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# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

adopted by the

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

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#### **DECLARATION 419**

on

#### NATO ENLARGEMENT\*

- 1. **Recalling** its Declaration 409 on *NATO Enlargement* adopted at the spring session in Vilnius in May 2014;
- 2. **Reaffirming** its full and continuous support for NATO enlargement and the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*\*:
- 3. **Noting** that in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's door remains open for European countries ready and able to fulfil the requirements of NATO membership;
- 4. **Acknowledging** the renewal by Ukraine of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations;
- 5. **Welcoming** the Wales Summit decisions on the open door policy, including the renewed encouragement addressed to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>\*\*</sup>, the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package which helps Georgia to advance its membership of the Alliance, and the commitment to decide on Montenegro's invitation by the end of 2015;
- 6. **Stressing** that NATO aspirants must continue with necessary preparations to fulfil the requirements of NATO membership as set out in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;
- 7. **Recalling** that NATO enlargement poses no threat to any nation but rather enhances the security and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic region;
- 8. **Stressing** that the NATO enlargement process cannot be influenced by a third party, other than by Alliance and aspirant countries;
- 9. *Highlighting* the strong catalysing effect of the open door policy, and *noting* that this positive impact requires the open door policy to remain a realistic and credible prospect;
- 10. **Convinced therefore** that Allies must continue to affirm and demonstrate their commitment to the open door policy;
- 11. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to maintain the Wales Summit commitment to the open door policy;
  - b. to deliver the support agreed at the Summit for aspirant countries, and to decide on Montenegro's invitation by the end of 2015;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 18 May 2015, Budapest, Hungary

<sup>\*\*</sup> Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

- c. to continue supporting the implementation of a Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and, in accordance with the Bucharest 2008 Summit decision, to take the next step in Georgia's integration to NATO by granting it a Membership Action Plan;
- 12. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the countries striving for NATO membership to redouble their efforts to address outstanding issues on their path towards membership;
- 13. **RECOGNISES** the difficult environment, in which Ukraine appears against a backdrop of the unprecedented aggression by the Russian Federation, and **ENCOURAGES** the Ukrainian Government and Parliament to put every effort into reforming the country according to democratic Euro-Atlantic standards;
- 14. **PLEDGES,** as it has done in the past, to render aspirant countries all possible assistance to help them achieve their goal of NATO membership.

on

### ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM\*

- 1. **Condemning** in the strongest terms the 10 October 2015 terrorist attack in Ankara and **expressing** its solidarity with the people of Turkey in the face of this tragedy;
- 2. **Deeply concerned** that the threat of terrorism in all its forms, including home-grown terrorism, has increased in recent years in the Euro-Atlantic area, as witnessed by terrorist attacks in Brussels, Ottawa, Paris, Copenhagen and Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, *inter alia*;
- 3. **Alarmed** by the proliferation of violent extremist groups across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond, and the extreme brutality and extensive, systematic abuse of human rights by these groups, in particular by Daesh and groups inspired by it;
- 4. **Noting** that these groups continue to threaten the security of neighbouring states, including members of the Euro-Atlantic community, primarily due to the so-called foreign fighters phenomenon and the use of the online communication platforms to promote violence and extremist ideas;
- 5. **Concerned** about the rise of xenophobia, islamophobia and other religious prejudices;
- 6. **Commending** the efforts of the international community to address the evolving terrorist threat, including the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the renewed initiatives to establish European Union-wide mechanisms to prevent terrorism, NATO's efforts to improve threat awareness and preparedness of the Allies, as well as a number of significant measures adopted on the national level in the Euro-Atlantic area to enhance national counter-terrorism capabilities, improve information sharing with relevant partners and assist countries in the MENA region with training, technical support and, when necessary, targeted military action against violent extremist groups;
- 7. **Stressing** that law enforcement measures alone are insufficient and need to be complemented by programmes focusing on the prevention of radicalisation and deradicalisation;
- 8. **Emphasising** the need to ensure that additional security measures do not undercut the values of freedom, democracy and human rights that underpin the North Atlantic Alliance;
- 9. **Considering** that a positive role is played by international support for development in those countries where social and economic problems, as well as inadequacy of local governments, corruption, lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law, create favourable conditions for terrorism expansion, particularly in Northern Africa and the Sub-Sahara region;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- 10. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to continue strengthening NATO's contribution to countering terrorism by expanding its role as a platform for exchanging relevant information and best practices among the Allies and partners, as well as for jointly developing technological counter-terrorism solutions;
- b. to support the EU's role in counter-terrorism, particularly by championing initiatives such as the creation of the European passenger name record; the introduction of an EU black list of terrorist suspects; the establishment of an EU terrorist finance tracking system; the strengthening of Frontex and Europol; the adoption of the Smart Borders package; the development of a European platform to improve the monitoring of extremist activity on the Internet; and the formation of a European tribunal specialising in terrorism offenses;
- c. to improve, in co-operation with the international community, and in particular the EU and NATO countries, their efforts in supporting international development and capacity-building programmes, giving priority to those countries where terrorism takes advantage from social, economic and governance difficulties to expand its influence;
- d. to implement vigorously UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters and to support broader global counter-terrorism initiatives such as the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the 2011 Global Counterterrorism Forum;
- e. to improve and broaden intelligence information-sharing mechanisms among the Allies and to encourage horizontal co-operation of sub-national law enforcement agencies;
- f. to invest adequately into the research and analysis of the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism;
- g. to ensure the implementation of the 40 Recommendations by the G7 Financial Action Task Force, the purpose of which is to establish standards to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, and to assist countries that are not yet meeting these standards;
- h. to ensure that law enforcement agencies have the adequate funding and manpower and to invest in technological counter-terrorism solutions including those that improve railway transport security;
- i. to consider augmenting national and sub-national counter-radicalisation programmes and to share best practices in this area;
- j. to mitigate the influence of extremist ideology and to facilitate counter-extremist narratives by curtailing the activities of hate preachers, supporting peaceful and moderate religious figures and encouraging the involvement of influential people such as musicians, sportsmen or bloggers who can appeal to the younger generation;
- k. to reinforce legal, parliamentary and civil oversight mechanisms regarding the use of surveillance and law enforcement agencies, and to exchange best practices and lessons learned in this area;
- I. to increase assistance to smaller European Allies as well as to partners in Europe, Asia and Africa, especially those with a large number of fighters returning from conflict zones, in addressing terrorist threats by augmenting the existing national intelligence, law enforcement and military capabilities of these countries.

on

# COUNTERING RUSSIA'S PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS\*

- 1. **Alarmed** by the intensity of Russia's propaganda and disinformation policies towards its own population, its neighbourhood and beyond, using various local media outlets to spread anti-Western sentiment, hate speech, homophobia and xenophobia, which aim to weaken Euro-Atlantic solidarity, to justify aggression against neighbours and to obstruct their Euro-Atlantic integration as well as to boost the popularity of Putin's regime;
- 2. **Denouncing** Russia's misuse of the open and pluralistic nature of the free world's media scene, while its own media space remains under the tight control of the government;
- 3. **Aware** that Russia's policy arsenal to influence and manipulate opinion abroad includes, among other techniques, creating confusion in the information space by spreading unverified information and conspiracy theories; disseminating completely fabricated reports; employing so-called Internet trolls; infiltrating the expert and NGO scenes as well as "compatriot" communities; promoting a distorted version of history; and increasing Russia's footprint in foreign media space;
- 4. **Convinced** that Russia's propaganda campaigns pose both an immediate and a long-term challenge that requires an active response by Allies, including the promotion of strong counter-narratives:
- 5. **Stressing** that this response should not include counter-propaganda, and must remain faithful to the values of democracy, human rights and freedom of the media;
- 6. **Commending** the efforts of NATO and the EU to address this challenge, in particular the work of NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, including its increased assistance to Ukraine; the inauguration of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga; the preparation of the EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication; as well as the national efforts of NATO and EU member states and Eastern European partners;
- 7. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to further reinforce relevant bodies within NATO and the EU in order to enhance their ability to respond swiftly to the most blatant cases of disinformation, including the revision of policies regarding classified intelligence information such as satellite imagery to allow public diplomacy officers to use less sensitive information:
- b. to facilitate the development of a coherent set of arguments refuting myths cultivated by Moscow;
- c. to establish platforms for the exchange of best national practices among the Euro-Atlantic community and for flagging potential information security threats;

presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- d. to revisit legislation that strengthens legal counter-measures such as imposing fines for the use of hate speech and clear disinformation;
- e. to encourage the world's leading media outlets to develop a set of high journalistic standards and encourage independent global watchdogs to monitor how these standards are being followed;
- f. to support international and national media initiatives in the Russian language, including launching a commonly-funded engaging and dynamic Russian-language TV channel;
- g. to revisit legislation in order to increase transparency of the funding of the media, NGOs and think tanks;
- h. to continue applying individual travel sanctions against the most active propagandists;
- i. to promote innovative and inexpensive measures such as the greater use of humour;
- j. to invest in research and education on how to recognise, report and react to orchestrated "trolling" attacks;
- k. to increase capacity building assistance to partner countries including Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the field of strategic communications;
- I. to support the work of professional historians who can provide credible responses to pseudoscientific theories propagated by Moscow;
- m. to encourage grass-roots civic initiatives that expose disinformation.

on

#### SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE\*

- 1. **Reiterating** its firm support for the government and the people of Ukraine in their struggle for independence and territorial integrity and their pursuit of European and Euro-Atlantic integration;
- 2. **Condemning** in the strongest terms the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and Russia's continuing military aggression in eastern Ukraine as well as the detention of Nadiya Savchenko, Oleh Sentsov and other Ukrainians since the beginning of the conflict, in blatant violation of Russia's international obligations and commitments under the Minsk agreements;
- 3. **Deeply disturbed** by Russia's disregard for human rights in the illegally occupied Ukrainian territories, including severe repression of the Tatar community and Ukrainian minority in Crimea;
- 4. **Applauding** the constitutional amendments in Ukraine designed to devolve more powers to local governments as a manifestation of Ukraine's commitment to building an inclusive society;
- 5. **Deeply regretting** that Russian-backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine are preventing Ukrainian local elections from taking place in areas under their control in contravention of the Minsk agreements; and **calling on** Russia to be co-operative in the development of an understanding on the modalities and timeframe of local elections in certain areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions;
- 6. **Deploring** Russia's decision to veto the plans for an international tribunal to investigate the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17;
- 7. **Emphasising** the need for diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict with Russia and **welcoming** the recent ceasefire as an important step, while **recognising** that these efforts should not compromise Ukrainian territorial integrity nor Ukraine's inalienable right to determine its own place in the European and Euro-Atlantic order;
- 8. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- m. to redouble efforts to help Ukraine at this critical juncture by increasing diplomatic, political, financial, economic, material and expert assistance both bilaterally and through bodies such as NATO, the EU and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;
- n. to maintain political, diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia until Moscow fully implements its commitments under the Minsk agreements, convincingly demonstrates that it is willing to abide by international law, and ends the occupation of Ukrainian territories, including Crimea;
- o. to press Russia and separatist forces to lift all restrictions on the ability of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to access to all areas of eastern Ukraine, including areas along the border with Russia, and report fully all relevant observations;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- p. to encourage and support direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives with the participation of international mediators in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict;
- 9. **CALLS** on democratically elected Ukrainian politicians to continue to demonstrate the moderation and determination necessary to build an inclusive and tolerant society, and to establish the highest standards possible in matters of political, economic and judicial governance, and, in particular, to tackle resolutely the problem of corruption.

on

#### MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE WALES SUMMIT INITIATIVES\*

The Assembly,

- 1. **Recognising** the changed security environment on NATO's eastern and southern flanks, requiring determined, comprehensive whole-of-Alliance responses;
- 2. **Appalled** by Russia's annexation of Crimea and continued military interference in Ukraine as well as by the occupation of the territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) of Georgia, and **troubled** by the difficulties encountered so far to implement the provisions of the Minsk II agreement and the EU-brokered Russian-Georgian ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008;
- 3. **Supporting** accordingly the advances made at the 'Normandy Format' Summit in Paris on 2 October 2015 with a view to consolidating the ceasefire and implementing the political part of the Minsk agreements in accordance with a suitable timetable;
- 4. **Remaining** unified and vigilant vis-à-vis Russia's ongoing attempts to use hybrid tactics to destabilize the eastern regions of the Alliance;
- 5. **Alarmed** by the increasing instability and rise of powerful, disruptive non-state armed groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) which have caused unprecedented levels of conflict, state failure and displaced populations;
- 6. **Concerned** by the increasing refugee flows from the MENA region toward Europe, posing some of the greatest challenges to all member and partner states in decades;
- 7. **Recognising** that, in the face of the new international security environment, solidarity among the members of the Euro-Atlantic community is as important today as it has ever been;
- 8. **Acknowledging** the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the Defence Spending Pledge, announced at the September 2014 Wales Summit, as key initiatives necessary for the Alliance to rise to these current and future security challenges;
- 9. **Commending** all 28 Allies for contributing to reassurance measures in Eastern Europe, including continuous air, land and maritime presence and other meaningful military activity, but **calling** for greater efforts to address the challenges emanating from the increasing instability along the Alliance's southern flank;
- 10. **Encouraged** by the progress of the RAP via the enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the rapid establishment, training and exercising of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), as a means of increasing Alliance readiness;
- 11. **Noting** that effective implementation of the RAP requires a robust, flexible and responsive NATO command structure with increased regional focus and enhanced situational awareness;

\* presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- 12. **Welcoming** the establishment of new multinational command and control structures, the NATO Force Integration Units, to support collective defence planning and assist with the multinational training and exercising of NATO forces in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania;
- 13. **Approving of** the enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on collective defence and incorporating hybrid threats and complex civil-military scenarios, but also **recalling** the need to maintain peak crisis response capabilities in parallel;
- 14. *Applauding* the organisation and launch of Trident Juncture Exercise 2015, qualifying elements of the NRF for rotational duties and proving the capabilities of the VJTF;
- 15. **Expressing its appreciation** to Germany, the Netherlands and Norway for leading the training and exercising of the interim VJTF, as well as its appreciation to Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Turkey and France for agreeing to be VJTF framework nations in the coming years;
- 16. **Welcoming** efforts by the United States to support the RAP through the European Reassurance Initiative and other high-end military asset transfers;
- 17. **Aware** that NATO's ability to reinforce host nation defences quickly along the eastern flank depends *inter alia* upon the preparation of infrastructure, preposition of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases for use, and **urges** that this work should be accelerated;
- 18. **Stressing** the importance for NATO of strengthening co-operation with the EU, based on the complementarity of their respective capabilities;
- 19. **Emphasising** also the importance of NATO enhancing co-ordination with other regional institutions:
- 20. **Confident** that the implementation of the RAP will be a success, emblematic of the Alliance's posture after the Wales Summit;
- 21. **Noting** the hybrid and distributed nature of current security threats on both the eastern and southern flanks of the Alliance require Allies to invest in their national capabilities and shore up NATO's situational awareness, mobility, and response time;
- 22. **Cognizant** that the NRF is only a small subset of the total national forces that may be called upon by NATO in an emergency and that the Allies need to maintain adequate readiness of their forces in order to conduct NATO's full range of missions;
- 23. **Highlighting and reminding** NATO member states of the importance of the Wales Summit Defence Spending Pledge, and **cognizant** of the high cost of reassurance and deterrence measures necessary today and into the future;
- 24. **Commending** efforts of European Allies to contribute to defence capabilities through the NATO Framework Nations Concept and the launch of three multinational European projects at the Wales Summit:
- 25. **Underscoring** that a strong European defence industry is critical not only to the development and maintenance of Alliance-wide capabilities, but also to address the growing problem of transatlantic and inter-European burden sharing;
- 26. **Recognising** the importance of the Alliance's open door policy for the Alliance itself and for partner and aspirant countries to join the Alliance based on their will and readiness;

- 27. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to work to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and to encourage Allies to move toward the NATO guidelines that recommend spending 2% GDP on national defence; and to dedicate at least 20% of their spending on new equipment;
- b. to demonstrate the political will and foresight to invest in their present and future defence forces, thereby strengthening their contributions to Alliance capability and readiness;
- to seek the basis for agreement on the framework for the utilisation of elements of the Readiness Action Plan in sub-Article 5 situations, particularly regarding the authority to alert and stage NATO forces;
- d. to work together to facilitate the rapid movement of equipment across European member states' territories during contingency operations;
- e. to plan for and understand the processes necessary for force deployment by individual member states;
- f. to renew discussions about intelligence sharing with NATO civil and military leaders as a means of enhancing situational awareness across the Alliance;
- g. to increase public outreach and education efforts to expand and build awareness and resilience among domestic populations as a means of resisting subversive tactics of hybrid warfare;
- h. to reaffirm commitments to share the burdens of the Alliance's costs and responsibilities, thereby strengthening fundamental and essential transatlantic and inter-European bonds of trust:
- i. to continue to support and further contribute to the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package which helps Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership in the Alliance, while welcoming the progress made on the Package, particularly the holding of the first NATO-Georgia exercise and the inauguration of the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in Georgia (JTEC);
- j. to provide support to partner states receiving refugees from the MENA region;
- k. to develop national cyber defence capabilities, and to continue to devise and enhance strategies of cyber defence co-operation among Allies and with relevant partner nations and organisations.

on

#### ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA\*

- 1. **Acknowledging** that Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, ongoing military aggression in Eastern Ukraine as well as other efforts to destabilise Ukraine are consistent with its aggressive posture toward its neighbours, including the occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), threaten European security, and constitute a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter and Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances;
- 2. **Noting** Russia's illegal aggression and support for armed groups in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;
- 3. **Expressing** solidarity with Ukraine and determination to assist it in this difficult moment;
- 4. **Noting** that Western sanctions on Russia represent a measured response to its transgressions of international law and send an important signal that "business as usual" is impossible as long as Russia persists in this policy line;
- 5. **Affirming** that these sanctions aim to express opposition to Russian actions, to signal that there is a price to pay for its Ukraine policy, with the objective of fully implementing the Minsk agreements, and to pressure Russia to come to the negotiating table to settle current disputes related to Ukraine and to stop violating fundamental international norms and principles:
- 6. **Applauding** the European Council's decision to extend sanctions against Russia as well as measures targeting dealings with Crimea and Sevastopol which Russia illegally occupies;
- 7. **Recognising** that Russia currently confronts an array of domestic economic difficulties linked to the falling price of energy, overreliance on energy exports, self-imposed restrictions on trade with Western countries, the flight of capital due to worsening governance and corruption problems;
- 8. **Acknowledging** that the United States, Canada and the EU stand ready to take further measures if required;
- 9. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to maintain the current sanctions regime on Russia concerning the situation in Eastern Ukraine as long as the Minsk agreements are not fully implemented, and to maintain the sanctions concerning Crimea/Sevastopol as long as the annexation is not ended;
- b. to be prepared to toughen these sanctions if Russia fails to meet its obligations under the Minsk agreements;
- c. to provide comprehensive support to the democratically elected government of Ukraine which is under enormous pressure from Russia;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

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- d. to demonstrate political and economic solidarity with those countries suffering from Russia's counter-sanctions and those non-NATO countries the economic and political freedom of which Russia now threatens:
- e. to counter Russia's highly misleading narrative about the nature of this conflict;
- f. to deny Russia the political leverage it seeks to exercise over the continent by diversifying Europe's energy supply base and enhancing energy interconnections, thus reducing its reliance on Russian oil and gas;
- g. to maintain channels of communication with the Kremlin and to work to find diplomatic ways to resolve these serious tensions.

on

# AN URGENT COMPREHENSIVE AND UNIFIED RESPONSE TO CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA)\*

The Assembly,

- 1. **Deeply concerned** about the continuing conflicts in Syria and Iraq which have triggered a devastating humanitarian crisis with severe repercussions for regional and global security;
- 2. **Appalled** by the brutal and indiscriminate use of force as well as by the gross, systematic and widespread human rights violations by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, as well as by Daesh and other parties to the conflicts in Syria and in Iraq;
- 3. **Condemning** Daesh's destruction of cultural sites considered as historical and architectural treasures;
- 4. **Commending** Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for hosting the overwhelming majority of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- 5. **Recognising** that many European countries are also confronted with an increasing inflow of refugees from the MENA region;
- 6. **Noting** that the number of returning foreign fighters is a key security concern for the countries in the MENA region, but also for other countries worldwide;
- 7. **Alarmed** that the rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq is impacting the stability of the MENA region, particularly Libya which risks sliding into further anarchy and chaos, unless the Government of National Accord is formed without further delay, and **deeply concerned** about the security situation in Yemen which has become a veritable safe haven for terrorist organisations following many years of dysfunctional governance and internal conflicts;
- 8. **Convinced** that any long-term settlement of these crises requires inclusive political solutions supported by all relevant international stakeholders, but that keeping up military pressure against Daesh and other extremist groups is essential in the meantime;
- 9. **Concerned** that, in the absence of such a long-term settlement, the humanitarian crises in the MENA region will only worsen, thereby fuelling a further deterioration of security and an increase in the number of refugees;
- 10. **Affirming** that dealing with the conditions that enable and support Daesh's rise is a strategic priority that requires countries in the MENA region to pursue inclusive policies and work together to stem the spread of extremist ideologies;
- 11. **Concerned** that Russia's military intervention and support for the Assad regime escalates the war and complicates finding a solution in Syria, and **alarmed** about Russia's violation of Turkish airspace and failure to co-ordinate its efforts with the international coalition against Daesh;

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<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- 12. **Welcoming** the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme;
- 13. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance, the EU, the international community and the governments of the countries in the MENA region:
- a. to continue to support the international coalition's efforts to neutralise the extremist groups operating in Syria and Iraq;
- b. to step up efforts to reach a comprehensive ceasefire and peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria through a Syrian-led and inclusive political process, and to support the ongoing diplomatic efforts in this regard, including those by the United Nations Special Envoy;
- c. to examine the possibility of the establishment of a no-fly zone and safe zones in Syria for the sheltering and protection of local communities and internally displaced persons;
- d. to increase humanitarian aid significantly and facilitate the granting of asylum for refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq;
- e. to provide support to partner states granting asylum to refugees fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq;
- f. to consider further measures, bilaterally and through NATO, to support Iraq in its fight against Daesh and other extremist groups;
- g. to continue to press the government of Iraq to pursue an active policy of inclusion and reconciliation involving all religious and ethnic minorities of the country, and to monitor the implementation of that policy;
- h. to work towards an agreement of all parties to the Libyan dialogue on the final text presented by UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UN SRSG), Bernardino León, and to follow up by assisting Libya in the process of reconciliation, rehabilitation and stabilisation;
- to improve the support to international development and capacity-building programmes in the MENA region;
- j. to develop a comprehensive policy approach to forces fighting Daesh, including the Kurdish Peshmerga (Iraq), which focuses on providing advice, training and assistance;

#### 14. **URGES** NATO member states:

- a. to increase material and logistical aid to neighbouring countries that are hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in order to improve their capability to deal with the refugee flows triggered by the Syrian crisis;
- b. to strengthen co-operation with the UN in logistical and humanitarian matters in order to improve conditions in refugee camps in neighbouring countries;

#### 15. **CALLS UPON** the Syrian regime:

a. to end the violence against the Syrian people and strictly observe the principles of humanitarian law and in particular to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 2139 and 2165 in order to guarantee humanitarian access and delivery;

- b. to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all actors of the Syrian opposition willing to negotiate in order to achieve a viable political compromise;
- 16. **CALLS UPON** the government of the Russian Federation to cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians immediately and to focus its efforts on fighting Daesh, to co-ordinate its efforts with the international coalition against Daesh and to promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition;
- 17. **CALLS UPON** the government and parliament of Iraq and all relevant parties of the country to build upon recent positive efforts to foster inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian reconciliation and to work together closely to defeat Daesh and other extremist groups, and put an end to human rights violations:
- 18. **CALLS UPON** all parties to the Libyan dialogue to agree to a swift and conclusive approval of the final text of a political agreement as presented by UN SRSG Bernardino León, to end the violent confrontation to the benefit of all Libyans and so that the new Government of National Accord can be formed without further delay;
- 19. **ENCOURAGES** the governments and parliaments of the MENA region:
- to fully back international efforts to defeat Daesh and other violent extremist organisations, to block the flow of foreign fighters to the region and stem the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorism;
- b. to use their influence to encourage political solutions to the conflicts in the region and to refrain from any action that might heighten tensions and aggravate the situation:
- c. to work together in bringing the belligerents in Yemen to the negotiation table to ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015), and to assist them in reaching a political settlement that leads to lasting peace.

on

## STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND STABILITY THROUGH NATO'S OPEN DOOR AND PARTNERSHIP POLICIES\*

The Assembly,

- 1. **Commemorating** the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Dayton Accords which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and paved the way for a new era of stability and co-operation in the Western Balkans;
- 2. **Recalling and commending** NATO's decisive role in restoring peace in the Western Balkans and in laying the foundations for lasting security and for the region's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions:
- 3. **Noting** that the Dayton Accords led to the development of a robust crisis-management role for NATO and practical co-operation with partner countries;
- 4. **Recognising and applauding** the invaluable contributions that partner countries have made to NATO-led missions and operations since the first deployments in the Western Balkans;
- 5. **Acknowledging** the crucial role these partnerships play in the promotion of international peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond;
- 6. **Underlining** the complementarity of NATO's Partnership and Open Door policies, and **noting** that the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of co-operative security have advanced stability in Europe;
- 7. **Stressing** that NATO's co-operation with partner countries rests on common values and aims to promote co-operation, confidence and stability, as well as increasing members' and partners' capacities to address new security challenges;
- 8. **Reaffirming** its full and continuous support for NATO enlargement and the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*\*, as stated in its declaration 419 on NATO Enlargement adopted at its Budapest Session in May 2015;
- 9. **Acknowledging** the renewal by Ukraine of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and **saluting** Kyiv's efforts to implement comprehensive reforms despite ongoing aggression by the Russian Federation;

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presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015,
Stavanger, Norway

<sup>\*\*</sup> Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

- 10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to continue delivering the support agreed at the Wales Summit for NATO aspirant countries, including support for implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package;
- b. to extend Montenegro an invitation to join the Alliance;
- c. to reiterate the Wales Summit commitment to the Open Door policy at the next NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, and to consider taking the next steps towards the full membership of other aspirant countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - based on progress towards fulfilling the conditions set in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;
- d. to further increase diplomatic, political, financial, economic, material and expert assistance to Ukraine for fulfilment of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations;
- e. to carry forward the adaptation and transformation of NATO partnerships initiated at the Wales Summit, prioritising values, joint responses to common challenges, capacity building and the further development of interoperability;
- 11. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the countries striving for NATO membership to step up reforms and address outstanding issues on their path towards membership;
- 12. **URGES** the government of Georgia to implement fully the recommendations of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2077 (2015) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Helsinki Declaration 2015 AS (15) D E;
- 13. **URGES** the government and parliament of Ukraine:
- a. to press ahead with the urgent political and socio-economic reforms needed to address citizens' needs and expectations for physical and economic security, effective and transparent governance, and respect for the rights of all Ukrainians;
- b. to take full advantage of the assistance provided by NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

on

#### CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY\*

- 1. **Convinced** that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the dominant cause of the global warming observed since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century;
- 2. **Recognising** that, without a concerted global response, climate change will have severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems;
- 3. **Stressing** the urgent need for actions, measures and rules on climate change mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency;
- 4. **Endorsing** the goal to keep the increase in global average temperature below 1.5° or 2°C above pre-industrial levels through deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions;
- 5. **Underlining** the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the need to turn this principle into concrete actions, fairly balancing emissions reductions and economic development;
- 6. **Fully convinced** that climate change-related risks will affect international security through increased natural disasters; stress on economic, food and water security; risks to public health; internal and external migration; and resource competition;
- 7. **Acknowledging** that climate change-related risks are significant threat multipliers that will shape the security environment in areas of concern to the Alliance and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations;
- 8. **Recognising** the need to supplement climate action with efforts to strengthen the resilience of states and societies at risk through adaption measures, development and humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes;
- 9. **Welcoming NATO's Green Defence Framework and Smart Energy Efforts**;
- 10. **URGES** member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to negotiate an ambitious, legally-binding, rules-based, universal, flexible, balanced, sustainable and dynamic agreement at the December 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21);
- b. to make every effort to live up to their climate goals and to periodically review and strengthen them within the framework of mechanisms allowing for the aforementioned maximum limit to be respected;
- c. to shape national climate change policies so as to take into consideration the Post-2015 Development Agenda, with particular reference to the fight against poverty and to the sustainable growth of the planet;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway

- d. to fully recognise climate change-related risks as significant threat multipliers in their foreign and security policies;
- e. to subsequently increase the frequency of military and political consultations on climate change within NATO, including at NATO summits;
- f. to examine how NATO's co-operative security efforts can take into account climate change-related risks, especially with NATO partners that are particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate change;

g. to fully support and enhance NATO's Green Defence Framework and Smart Energy efforts.