KUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 48: Pressemeddelelse og rapporten ’Sports Governance Observer’

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SpORtS GOveRnAnce

ObSeRveR 2015

the legitimacy crisis in international sports governance

Report / October 2015

Arnout Geeraert

KUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 48: Pressemeddelelse og rapporten ’Sports Governance Observer’

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KUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 48: Pressemeddelelse og rapporten ’Sports Governance Observer’

SPORTS GOVERNANCE

OBSERVER 2015

THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN

INTERNATIONAL SPORTS GOVERNANCE

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KUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 48: Pressemeddelelse og rapporten ’Sports Governance Observer’

Title

Sports governance observer 2015. The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance

Author

Arnout Geeraert

Cover photo

Thomas Søndergaard

Mercoprint Digital A/S

Edition

First edition, Copenhagen, October 2015

Price

A printed version of the report can be ordered from the Danish Institute for Sports Studies, price DKK

200 (delivery excluded). The report is available for free download at www.playthegame.org.

ISBN

978-87- 93375-18-5 (printed)

978-87- 93375-19-2 (pdf)

Publisher

Play the Game

c/o Danish Institute for Sports Studies

Kanonbådsvej 4A

DK-1437 København K

T: +45 3266 1030

E: [email protected]

W: www.idan.dk

W: www.playthegame.org

Quoting from this report is allowed with proper acknowledgements

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Content

Executive summary ...........................................................................................................................7

Part I. Background and introduction ............................................................................................ 11

1. The AGGIS Project and the Sports Governance Observer tool .........................................11

Part II. Study: The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance..................................12

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 12

2. Background ............................................................................................................................... 13

2.1 Transformations in international sports governance ....................................................13

2.2 The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance .............................................14

3. Methodology............................................................................................................................. 21

3.1 Legitimacy deficits as a problem of institutional design: the PA model ....................21

3.2 Data collection .................................................................................................................... 25

4. Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 25

4.1 Delegation of authority to ISFs ........................................................................................25

4.2 Screening and selection mechanisms – main findings ..................................................28

4.3 Monitoring and reporting requirements – main findings ............................................29

4.4 Administrative procedures – main findings ..................................................................30

4.5 Institutional checks – main findings................................................................................32

4.6 Elections – main findings .................................................................................................. 33

5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 35

Part III. Sports Governance Observer survey ..............................................................................36

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 36

2. Methodology............................................................................................................................. 36

3. The four dimensions of the Sports Governance Observer .................................................38

3.1 Dimension 1. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATION .....................40

3.2 Dimension 2. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS ........................................................................52

3.3 Dimension 3. CHECKS AND BALANCES.....................................................................61

3.4 Dimension 4. SOLIDARITY ..............................................................................................68

4. Results of the Sports Governance Observer survey ............................................................75

4.1 Overall results..................................................................................................................... 75

AIBA – International Boxing Association .............................................................................77

BWF – Badminton World Federation ....................................................................................78

FEI – Fédération Equestre Internationale The SGO index for FEI is 75.6%. ....................79

FIBA – International Basketball Federation..........................................................................80

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FIBT – International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation ...................................................81

FIE - International Fencing Federation .................................................................................82

FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association.................................................83

FIG – International Gymnastics Federation .........................................................................84

FIH – International Hockey Federation ................................................................................85

FIL – International Luge Federation ......................................................................................86

FINA – Fédération Internationale de Natation ....................................................................87

FIS – International Ski Federation .........................................................................................88

FISA – International Rowing Federation ..............................................................................89

FIVB – Fédération Internationale de Volleyball...................................................................90

IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federations................................................91

IBU – International Biathlon Union .......................................................................................92

ICF – International Canoe Federation ...................................................................................93

IGF – International Golf Federation ......................................................................................94

IHF – International Handball Federation .............................................................................95

IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation .........................................................................96

IJF – International Judo Federation .......................................................................................97

ISAF – International Sailing Federation ................................................................................98

ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation...................................................................99

ISU – International Skating Union ....................................................................................... 100

ITF – International Tennis Federation ................................................................................. 101

ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation .................................................................... 102

ITU – International Triathlon Union ................................................................................... 103

IWF – International Weightlifting Federation.................................................................... 104

UCI – Union Cycliste Internationale ................................................................................... 105

UIPM – Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne .................................................... 106

UWW – United World Wrestling......................................................................................... 107

WA – World Archery Federation......................................................................................... 108

WCF – World Curling Federation ....................................................................................... 109

WR - World Rugby ................................................................................................................ 110

WTF – World Taekwondo Federation................................................................................. 111

References ....................................................................................................................................... 116

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Executive summary

This report presents the

Sports Governance Observer,

a benchmarking tool for good gov-

ernance in international sports federations based on basic good governance criteria, and its

application to the

35 Olympic international sports federations.

The report was commis-

sioned by Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies and executed by Dr. Arnout

Geeraert as a co-operation project between Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Stud-

ies and the University of Leuven.

The report consists of three main parts.

The first part

briefly explores the origins of this report. These are to be found in the Action

for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS) project, which re-

ceived financial support in 2012-2013 from the European Commission’s Preparatory Ac-

tions in the field of sport. The project produced a checklist of good governance elements for

international sports federations. This report elaborates this checklist into a practical

benchmarking tool with a scoring system.

The second part

presents an in-depth study of the governance of 35 Olympic sports federa-

tions. This study uses the data collected within the framework of the application of the

Sports Governance Observer survey to the 35 Olympic federations. The study explores how

corruption, unsatisfied internal stakeholders, and a (perceived) lack of effectiveness have

led to a crisis in the legitimacy of international sports federation, which may lead to insta-

bility and disorder in international sports governance. The study demonstrates that legiti-

macy crises are caused, first and foremost, by flawed institutional design; in particular, by a

lack of robust control mechanisms that allow both member federations and external actors

to control international sports federations. The main findings regarding the five categories

of control mechanisms identified in academic literature are:

1. Screening and selection mechanisms



Only four federations (11%) have a nominations committee in place that performs

integrity and professional checks.

A majority of 19 federations (54%) announce the candidates standing for election

one month or less before the elections take place. 32 federations (91%) announce

candidates standing for elections less than 2 months before they take place.

In only one federation, candidates are obliged to provide their manifesto.



2. Monitoring and reporting requirements



Only eight federations (23%) publish the agenda and minutes of its general

assembly on their website.

Only four federations (11%) publish governing body decisions on their website and

(sometimes) explain the rationale behind key decisions.

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

Only six federations (17%) publish annual general activity reports on their websites

that include information on assets, accounts, revenue, sponsoring, and events.

Only eight federations (23%) publish (basic) reports of their standing committees

online.

None of the federations publishes reports on remuneration, including per diem

payments and bonuses, of its board members and senior officials.

A minority of 12 federations (35%) publishes externally audited annual financial

reports on its website.

3. Administrative procedures



For the 32 federations for which data was available, a majority of 18 federations

(56%) was found to have a code of ethics that includes crucial components such as

the prohibition of bribery and procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts.

A minority of six (17%) federations have clear conflict of interest rules in place that

include disclosure requirements and the duty to abstain from voting in particular

cases, and define appropriate thresholds. Seven (20%) federations do not have con-

flict of interest rules in place at all.

In 18 of the 29 federations for which data was available (62%), the governing body

selects the host. Importantly, in none of the federations, the selection of host candi-

dates takes place according to a transparent and objectively reproducible process,

in which bidding dossiers are reviewed independently and assigned a score on the

basis of pre-established criteria.

In a majority of 23 federations (66%), the chairman/woman of the athletes’ com-

mission is a member of the decision-making body. However, in only eight federa-

tions (23%), athletes elect the chairman/woman of the athletes’ commission.



4. Institutional checks



12 federations (34%) do not have an ethics committee in place. Moreover, in only

five federations (14%), the ethics committee is robust, meaning that it is independ-

ent from the governing body and has the power to initiate proceedings on its own

initiative.

Only six federations (17%) have an internal audit committee that has a clearly de-

fined role and has the authority to oversee the internal audit and assesses the quali-

ty of the internal control system.

A minority of eight federations (23%) have an independent committee in place that

allows national federations, club, players, or official directly affected by a decision-

making body decision to appeal that decision.



5. Elections



In 23 federations (66%), elections take place according to clear and objective proce-

dures and secret ballots are used.

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

None of the federations has rules in place that limit the terms of office of the presi-

dent to two terms of four years and governing body members to two terms of four

years. However, 11 federations (31%) have some form of limitation in place.

These findings demonstrate that the majority of the 35 Olympic international sports federa-

tions do not have an institutional design implemented that allows their constituents to

monitor and sanction decision-making body members. Therefore, senior sports officials are

not sufficiently incentivised to act in accordance with their constituents’ interests.

In order to remedy the status quo,

the third part of this report

presents both the Sports

Governance Observer and the benchmarking of the 35 Olympic sports federations on the

basis of the tool. Introducing the

SGO index

as a measure of good governance, this part

exposes the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 35 federations in relation to good gov-

ernance.

It shows that the SGO index

of the 35 federations combined is 45.4% with 26 federations

(74%) scoring less than 50% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Sports Governance Observer 2015 scores

SGO index

25%

FIS

FIFA

35%

45%

55%

65%

75%

FEI

ITU

FIL

IHF

UCI

AIBA

UIPM

ITTF

FIG

WA (FITA)

WTF

FINA

FIBA

FIH

ICF

UWW

ISU

FIBT

WCF

IWF

IBU

FIVB

ITF

IJF

BWF

ISAF

FISA

IIHF

IAAF

FIE

Rank

IGF

ISSF

The SGO index indicates to what degree the federations comply with the 36 indicators constituted in the

four governance dimensions: transparency, democratic process, checks and balances, and solidarity. Con-

sequently, a federation getting the highest possible score (5) on all included indicators in this survey

would achieve an SGO index of 100%.

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In general, the federations score weak to moderate on the four dimensions of good govern-

ance upon which the Sports Governance Observer is based, namely

transparency, demo-

cratic process, checks and balances,

and

solidarity

(see table 1).

Table 1: SGO Index and SGO scores – all 35 federations

All 35 federations

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.99

2.81

2.68

2.79

SGO Index

49.6%

45.2%

42.0%

44.9%

45.4%

It must be stressed that the SGO index reflects the presence of

basic criteria of good gov-

ernance.

Medium-size federations should be expected to have an SGO index close to 75%,

while large federations should achieve a score higher than 75%. While having a high SGO

index does not rule out the occurrence of corruption, it can be expected that the absence of

basic criteria of good governance increases the likelihood of opportunistic and unethical

behaviour.

Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies invites

everyone with an interest in

sports governance, including (senior) sports and governmental officials, to contribute to

developing the Sports Governance Observer further in order to increase its robustness,

validity and reliability.

PhD Arnout Geeraerd, KU Leuven: [email protected]. Jens Sejer Andersen, International

Director, Play the Game: [email protected]

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Part I. Background and introduction

1. The AGGIS Project and the Sports Governance Observer tool

1.1 Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS)

In 2012-2013, Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies cooperated with six Euro-

pean Universities (Loughborough University, Utrecht University, University of Leuven,

German Sport University Cologne, IDHEAP Lausanne, and Ljubljana University) and the

European Journalism Centre on the topic of good governance in international sports organ-

isations. The co-operation took place under the framework the Action for Good Govern-

ance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS) project, which received financial sup-

port from the European Commission’s Preparatory Actions in the field of sport.

The project aimed to identify guidelines, stimulate the debate and analyse the state of af-

fairs with regard to good governance in international sports organisations. Its outcomes

have been published in a final report (Alm, 2013). One of the key features of this report is

the Sports Governance Observer, a checklist of elements that the experts deemed vital for

good governance in international sports federations (see AGGIS group, 2013).

1.2 The Sports Governance Observer

After the funding period of the AGGIS project, Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports

Studies decided to continue its efforts on the subject of good governance. It engaged in a

project with the University of Leuven with the aim and view of elaborating the Sports Gov-

ernance Observer from a checklist into a practical benchmarking tool with a scoring system

that can be used to assess the degree of good governance in international sports federa-

tions. In addition, the aim was to test the tool on a large group of federations. The results of

these efforts are presented in this report.

1.3 Aims and scope of the report

The main aim of this report is to stimulate debate and disseminate good practice on the

issue of good governance in international sport. Everyone with an interest in sports gov-

ernance, including (senior) sports and governmental officials, is invited to contribute to

developing the Sports Governance Observer further in order to increase its robustness,

validity and reliability.

This report is divided in three main parts. After this introductory section, the second part

of the report presents an in-depth study of the governance of 35 Olympic sports federa-

tions. This study analyses the raw data collected within the framework of the Sports Gov-

ernance Observer survey. This adds to objectivity of the research. Indeed, the methodology

that underpins the Sports Governance Observer (i.e., constructing composite indicators) is

associated with making subjective choices and, therefore, the choice was made to also in-

clude in this report an analysis on the basis of the unprocessed data of the 35 federations.

The third part comprises both the Sports Governance Observer tool and the results of its

application on the 35 Olympic sports federations.

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Part II. Study: The legitimacy crisis in international sports

governance

1. Introduction

When international sports federations (ISFs) emerged at the turn of the twentieth century,

few actors questioned their legitimacy. On the contrary, there was a clear need for global

regulators for sport: increased international competition required clear and consistent

rules. Over the years, ISFs’ functional importance has continued to increase. ISFs proved

extremely useful: they possess functional qualities and expertise. Most notably, they pro-

vide order and structure to the complex sporting world through regulations, licenses, poli-

cies, and so on. Yet transformations in international sports governance have led to a more

commercialised setting, in which ISFs struggle to maintain their legitimacy. Corruption,

unsatisfied internal stakeholders, and a perceived lack of effectiveness have led stakehold-

ers to contest ISFs’ legitimacy.

This study argues that three forms of ISFs’ legitimacy are under threat, namely output le-

gitimacy, procedural legitimacy, and structural legitimacy. Because they fail to reflect af-

fected audiences’ expectations, ISFs develop legitimacy deficits in these three dimensions.

Aware that their legitimacy is under threat, ISFs engage in three practices in order to

(re-)claim and sustain legitimacy: self-legitimation, horizontal legitimation, which involves

engaging in partnerships with political actors, and institutional reform. These legitimation

efforts have however failed to fully address legitimacy gaps. In certain ISFs, this has led to

severe legitimacy crises because they face disempowerment, which may lead to instability

and disorder in international sports governance.

The study demonstrates that legitimacy crises are caused, first and foremost, by flawed

institutional design. It introduces the so-called Principal-Agent model in order to analyse

ISFs’ organisational structures. In order to reclaim legitimacy, ISFs must engage in thor-

ough institutional reforms and install a number of robust control mechanisms that allow

for monitoring and sanctioning senior sports officials’ behaviour.

This study continues as follows. The second section of this chapter explores how transfor-

mations in international sports governance have caused legitimacy gaps and crises in rela-

tion to ISFs. The third

section lays out the methodology of the study. It introduces the

Prin-

cipal-Agent

model to test the hypothesis that the

institutional design of ISFs is flawed. The

fourth section applies the Principal-Agent model in order to analyse the institutional de-

sign of ISFs. The analysis relies on data collected from the 35 Olympic ISFs. The final

sections summarises the findings and makes a number of policy recommendations.

This study is to be regarded as a working paper. If at all possible, please quote more final versions of the

study.

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2. Background

2.1 Transformations in international sports governance

At the turn of the twentieth century, international competition spurred the need to central-

ise sports governance and to unify rules, paving the way for the first ISFs. The creation and

success of the modern Olympic Games, for instance, increased international competition

(Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 64). The international sport governance system

that soon crystallised can generally be described as a hierarchical network running from

the global to continental, national, and local levels. In broad terms, for a single sport, an

international federation stands at the top of a vertical chain of command (Geeraert, 2016a).

ISFs were able to consolidate their monopolies as global regulating bodies for their respec-

tive sports because they fulfilled the need for consistent rules. Because the public sector has

long regarded sport a cultural and, above all, amateur activity, international sports govern-

ance has also remained largely private in nature. The sports world claims that the regula-

tion of sport is best kept private (Chappelet, 2010). This has not prevented politics from co-

opting sport (Jackson and Haigh, 2009). In recent years, this symbiosis has become particu-

larly visible in the politics and policies of the so-called emerging countries, which tend to

see sport mega-events as “proxies for integration and influence” (Cornelissen, 2010, p.

3015). The instrumentalisation of sport by politics is said to have led, at times, to improper

influence and the concentration of power in ISFs, inducing the corrosion of the ethical

character of international sports governance (Voy and Deeter, 1992; Weinreich, 2014a).

Even though they have allowed politics to influence their policies and decisions, autonomy

from formal regulatory public interference is an obsession for ISFs (Geeraert, Mrkonjic and

Chappelet, 2014). Modern sport’s construction is, in essence, rooted in classic liberalism,

namely in the concept of freedom of association (Szymanski, 2006). Autonomy is therefore

a deeply ingrained and cherished principle in the sports world. It is an essential part of

ISFs’ belief system; a doctrine that they aim to spread among political institutions and

stakeholders in order to keep the governance of international sport strictly private. Re-

markably, however, the sports world has never formulated a clear definition or justification

of the autonomy of sport (cf. IOC, 2008, p. 1). Autonomy is a concept that is deliberately

kept vague in order to function as a passe-partout to justify self-governance. Yet in the past

two decades, many facets of ISFs’ self-governance have come under increasing pressure.

The commercialisation of sport can be cited as a direct cause of this trend.

The origins of the commercialisation of sport can be traced to the period after the Second

World War, when more individual leisure time led to both more opportunities to practice

(organised) sport and an increased consumption of sport (Andreff, 2008). The development

of radio and, later on, television broadcasting even allowed for remote consumption of

sport events. Television broadcasting boosted the popularity of certain sports and fuelled

the global popularity of related sport events. However, the enormous commercial impact

of sports broadcasting only hit when a privatisation wave broke up public broadcasting

monopolies in Europe during the 1980s. Together with these evolutions, the development

of cable, satellite and digital television and the internet boosted the demand for sports

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broadcasting from the 1990s on, resulting in more valuable broadcasting deals for sporting

events (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Andreff and Bourg, 2006; Szymanski, 2006). Against

this background, the largest ISFs have increasingly realised the business potential of their

sporting events. Since the mid-1980s, they have marketed their events more effectively,

selling exclusive marketing rights – mostly through agencies – for vast sums of money

(Tomlinson, 2005; Chappelet and Kübler-Mabott, 2008). In this light, ISFs have also benefit-

ted from the revenue generated by the Olympic Games, which the International Olympic

Committee (IOC) redistributes among associated federations (Chappelet and Kübler-

Mabott, 2008).

The commercialisation of sport has put the autonomy of ISFs under increased pressure.

Reasons for this are fourfold:



Firstly, the increase in revenue has incentivised opportunistic senior sports officials

to behave unethically. A number of officials have engaged in racketeering, wire

fraud, money laundering, and taking bribes.

Secondly, as sport emerged from its initial amateur status and governance chal-

lenges became more complex, the impact of ISFs’ policies and decisions on public

and private actors and society at large increased accordingly. This has resulted in

affected actors undertaking actions to increase their influence on the governance of

international sport (Geeraert, 2016b).

Thirdly, sport is increasingly infiltrated by (international) criminal activities.

Fourthly, a trend towards ‘gigantism’ in relation to large sporting events has raised

questions regarding sustainability (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 80;

Geeraert, 2016c).



These issues, and the general failure of ISFs to provide adequate solutions, have put the

legitimacy

of ISFs to govern sport autonomously at an international level under severe

stress.

2.2 The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance

According to Zaum, “[a]n institution is legitimate if its power is justified in terms of moral

and socially embedded beliefs, and if those subject to its rule recognise that it should be

obeyed” (Zaum, 2013, p. 9). This definition reflects the meaning of legitimacy as “a social

status that can adhere to an actor or action” and which is “recognized as good, proper, or

commendable by a group of others” (Coleman, 2007, p. 20). It also highlights the im-

portance of specific audiences in judging whether an institution is legitimate. Yet for a giv-

en institution to lack

legitimacy

is not the same as lacking

support

from affected audiences.

Indeed, on order to be legitimate, an institution must be

perceived

as legitimate (Frost, 2013,

p. 27). When an institution’s practices and objectives fail to reflect affected audiences’ moral

and socially embedded beliefs, it develops a

legitimacy deficit

(Zaum, 2013, p. 7). Affected

audiences perceive the institution as illegitimate, and this may give rise to a

legitimacy crisis

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when legitimacy “declines to the point where the actor or institution must either adapt […]

or face disempowerment” (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 158).

Recently, a number of ISFs have developed severe legitimacy deficits. In certain cases, these

even gave rise to legitimacy crises. In order to assess these deficits, this section relies on

Zaum (2013), who distinguishes three different forms of legitimacy, namely

output legitima-

cy, procedural legitimacy,

and

structural legitimacy.

ISF’s legitimacy deficits are especially

situated in the former two dimensions. Their structural legitimacy, though challenged by

internal stakeholders, remains largely uncontested by political actors.

Output legitimacy

Firstly,

output legitimacy

refers to beliefs about an institution’s effectiveness to produce de-

sired outcomes and promote shared goals. ISFs have largely failed to adequately deal with

an increasing number of governance challenges that came with the commercialisation and

the resulting complexity of the sports world. Almost inevitably, the commercialisation of

sport has been at the basis of significant failures of governance (Henry and Lee, 2004).

These failures are not unique to sport. They reflect the challenges modern public govern-

ance faces in the light of an increasingly complex society and include both too little and too

much regulation, flawed policy designs, (political) gridlocks and cooperation failures (cf.

Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters, 2001). For instance, ISFs have largely been unable to unilaterally

deal with transnational governance issues, such as doping, match-fixing and criminal net-

works targeting sports (Houlihan, 1999; Bakadiababu, 2001; Hill, 2010). In addition, the

potential positive effects of large sporting events on local populations are undermined by

the lack of sustainability requirements for host countries (Geeraert, 2016c). Finally, due to

the increased commercial and economic significance of sports, activities of ISFs fall within

the scope of and often breach economic laws at different levels (Parrish, 2003; Parrish and

McArdle, 2004). Such failures of governance in sport have prompted the debate for more

public oversight and control over the sports world. Public authorities at different levels

have been contesting, competing, and cooperating with ISFs (Houlihan, 1999; Henry and

Lee, 2004; Croci and Forster, 2004; Chappelet, 2010; Geeraert, 2016b).

Procedural legitimacy

Secondly,

procedural legitimacy

pertains beliefs about whether or not an institution’s internal

workings conform to generally accepted procedures. Sports governance is characterised by

a hierarchical pyramid structure that runs from the global to continental, national, and lo-

cal levels (Geeraert, 2016a). As a general rule, an ISF stands at the top of a vertical chain of

command for each individual sport. Usually, continental sport federations are housed un-

der the global federation. National federations, in turn, are housed beneath the continental

federations. At the lowest end of the chain are clubs (when the sport in question is a team

sport) and athletes who take part in the competitions. They must conform to the rules

adopted at the top end of the pyramid.

As sport transitioned from its initial amateur status and governance challenges became

more complex, ISFs increasingly adopted more (diverse) tasks on behalf of their internal

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stakeholders (Geeraert, 2016b). For instance, ISFs issue rules that determine the conditions

for athlete transfers between clubs; the conditions clubs and athletes must fulfil to enter

competition; the modalities surrounding competition; doping use; and the redistribution of

revenue. Sport organisations can sanction athletes, clubs, and national federations for

breaching these rules through their disciplinary bodies. Directly affected by and cognizant

of the augmented powers of ISFs, internal stakeholders, have responded to the organisa-

tions’ increasing reach. Athletes, clubs, and national federations have voiced grievances

about their lack of participation and decision-making power in the policy processes of ISFs.

In certain cases, this has resulted in the emancipation of international sport organisation’s

internal stakeholders (Holt 2006; García, 2007; Thibault et al., 2010). Yet the danger exists

that the most powerful stakeholders are favoured to the detriment of those that have less

clout but are nevertheless equally affected by the policies devised by ISFs (Geeraert, 2016b).

The issue that most severely challenges ISFs’ procedural legitimacy, however, is corrup-

tion. A range of high-profile ethical scandals spurred public attention for corruption within

ISFs. These scandals seem to point to unfair, opaque and unaccountable internal (voting)

procedures, including regarding the awarding of sport events. The most notable examples

of corruption are the 2002 Olympic Winter Games bid scandal, which involved allegations

of bribery used to win the rights to host the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City (Mal-

lon, 2000), and the litany of corruption-related indictments enveloping FIFA, the governing

body of football (Jennings, 2006; Weinreich, 2014b). On 27 May 2015, US authorities indict-

ed fourteen officials on racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering charges. Seven

current FIFA officials (including one FIFA Vice-President) were arrested by the Swiss au-

thorities at the request of the US Department of Justice on suspicion of receiving $150 mil-

lion in bribes in return for media and marketing rights during FIFA related events in North

and South America. US and Swiss authorities subsequently initiated separate criminal in-

vestigations into the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 football World Cup hosting rights to

Russia and Qatar, respectively (Gibson, 2015).

Allegations of corruption or other forms of ‘governance failures’ are however not unique to

the largest sport organisation. Three examples below can serve to illustrate how a number

of smaller ISFs are affected by similar problems. Mexican Ruben Acosta allegedly got away

with at least $33 million in personal commissions in the last decade of his 24 years reign as

president of the International Volleyball Federation (Hoy, 2005). Hassan Moustafa, the

Egyptian President of the International Handball Federation, received over 300,000 euro in

travel reimbursement without presenting receipts. He also established a salary raise (from

a part-time fee of 30,000 Swiss Franc to an annual 500,000 Swiss Franc as a full-time em-

ployee) and his fellow board members (a 500 % increase) so that they receive more than the

International Handball Federation’s total development aid. Moreover, he allegedly secured

a personal contract worth 602,000 euro with German sports marketing company Sportfive,

which later acquired the IHF broadcasting rights (Ahl, 2009; 2010; 2013). Finally, in the In-

ternational Weightlifting Federation, Hungarian Tamas Aján, who has been president for

15 years, failed to account for the disappearance of an estimated $5 million of IOC grants

from two Swiss bank accounts (Hartmann, 2013).

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As a result of especially the high-profile ethical scandals in FIFA, public actors have in-

creasingly started to express their discontent with ISFs’ governance. National parliaments,

the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called

upon ISFs, in particular FIFA, to improve their governance (Randall and Brady, 2011; UK

Parliament, 2011; Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, 2012; European Par-

liament, 2013; European Parliament, 2015). Following the most recent FIFA corruption

scandal, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Culture Secretary John Whittingdale

called for reforms in FIFA (BBC, 2015).

Structural legitimacy

Thirdly,

structural legitimacy

refers to beliefs about whether or not an institution is “the

right organisation for the job” (Sutchman, 1995, p. 582). Internal stakeholders have chal-

lenged the legitimacy of their respective ISFs’ governing monopoly. In several sports, ISFs

protect their governing monopoly in order to deny their members the right to take part in

alternative sport events that are not officially sanctioned by the federation. Profitable, al-

ternative competition formats outside ISFs’ regulatory scope have nonetheless been pro-

posed and have emerged in recent years. Most recently, the International Skating Union

banned two Dutch speed skaters for life for participating in a profitable new competition in

Dubai (Rossing, 2014). The most notable example of a (possible) breakaway competition

has however occurred in football. In 1998, a private business group planned to set up a

highly profitable European super league competition outside of FIFA and UEFA’s struc-

tures (Holt, 2006, pp. 35-36). The plan was abandoned when UEFA agreed to reform its

premier European club championship Champions League so that elite European clubs

could gain more revenue. However, secession threats by elite European clubs continue to

emerge from time to time.

ISFs’ structural legitimacy has however been less challenged by public actors. Two reasons

can be cited for this. Firstly, as already noted, ISFs and the IOC have successfully promoted

the idea among political institutions that an autonomous sports movement is necessary for

the proper organisation of sport (Geeraert, 2016a). The sports worlds’ lobbying powers are

determined by a number of (sport) specific features. Sport is very popular with politicians,

who try to win votes by associating themselves with sporting events. Moreover, national

sports federations often have strong ties with their national government, and ISFs can capi-

talise on this (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Finally, ISFs can capitalise on their regulato-

ry powers in order to influence politics. Indeed, they important means of reprisal against

national public authorities, which they can use in order to keep these authorities under

control. ISFs can exact costs on a country by blocking it from participating in international

competitions by suspending its national sport federation. Moreover, they can withdraw the

privilege of hosting sporting events such as the World Cup or the Euro (Kędzior and

Szczepanik, 2012, p. 212). Finally, acting contrary to the wishes of the IOC and ISFs may be

detrimental for bids to host major events (García and Weatherill, 2012, p. 249). As already

mentioned, hosting (large) sporting events has become increasingly important to national

governments.

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The second reason why public actors have not severely challenged ISFs’ structural legiti-

macy is that ISFs’ are, at least in principle, extremely useful organisations. The recognition

of their functional qualities and expertise contributes to their legitimacy (Geeraert, 2016b;

see also Cutler, Haufler and Porter [1999]). First, as the custodians of sport, they are – in

principle – the only actors that can take into account the interests of sport as a whole. Other

sport stakeholders have separate interests that do not necessarily serve the general

(sporting) interest. ISFs effectuate cooperation between (internal) stakeholders, ensuring

that they all move in the same (mutually beneficial) direction. Related, whereas (internal)

stakeholders are unlikely to reach a stable agreement on policy, ISFs allow for

collective

decision-making

by controlling the agenda of sports governance. Second, they are specialised

bodies that are supposed to culminate the necessary expertise to govern sporting issues.

They provide

specialisation

in that they have the expertise, time and resources to oversee

sport competition. They are also useful in that they offer

dispute resolution

between internal

stakeholders. Third, they have an important state-like function in bringing

order and struc-

ture

the complex sporting world through regulations, licenses, policies, and so on. At the

global level, no overarching state authority exists that is capable of fulfilling this role

(Geeraert, 2016a, p. 423).

The resultant belief on the part of political institutions in the appropriateness of having

private monopolies govern sport has not been severely damaged as a result of sports

corruption.

Tellingly, in the aftermath of the FIFA corruption scandal, virtually no

politicians suggested that the organisation’s governing monopoly should be overthrown.

One significant exception to this rule is the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency

(WADA). WADA was conceived as a hybrid, public-private organisation because public

authorities requested a more significant role as they were sceptical about the IOC after the

2002 Salt Lake City corruption scandal (Houlihan, 2001, p. 125).

Legitimation efforts by ISFs

For an institution to be legitimate, it must claim and sustain its legitimacy so that it is

recognised as rightful. Institutions seeking legitimacy therefore constantly “justify their

identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs” (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 159). ISFs have

engaged in such processes. They have responded to legitimacy deficits by engaging in

legitimation practices, which pertain to “conscious efforts” to enhance and sustain their

legitimacy (Welsh and Zaum, 2013, p. 71).

Three broad practices stand out:

self-legitimation, horizontal legitimation,

and

institutional

reform:



Firstly, ISFs engage in

self-legitimation,

which refers to “an action or series of actions

– speech, writing, ritual, display – whereby people justify to themselves or others

the actions they are taking and the identities they are expressing or claiming”

However, note that both international and national sports federations’ structural legitimacy is

increasingly challenged by their inability to promote sport for all and their resultant loss of market share

in the sport for all market.

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(Barker, 2003, pp. 163-164). As mentioned, ISFs and the IOC often proclaim their le-

legitimacy in their discourse by referring to the autonomy of sport. A good example

is a position paper of the Olympic and sports movement on the autonomy of sport,

in which it is stresses that “[t]he responsibility sport has in society, and the

autonomy with which it regulates itself, have led to its credibility and legitimacy.

Autonomy thus means preserving the values of sport and the existing structures

through which it has developed in Europe and in the world” (IOC, 2008, p. 1).



Secondly, ISFs engage in

horizontal legitimation,

which pertains to “legitimation by

actors who are outside the hierarchical relationship governed by legitimacy”

(Zaum, 2013, p. 11). An established strategy in this regard has been to engage in

‘partnerships’ with (international) political actors such as the United Nations and

the European Union in order to solidify legitimacy credentials (cf. Williams, 2013,

p. 43). By associating with these actors, ISFs gain status and recognitions; they can

adopt some of the authority derived from the legitimacy of these institutions (cf.

Hurd, 2002, p. 43). ISFs benefit from the fact that the IOC has accumulated

international legitimacy by associating itself with the United Nations. Since 2009,

the IOC even enjoys observer status in the United Nations General Assembly and

in April 2014, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UN

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the IOC. The agreement stresses that the

United Nations and the IOC “share the same values of contributing to a better and

peaceful world through sport” and “calls for respect of the autonomous

organisation of sport” (IOC, 2014). ISFs such as FIFA, the International Judo

Federation, the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation, the Badminton

World Federation, the International Biathlon Union, the International Association

of Athletics Federations, and the International Volleyball Federation and

SportAccord, the umbrella organisation of more than 100 ISFs, have engaged in

similar partnerships with the United Nations (IOC, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013a; BWF,

2015; IAAF, 2015; UNESCO, 2015).

ISFs, continental federations and umbrella

organisations of sport federations have also been keen to associate themselves and

engage in partnership agreements with the European Union for reasons of

legitimation (Geeraert, 2016b).

Thirdly, in recent years, a number of ISFs have openly

reformed their internal

workings

in order to enhance their legitimacy. For instance, they have engaged in

governance reforms, aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability. When

doing so, they have often communicated these changes extensively to their internal

stakeholders and the general public. The most prominent examples in this regard

are the internal reforms that took place within the IOC after the Salt Lake City

scandal in 1999 and the recent FIFA reform process that followed numerous reports

of corruption (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Pieth, 2014a). Most recently,



Wilfried Lemke, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Sport for Development and

Peace in fact encourages such partnerships: “We need partnership between the world of sport and United

Nations to harness the full potential that sport has to be an agent for social change.” (Lemke in IOC, 2010).

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Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), the world governing body for sports cycling,

has announced that it will engage in governance reforms (UCI, 2015). The problem

with these reforms is that a generally accepted and objective benchmark is lacking

in order to evaluate if these reforms adequately address accountability and

transparency deficiencies or if they merely serve as window-dressing (Geeraert,

2015). In addition, ISFs have formally institutionalised the consultation of internal

stakeholders, in particular athletes (Geeraert, Alm and Grohl, 2014; Geeraert,

2016b).

The importance of resolving legitimacy gaps and crises

The legitimation efforts by ISFs have failed to fully address legitimacy gaps. Only when an

institution’s legitimacy claims are recognised as rightful does it command legitimacy

(Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 159). Affected audiences, particularly NGOs, internal stakeholders, and

parliamentary assemblies continue to challenge ISFs’ output and procedural legitimacy.

ISFs fail to reflect these audiences’ beliefs on procedural fairness and effectiveness. In

certain ISFs, this has led to severe legitimacy crises because “the level of social recognition”

that their identities, interests, practices, norms, or procedures “are rightful declines to the

point where the actor or institution must either adapt […] or face disempowerment” (Reus-

Smit, 2007, p. 158).

The most well-known example is FIFA, but the governance failures including the cases of

corruption mentioned above indicate that international sports governance faces a severe

legitimacy crisis.

This crisis is chronic, since legitimacy deficits remain severe, but the

compensatory use of short-term legitimation strategies “stave off disempowerment without

recalibrating the social bases of legitimacy” (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 168). Consequently, these

strategies are not sustainable. The danger therefore exists that international sports

governance is increasingly confronted with stability and disorder (cf. Reus-Smit, 2007, p.

170). Indeed, as indicated, ISFs are pivotal actors in international sports governance

because of their functional qualities and expertise. The disempowerment of ISFs moreover

bears costs for society at large. A failure to address issues such as doping, match-fixing,

money laundering, a lack of (environmental) sustainability, corruption, and the illegal

trade in African and South American athletes has a negative impact on the wider

community.

It is thus extremely important that the legitimacy crisis in international sport is resolved,

both for those involved in professional and grassroots sport and those that have nothing to

do with sport as such. How do we resolve this crisis? In what follows, it will be shown that

ISFs’ legitimacy deficit is essentially a problem of

flawed institutional design.

Put simply, ISFs often lack legitimacy because, in general, they are characterised by ‘bad

governance’.

Note that the IOC was confronted with a severe legitimacy crisis after the Salt Lake City corruption scan-

dal (see above).

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3. Methodology

3.1 Legitimacy deficits as a problem of institutional design: the principal‐agent

model

How do we resolve the legitimacy crisis in international sports governance in a sustainable

manner?

In order to make sure that ISFs conduct their tasks in such a way that they are recognised

as legitimate, their actions and interests need to be recalibrated with the normative

expectations of their social constituency of legitimation. Put differently, ISFs’ actions need

to “resonate with the normative expectations” of those that are affected by ISFs’ actions

(Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 172). This raises the question how we can make sure that ISFs’ act in

the best interest of stakeholders. In order to answer this question, we must conceptualise

and theorise the problem. This study relies on the insights of the Principal-Agent (PA)

model, which has proven a powerful tool to analyse relationships where an actor or group

of actors (the agent(s)) behaves on behalf of another actor or set of actors (the principal(s)).

In organisational studies, the Principal-Agent model is “fundamentally concerned with

institutional design” (Elgie, 2002, p. 189). In brief, actors (the

principals)

delegate tasks to an

institution (the

agent),

and expect the institution to behave in their best interest when

executing these tasks. However, the principals cannot fully observe and do not have

information on the appropriateness of all the actions of the agent. The agent, moreover, has

its own private interests that do not necessarily correspond with those of the principals,

and which incentivise the agent to behave opportunistically and pursue its own interests.

This gives rise to

agency slack

independent action by the agent that is undesired by the

principal.

Slack can take different forms. It can refer to inertia, inefficiency and/or

ineffectiveness, but also to corruption. The challenge of institutional design is thus to

construct agencies in such a way so as to minimise slack (Pollack, 1997, p. 101; Elgie, 2002,

p. 189; Majone, 1999). Indeed, institutions impose rules-based constraints on actors and

therefore structure the behaviour of actors.

This brings us to the question of how institutions can be designed so that agency slack is

minimised. This question of institutional design is in essence a problem associated with the

Principal-Agent model: how can we structure relationships between the principal and the

agent so that the outcomes of the agent’s actions comply with the principal’s wishes (cf.

Majone, 1999, p. 13)? Principal-Agent analysis holds that

control mechanisms

can alter the

The Principal-Agent model mostly relies on the theoretical assumptions of rational choice theory. Ration-

al choice theory assumes that actors behave rationally and instrumentally in order to maximise the attain-

ment of their self-interests (Snidal, 1985, p. 40). More specifically, this study finds resonance with

rational

choice institutionalism,

which holds that institutions impose rules-based constraints on actors and thus

structure the behaviour of actors, and these actors hold a fixed set of preferences and behave instrumental-

ly. Importantly, the Principal-Agent model should not be seen as a dogma or aim in itself. A useful alter-

native option to study actor behaviour in ISFs would be to use a constructivist approach, which explores

the existence of informal norms that shape actors’ identities and preferences within institutions. Such an

approach can even be complementary with the rational choice approach used in this study (cf. Geeraert

and Drieskens, 2015b).

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incentives of the agent such that acting in line with the principal’s interests is more attrac-

attractive (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 1997;

Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Such control mechanisms should comprise a mixture of

monitoring

and

sanctioning:

1. By

monitoring

the agent’s actions, the principal decreases information asymmetries

concerning the agent’s actions and interests. This decreases the likelihood that slack

will go unnoticed. In addition, knowing that the principal is observing its actions,

the agent will be motivated to act in the principal’s best interest.

Sanctions

entail imposing costs on the agent. The mere acknowledgement of the

credible possibility of a sanction “provides a measure of latent control over the

agent’s actions” (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 604). If demonstrating

slack leads to costs for the agent, than the agent will be incentivised not to act

contrary to the principal’s interests.

If monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are installed in institutions, acting in the

principals’ interests will be made a more attractive option. More specifically, five distinct

classes of measures that are particularly relevant for the present purposes emerge from the

Principal-Agent literature (i.e., monitoring and sanctioning) the agent (Calvert, McCubbins

and Weingast, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 1997; Fearon, 1999). These are

(1)

screening and selection mechanisms,

(2)

monitoring and reporting requirements,

(3)

administrative procedures,

(4)

institutional checks,

and (5)

elections.

ISFs that have measures

implemented in their institutional design are expected to demonstrate high degrees of

legitimacy. Reasons for this are threefold:

1. They allow for the calibration of agent actions with the normative expectations of

those that are represented (i.e., the principals) (cf. Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 172).

2. They contribute to outcome legitimacy because they increase institutions’

effectiveness. The reason for this is that, firstly, recognition of legitimacy translates

into voluntary compliance by stakeholders (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 170). Secondly,

administrative procedures that allow for the inclusion of principals in the decision

making process may lead to more effective governance because they can provide

specialized knowledge (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). Thirdly, increased

accountability enhances the learning capacity and effectiveness of organisations

(Aucoin and Heintzman 2000, Bovens 2007).

3. They enhance institutions’ procedural legitimacy because they improve the quality

of internal procedures. Firstly, they provide principals’ with statutory options for

control and thus contribute to the fairness and openness of (and, thus, trust in) the

internal working of the institution (Mouffe, 1993; Vaubel, 2006, p. 129). Secondly,

control mechanisms and procedures decrease the likelihood of agents engaging in

unethical behaviour such as corruption and fraud (Ades and Di Tella, 1997, p. 508).

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The Principal-Agent model predicts that, in the absence of control mechanisms, the agent

will minimise its efforts on behalf of the principal and even pursue its own interests at the

expense of the principal (McCubbins and Page, 1987, pp. 410-411; Pollack, 2003, p. 26). This

necessarily leads to legitimacy gaps and crises. This logic can also be inversed. Given the

legitimacy gaps and crises in international sports governance, it can be expected that the

institutional design of ISFs is flawed in the sense they lack monitoring and sanctioning

mechanisms.

The remainder of this report tests this hypothesis.

The decision was made to focus

on the 35 ISFs whose sports will be represented at the 2016 Olympic Games (see Table 1).

Although these federations vary considerably in terms of size, amount of revenue

generated and popularity of their respective sports, they are comparable because they

represent popular summer and winter sport and benefit from the IOC’s redistribution

scheme.

Table 2: Population of the study: the 35 Olympic ISFs

English name

International Boxing

Association

Badminton World

Federation

International Federation

for Equestrian Sports

International Basketball

Federation

International Bobsleigh &

Skeleton Federation

International Fencing

Federation

Acronym

AIBA

BWF

FEI

FIBA

FIBT

FIE

Summer/winter

Olympic sport

Summer

Winter

Summer

Winter

Summer

Winter

Summer

Registered

Office

Lausanne

Country

Co‐operated

with research

Switzerland No

Yes

Kuala Lumpur Malaysia

Lausanne

Geneva

Lausanne

Zürich

Lausanne

Berchtesgade

Lausanne

Switzerland Yes

Switzerland No

Switzerland Yes

Switzerland No

Germany

International Federation of FIFA

Association Football

International Federation of FIG

Gymnastics

International Hockey

Federation

International Luge

Federation

International Swimming

Federation

International Ski

Federation

FIH

FIL

FINA

FIS

Switzerland No

Oberhofen

Switzerland Yes

am Thunersse

Lausanne

Switzerland Yes

Switzerland No

International Federation of FISA

Rowing Associations

World Archery Federation

FITA/ WA

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International Volleyball

Federation

International Association

of Athletics Federations

FIVB

IAAF

Summer

Winter

Summer

Winter

Summer

Winter

Summer

Winter

Summer

Lausanne

Monaco

Salzburg

Lausanne

Basle

Zürich

Lausanne

Switzerland No

Monaco

Austria

Yes

Internation Biathlon Union IBU

International Canoe

Federation

International Golf

Federation

International Handball

Federation

International Ice Hockey

Federation

International Judo

Federation

International Sailing

Federation Limited

International Shooting

Sport Federation

International Skating

Union

International Tennis

Federation Limited

The International Table

Tennis Federation

ICF

IGF

IHF

IIHF

IJF

ISAF

ISSF

ISU

ITF

ITTF

Switzerland No

Switzerland Yes

Yes

Southampton UK

Munich

Lausanne

London

Lausanne

Vancouver

Budapest

Aigle

Monaco

Corsier‐sur‐

Vevey

Lausanne

Dublin

Seoul

Germany

Switzerland Yes

Canada

Hungary

Yes

The International Triathlon ITU

Union

International Weightlifting IWF

Federation

Union Cycliste

Internationale

Union International de

Pentathlon Moderne

United World Wrestling

World Curling Federation

World Rugby

World Taekwondo

Federation

UCI

UIPM

UWW

WCF

WTF

Switzerland No

Monaco

Yes

Switzerland No

Switzerland Yes

Ireland

Korea

Yes

In the case of the ITU, an official offered to assist with the data gathering.

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3.2 Data collection

The study relies on the

raw

data collected within the framework of the Sports Governance

Observer survey (see Part III of this report).

4. Analysis

This section applies the Principal-Agent model in order to analyse the institutional design

of ISFs. The decision-making bodies of ISFs are conceptualised as agents, who fulfil a range

of tasks on behalf of three main groups of principals, namely national sports federations,

athletes, and national public authorities. If ISFs do not have an institutional design

implemented that allows principals to monitoring and sanction decision-making body

members, the likelihood that the organisations demonstrate slack is high.

4.1 Delegation of authority to ISFs

ISFs fulfil a range of tasks on behalf of a diverse group of principals (Geeraert and

Drieskens, 2015a). This section identifies three groups of principals, which function as ISFs’

main constituents: national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities (see

Figure 1). The reason for focusing on these principals is that, in general, ISFs mostly fulfil

tasks on their behalf. True, the actual level of representation of these principals varies

between ISFs. Certain ISFs even fulfil very important tasks on behalf of other principals

(such as clubs) (Geeraert, 2016a).

Yet when analysing ISFs as a group, this study argues

and assumes that national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities are

the most prominent principals.

Figure 2. Delegation of authority to ISFs by principals

Athletes

Clubs

National

sports federations

ISFs

National

public authorities

General public

ISFs fulfil tasks and, therefore, act as agents for three main groups of actors: national sports

federations, athletes, and national public authorities:

Firstly,

national sports federations

have initially ceded sovereignty to ISFs to facilitate

international competition and to ensure clear and consistent sports rules across federations.

They explicitly delegated tasks to ISFs; thus, this relationship is closest to a Principal-Agent

relationship in the traditional sense (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Because they created

Note that EU institutions can also be conceptualised as principals of ISFs (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015;

Geeraert, 2016). Focus here, however, does not dwell on EU control of ISFs.

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ISFs, they enshrined into their statutes control options such as election procedures, report-

reporting requirements, and so on. The main way in which national federations can control

ISFs is through these statutory options for control. National federations are therefore – in

principle – the most powerful principals of ISFs: other principals lack statutory options for

controlling ISFs.

Importantly, national federations are not always inclined to control their ISFs’ decision-

making bodies. The reason is that senior sports officials have means at their disposal to

manipulate the preferences of member federations, such as awarding funding or the

privilege of hosting sporting events (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998, pp. 144-151; Schenk,

2011; Forster and Pope, 2004). National federations may thus become rather benevolent in

order to be able to receive such benefits. This underscores the importance of institutional

design: firstly, robust control mechanisms can mitigate the issue; and secondly, the

institutional design of ISFs may allow other principals to monitor ISFs’ decision-making

bodies.

Secondly,

ISFs also act on behalf of sports stakeholders such as

athletes

and

clubs:

they

devise rules and policies, which athletes and clubs must abide by. These principals are

formally linked to an ISF through a chain of delegation: individual athletes form clubs,

clubs form national sports federations to organise competition, and national sports

federations create continental and international sports federations. In this chain, in

principle, only the principals closest to ISFs, national sports federations, hold statutory

options for control. They are the

proximate principals

(Nielson and Tierney, 2003, p. 249).

This means that especially athletes are put in a complicated position regarding control.

Even though ISFs are increasingly regulating their profession, athletes seem to lack direct

control options over their principals. In order to control their ISFs, they need to voice their

grievances to their club, their club then has to pass these on to its national federation, and

the national federation has to contact the ISF. Consequently, in order for athletes to control

ISFs, there must be almost perfect control in each link of the delegation chain. This is rather

unrealistic: according to Nielson and Tierney, “agency slack increases as the delegation

chain grows longer” because some degree of slack is likely to occur in each link in the

delegation chain (Nielson and Tierney, 2003, p. 249). This is problematical, because athletes

can be conceptualised as

ultimate principals:

the chain of delegation emerged from their

initial delegation and is therefore ultimately intended to facilitate athletes’ competition.

Thirdly,

as sports commercialised and globalised,

national public authorities

(and, by

extension, the general public) have become increasingly important principals (Geeraert,

2016b). In short, public authorities demonstrate a tacit or explicit tolerance of ISFs’

regulation and policy-making on their behalf (cf. Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 5).

Firstly, national public authorities constitute a part of a chain of delegation that links to

ISFs. In certain countries, public authorities explicitly and formally delegate the task of

regulating national-level sport to national sports federations (Vocasport, 2004, p. 53). In

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other countries, delegation to national sports federations is more informal in nature.

Since

national federations are part of a system controlled by ISFs, public authorities also

implicitly delegate authority to these organisations. Secondly, delegation from national

public authorities to ISFs also takes place directly. States (implicitly) delegate legislative

powers to sports bodies, including, for instance, important parts of employment rules for

athletes (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a, p. 1451). Moreover, although national sports

federations are the official candidates, national governments

de facto

take part in the

bidding race for the organisation of international sports events and invest significant

resources to prepare candidacy (Walters, 2011). ISFs, then, perform the task of selecting a

suitable host on their behalf.

Regulatory norm production within ISFs, however, operates with such great autonomy

from public authorities that it is not realistic “to assert that the agents work under the

control or supervision of a national constitutional principal in any meaningful hierarchical

sense” (Lindseth, 2004, p. 4). As depicted in Figure 1, most ISFs are based in Switzerland,

where they have so far benefitted from a quasi-unregulated system.

Figure 3: Host countries of the 35 Olympic ISFs

Switzerland

Other European country

Outside Europe

The Swiss Civil Code provides only very basic minimum requirements for associations,

while the overall Swiss legal framework allows for large degrees of both fiscal and

organisational autonomy and limited prosecution of private corruption. Recently

introduced amendments to the Unfair Competition Act and the Swiss Criminal Code make

corruption in international sports organisations a criminal offence, and Swiss authorities

can actively prosecute offenses on the condition that there is a public interest. These

amendments were introduced specifically in response to recent FIFA corruption scandals.

The Swiss government initially suggested stricter amendments. Following lobbying by the

private sector, which would equally be affected by the law, the amendments were toned

down to include the condition of public interest. Other national public authorities are

Granted, some (neoliberal) states have no interest in regulating sport. This does not imply, however, that

there has been no delegation of (regulatory) tasks. Here, delegation to national federations is implicit and

informal in nature. That delegation nevertheless does take place is evidenced by the fact that national

public authorities can, in principle, overrule national federations and even take over the regulation of

sport.

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generally faced with regulatory overstretch in relation to ISFs: they do not hold statutory

options for control.

In what follows,

the institutional design

of the 35 Olympic sports federations is analysed.

Focus here is on the presence of formal control mechanisms, which prevent ISF officials

from pursuing their own interests at the expense of their principals.

More specifically, the

presense of five distinct organisational arrangements that allow for monitoring and

sanctioning ISFs are explored, namely (1)

screening and selection mechanisms,

(2)

monitoring

and reporting requirements,

(3)

administrative procedures,

(4)

institutional checks,

and (5)

elections

(Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack,

1997; Fearon, 1999). It must be noted that most of these mechanisms are intended to enable

national sports federations to control ISFs. This is logical, given that these actors have

created ISFs and function as

proximate principals.

In fact, it would even be rather impractical

to formally allow too many actors to control ISFs (cf. Nielson and Tierney, 2003).

Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated, the institutional design of ISFs may also allow public

authorities, the public in general, athletes and other stakeholders to control these

organisations, thereby mitigating the likelihood of slack.

4.2 Screening and selection mechanisms – main findings

Before contracting agents, principals can engage in screening processes; these processes

reduce information asymmetries about agents’ preferences and capabilities. They allow

principals to “sort out good agents from bad ones” (Strøm, 2000, p. 271). Appointing agents

with preferences that do not diverge from those of the principals decreases the likelihood

of slack because agents will have fewer motives to act opportunistically. It is necessary that

screening processes take place on the basis of both professional criteria, ensuring that the

agent is capable of performing the delegated tasks, and integrity criteria, ensuring that

he/she does not have unethical motives. It is of course nearly impossible to fully observe

the agent’s preferences and characteristics. Yet installing robust screening and selection

mechanisms increases the likelihood that the right persons are appointed at the outset.

The survey indicates that the vast majority of ISFs lack adequate screening and selection

mechanisms:



In corporate governance, establishing a nominations committee to screen potential

candidates for executive functions is standard practice (Pass, 2004). Such

committees typically perform both professional and integrity checks, and they

include independent (external) experts (Independent Governance Committee,

2014). The survey shows that only four federations (11%) have a nominations

committee in place that performs integrity and professional checks.

Principals should have sufficient time to inform themselves about candidates

standing for election. It is therefore important that the candidates are announced in



Emphasis is therefore placed on formal rules and procedures implemented in the institutional design of

ISFs. It must be noted, however, that informal and even exogenous control options may be at the disposal

of principals (Calvert

et al.

1989: 606; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a)

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good time. However, a majority of 19 federations (54%) announce the candidates

standing for election one month or less before the elections take place. 32

federations (91%) announce candidates standing for elections less than 2 months

before they take place.



A lack of information about candidates’ policy intentions can be resolved by

obliging candidates to present their programme. In only one federation (ITU),

candidates are obliged to provide their manifesto.

4.3 Monitoring and reporting requirements – main findings

As mentioned, principals can decrease information asymmetries concerning actions and

interests by monitoring agents’ actions. Consequently, agents will be motivated to act in

their principals’ best interest. Both (democratic) governments and private companies

usually have the statutory obligation to provide their principals reports on aspects of their

activities (Saalfeld, 2000; Pass, 2004). Such monitoring and reporting requirements oblige

agents to report on progress at predefined stages (cf. Mccubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989).

The monitoring and reporting requirements implemented in ISFs’ institutional design are

mostly intended to inform national sports federations because these actors function as

proximate principals

(see above). However, a wider reporting may enable interested third

parties, such as athletes, clubs, NGOs, citizens, interest groups or other actors to examine

the actions of ISFs (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Consequently, it not only enables

principals to rely on third parties to alert them to agency transgressions; third party

monitoring also decreases slack because it decreases the likelihood that acting contrary to

the wishes of principals will go unnoticed.

The majority of ISFs do not report to the general public. Even though the majority of

federations report to their member federations, the quality of reporting is lacking in a large

number of federations:



As they gather ISFs’ proximate principals, general assemblies have a very

important monitoring function (cf. Strøm, 2000). They should convene regularly –

the corporate governance standard is once a year – in order to review annual

reports. The general assemblies of 18 federations (51%) meet once a year, while

there are clear procedures enshrined in the statutes for convening emergency and

special meetings. Regarding 17 federations (49%), however, the general assemblies

meet once every two years or less.

Regarding the publication of important governing documents, all ISFs were found

to publish their statutes/constitution and sports rules (i.e., the rules of the game

and competition rules, such as the setting of the duration of a world championship

or the qualification rules for athletes).

Only eight federations (23%) publish the agenda and minutes of its general

assembly on their website. Yet 26 other federations (74%) provide these documents

to their member federations.



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

Only four federations (11%) publish governing body decisions on their website and

(sometimes) explain the rationale behind key decisions.

Only three (9%) federations publish basic biographical information on their

governing body members that includes at least six of the following items: date of

birth, position in the organisation, nationality education, professional background,

tasks within the organisation, and activities in other sport organisations.

Furthermore, 26 federations (74%) publish biographical information that cover

three to five of these items.

Only six federations (17%) publish annual general activity reports on their websites

that include information on assets, accounts, revenue, sponsoring, and events. 15

federations (43%) are known to distribute a general activity report to their member

federations. The rest of the federations (14 or 40%) either do not provide a complete

and founded report to their member federations or no evidence of such a report

could be found.

Only eight federations (23%) publish (basic) reports of their standing committees

online. Five other federations (14%) provide basic reports of a part of their standing

committees. The majority of federations, 22 federations (63%) to be specific, do not

publish any reports on standing committees.

None of the federations publishes reports on remuneration, including per diem

payments and bonuses, of its board members and senior officials.

Only one federation (FIFA) publishes a detailed report of their major event online.

A minority of 12 federations (35%) publishes externally audited annual financial

reports on its website. A total of 22 federations (63%) have been found to provide

externally audited annual financial reports to their member federations.

Out of 19 federations for which data was available, seven federations (37%) allow

the media to participate and record at their general assembly meetings.



4.4 Administrative procedures – main findings

Administrative procedures constitute the procedures agents must follow when executing

their tasks (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989). More specifically, they lay down the

steps agents must follow when conducting their tasks and, thus, limit the agents’ actions

priori.

By establishing administrative procedures, principals control agents without

investing too much resources. Next to procedural requirements, administrative procedures

may also involve enfranchising principals in the decision-making process, which assures

that agents are responsive to their interests.

The survey shows that the majority of ISFs do not have adequate administrative

procedures in place:

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

A quorum (i.e., a minimum number of attendees required to conduct business and

to cast votes) prevents that a small group of actors is able to monopolise power. No

federation has both a quorum installed at (at least) 50% for the legislative body and

one at 75% for the decision-making body. Ten federations (29%) have a quorum in

place in both their legislative and decision-making bodies, with the quorum for the

legislative body set at a minimum of 50%. Six federations (17%) have no quorum

installed for either their legislative or decision-making body.

Research suggests that governing body activity, measured by meeting frequency, is

an important dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999). Governing bodies that

meet frequently are more likely to perform their duties diligently and in accordance

with principals’ interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). In only four federations out of

29 federations for which data was available (14%), the governing bodies meet

quarterly at the least. In seven federations (20%), the governing body meets once a

year or less. In seven other federations (20%), the governing body meets more

frequently than once a year, but less or equal to once every six months.

A code of ethics

defines unacceptable behaviour within an organisation. It

constitutes a set of rules that limits the autonomy of agents to behaviour that is

deemed ethical. Put differently, a code of ethics aims to limit slack in the form of

unethical behaviour. For the 32 federations for which data was available, a majority

of 18 federations (56%) was found to have a code of ethics that includes crucial

components such as the prohibition of bribery and procedures covering the offer or

receipt of gifts. Seven federations (22%) do not make any reference to a code of

ethics in their governing documents or on their websites.

Conflicts of interest rules impose the notification and disclosure of conflicting

interests and, in certain cases, mandatory recusal from decisions. Conflicts of

interest may arise in particular in certain high-risk areas relating to ISFs. For

instance, governing body members may directly benefit from the choice of the

organisation of events, commercial deals or the distribution of funds to member

federations (Pieth, 2011, p. 30). A minority of six (17%) federations have clear

conflict of interest rules in place that include disclosure requirements and the duty

to abstain from voting in particular cases, and define appropriate thresholds. Seven

(20%) federations do not have conflict of interest rules in place at all.

The allocation of major events constitutes a high-risk area for ISFs in relation to

corruption. Allowing agents to make hosting decisions has proven to lead to

corruption and the concentration of power in the past. Moreover, when hoping to

secure the hosting of an event, member federations (principals) will be less inclined

to hold their agents to account. Even though corruption is not ruled out in this case,

an important step towards improving the allocation process of major events is by

allowing member federations to vote on the appropriate host. In 18 of the 29

federations for which data was available (62%), the governing body selects the host.

Importantly, in none of the federations, the selection of host candidates takes place



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according to a transparent and objectively reproducible process, in which bidding

dossiers are reviewed independently and assigned a score on the basis of pre-

established criteria.



An overwhelming majority of 34 ISFs have responded to athletes’ lack of control

options by formally granting athlete representatives consultative status in their

organisational structures. Yet in order to enable monitoring senior officials’

conduct, athletes’ representatives should have access to decision-making (cf.

Arnstein, 1969; Woods, 1999; Young, 2000). In addition, there must be a clear

connection between the representatives and the athletes, which can be achieved by

having athletes elected by their peers (Fearon, 1999; Saward, 2005). In a majority of

23 federations (66%), the chairman/woman of the athletes’ commission is a

member of the decision-making body. However, in only eight federations (23%),

athletes elect the chairman/woman of the athletes’ commission. In eight other

federations (23%), the chairman/woman of the athletes’ commission is elected by

the congress.

4.5 Institutional checks – main findings

Principals can also install institutional checks. This control mechanism hinges on the fact

that an agent is established and charged with monitoring the activities of another agent and

sometimes holds veto power (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, pp. 33-34). Institutional checks

are usually employed in order to prevent embezzlements, insider trading, corruption, and

abuse and concentration of power. Yet in order for institutional checks to work effectively,

they must have the authority to veto or block the actions of the agent and be independent

from the agent (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, pp. 33-34). Examples of such checks are

internal and external audits and ethics committees (Banks, 1989; Weber, 1993).

The majority of federations do not have robust institutional checks in place:



Ethics committees monitor compliance with the principles in the ethics code. They

head investigations upon receiving reports of violations. Only when a robust ethics

committee is in place does a code of ethics have a positive impact on ethical

behaviour (Weber 1993, p. 430). 12 federations (34%) do not have an ethics

committee in place. Moreover, in only five federations (14%), the ethics committee

is robust, meaning that it is independent from the governing body and has the

power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative.

An external audit is usually conducted by an organisation independent from the

organisation that is being audited. External audits scrutinize annual financial

accounts and examine and assess risks associated with finance. A vast majority of

33 federations (94%) is externally audited according to internationally recognised

standards

Supplemental to external audit, the internal audit provides external auditors with

business, activity and process knowledge, and inform them on the risks facing the

organisation. In addition, the internal audit assesses the quality of the internal



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control system, including risk management (IIA, 2013). An internal audit commit-

committee usually provides oversight to the internal audit. Only six federations

(17%) have an internal audit committee that has a clearly defined role and has the

authority to oversee the internal audit and assesses the quality of the internal

control system.



A minority of eight federations (23%) have an independent committee in place that

allows national federations, club, players, or official directly affected by a decision-

making body decision to appeal that decision.

4.6 Elections – main findings

Elections provide an important incentive for agents to behave according to their principals’

interests (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 602; Fearon, 1999; Pollack, 2003, p.

108). The credible threat of being replaced by a challenger in case of slack incentivizes

agents to conform to their principals’ wishes and to refrain from opportunistic behaviour

(Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Besley and Case, 1995). Moreover, elections offer principals the

possibility to “weed out bad types and retain good types” (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and

Rose, 2011, p. 171); thus selectively retaining ‘good’ agents (Smart and Sturm, 2013, p. 93).



In a vast majority of 24 federations (69%), all decision-making body members,

including the president, are elected. In 23 federations (66%), elections take place

according to clear and objective procedures (i.e., procedures that cover information

on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and,

where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds) and secret

ballots are used. Secret ballots prevent retaliation by elected decision-making body

members against member federations that did not vote for them. When anticipating

retaliation, member federations’ voting may be influenced.

An important issue regarding voting is the presence of term limits, namely a restriction on

the number of terms an incumbent may serve. At first sight, term limits are difficult to

reconcile with the logics of the Principal-Agent model. After all, principals cannot retain

good agents for a period longer than the restricted period. Most importantly, however,

incumbents in their final term no longer operate under the threat of being replaced: they

are forced to retire anyway. In the absence of this threat, they are, in principle, no longer

incentivised to act in accordance with their principals’ wishes (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992;

Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011). Why, then, would an ISF impose term limits?

Even though imposing term limits seems counterintuitive, there are a number of good

reasons for doing so, certainly within the context of sports governance.

Firstly, incumbents hold manifold advantages over challengers and are therefore more

likely to be re-elected (Tabarrok, 1994). Such incumbency advantages are often cumulative

(they grow with years of service) and include access to resources, fear of the uncertainty

associated with electing an alternative candidate with voters, name recognition, overall

power, and seniority (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 479; Cain and Levin, 1999, pp. 174-179;

Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344). Seniority produces incumbency advantage – with seniority comes

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power, which can be deployed to be re-elected, but also constitutes an advantage in itself.

In the case that continental sports federations elect governing body members, they will be

inclined to vote for incumbents because they have more experience. Voters reason that they

therefore have more power in the international federation’s governing body and that

electing an alternative candidate will give them a comparative disadvantage in relation to

other continental federations (cf. Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344). Altogether, the incumbency

advantage leads to high rates of re-election. Geeraert, Alm and Groll (2014b, p. 300)

provide evidence for this thesis in relation to the past presidents of the 35 Olympic ISFs.

They demonstrate how 60% of the presidents had been in office for more than eight years

on average. Why are long tenures problematical for ISF presidents and senior officials?

When re-election becomes more likely, even a certainty, agents will no longer be

incentivised to act in their principals’ best interest since the threat of being replaced by a

challenger no longer looms (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 480; Tabarrok, 1994, p. 334).

Moreover, certain re-elections result in apathetic voters and, thus, principals that are no

longer incentivised to hold agents to account (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 480).

Secondly, term limits prevent slack in the form of accumulation, concentration and abuse

of power. Incumbents are able to accumulate power over the years they spend in office

(Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 479). They may even be tempted to abuse this power through

covert activity in order to stay in office (Beerman, 2011, p. 1116-1117).

Thirdly, incumbents are more likely to target voters who benefit the most from their

policies and therefore risk favouritism of a group of principals (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 345;

Maltz, 2007, p. 131). This is particularly problematic in international sports governance,

where, given their global scope, ISFs’ members constitute a very heterogeneous group.

Continuously targeting and favouring a particular section of this group may result in a

guaranteed re-election – indeed, even bad agents can be difficult to replace in the absence

of term limits. The most blatant example of such a practice can be found within FIFA,

where a sort of ‘patronage system’ existed in which “[f]riends received personal favors or

were able to raise funds for their national associations, their confederations or their local

infrastructure in exchange for support for their benefactor” (Pieth, 2014b, p. 8). Surely,

alternation prevents such a system from developing (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 345; Maltz, 2007, p.

131). Term limits even induce agents to act in the general interest instead of favouring a

particular group of principals (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344; Glazer and Wattenberg, 1996; Smart

and Sturm, 2013)

Fourthly, term limits provide for more diversity among agents because they allow for new

(historically underrepresented) types of people to be elected to office (Cain and Levin, p.

175-176; Tabarrok, 1994, p. 335). Term limits therefore contribute to a solution for the

underrepresentation of, for instance, women in ISF governing bodies (Geeraert et al., 2014b,

298-299).

Fifthly, term limits enable fresh ideas for solving problems to enter the organisation (Cohen

and Spitzer, 1992, pp. 480-481). They therefore constitute a remedy for the perceived inertia

in international sports governance (Katwala, 2000).

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

None of the federations has rules in place that limit the terms of office of the

president to two terms of four years and governing body members to two terms of

four years. However, 11 federations (31%) have some form of limitation in place.

Yet they apply only for either the president or the governing body members or the

limitation allows the president or the governing body members to stay in office for

a (consecutive) period of more than eight years or limitations are in place for a

number of consecutive terms only.

5. Conclusion

This study confirmed the hypothesis that the institutional design of ISFs is generally

flawed. By relying on the Principal-Agent model, the analysis demonstrated that the

majority of the 35 Olympic ISFs do not have an institutional design implemented that

allows principals to monitor and sanction decision-making body members. Therefore,

senior sports officials are not sufficiently incentivised to act in accordance with their

principals’ interests.

Firstly, as proximate principals, member federations hold the most statutory options for

controlling ISFs’ decision-making bodies compared to national public authorities and

athletes. Yet these controls are not on a sufficiently high level. The vast majority of ISFs

lacks solid screening and selection mechanisms, monitoring and reporting requirements,

administrative procedures, institutional checks, and elections. Moreover, national sports

federations have been known to become rather benevolent in order not to miss out benefits

such as funding and the privilege of hosting important events. This problem is reinforced

in the absence of adequate control mechanisms.

Secondly, the position of athletes within ISFs’ structures needs to be enhanced. Athletes’

position in sports governance has been complicated by the fact that they are linked to ISFs

through clubs and national federations. ISFs have made efforts to involve athletes in

consultative committees, yet administrative procedures need to be installed that allow

athletes to be included in decision-making. Furthermore, institutional checks should be

installed that allow athletes to contest decisions by the decision-making body. Only then

will athletes be able to effectively monitor ISFs.

Thirdly, in order to ensure that ISFs’ decision-making bodies act in the general interest, the

quality of institutional checks needs to be enhanced so that unethical behaviour is

prevented. In addition, term limits need to be installed and reporting requirements need to

be implemented that oblige the publication of important reports and information so that

third parties such as NGOs, news media, and representative organisations of sports

stakeholders can monitor ISFs on behalf of ISFs’ principals.

Enhancing the institutional design of ISFs allows for the calibration of ISFs’ actions with the

normative expectations of principals. Only then will ISFs adequately address the legitimacy

gaps they are confronted with, and only then will they be able to fulfil their pivotal role in

international sports governance.

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Part III. Sports Governance Observer survey

1. Introduction

How can the institutional design or the governance of ISFs be improved? One of the

obstacles towards achieving better governance in ISFs is the lack of a generally accepted,

comprehensive and practical set of good governance indicators (Geeraert, 2015). The Sports

Governance Observer (SGO) aims to provide a modest step towards filling this void. More

specifically, it aims to inform ISFs on how they can organise their affairs in a sustainable

and effective manner as well as monitor their governance practices. The SGO is an easy to

use benchmarking tool based on composite indicators that can be used to assess good

governance in ISFs. The tool is based on a checklist of good governance indicators that was

developed by the AGGIS group (2013), which is further elaborated in this section by means

of a scoring system. Importantly, the Sports Governance Observer is based on

basic

indicators for good governance. A thorough assessment of good governance practices in

ISFs requires an in-depth study on a case-by-case basis.

Through its scoring system, the Sports Governance Observer functions as a tool for self-

assessment as well as external benchmarking. This is facilitated by a comprehensive

methodological sheet, designed for each individual indicator, which includes clear

requirements for each scoring category as well as an explanation of the importance of the

relevant indicator.

The final part of this report continues as follows. The second section presents the

methodology behind the Sports Governance Observer, which allows for the construction of

an SGO index as a measure of good governance. The third section introduces the

methodological sheets of the Sports Governance Observer, which include the scoring

system as well as explanations of the importance of each individual indicator. The fourth

and final section shows the results of the application of the Sports Governance Observer to

the 35 Olympic ISFs.

2. Methodology

2.1 Constructing the SGO index

To capture its empirical complexity, it is necessary to break down the notion of good

governance, measure its components and aggregate them (Nardo, Saisana, Saltelli &

Tarantola, 2005). The Sports Governance Observer is comprised out of four composite

indicators (dimensions), namely

transparency, democracy, checks and balances

and

solidarity

(see below).

Each dimension is a combination of individual indicators (36 in total) that represent

different dimensions of the respective composite indicator. Each of the 36 individual

indicators is quantified by using a pre-established scoring system (ranging from 1 for ‘not

fulfilled at all’ to 5 for ‘state of the art’). Especially large federations should be expected to

score 4-5 on a given indicator. The individual indicators were selected and quantified

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under a

fit-for-purpose

principle and, thus, on the basis of a thorough review of academic

(management, political science and (sports) governance) literature. Importantly, focus here

is mostly on rules-based or

de jure

rather than outcome-based or

de facto

indicators of good

governance (see Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008).

The indicators were subsequently applied to the 35 Olympic ISFs. This allowed for con-

structing an

SGO index

for each of the 35 federations according to the following formula:

∑

100

This formula results in a

percentage score

that represents the average of the percentage

scores from the four governance dimensions (transparency, democracy, checks and balanc-

es and solidarity) and the underlying 36 individual governance indicators.

In other words, the SGO index indicates to what degree the federations comply with the 36

indicators constituted in the four governance dimensions. Consequently, a federation get-

ting the highest possible score (5) on all included indicators in this survey would achieve

an SGO index of 100%.

The SGO index of the 35 federations combined is calculated according to the following

basic formula that gives the average percentage score of all federations:

∑

The decision was made not to assign weights to the individual indicators on the basis of

their relative importance. Hopkins asserts: “[s]ince it is probably impossible to obtain

agreement on weights, the simplest arrangement [equal weighting] is the best choice”

(Hopkins, 1991, p. 1471). It must be noted that this stance has been contested (Cherchye,

Moesen, Rogge and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006). Yet for the sake of simplicity, and in order to

avoid methodological obstacles related to missing data, the SGO index is based on equal

weighting.

Despite their increasing use, composite indicators are the subjects of controversy. Of par-

ticular concern is “the inescapable subjectivity involved in their construction” (Cherchye,

Moesen, Rogge and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006, p. 111). This study acknowledges this issue

but seeks to mitigate it by opting for full transparency with regard to the scoring system of

the Sports Governance Observer.

Note that outcomes may differ from rules.

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2.2 Data collection and analysis

Data collection took place during 2014 and the first part of 2015. It focused on obtaining

basic data on the organisational structures and arrangements of the 35 ISFs in order to as-

sign scores to each of the 36 indicators of the Sports Governance Observer. The main data

sources were therefore the federations’ statutes, byelaws, internal regulations (if available)

and website. In addition, the Secretaries-General of the 35 federations were contacted by

means of a total of one letter and three e-mails with the question to review and supplement

the collected data. This process proved difficult, as the majority of federations were either

unresponsive or uncooperative. The response rate was 43%, with 15 federations providing

their comments and amendments.

One federation (AIBA) specifically declined to cooperate, 19 federations did not respond to

our request (see Table 1). Importantly, the federations were asked to review the unpro-

cessed data in the form of a questionnaire; they did not have the opportunity to scrutinise

their scores on each indicator. The final scoring based on the quantified indicators was thus

conducted without input from the federations.

The decision was made to omit the data on internal controls (indicator 3.3) from the analy-

sis because it was deemed unreliable. In the end, data was gathered for 1,064 of the 1,260

indicators (84%). Because of the large quantity of missing data for the fourth dimension

(38%), the decision was made to exclude the dimension from the calculation of the SGO

index for a federation when a threshold of 5/7 of fulfilled indicators for the dimension is

not reached. Consequently, the solidarity dimension is excluded for 17 federations.

3. The four dimensions of the Sports Governance Observer

The good governance indicators of the sports governance observers are dispersed over four

dimensions, namely transparency, democratic processes, checks & balances, and solidarity.

Transparency

pertains the “degree of openness in conveying information” (Ball, 2009, p.

297). It is widely regarded as a panacea for good governance and failures of governance are

often linked to a lack of transparency (OECD, 2004, p. 50; Hood and Heald, 2006). Trans-

parency allows external actors to monitor the workings of an organisation and therefore

decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.

Democratic processes

concern rules and norms inherent to a democratic grammar of conduct

(Mouffe, 1993). In particular, they refer to participation in policy processes by those who

are affected by the policy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970). Democratic processes increase

the accountability and effectiveness of organisations (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast,

1989; Fearon, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004).

Checks & balances

or mutual control procedures are paramount to prevent the concentration

of power in and they ensure that decision-making is robust, independent and free from

improper influence. They ensure that no senior official or department has absolute control

over decisions, and clearly define the assigned duties (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000).

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Solidarity

refers to expressing responsibility towards internal and external stakeholders.

This involves practices relating to contributing to a better society and a cleaner environ-

ment by integrating social and environmental concerns in operations and interactions with

stakeholders.

In what follows, the dimensions, indicators and scoring system of the Sports Governance

Observer are presented.

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3.1 Dimension 1. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

Indicator 1.1

The organisation publishes its statutes/constitution; byelaws; sport rules; organisational chart; and stra‐

tegic objectives on its website

Explanation

Making these documents available online is a crucial first step in order to ensure that the

inner workings of an international sports federation (ISF) are open to public and stakehold-

er scrutiny. Firstly, statutes constitute a set of fundamental principles according to which

an organisation is governed. Secondly, byelaws are the rules that govern the internal man-

agement of an organisation. Thirdly, sports rules encompass sport rules

sensu stricto

– i.e.,

the rules of the game – and competition rules, such as the setting of the duration of a world

championship or the qualification rules for athletes. Fourthly, an organisational chart is a

diagram that shows the structure of an organisation, including the relationships between

and the relative ranks of its parts and positions. Finally, strategy formulation comprises the

task of analysing an organisation’s externals and internal environment and then selecting

appropriate strategies.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

None of the mentioned documents are available on the organisation’s

website and

The organisation publishes only one or two of the mentioned documents



The organisation publishes only one or two of the mentioned docu‐

ments, but provides its internal stakeholders (member federations,

athletes, clubs,…) other documents (making a total of at least four

documents) through newsletters or via a protected member section

of the organisation’s website

The organisation publishes only three of the mentioned documents,

including the statutes

The organisation publishes four of the mentioned documents includ‐

ing the statutes and the organisational chart but they are not re‐

trievable through the home page (or sub‐levels of the home page

accessible through the home page) of the website



Good

The organisation publishes at least four of the mentioned documents

including the statutes and they are retrievable through the home page

(or sub‐levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of

the website

The organisation publishes all of the mentioned documents and they are

retrievable through the home page (or sub‐levels of the home page ac‐

cessible through the home page) of the website

State of the art

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Indicator 1.2

The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general assembly on its website

Explanation

Publishing the agenda and minutes of statutory meetings allows for public scrutiny of the

relationship between senior sports officials and member federations. Minutes consist of a

record or summary of all motions, proposals, resolutions and any other matter formally

voted upon (including the vote thereon).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

Not available on the organisation’s website

Little information is published (e.g. only the agenda)



The agenda and minutes are published, but they are not timely pub‐

lished (e.g. no minutes from recent statutory meeting)

Incomplete (they do not reflect all the discussed items, participation

rate, etc.),

not objective

not understandable

The agenda and minutes are provided to the organisation’s internal

stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…) through newslet‐

ters or via a protected member section of the organisation’s website.

They are timely provided, complete (they reflect all the discussed items,

participation rate, etc.), objective and understandable

OR two or more of the following:



Good

The agenda and minutes are published, but they are either



Incomplete (they do not include all the discussed items, participation

rate, etc.),



not objective

not understandable

not timely published

State of the art

The agenda and minutes, timely published on the organisation’s website, are

complete (they reflect all the discussed items, participation rate, etc.), objec‐

tive and understandable

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Indicator 1.3

The organisation publishes decisions taken at its executive body meetings on its website

Explanation

By producing regular narrative accounts that seek to justify its decisions, actions and re-

sults in the eyes of its internal stakeholders and the general public, an ISF can prevent that

it becomes a closed and secret club (Fox and Miller, 1995; Dryzek, 2000; Newman, 2005).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation does not produce any information regarding its executive

body meetings

The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board’s decisions. The

published information is one of the following:



and



Moderate

the organisation does not explain the rationale behind any key decisions

not timely published

not complete (it does not reflect all the discussed items)

not objective

not understandable

The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board’s decisions. The

published information is one of the following:



Summaries of the organisation’s executive board’s decisions are provided to

the organisation’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes,

clubs,…) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the or‐

ganisation’s website. They are timely provided, complete (they reflect all the

discussed items, participation rate, etc.), objective and understandable

not timely published

not complete (it does not reflect all the discussed items)

not objective

not understandable

it does not explain the rationale behind any key decisions.

Good

The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board’s decisions. The

published information is



timely published

complete (it reflects all the discussed items)

objective

understandable

The organisation explains the rationale behind certain key decisions.

State of the art

The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board’s decisions. The

published information is



timely published

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

complete (it reflects all the discussed items)

objective

understandable

The organisation explains the rationale behind all key decisions.

Indicator 1.4

The organisation gives the media access to its general assembly meetings

Explanation

Allowing media access to statutory meetings enhances public scrutiny.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all Media access is not allowed

Weak

Moderate

Good

Media access is restricted and recording is not allowed

Media access is restricted and recording is restricted



Statutory meetings are open to media

They are open to being photographed, broadcast, webcast or otherwise

recorded and/or transmitted by audio or video means

Statutory meetings are open to media

They are open to being photographed, broadcast, webcast or otherwise

recorded and/or transmitted by audio or video means

Public notice of the time and place of a meeting scheduled is given to the

news media. In addition, it is conspicuously posted on the organisation’s

website

State of the art

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Indicator 1.5

The organisation publishes basic information about its board members and senior officials on its website

Explanation

Basic biographical information gives the general public insight into senior officials’ back-

ground, affiliations and education.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all No information

Weak

Moderate

The available information is extremely basic and/or is only available for a very

small group of senior officials

The information covers 3 or more but not all of the following items:



date of birth



cover all of the items but is not available for all the senior officials

position

nationality

education

professional background

tasks within the organisation

current activities in other sports organisations

official functions and political posts

Good

State of the art

The published information includes at least six of the items listed above

The published information includes all or more of the items listed above

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Indicator 1.6

Contact details to board members and senior officials are published on the organisation’s website

Explanation

The starting point of an accountability relationship is the ability to ask questions, so that

the actor that is being held accountable has to explain and justify his/her conduct (Bovens,

2007).

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions



Not fulfilled at all No contact information

Weak

Only a general email address is available on the organisation’s website

Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are not provided to

the organisation’s internal stakeholders

Moderate

Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are provided to the or‐

ganisation’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…)

through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation’s

website



A general contact address for officials is available on the organisation’s

website

The email address and phone number of the secretariat is available on the

organisation’s website

Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are provided to the

organisation’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes,

clubs,…) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the

organisation’s website

The email address and phone number of the secretariat is available on the

organisation’s website

Email addresses of individual senior officials are available on the organisa‐

tion’s website

Good

State of the art



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Indicator 1.7

The organisation publishes information about its member federations on its website

Explanation

Publishing general information about member federations provides insight into the impact

of an ISF.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

Only two or less elements from score 5 are published or members are pre‐

sented without any additional information



All elements from score 4 are provided to the organisation’s internal

stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…) through newsletters

or via a protected member section of the organisation’s website

3 or more, but not all elements from score 4 are published

Not fulfilled at all No information is available



Good

Information on the member federations includes:



Founding year



Affiliated since

Website

Email address

Address

President

General secretary

State of the art

Information on the member federations includes:



Founding year

Affiliated since

Website

Email address

Address

President

General secretary

Nr of affiliated athletes

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Indicator 1.8

The organisation publishes its annual general activity report on its website

Explanation

Annual reports outline the organisation’s accomplishments. Therefore, they constitute a

vital element of accountability since they provide the general public with in-depth and

comprehensive information on the activities carried out by the ISF and its attained goals.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Conditions



Moderate



It is provided to the member federations, but it does not includes all ele‐

ments in score 4

General activity report meets the conditions in score 4, but it is not pub‐

lished on an annual basis

The most recent report is not available

It is not easily accessible through the website and/or the annual reports

from the previous 3 years are not available

It includes all elements in score 4 but is not published online but provided

to the organisation’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes,

clubs,…) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the

organisation’s website

It is not provided to the organisation’s internal stakeholders

General activity report is published but does not meet all of the condi‐

tions in score 4

Not fulfilled at all No general reports are published

And/or



And/or

Good

State of the art

General activity report is published online annually and includes complete and

founded information on accounts, assets, revenue, sponsoring and events

General activity report is published annually and includes complete, objective

and understandable information on accounts, assets, events, revenue, spon‐

soring, development of the sport and programmes

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Indicator 1.9

The organisation publishes reports of its standing committees on its website

Explanation

Standing committees, such as finance, ethics and athlete committees, have an important

supporting function in the governance of ISFs. Publishing reports on their activities is

therefore an important part of reporting transparency.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

Annual reports of less than 50% of the standing committees are published

online



Reports of all standing committees are provided to the organisation’s

internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…) through

newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation’s web‐

site

Reports meets the conditions in score 4, but they are not published on an

annual basis

The most recent report is not available

It is not easily accessible through the website and/or the annual reports

from the previous three years are not available

Annual reports of 50% or more of the standing committees are published

Not fulfilled at all No reports are published



and/or



Good

State of the art

and/or

Annual reports of 75% of the standing committees are published online

Annual reports of all the standing committees are published online

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Indicator 1.10

The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report on its website according to rec‐

ognised international standards

Explanation

A contemporary financial compliance system includes all financial transactions in an audit-

ed bookkeeping and financial reporting system and applies strict bookkeeping and audit-

ing standards. In order to make ISFs publicly accountable, this information should be made

available to the general public, especially since ISFs often operate under a large

de facto

autonomy.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions



Annual financial reports are published, but they are not externally audited



Moderate



Externally audited annual financial reports are provided to the organisa‐

tion’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…)

through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisa‐

tion’s website and reports from the past 3 years are available

The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report

on its website according to recognised international standards, but the

reports from the past 3 years are not all available

Comprehensive information is published as part of general report

Only basic financial information is published as part of a general report

Externally audited financial reports according to recognised international

standards are published, but the latest report is not available

Not fulfilled at all No financial reports are published

Weak

Good



State of the art

The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report on its

website according to recognised international standards and the reports from

the past 3 years are available

E.g. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)

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Indicator 1.11

The organisation publishes regulations and reports on remuneration, including per diem payments and

bonuses, of its board members and senior officials on its website

Explanation

Senior sports officials have a responsibility to cautiously handle financial assets. A com-

mitment to developing sport, a public good, does not resonate well with personal enrich-

ment. However, personal enrichment is a particular risk associated with ISFs due to the

large degrees of autonomy under which senior sports officials operate.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Conditions



Moderate



Regulations and reports on remuneration are provided to the organisa‐

tion’s internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,…)

through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisa‐

tion’s website and reports from the past 3 years are available

Regulations are available

Reports exist, but they are not available

Regulations are available

Reports are available

Regulations are in place, but not available on the website

No reports are available

Regulations are available

Reports on remuneration do not exist

Not fulfilled at all No information is published

Good



State of the art

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Indicator 1.12

The organisation publishes main event reports with detailed and relevant information on its website

Explanation

Events are often the biggest source of revenue for ISFs and they can increase the popularity

of the sport across borders. They have the potential to have both positive and negative ef-

fects on the wider community. Since they cannot be organised without public support, they

must be open to close public scrutiny. Key elements of an event report include financial

information, media coverage, sponsors, infrastructure, attendance rates and athlete partici-

pation.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

The report only includes 1 or 2 of the elements mentioned below



The report includes more than 2 of the elements mentioned below



Event reports are provided to the organisation’s internal stakeholders

(member federations, athletes, clubs,…) through newsletters or via a pro‐

tected member section of the organisation’s website

Not fulfilled at all No report is available

Good

The event report includes sections on



Governance



Revenue

Sponsors

Media coverage

Infrastructure

Attendance

Athlete participation

And, an objective assessments of economic, social and environmental

impacts

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3.2 Dimension 2. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Indicator 2.1

There are elections of the president and the governing bodies and, where appropriate, the standing

committees

Explanation

A principal way for constituents to hold office holders accountable is through elections.

Faced with the possibility of not being re-elected, incumbents will be inclined to act in the

best interest of those who hold voting power.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Conditions



Moderate



Good



The president is not elected

A portion of the governing body members are elected by the congress or

by continental federations

The president is elected

The majority of governing body members (with the exception of the sec‐

retary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations

The governing body can co‐opt members whose appointment is not ap‐

proved by the congress

The president is elected by the congress

All the other governing body members (with the exception of the secre‐

tary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations

The president is elected by the congress

All the other governing body members (with the exception of the secre‐

tary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations

A nomination committee is established. This committee receives nomina‐

tions and ensures checks relating to professional and integrity criteria on

all candidates

The president is elected

A portion of the governing body members are elected by the congress or

by continental federations

The president can co‐opt members whose appointment is not approved

by the congress

Only the president is elected or the governing body members

He/she subsequently appoints the other members of the governing body

Not fulfilled at all No elections are in place

State of the art

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Indicator 2.2

Elections are on the basis of secret ballots and clear procedures detailed in the organisation’s governing

document/s

Explanation

Elections on the basis of secret ballots ensure that no voter fears reprisals. Clear procedures

add to the objectivity of elections.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions



No secret ballots



Procedures are in place but they do not cover information on people

qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and,

where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds

No secret ballots

Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to

vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where ap‐

plicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds

Secret ballots (or, secret ballots can be requested)

Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to

vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where ap‐

plicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds

Secret ballots

Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to

vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where ap‐

plicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds

The procedures are controlled by a body within the organisation (e.g.

nomination committee)

Not fulfilled at all No clear procedures and no secret ballots

Weak

Moderate



Good



State of the art



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Indicator 2.3

The organisation offers to the candidates standing for election opportunities to present their pro‐

gramme/manifesto

Explanation

In order to make an informed vote, it is important for voters to have a clear picture on can-

didates’ policy agenda, preferences and interests.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all The candidates standing for election do not have opportunities to present

their programme/manifesto. They are not obliged to announce their candidacy

before the election takes place

Weak

Moderate

Candidates who wish to stand for election are obliged to announce their can‐

didacy in less than 4 months before the elections take place

Candidates who wish to stand for election are not obliged to announce their

candidacy in good time (announced less than 4 months before the election)

and the congress is informed of their candidacy OR they are not obliged to

present their programme/manifesto to the congress



Candidates who wish to stand for election must announce their candidacy

in good time, also to the congress (at least 4 months)

They must present their programme/manifesto to the congress

Candidates who wish to stand for election must announce their candidacy

in good time, also to the congress (at least 4 months)

They must present their programme/manifesto to the congress

Contributions from private actors to the campaign of a presidential candi‐

date are forbidden; a system of campaign financing is in place which pro‐

vides officially announced candidates, which have sufficient backing by a

number of member federation, with funding; this system is controlled by

a nomination committee

Good

State of the art



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Indicator 2.4

The decisions on allocation of major events are made through a democratic, open, transparent and objec‐

tively reproducible process

Explanation

The allocation of the hosting of major events constitutes a high-risk area in relation to cor-

ruption and conflicts of interest. Such risks can be managed by making the bidding process

democratic, objective, open and transparent.

Operationalisation

Score

Weak

Conditions



Moderate



And



Good



the final candidate is elected by the congress

Clear conflict of interest rules are in place (those can be part of a general

conflict of interest regulations, applicable not only to the allocation of

events)

The criteria for a bid for major events are communicated to its members

in good time (min. 1 year before the event is awarded)

The bidding dossiers are reviewed, evaluated and scores are assigned on

the basis of pre‐established and objective criteria

Only bids achieving a minimum score are shortlisted

The governing body confirms the shortlist and the final candidate is elect‐

ed by the congress

Clear conflict of interest rules are in place (those can be part of a general

conflict of interest regulations, applicable not only to the allocation of

events)

The organisation adopts a geographical rotation policy

The criteria for a bid for major events are communicated to its members

in good time (min. 1 year before the event is awarded)

The bidding dossiers are reviewed, evaluated and scores are assigned on

the basis of pre‐established and objective criteria

External procurement experts assist with this evaluation

Only bids achieving a minimum score are shortlisted

The governing body confirms the shortlist

The final candidate is elected by the congress

Only one or two of the criteria below are fulfilled

The Congress does not decide

More than two of the criteria below are fulfilled (but not all those in the

‘good’ variable)

Not fulfilled at all None of the criteria below are fulfilled

and/or



State of the art



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Indicator 2.5

The organisation defines a quorum in its governing document/s for its legislative and decision making

bodies

Explanation

A quorum (i.e., a minimum number of attendees required to conduct business and to cast

votes) prevents a small group of officials from monopolising power.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all No quorum in place

Weak



A quorum set at 50% or less is in place in both bodies

A quorum is in place in either the legislative or the decision making body

For the legislative body, it is at 50% OR for the decision making body, it is

at 75%

A quorum is in place in both the organisation’s legislative and decision

making bodies

For the legislative body, it is at 50% OR for the decision making body, it is

at 75%

A quorum is in place in the organisation’s legislative and decision making

bodies

For the legislative body, it is at 50%, and for the decision making body, it

is at 75%



a quorum is in place in either the legislative or the decision making body

Moderate

Good



State of the art



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Indicator 2.6

The organisation’s elected officials have a term limit

Explanation

Term limits remedy high rates of re-election stemming directly from advantages incum-

bents enjoy over challengers (with seniority comes power). Moreover, they prevent that

office holders lose touch with their constituents – voter become apathetic when they as-

sume that the re-election of incumbents is inevitable. Term limits therefore make sure that

elections provide new ideas for solving problems and they prevent the concentration of

power (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992).

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all No limitations are in place

Weak

Moderate

An age limit is in place.



Limitations are in place, but only for either the president or the governing

body members and/or the limitation allows the president or the governing

body members to stay in office for a (consecutive) period of more than 8

years



Limitations are in place for a number of consecutive terms only.

Good

The following limitations to terms of office are in place:



President: 2 terms of 4 years

Governing body members: 2 terms of 4 years

State of the art

The following limitations to terms of office are in place:



In addition, only a fraction (e.g. one third) of the members of the board of

directors is elected each time (preventing a hostile takeover and/or a sudden

loss of expertise and experience)

President: 2 terms of 4 years

Governing body members: 2 terms of 4 years

Judicial body members: 1 term of 6 years

Chairmen of standing committees: 1 term of 8 years

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Indicator 2.7

The organisation’s general assembly meets at least once a year

Explanation

As a minimum, the target should be set at one general assembly meeting per year in order

to give member federations the possibility to scrutinise the financial accounts and general

policy of the past year.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all The organisation’s general assembly meets less than once every 2 years

Weak

Moderate

Good

State of the art

The organisation’s general assembly meets once every 2 years

The organisation’s general assembly de facto meets at least once a year

The organisation’s general assembly has to meet at least once a year

The general assembly has to meet at least once a year and there are clear pro‐

cedures enshrined in the statutes for convening emergency and special meet‐

ings

Indicator 2.8

The organisation’s governing body meets regularly

Explanation

The principal task of a governing body is to oversee the management of an organisation

(Carver and Carver 2001). Research suggests that governing body activity, measured by

meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999). Govern-

ing bodies that meet frequently are also more likely to perform their duties diligently and

in accordance with shareholders' interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

The governing body meets once a year or less

The governing body meets once every 6 months or less



Good



State of the art



The governing body meets less than quarterly

Governing body meetings are scheduled

The governing body meets quarterly at the least

Governing body meetings are scheduled

The governing body meets more regularly than quarterly

Governing body meetings are scheduled

There are procedures for convening emergency or special meetings

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Indicator 2.9

The organisation encourages gender equity with regard to its leading officials

Explanation

Diversity in governing bodies is needed in order to ensure that everybody’s best interests

are being looked after (Katwala, 2000, p. 9). Importantly, studies have demonstrated that

female inclusion in boards enhances organisations’ performance (Brown, Brown and Ana-

stasopoulos, 2002; Fondas and Sassalos, 2000, Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004; Terjesen,

and Singh, 2009). Female directors also function as important role models, encouraging

other women to pursue similar careers (Sealy and Singh, 2010).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

The organisation has no gender equity policy

The organisation has a gender equity policy, but not for the entire organisa‐

tion or it does not promotes gender equity in all leadership positions

The organisation has



Good



State of the art



a quota for female governing body members

The organisation adopts a 25% or higher quota for female governing

body members

The organisation has a gender equity policy for the entire organisation,

which promotes gender equity in all leadership positions

The organisation adopts a 25% or higher quota for female governing

body members

The organisation has a gender equity policy for the entire organisation,

which promotes gender equity in all leadership positions

The organisation has a policy in place which stresses gender equity

throughout sport at all levels

a gender equity policy for the entire organisation, which promotes gen‐

der equity in all leadership positions

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Indicator 2.10

The organisation provides opportunity for athletes to be represented within the organisation

Explanation

Including athletes in policy processes makes policies more effective because they come to

see ISFs’ decisions as their own decisions and provide specialised knowledge (Woods,

1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). Athlete inclusion also reduces the likelihood of legal

challenges, but only if they perceive their representatives participating in the policy process

as legitimate (Saward, 2005, Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). However, mere consultation of-

fers no assurance that athletes’ concerns and ideas will actually be taken into account; this

requires access to decision-making and decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969; Woods,

1999, Young, 2000).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation makes no formal efforts to involve athletes in its decision

making processes



Athletes are represented within the organisation, but the chair‐

man/woman of the athletes committee is not a member of the organi‐

sation’s governing body

Athletes are represented but there is no athletes committee in place

Athletes are represented within a specific athletes’ committee.

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the

organisation’s governing body

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is not elected by the

congress or by athletes

he/she does not have voting authority

Athletes are represented within a specific athletes’ committee.

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the

organisation’s governing body

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is elected by congress

Athletes are represented within a specific athletes’ committee.

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the

organisation’s governing body

The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is elected by athletes

and/or



Moderate



Good



State of the art



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3.3 Dimension 3. CHECKS AND BALANCES

Indicator 3.1

The organisation has an internal audit committee

Explanation

The internal audit committee plays many important roles within an organisation, including

providing oversight to the internal audit. Internal audit is supplemental to external audit. It

can provide external auditors with business, activity and process knowledge, as well as

information on the risks facing the organisation. According to the Institute of Internal Au-

ditors, internal auditing evaluates and improves the effectiveness the nature of three specif-

ic processes:



“Risk management processes — identification and evaluation of potential risks that

might affect the achievement of objectives of an organisation and determination of ad-

equate corrective actions. A link can here be made to critical success factors.

Control processes — policies, procedures, and activities which ensure that risks are

kept within the limits defined by management in the risk management process.

Governance processes — procedures which allow stakeholders to evaluate risk and

control processes defined by management” (IIA 2013).



Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation has no internal audit committee



A finance committee is present which only has the competence to re‐

view and recommend the draft budget, to prepare financial statements,

and/or to study the external auditor’s report.

The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisa‐

tion’s statutes

The committee oversees the internal audit

The committee assesses the quality of the internal control system, in‐

cluding risk management

The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisa‐

tion’s statutes

The chair of the committee is an external expert

The committee members have the necessary expertise to perform their

functions

The committee oversees the internal audit

An audit committee is present, but its tasks are not clearly defined in

the statutes.

Moderate



Good



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

State of the art



The committee assesses the quality of the internal control system, in‐

cluding risk management

The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisa‐

tion’s statutes

The chair of the committee is an external expert and a (non‐executive)

member of the governing body

The committee members have the necessary expertise to perform their

functions

The committee oversees the internal audit

The committee draws up its own budget and is able to decide on the

support of external advice at its own discretion

The committee reviews the financial statements

The committee assesses and monitor the quality of the internal control

system, including risk management

Indicator 3.2

The organisation is externally audited according to internationally recognised standards

Explanation

An independent external audit of ISFs’ finances provides stakeholders with the necessary

objective information on the organisation’s financial performance.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Good

State of the art

Conditions

No external audit

The organisation’s finances are externally audited, but not according to in‐

ternationally recognised standards

The organisation’s finances are externally audited according to international‐

ly recognised standards, but not on an annual basis

The organisation’s finances are externally audited according to international‐

ly recognised standards



The organisation is externally audited according to internationally rec‐

ognised standards

The audit includes a review of



the application and effectiveness of risk management procedures

and risk assessment methodologies;

a review of financial reports and accounting records, and;

compliance with internal policies.

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Indicator 3.3

The organisation adopts an integrated internal control and risk management system

Explanation

Internal controls ensure that ISFs work in an effective manner with regard to operational

and financial performance goals (COSO, 2013).

An important part of an internal control

system is risk assessment. There are specific corruption-related risks in relation to ISFs.

Examples include funding being distributed to member federations, the hosting of events,

commercial contracts and financial controls over member associations (Pieth, 2011).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Good

Conditions

No internal control system

Internal financial controls are not on a sufficiently high standard (COSO sys‐

tem or similar)

Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a

sufficiently high standard



State of the art



Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a

sufficiently high standard

In addition, the organisation adopts systematic controls to corruption

risks connected with ISGBs

Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a

sufficiently high standard

In addition, the organisation adopts systematic controls to corruption

risks associated with ISFs, including:



payments to member federations

payments to parties that are close to member federations

Such payments are controlled either directly or indirectly (Pieth, 2011, p.

21):



Directly (each payment is controlled until it reaches the ultimate payee,

for instance by entering into a direct contractual relationship with the

latter; implementation and performance are then controlled through

own accounting system, etc.)

Indirectly (through access to audited financial statements; restricting

cash payments to the absolute minimum; allow payments only to bank

addresses or bank accounts which are defined in formal agreements;

disallow any payments to bank addresses which are not in the country

of residence or domicile of the payee; monitor the financial statements

of the payees, which document the proper allocation of the funds)



Important elements of an integrated control system (such as the presence of an accounting committee)

are included in other indicators. This indicator focuses on the presence of financial controls.

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Indicator 3.4

The organisation has or recognises an Ethics/Integrity Code for all its members and officials

Explanation

An ethics code defines unacceptable behaviour within an organisation. International organ-

isations have issue checklists of components that should be part of such a code (e.g. Inter-

national Chamber of Commerce 2008). ISF’s codes of ethics need to include rules on gifts

and hospitality, political and charitable contributions, as well as the contracting of third

parties (Pieth, 2011).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions

No ethics code within the organisation

Ethics code available, applicable to staff and senior officials, is available but

it does not include all the components in 4

The ethics code, applicable to staff and senior officials, includes the compo‐

nents in 4, but it is not clearly separated from the disciplinary code for ath‐

letes

The ethics code includes the following components:



The prohibition of bribery and extortion at all times and in any form

Procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses

in order to ensure that “such arrangements (a) are limited to reasonable

and bona fide expenditures, and (b) do not improperly affect, or might

be deemed to improperly affect, the outcome of a procurement or oth‐

er business transaction” (ICC, 2008, art. 5)

Good

State of the art

In addition to the above components, the ethics code includes:



Rules on charitable contributions

Rules on the selection, contracting and supervision of third parties

Training

A helpline

Furthermore, the organisation provides:

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Indicator 3.5

The organisation has clear conflict of interest rules

Explanation

Conflicts of interest require notification and disclosure and, in certain cases, mandatory

recusal from decisions. Conflicts of interest may arise in particular in certain high-risk areas

relating to ISFs. For instance, governing body members may directly benefit from the

choice of the organisation of events, commercial deals or the distribution of funds to mem-

ber federations (Pieth, 2011, p. 30).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Good

Conditions

No conflict of interest rules are in place

Rules are in place but they are not sufficiently clear and/or they do not in‐

clude at least one of the conditions in 4

General conflict of interest rules are in place but they do not include all con‐

ditions in 4



Clear and consistent conflict of interest rules are in place.

They include the duty to abstain from voting in cases of conflict of inter‐

ests regarding



and



State of the art

define an appropriate threshold

Furthermore, they include disclosure requirements and clearly describe

the consequences for transgressors

hosting decisions

commercialisation decisions

In addition to the points in 4, the organisation makes financial contributions

to its member federations dependent upon the application of conflict of

interest standards within these organisations

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Indicator 3.6

The organisation has an independent body (e.g. Ethics Committee) to check the application of the

rules referred in indicators 3.4 and 3.5

Explanation

In order to ensure compliance with the code of ethics and conflict of interest rules, a com-

mittee should be in place that has the task of assessing compliance and of heading investi-

gations upon receiving reports of violations. Only then, ethical behaviour can fully enter

the daily decision-making and behaviour of ISF senior officials and staff (Weber, 1993, p.

430). Staff and governing body members need to explain and justify their conduct to the

committee, which should have the power to pose questions and pass judgement, after

which transgressors of the code face consequences (Bovens, 2007).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

There is no ethics committee or similar in place to check the application of the

rules referred in indicators 3.4 and 3.5



The committee (or the general disciplinary body) cannot initiate proceed‐

ings on its own initiative (i.e., without referral by the President, the Sec‐

retary General or the governing body)

the committee members are not independent from the governing body

and/or staff cannot report irregular behaviour committed by employees

in the knowledge that they are afforded protection and safety (whistle‐

blower protection)

The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative

The committee members are not independent from the governing body

and/or

staff cannot report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are

afforded (whistle‐blower) protection

The committee members are independent from the governing body

The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative

Staff can report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are af‐

forded (whistle‐blower) protection

The committee members are independent from the governing body

The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative

The committee has its own budget

The committee members are objectively recruited

The committee members are appointed by the congress

Staff can report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are af‐

forded (whistle‐blower) protection

Pre‐set sanctions (e.g. disciplinary reprimands) are determined in order

to address minor breaches

and/or



Moderate



Good



State of the art



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

The committee is separated into an investigatory and an adjudicatory

chamber or a similar separation of powers is provided

Indicator 3.7

The organisation’s decisions can be contested through internal channels specified in its governing

document/s

Explanation

The right of any national association, club, player, official or member to appeal any deci-

sion by which they are directly affected constitutes an important check.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation’s decisions cannot be contested



Moderate



Good



The conditions in 4 are fulfilled, but the secretary general or president

has the discretionary authority to refer cases to the committee.

Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affect‐

ed by a decision shall be entitled to appeal

The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing

body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation

The members of the appeal committee may not sit on the committee if

the case being dealt with concerns themselves or players, clubs, officials

or any other members of the national association to which they belong

Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affect‐

ed by a decision shall be entitled to appeal

The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing

body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation

The members of the appeal committee may not sit on the committee if

the case being dealt with concerns themselves or players, clubs, officials

or any other members of the national association to which they belong

The parties concerned are entitled to a hearing if they so desire

The members of the appeal committee belong to the governing body or

to any of the standing committees of the organisation

And/or not every national association, club, player, official or member

directly affected by a decision shall be entitled to appeal

Executive body decisions cannot be appealed internally

Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affect‐

ed by a decision shall be entitled to appeal

The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing

body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation

State of the art



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3.4 Dimension 4. SOLIDARITY

Indicator 4.1

The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of grass‐roots activities

Explanation

As the custodians of sport, a public good, ISFs have a responsibility for fostering the global

development of grass-roots activities. According to Eurostrategies

et al.

(2011),

“grassroots

sport covers all sport disciplines practiced by non-professionals and organised on a nation-

al level through national sport” (Eurostrategies

et al.,

2011, p. 13).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Conditions

The organisation does not allocate specific resources for the global devel‐

opment of grass‐roots activities and does not promote the global develop‐

ment of grass‐roots activities

The organisation promotes the global development of grass‐roots activities,

but does not allocate specific resources

The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of

grass‐roots activities, but it does not consolidate these under a comprehen‐

sive strategy (approved or not approved by the Congress)



The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development

of grass‐roots activities and it consolidates these under a comprehen‐

sive strategy (not approved by the Congress)

The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development

of grass‐roots activities

The different programmes are consolidated under a comprehensive

strategy, approved by the Congress

Weak

Moderate

Good

State of the art



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Indicator 4.2

The organisation has a well‐defined Social Responsibility (SR) strategy and/or programme

Explanation

In the broad sense, (Corporate) Social Responsibility (SR) can be defined as “a continuing

commitment by an organisation to behave ethically and contribute to economic develop-

ment, while also improving the quality of life of its employees, the local community, and

society at large” (Watts and Holme, 1999).

SR does not cover a single, comprehensive

activity (Lindgreen, Swaen and Johnston, 2009). By taking a strategic approach to social

responsibility, organisations can determine what activities they devote to SR. By planning

out SR as part of an organisation’s overall plan, it is ensured that (commercial) activities do

not overshadow the need to behave socially responsible. This indicator looks at SR in a

more narrow sense and focuses on contributing to society, while leaving out the elements

that have been treated in other indicators.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation does not make efforts towards achieving the area’s in score

4 and 5

The organisation makes certain efforts towards achieving the area’s in score

4 and 5, but it does not have a well‐defined SR strategy and/or pro‐

gramme(s)



The organisation makes certain efforts towards achieving the area’s in

score 4 and 5, but it does not have a well‐defined SR strategy and/or

programme(s)

The organisation makes serious efforts (investments, programmes

and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative externalities

of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping preven‐

tion, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)

Moderate



Good

The organisation has a well‐defined SR strategy and/or programme(s)

The strategy or programme(s) cover one of the following areas:



Mitigating environmental degradation (not including degradation

through event(s) )

Improving the social, cultural, educational or psychological circumstanc‐

es of marginalised and/or fractured communities (not including anti‐

discrimination and sexual harassment; legacy requirements for events;

development of grassroots sports)

In addition, the organisation makes serious efforts (investments, pro‐

grammes and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative exter‐

nalities of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping pre‐

By referring to “Social Responsibility”, ISO 26000 extends the idea of “Corporate Social Responsibility”

(CSR) from private businesses to other organisations, such as NGOs or ISFs.

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vention, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)

State of the art

The organisation has a well‐defined SR strategy and/or programme(s)

The strategy or programme(s) cover all of the following areas:



Mitigating environmental degradation (not including degradation

through event(s) )



Improving the social, cultural, educational or psychological circumstanc‐

es of marginalised and/or fractured communities (not including anti‐

discrimination and sexual harassment; legacy requirements for events;

development of grassroots sports)

In addition, the organisation makes serious efforts (investments, pro‐

grammes and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative exter‐

nalities of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping pre‐

vention, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)

Indicator 4.3

The organisation has legacy requirements for communities in which its events are hosted

Explanation

Large sport events can have both positive and negative effects on communities in which

they are hosted. ISFs have a responsibility to ensure that their events live up to their full

potential, ensuring positive and minimising long-term negative effects.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

There are no legacy requirements.



Moderate



Good



State of the art



The organisation adopts legacy requirements for the hosting of its major

event

These requirements are not specific and clear

The organisation adopts social or sporting legacy requirements

These requirements are specific and clear

Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the

fulfilment of these requirements

The organisation adopts social and sporting legacy requirements for the

hosting of its major event

These requirements are specific and clear

Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the

fulfilment of these requirements by means of a scoring system

The organisation adopts social and sporting legacy requirements for the

hosting all its events

These requirements are specific and clear

Bids to host all events are evaluated based amongst others on the ful‐

filment of these requirements by means of a scoring system

The fulfilment of these requirements is evaluated ex post

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Indicator 4.4

The organisation adopts an environmental management system (ISO 14001, EMAS or similar) for its

major events

Explanation

Environmental management systems are (usually voluntary) tools for public administra-

tions as well as private companies. They are intended to help organisations to optimise

their production processes, reducing environmental impacts and making more effective

use of resources (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). Consequently, they are suited as a tool

for reducing the environmental impacts of sport events.

Operationalisation

Score

Conditions

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

The organisation does not adopt environmental requirements for its major

events



Legacy requirements for the hosting of the organisation’s major event

are adopted

These requirements are not specific and clear

Legacy requirements for the hosting of the organisation’s major event

are adopted

These requirements are specific and clear

Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on

the fulfilment of these requirements

An environmental management system (ISO, EMAS or similar) is

adopted for the organisation’s major events

Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on

the fulfilment this requirement

The organisation obliges an environmental management system (ISO,

EMAS or similar) for its major events

Moderate



Good



State of the art



For instance, several sport events and many sport facilities have already received EU eco-management

and audit scheme (EMAS) certification. TOROC, the Organising Committee for the 2006 Winter Olympic

Games in Turin, has produced a handbook on how to apply EMAS to sporting events which includes

concrete steps towards registration and examples of activities (see TOROC, 2006).

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Indicator 4.5

The organisation offers consulting to member federations in the areas of organisations and manage‐

ment through workshops, one to one advice or similar

Explanation

ISFs can assist national sports federations to become more professional in their approach,

and more able to maximise their organisational advantages. For instance, ISFs can dissemi-

nate best practice on a range of issues related to good governance (Holt, 2006, p. 158).

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Good

Conditions

The organisation does not offer any form of consulting to member federa‐

tions in the areas of organisations and management

The organisation provides basic information on its website in the areas of

organisations and management, directed towards its member federations

The organisation disseminates documentation in the areas of organisations

and management among its member federations

The organisation offers consulting to member federations in the areas of

organisations and management through workshops, one to one advice or

similar

The organisation adopts a comprehensive strategy for consulting to member

federations in the areas of organisations and management through work‐

shops, one to one advice or similar

State of the art

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Indicator 4.6

Representatives from economically weaker member federations can apply for support to attend the

general assembly

Explanation

The congress has an important monitoring function with regard to the governing body

(Strøm, 2000). Yet it can be rather costly for national sporting delegates to attend congress

meetings. In order to achieve a high attendance rate, ISFs can reimburse travel expenses

and hotel stays for economically disadvantaged members federations. In addition, new

communication technology can be used as an enabler.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Moderate

Conditions



The organisation does not provide support for economically weaker

member federations

The organisation provides support for federations, but it is not specifi‐

cally directed towards economically weaker federations

Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations

can apply for support to attend the general assembly or new communi‐

cation technology (e.g. proxy voting) is used as an enabler

There are however no clearly defined application procedures available

Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations

can apply for support to attend the general assembly or new communi‐

cation technology is used as an enabler

There are clearly defined application procedures available

Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations

can apply for support to attend the general assembly

Reimbursed expenses are internally audited and reported

New communication technology is used as an enabler

There are clearly defined application procedures available



Good



State of the art



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Indicator 4.7

The organisation adopts a clear anti‐discrimination policy

Explanation

Discrimination and harassment can be based on race, ethnic origin or skin colour, nationali-

ty, gender, sexual orientation, ability, religious or political convictions, illness, sensory im-

pairments, learning difficulties, age, and so on. ISFs have a responsibility to combat dis-

crimination and harassment in all levels of sport.

In addition, internal anti-discrimination

and anti-harassment policies contribute to providing a work environment free of discrimi-

nation and/or harassment.

Operationalisation

Score

Not fulfilled at all

Weak

Conditions

The organisation does not adopt any of the discussed policies.

The organisation takes certain measures towards fighting one of the follow‐

ing:



Internal anti‐discrimination and anti‐harassment measures;



Moderate



Good



State of the art



Measures directed towards combating discrimination in sport.

The organisation only adopts one of the following:

A clear internal anti‐discrimination and anti‐harassment policy;

A clear policy directed towards combating discrimination in sport.

The organisation adopts a clear internal anti‐discrimination and anti‐

harassment policy;

The organisation adopts a clear policy directed towards combating dis‐

crimination in sport.

The organisation adopts a clear internal anti‐discrimination and anti‐

harassment policy;

The organisation adopts a clear policy directed towards combating dis‐

crimination in sport;

The policies address discrimination based on at least 3 of the following:



Race, ethnic origin or skin colour

Nationality

Gender

Ability

Sexual orientation

Religious or political convictions

Illness

Sensory impairments

Learning difficulties

Age.

According to the Olympic Charter, “[t]he practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have

the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit” (IOC,

2013a).

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4. Results of the Sports Governance Observer survey

This section presents the results of the application of the Sports Governance Observer on

the 35 Olympic ISFs. After a brief presentation of the overall results, the SGO indexes and

the dimension scores of the individual federations are presented. Furthermore, the meth-

odological sheets of the Sport Governance Observer and the federations’ scores on individ-

ual indicators allow for a concise overview of the main strengths and weaknesses of each

federation.

4.1 Overall results

It must be stressed that the SGO index reflects the presence of basic criteria of good gov-

ernance. Medium-size federations should be expected to have an SGO index close to 75%,

while large federations should achieve a score higher than 75%.

The SGO index of the 35

federations combined is 45.4%, with 26 federations (74%) scoring less than 50%. This over-

all score points at severe governance problems in ISFs.

While having a high SGO index

does not rule out the occurrence of corruption, it can be expected that the absence of basic

criteria of good governance increases the likelihood of opportunistic and unethical behav-

iour.

Table 3: SGO Index and SGO scores – all 35 federations

All 35 federations

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.99

2.81

2.68

2.79

SGO Index

49.6%

45.2%

42.0%

44.9%

45.4%

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Figure 4: 35 Olympic international sports federations

Transparency

2.99

Solidarity

2.78

2.81

Democratic

process

2.67

Checks and

balances

The scoring scale

1. Not fulfilled at all

2. Weak

3. Moderate

4. Good

5. State of the art

As table 3 and figure 4 show, the federations generally achieve modest to weak scores on

all dimensions, but especially worrisome is the general lack of decent checks and balances

in the federations. For instance, only five federations (14%) have a robust ethics committee;

only six federations (17%) have adequate conflict of interest rules in place; and none of the

federations has adequate term limits in place.

Furthermore, only four federations (11%) perform integrity and professional checks on

candidates standing for elections; only six federations (17%) publish decent general activity

reports online; none of the federations selects event hosts on the basis of a transparent and

objective process; only five federations (14%) have a robust ethics committee; and none of

the federations has adequate term limits in place.

Regarding solidarity, problems are particularly situated in a lack of sustainability require-

ments for major events.

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AIBA – International Boxing Association

The SGO index for AIBA is 46.6%.

Main strengths are:



Good election procedures for senior officials



Adequate conflict of interest rules and ethics code

Main weaknesses are:



moderate to weak public transparency



No frequent general assembly and decision-making body meetings



Lack of internal audit and ethics committee.

Table 4: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – AIBA

AIBA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.80

3.13

2.67

N/A

SGO Index

45.0%

53.1%

41.7%

N/A

46.6%

Figure 5: AIBA – International Boxing Association

Transparency

2.80

Solidarity

3.13

Democratic

process

2.67

Checks and

balances

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BWF – Badminton World Federation

The SGO index for BWF is 56.2%.

Main strengths are:



Good reporting transparency



Adequate athlete representation



Good social responsibility programme

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Ethics and audit committees.

Table 5: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – BWF

BWF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.25

3.00

3.17

3.57

SGO Index

56.3%

50.0%

54.2%

64.3%

56.2%

Figure 6: BWF – Badminton World Federation

Transparency

3.25

Solidarity 3.57

3.00

Democratic

process

3.17

Checks and

balances

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FEI – Fédération Equestre Internationale

The SGO index for FEI is 75.6%.

Main strengths are:



Excellent checks and balances



Very transparent organization



Robust election procedures.

Main weakness is



The procedure for allocation of events

Table 6: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FEI

FEI

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

4.08

3.80

4.50

3.71

SGO Index

77.1%

70.0%

87.5%

67.9%

75.6%

Figure 7: FEI – Fédération Equestre Internationale

Transparency

4.08

Solidarity 3.71

3.80 Democratic

process

4.50

Checks and

balances

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FIBA – International Basketball Federation

The SGO index for FIBA is 39.6%.

Main strengths are:



Solid ethics code



Social responsibility and development programmes



Excellent consulting services to member federations

Main weaknesses are:



Inadequate election procedures



No frequent general assembly meetings



No robust ethics committee.

Table 7: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIBA

FIBA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.70

2.56

3.00

N/A

SGO Index

42.5%

38.9%

50.0%

N/A

43.8%

Figure 8: FIBA – International Basketball Federation

Transparency

2.70

Solidarity

2.56

Democratic

process

2.50

Checks and

balances

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FIBT – International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation

The SGO index for FIBT is 40.9%.

Main strengths are:



Solid ethics code



Good athletes representation

Main weaknesses are:



Weak reporting transparency



Lack of term limits



Weak ethics committee

Table 8: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIBT

FIBT

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.55

2.70

2.67

N/A

SGO Index

38.6%

42.5%

41.7%

N/A

40.9%

Figure 9: International Bobsleight and Skeleton Federation

Transparency

2.55

Solidarity

2.70

Democratic

process

2.67

Checks and

balances

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FIE ‐ International Fencing Federation

The SGO index for FIE is 51.1%.

Main strengths are



Good reporting transparency



Athletes representation



Election procedures

Main weaknesses are



Lack of internal checks

Table 9: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIE

FIE

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.90

3.40

1.83

N/A

SGO Index

72.5%

60.0%

20.8%

N/A

51.1%

Figure 10: FIE – International Fencing Federation

Transparency

3.90

Solidarity

3.40

Democratic

process

1.83

Checks and

balances

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FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association

The SGO index for FIFA is 67.8%.

Main strengths are:



Robust internal audit committee



Good ethics committee



Solidarity and development programmes

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Lack of gender equity policy



Inadequate procedure for allocation of world cups



Weak legacy and sustainability requirements for world cups

Table 10: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIFA

FIFA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.92

3.10

3.83

4.00

SGO Index

72.9%

52.5%

70.8%

75.0%

67.8%

Figure 11: Fédération Internationale de Football Association

Transparency

3.92

Solidarity 4.00

3.10

Democratic

process

3.83

Checks and

balances

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FIG – International Gymnastics Federation

The SGO index for FIG is 45.3%.

Main strengths are:



Athlete representation



Development programme



Consultancy programme for member federations

Main weaknesses are:



The allocation procedure for main event



Weak ethics code and conflict of interest rules



Lack of decent audit and ethics committees

Table 11: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIG

FIG

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.91

3.10

2.67

2.57

SGO Index

47.7%

52.5%

41.7%

39.3%

45.3%

Figure 12: FIG ‐ International Gymnastics Federation

Transparency

2.91

Solidarity

2.57

3.10

Democratic

process

2.67

Checks and

balances

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FIH – International Hockey Federation

The SGO index for FIH is 43.2%.

Main strengths are:



Athlete representation



Adequate ethics code



Development and social responsibility programmes

Main weaknesses are:



No event reports



No internal audit and ethics committees

Table 12: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIH

FIH

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.60

2.75

2.83

N/A

SGO Index

40.0%

43.8%

45.8%

N/A

43.2%

Figure 13: FIH – International Hockey Federation

Transparency

2.60

Solidarity

2.75

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

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FIL – International Luge Federation

The SGO index for FIL is 34.2%.

Main strengths are:



Annual general assembly meetings



Elections of senior officials

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Lack of gender equity policy



Absence of decent internal checks

Table 13: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIL

FIL

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.55

2.56

2.00

N/A

SGO Index

38.6%

38.9%

25.0%

N/A

34.2%

Figure 14: FIL – International Luge Federation

Transparency

2.55

Solidarity

2.56

Democratic

process

2.00

Checks and

balances

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FINA – Fédération Internationale de Natation

The SGO index for FINA is 43.8%.

Main strengths are:



Elections of senior officials



Quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies



Robust ethics code

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of decent internal audit and ethics committees



Weak allocation procedure for main event

Table 14: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FINA

FINA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.80

2.63

2.83

N/A

SGO Index

45.0%

40.6%

45.8%

N/A

43.8%

Figure 15: FINA – Fédération Internationale de Natation

Transparency

2.80

Solidarity

2.63

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

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FIS – International Ski Federation

The SGO index for FIS is 61.4%.

Main strengths are:



Very good reporting transparency



Solid election procedures and ethics code



Excellent solidarity

Main weaknesses are:



Weak ethics and internal audit committee



Lack of term limits



No regular general assembly and decision-making body meetings

Table 15: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIS

FIS

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

4.08

2.40

3.33

4.00

SGO Index

77.1%

35.0%

58.3%

75.0%

61.4%

Figure 16: FIS ‐ International Ski Federation

Transparency

4.08

Solidarity

4.00

2.40

Democratic

process

3.33

Checks and

balances

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FISA – International Rowing Federation

The SGO index for FISA is 54.5%.

Main strengths are:



Overall transparency



Solid ethics code



Good athlete representation



Good social responsibility and development programmes

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies



Weak ethics and audit committees

Table 16: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FISA

FISA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.92

2.80

3.43

2.57

SGO Index

72.9%

45.0%

60.7%

39.3%

54.5%

Figure 17: FISA – International Rowing Federation

Transparency

3.92

Solidarity

2.57

2.80

Democratic

process

3.43

Checks and

balances

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FIVB – Fédération Internationale de Volleyball

The SGO index for FIVB is 38.1%.

Main strengths are:



Solid ethics code



Development programme

Main weaknesses are:



Not all senior officials are elected



Weak ethics and audit committees



No regular legislative and decision-making body meetings

Table 17: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIVB

FIVB

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.63

2.44

2.50

N/A

SGO Index

40.6%

36.1%

37.5%

N/A

38.1%

Figure 18: FIVB – Fédération Internationale de Volleyball

Transparency

2.63

Solidarity

2.44

Democratic

process

2.50

Checks and

balances

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IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federations

The SGO index for IAAF is 52.5%.

Main strengths are:



Good athlete representation



Election of senior officials



Robust ethics commission



Solid development and social responsibility programmes

Main weaknesses are:



Weak audit committee



Lack of quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies

Table 18: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IAAF

IAAF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.00

2.70

3.60

N/A

SGO Index

50.0%

42.5%

65.0%

N/A

52.5%

Figure 19: IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federation

Transparency

3.00

Solidarity

2.70

Democratic

process

3.60

Checks and

balances

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IBU – International Biathlon Union

The SGO index for IBU is 38.5%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures



Solid development programme

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of event reports



Lack of term limits



Weak internal audit and ethics committees



Weak ethics code and conflict of interests rules

Table 19: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IBU

IBU

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.92

2.50

2.17

2.57

SGO Index

47.9%

37.5%

29.2%

39.3%

38.5%

Figure 20: IBU – International Biathlon Union

Transparency

2.92

Solidarity

2.57

2.50

Democratic

process

2.17

Checks and

balances

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ICF – International Canoe Federation

The SGO index for ICF is 42.5%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures



Quorums in legislative and decision-making bodies



Very good athlete representation

Main weaknesses are:



Weak procedures for deciding host of main event



Lack of audit and ethics committees



Lack of term limits



No annual general assembly meetings

Table 20: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ICF

ICF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.90

3.00

2.20

N/A

SGO Index

47.5%

50.0%

30.0%

N/A

42.5%

Figure 21: ICF – International Canoe Federation

Transparency

2.90

Solidarity

3.00

Democratic

process

2.20

Checks and

balances

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IGF – International Golf Federation

The SGO index for IGF is 27.8%.

Main strengths are:



Presence of quorums in legislative and decision-making bodies



Transparency of governing body documents

Main weaknesses are:



Overall lack of democratic processes and internal checks

Table 21: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IGF

IGF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.33

2.00

N/A

SGO Index

33.3%

25.0%

N/A

27.8%

Figure 22: IGF – International Golf Federation

Transparency

2.33

Solidarity

2.00

Democratic

process

2.00

Checks and

balances

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IHF – International Handball Federation

The SGO index for IHF is 48.3%.

Main strengths are:



Elections of senior officials



Good athletes representation



Solid ethics code, ethics committee, and conflict of interest rules

Main weaknesses are:



Weak internal audit committee



Weak allocation process for major event



Lack of term limits

Table 22: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IHF

IHF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.50

2.70

3.60

N/A

SGO Index

37.5%

42.5%

65.0%

N/A

48.3%

Figure 23: IHF – International Handball Federation

Transparency

2.50

Solidarity

2.70

Democratic

process

3.60

Checks and

balances

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IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation

The SGO index for IIHF is 52.8%.

Main strengths are:



Elections of all decision-making body members



Solid internal audit committee



Ethics code



Development programme

Main weaknesses are:



Weak athlete representation



No nominations committee



No ethics committee.

Table 23: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IIHF

IIHF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.33

3.00

N/A

SGO Index

58.3%

50.0%

N/A

52.8%

Figure 24: IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation

Transparency

3.33

Solidarity

3.00

Democratic

process

3.00

Checks and

balances

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IJF – International Judo Federation

The SGO index for IJF is 36.2%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures for senior officials and athlete representation



Food social responsibility programme

Main weaknesses are:



Weak main event allocation procedure



Lack of decent ethics code and conflict of interest rules



Lack of ethics and audit committees

Table 24: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IJF

IJF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.67

2.50

2.33

2.29

SGO Index

41.7%

37.5%

33.3%

32.1%

36.2%

Figure 25: IJF – International Judo Federation

Transparency

2.67

Solidarity

2.29

2.50

Democratic

process

2.33

Checks and

balances

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ISAF – International Sailing Federation

The SGO index for ISAF is 55.2%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures for senior officials



Good athlete representation



Robust ethics committee



Good social responsibility programme

Main weaknesses are:



Weak reporting transparency



No quorum for decision-making and legislative bodies



No decent conflict of interest rules

Table 25: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISAF

ISAF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.88

3.50

3.25

N/A

SGO Index

46.9%

62.5%

56.3%

N/A

55.2%

Figure 26: ISAF – International Sailing Federation

Transparency

2.88

Solidarity

3.50

Democratic

process

3.25

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

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ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation

The SGO index for ISSF is 27.3%.

Main strengths are:



Good athlete representation



Election of senior officials

Main weaknesses are:



Overall weak solidarity and checks and balances

Table 26: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISSF

ISSF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.73

2.40

1.67

1.57

SGO Index

43.2%

35.0%

16.7%

14.3%

27.3%

Figure 27: ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation

Transparency

2.73

Solidarity

1.57

2.40

Democratic

process

1.67

Checks and

balances

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ISU – International Skating Union

The SGO index for ISU is 41.5%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures and ethics code



Environmental requirements for major events



Solid development programme

Main weaknesses are:



No annual general assembly meetings



Weak main event allocation procedure



Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committees

Table 27: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISU

ISU

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.58

2.70

2.50

2.86

SGO Index

39.6%

42.5%

37.5%

46.4%

41.5%

Figure 28: ISU ‐ International Skating Union

Transparency

2.58

Solidarity

2.86

2.70

Democratic

process

2.50

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

100

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ITF – International Tennis Federation

The SGO index for ITF is 37.0%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures and ethics code



Development programme and solidarity programme

Main weaknesses are:



No gender equity policy



Weak athlete representation



Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committees

Table 28: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITF

ITF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.20

2.89

2.67

2.17

SGO Index

30.0%

47.2%

41.7%

29.2%

37.0%

Figure 29: ITF – International Tennis Federation

Transparency

2.20

Solidarity

2.17

2.89

Democratic

process

2.67

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

101

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ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation

The SGO index for ITTF is 45.8%.

Main strengths are:



Good reporting transparency



Solid election procedures, solidarity and event programmes



Consultancy to member federations

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of legacy requirements for main events



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee

Table 29: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITTF

ITTF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.50

3.00

1.83

3.00

SGO Index

62.5%

50.0%

20.8%

50.0%

45.8%

Figure 30: ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation

Transparency

3.50

Solidarity

3.00

Democratic

process

1.83

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

102

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ITU – International Triathlon Union

The SGO index for ITU is 30.4%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures

Main weaknesses are:



Very weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of term limits



Irregular decision-making body meetings



Lack of event reports



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee

Table 30: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITU

ITU

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.33

3.00

1.67

1.86

SGO Index

33.3%

50.0%

16.7%

21.4%

30.4%

Figure 31: ITU – The International Triathlon Union

Transparency

2.33

Solidarity

1.86

3.00

Democratic

process

1.67

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

103

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IWF – International Weightlifting Federation

The SGO index for IWF is 30.4%.



Main strengths are:

Strong development programme

Strong ethics code and conflict of interest rules

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of term limits



Irregular decision-making body meetings



Lack of event reports



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee

Table 31: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IWF

IWF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.82

2.60

2.83

2.00

SGO Index

45.5%

40.0%

45.8%

25.0%

39.1%

Figure 32: IWF – International Weightlifting Federation

Transparency

2.81

Solidarity

2.00

2.60

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

104

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UCI – Union Cycliste Internationale

The SGO index for UCI is 47.6%.

Main strengths are:



Solid ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics commission



Strong development programme

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of good audit committee



Lack of decent term limits



No quorum for legislative and decision-making bodies

Table 32: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UCI

UCI

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.27

2.44

3.00

N/A

SGO Index

56.8%

36.1%

50.0%

N/A

47.6%

Figure 33: UCI – Union Cycliste Internationale

Transparency

3.27

Solidarity

2.44

Democratic

process

3.00

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

105

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UIPM – Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne

The SGO index for UIPM is 46.2%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures and athletes representation



Overall strong solidarity

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee

Table 33: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UIPM

UIPM

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.75

3.10

1.83

3.71

SGO Index

43.8%

52.5%

20.8%

67.9%

46.2%

Figure 34: UIPM – Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne

Transparency

2.75

Solidarity

3.71

1.83

3.10

Democratic

process

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

106

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UWW – United World Wrestling

The SGO index for UWW is 42.1%.

Main strengths are:



Strong development and anti-discrimination programmes

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Lack of decent event reports



Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee

Table 34: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UWW

UWW

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.00

2.22

2.83

N/A

SGO Index

50.0%

30.6%

45.8%

N/A

42.1%

Figure 35: UWW – United World Wrestling

Transparency

3.00

Solidarity

2.22

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

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107

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WA – World Archery Federation

The SGO index for WA is 45.3%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures and athlete representation

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Lack of decent event reports



Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee



No regular legislative and decision-making body meetings

Table 35: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WA

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.00

2.60

2.83

N/A

SGO Index

50.0%

40.0%

45.8%

N/A

45.3%

Figure 36: WA – World Archery Federation

Transparency

3.00

Solidarity

2.60

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

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WCF – World Curling Federation

The SGO index for WCF is 39.3%.

Main strengths are:



Solid election procedures

Main weaknesses are:



Overall very weak internal checks and solidarity

Table 36: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WCF

WCF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.08

3.20

2.00

SGO Index

52.1%

55.0%

25.0%

39.3%

Figure 37: WCF – World Curling Federation

Transparency

3.08

Solidarity

2.00

3.20

Democratic

process

2.00

Checks and

balances

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109

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WR ‐ World Rugby

The SGO index for WR is 45.8%.

Main strengths are:



Good reporting transparency



Overall good solidarity



Solid election procedures

Main weaknesses are:



Weak main event allocation procedure



Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committee



Lack of ethics code and decent conflict of interest rules

Table 37: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WR

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

3.00

2.90

2.00

3.43

SGO Index

50.0%

47.5%

25.0%

60.7%

45.8%

Figure 38: WR ‐ World Rugby

Transparency

3.00

Solidarity 3.43

2.90

Democratic

process

2.00

Checks and

balances

Play the Game

110

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WTF – World Taekwondo Federation

The SGO index for WTF is 44.2%.

Main strengths are:



Very strong election procedures



Solid ethics code



Consulting to member federations

Main weaknesses are:



Lack of term limits



Lack of decent event reports



Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event



Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit

committee



No regular decision-making body meetings

Table 38: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WTF

WTF

Dimension

Transparency

Democratic process

Checks and balances

Solidarity

Overall

SGO score

(on a scale from 1‐5)

2.92

2.90

2.83

2.43

SGO Index

47.9%

47.5%

45.8%

35.7%

44.2%

Figure 39: WTF – World Taekwondo Federation

Transparency

2.92

Solidarity

2.43

2.90

Democratic

process

2.83

Checks and

balances

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Table 39: Scores of the 35 Olympic ISFs on the individual indicators of the Sports Governance

Observer

Transparency

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.10

1.11

1.12

Mean

Percentage

Democratic process

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

2.10

Mean

Percentage

Checks and balances

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

Mean

Percentage

Solidarity

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

Mean

Percentage

Total

SGO index

3.57

3.71

2.75

264

4.00

2.57

AIBA BWF

FEI

FIBA

FIBT

FIE

FIFA

FIG

FIH

2.80 3.25 4.08 2.70 2.55 3.90 3.92 2.91 2.60

45.0% 56.3% 77.1% 42.5% 38.6% 72.5% 72.9% 47.7% 40.0%

3.13 3.00 3.80 2.56 2.70 3.40 3.10 3.10 2.75

53.1% 50.0% 70.0% 38.9% 42.5% 60.0% 52.5% 52.5% 43.8%

2.67 3.17 4.50 3.00 2.67 1.83 3.83 2.67 2.83

41.7% 54.2% 87.5% 50.0% 41.7% 20.8% 70.8% 41.7% 45.8%

64.3% 67.9%

2.86 3.25 4.02

75.0% 39.3%

3.04 3.71 2.81

2.73

46.6% 56.2% 75.6% 43.8% 40.9% 51.1% 67.8% 45.3% 43.2%

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Transparency

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.10

1.11

1.12

Mean

Percentage

Democratic process

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

2.10

Mean

Percentage

Checks and balances

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

Mean

Percentage

Solidarity

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

Mean

Percentage

Total

SGO index

FIL

FINA

FIS

FISA

FIVB

IAAF

IBU

ICF

IGF

3.92

2.92

2.90

2.33

2.55

2.80

4.08

2.63

3.00

38.6% 45.0% 77.1% 72.9% 40.6% 50.0% 47.9% 47.5% 33.3%

2.56

2.90

2.44

2.70

2.50

3.00

2.00

2.63

2.40

38.9% 40.6% 35.0% 47.5% 36.1% 42.5% 37.5% 50.0% 25.0%

2.00

2.83

3.33

2.17

2.50

3.60

2.20

2.00

25.0% 45.8% 58.3% 58.3% 37.5% 65.0% 29.2% 30.0% 25.0%

2.57

3.18

2.57

39.3%

2.37

2.75

4.00

3.45

75.0% 39.3%

2.52

3.10

2.54

2.70

2.11

34.2% 43.8% 61.4% 54.5% 38.1% 52.5% 38.5% 42.5% 27.8%

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Transparency

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.10

1.11

1.12

Mean

Percentage

Democratic process

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

2.10

Mean

Percentage

Checks and balances

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

Mean

Percentage

Solidarity

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

Mean

Percentage

Total

SGO index

IHF

IIHF

IJF

ISAF

ISSF

ISU

ITF

ITTF

3.00

2.58

2.20

3.50

2.50

3.33

2.67

2.88

2.73

37.5% 58.3% 41.7% 50.0% 46.9% 43.2% 39.6% 30.0% 62.5%

2.70

3.00

2.50

2.90

3.50

2.40

2.70

2.89

3.00

42.5% 50.0% 37.5% 47.5% 62.5% 35.0% 42.5% 47.2% 50.0%

3.60

3.00

2.33

2.00

2.50

2.67

1.83

3.25

1.67

65.0% 50.0% 33.3% 25.0% 56.3% 16.7% 37.5% 41.7% 20.8%

3.43

2.83

3.21

1.57

2.09

2.86

2.66

2.17

2.48

3.00

2.83

2.93

3.11

2.29

2.45

32.1% 60.7%

14.3% 46.4% 29.2% 50.0%

48.3% 52.8% 36.2% 45.8% 55.2% 27.3% 41.5% 37.0% 45.8%

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Transparency

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.10

1.11

1.12

Mean

Percentage

Democratic process

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

2.10

Mean

Percentage

Checks and balances

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

Mean

Percentage

Solidarity

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

Mean

Percentage

Total

SGO index

IWF

UCI

UIPM UWW WA (FITA) WCF

WTF

Mean

2.82

3.27

2.75

3.00

50.0%

3.08

52.1%

3.00

50.0%

2.92

47.9%

2.98

49.6%

45.5% 56.8% 43.8% 50.0%

2.60

2.44

3.10

2.22

2.60

40.0%

3.20

55.0%

2.90

47.5%

2.90

47.5%

2.81

45.3%

40.0% 36.1% 52.5% 30.6%

2.83

3.00

1.83

2.83

45.8%

2.00

25.0%

2.00

25.0%

2.83

45.8%

2.66

41.5%

45.8% 50.0% 20.8% 45.8%

2.00

25.0%

2.56

3.43

60.7%

2.83

45.8%

2.43

35.7%

2.77

44.2%

2.83

45.7%

2.82

45.5%

2.00

25.0%

2.91

3.71

2.85

2.69

2.81

45.3%

67.9%

2.57

39.3%

39.1% 47.6% 46.2% 42.1%

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