REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

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DIIS REPORT 2015: 15

An Introduction to

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING

AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND

RADICALIZATION

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

Contents

Abstract

Introduction

Background

Structural arrangements and ideological foundations

Main elements and actors

The General level

The specific level

The Targeted level

Info-houses bringing together police and municipalities

The Centre for Prevention of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service

The Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, and the Danish Agency

for International Recruitment and Integration

The Danish Prison and Probation Service

Municipalities

Cooperation networks

Expansion

Dilemmas, challenges and criticisms

This report is written by Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen and published by DIIS.

Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, Ph.D., is a researcher at DIIS.

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: [email protected]

www.diis.dk

Layout: Mark Gry Christiansen

Printed in Denmark by Eurographic Danmark

ISBN 978-87-7605-771-8 (print)

ISBN 978-87-7605-770-1 (pdf)

All DIIS publications are available for free on DIIS.DK

©Copenhagen 2015, the author and DIIS

Notes

Literature

Fundamental criticism

Political criticism

The risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies

Lack of consensus, clear definitions and evaluations

Practical challenges

Civil society

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

ABSTRACT

Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gain-

ing momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in

the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attract-

ed attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and

Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. The present report

provides an introductory overview of the main actors and initiatives in the Danish

approach and an introduction to the foundations on which it is build. It also discuss-

es the main dilemmas, challenges and criticisms with which the approach is faced

with the aim of contributing to its further development.

The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicali-

zation is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-ser-

vice providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, and the

intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from existing structures and

initiatives developed for other purposes. It includes state, regional and local actors

and is structured around efforts targeted respectively at the wider Danish society,

extremist individuals and groups, and individuals involved, or in imminent danger of

becoming involved, in illegal activities. Concrete methods are continuously being

developed , both top-down and bottom-up, to meet contemporary challenges, but

the approach in its entirety rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from

understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behav-

iour can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are

lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these

understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-00’s, preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization

(CVE) has increasingly gained momentum as a supplement to more traditional

counterterrorism activities (CT) in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism.

The Danish approach has attracted international attention not least because of its

emphasis on preventing individuals from travelling to Syria and Iraq and its take on

receiving returnees from those countries, often referred to as the Arhus model. In

February 2015 the mayor of Aarhus, Jacob Bundsgaard, made a presentation at a

White House summit to counter violent extremism in Washington, and by the fall of

2015 almost 300 international news media

had reported on what is sometimes

framed as a typically Scandinavian soft-handed approach. However, the Aarhus

model is one local component of a comprehensive national approach, which is

about more than simply ‘warmly welcoming home Isis Fighters’, as the

International

Business Times

put it.

The Danish approach to preventing and countering all types of violent extremism

and radicalization, be they political or religious, is based on systematized mul-

ti-agency collaboration between various social-services providers, the educational

system, the health-care system, the police, and the intelligence and security servic-

es that has evolved over a decade. The sharing of information necessary for such

collaboration is regulated by the Danish Administration Justice Act, which limits the

use of shared information.

The Danish approach draws on decades of experience

with similar collaboration from other areas and benefits from already existing struc-

tures and initiatives developed for other purposes than specifically preventing ex-

tremism and radicalization.

The approach has been developed in practice, through

learning-by-doing and trial-and-error, rather than sitting

behind a desk.

The approach has been developed in practice, through learning-by-doing and tri-

al-and-error, rather than sitting behind a desk. This means that there have been

changes along the way and that mistakes have been made. It also means that there

has been a willingness to listen and learn – and make adaptations – as practical

experiences were collected and scientific research was conducted. To this day, the

approach and its specific methods are not dictated by the state but rather have

been developed in cooperation between different and equally important actors. Lo-

cal practitioners may receive guidelines from the state and after testing them in

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

actual conditions may then provide feedback which is used to refine the guidelines

further. Alternatively the local practitioners may develop concrete initiatives or

methods and put them into practice, after which they are adopted on the state level

and copied in other local contexts. The approach and its concrete methods are

therefore continuously being developed both top-down and bottom-up, a process

allowing them to be adapted to changes in challenges and perceptions of threats.

Many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for exam-

ple, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. Crucial to this approach is the

fact that participation is voluntary. This implies, for example, that engagement in an

exit programme is not a way of reducing a prison sentence.

However, the approach is not only based on the development of new initiatives and

methods specifically designed for the purpose of preventing and countering extrem-

ism and radicalization. It is also very much a question of coordinating and using al-

ready existing components that may serve a purpose. An example of this is the nu-

merous cost-free offers of assistance for anything from careers advice to

psychological counselling or assistance with housing, as is available to all citizens

of the welfare state.

The present report therefore provides an overview of the main actors and initiatives

in the Danish approach and an introduction to the foundations on which it is build.

For the sake of clarity, compromises have been made with regards to complexity

and the descriptions should be viewed as simplified ideal types. The report also

discusses the main dilemmas, challenges and criticisms with which the approach is

faced with the aim of contributing to its further development. The report does not

deal with the legislative or administrative foundations of the approach, nor with pu-

nitive or other repressive measures, nor with international cooperation.

Moreover, it is not the report’s aim to evaluate the Danish approach or to compare it

with other countries’ approaches, nor to unravel the tangled web that haunts the

approach of a lack of clear definitions and consensus. When looking at anything to

do with terrorism, extremism or radicalization, one must always be aware that these

are political and context-dependant concepts that are unlikely ever to find common-

ly accepted definitions. The objective of the present report is not to provide an ac-

count of the many definitions or uses of these concepts either currently or histori-

cally, either internationally or for Denmark itself.

However, in the process of

providing an introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing

these ill-defined categories, the author

also

aims to show that challenges do arise

from the lack of clear definitions.

The approach should not be seen as an alternative to punitive

or other repressive measures, but as a supplement. If it is an

alternative to anything, it is to doing nothing when repressive

measures are not warranted.

The report is based on open source material, much of which is only available in

Danish, combined with the author’s observations from eight years of advising gov-

ernment, municipalities and authorities and teaching courses for frontline staff en-

gaged in concrete initiatives, supplemented by conversations with policy makers as

well as practitioners working with the approach. All analyses, conclusions and flaws

are solely the responsibility of the author.

The approach should therefore not be seen as an alternative to punitive or other re-

pressive measures, but rather as a supplement. If it is an alternative to anything, it

is to doing nothing when punitive and other repressive measures are not warranted.

Although the policy and the concrete methods and initiatives associated with it are

continuously being developed to meet contemporary challenges, the approach in its

entirety rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the

welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behaviour can be changed. In

order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from

the Danish approach, knowledge is required about the understandings and struc-

tures into which it is incorporated.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

BACKGROUND

As in many other countries, individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq have been a key

concern in Denmark since 2012. When the government drafted a new action plan,

Prevention of radicalisation and extremism,

in September 2014, such individuals were

identified as “[o]ne of the most urgent issues”.

The two other main issues identified

were the “increasing use of the internet and social media to spread extreme propa-

ganda and recruit followers”

and “criminals, including people associated with

gangs” with “close links to extremist circles”.

In February 2015, Denmark was struck by the first attack defined as terrorism in

which victims were killed. Omar Abdel Hamid el-Hussein, who was known to have a

violent criminal past and had recently been released from prison, shot and killed two

civilians and injured six police officers at a cultural centre and a synagogue in Co-

penhagen. During his imprisonment el-Hussein had expressed sympathy for the

group Islamic State, which had led prison staff to warn the Prison and Probation

Service and to the latter warning the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET).

More traditional counterterrorism measures, however, attract

most of the funding.

These events emphasised the concerns about criminals expressed in the 2014 ac-

tion plan, but it also led to a critical examination of what was being done to prevent

terrorism. Following the shootings, the authorities’ efforts before, during and after

the events were evaluated.

These evaluations did not lead to any paradigm shifts

but rather to a strengthening of already existing initiatives as could be expected, the

shootings also led to an increased focus on the role of the Prison and Probation

Service and on prevention on the ground, meaning that municipalities that had not

faced any concrete challenges felt the need to launch the same initiatives as more

troubled municipalities.

More traditional counterterrorism measures, however, attract most of the funding.

In February 2015, after the shootings but prior to the evaluations, the government

launched twelve new initiatives against terrorism,

to be funded to the tune of DKK

970 million (EUR 130 million) over the next four years. Most of the funding was to

the two Danish intelligence services’ more traditional efforts to counter and prevent

terrorism, such as surveillance, analyses, intervention teams and bodyguards; rela-

tively little was reserved for the efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism

and radicalisation

that have been developing since the mid-00’s.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

It was particularly the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the

bombs in Madrid in 2004 and the bombs in London in 2005, combined with several

terrorism-related arrests in Denmark since 2005 and the so-called “cartoon crisis”

which followed the Danish daily

Jyllands-Posten’s

printing of twelve cartoons in

2005, that put the prevention of terrorism on the Danish agenda. From the begin-

ning there was focus on the need for more than repressive measures, and already in

2008 Denmark accepted the invitation of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,

Gilles de Kerchove, to act as the lead country on deradicalization, as it was called

then. In January 2009 the government drafted a national action plan to prevent ex-

tremism and radicalization. In the years leading up to its drafting, attention was al-

ready being directed to these themes in the three largest municipalities of Aarhus,

Odense and Copenhagen, and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service had es-

tablished a special Centre for Prevention under its Preventive Security Department.

Similarly, the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs had estab-

lished a Division for Cohesion and Prevention of Radicalization, which “in each of

their areas of expertise and in collaboration with other authorities [was to] work to

prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people”.

The 2009 action plan listed 22 concrete initiatives tying the “prevention of extremist

views and radicalization” to a whole host of themes, including international cooper-

ation to promote peace, development and democracy; efforts against discrimina-

tion and intolerance; access to education, jobs and equal opportunities; and integra-

tion and intercultural dialogue.

As was the case with the original British Prevent

strategy, this led to criticism, not least because the plan was blamed for stigmatiz-

ing certain sections of the population and for confusing security threats with social

challenges. When a new action plan was drafted in 2014 it was more narrowly fo-

cused and to some extent concerned with “separating the goals of counter-radicali-

sation from social cohesion-building and integration-agendas”.

Both action plans

address all types of extremism, but mention explicitly left-wing, right-wing and Isla-

mist extremism.

The two action plans were drafted by different governments. The first was drafted

by a centre-right government coalition between the Liberal Party and the Conserva-

tive Party led by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, whereas the second was

drafted by a centre-left government coalition between the Social Democrats and the

Danish Social Liberal Party led by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt. However,

it would not be fair to claim that the differences between the two plans were only or

primarily the results of the different governments that drew them up. Rather, they at

least appear to also be the results of five years of hard-won experiences. This will be

further discussed at the end of the report.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

But still, despite lessons learned and its narrower focus, the Danish approach is very

much a work in progress and it is still controversial and being debated. The chal-

lenges arise not least from the lack of a clear common definition of radicalization

and extremism and of a consensus over what the problem actually is (violence or

ideology), what the roots are (politics, religion, failed integration, identity, wars, etc.),

what the cure is (more religion, less religion, social changes, crime prevention, indi-

vidual treatment, harsher punishments, etc.), and who can best reach the target

group (soft social workers, tough police or someone not connected with the author-

ities at all).

Despite lessons learned and its narrower focus, the Danish

approach is very much a work in progress and it is still

controversial and being debated.

This means there is room for opinions and assumptions based on political and/or

personal preferences. To add to the challenges, there are no evaluations of the

effects of initiatives, only evaluations of their implementation,

which means that

there is not a lot of knowledge on the basis of which informed decisions can be

made. These challenges are not unique to the prevention of extremism and radical-

ization, but accompany most policy areas in their early years of development. At the

end of the report, the dilemmas, challenges and critiques facing the Danish ap-

proach will be discussed.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

STRUCTURAL

ARRANGEMENTS

AND IDEOLOGICAL

FOUNDATIONS

The Danish approach to countering and preventing violent extremism and radicali-

zation has from the very beginning involved incorporating the activities of many

agencies into existing structures, relying heavily on cooperation and benefitting

from the trust that is an integral aspect of Danish society. Not only do agencies trust

each other enough to work together, the population also trusts the state and its

agencies, and each other for that matter.

Such multi-agency cooperation and its

necessary sharing of information is regulated by § 115 of the Danish Administration

Justice Act, which stipulates that authorities can share information about an indi-

vidual if necessary to cooperation in crime prevention or to cooperation between the

police, the social services and social psychiatry and mental health authorities in

their efforts to help socially vulnerable individuals. Information may not, however, be

shared for the purposes of criminal investigations.

From the beginning, the Danish approach has been anchored

in two agendas. One is the protection of the state and society

against terrorist attacks, while the other is the welfare state’s

responsibility for the individual’s well-being, which obliges it to

protect the individual against self-harming behaviour.

From the beginning, the Danish approach has been anchored in two agendas. One

is the protection of the state and society against terrorist attacks, while the other is

the welfare state’s responsibility for the individual’s well-being, which obliges it to

protect the individual against self-harming behaviour. The combination of these two

agendas also reflects the understanding that there is a need for more than repres-

sive measures. The combination is present throughout the approach, from the na-

tional to the regional and local levels. See Figure 1 on page 16.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

Figure 1. Main actors

The roles and activities of the individual actors will be described in the section “Main

elements and actors”.

Nationally two main actors cooperate and to some extent coordinate regional and

local efforts, but also engage directly. One is a centre for prevention at the Danish

Security and Intelligence Service (PET), which focuses primarily on security and on

preventing illegal activities. The other is a division for prevention at the Ministry of

Immigration, Integration and Housing, which has a broader focus on preventing ex-

tremism and radicalization, including a focus on more social aspects.

Ministry of Immigration,

Integration and Housing

Ministry of Justice

MINISTRIES

Although the Centre for Prevention at PET has certainly developed and changed

over the years, it has remained organisationally in place. The other leg of the efforts

has been subject to greater changes, illustrating how politically sensitive this sub-

ject is. As indicated, it was initially located in the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration

and Integration Affairs, but in October 2011 a change in government led to the abo-

Danish Agency for

International Recruitment

and Integration

PET

Centre for

Prevention

Prison and

Probation

Service

NATIONAL

AGENCIES

lition of this ministry, and the Division for Cohesion and Prevention of Radicalization

was moved to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. Subsequently, the divi-

sion was divided into a policy-oriented branch that remained in the ministry and a

more practice-oriented branch that was placed under the National Board of Social

Services, a government agency within the ministry, where coordination with efforts

Municipalities

INFO-HOUSES

(Cooperation between

police district and

municipalities within it)

aimed at vulnerable youth, including the prevention of gang membership, was facil-

Police

districts

REGIONAL

LEVEL

itated.

Following a change of government after the elections in June 2015, the Ministry of

Immigration, Integration and Housing was established and the divisions were

moved there, thus retaining a policy-oriented division in the ministry, with a more

practice-oriented division now being placed in a newly established Danish Agency

Professionals

(teachers, mentors, social

workers, coaches, etc.)

Networks

SSP | PSP | KSP

LOCAL

COOPERATION

for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI) within the same ministry.

Civil society,

Non-Government

Organisations etc.

LOCAL LEVEL

These actors cooperate and to some extent coordinate or at

least advise efforts on the regional and local levels, where the

approach also revolves around collaboration between the police

and the security and intelligence service on the one hand and

agencies responsible for the relevant social services on the

other hand.

Main actors (T. Gemmerli & A. Hemmingsen)

These actors cooperate and to some extent coordinate or at least advise efforts on

the regional and local levels, where the approach also revolves around collaboration

between the police and the security and intelligence service on the one hand and

agencies responsible for the relevant social services on the other hand. There is

ample room for adjustments to regional or local needs, resources and existing

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

structures, and methods are developed top-down as well as bottom-up. An example

of top-down development is a series of handbooks entitled

Prevention of extremism,

published by the ministry in 2012.

An example of bottom-up development is the

contingency plan to intervene and stop individuals travelling to and from Syria and

Iraq, which was developed by means of already existing cooperation between the

city of Aarhus and the east Jutland Police in late 2013.

other ‘parameter of concern’” for the ordinary crime prevention system.

As an ex-

tension, it was therefore also incorporated into existing understandings of crime

and of early prevention. Early prevention is an integral part of the Danish approach

to anything from crime prevention to health care and child care, in which all new

parents are offered health visits at home for the first year of a child’s life to provide

advice on the health and welfare of the children and thus prevent future problems.

This is seen as more cost-effective in the long run than remedying problems in the

future if they should arise.

This plan was based on

individual guidance and advice for individuals considering travelling to Syria or Iraq

and after-care for returnees, including debriefing, medical care, consultations with a

psychologist and mentoring. It also offered guidance and advice for relatives and

dialogue with local communities. In 2014 this approach was adopted nationally, the

government’s action plan effectively making what is often referred to as the Aarhus

model part of the Danish approach.

Such multi-agency approaches to prevention, based on cooperation between the

police and social service agencies and revolving around information-sharing to spot

potential future problems and launch preventive measures as early as possible, are

not new in Denmark. Since 1977, networks of schools, social services and the police

(SSP) have existed in most municipalities. These were established primarily to pre-

vent young people under the age of eighteen from engaging in crime, and since then

other networks have been established to focus on other target groups. In 2009,

networks involving the police, social services and psychiatric health care (PSP) were

created primarily to prevent individuals with psychiatric problems from engaging in

crime, and in 2010 similar networks involving the police, social services and the

Prison and Probation Services (KSP) were launched primarily to prevent individuals

released from prison or other institutions from (re)engaging in crime. All these net-

works facilitate cooperation and information-sharing between different authorities

and aim simultaneously to protect society from crime and to protect individuals

from engaging in crime.

From the very beginning, Danish efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism

and radicalization were incorporated into these existing structures. As this indi-

cates, transferring the Danish approach or elements of it to contexts where such

structures and overall trust in them do not exist may prove difficult. As this also in-

dicates, the understanding of terrorism as a crime comparable to other types of

crime, and of extremism and radicalization as risks especially to vulnerable young

people, rather than as an existential threat to the state and the existing order or a

political challenge, is crucial to the Danish approach. As a consequence, preventing

and countering violent extremism and radicalization was incorporated into existing

conceptualizations of the prevention of crime, with radicalization becoming “Yet an-

It can be difficult to find out exactly what is this extremism and

radicalization that must be prevented and countered.

However, it can be difficult to find out exactly what is this extremism and radicaliza-

tion that must be prevented and countered. In the action plan from 2014, extremism

and radicalization are defined as follows:

Extremism can be defined in various ways. In this publication, the term is used to

describe groups that can be characterised by their:

simplistic views of the world and of “the enemy”, in which particular groups or as-

pects of society are seen as a threat.

intolerance and lack of respect for other people’s views, freedom and rights.

rejection of fundamental democratic values and norms, or non-acceptance of dem-

ocratic decision-making processes.

use of illegal and possibly violent methods to achieve political/religious ideological

goals.

Radicalisation is not a clearly defined concept. It is a process that takes various forms.

Sometimes it happens relatively quickly, sometimes it is long and drawn-out. There

are no simple causal relationships – radicalisation is triggered by different factors

and leads to different forms of involvement. It can assume forms such as support for

radical views or extremist ideology, and it can lead to acceptance of violence or other

unlawful acts as a means to achieve a political/religious goal.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

It should be clear that these definitions are not easily operationalized, as they do not

clearly define what is and, perhaps more importantly, what is not extremism or rad-

icalization. Although there is no clear, commonly agreed definition of radicalization

or extremism, it is possible to identify the contours of an understanding upon which

the Danish approach rests. This understanding focuses on the individual and to

some extent de-politicizes extremism and radicalization, although the two are al-

ways linked to (the future risk of) terrorism – a category that is intrinsically political.

Instead of solid conceptualization and empirical grounding, it seems the authorities

operate with a pragmatic model, a heuristic working model that describes radicaliza-

tion in a formulaic manner as a process in which an individual moves from a phase of

showing normal behavior (without further definition) to phases where the individual

gradually but increasingly diverges from normal behavior until he or she reaches a so-

called ‘tipping point’, described as the point where the radicalized individual transgress-

es the boundary between radical thinking and violent action, that is, from thoughts to

action. This “tipping point” is conceptualized as a point reached not by all individuals

but by those few with somehow vulnerable minds. [… This] universalistic approach to

a heuristic understanding of radicalization beyond time and space is grounded in an

individualistic interpretation of the phenomenon, which leads to a socio-psychological

model of ‘identifying radicals’ beyond the political context: de-politicization.

The focus on the vulnerable individual and on socio-psychological explanations

leads in practice to a focus on pull factors rather than push factors. Instead of look-

ing at what is wrong with the world that pushes people to rebel, it looks at what in-

dividuals gain from becoming involved and then attempts to provide this in other

ways or to give the individual something to lose (e.g. education, a job, re-established

family ties). The approach seems to rest on a basic understanding that Danish soci-

ety is so good that it does not make sense to oppose it and therefore opposition

must be the result of misunderstandings. This means there is an underlying under-

standing of the target group as misguided or as unaware of its own possibilities and

potential, in just the same way that ordinary crime prevention views individuals who

are vulnerable to involvement in risky behaviour such as crime or substance abuse.

As a consequence the approach relies heavily on mentors, coaches and therapy to

open the individual’s eyes to enable and build capacity and to achieve his or her

inclusion into mainstream society.

The Danish approach is increasingly being understood as existing within the same

framework as efforts to prevent other risky behaviour.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

MAIN ELEMENTS

AND ACTORS

The prevention of crime as well as of health and social problems in Denmark is often

framed within the so-called “Prevention Pyramid”, which is also used by the World

Health Organisation (WHO). This pyramid identifies different stages in which differ-

ent types of activities can take place with the aim of preventing future problems or

preventing existing ones becoming worse. Increasingly, preventing and countering

extremism and radicalization is also framed within this model.

Figure 2. Prevention Pyramid

TARGETED

Preventing

specific events

Intervention and exit

Aimed at individuals

assessed as

violent extremist

SPECIFIC

Preventing worsening of problems

Interventions

Aimed at individuals/groups

assessed as extremist

GENERAL

Preventing problems from arising

Outreach and general capacity- and resilience-building

Aimed at the broader population, particularly youth

(A. Hemmingsen)

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

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Two primary types of activities are aimed at these different target groups to prevent

and counter extremism and radicalization. One type is

outreach,

where representa-

tives of the authorities reach out to and engage with individuals or groups that are

not currently in any kind of trouble but that could get into trouble in the future, as

well as individuals and groups in contact with individuals and groups in trouble or

deemed to be in danger of getting into trouble. The other type is

exit and intervention,

which is for individuals and groups that are already in trouble or deemed to be in

imminent danger of getting into trouble. Within ordinary crime prevention this ap-

proach and its potential pitfalls are well known, so if one accepts the claim that

prevention of radicalization and extremism are comparable to crime prevention, it

suggests that there is experience and evidence to draw on.

Facilitation of dialogue

about controversial

themes.

National corps of young Dialogue Ambassadors available for

debates in, for example, schools. The aim is to ensure that

sensitive topics are not debated just by extremist groups

presenting only their solutions.

Dialogue-based workshops for primary and secondary

schools challenging prejudices and debating themes such as

radicalization and discrimination.

Strengthening critical

sense.

Including knowledge about, for example, manipulation and

critical use of the internet in the curriculum in primary

schools.

Dialogue with local communities about their concerns.

Courses on awareness about radicalization and extremism

for professionals who have direct contact with citizens.

Including knowledge about extremism, radicalization and

prevention in the curriculum for teachers, social workers, etc.

Outreach.

Training professionals.

THE GENERAL LEVEL

In preventing and countering extremism and radicalization, the general level is par-

ticularly aimed at young people and those considered to be in a position to have an

impact on young people. The focus is on awareness and capacity-building to im-

prove general conditions on both the societal and the individual level.

As mentioned, there may be valuable experiences to take from ordinary crime pre-

vention. One hard-earned experience from this area is that on the general level, there

is a risk of creating problems that would never have arisen simply by addressing

them. Drawing attention to a danger or a problem that is to be prevented by directly

The focus is on awareness and capacity-building to improve

general conditions on both the societal and the individual level.

addressing it (problem-addressing) may lead to social exaggeration or majority mis-

understandings, or in other words: the audience may come to believe that what one

is trying to prevent is more normal or widespread than it is and therefore begin tak-

ing an interest in it. Unlike some countries, Denmark has so far not employed pub-

This is the earliest type of prevention, aimed at preventing anything from ever hap-

pening. Activities include:

ACTIVITIES

Building/strengthening

resilience and cohesion

on the societal level.

EXAMPLES

Initiatives to include all residents and strengthen general

social cohesion through the educational system and locally.

Increasingly not framed as part of the prevention of

extremism and radicalization, but rather as general efforts

that may have positive effects in this area, as well as in many

others.

Enlightenment about

own opportunities and

Danish society.

Through the educational system.

licly available counter-narrative campaigns explicitly engaging with, for example, the

propaganda of extremist organizations. Most likely part of the explanation is that, in

the underlying logic of the Danish approach, such campaigns would be risky be-

cause they address the problems on the general level.

This reluctance to address problems directly can actually be traced throughout the

Danish approach even on the individual level, such as in a mentoring or exit pro-

gramme. This means that systematic engagement with ideology by, for example,

using religious authorities to promote a non-violent interpretation is not an integral

component of the approach. Rather, the focus is on improving circumstances, and

capacity-building. As a consequence, it would be fair to say that the approach in

practice, at least on the surface, revolves more around (behavioural) disengage-

ment than (intellectual) deradicalization.

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THE SPECIFIC LEVEL

The specific level includes individuals or groups who are assessed as being extrem-

ist, for example, because they circulate in problematic social environments, but are

not violent. On this level, exit and intervention activities are employed. Outreach to

such individuals’ immediate social surroundings may also take place without shar-

ing the concerns about specific individuals. The focus is on capacity-building for the

individual and his or her immediate surroundings and on preventing problems from

arising or becoming worse. Activities include:

THE TARGETED LEVEL

The targeted level is aimed at individuals who have engaged in criminal acts or are

assessed as being in imminent risk of doing so. The focus is on capacity-building

and the prevention of specific criminal acts. On this level it is only about intervention

and exit, but when necessary and possible attempts may be made to reach out to

and include the relatives of the individual in order to build their capacity to support

the individual. Activities include:

ACTIVITIES

EXAMPLES

Individually tailored programmes offered by the Centre

for Prevention at the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service, the Danish Prison and Probation Service, and

municipalities and/or local police coordinated by the

Info-houses (described in the next section).

Mentoring and coaching

programs.

Capacity-building (life skills, education, etc.), mentoring,

assistance with housing, therapy, medical help, etc.

coordinated by Info-houses. Individual guidance on gain-

ing access to services that are available to all Danish

citizens.

ACTIVITIES

Guidance to individuals.

EXAMPLES

Individual mentors.

Coaching regarding education, careers, relations, or

other factors that may improve the individual’s

situation.

Individual guidance on gaining access to services that

are available to all Danish citizens.

Exit programmes.

Guidance to relatives.

Networks for the parents or other relatives of individu-

als considering travelling to a conflict area or returning

from one.

Coaching for the parents or other relatives of individu-

als involved in extremism or considering travelling to a

conflict area or returning from one.

Dialogue with communities to prevent, for example,

facilitation of travel to a conflict area.

In the following the main actors, their activities and cooperation and the procedures

regarding coordination are described.

Outreach.

INFO-HOUSES BRINGING TOGETHER POLICE AND MUNICIPALITIES

Central to the Danish approach is the so-called “Info-house” structure. Info-houses

are not physical houses, but are perhaps most accurately defined as a framework

for local cooperation between the police and municipal social service administra-

tions and providers and as centres of excellence concerning extremism and radical-

ization.

Such Info-houses have been established in all twelve Danish police districts to

assess concerns about radicalization and extremism that may originate from

agencies, services, professionals or civilians, to coordinate cooperation between all

the relevant actors and to refer to preventive efforts specifically designed for the

purpose or developed for other or general purposes, provided by the police or munic-

ipality. The details of the cooperation vary according to local needs, resources and

the existing structures into which they are incorporated.

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Figure 3. Procedures

Having assessed the concerns, the Info-houses decide if action is to be taken and if

so by whom. If the concerns are rated as a threat to security, the case is passed to

the Danish Security and Intelligence Service’s Centre for Prevention. Cases may also

be referred back to the Info-houses from the Centre after its assessment. If there is

Prison and

Probation

Service

PET

Center for

Prevention

Ministry of

Immigration,

Integration and

Housing

no threat to security, the case is referred to the initiatives offered by the police or the

municipality. These may be initiatives specifically designed for the prevention of

extremism and radicalization, or more general ones that are available to all citizens,

such as career counselling, assistance with housing or therapy. If possible, the case

is referred to an actor who the individual in question already knows and trusts. This

can mean anything from a specially trained mentor to a soccer coach or a teacher

who already knows the individual in question, depending on a concrete assessment

in each case. As is the case with all initiatives, participation is optional.

Police districts

Networks

SSP | PSP | KSP

INFO-HOUSES

(Cooperation between

police district and

municipalities within it)

Professionals

Danish Agency

for International

Recruitment

and Integration

In September 2015 the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing announced

a tender for a national hotline offering assistance to “parents, relatives, and others

concerned that a child, a young person or an adult is at risk of radicalization or al-

ready part of an extremist milieu”.

The hotline is to be established and run in con-

nection with one of the existing Info-houses and will offer immediate advice and

information about where and how more assistance can be found. This is an exten-

sion of the local hotlines already established in Copenhagen and Aarhus. If success-

Flow of concerns

ful, the national hotline will most likely strengthen the Info-house structure, ensuring

the desired flow of information.

As mentioned, the main coordinating powers nationally are the Danish Security and

Intelligence Service’s Centre for Prevention and the Danish Agency for International

Recruitment and Integration within the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and

Housing. In addition to coordinating and advising others, these actors also have

concrete initiatives of their own.

Civil society

Municipalities

Initiatives / actions

Advice / guidance

Procedures (T. Gemmerli & A. Hemmingsen)

The Info-houses collect incoming concerns and assess whether they are warranted.

If they find there are grounds for concerns, they assess whether these are primarily

related to (and best dealt with as) social challenges or whether there are any secu-

rity aspects. This process may also involve the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service’s Centre for Prevention. The model could therefore represent a unique pos-

sibility for the service to gain access to a wealth of information, which some local

authorities are very aware of. As previously mentioned, information-sharing be-

tween different Danish authorities is regulated by § 115 of The Danish Administra-

tion Justice Act.

THE CENTRE FOR PREVENTION OF THE DANISH SECURITY AND

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The primary focus of the Centre for Prevention of the Danish Security and Intelli-

gence Service (PET) is the targeted level, but the Centre engages on all levels

through both outreach and intervention activities. On the general level, the Centre

engages in outreach to “civil resourceful persons and other partners for dialogue

that may contribute to ensuring the local community’s resilience and cohesion in

the face of radicalization and violent extremism”.

On the specific level, the Centre

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collaborates with the Ministry in training key frontline staff to be aware of signs of

concern, to work within the structures of the Danish approach, and to handle con-

crete preventive efforts. On the targeted level, the Centre engages with individuals

convicted of crimes related to violent extremism or terrorism or where there is an

increased concern for national security.

tion and extremism to better enable them to meet their obligation to be aware of

signs of concern and to report the to the Prison and Probation Service, which may

then lead to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service being warned or to in-

creased security measures.

MUNICIPALITIES

THE MINISTRY OF IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND HOUSING, AND THE

DANISH AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT AND INTEGRATION

The Service’s counterpart, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing,

with the Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI), primar-

ily focuses on the other two levels of the pyramid. As already mentioned, they col-

laborate with the Service in offering training for key frontline staff, and in addition

they engage in advising and supporting the Info-houses, as well as concrete initia-

tives regionally and locally, developing methods and producing educational materi-

al, and serving as an entry point with regard to gathering and disseminating knowl-

edge. The Ministry also administers funding for practical initiatives, as well as

research.

As mentioned, Info-houses have been established in all twelve Danish police dis-

tricts to structure cooperation between the police and social services. In addition to

already existing efforts developed for other or general purposes that may be rele-

vant to preventing extremism and radicalisation, most municipalities have also de-

veloped or adopted targeted efforts. Prior to the ministerial level’s recommenda-

tions about implementing the Info-house structure, some municipalities had already

developed their own targeted initiatives, which continue. The two most visible ef-

forts can be found in the two largest municipalities of Aarhus and Copenhagen.

Aarhus

Following the Danish Security and Intelligence Service’s campaign, “Police against

Terrorism”, in all Danish police districts in 2005, the municipality of Aarhus and the

East Jutland Police established a pilot project to prevent violent radicalization in

THE DANISH PRISON AND PROBATION SERVICE

In addition to being involved through the Danish Security and Intelligence Service

(PET), the Ministry of Justice also takes part through the ordinary police and the

Danish Prison and Probation Service. The latter attracted a great deal of attention

following the Copenhagen shootings in February 2015 because the suspect had

been imprisoned, and their efforts are likely to be strengthened and given additional

funding in the near future. Already in February they were promised new funding for

a continuation of their pilot programme “Deradicalization - Back on track”, initiated

in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in 2011 and sup-

ported by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European

Union. The programme is based on mentoring for individuals convicted under terror-

ism legislation, individuals convicted of hate crimes and individuals convicted or in

custody who are considered vulnerable to radicalization.

Since 2012 the Danish Prison and Probation Service has cooperated with the Dan-

ish Security and Intelligence Service in training prison staff in issues of radicaliza-

2007, drawing inspiration from the Dutch project Wij Amsterdammers. In 2011 the

project was anchored in SSP Aarhus. Aarhus’ efforts include:

Info-house. Assessing concerns and planning and coordinating the prevention of

radicalization

Counselling and advising professionals about radicalization

Providing information about radicalization to the public

Specialised mentoring for prevention of or intervention in radicalization

Counselling, advising and exit programmes for individuals considering travelling to

Syria or returning from there

Outreach to local communities and other actors in contact with such individuals

Counselling and advising the parents of radicalized young people and facilitating

networks between them

Dialogue-based workshops for primary and secondary schools about radicalization

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The efforts related to individuals travelling to Syria or Iraq are preventive and are

aimed at either dissuading individuals from travelling or ensuring that they return

safely and without being a threat to security. To dissuade individuals from travelling,

individual guidance and advice is offered, which for returnees includes debriefing,

psychological therapy, medical assistance, individual mentoring and tailored exit

programmes. Participation is entirely optional.

Coaches and mentors for young people and their families

Support, advice, counselling and mentoring for returnees who wish it

Outreach to local communities and other actors in contact with such individuals

Copenhagen

In 2009 the municipality of Copenhagen established its VINK division as a pilot pro-

ject to gather knowledge and provide advice for professionals in the municipality

working with the early prevention of radicalization and extremism. The aim was

primarily to work with early prevention by educating professionals as well as the

broader public to engage with young people, counter prejudice and facilitate dia-

logue in order to strengthen the inclusion of young people attracted to extreme

communities and provide them with alternatives.

In 2011 these efforts were more closely tied to SSP Copenhagen, but unlike Aarhus

they were not organizationally anchored in this structure. As a consequence of in-

creased demand and a focus on the area, as well as a request from the Danish Se-

curity and Intelligence Service to include a preparedness group related to returnees

from Syria or other conflict areas, VINK was provided with additional resources for

the period 2015-18 in 2014.

In January 2015 the municipality of Copenhagen’s Committee for Employment and

Integration appointed an expert group to prevent radicalization tasked with making

recommendations for how the City of Copenhagen can strengthen its efforts

against the radicalization of young people.

es.

Copenhagen’s efforts include:

An example of how the info-house structure may be implemented in different ways

by adapting it to existing structures, needs and resources, is a group of municipali-

ties around Copenhagen that as of late 2015 are working on developing a joint pro-

gramme with the relevant police districts, thus sharing their resources rather than

creating individual programmes in each municipality.

COOPERATION NETWORKS

As previously mentioned, a crucial part of the Danish multi-agency approach is the

already established networks of School, Social Services & Police (SSP), the net-

works of Prison and Probations Services, Social Services & Police (KSP), and the

networks of Psychiatry, Social Services & Police (PSP). As described, in some cases

the Info-houses are anchored in these, while in others they closely cooperate with

them.

In addition, the networks also contribute substantially by having direct contact with

the general public and individuals at risk, thus enabling them to spot signs of con-

cerns as key personnel have been trained to do on courses arranged by the Centre

for Prevention at the Danish Security and Intelligence Service in cooperation with

the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.

Following the expert group’s recom-

mendations,

the efforts were further strengthened and given additional resourc-

Info-house. Assessing concerns, and planning and coordinating prevention of

radicalization

Centralization of knowledge and methods made available to professionals and the

wider public

Advise and counselling for professionals

Providing information about radicalization to the public

EXPANSION

Increasingly the responsibility to spot signs of concern also involves the education-

al sector, including primary and secondary schools and universities and social ser-

vice providers such as housing, unemployment benefits, pensions, employment

services and health care. Finally, there is an increasing ambition to include civil so-

ciety in more organised ways.

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DILEMMAS, CHALLENGES

AND CRITICISMS

As might be expected, the Danish approach to countering and preventing extrem-

ism and radicalization has been and still is faced with dilemmas, challenges and

criticisms. As mentioned in the introduction, the approach has developed by trial

and error in tandem with the entire new policy area being developed, practical expe-

riences being made and knowledge being produced. Important changes resulting

from these developments are the nuancing of understandings of radicalization and

extremism, the narrowing and focusing of efforts and the disassociation from other

agendas (such as integration or the promotion of liberal values) among the profes-

sionals directly involved. But outsiders are not necessarily following. Particularly

when concrete events, such as terrorist attacks, put radicalization and extremism at

the top of the public agenda, some voices in the debate revert to less sophisticated

conceptualizations. The discourse created by such debates cannot be ignored, as it

shapes the perception of initiatives to counter and prevent extremism and radicali-

zation and may shortcut any progresses made, leading to the initiatives being re-

ceived and perceived as if they were part of the discourse. Putting it more bluntly, a

strong omnipresent public discourse that links extremism to Islam or Muslims may

spill over and lead to initiatives being perceived as doing the same thing. Until such

a day when there is a complete consensus on what extremism and radicalization is,

those working in the area will have to be aware of such dynamics and constantly

develop their ability to manoeuvre in a context shaped by events beyond their

control.

Until there is a complete consensus on what extremism and

radicalization is, those working in the area will, have to be

constantly develop their ability to manoeuvre in a context

shaped by events beyond their control.

In an excellent article from 2015, Lindekilde

tracks the development of the Danish

policy to prevent and counter extremism and radicalization by comparing the action

plan from 2009 to the action plan from 2014. Lindekilde identifies three key improve-

ments:

The first is the professionalization of the initiatives, the sophistication of techniques

and organizational maturing resulting in, among other things, frameworks for indi-

vidual interventions that rests on a sound psychological foundation and frame-

works for local cooperation between municipalities and the police, that create the

organizational foundation necessary for the training of frontline staff.

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The second improvement is the disassociation of policies regarding integration or

discrimination and policies regarding security, thus creating a less ambiguous secu-

rity agenda and increasingly replacing the notion of a battle of ideas with a focus on

preventing violent acts.

The third improvement is the inclusion of a more complex and nuanced understand-

ing of radicalization than the simple phase-models with their identifiable stages

through which an individual is believed to pass in the process of transforming from

‘ordinary’ to ‘terrorist’, models which were popular in the early years.

However, although improvements have been made, the Danish approach is still

faced with challenges, dilemmas and criticisms. There are, of course, practical chal-

lenges such as the inherent difficulties of cooperation. In addition to these, there are

challenges related to the lack of a fundamental consensus and clear definitions and

to the lack of knowledge about whether or not the approach and/or its specific com-

ponents actually work.

There are also dilemmas emanating from differing views on what radicalization and

extremism are and how they are best prevented, which are shaped by both political

positions and fundamental views of humanity.

A more practical dilemma is the question of whether the approach or aspects of it

may in fact create counterproductive side-effects. In addition, there are dilemmas

related to proportionality: at what costs should attempts be made to prevent radi-

calization and extremism? What strange bedfellows are societies willing to risk end-

ing up with in making these efforts? Finally, there is a more fundamental criticism of

the entire understanding of radicalization as revolving solely around the individual.

This criticism is by no means only raised in connection with the Danish approach: it

is also made in connection with other countries’ approaches and with the entire

discourse on radicalization.

Nor is the criticism purely intellectual. The ways in

which challenges are understood shape how we are able to imagine responding to

them. If we see radicalization solely as an individual matter, as irrational and as the

result of misunderstandings, there is a risk that we ignore responses that might

prove productive. One example of such a response could be to address the political

issues of actual violent conflicts and suggest alternative and socially more accept-

able ways to engage in them. Another could be to enter into dialogue with the imme-

diate social environments and constituencies of the individuals in question to un-

derstand their grievances, be they real or perceived, be they related to domestic or

international politics, and then attempt to find non-violent ways to address them.

The ways in which challenges are understood shape how we

are able to imagine responding to them. If we see radicalization

solely as an individual matter, as irrational and as the result of

misunderstandings, there is a risk that we ignore responses that

might prove productive.

On an individual level, socio-psychological processes indisputably play an important

role as mediators between political indignation and ideology on the one hand and

engagement in activities on the other hand. But although socio-psychological pro-

cesses are highly relevant from an individual perspective, as well as in individual

mentoring or exit programmes, leaving out the political aspect entirely would be

problematic. On both the conceptual and practical levels, as when designing an in-

dividual programme, there is a need to acknowledge the possibility that real political

agendas, real indignations and real grievances exist.

FUNDAMENTAL CRITICISM

This criticism can also be found among the professionals involved in the efforts to

The Danish approach, like many others, is very focused on the individual because it

takes its point of departure in radicalization. As indicated above, this leads to a

de-politicization (in the words of Andersen and Moe) of phenomena that are intrinsi-

cally linked to terrorism which in its very nature is political and of an area that is

hyper-politicized. “One could argue that, by lumping together the fight against ex-

tremist ideas and drug abuse, we are obscuring the political nature of de-radicalisa-

tion work – the attempt to ‘normalise’ and battle political and religious attitudes and

practices that are not unlawful as such but that are deemed risky by authorities”.

counter and prevent radicalization and extremism: “Although such a strategy [of

de-politicization] may help to legitimise de-radicalisation interventions in the eyes of

some frontline workers and target groups […] a substantial share does not accept

the analogy between ordinary crime prevention and de-radicalisation interventions.

This group sees a huge difference between protecting youngsters from crime and

drug abuse, and protecting them against certain political and/or religious views”.

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POLITICAL CRITICISM

As indicated, even in Denmark there is disagreement over the details of the ap-

proach. Much of this originates with political positions and personal preferences.

One contested theme is whether the soft-handed incentive approach is effective

and just and whether there should be a greater focus on punitive measures. Such

criticisms are not unique to the prevention of extremism and radicalization. They

regularly arise in relation to ordinary crime prevention too, and they tie into funda-

mental debates about the welfare state, where some subscribe to a more conserv-

ative version in which punitive measures are preferred to regulate behaviour, others

to a liberal version in which incentivized measures are preferred.

Practical dilemmas also emanate from these differences of view, as the threat of

punitive measures may complicate incentivization or even make it impossible. One

example of this might be the increased criminalization of travels to Syria and Iraq.

The threat of prosecution or eviction may make it difficult for representatives of the

Danish authorities to earn the trust of individuals returning from these countries,

which is crucial to their engagement in volunteer exit and disengagement pro-

grammes, or the relatives of individuals who are considering travelling.

Finally, there are also political aspects to the efforts to prevent and counter extrem-

ism and radicalization that tie into a broader debate about the extent to which the

welfare state should be allowed to intervene in the lives of citizens. This debate also

affects issues such as smoking, substance abuse and drinking. One example is a

heated debate in Denmark in 2015 about whether or not the state should be allowed

to confine pregnant women with a substance abuse in order to protect (them

against harming) the foetus, following the national Ethical Council recommending

increased possibilities.

In relation to the prevention of radicalization and extrem-

ism, the dilemma became obvious in early 2015 when the media reported that in

late 2014 a fifteen-year-old boy had been removed from the care of his father for

fears that the latter was raising him to engage in war. The decision was criticized for

being an example of the efforts to prevent radicalization going too far.

THE RISK OF CREATING SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES

Another challenge is that the Danish approach is being criticized for creating self-ful-

filling prophecies by stigmatizing or ostracizing parts of the population, thereby con-

tributing to polarization and potentially to subsequent radicalization.

The increase in awareness and extended networks among both professionals and

How important the prevention of radicalization and extremism is

compared to other challenges and what price society should be

willing to pay for it is a political choice.

members of civil society who have been trained and/or encouraged to spot early

signs of concern can be effective elements in any type of prevention, but they also

carry with them the risk of being perceived as detailed surveillance networks moni-

toring everybody’s actions everywhere or, perhaps more damagingly, particular

parts of the population alone. “When this awareness network is expanded especial-

Another political theme is how important the prevention of radicalization and ex-

tremism is compared to other challenges and what price society should be willing to

pay for it. These questions have been raised in relation to Aarhus’ dialogue with the

board of the Grimhoj Mosque in Aarhus in an attempt to minimize the number of

Danes travelling to Syria and Iraq, as well as in relation to Copenhagen’s cooperation

with the organization Islamisk Trossamfund, which runs the Wakf Mosque in Co-

penhagen. In both cases political voices have demanded that all contact be ended

on the basis that the Mosque and the organization were both in conflict with funda-

mental Danish values, which were so important that the potential benefits of the

contact did not justify the compromise it involved making. In November 2015 the

municipal council of Copenhagen decided that all contact with Islamisk Trossam-

fund was to be ended. This meant that the efforts the prevent radicalization and

extremism no longer involved engaging in dialogue with the organization.

ly to target those identified as ‘at-risk communities’ – typically communities with a

majority of Muslim immigrants – it is obvious that citizens of these communities

may feel exposed to increased surveillance and selected targeting just because they

are Muslim immigrants. […] In other words, outreach and awareness programs that

are implemented in order to create safety and trust in society, as well as to prevent

radicalization and extremism, risk the unintended consequence of creating a socie-

ty of mistrust, with the additional danger of laying the ground for more radicalization

rather than preventing it.”

A continued effort to delimit the concepts of radicalization and extremism, to disso-

ciate them from specific parts of the population and to disseminate empirically

based knowledge about them will contribute to minimizing the risk of creating or

laying the ground for future radicalisation, but other potential side effects should not

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be overlooked. The creation of mistrust and polarization is in itself a problem even if

it does not cause radicalization.

In this context, it is promising that when tenders for nineteen initiatives to strength-

en the efforts to counter and prevent extremism and radicalization were made by

the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing in late 2015, a tender was also

made to evaluate fourteen of the initiatives, explicitly stipulating that the evaluation

LACK OF CONSENSUS, CLEAR DEFINITIONS AND EVALUATIONS

As indicated several times, the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extrem-

ism continues to be a challenge. So too does the lack of any consensus over what

the problem is and what the exact aim, or success criteria, of preventive efforts is.

These challenges could most likely be minimized through a wholehearted effort to

evaluate the effects of existing initiatives because such a process would necessari-

ly establish common definitions and success criteria and simultaneously flush out

any symbolic gestures. As in other countries, there have been evaluations of the

implementation and the output of efforts in Denmark, but so far none of the actual

outcomes and effects. The need for such evaluations of efforts is continuously em-

phasised by the political criticisms of the approach described earlier. As long as

there are no evaluations to inform the debate, it will remain open to assumptions,

gut feelings and opinions that are not necessarily conducive to the development of

an effective approach.

is to be of the results, not just the implementation.

One of the strengths of the Danish approach is its flexibility, the inclusion of different

types of professionals who view challenges and specific cases in different ways and

the fact that it leaves room for individual assessments. But the lack of clear defini-

tions and success criteria means that providing room for individual professional

assessments carries with it the risk of leaving room for the individual professional’s

prejudices or (mis)understandings as well.

In an interim evaluation of the National Board of Social Services’ project for the

Comprehensive Prevention of Extremism, the very broad definition of the target

group has been criticized because the criteria for inclusion and exclusion are un-

clear. This is regarded as problematic because it may lead to the project (and who is

to be included in it) being interpreted differently in different municipalities: “As a cit-

izen in Denmark one must be treated equally regardless of which municipality one

happens to be residing in. […] This is particularly important in an area that may po-

tentially have legal consequences, e.g. in relation to a trial where a previous registra-

The need for evaluations of the effects of preventive efforts is

continuously emphasised by the political criticisms of the ap-

proach. As long as there are no evaluations to inform the debate,

it will remain open to assumptions, gut feelings and opinions.

tion of a citizen as in danger of radicalization may be seen as decisive”.

However,

it could also be argued that a standardization of criteria would increase the likeli-

hood of such registrations being accepted as relevant in the legal system.

Another criticism that has been raised of the lack of standards is that “…the diversi-

ty of professional groups involved in assessing individual cases may also cause

It will never be possible to conduct a quantitative evaluation of the preventive efforts

by counting the number of individuals who have not become radicalized as a result

of them or the number of terrorist plots that have not been started, but it would be

possible to conduct a qualitative study of exit programmes and intervention activi-

ties. In doing so, it would be extremely important to emphasize the user perspective

by interviewing those involved. It would also be possible to investigate the potential

side-effects of outreach efforts in particular by actually interviewing those believed

to be affected and subsequently comparing the results with the worst case scenar-

io of not doing anything and the best case scenario of what is being done to assess

whether the proportions, and the cost-benefit balance, are acceptable.

problems, because what counts as ‘radicalisation’ or ‘signs of radicalisation’ on the

one hand and protective ‘resilience factors’ on the other hand – who counts as ‘vul-

nerable individuals’ – varies considerably across professional groups (Jakobsen

and Jensen 2011) […] This constitutes a risk of potential under-reaction (false nega-

tives) and over-reaction (false positives)”.

In sum, the flexibility and multi-discipli-

narily of the approach constitute both a strength and a weakness.

In the absence of clear definitions and objectively observable indicators of radicali-

zation and extremism, the inclusion of shared procedures for assessment, not least

in the Info-houses, could be a step in the direction of minimizing the risk of, for ex-

ample, individual understandings or concrete events, such as attacks, affecting as-

sessments. This would also to some extent alleviate the substantial pressure of re-

sponsibility placed on the professionals involved.

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PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

As has hopefully become clear, the Danish approach relies heavily on cooperation

and coordination between different sectors, authorities, institutions and individuals.

Such cooperation can be challenging, not least when it is not entirely clear who has

the final coordinating responsibility, for example, in relation to transition from one

system to another, such as prison to municipality. Following the Copenhagen shoot-

ings in February 2015, this challenge has been addressed both nationally and local-

ly,

and improvements will undoubtedly be seen, but it is unlikely that all the chal-

lenges will ever be completely overcome. Cooperation, particularly between different

agencies and between agencies and other actors, will always be challenging. This is

in no way unique to this area and should not be seen as an argument for abandon-

ing cooperation.

Although the challenges may never be completely overcome, experience indicates

that they can be minimized. In the early years of the development of the Danish ap-

proach, there was another challenge to cooperation, namely that not all parties felt

comfortable in becoming involved. The frontline staff and other local actors who

were tasked with keeping an eye out for concerns and reporting them to the In-

fo-houses and/or the authorities were often sceptical and worried that their actions

would cast them as informants, this damaging the relations of trust they had built

up and needed to maintain in order to do their jobs, or that their obligation to protect

and help the young people, for example, would conflict with and be subordinated to

the obligation to assist the authorities in protecting society against the same young

people.

The general impression among the central actors seems to be that such resistance

has decreased over the years, not least because the Copenhagen shootings in Feb-

ruary 2015 and the fact that at least 125 Danes have travelled to Syria and/or Iraq,

where at least a fifth have died,

has led to a consensus that something has to be

done. One civil servant, who has been involved in these efforts since the beginning,

described the change by painting the picture of civil servants, who in the early years

contacted frontline staff to get them on board, being met with rotten tomatoes,

whereas today the frontline staff ask for assistance.

prisons. 70% indicated that the staff needed more concrete knowledge, that is,

“knowledge about which signals I am to be particularly aware of” and “knowledge

about why and how someone chooses to become extreme. If we do not know what

is normal, how are we to recognize the abnormal?”

Similarly, social educators have called for knowledge, methods and guidelines. In

November 2015 the National Federation of Social Educators published a report

based on a survey among its members. 24% of respondents indicated that radicali-

zation was or had been a theme in their work. Of these, more than half indicated that

their workplaces did not have guidelines for addressing this theme, and almost half

indicated that they needed more knowledge and supervision.

The calls are apparently being heard. The tenders mentioned above for nineteen in-

itiatives to strengthen efforts to counter and prevent extremism and radicalization,

offered by the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing in late 2015, includ-

ed several initiatives aimed at qualifying current and future professionals.

In addition to more information about radicalization and extremism the frontline

staff might also benefit from more information about the Danish approach and its

structures. In an ideal world all would be familiar with the Info-houses and contact

them if in doubt.

In an ideal world all would be familiar with the Info-houses and

contact them if in doubt,

As already noted, the two main actors involved on the national level are the Danish

Security and Intelligence Service, particularly the Centre for Prevention, which pri-

marily focuses on security threats and aims to prevent illegal activities by engaging

in all levels of the prevention pyramid, and the Ministry of Immigration, Integration

and Housing and its Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration

(SIRI), which has a broader focus on preventing extremism and radicalization, in-

cluding a focus on preventing the more social aspects.

Over the years, the Centre for Prevention and the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service have remained organizationally in place, whereas the other leg of the ap-

proach has been subject to more structural changes. As mentioned, the change in

government in 2015 meant that the policy-oriented division in the ministry and the

Although many of the frontline staff may have accepted the need for them to keep

an eye out, some are still uncertain about exactly what they are to keep an eye out

for. Following the Copenhagen shootings and the increased focus on prisons, the

Danish association for prison staff conducted a survey of its representatives in all

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practice-oriented division in the National Board of Social Services were moved re-

spectively to the new Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing and the new

Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI).

This meant that the practice-oriented division was removed from day-to-day coop-

eration and coordination with a division working on the prevention of gang-related

crimes. Considering the increasing relevance of the intersections between terrorism

and other types of crime,

the removal is somewhat puzzling. This was explicitly

mentioned in the evaluation of the authorities’ efforts in relation to the Copenhagen

shootings, and closer coordination between the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service’s efforts against radicalization and the Danish National Police’s efforts

against gangs was recommended.

This is not a new idea: from the very beginning

the Danish Prison and Probation Service has been coordinating its efforts regarding

radicalization and gangs respectively, not least in their development of exit pro-

grammes. It would make sense to have such coordination reflected in both legs of

the efforts.

from actors with uncontroversial agendas compromising those in an attempt to re-

frame them as relevant to the prevention of radicalization and extremism to gain

access to funding and other resources. A third dilemma could arise from, for exam-

ple, programmes being designed by private providers who may be more motivated

by income and therefore have an interest in boosting rather than minimizing the

threat.

Mobilization of civil society could in time compromise the

professionalization which has thus far characterized the Danish

approach and increase the risk of involving and legitimizing

actors with unknown agendas.

One of the greatest strengths of the Danish approach has always been the profes-

sionalization and institutionalisation of its efforts, which so far has meant that it has

avoided scandals comparable to those seen in, for example, the UK where the out-

sourcing of tasks has led to funding going to highly problematic actors.

CIVIL SOCIETY

The previously mentioned challenges arising from the lack of consensus, clear defi-

There is increasing ambition to include civil society, not least in the shape of NGOs

and private actors, in the efforts to prevent and counter radicalization and extrem-

ism in Denmark. One of the reasons for this ambition is the fact that other countries,

particularly the US, rely much more on such actors. The question, however, is wheth-

er this is necessary in Denmark. In the US the inclusion of private actors as provid-

ers of social services but also of security services is widespread and an integral part

of the system but in Denmark the entire system is built around such services being

provided by the public sector. In addition to the questionable relevance of adopting

elements of an approach that is substantially different from the Danish, there are

potential risks associated with an increased mobilization of civil society.

To answer this question, a debate about proportions is needed. A debate that ad-

First of all, such mobilization could in time compromise the professionalization

which has thus far characterized the Danish approach and increase the risk of in-

volving and legitimizing actors with unknown agendas, leading to problems that

other countries such as the UK have previously encountered.

The conflicts, men-

tioned above, around cooperation between preventive efforts in Copenhagen and

Aarhus and religious communities are examples of dilemmas related to the legitimi-

zation of actors with agendas which not everybody will agree are worth legitimizing

in an attempt to prevent radicalization and extremism. Another dilemma could arise

dresses the importance of preventing radicalization and extremism and the impor-

tance of preventing terrorism compared to the importance of other issues.

The inclusion of civil society is often justified by reference to the fact that the author-

ities cannot be present everywhere and that there are individuals and groups that

they cannot reach. The question is whether the need to attempt to reach those who

cannot be reached through already included actors trumps any potential risks in-

cluding that they are reached with something only marginally less controversial.

nitions and success criteria may be exaggerated by the inclusion of non-profession-

al actors. As long as there is so much room for individual (mis)understandings, in-

cluding even more actors under less strict control would be a risky path to follow.

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NOTES

Sheikh, Aarhus: Skamrost model har huller [Aarhus: Praised model has flaws], 2015, Politiken.

Kinder, Denmark: Isis Fighters Warmly Welcomed Home by the Psychiatrists, 2014, International

Business Times.

This is further explained below.

For more on this see, e.g., Gemmerli, Radicalisation. A politically contrived concept, 2015; Gemmerli,

Online-radikalisering: en rundrejse i forskningslitteraturen. Litteraturreview af definitioner og tilgange

inden for online-radikalisering, 2014:08; Gemmerli, Online-radikalisering: et uafklaret begreb.

Litteraturreview af definitioner og tilgange inden for online-radikalisering, 2014:07; Gemmerli, Ny

definition af radikalisering - en ligning med mange ubekendte, 2014.

The author is very grateful to the professionals who have taken the time to contribute and to research

colleagues who have taken the time to review and discuss draft versions of the present report

The Government of Denmark, Prevention of radicalisation and extremism, 2014, p. 5.

Ibid.

Rigspolitiet, Evaluering af myndighedsindsatsen forud for og i forbindelse med terrorhændelserne

den 14. og 15. februar 2015 i København, 2015.

The Government of Denmark, Et stærkt værn mod terror. 12 nye tiltag mod terror, 2015.

Ibid.

The Government of Denmark, A common and safe future. An action plan to prevent extremist views

and radicalisation among young people, 2009.

Ibid.

Lindekilde, Refocusing the Danish counter-radicalisation efforts: an analysis of the (problematic) logic

and practice of individual de-radicalisation interventions, 2015, p. 237.

For a comparison of the two action plans, see Lindekilde, Dansk forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radi-

kalisering 2009-2014, 2015

See e.g. COWI, Midtvejsevaluering af regeringens handlingsplan ‘En fælles og tryg fremtid’, 2011.

For an interesting take on the role of trust in Scandinavian welfare states, see Bergh, A. and

Bjørnskov, C., Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State, 2011, pp. 1–19. The

general trust in Denmark is also mirrored in the fact that the country continuously ranks as one of the

least corrupt countries in the world; see www.transparency.org

For the purpose of clarity the figure is a simplified presentation. In practice there is contact between

most actors, e.g. between the Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration and the

municipalities and between the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the municipalities. Other

actors, including ministries, also play roles.

The series includes five handbooks: Relational work and mentoring; Antidemocratic and extremist

environments; Methods for working with radicalization; Local strategies; 14 examples from working

with radicalization.

Often referred to as the Aarhus model.

Lindekilde, Refocusing the Danish counter-radicalisation efforts, 2015, p. 235.

One could argue that such cost-benefit analyses are more in the logic of a competition state than of a

welfare state

The Government of Denmark, Prevention of radicalisation and extremism, 2014, p. 5.

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Andersen and Moe, Responding to Radicalization, 2015, pp. 78-79.

The model is occasionally depicted on the side or with more layers.

For the purpose of clarity, the figure is a simplified presentation. In practice, different actors work

with different variations of the model reflecting their focus and area of responsibility. The Danish

Agency for International Recruitment and Integration, for example, works with an understanding in

which the general layer includes everybody, the specific layer includes individuals at risk of

radicalization, and the targeted layer includes individuals in extremist environments. This version

reflects the understanding that individuals assessed as violent extremists are not within the agency’s

area of responsibility but rather that of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.

See e.g. Anbefalinger fra ekspertgruppen til forebyggelse af radikalisering, Færre radikaliserede

gennem en effektiv og sammenhængende indsats, København Kommune 2015. Abridged version

available in English: Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort. Recommendations

of the expert group to prevent radicalization

For more on this see e.g. Gemmerli, The fight against online radicalisation starts offline. Extremism

on the internet, 2015.

For the purpose of clarity, the figure is a simplified presentation aimed at illustrating how, ideally,

concrete concerns about an individual or group are assessed in the same few centres of excellence

then refer the individual or group to the most suitable initiative offered by the actors involved, and

how learning and advice circulates between practitioners and theoreticians, as well as between

national, regional and local level.

Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, tender offer, September 30, 2015, accessed

October 30, 2015. http://www.uibm.dk/puljer/12-puljeansogninger/55-ny-pulje-skal-forebygge-radi-

kalisering-gennem-etablering-af-national-hotline

Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, Årlig redegørelse 2014, 2015, p. 15.

Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, Årlig redegørelse 2014, 2015.

The author was a member of the group.

Anbefalinger fra ekspertgruppen til forebyggelse af radikalisering, Færre radikaliserede gennem en

effektiv og sammenhængende indsats, 2015, (Abridged version available in English).

Nissen, København fordobler indsats mod radikalisering, 2015, Berlingske.

The author has taught on these courses since 2010.

See e.g. Government of Denmark, Prevention of radicalisation and extremism, 2014, and Køben-

havns Kommune, Anbefalinger fra ekspertgruppen til forebyggelse af radikalisering, Færre

radikaliserede gennem en effektiv og sammenhængende indsats, 2015 (Abridged version available in

English).

Lindekilde, L. Dansk forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikalisering 2009-2014, 2015.

Some of the most widely criticized examples can be found in Silber, M. D. and A. Bhatt, Radicalizati-

on in the West (2007).

Lindekilde, L., Refocusing Danish counter-radicalisation efforts: an analysis of the (problematic) logic

and practice of individual de-radicalisation interventions, 2015, p. 235.

For more on this see, e.g., Kundnani, Radicalisation: the journey of a concept, 2015; Sedgwick, The

concept of radicalisation as a source of confusion, 2010; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, Why

conventional wisdom on radicalisation fails: the persistence of a failed discourse, 2010; Patel, Rethin-

king Radicalization, 2011.

Lindekilde, Refocusing the Danish counter-radicalisation efforts: an analysis of the (problematic)

logic and practice of individual de-radicalisation interventions, 2015, p. 236.

Dahlgaard and Jensen, København vil droppe samarbejde med Islamisk Trossamfund, 2015.

See e.g. DR, Flertal i Etisk Råd åbner for tvangsbehandling af gravide misbrugere, 2015.

O. Borg, Dreng tvangsfjernet af frygt for radikalisering, 2015, Jyllands-Posten.

Andersen and Moe, Responding to Radicalization, 2015, p. 82.

Oxford Research, Midtvejsevaluering af ‘Helhedsorienteret forebyggelse af ekstremisme’- Mentor-,

forældre- og ung-til-ung-dialogindsats, 2014, p. 29.

Lindekilde, Refocusing the Danish counter-radicalisation efforts: an analysis of the (problematic)

logic and practice of individual de-radicalisation interventions, 2015, pp. 230-231.

See e.g. Rigspolitiet, Evaluering af myndighedsindsatsen forud for og i forbindelse med terrorhæn-

delserne den 14. og 15. februar 2015 i København, 2015, and Københavns Kommune, Anbefalinger

fra ekspertgruppen til forebyggelse af radikalisering: Færre radikaliserede gennem en effektiv og

sammenhængende indsats, 2015 (abridged version available in English).

According to the Danish Security and Intelligence Agency’s threat evaluation, October 23, 2015.

Personal conversation, October 23, 2015.

Fængselsfunktionæren, magazine no. 4, 2015, p. 4.

Socialpædagogerne, Antiradikalisering: Socialpædagogers viden, erfaringer og håndtering, 2015.

For more on this see e.g. Hemmingsen, A., Crone, M. and Witt, J. P., The Politicisation of Violence: An

Alternative to Radicalisation. Crime and terrorism, 2015; Hemmingsen, A., Understanding and preven-

tion after the Copenhagen shootings. Trends in recent attacks in the West, 2015.

Rigspolitiet [Danish National Police], Evaluering af myndighedsindsatsen forud for og i forbindelse

med terrorhændelserne den 14. og 15. februar 2015 i København, 2015, p. 95.

HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 2011.

Ibid.

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LITERATURE

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, REPORTS, EVALUATIONS, ETC.

COWI.

(2011) Midtvejsevaluering af regeringens handlingsplan “En fælles og tryg fremtid”

(Interim evaluation of the Danish Government’s action plan: “A common and safe future”).

Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equailty, Integration and Social Affairs.

(2011)

14 eksempler fra arbejdet med radikalisering [14 examples of working with radicalization].

Prevention of extremism: Handbook series.

Available from: http://www.integrationsviden.dk/

demokrati-deltagelse/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme#.VkTetKN7y72. [Accessed on 12

November 2015].

Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equailty, Integration and Social Affairs.(2011)

Lokale strategier [Local Strategies].

Prevention of extremism: Handbook series.

Available

from: http://www.integrationsviden.dk/demokrati-deltagelse/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme#.

VkTetKN7y72. [Accessed on 12

November 2015].

Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equailty, Integration and Social Affairs.

(2012)

Metoder i arbejdet med radikalisering [Methods for working with radicalization].

Prevention of extremism: Handbook series.

Available from: http://www.integrationsviden.dk/

demokrati-deltagelse/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme#.VkTetKN7y72. [Accessed on 12

November 2015].

Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equailty, Integration and Social Affairs.

(2012)

Antidemokratiske og ekstremistiske miljøer [Antidemocratic and extremist environments].

Prevention of extremism: Handbook series.

Available from: http://www.integrationsviden.dk/

demokrati-deltagelse/forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme#.VkTetKN7y72. [Accessed on 12

November 2015].

Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs.

(2012)

Relations- og mentorarbejde [Relational work and mentoring].

Prevention of extremism:

Handbook series.

Available from: http://www.integrationsviden.dk/demokrati-deltagelse/

forebyggelse-af-ekstremisme#.VkTetKN7y72. [Accessed on 12

November 2015].

Expert Group To Prevent Radicalisation.

(2015) Færre radikaliserede gennem en effektiv og

sammenhængende indsats: Anbefalinger fra ekspertgruppen til forebyggelse af radikalisering

[Less radicalization through an effective and coherent effort: Recommendations of the expert

group to prevent radicalization] Copenhagen: Copenhagen Municipality. (Abridged version

available in English)

Fængelsforbundet

[Prison Association]. (2015) Fængselsfunktionæren [The Prison Function-

ary], Magazine no. 4. Copenhagen: PE Offset A/S.

Government of Denmark.

(2015) Et stærkt værn mod terror. 12 nye tiltag mod terror

[A strong defence against terrorism: 12 new initiatives against terrorism]. Copenhagen:

Justitsministeriet.

Government of Denmark.

(2014) Prevention of radicalization and extremism: Action plan.

Copenhagen: Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs.

Government of Denmark.

(2009) A common and safe future: An action plan to prevent

extremist views and radicalization among young people, Copenhagen: Schultz Distribution.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

HM Government.

(2011) Prevent Strategy, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State

for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, June 2011.

Navigent A/S.

(2014) Deradicalisation – Back on track. Concept for mentor training

programme with a focus on extremism and radicalisation. On behalf of the Danish Depart-

ment of Prisons and Probation & the Danish Ministry of Children, Gender, Equality, Integration

and Social Affairs. May.

Oxford Research.

(2014) Midtvejsevaluering af ’Helhedsorienteret forebyggelse af ekstrem-

isme’- Mentor-, forældre- og ung-til-ung-dialogindsats (Interim evaluation of “Holistic

approach to prevention of extremism” – Mentor-, parent- and youth-to-youth dialogue

efforts), Copenhagen: Socialstyrelsen [The National Board of Social Services]

Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)

[The Danish Security and Intelligence Service]. (2015)

Årlig redegørelse 2014 [Annual report 2014]. Copenhagen: PET.

Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)

[The Danish Security and Intelligence Service]. (2015)

Terrortruslen mod Danmark fra udrejste til Syrien/Irak (Terror threat against Denmark from

individuals travelling to Syria/Iraq), threat evaluation of 23 October 2015. Copenhagen.

Rigspolitiet.

[Danish National Police] (2015) Evaluering af myndighedsindsatsen forud for og

i forbindelse med terrorhændelserne den 14. og 15. februar 2015 i København [Evaluation of

the authorities’ efforts before and in relations to the terrorist incidents of 14-15 February

2015], Copenhagen.

Silber, M. D. and A. Bhatt

(2007) Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, New

York City Police Department.

Socialpædagogerne

[Social Educators]. (2015) Antiradikalisering. Socialpædagogers viden,

erfaringer og håndtering [Anti-radicalization. Knowledge, experience and addressing among

social educators]. Socialpædagogerne.

Østjyllands Politi And Aarhus Kommune

[East Jutland Police og Aarhus Municipality]. (2014)

Forebyggelse af radikalisering og diskrimination i Aarhus [Prevention of radicalization and

discrimination in Aarhus]. Aarhus: SSP.

ACADEMIC LITERATURE

Andersen, L. E. and Moe, L. W.

(2015) Responding to Radicalization: Exporting the

Dilemmas. In MOURITZEN, H. and HVIDT, N. (eds.).

Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2015,

Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Bergh, A. & Bjørnskov, C.

(2011) Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the

Welfare State,

Kyklos

64(1), pp. 1–19.

Borch, C.

(2005) Kriminalitet og magt. Kriminalitetsopfattelser i det 20. Århundrede

[Crime and power: Perceptions of crime in the 20

century], Copenhagen: Politisk Revy.

Gemmerli, T.

(2015) Radicalisation: A politically contrived concept. DIIS Policy Brief,

Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Gemmerli, T.

(2015) The fight against online radicalisation starts offline: Extremism on the

internet. DIIS Policy Brief. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

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Gemmerli, T.

(2014) Online-radikalisering: en rundrejse i forskningslitteraturen: Litteratur-

review af definitioner og tilgange inden for online-radikalisering [Online radicalization: A round

trip of the research literature: Literature review of definitions and approaches in online

radicalization], DIIS Report 2014:08. Danish Institute for International Studies.

Gemmerli, T.

(2014) Online-radikalisering: et uafklaret begreb. Litteraturreview af definitioner

og tilgange inden for online-radikalisering, [Online radicalization: an unreconciled concept.

Literature review of definitions of and approaches to online radicalization], DIIS Report

2014:07. Danish Institute for International Studies.

Gemmerli, T.

(2014) Ny definition af radikalisering - en ligning med mange ubekendte

[New definition of radicalization – an equation with many unknowns], DIIS Policy Brief,

Danish Institute for International Studies.

Githens-Mazer, J. and Lambert R.

(2010) Why conventional wisdom on radicalisation fails:

the persistence of a failed discourse,

International Affairs.

86(4), pp. 889-901.

Hemmingsen, A., Crone, M. and Witt, J. P.

(2015) The Politicisation of Violence:

An Alternative to Radicalisation. Crime and terrorism, DIIS Policy Brief, Danish Institute for

International Studies.

Hemmingsen, A.

(2015) Understanding and prevention after the Copenhagen shootings.

Trends in recent attacks in the West, DIIS Policy Brief, Danish Institute for International

Studies.

Kundani, A.

(2012) Radicalisation: the journey of a concept, in

Baker-Beal, C., Heath-Kelly,

C. and Jarvis, L.

(eds.),

Counter-radicalisation. Critical perspectives,

Abingdon: Routledge.

Lindekilde, L.

(2015) Refocusing the Danish counter-radicalisation efforts: an analysis of the

(problematic) logic and practice of individual de-radicalisation interventions, in

Baker-Beal,

C., Heath-Kelly, C. and Jarvis, L.

(eds.),

Counter-radicalisation. Critical perspectives,

Abingdon: Routledge.

Lindekilde, L.

(2015) Dansk forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikalisering 2009-2014:

udviklingstendenser og fremtidige udfordringer [Danish prevention of extremism and

radicalisation 2009-2014: tendencies in development and future challenges],

Politica,

47(3),

pp. 424-444.

Patel, F.

(2011)

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Brennan Center for Justice, New York University

School of Law.

Sedgwick, M.

(2010) The concept of radicalisation as a source of confusion,

Terrorism and

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22(4), pp. 479-494.

MEDIA

Borg, O.

(2015) Dreng tvangsfjernet af frygt for radikalisering [Boy removed from his family

for fear of radicalization],

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February 2015. Available from: http://

jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE7494670/Dreng+tvangsfjernet+af+frygt+for+radikalisering/

[Accessed on 23

November 2015].

Danmarks Radio.

(2015) Flertal i Etisk Råd åbner for tvangsbehandling af gravide misbrugere

[Majority in the Ethical Council opens up for compulsory treatment of pregnant drug users],

[Online] 29

September. Available from: http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/fler-

tal-i-etisk-raad-aabner-tvangsbehandling-af-gravide-misbrugere [Accessed on 23

November

2015 ].

Dahlgaad, M. & H. Jensen

(2015) København vil droppe samarbejde med Islamisk Trossam-

fund [Copenhagen to abandon cooperation with Islamisk Trossamfund],

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bejde-med-islamisk-trossamfund [Accessed on 23

November 2015].

Kinder, T.

(2014) Denmark: Isis Fighters Warmly Welcomed Home by the Psychiatrists,

International Business Times.

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October. Available from: http://www.ibtimes.co.

uk/denmark-isis-fighters-warmly-welcome-home-by-psychiatrists-1470546 [Accessed on

November 2015].

Nissen, L. S.

(2015) København fordobler indsats mod radikalisering [Copenhagen doubles

the efforts against radicalization],

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September. Available from: http://

www.b.dk/nationalt/koebenhavn-fordobler-indsats-mod-radikalisering. [Accessed on 23

November 2015].

Sheikh, J.

(2015), Aarhus: Skamrost model har huller [Aarhus: Praised model has flaws],

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October. Available from: http://politiken.dk/indland/ECE2890653/

aarhus-skamrost-model-har-huller/. [Accessed on 23

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Sheikh, J.

(2015), Socialpædagoger mangler hjælp mod radikalisering [Social educators need

help against radicalization],

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politiken.dk/indland/samfund/ECE2928093/socialpaedagoger-mangler-hjaelp-mod-radika-

lisering/ [Accessed on 23

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THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

REU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 248: Diis Report 2015: 15: An Introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization

DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Østbanegade 117 DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø www.diis.dk