses for senior

leaders of infantry Army Reserve units did not include instruction in key

skills such as commanding operations with armoured fighting vehicles,

conducting operations in urban areas, and working in command posts.

We found that Army Reserve infantry soldiers received 25 percent fewer

days of formal individual skills training over their careers than did their

Regular Force counterparts.

5.103

Training for deployment on international missions.

The Canadian

Army has recognized that it needs to address gaps during the pre-deployment

training of Army Reserve soldiers for international missions.

5.104

The importance of addressing all gaps in individual training during

pre-deployment training was noted in a 2014 inquiry into a 2010 training

incident in Afghanistan in which four Army Reserve soldiers were injured

and one was killed. The casualties occurred while the soldiers were

training to operate a particular weapon that was part of the mission’s

equipment but had not been included in pre-deployment training.

The inquiry concluded that the lack of this pre-deployment training

contributed to this incident.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Army Reserve soldiers were

deployed to Eastern Europe

in 2015.

Photo: National Defence

5.105

More recently, Canadian Armed Forces soldiers began to deploy as

part of NATO’s collective defence in Eastern Europe. When we examined

pre-deployment training records for one rotation, the records confirmed

that Army Reserve soldiers had completed training on a range of weapons.

However, for another rotation, confirmation existed only for their personal

weapons. In both cases, a gap remained in the weapons training between

Army Reserve and Regular Army soldiers before they deployed on

international missions.

5.106

Recommendation.

National Defence needs to ensure that training

of Army Reserve soldiers for international deployments addresses all

known gaps in individual occupational skills training.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army already

provides sufficient detail to ensure that Army Reserve soldiers are trained

to the level required for employment on domestic and international

missions. The Army ensures that Reserve soldiers are trained to their

occupational function point within their trade and that continuation

training is provided annually to enable those soldiers to operate in

platoon- and company-level operations. Gaps or deficiencies in skills are

identified during the pre-deployment training phase, and the designated

Commanders assess and determine how those gaps will be rectified

(through individual training courses or collective level training at the

deploying unit level). Once deployed, whether Regular or Reserve, the unit

will conduct refresher or continuation training to ensure skill proficiency is

maintained. If a new task or piece of equipment is identified, the deployed

unit Commander will provide the level of training as required. The

Canadian Army will ensure the training records of individual soldiers are

kept up to date and will continue to explore ways to minimize all known

skill gaps.

Army Reserve and Regular Army unit training were not fully integrated

What we found

5.107

We found that the level of collective training of Army Reserve units

was designed to be less than the Canadian Army’s required level of

collective training which is vital for success when deployed. We also found

that Army Reserve unit training was not fully integrated with that of

Regular Army units.

5.108

Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined

and discusses

• collective training, and

• integrating Army Reserve training with Regular Army training.

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Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Why this finding matters

5.109

This finding matters because the Canadian Army has stated that it

needs Army Reserve units to train soldiers who can be deployed as part of

an integrated Army to meet assigned missions.

Recommendation

5.110

Our recommendation in this area of examination appears

at paragraph 5.119.

Analysis to support

this finding

5.111

What we examined.

We examined the Canadian Army’s

requirements and reports of collective training of Army Reserve units.

We also examined how this training was aligned with the three-year

training cycle of the Regular Army.

5.112

Collective training.

The Canadian Army has identified that it is

critical to ensure that its soldiers train to work together in a larger team

of up to 150 soldiers or more, with many different kinds of equipment.

Regular Army units train to this level to have all the skills they require for

fighting as an integrated team that can quickly adapt to various combat

situations. We found that by design, Army Reserve units train for fewer

skills, in smaller teams of 25 to 40 soldiers, and with less access to

equipment.

5.113

We also found that in meeting their collective training requirements,

some Army Reserve units did not follow the Canadian Army’s requirement

that all training be both progressive and safe. During our audit work, it

came to our attention that five Army Reserve post-exercise reports between

2013 and 2015 stated that collective training was not always progressive

and raised safety concerns. For example, in one case, contrary to the

Canadian Army’s guidance, units conducted a live-fire exercise without

“walking” their soldiers through the exercise beforehand.

5.114

We also found that the process used to confirm that Army

Reserve units had achieved the required level of training was inconsistent.

We asked 10 units across all Divisions for information confirming that

the units had achieved their required levels of training. We found that

the quality of confirmations varied greatly, from well documented to not

documented. In six cases, there was no documentation to show that the

units had achieved the required level of training. In our opinion, without

a consistent and documented confirmation process, the Canadian Army

does not have full assurance that all Army Reserve units have achieved

the level of collective training they need to progress to higher levels of

collective training, including pre-deployment training for international

missions.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

5.115

We found that the Canadian Army has taken some steps to improve

the collective training of Army Reserve soldiers. For example, we observed

a recent large-scale exercise involving over 1,000 Army Reserve soldiers

from across Ontario that included Regular Army soldiers instructing and

coaching Army Reserve soldiers on the tactics and skills that they would

need to deploy in a combat role.

Regular Army soldiers instruct

and coach Army Reserve

soldiers on tactics and skills

during an exercise at Canadian

Forces Base Petawawa.

Photo: Office of the Auditor General

of Canada

5.116

Integrating Army Reserve training with Regular Army training.

We found that the collective training requirements for Army Reserve units

were not integrated into the three-year training cycle of the Regular Army.

Analysis conducted in 2015 by the Canadian Army concluded that

integration into the training cycle of the Regular Army would ensure that

the Army Reserve’s training for domestic and international missions

would be conducted in a progressive and predictable manner and provide

formal confirmation of that training. The analysis also noted that this

enhanced training would increase the retention of Army Reserve soldiers.

5.117

As previously mentioned, the Army Reserve is expected to provide

up to 20 percent of soldiers being deployed on major international

missions. Army Reserve soldiers are deployed as individuals placed in

Regular Army units or in Army Reserve teams that provide key tasks, such

as Convoy Escort, Force Protection, Persistent Surveillance, and Influence

Activities. However, the Canadian Army has determined that, with the

exception of Influence Activities, these key tasks would have to be

performed by Regular Army soldiers during the initial rotation. This is

because the training of Army Reserve units has not been integrated into

the Regular Army’s training plan to prepare for

Canada First

Defence

Strategy missions.

5.118

In 2009, the Canadian Army took steps to integrate the collective

training of Army Reserve and Regular Army units in the same Division.

This integration was to be achieved by linking units that perform the

same combat operations—for example, Army Reserve infantry units with

Regular Army infantry units. These pairings were to help develop

command and control relationships, and joint training, which would

ensure that Army Reserve units were prepared to meet assigned tasks.

However, we found that, with the exception of artillery units, this has not

happened.

5.119

Recommendation.

National Defence should improve the collective

training and integration of Army Reserve units with their Regular Army

counterparts so that they are better prepared to support deployments.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army is taking the

necessary steps to develop opportunities for stronger integration between

the Regular Army and the Reserve Force.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Conclusion

5.120

We concluded that although Army Reserve units received clear

guidance for domestic missions, the Canadian Army did not require Army

Reserve groups to formally confirm that they were prepared to deploy on

domestic missions. Army Reserve units and groups did not always have

access to key equipment. At the same time, Army Reserve units lacked

clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of

training as cohesive teams, and had not fully integrated this training with

that of the Regular Army.

5.121

We concluded that the Army Reserve did not have the number of

soldiers it needed and lacked information on whether soldiers were

prepared to deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers

has been steadily declining because the Army Reserve has been unable to

recruit and retain the soldiers it needs. Furthermore, funding was not

designed to fully support unit training and other activities.

5.122

We concluded that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of

physical fitness training and were not trained in the same number of skills

as Regular Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had

not acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

About the Audit

The Office of the Auditor General’s responsibility was to conduct an independent examination of

National Defence’s Canadian Army Reserve to provide objective information, advice, and assurance

to assist Parliament in its scrutiny of the government’s management of resources and programs.

National Defence is responsible for the readiness of the Canadian Army (Regular Force and Army

Reserve) and ensures that all members and units of the Army Reserve are trained and equipped so

that they are prepared for assigned missions.

All of the audit work in this report was conducted in accordance with the standards for assurance

engagements set out by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada (CPA) in the CPA Canada

Handbook—Assurance. While the Office adopts these standards as the minimum requirement for our

audits, we also draw upon the standards and practices of other disciplines.

As part of our regular audit process, we obtained management’s confirmation that the findings in this

report are factually based.

Objective

The objective of the audit was to determine whether the Army Reserve is ready to deploy for domestic

and international missions. (Ready means to be prepared.) The sub-objectives included whether

• National Defence assigned missions and objectives to the Army Reserve and its units with

the necessary resources,

• Army Reserve units had the capacity to accomplish assigned missions, and

• Army Reserve personnel and units were trained to be combat-capable and to achieve their

assigned missions.

Scope and approach

The audit scope included National Defence and focused on the Canadian Army Reserve.

We examined National Defence operational plans, data, and reports, including the funding of Army

Reserve units. We also examined the performance of the recruiting system for the Army Reserve.

We examined guidance and observed training, and interviewed senior Canadian Army commanders,

command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve soldiers.

When we used representative sampling for analyzing Army Reserve soldiers’ reports of injury, disease,

illness, or exposure to toxic material, sample sizes were sufficient to report on the sampled population

with a confidence level of 90 percent and a margin of error of less than +10 percent.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Criteria

Sources

To determine whether National Defence assigned missions and objectives to the Army Reserve

and its units with the necessary resources, we used the following criteria:

National Defence assigns clear missions to all Army

Reserve units, which contributes to an integrated,

multi-purpose, and combat-capable military.

National Defence allocates resources to the Army

Reserve to achieve National Defence and Canadian

Army objectives and manages risks to readiness targets,

force generation, and equipment needs.

National Defence monitors Army Reserve performance

and takes appropriate action to ensure that the Army

Reserve can meet assigned missions.

•

Canada First

Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008

• Departmental Performance Report 2013–14,

National Defence

• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,

National Defence

• Policy on Management, Resources and Results

Structures, Treasury Board, 2012

• Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for

the Government of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada

Secretariat, 2000

To determine whether Army Reserve units had the capacity to accomplish assigned missions,

we used the following criteria:

Army Reserve units have the people they need to be

effective (for example, unit strength and attending

members).

Army Reserve units enrol sufficient numbers of recruits.

Army Reserve units retain the people they need (for

example, trainers and command staff ).

Army Reserve units have access to the equipment they

need to accomplish assigned missions.

•

Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee,

National

Defence, 1998

•

Canada First

Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008

• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,

National Defence

•

Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges

of the Future,

National Defence, 2002

•

Land Operations 2021—Adaptive Dispersed Operations:

The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of

Tomorrow,

National Defence, 2007

To determine whether Army Reserve personnel and units were trained to be combat-capable

and to achieve their assigned missions, we used the following criteria:

National Defence defines individual training

requirements to achieve a combat-capable reserve

force.

Army Reserve personnel receive the opportunities and

resources they need to achieve individual training

requirements.

Individual members of the Army Reserve meet the

training requirements for their trade, rank, and

deployment.

Army Reserve units receive the collective training they

need to accomplish assigned missions.

•

Canada First

Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008

• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,

National Defence

•

Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee,

National Defence, 1998

•

Training for Land Operations,

National Defence,

June 2014

Management reviewed and accepted the suitability of the criteria used in the audit.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Period covered by the audit

The audit examined the period covered by the 2012–13, 2013–14, and 2014–15 fiscal years,

and reached back over longer periods, as required, to gather evidence to conclude against criteria.

Relevant observations up to January 2016 were also included. Audit work for this report was

completed on 26 January 2016.

Audit team

Assistant Auditor General: Jerome Berthelette

Principal: Gordon Stock

Director: Craig Millar

Françoise Bessette

Glenn Crites

Julie Hudon

John McGrath

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

List of Recommendations

The following is a list of recommendations found in this report. The number in front of the

recommendation indicates the paragraph where it appears in the report. The numbers in parentheses

indicate the paragraphs where the topic is discussed.

Recommendation

Response

Guidance on preparing for missions

5.22

National Defence should

provide individual Army Reserve units

with clear guidance so that they can

prepare their soldiers for key tasks

assigned to the Army Reserve for major

international missions.

(5.18–5.21)

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Providing the necessary

training to soldiers before they participate in international

deployments is of paramount importance to the Canadian Army.

Guidance regarding the required training is provided in the Army’s

annual operation plan. Once Reserve participation in a given

expeditionary operation is announced, specific direction is given with

respect to the training required for individuals and for designated

Reserve Teams (to conduct tasks such as Convoy Escort, Force

Protection, and Persistent Surveillance). Every Team is “confirmed”

through a deliberate process before being given the green light to

deploy. The Army will work toward improving its guidance for

anticipated key tasks for major international missions.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. A procurement plan is under

way to address the shortages within certain fleets. The Canadian

Army has defined and provides the equipment required to conduct

domestic operations. The majority of this equipment is held either

within the unit or with the Canadian Brigade Group. When a specific

requirement or gap is identified that is not within the Brigade Group,

the Division will reallocate from within its own resources or will

request additional items from national stocks.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army will

review the process and develop a better-documented confirmation

method. The Army conducts training on an annual basis for

the 10 Territorial Battalion Groups and the four Arctic Company

Response Groups. This training may be verbally confirmed through

the chain of command, which is found to be sufficient for training

objectives.

5.32

The Canadian Army should

define and provide access to the

equipment that Army Reserve units and

groups need to train and deploy for

domestic missions.

(5.28–5.31)

5.34

The Canadian Army should

require Army Reserve groups to formally

confirm that they are prepared to support

domestic missions.

(5.33)

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Recommendation

Response

Sustainability of Army Reserve units

5.57

National Defence should design

and implement a retention strategy for

the Army Reserve.

(5.46–5.56)

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Retention enables Canadian

Armed Forces’ operational and institutional excellence. National

Defence will develop and implement a Canadian Armed Forces

retention strategy that will ensure retaining our members in uniform

is a fundamental aspect of how we manage our people, and is given

equal, if not greater, prominence in our attraction and recruiting

efforts. Our approach going forward will be comprehensive and

incorporate the Regular and Reserve Force, creating greater mobility

between these components and accounting for the range of

requirements inherent in each. While consideration will be given

to transactional requirements in the areas of compensation and

benefits, National Defence will develop effective measures including,

but not limited to, career management, family support, mental health

and wellness support, and diversity requirements.

The Canadian Army is developing a retention strategy for the Army

Reserve, and is in the process of updating the strategy based on Chief

Military Personnel initiatives.

5.62

National Defence should review

the terms of service of Army Reserve

soldiers, and the contracts of full-time

Army Reserve soldiers, to ensure that it is

in compliance with the

National Defence

Act.

(5.58–5.61)

5.65

National Defence should review

its policies and clarify Army Reserve

soldiers’ access to medical services.

(5.63–5.64)

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Armed Forces

will review the framework for the Reserve Force terms of service and

the administration of Reserve Force service to ensure it complies with

the

National Defence Act

and the regulations enacted under it.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Forces Health

Services Group Headquarters is actively advancing a number of

initiatives to review and support policies for medical assessments that

contribute to Primary Reserve soldiers’ overall readiness for training

and deployment, and that clarify access to medical services, including

• issuing a communiqué to establish the priority for Reservists to

receive medical assessments from Headquarters (released

October 2015);

• updating the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chapter 34,

Section 2 (Medical Care of Officers and Non-commissioned

Members), currently with the National Defence Regulations Section

for amendment drafting, with estimated anticipated approval

six months after Section work is complete. In 2009, Health Services

Group Headquarters published interim guidance on entitlement

to health care for Reserve Force personnel. This was also

communicated to members in correspondence dated 2011 from

the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, along with an accompanying

guide. Annual reminders are issued to health care providers with

regard to entitlement rules;

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Recommendation

Response

• assessing courses of action proposed in the joint Canadian Forces

Ombudsman/Health Services Group study, “The Feasibility of

Providing Periodic Health Assessments to All Primary Reservists”

(June 2015) and other potential tools to determine medical fitness

and conduct periodic health assessments, through a Reserve

Medical Readiness Working Group. It is anticipated that alternatives

will be developed by August 2016 and implemented in the fall

of 2016.

5.70

National Defence should ensure

that it has up-to-date information on

whether Army Reserve soldiers are

prepared for deployment. This

information should include civilian

qualifications held by Army Reserve

soldiers.

(5.66–5.69)

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Work is ongoing through the

Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation project to

maintain all Reserve Force personnel readiness using the future

military personnel management tool, Guardian. As part of the project,

investigation and analysis will take into account the possibility of

including civilian qualifications.

The Canadian Army will make every effort to utilize existing human

resource systems to keep data up to date in relation to readiness.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army assigns

resources to ensure that all mandated tasks are funded. We will

monitor whether these tasks are consistent with the results expected

of them.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. National Defence utilizes a

financial reporting structure to record how much is allocated to and

expended by the Primary Reserves. Commencing 9 February 2016,

expenditures related to the Reserve Program were incorporated in the

financial reports briefed to senior management. This approach will

provide greater visibility on funding and expenditures, and will

support enhanced reporting and performance measurement.

5.80

National Defence should ensure

that budgeted annual funding for Army

Reserve units is consistent with expected

results.

(5.76–5.79)

5.84

National Defence should

complete planned changes to the way it

reports its annual budgets and the

expenses of the Army Reserve, so that

National Defence can link assigned

funding to expected results.

(5.81–5.83)

Training of Army Reserve soldiers

5.96

National Defence should work

with departments and agencies that have

responsibility under the

Canada Labour

Code

and the

Reserve Forces Training Leave

Regulations

to consider including

coverage of absences to attend all types

of occupational skills training into the

Code and the Regulations.

(5.94–5.95)

5.98

National Defence should

consider amendments to its proposed

Compensation for Employers of Reservists

Program to include absences for all

occupational skills training of Army

Reserve soldiers.

(5.97)

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. National Defence will consult

with the Public Service Commission of Canada and other applicable

agencies to determine whether changes to federal job protection

legislation can be justified.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. Only once the original

program is fully implemented and institutionalized will National

Defence undertake an evidence-based feasibility study on the

expansion of the Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program

to include leave for occupational and career training courses,

including associated training activities required for career

progression.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Recommendation

5.106

National Defence needs to

ensure that training of Army Reserve

soldiers for international deployments

addresses all known gaps in individual

occupational skills training.

(5.99–5.105)

Response

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army already

provides sufficient detail to ensure that Army Reserve soldiers are

trained to the level required for employment on domestic and

international missions. The Army ensures that Reserve soldiers are

trained to their occupational function point within their trade and

that continuation training is provided annually to enable those

soldiers to operate in platoon- and company-level operations. Gaps or

deficiencies in skills are identified during the pre-deployment training

phase, and the designated Commanders assess and determine how

those gaps will be rectified (through individual training courses or

collective level training at the deploying unit level). Once deployed,

whether Regular or Reserve, the unit will conduct refresher or

continuation training to ensure skill proficiency is maintained. If a new

task or piece of equipment is identified, the deployed unit

Commander will provide the level of training as required. The

Canadian Army will ensure the training records of individual soldiers

are kept up to date and will continue to explore ways to minimize all

known skill gaps.

National Defence’s response.

Agreed. The Canadian Army is taking

the necessary steps to develop opportunities for stronger integration

between the Regular Army and the Reserve Force.

5.119

National Defence should

improve the collective training and

integration of Army Reserve units with

their Regular Army counterparts so that

they are better prepared to support

deployments.

(5.112–5.118)

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Appendix

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year

Area of

operations

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

Unit name

Community

3rd Canadian Division (Edmonton)

British Columbia

39 Canadian Brigade Group

The British Columbia Regiment

(Duke of Connaught’s Own)

The British Columbia Dragoons

5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery

Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery

(RCA)

15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

39 Combat Engineer Regiment

39 Signal Regiment

The Rocky Mountain Rangers

The Royal Westminster Regiment

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

The Canadian Scottish Regiment

(Princess Mary’s)

39 Service Battalion

Alberta

41 Canadian Brigade Group

The South Alberta Light Horse

The King’s Own Calgary Regiment

20th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

20th Independent Field Battery, RCA

41 Combat Engineer Regiment

41 Signal Regiment

The Loyal Edmonton Regiment

The Calgary Highlanders

41 Service Battalion

47%

62%

50%

56%

72%

42%

54%

74%

42%

121%

72%

Vancouver

Kelowna and Vernon

Victoria and Nanaimo

91%

56%

53%

106%

108%

106%

72%

56%

Vancouver and Aldergrove

Vancouver, Chilliwack, and Trail

Vancouver, Victoria, and Nanaimo

Kamloops and Prince George

New Westminster and Aldergrove

Vancouver

Victoria, Nanaimo, and Courtenay

Victoria and Richmond

Calgary

Edmonton and Medicine Hat

Calgary

Edmonton and Red Deer

Lethbridge

Calgary and Edmonton

Calgary, Edmonton, and Red Deer

Edmonton and Yellowknife

(Northwest Territories)

Calgary

Calgary and Edmonton

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year (continued)

Area of

operations

Saskatchewan,

Manitoba, and

Northwestern

Ontario

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

Winnipeg

59%

66%

43%

54%

43%

53%

36%

69%

63%

67%

56%

57%

39%

Moose Jaw

Winnipeg

Regina

Brandon and Portage la Prairie

Kenora

Winnipeg and Saskatoon

Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg,

and Thunder Bay

Winnipeg

Thunder Bay

Saskatoon and Prince Albert

Regina

Winnipeg

Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg,

and Thunder Bay

Unit name

38 Canadian Brigade Group

The Saskatchewan Dragoons

The Fort Garry Horse

10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

26th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

116th Independent Field Battery, RCA

38 Combat Engineer Regiment

38 Signal Regiment

The Royal Winnipeg Rifles

The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment

The North Saskatchewan Regiment

The Royal Regina Rifles

The Queen’s Own Cameron

Highlanders of Canada

38 Service Battalion

Community

4th Canadian Division (Toronto)

Southwestern

Ontario

31 Canadian Brigade Group

1st Hussars

The Windsor Regiment, Royal

Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC)

11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

31 Combat Engineer Regiment

(The Elgins)

31 Signal Regiment

The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry

(Wentworth Regiment)

4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian

Regiment

The Grey and Simcoe Foresters

The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada

85%

80%

73%

51%

61%

91%

75%

79%

69%

London

London and Sarnia

Windsor

Guelph and Hamilton

St. Thomas and Waterloo

Hamilton

Hamilton and Burlington

London and Stratford

Owen Sound and Barrie

Cambridge and Kitchener

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year (continued)

Area of

operations

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

80%

82%

Unit name

The Essex and Kent Scottish

The Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders of Canada (Princess

Louise’s)

31 Service Battalion

Community

Windsor and Chatham

Hamilton, Windsor, and Chatham

52%

Hamilton, London, Sault Ste. Marie,

and Windsor

Toronto

Central Ontario

32 Canadian Brigade Group

The Governor General’s Horse Guards

The Queen’s York Rangers

(1st American Regiment)

7th Toronto Regiment, RCA

56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

32 Combat Engineer Regiment

32 Signal Regiment

The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada

The Royal Regiment of Canada

The Lincoln and Welland Regiment

The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin, and

Halton Regiment)

48th Highlanders of Canada

The Toronto Scottish Regiment

(Queen Elizabeth the Queen

Mother’s Own)

32 Service Battalion

63%

71%

87%

93%

84%

77%

100%

79%

68%

70%

92%

76%

Toronto

Toronto and Aurora

Toronto

Brantford, St. Catharines, and Simcoe

Toronto

Toronto and Borden

Toronto and Scarborough

Toronto

St. Catharines and Welland

Brampton, Oakville, and Georgetown

Toronto

Etobicoke and Mississauga

73%

Toronto

Ottawa

Eastern Ontario

33 Canadian Brigade Group

The Ontario Regiment (RCAC)

30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

42nd Field Artillery Regiment (Lanark

and Renfrew Scottish), RCA

49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

33 Combat Engineer Regiment

33 Signal Regiment

Governor General’s Foot Guards

66%

92%

67%

64%

75%

89%

98%

Oshawa

Ottawa

Pembroke

Sault Ste. Marie

Ottawa and Orleans

Ottawa

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year (continued)

Area of

operations

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

57%

106%

51%

57%

83%

66%

57%

62%

Kingston

Peterborough, Belleville,

and Cobourg

Brockville

Cornwall

Ottawa

North Bay and Timmins

Sudbury

Ottawa and North Bay

Unit name

The Princess of Wales’ Own Regiment

The Hastings and Prince Edward

Regiment

The Brockville Rifles

Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry

Highlanders

The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa

(Duke of Edinburgh’s Own)

The Algonquin Regiment

2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of

Canada

33 Service Battalion

Community

2nd Canadian Division (Montréal)

Western Quebec

34 Canadian Brigade Group

The Royal Canadian Hussars

(Montréal)

Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC)

2nd Field Regiment, RCA

34 Combat Engineer Regiment

34 Signal Regiment

The Canadian Grenadier Guards

The Black Watch (Royal Highland

Regiment) of Canada

4th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment

(Châteauguay)

6th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment

Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal

Le Régiment de Maisonneuve

The Royal Montréal Regiment

34 Service Battalion

93%

96%

98%

91%

96%

112%

109%

104%

102%

117%

104%

113%

89%

Montréal

Gatineau

Montréal

Montréal and Rouyn-Noranda

Montréal

Laval

St-Hyacinthe and Drummondville

Montréal

Westmount

St. Hubert

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year (continued)

Area of

operations

Eastern Quebec

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

Québec City

89%

98%

62%

85%

81%

78%

124%

71%

103%

95%

86%

83%

Sherbrooke

Trois-Rivières

Lévis

Shawinigan

Québec City

Beauport and Sherbrooke

Québec City

Rimouski, Rivière-du-Loup, and

Matane

Lévis and Beauceville

Jonquière

Sherbrooke

Québec City

Unit name

35 Canadian Brigade Group

Sherbrooke Hussars

12e Régiment blindé du Canada

6th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

62nd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

35 Combat Engineer Regiment

35 Signal Regiment

Les Voltigeurs de Québec

Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent

Le Régiment de la Chaudière

Le Régiment du Saguenay

Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke

35 Service Battalion

Community

5th Canadian Division (Halifax)

Nova Scotia and

Prince Edward

Island

36 Canadian Brigade Group

The Halifax Rifles (RCAC)

The Prince Edward Island Regiment

(RCAC)

1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field

Artillery Regiment, RCA

84th Independent Field Battery, RCA

36 Combat Engineer Regiment

36 Signal Regiment

The Princess Louise Fusiliers

The West Nova Scotia Regiment

The Nova Scotia Highlanders

Cape Breton Highlanders

36 Service Battalion

49%

73%

62%

45%

58%

38%

59%

85%

66%

64%

61%

Halifax

Charlottetown and Summerside

Halifax

Yarmouth

Sydney

Halifax, Glace Bay, and Charlottetown

Halifax

Windsor, Aldershot, Middleton, and

Bridgewater

Amherst, Truro, New Glasgow, Pictou,

and Springhill

Sydney

Halifax and Sydney

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence

Report 5

Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,

2014–15 fiscal year (continued)

Area of

operations

New Brunswick

and

Newfoundland

and Labrador

Percentage

of ideal

unit size*

Moncton

52%

56%

72%

47%

70%

Moncton and Sussex

Saint John and Woodstock

Fredericton and St. John’s

Saint John and St. John’s

Fredericton, Edmundston,

and Saint John

Moncton, Campbellton, Bathurst,

and Miramichi City

St. John’s

Corner Brook, Stephenville,

and Grand Falls

Saint John and St. John’s

Unit name

37 Canadian Brigade Group

8th Canadian Hussars

(Princess Louise’s)

3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA

37 Combat Engineer Regiment

37 Signal Regiment

1st Battalion, The Royal New

Brunswick Regiment

(Carleton and York)

The North Shore (New Brunswick)

Regiment

1st Battalion, The Royal

Newfoundland Regiment

2nd Battalion, The Royal

Newfoundland Regiment

37 Service Battalion

Community

71%

91%

61%

54%

All Divisions

Units that report

directly to

Canadian Army

Division

Headquarters

6 Intelligence Company

2 Intelligence Company

7 Intelligence Company

4 Intelligence Company

3 Intelligence Company

Source: Based on information from National Defence

47%

57%

59%

65%

57%

Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Edmonton

Toronto

Ottawa

Montréal and Québec City

Halifax

* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.

Report 5

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016