Udenrigsudvalget 2014-15 (1. samling)
URU Alm.del Bilag 78
Offentligt
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Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title: Support to the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)
What support will the UK provide?
1.
The UK will provide up to £14.9 million over three years (2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17) from the
International Climate Fund (ICF) to support the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). The
support package includes core funding for GGGI operations for three years to be disbursed on the
basis of organisational performance and poverty-focus, plus provision for DFID to actively follow-
up on the findings of a due diligence assessment and to evaluate performance.
Why is UK support required?
2.
DFID’s vision is for poorer countries to achieve a secure, self-financed, timely exit from
poverty.
Economic development is central to this process, and takes place when a country
achieves sustained, high rates of economic growth
and
when this growth is accompanied by a
wider economic transformation that shares prosperity, benefitting the poor.
Economic growth is vital for creating productive jobs and increasing the tax revenues that
help developing countries fund their own services.
Supporting the transformation of
economies ensures that we are not only helping the poor where we find them, but generating a
sustained transition out of poverty that creates new and long term opportunities for improved
incomes.
As articulated in the Economic Development Strategic Framework (EDSF) this requires:
(i)
high and sustained growth rates; (ii) policies and investments that encourage inclusive, broad-
based economic growth and are founded on sustainable use of natural resources; (iii) removal of
the structural barriers that stop individuals benefiting from economic development and keep
people in persistent poverty.
Growth is sustained in the long term by supporting inclusive political and economic institutions,
and
through responsible management of natural resources and managing dangerous
climate change. Revenues from assets that will run out should be invested well and
renewable resources used sustainably.
Economic development which integrates environmental considerations is therefore critical.
This is because economies need to find patterns of development that take account of their natural
capital, and reduce rather than exacerbate their vulnerability to future climate change. Otherwise
growth may not be sustained over the longer-term and development gains can be easily eroded.
‘Green Growth’
is growth that takes into account its impact on natural wealth or assets and the
environment. . This definition recognises the need to balance short-term drivers of growth and
longer-term global environmental constraints and that trade-offs exist. It also recognises that green
growth paths may not be in all countries’ interests to pursue at all stages of their development,
given their relative impact on poverty and shared prosperity.
1
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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8.
There is a dearth of evidence and policy advice for developing country governments
to
consider and understand their options for national decision making, and the potential impacts they
might have. Whether it is the trade-offs that taking a greener approach might have on economic
growth or the potential lock-in issues associated with alternative growth paths, which are
irreversible.
DFID is in a strong position to support this agenda – through the UK International Climate
Fund (ICF). This fund allows DFID to generate evidence on what works well (and less well)
for green growth.
It is important to know where these trade-offs exist to ensure that the
environmental gains achieved reinforce growth and poverty reduction. This is especially important
for low-income countries.
9.
10.
Developing countries need better information on which interventions achieve
environmental objectives without compromising growth and poverty reduction.
The need for
and impact of green growth vary between contexts. It is dependent on the state of development
and will vary between sectors of their economies. The evidence is weak on when and how poor
countries should prioritise green growth. In addition, countries’ ability to implement even priority
green growth actions are constrained by limited resources and implementation capacity and
political capital.
11.
This programme therefore combines support to country governments to make their own
well-informed decisions about growth paths with work to build the evidence base on green
growth.
Its goal is to provide independent demand-led policy advice on green growth that is clear
about the trade-offs but also clear about the potential opportunities.
12.
The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) is a new multilateral that helps governments
devise and implement green growth plans.
Unlike other green growth institutions, GGGI’s clear
technical entry point is economic growth, as the main engine for poverty reduction. This is its
unique selling point. It operates where there is strong demand for its independent advice. GGGI’s
teams are normally located in government ministries, making them well placed to incorporate the
environment into budgeting and policy making and avoid creating parallel and ad hoc processes.
GGGI’s operational model is summarised in the figure in the Appendix to the Business Case.
13.
Although a young institution, GGGI has already demonstrated an ability to convert analysis
and research into policy change in developing countries.
In Ethiopia GGGI has helped the
government develop and implement a Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Strategy. GGGI
provided the analytical basis to prioritise policy options using clear institutional arrangements that
cut across government. GGGI also helped to develop a facility to finance the implementation of
CRGE priorities. This has already received $26m of funding from UK and Austria. GGGI has also
demonstrated results in Energy Efficient Building and Housing in Rwanda; and the agricultural
sector in Karnataka. They are helping the East African Community develop a Renewable Energy
Master Plan before supporting investment analysis for renewable energy projects in 2015-16.
14.
GGGI recognises that green growth requires the private sector to be a key driving force if
scale is to be achieved,
seeking to catalyse private sector investment and ensure strong
feedback (in both directions) between the private and public sectors. The private sector focus is
also reflected through GGGI’s governance, which includes a business council with 19 private
sector members, including Siemens, KPMG and Deutsche Bank. GGGI also has partnerships with
a number of global initiatives including Finance for Resilience (FiRe) together with Bloomberg and
Rockefeller Foundation, a private sector-led platform that aims to drive global investment in clean
energy.
The results of this work to engage the private sector can be seen on the ground.
In
Thailand GGGI has helped establish a compliance based carbon market and in Mongolia public
private partnership has been developed for green infrastructure.
15.
GGGI offers the best VFM option for DFID, outperforming alternative delivery options.
DFID
advisers could not provide the sustained, technical engagement needed with national institutions
2
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and the private sector to deliver on this agenda. DFID lacks the existing networks in which to
engage the private sector. There is a risk that stand-alone studies will provide a piece-meal
approach to developing the evidence base. And delivery through a multilateral, such as the World
Bank, would miss the opportunity to capitalise on the reputation that GGGI has developed as a
trusted adviser, and would require a major scale up by the Bank in this area.
16.
Support to GGGI would also help to leverage the impact of DFID’s other investments in
knowledge generation around ‘green’ patterns of development.
DFID currently invests in the
Climate Development Knowledge Network (CDKN). An independent review of CDKN has found
that the demand for knowledge and support for practical action on green growth exceeds the
supply capacity of CDKN. Moreover, CDKN as a climate focused organisation, providing targeted
research, information and knowledge products in response to demand. In contrast, GGGI provided
a more strategic, ongoing broader policy advice to Governments focused more broadly on green
growth, whilst at the same time engaging with the private sector to identify bankable projects that
will impact positively on green growth.
17.
GGGI has a pipeline of activities that it does not have the resources to meet and has
significant scope to scale-up activities in low-income countries, especially DFID focus
countries.
It is clear that GGGI has a pipeline of activities, identified by developing and emerging
economies, related to green growth policy research and support to implementation, and at current
levels of donor funding, the GGGI does not have the resources to meet the level of demand for its
services.
18.
GGGI developed from a Korean NGO. Given its origins and the fact that it has programmes
in six member countries of the G20
1
as well as eight G20 donors
2
, GGGI is placed in an
influential position to shape international negotiations on climate change.
GGGI fills a clear
gap in being the only organisation working on green growth to be governed and ‘owned’ by an
equal partnership between developing and developed countries. Not only does this governance
structure greatly increase GGGI’s credibility in the eyes of developing country governments – but
also allows unique opportunities for north-south and south-south learning across member
countries.
19.
The UK was one of eighteen founding members of the GGGI,
with the Deputy Prime Minister
representing the UK at the agreement of its establishment in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. The UK sits
on the assembly of GGGI. DFID has not provided core funding to GGGI but DFID Ethiopia has
provided £900,000 for its in-country work and advice. DFID Ethiopia does not plan to continue
funding given this proposal to provide core funding to GGGI.
20.
GGGI operates in a full-range of developing countries, including both low and middle-
income countries. DFID intends to increase the number of tier 1 countries that GGGI
operates in, and our funding will depend on this.
This will complement the efforts of other
donors, some of whom have also made their continued support conditional upon GGGI increasing
its number of operations in low income countries in its next 5 year strategy (2015 – 2020).
21.
We have a unique opportunity to shape the nature and focus of countries within the GGGI
portfolio.
We have already started to work with GGGI to build up a potential pipeline of low-
income countries, especially in DFID focus countries, and this will remain a priority. In addition,
our first disbursement will depend on a commitment from GGGI in the new strategy to be agreed in
November that at least 50% of GGGI’s portfolio will be in low income countries. Our second
disbursement will be dependent of evidence that this material shift has occurred.
22.
The inclusion of Middle Income Countries (MICs) and Tier 2 countries in GGGI’s portfolio is
strategically useful, however, and supports DFID’s poverty related objectives in a number
1
2
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa
Australia and South Korea, alongside Denmark, Germany, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland and UAE.
3
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of ways.
Firstly, evidence from MICs is relevant for low-income countries (LICs), providing
examples of how countries can leap-frog resource intensive growth and help avoid serious lock-in.
Secondly, this helps generate a South-South dynamic which is appreciated by partner countries
who look towards countries such as Korea and Vietnam as a source of inspiration. Thirdly many of
these MICs also contain a large number of poor people and are a large source of carbon
emissions. It should also be noted that a large part of the financing for programmes in MICs is
provided separately from core-donor funds in earmarked funds, meaning that DFID’s contribution
to GGGI’s core budget will be disproportionately allocated towards activities in LICs (as compared
with the full profile of GGGI activities)
3
.
23.
Alongside LIC and poverty focus, funding levels will be determined by a wider set of Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs), to ensure DFID funding to GGGI continues to provide good
value for money.
These KPIs focus on fully addressing financial management – the residual
issues raised an overall positive due-diligence assessment. We are confident that these will be
met as external assessments have commended GGGI’s strong agility to respond to external
demand. Other KPIs relate to important themes such as GGGI’s approach and capability on
gender.
24.
Gender will receive stronger focus in GGGI’s next medium term plan.
KPIs to ensure GGGI
makes progress on its performance on gender dimensions of green growth policy will ensure
gender is embedded in its results framework and a dedicated gender specialist is recruited to
develop an initial gender action plan for GGGI by mid-2015.
25.
As GGGI is a demand-led model, it first requires a high-level and strong political
commitment by the partner country. We will work with DFID country offices to ensure they
are aware of the services of GGGI.
DFID will also work through internal and external DFID
channels, including across-HMG, in order to stoke demand from partner countries.
26.
GGGI is viewed as a strategic organisation for HMG international objectives on green
growth and we will use GGGI to help inform cross-Whitehall discussions.
GGGI is a valuable
partner for DECC in climate change negotiations. Green growth and GGGI is an important
dimension of UK’s bilateral relationship with Korea. DFID will also continue to work with FCO to
take guidance on governance issues. This Business Case has been developed in close
collaboration with FCO and with DECC.
What are the expected results?
27. This programme will provide practical support to implement high quality green growth policies in
developing countries. It will also improve knowledge and evidence on green growth policies and
their implementation across developing countries.
28. The programme outcomes will be: (i) policy-makers and private sector actors have better access
to knowledge and evidence about green growth policies and programmes (including on trade-offs);
(ii) governments and firms have the capacity, tools, and information required to implement green
growth policies and programmes; and (iii) where appropriate, green growth principles are
integrated into wider development planning. These programme outcomes are expected to make a
strong contribution towards the ICF objectives around transformational change
4
.
3
Earmarked donors are: EBRD, Germany, Switzerland and UAE
4
Transformational change is defined as change which catalyses further changes, enabling either a shift from one state to
another (for example from conventional to lower carbon or more climate-resilient patterns of development) or faster
change (for example speeding progress on cutting the rate of deforestation).
4
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29. The programme results will be delivered under three outputs. GGGI’s current work plan includes
targets up to 2016. It will be updated when GGGI’s new medium term strategic and results
framework is completed later in 2014. DFID will contribute to the following results by GGGI::
30.
Output 1:
Country Driven green growth strategic plans developed, and accompanied, where
necessary, by legal and institutional framework and investment plans for their adoption. This will
include support to policy makers; including for example improved data on development progress
beyond GDP, institution building, training, lesson-sharing between countries and practical advice
to overcome governance or political economy barriers to implementation of green growth policies
and programmes. Results under this output, by 2016, will include:
GGGI will have provided policy advice and supported the development of 10 local, national,
regional or sectoral green growth plans.
GGGI will have supported the design and/or review of 10 legal and institutional frameworks
surrounding the aforementioned green growth plans.
GGGI will have developed 10 sectoral/subsector or locality based investment plans.
GGGI will have mobilised up to $10m of public finance for climate change purposes
31.
Output 2:
Robust research and evidence for policy-makers on the costs and benefits of green
growth policy measures; grounded in strong empirical work based on country experiences.
Evidence has a strong focus on what works well (and less well) in different contexts, and identifies
potential policy trade-offs (for example between growth, resource depletion and poverty reduction).
Results under this output by 2016, will include:
GGGI will have published a combination of 30: tools and methodologies; peer-reviewed
research papers; policy guides and other knowledge products based on GGGI’s country
experience.
20 governments using GGGI produced evidence and analysis
A 50% acknowledgement of using GGGI products by the academics, practitioners and policy
makers surveyed.
GGGI’s work will have been presented at 50 high level forums or workshops in the past year.
32.
Output 3:
Providing a robust enabling environment in GGGI’s client countries (and globally) for
private sector investments aligning with green growth principles. Results under this output by
2016, will include:
4 Governments will have accepted GGGI recommendations on risk reducing instruments for
further action.
4 Governments will have accepted GGGI recommendations on other incentive initiatives for
further action.
10 forums established or supported that bring private sector and government officials together
on establishing an enabling environment for green growth investments.
5 investment vehicles/tools/instruments designed to finance green growth plans developed with
the support of GGGI
Link companies to developing country governments that are seeking private sector finance,
technology and expertise to accelerate implementation of their green growth economic
5
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development plans
6
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Strategic Case
Context and need for a DFID intervention
The problem:
33. There is clear evidence to show that economic growth is the principal enabler of long-term poverty
reduction
5
. Where it has been achieved, high sustained growth has usually resulted in mass job
creation which in turn has raised wages and spread the benefits of growth more widely. Developing
countries have the potential to achieve far higher rates of growth than was possible during
comparable stages of development in OECD countries.
34. High growth is necessary to transform a society and create an exit from poverty, but it is not
sufficient. Growth needs to be inclusive and ultimately sustainable, otherwise groups excluded from
the growth process will remain in poverty, and future generations risk remaining in, or falling back
into poverty.
35. There is a risk that patterns of economic development that degrade the natural environment and
deplete natural resources may be difficult to sustain in the long run and/or will not be pro-poor
6
.
Growth patterns that are potentially unsustainable include: (i) growth that is driven by exploitation of
the natural resource base or wasteful use of natural resources; (ii) carbon intensive growth, which
can lock countries into high-carbon futures, and increase rate of climate change; and (iii)
development paths that fail to build resilience to future environmental shocks or trend changes. At
the local level, the poor are more reliant on easy access to environmental resources. Poor people
are often rely on ‘common property’ natural resources such as forests, fish stocks, pasturelands and
wetlands for their livelihoods
7
- for example for food, fuel and for small enterprises. Evidence and
potential risks associated with these three patterns are explored below.
Pattern 1: Growth that depletes natural capital
36. Some countries have followed patterns of economic growth that are driven by depletion of the stock
of natural resources. For example recent GDP growth in some African countries has been driven by
oil and mineral exports. Over the period 2005 – 2013, resource-rich countries in Sub Saharan Africa
had higher average growth rates than non-resource-rich countries
8
. According to the World Bank,
strong growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been underpinned by strong export growth – much of
which is driven by exploitation of the region’s natural resources
9
37. However, the methodology used to measure economic growth – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) –
takes inadequate account of degradation of natural capital. There are limits to how well GDP growth
on its own measures progress of societies and welfare
10
. Its focus on present income leads to a
need to keep present consumption levels up, but runs the risk of funding present consumption by
5
Whilst policy can make some impact on poverty without growth, and certainly increase the effectiveness with which growth reduces
poverty, there is strong evidence that growth is the principal enabling factor. (DFID Growth Refresh, 2012). See for example cross-
country analysis by Kraay (Kraay, A. (2006), “When
is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from a Panel of Countries”,
Journal of Economics 80,
198-227) which suggests that over longer horizons, between 69% and 97% of cross-country differences in poverty changes can be
accounted for by growth.
6
See World Bank (2012)
Inclusive Green Growth, The Pathway to Sustainable Development
(World Bank, 2012)
8
World Bank (2013)
Africa’s Pulse,
Volume 8 October 2013, page 9
Oil, metals, and other mineral exports in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from $56 billion in 2002 to $288 billion in 2012
10
Stiglitz et al. (2009)
Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (
2009); Thomas, J. &
Evans, J. (2010) There’s
more to life than GDP but how can we measure it?,
(Economic & Labour Market Review, 4(9))
9
7
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running down wealth and hence reducing the capacity of the economy to continue generating
income in the long run. The World Bank finds that countries with strong GDP growth rates such as
Nigeria, Angola, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan have negative ‘genuine’ saving rates when depletion of
natural resource capital is taken into account. GDP figures therefore do not indicate whether growth
can be sustained in the long run.
38. Sustainable development is about enhancing well-being through time
11
. Some economists have
argued in the long run, simply running down the stock of natural resources cannot sustain growth.
Economic theory tells us that to sustain growth over time (i.e. for consumption per person to
continue indefinitely) – the receipts from extraction of natural resources need to be reinvested into
man-made capital so that the total capital stock remains constant
12, 13
. Collier (2010) recommends
that non-renewable assets should be governed by the custody principle
14
whilst renewable natural
assets should not be harvested below sustainably regenerating levels.
Pattern 2: Carbon intensive growth
39. Patterns of economic growth that result in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may be difficult to
sustain in the long run because they can lock countries in to (potentially expensive) high carbon
futures and lead to climate change
15
.
40. As economies grow, governments and firms will make investment decisions about infrastructure
that will last for many years into the future and about how to produce energy. Therefore there is
need for action and planning today if we desire a low carbon future. This is particularly relevant for
developing countries, where most of the infrastructure and cities will be built in the next few
decades
16
. “Carbon lock-in” occurs when investments in long-lived projects and infrastructure result
in countries being geared towards a higher carbon intensity path economy. Investments in high
carbon infrastructure mean that the future costs of decarbonising an economy are increased. In
addition to the economic lock-in of infrastructure there is likely to be political and behavioural lock-in
that will increase the transaction costs associated with reducing carbon intensity in the future.
Individuals in society also may become accustomed to a certain way of living their lives that might
lead to resistance to later change.
41. There is strong evidence to suggest that carbon intensive growth patterns are leading to man-made
changes in the climate, which will make it more difficult to sustain economic growth in the future.
17
A
changing climate and increased frequency of climate related disasters matters for economic growth
in the short and long run.
18
In the short run, poorer countries sustain greater negative impacts from
11
World Bank (2003)
World Development Report - Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: Transforming Institutions, Growth and
Quality of Life
(The World Bank 2003)
12
The economic theory was first explored by Hartwick, J (1977)
Intergenerational Equity and the Investment Rents from Exhaustible
Resources
(American Economic Review, 67, December pp. 972 – 74). Also see de Bruin (2000) Economic Growth and the Environment
(Springer, January 2000).
13
Hartwick’s sustainability theory assumes that different types of assets can be substituted for one another perfectly.
14
The custody principle states that each generation bequeaths assets to the next generation of value at least equivalent to those
bequeathed to it. Collier, P (2010): The Plundered Planet.
15
Parry, Martin L., ed. Climate Change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: contribution of Working Group II to the fourth
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Vol. 4. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
16
Hallegatte, S. et al (2013)
From Growth to Green Growth – A Framework;
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5872, World Bank
Washington DC
17
There is evidence to show that that climate change has already affected the magnitude and frequency of some climate extremes and
these are likely to increase further in the future IPCC SREX Extreme Events Report (2011) Summary for Policymakers
18
See DFID’s ‘How To note on climate resilient growth’ (November 2010) for more detail.
8
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weather events, related to their lower resilience
19
.
Growth is affected in the long run because
resources that could have been used (more productively) elsewhere to stimulate growth will be
absorbed by relief, recovery and adaptation efforts
20
. Climate change will also affect several drivers
of long run economic growth: capital accumulation; infrastructure; human health; and productivity
growth in energy and agriculture sectors. In addition, these adverse impacts are also likely to put a
strain on governance and institutions
21
.
42. To ensure long run, pro-poor growth, there is therefore a need to decouple economic growth from
GHG emissions at a global level. This is challenging because modern sources of energy are critical
for economic growth - historically no country has grown its economy without increasing
emissions. There could be a trade-off between avoiding carbon lock-in and the rate of growth
22
More research is needed to establish whether those trade-offs may be avoided in practice.
43. Opportunities for avoiding the trade-offs may be increasing as the economics of low carbon
technology change, driven by the falling costs of renewable technology. The minimum price at
which energy must be sold for an energy project to break even – its levelised cost - continues to fall
for a range of renewable technologies. In a recent report UNEP find that the levelised cost of
infrastructure scale solar photovoltaic (PV) systems was 40% lower in 2012 than in 2011 and
residential PV systems were 30% lower. Those for on-shore wind also fell in 2012, though only by
3-4%. A study by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) found that most renewable
technologies can produce electricity cheaper than diesel generators, often making them the
technology of choice for consumers not connected to electricity grids.
44. Developing countries are not in the same position as developed countries in dealing with these this
trade-offs. Developing nations account for a small share of total emissions (although this proportion
will change over time, as developing countries are experiencing higher levels of growth). As a
result, DFID focal countries (especially the poorest) tend to have less need to reduce emissions–
although they need to consider the effect of global emissions on their economies (by adapting and
improving resilience). Because of their relatively low emissions and strong need for high and
inclusive growth, DFID should not pressure low-income countries to pursue growth paths with lower
carbon intensity (e.g. with a higher share of energy from rewenables) However, where countries
want to explore lower carbon patterns of growth, DFID should be ready to support and work with
them
23
.
45. A number of developing countries already see some benefits to a move to patterns of growth that
are less carbon intensive. For example The Government of Ethiopia has developed a
Climate
Resilient Green Economy Strategy
24
, and The Government of Rwanda a
Green Growth and Climate
19
For example, during the period from 1970 to 2008 over 95% of deaths from natural disasters occurred in developing countries (Cavallo
and Noy, 2010; CRED, 2010).
20
Some economists have suggested that natural disasters could create a sort of ‘creative destruction’ by wiping our inefficient
infrastructure that will be rebuilt (see Skidmore, M., and H. Toya. 2002.
Do Natural Disasters Promote Long-Run Growth?
Economic
Inquiry 40 (4): 664–87.). However more recent research has discredited this theory, funding that disasters do on the whole damage
growth in the short and long run (see Hallegatte, S., and P. Dumas. 2009.
Can Natural Disasters Have Positive Consequences?
Investigating the Role of Embodied Technical Change.
Ecological Economics 68 (3): 777–786.).
21
Vivid Economics (2010)
Promoting Economic Growth when the Climate is Changing
(DFID, 2010)
22
Shafik, Nemat. 1994.
Economic development and environmental quality: an econometric analysis.
Oxford Economic Papers 46
(October): 757–773
23
Where there are localised effects due to poorer countries own emissions and other pollution, they should address these.
24
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2011)
Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy, Green economy strategy
(Addis Ababa,
2011)
9
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Resilience Strategy
25
. Part of the appeal is the range of co-benefits associated with low carbon
development that countries can exploit. For example, there is huge scope for cost-saving energy
efficiency in all countries; there health gains from cleaner energy sources for cooking and lighting;
and some research suggests that innovation in new technologies be a source of growth in itself
26
.
More research is clearly needed to identify where ‘win-win’ policies exist and to compare their costs
and benefits.
Pattern 3: Climate-vulnerable growth patterns
46. Climate change will have negative impacts on economic growth, but at the same time levels and
patterns of growth will determine the level of vulnerability that countries have to the impacts of
climate change. Discussions around ‘green growth’ often focus on low carbon development – but
resilience is important too. The pattern of economic development (geographic, sectoral) will
determine the economy’s resilience to shocks – its ability to recover, and the speed with which it
does. Growth and poverty reduction has been found to be important for increased climate change
adaptive capacity.
27
47. Research
28
indicates that the level of vulnerability that a country has to shocks from climate
extremes depends on the stage of a country’s development. At very low levels of development, the
absolute monetary value of losses from extreme events is likely to be small (though it may be large
in terms of poverty impact and even lives lost). As economies become more complex, they are
typically more integrated sectorally and geographically than simple ones. This increases the
multiplier effects of shocks in a particular sector or region. In the later stages of development, the
relative scale of the economic impacts of disasters is likely to decline again as countries build
capacity to adapt and their economics are diversified in ways that allow them to absorb and contain
shocks.
48. To ensure sustainable long run pro-poor growth, economies therefore need to find patterns of
development that reduce rather than exacerbate their vulnerability to current weather variability and
future climate change.
The concept of ‘green growth’
49. Green growth policies should aim to make sustained (long term) pro-poor growth, which is more
resource efficient, and cleaner, without necessarily slowing down growth (in the short term) but
these should be based on a clear and robust evidence base
29
.
50. For countries with a large proportion of its population below or close to the poverty line will need to
ensure a primary focus on policies that reduce poverty (including broad economic growth). Low
25
Republic of Rwanda (2011)
Green Growth and Climate Resilience National Strategy for Climate Change and Low Carbon Development
(Kigali, October 2011)
26
See Hallegatte et la. (2013) page 9, for a discussion
27
Noy (2009) showed that higher GDP per capita, as well as better institutional and human development indicators reduced losses from
climate-related disasters (Noy, I. 2009. “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Disasters.” Journal of Development Economics 88 (2009):
221–231). de la Fuente and Dercon (2008) use micro-data show that those with more assets can cope better with severe shocks (de la
Fuente, A. and S. Dercon. 2008. “Disasters, growth and poverty in Africa: revisiting the microeconomic evidence. ” Background Paper
for the 2009 ISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Washington D.C.: World Bank)
28
Benson, C. and Clay, E., (1998);
The Impact of Drought in Sub-Saharan African Economies;
World Bank Technical Paper; No. 401; World
Bank; Washington DC.
Various policies and programmes labelled as ‘green growth’ should not automatically be assumed to meet the three
requirements of good for growth, good for the environment and good for poverty reduction and they should scrutinise
closely any trade-offs.
29
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Income Countries should not be bound to minimise carbon emissions, but rather they should be
encouraged to pursue growth and development paths that preserve options. As developing
countries get richer they will generally become more resilient and better resourced to both (i)
withstand more volatile and extreme climatic conditions and (ii) able to invest in adaptation and
have a phased entry into mitigating climate change.
51. Green growth work is helping to identify programmes and policy that use aid resources and
influence to promote climate-resilience are justifiable where they both deliver short-term poverty
reduction impacts, and Help avoid serious lock-in or irreversibility in local or national development
paths in terms of future growth and poverty for a country.
52. It is important that the international community should continue to invest in knowledge of what
works, which has the potential to increase the set of ‘win-win’ opportunities and associated
investments.
53. Green growth policies and strategies can be taken forward by both the public and private sectors.
For business and industries, actions will include improving resource efficiency in production,
reducing waste, and reducing the carbon-intensity of production. For the public sector, actions will
include for example
30
:
Collecting data ‘beyond GDP’ in the national statistics to measure changes in natural capital, and
using that information to guide decision making – for example for public works projects
31
.
Developing policies that help the private sector to fully value natural capital. For example by
pricing pollution or natural resource use through taxes or tradable permits. Governments can
also remove subsidies to industries that encourage pollution or over-extraction of natural
resources.
Fostering ‘green’ innovation by funding research into technology development, reducing barriers
to foreign investment, and by enforcing intellectual property rights,
Providing information and sharing good practice with consumers and firms to help them to use
natural resources more efficiently, and reduce waste and pollution.
54. There are a number of barriers to the implementation of green growth policies, however, are
summarised in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Barrier to green growth
Information failures
(public sector)
Information failures
(private)
Governance failures
Explanation
There is not yet robust evidence base on green growth policies, the extent to
which they are transferrable, and how they can be implemented in practice.
Private companies and industries lack information on low carbon technologies and
on how to be less wasteful in their production.
There is a lack of practical experience amongst policy makers in planning and
implementing green growth policies and strategies. Changes in the natural capital
stock are often not captured in national statistical accounting systems – this
makes it harder to take natural capital into account in decision making
32
.
There may be vested interests (for example links between politicians and fossil
fuel companies, the mining industry or energy intensive industries) that make it
even more difficult for policy makers to implement policies that support low carbon
development
33
. Policies that aim to reflect the ‘real’ price of environmental goods
and services may be difficult to implement because the benefits are usually diffuse
Governance failures
30
31
See OECD
Towards Green Growth,
Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion of green growth policies
OECD Towards Green Growth,
page 35. Also see the WAVES Partnership brochure
32
World Bank (200x)
The Global Partnership on Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystems Services, Annual Report 2013
(2013)
33
Ellis, K, Cambray, A and Lemma, A (2003)
Drivers and Challenges for Climate Compatible Development
CDKN working paper, 2013.
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and hard to quantify, but the costs are immediate, visible and often concentrated
on a vocal minority
34
.
Behavioural barriers
(public sector)
Decision makers tend to develop polices based upon past experiences by others,
rules of thumb, and the information that they have to hand
35
. Because green
growth policies are not the norm, policy makers may suffer from inertia or be
adverse to the risks associated with trying out new approaches.
Green Growth requires changes in behaviour by industries and financial markets
(for example to adopt resource efficient technologies) but there are barriers to
engaging the private sector, particularly in developing countries.
Behavioural barriers
(private sector)
55. However, while green growth can have benefits, there are many areas where there will be trade-offs
between emissions reductions and a greener growth on the one hand, and alternative forms of
growth that might be more effective in poverty reduction. Indeed, future resilience of countries
depends to a large extent on their ability to create wealth and build up human capital now. Dercon
(2012, 2014)
36
discusses potential consequences of implementing ‘green growth’ policies which fail
to account for the sectoral and spatial processes behind effective poverty reduction. Dercon argues
that without a sufficient evidence base, we risk asking the poor to pay the price for greening the
planet.
56. Without a well-developed evidence base, we lack the ability to judge where these trade-offs lie in
individual country-contexts. This suggests that it is important to build the evidence base on the
circumstances under which green growth interventions might be appropriate (as whilst there is an
expanding evidence base on green growth policies
37
, and proposed methodologies for approaching
policies
38
, it remains limited), while supporting country governments to make their own appropriate
decisions.
57. An improved understanding of the short-run costs of green growth policies will be one of the outputs
of this programme. The programme will aim to better understand costs and benefits of green growth
policy measures over time - examining effects on growth, resource depletion and poverty reduction
- and grounding those findings in strong empirical work based on country experiences.
Need for DFID intervention
58. The UK is committed to spending £3.87bn through the Investment Climate Facility (ICF) between
2011/12 and 2015/16 to help the world’s poorest adapt to climate change and promote cleaner,
greener growth. If the interventions from this fund are not based on robust analysis and evidence,
we may face a trade-off in overcoming the twin challenges of world poverty and climate change.
59. The UK is in a strong position to support this agenda. Through the ICF we are using climate finance
to generate evidence on what works well (and less well) for low carbon, climate resilient
development. Actions to tackle the barriers associated with green growth policy making will make
an important contribution towards our efforts to achieve the ambitious goals of the ICF.
60. The ICF aims to bring about transformational change in its focus countries, defined as change
34
35
World Bank (2012)
Inclusive Green Growth, The Pathway to Sustainable Development
(World Bank, 2012); page 12
See Kahneman, Dl (2001)
Thinking fast and slow.
(Macmillan, 2011)
38 Dercon, Stefan. "Is green growth good for the poor?." (2012); Dercon, Stefan ‘Climate Change, Green Growth and Aid in Poor
Countries’ (2014 – Forthcoming)
37
See UNDP (2012) Case studies of sustainable development in practice, triple wins for sustainable development
38
A methodology for assessing green growth polices is however presented in: De Serres et al (2010),
A Framework for Assessing Green
Growth Policies,
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 774, OECD, Paris.
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which catalyses further changes, enabling either a shift from one state to another (for example from
conventional to lower carbon or more climate-resilient patterns of development) or faster change
(for example speeding progress on cutting the rate of deforestation). Improved knowledge on green
growth policy design and implementation is critical to the wider success of ICF programming.
61. DFID acknowledges that for many focus countries, their priority is economic growth, as the main
engine for poverty reduction and human development. As such, green growth strategies should
work with government institutions concerned with developing and executing growth and
development plans.
62. The information failures, governance constraints and behavioural barriers set out in Table 1
together generate a strong case for public intervention in the green growth policy sphere. And there
is a good case for early action to address the barriers to green growth. Because some decisions
today (for example the design of infrastructure investments or which cities develop) can lock
economies in to high carbon or less resilient development pathways. Careful planning now to avoid
‘lock-in’ can have big implications for growth in the future.
63. One way in which DFID is already helping to develop knowledge, evidence and practical experience
on green growth is through the Climate Development Knowledge Network programme (CDKN)
39
.
CDKN aims to help decision-makers in developing countries design and deliver ‘climate compatible
development’ (a model of development consistent with green growth as set out above).
64. An independent review of CDKN
40
has found that the demand for knowledge, evidence and support
for practical action on green growth exceeds the supply capacity of CDKN. The Global Green
Growth Institute (GGGI) has a pipeline of activities, identified by developing and emerging
economies, related to green growth policy research and support to implementation. At current levels
of donor funding, the GGGI does not have the resources to meet the level of demand for its
services. There is therefore a good case for DFID to increase support these types of activities. A
series of options as to how this could be achieved are explored in the Appraisal Case.
Gender equality
65. Green growth policy has wide economic, social and environmental impacts and the gender
dimension central to these. Channels include differential impact of policies (e.g. removing kerosene
subsidies) and effect of policies on economic assets and opportunities (e.g. women’s rights over
land, access to jobs). There is scope for stronger gender budgeting on green growth policies and for
building gender into applied research green growth topics.
66. The Appraisal Case below looks at how DFID will ensure gender dimensions are prioritised
following identification of the preferred option.
Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
67. The theory of change for this programme is that supporting policy design and implementation and
improving knowledge and evidence on green growth policies will help decision makers to move
39
40
More information on CDKN can be found here: http://cdkn.org/
ITAD (2013)
External Evaluation Report of the Climate Development Knowledge Network,
ITAD 2013. The mid term review of CDKN
found that, “As GGGI is currently working in a handful of developing countries and CDKN aims to concentrate on up to 14 deep
engagement countries the need for both organisations vastly outweighs their combined capacities.”
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towards more sustainable patterns of development that contribute towards poverty reduction.
Impact
(i)
Policy-makers have better access to knowledge and evidence about planning and
implementing transformative, economy-wide green growth strategies (including on trade-
offs);
(ii)
Governments have the capacity, tools, and can leverage the finance required to implement
green growth policies and programmes;
(iii)
The private sector is directly engaged in developing and implementing green growth plans.
Outcome
(i)
Green Growth strategies and implementation plans are adopted and implemented by
governments and other stakeholders with adequate financing, institutional support, and
technical expertise;
(ii)
Relevant, high quality research is available and used to explore green growth and guide
policymakers and others;
(iii)
Private sector is directly engaged in developing and implementing green growth plans.
68. The impact and outcomes of the programme will be achieved through support to three outputs;
indicators are set out in the log-frame.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Output 1:
Country driven green growth strategies developed, accompanied by, here
necessary, legal and institutional frameworks and investment plans for their adoption.
Output 2:
Robust research and evidence is available on cost and benefits of green growth
policy measures.
Output 3:
A robust enabling environment is created in countries (and globally) for private
sector investments aligning with green growth principles. Companies are linked to
developing country governments that are seeking private sector finance, technology and
expertise to accelerate implementation of their green growth economic development
plans. (Examples include: investment analysis for sustainable energy projects
country/state energy and other sector plans involving private sector consultation, private
sector involvement in urban planning.)
69. The expected results from the preferred option will be outlined following the appraisal case. These
are set out in section H below alongside the theory of change for the preferred option.
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APPRAISAL CASE
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
70. The Strategic Case set out the rationale for UK Government intervention in activities that help
countries to move towards patterns of development that are sustainable in the long run and reduce
poverty. The solution proposed is to support a green growth policy that integrates the environment
into economic decision making.
71. The Strategic Case also identified a series of barriers that prevent policy makers (particularly in less
developed countries) and firms from implementing green growth policies. These included
informational failures, governance failures and behavioural barriers.
72. The programme will therefore need to overcome these barriers by delivering practical support to
policy makers and companies to implement proven approaches, improving the knowledge and
evidence base on green growth policies specific to particular country circumstances and be effective
at disseminating evidence globally. Table 2 lists the delivery options have been identified as part of
the scoping exercise for this Business Case:
Table 2: Options identified during scoping exercise
Option 1
No further support to green growth policy research and implementation
Option 2
Expand the remit of the DFID supported Climate Development and Knowledge Network
(CDKN). This option could include a networked approach to green growth policy research,
similar to the Low Emissions Development (LEDS) Global Partnership managed by CDKN.
Support green growth research to be led by a research institute such as the International
Growth Centre (IGC), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) or the International Institute
for Environment and Development (IIED)
Directly commission and support a series of stand-alone research studies, led by DFID Policy
Division. Set up a new body to work with policy makers and the private sector in developing
countries to disseminate research and provide support to implementation.
Finance green growth research and support to implementation by the World Bank or other
interested Multilateral Development Banks.
Support GGGI to work with developing and emerging economies to implement green growth
policies, to undertake green growth policy research and disseminate evidence
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Option 6
73.
Option 1
would imply no additional UK support to green growth policy development and
implementation. UK work on green growth would comprise existing support to the CDKN programme
(more information under option 2 below). Studies could be undertaken to synthesise findings from
across programmes implemented under the International Climate Fund to draw some conclusions
on promising policy recommendations about how to implement successful low-carbon or resilience
building projects. However, this option is unlikely to deliver a robust or systematic evidence base on
green growth policy making, and there would be no provision for evidence dissemination yet alone
practical support to developing countries to implement better policies. There would be no support to
governments or private actors to implement green growth actions. This option is therefore rejected
on the grounds that it fails to address the need identified in the strategic case.
74.
Option 2
is to increase UK support to the Climate Development and Knowledge Network (CDKN)
programme. CDKN supports decision-makers in designing and delivering “climate compatible
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development” – a model of development that is similar to green growth but narrower in its focus on
climate change, development and growth. CDKN aims to provide developing country policymakers
with access to high quality research and policy advice on climate change and development. CDKN
delivers its work through a portfolio of country technical assistance, research, and knowledge
management.
75. DFID has recently agreed an extension to CDKN of £40 million designed to maintain the
organisation’s operational budget and extend the initial 5-year phase of the programme by a further
2 years
41
. The progress and value for money of CDKN will be reviewed in financial year 2016/17,
after which decisions about future UK support to CDKN will be made. Further support to CDKN is
therefore rejected as part of this programme. However it will be important that any further support to
green growth research and policy implemented under this programme complements and
strengthens the outputs delivered by through CDKN.
76. GGGI’s approach is long-term and relationship intensive, with a strong local presence and a focus
on the county’s mainstream, end-to-end planning and implementation processes. CDKN is a third-
party provider of technical support, with a project based approach designed to accelerate progress
in specific high-priority initiatives. These basic differences in strategic approach and delivery model
allow the two organisations to work in tandem, and they have shown an ability to collaborate
effectively and to enhance each other’s outcomes in countries where both are present. (Further
discussion of the differences and complementarities between CDKN and GGGI are in Box 1.)
77.
Option 3
is for DFID to provide support to green growth policy advice and research through a policy
research institute such as the International Growth Centre (IGC), the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) or the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). All three
organisations already receive support for their research efforts from DFID
42
. Whilst all three of these
institutions have a track record in the provision of policy relevant research, it is not clear that any
have the capacity to deliver in-country support to policy makers and the private sector of the scale
and type envisioned by the programme theory of change. This option is therefore rejected on the
grounds that it fails to address the need identified in the strategic case.
78.
Option 4
is to design a new DFID led programme of support to green growth research and policy
design from scratch. Under this option DFID would commission a series of stand-alone research
studies, designed and managed by staff in DFID. The research could be undertaken by a third party
agency (or series of agencies) identified through competitive tender. Under this option DFID would
need to set up a new body that would disseminate research, create networks of practice, and work
in collaboration with decision makers in developing countries to support implementation. Support
could in principle be linked to the DFID County Office network. This option will be explored further in
appraisal section G below.
79.
Option 5
is to deliver support to green growth policy research and implementation through a
Multilateral Development Bank such as the World Bank, using a model akin to existing DFID
programmes of support to the World Bank's Knowledge for Change Program (KCP) or the UN
University World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER). MDBs are likely to have
technical staff with strong expertise in relevant fields, plus they have the benefit of an existing
network of contacts with decision makers in government. This option will be explored further in
41
Analytical work by DFID considered a range of VFM criteria such as absorptive capacity, pipeline of activities and UK
burden share in order to establish the appropriate level of funding for CDKN in this tranche.
42
Insert figures, IGC xx; ODI accountable grant; IIED accountable grant.
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appraisal section G below.
80.
Option 6
is for DFID to provide direct support to the GGGI to develop green growth policy advice
and research, to disseminate that research, to work with developing countries to implement green
growth policies, and to work directly with the private sector. Set up in 2010, GGGI’s core mandate is
to, “advance the practice and theory of green growth by helping to develop, implement and deepen
understanding of green growth strategies”. This option will be explored further in appraisal section G
below.
81.
Options 4, 5 and 6 have been identified as the feasible options and will be explored further
below.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option including delivery routes
82. Table 3 below lists the quality of evidence for each delivery option in delivering the outcome is rated
(either Very Strong, Strong, Medium, Limited or No Evidence).
Table 3
Option
Option 4
– DFID managed
studies and capacity building
programme
Evidence rating
Medium.
DFID could undertake a project design phase in
order to improve knowledge on the potential costs and
benefits of this option. DFID can draw upon experience from
other programmes – for example the design and
implementation phase of CDKN.
Medium.
DFID can draw upon experience from existing
programmes of support to multilateral organisations for
growth research. Evidence from the Multilateral Aid Review
can be utilised. However, scoping and design work would
need to take place in order to estimate the costs and
benefits of this option.
Strong.
DFID can draw upon a recent multi-donor review of
the GGGI. DFID has good working relationships with GGGI
staff who are able to provide evidence to support the
appraisal case. Some scoping work will still need to take
place to identify the correct level and type of funding
required.
Option 5
– Delivery through
multilateral development bank
Option 6
– Support to the GGGI
C. For each feasible option, what is the assessment of local capacity? Is the intervention likely to
strengthen capacity in a durable manner?
83. A key outcome of any intervention is that ‘Green Growth strategic and implementation plans are
adopted and implemented by governments and other stakeholders with adequate financing,
institutional support, and technical expertise’. Therefore it is vital that any option taken strengthens
capacity in a durable manner. Therefore, this plays an integral part of our assessment into how each
delivery option will achieve the planned outputs (see Annex I)
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C,
low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
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Table 4
Climate & Environment Category
Option
Climate
change
and Climate change and
environment
risks
and environment opportunities,
impacts, Category (A, B, C, Category (A, B, C, D)
D)
4 - DFID
C
A
5 - Multilateral
C
A
6 - GGGI
C
A
84. The programme has the potential to facilitate the move to environmentally sustainable and climate
resilient growth. The main climate and environment opportunities will therefore be proportionate to
the ability programme to deliver on its objectives. There are three main factors which will affect this
delivery:
i.
ii.
iii.
Ability to deliver high quality policy advice and research and analysis tailored to the needs of
users;
The ability to retain political neutrality and credibility; and
The ability to deliver in timely manner over the next 2-3 years, given the need for evidence to
support national e.g. NAMAs and climate resilient development policies; and international
processes, e.g.: UNFCCC negotiations and Sustainable Development Goals.
Table 5
Option/Ranking
4 - DFID
5 - Multilateral
6 - GGGI
Quality/Demand Neutrality/credibility Delivery/Timeliness
Responsiveness
2
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
85. The Appraisal Case below finds that GGGI support comes out best in terms of maximising its impact
on green growth thinking, largely due to its specialised mandate and ability to deliver tailored, timely
support, that responds to demand and facilitate its adoption e.g. into national planning processes.
There are a number of risks to the approach:
i.
ii.
Most fundamental is that the evidence does not support, or is not of good enough
quality/credibility, to support policy making, undermining the case for Green Growth.
The focus on growth may reduce the amount of focus on wider environmental issues such as bio-
diversity and non-carbon pollution and preservation of landscapes, that should form part of an
overall sustainable development strategy.
86. The programme must therefore ensure that its design and operational strategy addresses these
issues. In addition, although the programme will have limited environmental impacts it is important
that GGGI has in place a set of climate and environment policies and guidelines that meet
international standards and ensure that GGGI requires its partners to work to similar standards.
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D. If any, what are the likely major impacts on social development
43
?
87. An underpinning aim of the GGGI proposal is that green growth should contribute to poverty
reduction, and as such can help transform a society if that growth is sustained and inclusive.
88. The analysis of best practice, good models and support for implementation will cover not only the
potential risks, but the opportunities for different approaches, policy and programming choices
present for women, the poor, and excluded. For instance, interventions which open up employment
in non-traditional fields can create opportunities for women in the supply chain (eg SE4All salt pans,
GACC clean cookstoves, India, barefoot solar engineers, and lighting a billion lives).
89. A second key issue for targeted analysis is the extent to which the protection and preservation of
natural capital both helps maintain these assets for future generations, and enables poor people and
groups to engage in the management of these resources without prejudicing their access, or
excluding them from their prime source of livelihood and livelihood protection.
90. Thirdly, the project aims to synthesise experience across countries to contribute to evidence
generation, models and best practice in this field, and to strengthen understanding of the
growth/environment/poverty nexus. It will also support the implementation of policies with decision-
makers. An ability to consider the differential impact of policies on different groups of poor people,
on social exclusion and on women and girls will be a critical part of this analysis, and there will be
much to learn from the methodologies and studies pioneered by the MDBs and IMF on ex-ante
poverty and social impact analysis.
91. The recent joint donor review highlighted a number of areas where GGGI could strengthen its
approach to the production of quality analytical products and implementation. Particular care will be
taken to ensure that GGGI implements good practice on stakeholder engagement, understands the
importance of building broad based constituencies for change (as evidenced by experience on
PSIAs, World Bank 2008, DFID 2006), and can advise decision-makers on communications
strategies for build ownership of difficult reforms.
92. To ensure high quality analysis and implementation, GGGI will also ensure that it contains the
relevant expertise both centrally and in country offices to undertake analysis of ex-ante policy
impacts on poverty, exclusion and women and girls.
E. For fragile and conflict affected countries, what are the likely major impacts on conflict and
fragility, if any?
93. Climate change increasingly undermines human security in the present day, and will increasingly do
so in the future, by reducing access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to
sustain livelihoods. Climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the
opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods
44
. Migration may be another
response of people whose livelihoods are undermined by climate change. Whilst climate is unlikely
to be the only ‘push’ factor in migration decisions, it may increase the risk of conflict in host
communities. ‘Green Growth’ strategies can help countries alleviate the effects of climatic shocks
and distributional struggles over scarce resources.
43
These are shortened version of the climate and environment, and social development assessments. To see the
full versions please see Annex III
44
Barnett, Jon, and W. Neil Adger. "Climate change, human security and violent conflict." Political geography 26.6 (2007): 639-655.
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F. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option? Identify the preferred option.
94. The Strategic Case gives the economic justification for government support activities that help
countries to move towards patterns of development that are sustainable in the long run and reduce
poverty.
95. Where programmes work in a defined context, the usual approach to the economic appraisal is to
present and compare the additional costs with the additional benefits of the proposed set of
activities, and subject these to sensitivity analyses. However, through support to green growth
research and implementation, this programme proposes to support a range of capacity building
projects with country-specific as well as global benefits, research and its dissemination. The specific
costs and benefits of individual components are uncertain. Therefore a comprehensive cost and
benefit analysis is neither possible nor proportional, and has not been undertaken for the following
reasons:
The exact nature and scope of the questions to be considered are often defined during
the research programme itself.
The knowledge outputs are non-commercial global public goods, so do not have a
market price to use for quantification.
Development impacts of research can take many years as there is a large gestation
period before evidence is reflected in policy and implemented.
There are many factors contributing to policy decisions so attribution to research is very
difficult to determine.
The results chain for research is non-linear, indirect and contains a lot of externalities,
so an accurate estimation of impact is nearly impossible to establish.
There are still many unknowns in climate change science and economics, so it is hard
to estimate what future probabilities and levels of cost will be.
96. Instead the approach is to assess each delivery option according to how well we expect it to achieve
the planned outputs. Each deliver option is given a score of 1 (low) – 5 (high) on how they are
expected them to perform against:
Output 1: Country driven green growth strategies developed, accompanied by, here necessary,
legal and institutional frameworks and investment plans for their adoption.
Output 2: Robust research and evidence is available on cost and benefits of green growth policy
measures.
Output 3: A robust enabling environment is created in countries (and globally) for private sector
investments aligning with green growth principles.
97. The expected costs of delivering the outputs were also assessed. The full assessment of each of
these options are detailed in Annex I. The summary conclusions are as follows:
98.
Option 4: delivery by DFID in house potentially drawing in expertise from across HMG.
DFID
does not currently have the capacity to provide high-quality demand-led advice on green growth
planning and implementation. Demand-led planning and implementation is a specialism in its own
right, and it is hardly feasible to have 40 DFID advisers learning independently throughout the world.
Further, it is unlikely that DFID would be able to embed staff within national ministries as GGGI has
been able to do. For research, DFID staff would design and commission a series of green growth
policy evidence papers. As there are insufficient resources in house, these would need to be
contracted out to a third party (or parties). It would be possible to bring in good technical expertise,
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however there is a strong risk that stand-alone studies will not be systematic and will provide a
piecemeal approach to developing the evidence base. There will be limited opportunity to learn from
different contexts – particularly those beyond DFID focus countries and limited opportunity to
develop networks and communities of practice for dissemination. In terms of engaging the private
sector, DFID does not have existing networks on which to build, so it may take some time to build
relationships and have impact.
We anticipate that there would be large up-front costs associated with the design and creation of a
new body to carry out capacity building activities and there would be large burden on DFID staff
time. On the other hand, DFID funds could be directed solely at DFID focus countries and would
avoid the large fixed costs problems associated with new departments, such as HR and IT.
99.
Option 5: delivery by an
MDB
such as the World Bank.
The analysis proceeds with the World
Bank in mind as a delivery agent, but the conclusions would largely hold if a different MDB were
selected. The overall performance against programme outputs is fairly strong. The World Bank has
solid expertise in relevant technical fields and has demonstrated thought leadership on green
growth. There is however a risk that the Bank would skew research outputs towards its own interests
(for instance prioritising research relating to infrastructure development) and some developing
countries might not feel that policy advice was completely impartial. Thus this deliver route would not
be independent or demand-led. This lack of trust may hinder their ability to embed themselves with
National Ministries as GGGI has been able to do.
The World Bank has a good track record in the delivery of outputs similar to those proposed under
this programme at reasonable cost (for example Knowledge for Change and WAVES). However, the
programme would require the Bank to set up a new dedicated project unit to implement this
programme. At first instance, this would probably mean a large number of advisers flying from a
Washington base to provide advice. If this was then to move to a country or regional model, there
would be large sunk costs associated with set-up of a new body.
100. Option
6: delivery by GGGI.
The option displays strong performance against all of the programme
outputs. GGGI have demonstrated expertise in green growth policy research, and in Ethiopia they
have translated policy analysis into practical advice and capacity building with government,
culminating in the development of the new
Climate Resilient Green Economy
Strategy. GGGI works
in a mixture of developing and emerging economies, meaning there is good potential for less
developed countries to learn from the experiences of countries further along their development path.
Whilst progress on GGGI’s private sector pillar has been fairly slow to date, the structures are in
place to carry out work with the private sector, and there is scope to scale up these activities under
this programme.
Delivery through GGGI would benefit from the structures and systems needed to deliver the
programme outputs already being in place. GGGI has recently transformed from a Korean based
NGO to an international organisation, and as a result it has significantly expanded its activities since
2010. There are sunk costs associated with the new management and administration systems that
GGGI has put in place (for example the HR department, and IT and financial management systems).
We anticipate that these overhead costs will decline over time relative to programme activities as
GGGI expands its programme into more focus countries and accelerates measures to cut costs.
Risks of delivery through GGGI include need for: strengthened financial management and delivery
systems and capacity; greater poverty focus in its programming; and need for strengthening its
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planning and delivery on gender. GGGI’s senior management has put in place a reform programme
on financial management issues. (As GGGI is the preferred option, these risks and the use of KPIs
as well as focusing programme management on these areas, is discussed in the Management
Case.)
101. Chart 1 summarises the finding from stage 2 of the appraisal. Option 6: delivery through GGGI, was
the highest scoring option against the planned programme outputs. GGGI is also expected to be the
lowest cost of the three options. Support to GGGI is therefore the recommended option.
Chart 1: Summary VFM analysis
* Maximum benefit score = 16; cost scores range from 1 (low cost) to 3 (high cost)
102. An independent review of CDKN
45
has found that the demand for knowledge, evidence and support
for practical action on green growth exceeds the supply capacity of CDKN. In the Strategic Case,
we discussed the reasons why additional funding for CDKN would not be a preferable option in the
short-term. Here we discuss why funding both GGGI and CDKN will represent complementary
initiatives, with distinct but compatible approaches that will provide further leverage for the UK
government in meeting the need addressed in the Strategic Case.
Box 1: GGGI and CDKN: Why invest in both?
100. GGGI’s clear technical entry point is economic growth, as the main engine for poverty reduction.
This is its unique selling point. It operates where there is strong demand for its independent
advice. GGGI’s teams are normally located in government ministries, making them well placed to
45
ITAD (2013)
External Evaluation Report of the Climate Development Knowledge Network,
ITAD 2013. The mid term review of CDKN
found that, “As GGGI is currently working in a handful of developing countries and CDKN aims to concentrate on up to 14 deep
engagement countries the need for both organisations vastly outweighs their combined capacities.”
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incorporate the environment into budgeting and policy making and avoid creating parallel and ad
hoc processes.
101. This is a fundamental difference between CDKN and GGGI. GGGI sees economic growth, as the
main engine for poverty reduction and human development; GGGI aims at working with those
government institutions concerned with developing and executing growth and development plans.
CDKN’s entry point is climate compatible development; ‘development that minimises the harm
caused by climate impacts, while maximising the many human development opportunities
presented by a low emissions, more resilient, future.’ Institutionally, GGGI’s operating model
involves their presence being requested by governments and housed in appropriate ministries.
This embedded model increases the chances of high quality advice being adopted.
102.
GGGI is a treaty based, multi-partner institution, ‘owned’ by its country partners, and working with
them in a long-term programmatic effort, with a fully-integrated set of support services. As such,
GGGI’s approach is long-term and relationship intensive, with a strong local presence and a focus
on the county’s mainstream, end-to-end planning and implementation processes. CDKN is a third-
party provider of technical support, with a project based approach designed to accelerate progress
in specific high-priority initiatives. These basic differences in strategic approach and delivery
model allow the two organisations to work in tandem, and they have shown an ability to
collaborate effectively and to enhance each other’s outcomes in countries where both are present.
103. For instance, through GGGI’s knowledge networking and sharing initiatives such as the Green
Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP) and the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative (GGBP),
GGGI provides a platform for the dissemination of green growth policy relevant research, case
studies and best practice. This ensures GGGI’s work achieves the maximum ‘demonstration
effect’, facilitating replication of its experience in other countries. GGGI and CDKN have
collaborated successfully on these initiatives, which have strengthened CDKN’s work on
supporting developing country negotiators to the UNFCCC. As opposed to creating duplication or
overlap, support to GGGI would help to leverage the impact of CDKN research and maximise its
relevance, applicability and availability in developing and emerging countries.
104. The geographical scope of CDKN and GGGI country programmes is complementary rather than
overlapping. In cases where CDKN and GGGI do work in the same country, they have aligned
according to comparative advantage and have worked effectively together (Ethiopia). There is
further potential to build on this going forward.
105. Working with both CDKN and GGGI can actually provide further leverage to the UK Government
by helping ensure even stronger collaboration and a complementary focus. The closer the
organisations are able to work together, the greater the potential impact of the respective
initiatives, through transfer of knowledge and tools and coordination based on comparative
advantages. A full discussion of GGGI’s and CDKN’s comparative advantages is attached in
Annex II.
What DFID support to GGGI will deliver
103. GGGI works across three pillars of activity designed to address these barriers: green growth
planning and implementation, research and public-private cooperation.
104.
Green Growth Planning and Implementation:
GGGI embeds staff within developing country
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government departments to assist in government-led processes relating to green growth. This model
allows GGGI to act effectively as a trusted, neutral partner to governments that request its services.
The 2013 Joint Donor Review (JDR) found that ‘[GGGI] country teams have established themselves
as trusted advisors to the respective governments, and appear to have exploited this well to take the
green growth policy process forwards. They have achieved direct access to top leadership levels in
ways that development partners may not be able to access (according to the development partners
themselves).
105. This method of operation has allowed GGGI to achieve a number of positive results, despite being a
relatively young institution. For instance, the Government of Ethiopia have commended GGGI’s
support to their Climate Resilient Growth Economy (CRGE) planning process and have continued to
work with GGGI on the implementation phase. This has led to the creation of a CRGE facility to help
finance the implementation of the CRGE priorities and to which DFID Ethiopia has committed £15m.
This transformative approach developed by the Government of Ethiopia will provide a clear example
of green economic transformation, not only in Africa but across the world (see Box 2 below). Other
examples of GGP&I results include:
In Rwanda, GGGI have assisted with the policy and legal framework for energy efficient and
affordable housing in Kigali. This is part of their wider work on urban development with the
Ministry of Infrastructure. The ministry of Economics and Finance hopes to integrate the
results of this into the 2014-15 national budgeting process.
In Karnataka, three key recommendations from GGGI’s agricultural sector analysis have
been incorporated into the state budget and rain-fed farming policy.
In Mongolia, GGGI have drawn together an advisory committee to produce three green
energy scenarios, the results of which have been used by Ministry counterparts into the
amendments to the Renewable Energy Law.
Development of the Renewable Energy Master Plan of the EAC
Box 2: GGGI in Ethiopia
The CRGE vision, which was launched in November 2011, sets the ambition of Ethiopia having a middle income
status by 2025 while building resilience to the shocks of climate change and achieving growth with a zero net
increase in carbon emissions from 2010 levels. For the past two years, GGGI Ethiopia has been working closely
with the government in all the stages of planning and strategizing how best to bring this vision to reality on the
ground. The 2013 Joint Donor Review found that GGGI had ‘achieved direct access to top-leadership levels in
way that development partners may not be able to access [according to the development partners themselves]’.
At two workshops in October, Ethiopia unveiled the Sectoral Reduction Mechanism (SRM) Framework, which
outlines the mechanism for implementation of the CRGE; the Operational Manual for the CRGE Facility that sets
out the detailed mechanics of a new institution that will attract, pool and deploy funding to meet the CRGE vision;
and the Climate Resilience Strategy for agriculture that analyses the risk posed by climate change and outlines
priority strategies building climate resilience in the critical agriculture sector. In essence, the SRM Framework
outlines the process by which line ministries should develop plans for funding from the CRGE Facility, which in
turn is the pooled financing mechanism of the government.
UK Funding
UK Aid – DFID Ethiopia is contributing GBP 15 million (USD 24 million) to the CRGE Facility to support the
Government of Ethiopia in its ambition to build a Climate Resilient Green Economy. These funds will be used to
support the implementation of the Sector Reduction Mechanism’s process: to generate and fund high quality
strategic investments that respond to the priorities of the Government of Ethiopia. This finance will be used to
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support the Government of Ethiopia to build a Climate Resilient Green Economy across different sectors. This
transformative approach developed by the Government of Ethiopia will provide a clear example of green
economic transformation, not only in Africa but across the world. Feedback from DFID Ethiopia is that GGGI do
an excellent job in policy terms, they are a key strategic partner and are doing really interesting and important
work with Government.
106.
Public-Private Cooperation:
GGGI will catalyse private sector initiatives in a way consistent with
green growth policy work stream. This will include work on (a) risk reduction and financial
instruments; (b) incentives and (c) sustainable consumption and impact investments. As an example
the private sector will be involved in developing investment guidelines for implementation of green
growth projects and in designing policy frameworks. GGGI convenes a Business Council and
partners with Siemens, KPMG and Deutsche Bank among others. The four main thematic areas with
which the business council focus are: technology; global value-chains; institutional investors and
energy efficiency finance.
107. Public Private Cooperation (PPC) also works in collaboration with GGGI’s country activities, this
includes its work in Thailand, where it aims to establish a compliance-based carbon market. This will
use the Korean experience of its own carbon market as a template. In Mongolia, a project in
consultation with the Ministry of Economic Development is developing a framework for Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) in green infrastructure.
108. GGGI also works with a number of global private-public sector initiatives. These include the G20
Green Growth Action Alliance which works with the World Economic Forum’s Environmental
Initiatives; Bloomberg and Rockerfeller Foundation in order to mobilise climate finance; and The
Sustainable Infrastructure Foundation to further develop project design templates in compliance with
MDB standard practices.
109.
Knowledge Development & Management (KDM):
GGGI’s research is grounded in the needs of
practitioners based on the first two work streams. KDM brings feedback from the field on what
further knowledge development is required by policymakers and practitioners, bridging the frequent
disconnect between research and practice. Evidence is disseminated through networks such as the
Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP) and Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP).
110. Table 6 summarises GGGI’s programme activities. The results and logframe reflect selected
indicators and targets from GGGI’s current work programme. Full work programmes are in GGGI’s
work plan and budget for 2014-16.
Table 6 - GGGI pillars of activity
Pillar
Green
Growth
Planning
and Implementation (GGP&I)
(70% programme)
Description
Expert advice and capacity building in developing and emerging country
governments to improve design and implementing green growth plans.
Works in close collaboration with national governments through ministries
and by providing support to government led processes such as green
growth plans at the national level or subnational level.
Works effectively in-country with other NGOs/experts providing climate-
related expertise
[2]
CDKN’s mid-term review offers evidence of the early stages of practical CDKN-GGGI cooperation (In Ethiopia):
http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/2012-077-CDKN-MTR-Final-Report-15March-2013.pdf
[2]
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Knowledge Development and
Management (KDM)
(15% programme)
Public-private
co-operation
(PPC)
(15% programme)
Only operates in countries with high-level commitment to transforming
green growth policy making, and where GGGI can leverage significant
impact e.g. policy change, mobilising resources
High-quality research building the evidence basis for green growth in
GGP&I programmes and more widely.
Research agenda is geared towards priorities in: delivery of GGP&I
programmes; and by senior economic policymakers and growth
economists in developing countries.
Research draws on lessons from in-country GGP&I experience, identifying
where gains are replicable in other focus countries.
GGGI manages global platforms for disseminating green growth research
on critical aspects of green growth:
- Green Growth Best Practice : seeks to improve quality and
effectiveness of green growth planning and implementation
internationally. It facilitates peer learning, compiling, analysing and
broadly disseminating best practices at all levels of government, the
private sector and civil society
[3]
.
- Green Growth Knowledge Platform
[4]
with OECD, UNEP and World
Bank, an online platform on green growth theory and practice.
Linking companies to developing country governments that are seeking
private sector finance, technology and expertise to accelerate
implementation of their green growth economic development plans
Building intra- and cross-industry programs of cooperation, and linking
them to relevant intergovernmental processes, to expand markets in
developing and emerging countries for resource-efficient products,
services and industrial processes.
Address issues from a private sector point of view: risk reduction; financial
instruments; incentives; sustainable consumption and impact investment
111. GGGI will directly enable 10-15 geographically and economically diverse developing countries to
address these three barriers and so demonstrate available paths to rapid poverty reducing growth
with simultaneous strong environmental and emissions reducing performance. Concrete positive
examples in selected partner countries will provide evidence and role models for others to replicate
success across other countries. Successful action should also help to move the polarized North-
South politics of sustainable development and provide important evidence and impetus to help the
international community to integrate the economic and environmental pillars of sustainable
development.
112. In order to achieve these goals the GGGI has been set up as a specialized enabling institution for
green growth. It is a multi-stakeholder international organization, with a mission is to advance the
practice and evidence of green growth by helping to develop, implement and deepen understanding
of green growth strategies, focusing on integrating green growth into economic policy and business.
These green growth plans will seek to take opportunities that others may miss due to a lack of
knowledge in this area or due to a lack of long term and trusted engagement and deep
understanding of the economy and society. The GGGI will provide countries with frameworks,
evidence and advice to make decisions that consider a broad range of economic, social and
environmental impacts that will deliver development and the GGGI will follow this through to action.
The GGGI will increasingly be able to leverage experiences and lessons from this work to catalyse
larger change.
113. Chart 2 sets out GGGI’s the planned budget from 2014 to 2016 against the programme and
[3]
For Synthesis of Key Findings, please refer to:
http://ggbp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/GGBP-Synthesis-
of-Key-Findings.pdf
[4]
http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/
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management budget lines. Reflecting DFID’s priorities for the next medium term strategy, DFID
wants to see support to green growth policies increasing in poor countries in 2015 and 2016. We will
incentivise this with the key performance indicators for DFID funding. We also want to see work with
the private sector scaled up and this can be seen in the increasing spend for Public Private
Cooperation.
114. Administrative costs are clearly high, especially in 2014/15. The importance of reducing
administrative costs and the ways that targets will be set and monitored are discussed in the VFM
section below. The nature of GGGI’s business – delivering quality evidence and advice rather than
financial aid – means that administrative costs appear high. It is important that these demonstrate a
downward trajectory as a share of total costs. The use of annual tranches and key performance
indicators builds in an exit strategy to the programme if performance is poor on technical or
management grounds.
Chart 2: GGGI Planned expenditure by budget line
Source: Corrigendum to the GGGI Draft Workplan and Budget 2014 – 2016, December 2013
115. The programme will be able to report against a number of the ICF criteria. These are set out in Table
7 and in the logical framework. GGGI monitoring approach and DFID’s approach to monitoring are
set out in the Management Case.
Table 7: GGGI expected results against ICF criteria
Expected results
We anticipate that a commitment from DFID will encourage other donors to
confirm their commitments and to mobilise additional funding to GGGI. We
also expect that partner governments in GGGI focus countries will provide
some match funding for green growth activities (which include actions on
climate change).
Through the GGP&I activity pillar, GGGI will support governments to
integrate green growth into their national and sector level economic
development strategies through provision of analytical tools, capacity
building and communities of practice. The programme will be able to report
ICF Criteria
ICF Criteria 11:
Volume of
public finance mobilised for
climate change purposes
as a result of ICF funding
ICF Criteria 13:
Level of
integration of climate
change in national, sectoral
or institutional planning as
a result of ICF support
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against the scorecard indicator at a country or sector level.
ICF Criteria 14:
Level of
institutional knowledge of
climate change issues as a
result of ICF support
Under the knowledge development activity pillar GGGI will develop a
range of economic research into green growth policy and practice. Under
the GGP&I pillar GGGI will help partner governments to improve their
institutional knowledge of green growth. GGGI also supports the online
‘Green Growth Knowledge Platform’ which aims to share green growth
related tools and methodologies and to make them more directly available
to developing countries. The programme will be able to report against the
scorecard indicator at a country or sector level.
GGGI will be able to report against the criteria scorecard for
transformational change. We expect that GGGI will make progress against
all of the scorecard criteria:
- Fostering political will to act on climate change: GGGI will build
communities of practice on green growth and improve the global
knowledge base (for example through the green growth knowledge
platform).
- ICF-supported activities are enhancing local capacities to act on climate
change GGGI will build capacity in partner governments (national and
local) on green growth planning and implementation.
- HMG-supported activities are encouraging innovation and testing new
approaches and ideas GGGI research activities will develop and test
new ideas and approaches. Green growth activities actions and
strategies will be tested in a range of contexts through the programme.
- HMG-supported activities are creating the incentives for others to act on
climate change: GGGI aims to create incentives through knowledge and
demonstration on successful green growth actions (in both the public
and private sectors).
- HMG-supported activities are being replicated by others: If the GGGI
programme is successful, it will demonstrate the benefits of green
growth activities to countries beyond its direct partner countries.
- Activities are likely to be sustained once HMG funding ends: In the
concept note for the new GGGI strategy 2015-2020, GGGI sets out
how it aims to build a partnership model with client countries in order to
sustain long term impact. The organisation plans to build long-term
relationships with core donors in order to ensure predictable and reliable
funding.
ICF Criteria 15:
Extent to
which ICF intervention is
likely to have a
transformational impact
What is the appropriate level of funding to the preferred option?
116. At present there are 5 core donors supporting GGGI, (Korea who have contributed $10 million per
year, and Australia, Denmark, Norway and Qatar who each have each contributed $5m per year). A
UK contribution would display commitment to tackle the barriers identified in the strategic case and
may help to leverage more predictable support from other donors.
117. The ICF technical panel suggested in their feedback that the UK provide £12-£15m over a 3-year
period to GGGI, with an option to discontinue funding or expand in the future dependent on
performance. The panel noted that the UK should ensure that it maximises its influence within GGGI
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and that the organisation gave a stronger poverty focus.
118. An annual UK contribution to GGGI of $5 million (£3.1m
46
) would be in line with the scale of
commitments by other core donors such as Norway and Denmark. A contribution of this scale over
the three years of planned implementation (2014-16) would help to improve the predictability of
GGGI’s funding and give the organisation space to source other predictable core donors.
119. The recommended funding profile is shown in Table 8, in dollars then in sterling. DFID’s funding is
designed to support progress on governance and management improvements are on track and to
support a significantly more poverty-oriented programme by GGGI in its next medium term plan and
evidence of this shift within the timeframe of this project.. It will be disbursed as either further core
funding or as earmarked funding, depending on what mechanism is judged to have the greatest
leverage on the overall poverty profile of GGGI’s strategy and spend.
120. Funding will be 11% ($5m/£3.2m) of GGGI spend in 2014 rising to 13% ($7.2m/£4.3m) in 2016,
approximately 16% ($9m/£5.4m) in 2015 and 19% ($10.8m/£6.4m) in 2016. These percentages are
upper limits. GGGI’s financial year runs from January to December. If GGGI performance is strong
in terms of organisation improvements and poverty focus but capacity to spend is not increasing as
hoped, DFID will have the option to manage its exposure by disbursing part of the 2016/17 tranche
in support of GGGI’s 2017 budget. This could prevent DFID funding too high a share of GGGI’s
overall programme.
Table 8: Summary of DFID expenditure
2014/15
2015/16
$000's
Funding to GGGI
Total ($)
$:£
£000's
Funding to GGGI
Strategy, due diligence follow-up, evaluation
Total (£)
Memo:
GGGI Budget plans
DFID %
$5,000
$5,000
1.68
2014/15
£2,976
£30
£3,006
$9,000
$9,000
2015/16
£5,357
£35
£5,392
2016/17
$10,800
$10,800
2016/17
£6,429
£75
£6,504
Total
$24,800
$24,800
Total
£14,762
£140
£14,902
47.2
11%
54.8
16%
57.1
19%
121. The annual base tranches will also only be disbursed following satisfactory performance against key
indicators, which have been identified based on the findings of the due diligence assessment. The
framework is set out in the Management Case and will be referred to in the MoU. If performance is
mixed, DFID will be able to provide part of the funding if appropriate.
122. Assessing the full poverty impact of GGGI’s programmes requires looking beyond the income status
of countries GGGI is active in. Table 9 below shows the share current profile of GGGI countries.
46
Based on an exchange rate of £1:$1.635
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Several countries are middle income but contain large numbers of poor people. Furthermore,
evidence from MICs are relevant for LICs – providing the take-up of lessons from GGGI
programmes and research takes place. While few DFID Tier 1 countries are included, GGGI is
active in several very important and influential Tier 3 countries. However, the fact remains that few
GGGI countries are at present low income whereas the theory of change is most clear and direct for
GGGI operations in LICs. We have addressed this in programme design.
Table 9: Profile of GGGI’s country focus (Green Growth Policy and Implementation work stream)
Low income
Lower-middle
Upper-middle
Other/N/A
Countries/
Regions
Cambodia
Ethiopia (NORAD,
DFID)
Rwanda
India
Indonesia
Mongolia
Philippines
Vietnam
Brazil
China
Jordan (BMU/Germany)
Kazakhstan (EBRD)
Mexico
Peru
S. Africa
Thailand (BMU/Germany)
Central Asia
Mekong
MENA (UAE)
East Africa
Community
% of
27%
35%
30%
budget
Note: agencies in brackets are or have provided earmarked funding to GGGI’s work in a specific country
8%
123. Our first disbursement will depend on a commitment from GGGI in the new strategy to be agreed in
November that at least 50% of GGGI’s portfolio will be in low income countries. Our second
disbursement will be dependent of evidence that this material shift has occurred. By withholding part
of the contribution, this will allow DFID to ensure that GGGI gives a stronger poverty focus. GGGI’s
portfolio is currently weighted towards upper-middle and lower-middle income countries. It is in
DFID’s interest for GGGI to pursue a greater low-income focus in its Green Growth Planning and
Implementation work-stream. There is an emerging consensus with other donors, that poverty focus
needs to be increased. the KPIs will provide DFID with sufficient leverage to ensure not only are
these low-income countries but also to fill gaps in the GGGI portfolio which are of specific interest to
DFID e.g. West Africa. This may be earmarked or as additional core funding depending on DFID’s
assessment of how best to secure additional GGGI work in LICs.
124.
125. As GGGI is a demand-led model, it first requires a high-level and strong political commitment by the
partner country. DFID will work through internal and external DFID channels, including across-HMG,
in order to stoke demand from partner countries.
G. Theory of Change for Preferred Option
126. Figure 1 below sets out GGGI’s theory of change, linking its activities to the overall outcome of more
sustainable and equitable growth – growth that will remain the main driver of poverty reduction in
developing countries. The Theory of Change also shows how providing evidence and supporting the
practical implementation of more sustainable growth policies GGGI will make an important
contribution to the ICF ambition to support transformational change to more sustainable growth and
poverty reduction.
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Figure 1: GGGI Theory of Change
127. The key assumptions behind the theory of change are that:
Policies and programmes that are simultaneously good for economic development, take the
environment into account and reduce poverty do exist.
Policies are not implemented at present because policy makers and private actors do not have the
information necessary (for example on their costs and benefits) or practical experience needed to put
them in place.
Some policy makers must be willing to experiment with new green growth approaches in order that
others can learn from their experiences.
Some private sector actors are forward thinking and are willing to test new business models.
128. The theory of change assumptions will be tested and revised through routine programme monitoring
and through programme evaluation.
129. DFID’s objectives through GGGI require achieving influence through dialogue and through UK
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participation in governance structures. The Management Case describes these structures and which
committees the UK will prioritise.
H. What measures can be used to monitor Value for Money for the intervention?
130. The following section summarises what we will look at to monitor VFM and at GGGI's ability to report
against DFID’s VFM framework at economy (inputs), efficiency (activities/outputs) and cost
effectiveness (outcome) levels.
131. It also refers to several key performance indicators that will be used in programme management as
disbursement triggers for DFID funding. These include: credible budget setting; linking results and
budgets; identifying cost savings and achieving these; and monitoring adherence to travel policy.
The specific indicators for the second tranche are detailed in the Management Case.
Economy
132. Economy is the extent to which GGGI is purchasing inputs at the right price and quality. We will
monitor GGGI’s economy by ensuring:
a. Policies governing major cost drivers (e.g. salaries, consultants, travel) are in line with practice in
other international organisations
b. Budgets are reported in a way which enables scrutiny of overheads and cost drivers
c. Ambitious targets for improving cost economy are set and monitored at the level of the whole
organisation and at division/department level.
a. Policies governing major cost drivers
133. The main expenditure line items are governed by a series of policies approved by the Council.
GGGI has implemented procurement, recruitment, travel and financial management policies,
benchmarked against other international organisations that ensure it is able to secure inputs at the
best possible prices without compromising quality. All policies are available at:
http://gggi.org/gggi-
regulations-policies-guidance-notes/
134. GGGI has shifted away from a consultancy based model in order to improve effectiveness and to
manage costs. Staff costs are benchmarked against other international organizations, through a
thorough HR and Management Establishment Project conducted in cooperation with PwC. Staff
grade and salary bands have been established based on research into the HR systems of other
international organizations (World Bank, ADB, UN and others) and a strategic analysis of the
implications of such HR systems and structures. Procurement policies are based on an exercise
conducted by UNOPS, benchmarking GGGI procurement against the World Bank, UNDP, AusAID,
EBRD and IRENA.
135. GGGI’s consultancy fees have been based on comparison with other organisations for specified
levels of qualifications and experience. GGGI only uses external consultants for expertise
unavailable from their network of expert partners (LSE, Indian Institute of Science). For a project in
Karnataka, 2,300 days were sourced at a unit cost of $227. The average cost for consultants in this
project was $550 (over 327 days).
136. GGGI’s travel policy has come under the spotlight during 2013/14. Specific cost management steps
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related to travel in the 2014-16 plan include:
Promoting the expanded use of information technology (IT) facilities including videoconferencing
for consultations with project offices.
Containing business travel expenses through travel policy reforms, including stricter
implementation of the existing travel rules and vigorously monitoring business travel expenses
based on enhanced quarterly monitoring by the OEMG.
Monitoring and rationalising travel for conferences, seminars and meetings.
Encouraging stricter enforcement of cost-effective flights and improvements in booking practices.
b. Budgets are reported in a way which enables scrutiny of overheads and cost drivers
137. GGGI’s own systems require the organisation to present budgets and report on implementation and
expenditure at the corporate and project level.
138. GGGI’s own systems require the organisation to present budgets and report on implementation and
expenditure at the corporate and project level. Parameters for the main expenditure line items are
governed by a series of policies approved by the Council, including procurement, recruitment and
financial management processes.
139. The current organisational reforms are improving GGGI’s abilities to manage costs and monitor
delivery/performance. Measures include:
Cost savings, including reducing use of consultants using its own staff, outsourcing only where
this provides access to expert resources in a cost-effective manner;
Monitoring business travel;
Further strengthening of the link between the budget and results;
More rigorous monitoring and implementation of the budget, further prioritisation and new
efficiency initiatives, rationalisation of business travel;
Improvements in the scrutiny of project selection; and
Regular and rigorous monitoring and review.
c. Targets for improving cost economy are set and monitored
140. The GGGI Management and Administration Department have developed a number of aggregate
VFM indicators to measure its performance from 2014-2016 (set out in Table 10). GGGI is a
relatively new and expanding organisation. The indicator ‘Policy and programmes as % of total
costs’ is therefore low at this stage (68% in 2014). This will increase as investment in system
improvements are completed, as programme expenditure increases and as additional efficiency/cost
saving measures are implemented (to 77% in 2016).
141. Such indicators are not readily comparable to other institutions – for problems that are well known
from the MAR process. For instance, GGGI’s programmes are knowledge and human-resource
intensive; GGGI does not disburse on bed nets, text books or infrastructure that would mean higher
programme costs in other multilaterals. It is meaningful, however, to monitor this indicator over time
for GGGI, and to scrutinise the cost drivers that underpin it. The overall approach to monitoring VFM
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will provide this assurance. We will push for an target rate of savings that is both meaningful and
easily communicated e.g. a specified percentage or amount per year.
142. DFID will track performance against these indicators over the programme lifetime on an annual
basis. These indicators should be regarded as headline indicators. GGGI’s Work Plan and Budget
documents contain an impressive degree of detail of the cost components of different departments
and offices. This transparency will enable DFID and existing contributors to push for meaningful
discussions on cost drivers in GGGI’s budget. A KPI is the identification of cost saving measures by
Division (see Management Case).
Table 10: GGGI Management and Administration key performance indicators and targets
2014
2015
2016
% of staff female
% of staff at HQ
% of staff in international offices
% of staff in programme countries
Management and admin as % of budget
Policy and programmes as % of overall budget
GGGI governance as % of total costs
International office cost as % of total budget
Capital investments as % of total budget
Average length of time between receipt of invoice to
payment (work days)
50%
60%
17%
23%
21%
68%
5.9%
1.5%
4.2%
10
50%
55%
17%
28%
18%
76%
3.6%
1.5%
1.3%
10
50%
50%
17%
33%
17%
77%
3.5%
1.4%
0.5%
10
Source: GGGI Draft Workplan and Budget 2014-2016; adapted by DFID to reflect latest GGGI budget
Efficiency
143. To gauge efficiency we will monitor how well GGGI converts programme inputs into the planned
outputs.
144. GGGI’s outputs are often major activities such as delivering Green Growth Strategies. Taking the
example of Green Growth Strategies, GGGI has demonstrated that it understands the expected
costs of these strategies and that it has a systematic approach for budgeting, monitoring and
revising costs. The expected cost of each sector, country or regional strategy varies from $0.5m to
$3m depending on its scope and complexity and duration. The costs of components of these
strategies (scoping, cross-sectoral analyses, appraisal of specific investments) are also known for
different countries and further detail available on the cost drivers of these components.
145. Proactive cost management: Cost control of projects is embedded within Core Operating Processes
– GGGI’s project management procedures. Budgets are set at the outset based on expected
quantity, quality and unit costs of inputs (a summary budget for a cross-sectoral analysis in
Karnataka has been provided as an example with justification for the HR costs that make up 70% of
the costs). Quarterly reviews, portfolio reviews, the requirement for variations to be approved by
management committee and the role of the new internal audit function provide mechanisms for
oversight of finance and results.
Effectiveness
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146. Effectiveness is the extent to which the outputs of the programme are expected to achieve the
desired programme outcomes. GGGI’s operating model aims to ensure outputs can be converted
into outcomes in the following ways:
Building long term relationships using embedded teams of its own staff, with projects continuing
for 3-5 years from initial scoping and analysis to mobilisation of investment funds
GGGI aligns with national governments through relevant ministries and by providing support to
government led processes such as green growth plans at the national or subnational level. In this
way, GGGI is not developing parallel processes but rather supporting already ongoing or planned
processes and activities
Once robust, cost-effective strategic plan have been designed, GGGI supports their
implementation through attracting public and private investment, supporting technical policy
design and human and institutional capacity building
Knowledge sharing activities to enable developing countries to leverage the lessons learned from
its work elsewhere. For example, projects in Latin America will benefit from the experience on
forestry in Indonesia as project teams share experience, models, data, networks etc.
Compared with the typical project-by-project development assistance approach, GGGI’s deep,
long-lasting engagement and cross-fertilisation of experience enhances the value for money of
what could otherwise be independent and difficult to connect projects.
147. In November 2013, GGGI published a concept note which will inform the development of its new
strategic plan for 2015-2020. DFID will invest significant time in influencing this strategic plan
through in the Informal Working Group that has been formed to consult on and develop the
document. The strategic plan will set out three different levels of results: (i) global goals (or impact);
(ii) organisational and functional outcomes and (iii) organisational outputs
47
.
148. From informal meetings with existing core donors, including Denmark and Norway, it has been
evident that DFID’s priorities for GGGI’s 2015-2020 Strategic Plan align with priorities of other
donors.
149.
The strongest of these priorities is that funding for the organisation can only be fully justified
if the country mix adjusts to secure a higher representation of low-income and DFID-focus
countries.
In addition to this, DFID would like to see GGGI’s 2015-2020 Strategy: (i) addresses
gender equity, social and environmental safeguards in each of the programmatic pillars; (ii) ensure
predictability in the sources and timing of funding and (iii) to deepen focus in country level practical
implementation. . The June Informal Working Group on the new strategy revealed consensus that
GGGI’s operations should be more focused on low income countries.
150. GGGI’s preparations for its new strategic plan show its intent to improve its understanding of how its
activities lead to quality outputs and deliver outcomes. As part of the next strategic plan, a new
results-framework is being developed, based on a revised theory of change. The theory of change
(set out in section H above) aims to establish links between the three different levels of result and
demonstrate how integrated work across the three activity pillars will lead to ‘transformational
pathway changes’ in focus countries. The planning and monitoring framework set out in Figure 2
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GGGI (2013)
Concept Note for Preparing GGGI Strategy 2015-2020,
November 2013
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shows how GGGI monitoring and evaluation activities will be linked to its work planning and levels of
activity. The organisational outputs will measure the direct contribution of GGGI makes in terms of
processes, products and services to its strategic outcomes. They will represent the results
attributable to GGGI at the global, regional and national levels and the tangible delivery of GGGI’s
interventions.
Figure 2: GGGI Planning and Monitoring Framework
Source:
Concept Note for Preparing GGGI Strategy 2015-2020, November 2013
151. To assess impact, DFID will monitor progress against the new GGGI “global goals”. The global goals
will measure GGGI’s development impact over 6 years, in countries, regions and globally; reflecting
progress against GGGI’s vision and mission
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. To assess outcomes, DFID will monitor progress
against GGGI’s “strategic outcomes”. The strategic outcomes will measure GGGI’s development
outcomes that contribute towards the achievement of the global goals. As part of the new strategic
plan the strategic outcomes will be developed for each of the three core work-streams of GGGI and
measured every 3 years. The project logframe will be revised at the conclusion of the 2015-2020
Strategy in late-2014.
152. In summary the case for GGGI developed in the Appraisal Case is based on:
Excellent fit with our objectives on green growth:
GGGI sees economic growth and the private
sector as clear entry points for green growth policies, recognising the role of growth in poverty
reduction. GGGI has proven itself able to implement research by embedding itself within government
ministries. This engagement is crucial if we are to get the most value from the £3.87bn spend of the
International Climate Fund (ICF).
48
Achievements at this level cannot be attributed to any given development partner, but are the result of interventions of
an array of stakeholders. GGGI will contribute to achieving progress in line with its mandate, but at this highest level of
results, there can be no direct attribution of causality.
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Clear mandate on green growth Difference from other existing organisations:
GGGI fills a clear
gap in the international architecture on climate change and the environment – it fills a real gap. GGGI
helps open up opportunities to more fully mainstream climate mitigation and adaptation policies by
linking them to the core (usually higher priority) development objectives.
A credible demand-led model with strong performance in the countries it works in:
GGGI
works with government departments responsible for growth and development plans. This model
avoids developing parallel processes but supports core GGGI is regarded as a trusted and
competent adviser in its partner countries. It has established valuable global partnerships across
traditional divides of developed/developing countries and private/public sectors.
Emphasis on implementation and policy rather than research:
An operating model that bridges
the gap between evidence and implementation effectively. GGGI’s focus is on policy implementation,
not just research and analysis – this is what DFID requires as it addresses the identified gap in green
growth policy and practice.
Involvement of emerging powers:
GGGI involves a number of emerging powers due to its Korean
HQ and non-traditional members and donors. Partner countries include six members of the G20
(Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa). There are also three G20 donors
(Australia, Germany and South Korea) alongside Denmark, EBRD, Norway, Switzerland, Qatar and
UAE. GGGI is governed and ‘owned’ by an equal partnership between developing and developed
countries. The demonstration effect of middle income/emerging economies is expected to be strong
for currently low income countries.
Importance GGGI attaches to strong financial management and VFM:
GGGI is taking reforms to
its financial management systems seriously, especially demonstrating value-for-money. The bulk of
this Business Case and the structure of DFID’s support to GGGI deals with the financial management
changes underway and how DFID will implement this.
GGGI and Gender equality
153. DFID have received a commitment at the Informal Working Group meeting on the next GGGI
Strategy that GGGI will strengthen gender considerations in their next Work Programme and Budget
(2015-2017) to be published in October. We and other donors have sought these assurances
because GGGI has not yet prioritised gender in its work. This section summarises GGGI’s practices
to date and how GGGI will make significant steps to improve its ability to address gender over the
next year.
154. GGGI’s business requires supporting the implementation of policies with decision-makers at the
heart of government. An ability to consider the differential impact of policies on different groups of
poor people, on social exclusion and on women and girls will be a critical part of this work.
Is GGGI’s current and planned approach adequate
155. GGGI’s policy and existing work plan and systems reflect its intent to tackle gender but we along
with other donors recognise their efforts have to be deepened and accelerated. GGGI monitors
internal gender indicators including the gender balance of its staff with an aim of gender parity and is
developing a gender action plan. For its programmes, the Environmental and Social Safeguards
Policy states:
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The
GGGI, in all its work streams, will carry out, careful analysis on understanding the mechanisms
through which policies, financing and technologies related to green growth affect women and gender
balance in the community, the labour market and the family.
156. But this Policy does not yet reflect institutional performance on gender. A Joint Donor Review
(Australia, Denmark, Korea, Norway) in 2013 covering a wide range of aspects of GGGI did not find
strong evidence of gender sensitivity in programming, noting that responsibilities were too narrowly
focused and there wasn’t wide awareness of social issues.
157. The 2014-16 work plan commits to ensuring that best practice on gender and safe guards is
mainstreamed in all country level projects and has a safeguard’s Advisor to monitor this. GGGI is
developing tools for programme staff to address safeguards on environment, social and gender
issues in GGGI’s programme activities. Assessments will happen as part of the context analysis at
scoping stage of interventions. A routine evaluation template for all ongoing projects is being
developed by the Organisational Delivery Unit based on DAC standards that includes reporting on
gender impact. It is expected that the tools will provide for assessments of social, environment and
gender issues using a “traffic-light” system that defines remedial measures based on the
assessments. These will be presented to the Council in December 2014.
158. GGGI’s interventions can be strengthened by linking with gender budgeting initiatives in partner
countries and by considering green growth and gender research.
How is DFID going to ensure gender is addressed during implementation
159. GGGI is managing a very wide range of institutional reforms which are also priorities for us, including
to its financial management and human resourcing systems. DFID will support GGGI make progress
on its performance on gender dimensions of green growth policy:
a) by prioritising GGGI’s performance on gender during negotiations on the next medium term
strategy during 2014;
b) including a specific gender KPI (relating to strengthening gender indicators in the revised results
framework by mid-2015); and
c) requiring a dedicated gender specialist to be funded in the 2015 budget with the objectives of
putting GGGI’s work on gender on a new trajectory. This person would develop an initial gender
action plan for GGGI by mid-2015. The plan would map out how GGGI (i) strengthens the gender
dimension of country level strategies (ii) builds capacity at HQ and in country offices for best
practice in green growth products and services and (iii) improves knowledge of how to monitor
gender in GGGI activities cost effectively.
J. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
160. GGGI delivers the best value for money solution for delivering DFID’s objectives on green growth.
GGGI has a good and complementary fit with other DFID initiatives (e.g. CDKN, IIED), it has an
international mandate for green growth policy in developing countries and is recognised as
performing well by country governments, the private sector and other international organisations.
GGGI’s delivery model – focusing on policy implementation, not just research and analysis – is what
DFID requires as it addresses this gap in green growth policy and practice. Aspects of its operating
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model such as embedding in host governments and its strong links into private sector, think tank and
academic networks would be difficult to replicate or substitute for in another organisation and risk
duplication.
161. GGGI’s model works for developing countries including many of the world’s poor in low and middle
income countries; however, DFID will seek to increase this poverty focus. The structure of DFID’s
contributions to GGGI are intended to underpin delivery of GGGI’s existing work plan and reforms,
but also to incentivise greater poverty focus in the next medium term strategy.
162. GGGI’s negative publicity over the last six months concerned its travel policy and how this was
implemented. This publicity as well as a Joint Donor Review highlighted the range of cost-related
issues that GGGI has had to strengthen to transition from NGO to multilateral organisation.
163. During appraisal, including preparation of a due diligence assessment, GGGI has demonstrated to
DFID its seriousness on value for money. GGGI has a strong awareness of the costs of its major
activities and cost drivers at a division and organisational level. It has modernised the policies
governing its systems and main cost categories. It has explained how it budgets for projects (such
as a green growth strategy in a country) and how it monitors costs. It has a working definition of
administrative costs that it can monitor as a proportion of total costs over time and presents data in a
way that cost drivers such as salaries and travel can be monitored e.g. at the divisional level.
164. GGGI’s programme costs as a % of total costs are monitored and expected to increase from 68% in
2014 to 72% in 2016. This is an organisation level target. Cost drivers of major components such as
salaries and travel will also be monitored and targets set and monitored at divisional level.
165. DFID’s management arrangements include KPIs that will govern future disbursements demonstrate
how monitoring GGGI’s targets for continued progress on value-for-money will be built into
programme management.
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Commercial Case
Direct procurement through a contracted supplier
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
166. There will be no direct procurement requirement for the support as the preferred delivery option
is to contribute to GGGI using a Memorandum of Understanding with GGGI. The GGGI will
ensure good value for money is obtained by following international standard procurement
guidelines, as set out their procurement rules. As part of its membership of the GGGI Council
DFID will monitor the adherence to guidelines and expect to see evidence of procurement
performance as part of GGGI’s annual reporting.
Delivery through a third party entity (multilateral organisation; civil society organisation
or support to government)
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
167. The appraisal of options identified the GGGI to be best placed in terms of results and value for
money to deliver the outputs required. The most appropriate funding mechanism to use is
DFID’s Memorandum of Understanding for contributions to international organisations. This will
enable the UK to provide multi-year funding, as one of several international donors. This
document will clearly set out the understanding reached by DFID and the GGGI on how we will
work together and is not a legally binding aid exchange. This agreement will give us the
flexibility to modify or terminate our financial contribution to the project, if any changes occurred,
which, in DFID’s opinion, significantly increased or impaired its development value. The MoU
will also ensure that UK funding is available for the purposes of achieving the outcome and
outputs set out in the business case, which will be attached to the document and reference,
when presented for signature.
168. DFID has conducted a Due Diligence Assessment. The findings of this assessment have
informed the analysis in this Business Case including the design of Key Performance Indicators.
The proposed contribution will enable the UK to use its role on the GGGI’s Council to improve
the focus on results, for example by driving improvements in project cycle efficiency, and the
reporting of results which has significantly improved recently due to GGGI’s response to the
Joint Donor Review.
B. What assurance has been obtained on capability and capacity to deliver?
Core competences of organisation to deliver in-country:
169. As a young organisation there is not yet a large body of evidence on GGGI’s success in
delivering long term transformational change. Where the GGGI has been working however it
has shown its ability to demonstrate very positive results and has achieved many key results
milestones. These achievements have been well documented in: GGGI’s Annual Reports; Joint
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Donor Reviews; External Assessments; Letters of Support from Government Ministries; and
communications with DFID counterparts who have seen the outputs that GGGI have produced.
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170. GGGI has prepared technical and financial project reports to external project donors on a
number of projects initiated and implemented in the last 2 years that have been already
approved. Some of the donors are BMU (Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und
Reaktorsicherheit), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
171. GGGI’s ability to deliver is also supported by third party endorsements received from one of its
largest programmes in Ethiopia (see Annex V).
172. A Joint Donor Review (JDR) of September 2013 identified a number of areas for GGGI to
strengthen systems and performance and GGGI continues to address the recommendations that
were made. As a result, a number of changes are taking place to both its policies and systems.
For example, a risk management framework is currently being developed and is strengthening
its financial management by introducing an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tool that will
enable real time budgeting and reporting.
173. Guidelines on the application and implementation of the anti-corruption policy are currently
under development and scheduled to be finalised within the first half of 2014. This will help to
ensure that DFID is advised of any potential fraud against their funds. The analysis of GGGI’s
financial stability concludes that the organisation is financially viable and that sufficient controls
are in place.
174. In addition, monitoring processes that track activities, outputs, outcomes, and indicators have
been implemented, In addition project spending and contract information relating notably to
institutional buy-in, risk analysis, proactivity, legal covenants, and reporting obligations to donors
have been put in place.
175. Continued DFID funding as set out in the Memorandum will be subject to continued progress
implementing the recommendations of the Joint Donor Review and satisfactory performance
against annual key performance indicators (KPIs). These are set out in the Management Case of
this Business Case, which underpins our financial contribution and will be the reference
document to the signed Memorandum of Understanding.
Delivery of outputs:
176. DFID will be able to monitor results by both conducting its own reviews of the organisation, and
also by working closely with GGGI’s Organisation and Delivery Unit (ODU) who will monitor,
evaluate and report on GGGI’s organisation and delivery.
177. A key component of the ODU’s ability to effectively monitor GGGI’s performance will be the new
enterprise resource planning tool (ERP) alongside the operation of a new Results Framework.
Whilst DFID understands that both of these will take time to implement, they are included as Key
Performance Indicators for release of the second tranche of funding in July 2015.
Technical capability and sources of expertise:
178. The Executive Management Group is composed of the Director General (Yvo de Boer), Deputy
49
All of these are included in the Annex IV.
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Director General – Management and Administration (Robert Dawson), Deputy Director General
– Green Growth Planning and Implementation (Mattia Romani), Assistant Deputy Director
(Nikolaus Schultz), Chief Financial Officer (Munehiko Joya) and Director and Strategy, Policy
and Communications (Hyoeun Jenny Kim). All of the Executive Management Group have
substantial experience in their relevant areas. Full details on all members of the Executive
Management group, including academic qualifications can be found at:
http://gggi.org/about-
gggi/people-3/executive-management/
179. GGGI currently has a staff of 71 (professional) and 43 (general) staff professionals all with
significant relevant professional and/ or academic experience. Given that DFID’s contribution to
GGGI is proposed to be as core funding, all staff will be involved with the programme.
180. The funding agreement between GGGI and DFID would be overseen and managed by GGGI’s
Strategy, Policy and Communications team composed of 12 full time professional staff. This
would be supported by the Organisational Delivery Unit (4 full time professionals) with regard to
project and programme monitoring and evaluation.
Procurement capability:
181. GGGI has approved procurement rules and guidelines, based on the following principles:
Accountability: responsibility for the actions and decisions taken in relation to procurement
and for the resulting outcomes.
Effective Competition: Encourage competitive and non-discriminatory processes
Fairness and Transparency: Treat all suppliers in a fair and equal manner and take steps to
enable appropriate scrutiny of procurement activity;
Sustainability: Meet the needs for goods, services, works and utilities whilst generating
benefits not only to the organisation but also to the society and the economy and minimising
damage to the environment;
Best Value for Money: Use resources in an efficient, effective, economical and ethical
manner.
182. The procurement process includes checks to ensure that the policy has been implemented
effectively and correctly – the process is reviewed by the Procurement Officer, Contracts Review
Committee (as appropriate) and is signed off according to the appropriate level of delegated
authority.
183. A Procurement Audit may be in the work programme of the Office of Internal Audit and Integrity
audit programme for 2015 within GGGI – this will evaluate compliance with the procurement
policy.
106. GGGI now has a procurement team in Seoul headed by a Senior Procurement Expert. Their
work programme includes the development of user friendly procurement guidelines for both
internal and external use and the training of staff. The internal audit team is also responsible for
the development of a full procurement strategy and plan which is aligned to GGGI’s strategic
objectives and specifically addresses value for money.
184. GGGI procurement rules are designed to ensure transparent and fair procurement through
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controls around content and publishing of Invitation to Tender, stipulations around number of
suppliers/ bids received, bid opening procedure, Bid security, bid evaluation, announcement of
the bid evaluation result and award of contract.
185. The procurement rules clearly state the procurement ethics designed to ensure that GGGI treats
all Suppliers in a fair and equal manner in accordance with the principles of fairness, integrity
and transparency.
186. The Procurement Rules state in Rule 2.5 GGGI’s Complaints and Appeals Mechanism: ‘A
Supplier that claims to have suffered or claims that it may suffer loss or injury because of the
alleged non-compliance of a decision or action of the GGGI with the provisions of these Rules
may challenge the decision or action concerned. A two-tier mechanism shall be set up for the
Complaints and Appeals Mechanism whereby the protest shall first be submitted to the
Procurement Officer, who shall provide a written decision stating the basis upon which it was
made. The protestor has the right to file a written appeal to an internal Independent Review
Committee, whose decision will be final and conclusive. The decisions of the Independent
Review Committee will be published’.
Risks:
187. GGGI has developed a comprehensive set of rules and policies to safeguard its activities from
inappropriate or non-compliant acts or omissions.
188. GGGI’s staff rules and regulations and the Code of Conduct cover fraud, bribery and corruption
issues. A formal anti-corruption policy was also approved on 7 November 2013 and is available
on the GGGI website at:
http://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Anti-Corruption-Policy.pdf.
The policy includes information on prevention and control of fraudulent practice and details
around reporting of coercive, collusive, corrupt and fraudulent practice. This included
implementing a full White blower policy, available online at:
http://gggi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Whistleblower-Policy.pdf
189. GGGI also has policies and procedures in place for HR, Procurement, Finance and the Core
Operating Processes, all of which are backed up by the Delegation of Authority which specifies
roles and segregation of duties. Again, all policies are available online at:
www.gggi.org/gggi-
regulations-policies-guidance-notes/
190. Although yet to be institutionalised, GGGI is in the process of developing a comprehensive risk
management framework. This will include a risk register with risk rating based on the probability
of the identified risks occurring and their possible impacts on GGGI projects, as well as the
organisation as a whole. The risks will be monitored on a quarterly basis and the register will be
updated accordingly.
191. Risk management has been embedded throughout the organisation’s project operations through
the compiling of Quarterly Implementation Reports sent by the project teams, which are
analysed and reviewed by the Organisation and Delivery Unit, and summarised for Directors and
the Programme Sub-Committee for assessment/feedback. Any identified risk is then managed
through regular meetings of the Executive Group.
192. With regards to ethics, GGGI have a Code of Conduct (Annex 2 to the Staff Rules and
Regulations) which clearly states GGGI’s policy on Conflict of Interest in Paragraphs 34 – 55.
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GGGI’s Procurement Rules also clearly state requirements for declaration of any conflict of
interest.
DFID relationship
193. DFID will ensure the main risks identified in the Due Diligence Assessment are followed up
through its Key Performance Indicators which will determine whether additional tranches of
funding are to be released after the identified ‘trigger points’ in the project.
194. DFID also have an informal agreement to become a member of GGGI’s Audit and Finance
sub—Committee (AFSC) subject to membership approval. This will allow DFID to push for
greater efficiencies through this body, which has been seen to be working effectively since its
inception in January 2013.
195. DFID will also play an integral part of the Informal Working Group (IWG) which will help shape
GGGI’s strategic plan in the years 2015-2020 as discussed above. DFID has also joined a core
donor group with Danida and Norad to support its effective engagement with GGGI technical
staff and management. This group will undertake a further joint donor review at some point in
2015. DFID’s priorities in the strategy process will include:
(i) Deepening the poverty focus of GGGI’s portfolio and presence in low income countries,
(ii) Ensuring the strategy addresses gender equity, social and environmental safeguards in each
of the programmatic pillars
(iii) Improving predictability in the sources and timing of funding; and
(iv) Deepening GGGI’s focus in country level practical implementation in regions which are of
strategic interest to DFID.
196. The Council meets twice a year. DFID will be represented by a senior HMG official from London
or Seoul supported by GRD technical staff.
C. Is there an opportunity to negotiate on anticipated costs?
197. DFID will continue to use its role on the GGGI Council to continually challenge costs. We will
also ensure that funds earmarked for specific activities deliver best value for money.
198. However, GGGI has standard global fee rates and management charges. Global fee rates are
set in GGGI's individual consultant policy (31st July 2013). These fees are based on a
benchmarking exercise against other International Organisations including UN, UNDP and
IRENA. At the 3rd Session of the GGGI Council in June 2013 an agreement was reached to
apply a minimum of 7% of overhead cost recovery rate to earmarked funded projects. GGGI's
overall overheads in 2013 are 12.6% of budget with a planned decrease to 11% over the next
three years as GGGI develops economies of scale. This is similar to other organisations in their
early years of operation.
199. As set out in the value for money analysis (section I), GGGI’s systems require the organisation
to present budgets and report on implementation and expenditure at the corporate and project
level. Parameters for the main expenditure line items are governed by a series of policies
approved by the Council, including procurement, recruitment and financial management
processes. There are a number of main cost items that will be monitored over time and against
comparator institutions. DFID will work to improve on these levels of economy where possible.
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Financial Case
A. Who are the recipients of all proposed payments?
200. GGGI will be the recipient of the majority of payments from DFID. GGGI will be responsible for the
use of and accounting for these funds. A small amount of the funds will be retained by DFID to
contract supporting activities directly.
B. What are the costs to be incurred directly by DFID?
201. The total cost to DFID will be up to £14.9 million for the period 2014/15 – 16/17. The £14.9 million
will come from the £2.9 billion International Climate Fund (ICF) as resource expenditure. A cost
break down is set out in Table 11. The Key Performance Indicators in Table 15 in the
Management Case show the criteria for disbursements.
Table 11: Summary of programme expenditures
2014/15
£000's
Funding to GGGI
Strategy, due diligence follow-up, evaluation
Total (£)
£2,976
£30
£3,006
2014/15
2015/16
£5,357
£35
£5,392
2015/16
2016/17
£6,429
£75
£6,504
2016/17
Total
£14,762
£140
£14,902
Total
202. Management of our GGGI contribution and participation in the GGGI Council will require
administrative resource from DFID. Necessary resource is estimated to be 0.2 FTE A2 Adviser,
0.2 FTE Programme Manager and 0.05 FTE other advisory resources. This is an increase on
existing resource but can be absorbed within existing administrative budgets. Specialist resources
will also be sourced from CED and PSD on climate change policy and financial/private sector
engagement. The budget line for due diligence follow-up and evaluation will be used as described
in the Management Case.
203. DFID has funding for the GGGI is not considered novel, contentious, repercussive, or politically
sensitive and does not exceed DFID’s delegated limit of £150 million, therefore will not require
approval from HM Treasury.
C. Is the required funding available through current resource allocation or via a bid from
contingency? Will it be funded through capital/programme/admin?
204. This programme will be funded using 100% current programme resources available from the ICF
budget. The contribution would need to be RDEL as the funds provide only grants, and support
research and projects which can include a mixture of types of investment for example research,
capacity building, institutional strengthening and awareness raising. This is exogenous i.e.: at the
point of contribution we would not know to what extent the funds would be used for capital
projects.
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F. What is the profile of estimated costs? How will you work to ensure accurate forecasting?
205. The contributions to GGGI will be disbursed in a way that will maximise DFID influence. This will
include using KPIs to ensure that tranches of funds are only released once DFID are assured that
GGGI have performed to the standards expected of them.
206. The timing of the payments will be set out in a Memorandum of Understanding between DFID and
the GGGI. It is anticipated that the first payment will be in July 2014 with subsequent
disbursements being in July 2015 and July 2016.
207. The Programme Manager will ensure accurate forecasting through developing a strong working
relationship with GGGI, enabling effective engagement on programme issues including financial
management and reporting issues.
GGGI’s financial stability
208. As of 31 December 2012 the GGGI’s total assets totalled $16,385,401, which is 12% more than
the total assets as at 31 December 2011 ($14,578,532) and almost twice the total assets as at 31
December 2010 ($8,426,610). A ratio analysis of the GGGI’s audited financial statements is in
Table 12:
Table 12: ratio analysis of GGGI’s audited financial statements
Ratio analysis
Current ratio
Acid test
Total liabilities to total assets
Long term liabilities to Equity
2.69
2.42
34%
0%
Good
Good
Good
Good
209. Table 13 summarises GGGI’s expenditure, revenue and financing plans for 2014-16. The
approved budget for 2014 is $47.2m rising to $57.1m by 2016. However, expenditures will be
tightly controlled within available budget and to ensure orderly procurement and spending; in 2014
spend is currently expected to be lower (around $43m) due to expenditure processes starting later
as funds have become available later than hoped. The share of administrative/overhead costs also
decline from about 32% in 2014 to 23% in 2016 as the cost of implementing reforms declines and
programme spend increases. (Sections on VFM and KPIs describe cost reduction targets in more
detail.)
210. New donor financing each year is projected to be in the region of $40-$50m of which the
core/earmarked split is about 75:25. The ‘carry over from previous year’ ‘and carry forward’ to
following year play an important role especially in 2014 and 2015 in managing GGGI’s current
difficult cash flow. Uncertainties over donor funding is an area that GGGI want to strengthen
through (i) sound organisational systems and performance that warrant more predictable funding
from donors; and (ii) better budget and resource planning. The two carry over figures of $14m in
2014 help finance operations this year. The carryover from previous year supported expenditure in
the first half of 2014. The projected carry forward is due to expected later payments in 2014 and to
support plans in 2015. Reflecting this unsatisfactory financing situation, credibility of budget and
resource planning is part of the KPI framework. This is also a top priority of GGGI’s senior
management.
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Table 13: GGGI expenditure and financing plans 2014-16
2014
EXPENDITURE
Green Growth Policy and Implementation
22.0
Public Private Cooperation
2.8
Knowledge development and managt
4.8
GGGI Governance
2.8
Strategy policy and communications
2.3
Management and administration
9.8
Capital budget
2.0
Satellite office costs
0.7
Memo: Policy/Prog costs as % of total
TOTAL expenditure
REVENUE
Core
Australia
50
Denmark
Korea
Norway
51
Qatar
UK - if approved
New Core Donor (to be identified)
Earmarked resources from donors
Total revenue
FINANCING
Carry over/surplus from previous year
Carry forward (-) / new financing (+)
NET financing
TOTAL revenue and financing
68%
47.2
2015
26.5
5.0
7.0
2.0
3.0
9.8
0.7
0.8
76%
54.8
2016
27.0
6.0
8.0
2.0
3.2
9.8
0.3
0.8
77%
57.1
35.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
12.0
47.0
30.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
10.0
40.0
35.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
13.5
48.5
14.8
-14.6
0.2
47.2
14.6
0.2
14.8
54.8
-0.2
8.8
8.6
57.1
211. An indicative level of DFID resources of $5m (£3.2m) are reflected in this budget. Additional
resourcing will (a) help close the financing requirements after 2014 and (b) support additional high
priority and poverty-focused programming depending on the outcome of the 2015-2020 Strategy.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
212. A comprehensive Due Diligence Assessment has been carried out for GGGI which has shown that
GGGI is low-to-medium risk. GGGI is a relatively young organisation and its systems are still being
developed. The organisation has made efforts to strengthen its financial policies (and others) over
the past year.
213. Two recent assessments - one by Deloitte for Norway, and the other a Joint Donor Review (JDR)
– have reported that GGGI has acted on the recommendations of previous audits and are taking
has recently confirmed funding which is expected to be about $5m per year.
51
Norway provided $10m to GGGI in 2014 due to a delay in processing their 2013 contribution. Therefore, this
$10m represents the Norwegian contribution for both 2013 and 2014.
50
Ausaid
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positive steps to strengthen their policies. For example the JDR found that
GGGI’s financial
management system is marked by a number of weaknesses that are currently being addressed by
the new Executive Management Group….. The review team is confident that the Executive
Management Group is giving the highest possible priority to addressing the weakness in the
financial management system. Obtaining a comprehensive and accurate picture of GGGI’s
financial situation and transparency and accountability in spending decisions is of critical
importance, especially to the core-funding donors (p.24-25).
214. GGGI is in the process of developing a comprehensive risk management framework. This will
include a risk register with risk rating based on the probability of the identified risks occurring and
their possible impact on the GGGI projects, as well as programme as a whole. The risks will be
monitored on a quarterly basis and the register will be updated accordingly. This is already being
practiced at the project level but more emphasis will be provided on aggregating the risks to the
corporate level.
215. GGGI’s staff rules and regulations and the Code of Conduct cover fraud, bribery and corruption
issues. A formal anti-corruption policy was also approved on 7 November 2013. The policy
includes information on prevention and control of fraudulent practice and details around reporting
of coercive, collusive, corrupt and fraudulent practice. GGGI’s Procurement Rules also clearly
state policies and processes to protect against Fraud, Bribery and Corruption.
216. Guidelines on the application and implementation of the anti-corruption policy currently under
development - and scheduled to be finalised within the first half of 2014 and rolled out through
necessary dissemination and training activities - will ensure that DFID is advised of all potential
fraud against their funds. However, current GGGI Funding Agreements and MoUs do contain
language protecting donors against fraud within GGGI.
217. GGGI approved and implemented a Whistleblower policy on 8 November 2013. This includes
details around the duty of all staff members to report in writing to the Deputy Director General –
Management and Administration any suspected integrity violation of misconduct of staff and any
third parties.
218. As of December 2013, the Code of Conduct formed part of GGGI’s induction presentation
package which has been presented to all new joiners and circulated for information and review to
all existing GGGI staff members. The Office of Internal Audit and Integrity (OIAI), which was
established in April 2013, takes a leading role in investigating reported misconduct including, but
not limited to, fraud, bribery and corruption.
219. Upon receiving allegations of fraud, the OIAI have investigated all incidents and reported results
from the investigations to Management. The results and action plans were consulted with external
legal advisors. Management has taken necessary administrative actions in accordance with the
organisation’s Staff Regulations and Rules. The organisation does not tolerate any fraudulent
activities by any level of staff members.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported and accounted for?
220. GGGI generates the estimated budget vs. actual execution report after the monthly closing and it
is shared with the relevant programme managers / budget holders accordingly. GGGI from 2014
onwards will conduct a mid-term review of its budget whereby any variances can be investigated
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and be incorporated into the revised budget. GGGI is in the process of strengthening this
budgeting process to provide the ability to see the finer details/ variances month to month. The
latest work plan and budget is available on GGGI’s website.
221. Once the GGGI Finance Team finalises month-end closing, financial information is circulated to
each department for the purpose of budget monitoring and control. Also, the team reports
financial information to the Audit and Finance Sub-Committee (AFSC) on a quarterly basis and the
Chair on a monthly basis and shares the information at regular Management Committee Members’
(MCM) meetings.
222. GGGI management issues a monthly financial and operational key update report to the Chairman
of the Council. All management reports are published according to GGGI`s disclosure policy.
223. In terms of whether DFID and other funding sources could be separately identified, monitored and
reported, GGGI recently implemented a new EMAX financial system which allows for full
management of different funding sources via separate project profit and loss–maintained and
reported against.
224. During the fourth Council meeting in December 2013, GGGI had its finance policy and procedures
manual presented and noted to all of the Council members. The noted policy was presented to
the DG for his approval on 27 December 2013 and implemented on 1 January 2014.
225. Budget preparation and budget management is the responsibility of the programme
manager/budget holder. This is assessed through quarterly reporting through the Quarterly
Implementation Reports which track expenditure against budget. Going forward budget execution
will also be assessed by monthly reporting to budget holders. A full mid-year budget review will
also take place from 2014 onwards to check execution against plans and to make any necessary
adjustments.
226. All external audit reports are available online through GGGI’s Annual Reports. No issues have
been raised in management letters. In 2013, four internal audit projects were undertaken.
Reports for projects 1 and 2 were finalised in August and September 2013. Projects 3 and 4 have
been completed and reports are currently being finalised.
227. The target of the 2014 proposed budget compared to projection for 2014 presented in 2013, will
be achieving close to zero real growth. This will entail measures such as cost savings, further
strengthening the link between the budget and results, more rigorous monitoring and
implementation of the budget, further prioritisation and new efficiency initiatives, rationalisation of
business travel, and further improvements in the scrutiny of project selection. Regular and
rigorous monitoring and review will be ensured through active discussion with all the departments
and project offices during midyear and annual budget exercise.
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Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
DFID Management Arrangements
228. The UK was one of eighteen founding member countries of the GGGI, with the Deputy Prime Minister
representing the UK at the agreement of its establishment in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. The UK sits on
the assembly of GGGI. By end-2014 it is expected that Denmark, Australia, Republic of Korea, Norway
and Qatar will have provided core finance to GGGI. DFID has not provided core funding to GGGI but
DFID Ethiopia has provided £900,000 for its in-country work and advice. There are no other financial
relationships with GGGI across HMG.
229. DFID will make suitable management arrangements for the GGGI, including necessary staff time and
reserving funds to conduct important strategic and monitoring visits where necessary. Funding to the
GGGI will be managed by DFID’s Growth and Resilience Department (GRD). Necessary resource is
estimated to be 0.5 FTE A2/B1D Adviser and 0.2 FTE Programme Manager. Specialist resources will
also be sourced from GRD, CED and PSD on climate change policy, financial/private sector
engagement and on priority issues such as gender and political economy.
230. The £120,000 budget line for due diligence follow-up and evaluation is planned to be utilised as follows
(Table 14). £60,000 (£20,000 per year) will be to provide technical expertise in financial management
procured by Growth Team (e.g. a small contract with an accountancy firm with UK and Korean
presence. The outputs from this contract will inform DFID’s inputs on the Audit and Finance Sub-
Committee (discussed below); the products of the contract will be made available to GGGI and
members of the Audit and Finance Sub-Committee (AFSC). £10,000 has been provided for additional
DFID inputs into the important Joint Donor Review in 2015 (e.g. travel and accommodation to Seoul
and GGGI country programmes by 3 or more DFID staff or consultants). The evaluation budget is likely
to be a contribution to a wider DFID evaluation of Green Growth programmes in 2016/17.
Table 14: Strategy, due diligence follow-up and evaluation
Due diligence follow-up, evaluation
£000's
Technical support on AFSC
Participation in Strategy and Joint Donor Review
Evaluation
TOTAL
2014/15
20
10
30
2015/16
20
15
35
2016/17
20
5
50
75
Total
60
30
50
140
231. DFID will continue to work with counterparts across Whitehall, especially the FCO and DECC to
ensure that every opportunity is taken to maximise the impact and additionally of the GGGI. The British
Embassy in Seoul provides a valuable means of communicating with GGGI Senior Management and
representing the UK at GGGI Council and other meetings.
232. On the provision of funds DFID will draw up an MOU with GGGI. Such an agreement will include
specific criteria or outputs that the UK requires as a condition of its support.
233. Core funding will enable the UK to assume an influential strategic role on GGGI’s council. As a Council
member DFID will be in a position to scrutinise ongoing management arrangements and also influence
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the strategy, annual work program and budget, the monitoring and evaluation framework, and the
financial controls. In addition, GGGI have expressed an interest that DFID sits on the Audit and
Finance Subcommittee.
234. In addition to DFID’s role on the Council and particular sub-committees, DFID will also influence GGGI
through bilateral engagement, and through forming alliances with similarly minded donors. These
meetings have already commenced alongside Danida and Norad and are held on a monthly basis. On
providing funding DFID would become part of the Donor Consultative group and would participate in
the next Joint Donor Review in 2015.
235. DFID will engage actively on annual reviews and independent evaluations, which will be necessary as
the programme is innovative and building up credible, tested evidence on green growth will be
important to ensure the GGGI’s transformational impact. In managing the programme the Growth and
Resilience department will draw on the knowledge and experience gained from managing the
International Growth Centre and DFID’s accountable grants.
236. Progress against the key results outputs will be subject to oversight by DFID. Funds will be released
according to the KPI schedule below. Financial reports, compliance and administrative functions will
be managed by the DFID programme manager. The DFID programme management team will
coordinate component reporting as necessary to meet DFID annual review requirements. Annual
Reviews will draw on the cadre 10% contribution of advisers across DFID.
237. The DFID programme management team will work closely with related programmes including CDKN.
This will ensure that synergies between programmes are maximised including evaluation and lesson
learning and consistency in approach. The DFID Programme Manager will be Danny O’Mahony.
Governance
238. GGGI grew out of the green growth experience of the Republic of Korea. It was initially structured as a
non-profit foundation under Article 32 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Korea on 16 June 2010. It
converted into an international organization in accordance with an agreement among its major partner
governments in October 2012 following the ratification of the organization’s Establishment Agreement
by several member country governments.
239. On October 23, 2012, GGGI held inaugural meetings of its Assembly and Council in Seoul as part of
the organization’s new international governance structure. This came after a signing ceremony for the
Establishment Agreement, which was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at the United Nations Conference
on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012.
240. Membership to GGGI is open to any member state of the United Nations that subscribes to the
organisation’s goals and objectives. Regional integration organisations –bodies consisting of
sovereign states of a given region –are also eligible for GGGI membership.
241. The GGGI’s governance structure (see below) consists of of an Assembly, a Council, an Advisory
Committee, and a Secretariat whose functions are as follows:
242. The Assembly is composed of GGGI Members and meets every two years. The functions of the
Assembly include advising on the overall direction of GGGI and reviewing the organisation’s progress
in meeting its stated objectives. The Assembly also elects Council members and appoints the Director
General (DG).
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243. The Council serves as the executive organ of GGGI and approves the organisation’s strategy, budget
and criteria for GGGI programmes. Currently, the Council has three sub-committees – a Facilitative
sub-committee, a Programme Sub-Committee, and an Audit and Finance Sub-Committee.
244. The Secretariat acts as the chief operational organ of the organisation and is headed by the DG, who
represents GGGI externally and provides strategic leadership for the organisation to carry out its
objectives.
245. The DG is nominated by the Council and appointed by the Assembly and performs his/her duties under
their guidance.
246. In addition, GGGI has established an Advisory Committee, composed of leading, relevant non-state
actors and serves as a forum for public-private cooperation on Green Growth and provides inputs on
GGGI’s strategy and activities.
247. Since its establishment over a year ago, the Assembly met once in October 2012 and again in an
extraordinary session in September 2013. The Council has already convened four times and held a
strategy workshop in mid-September 2013. The fifth Council meeting will take place in June 2014.
The three sub-committees of the Council have met frequently to discuss and have worked with the
Secretariat on a broad range of topics regarding GGGI’s operations and activity.
248. The frequency of meetings of these governing organs and the breadth of their involvement are
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evidence of the GGGI members’ deep interest and effective guidance in overseeing and leading the
newly launched international organisation to rapidly develop both internally and externally into a full-
fledged IO with effective systems in place to control operations and activity.
249. GGGI has an Audit and Finance Sub-Committee (AFSC) whose members are appointed by the
Council. The current members are Denmark (Chair), ROK, UAE, and Kiribati. They meet on a
quarterly basis and the minutes are produced and reported to the Council. The Committee has been
working very effectively since its inception in January 2013. DFID have received informal assurances
that they will be able to join the AFSC once approved to become a member of the Council.
250. All recommendations made by the AFSC are actioned immediately and evidence submitted to the
Chair of the AFSC who, if satisfied will circulate to all other members. Often these recommendations
form the basis of subsequent decisions by the GGGI Council (for example recently on Procurement
and Budgeting).
251. The Office of Internal Audit and Integrity (OIAI) was established in April 2013 under the direction of the
Audit and Finance Sub-Committee (AFSC) of the Council. The Charter for OIAI, approved by the
Director General and Chair of the AFSC, defines roles and responsibility of the office and clearly sets
out its mandate.
252. GGGI has a Program Sub-Committee whose function is to assist the Council in carrying out its
responsibilities in overseeing GGGI programmatic activities in the areas of green growth planning and
implementation, research and public-private cooperation. The Sub-Committee meet as deemed
necessary, but not less than twice per year. The current members are Costa Rica (Chair), Australia,
Indonesia, Norway and GGGI representatives.
253. GGGI also has a Facilitative Sub-Committee of the Council. Its function is to assist the Council in
carrying out its responsibilities in overseeing GGGI’s activities and facilitating matters that require
coordination with the Director-General in between Council sessions. The Sub-Committee meet as
deemed necessary, but not less than twice per year.
Past Performance
DFID Ethiopia
254. DFID have only financed GGGI to deliver one piece of work, but work with them as strategic partners
on the wider climate agenda. The Ethiopia Green Growth Planning and Implementation Programme is
a flagship GGGI programme in Ethiopia. GGGI have strong established relationships with Government
and are providing strategic, long term technical support. No other partner is delivering such high-level
or strategic support. For other countries and programmes, GGGI should build on the Ethiopian
experience, ensuring they learn lessons about what really works and what doesn’t. In-country strategic
vision and leadership is crucial.
255. GGGI effectively delivered a Climate Resilience strategy for Agriculture sector with Ethiopian Ministry
of Agriculture, funded by DFID. The analysis was robust and they developed a very effective way of
working with the Ministry.
256. GGGI tends to focus on the climate and growth elements; in low income contexts they need to ensure
they bring a sufficiently strong understanding of poverty and social development issues to make the
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links and provide analysis rooted in the political and socio-economic realities of the context.
257. Feedback from DFID Ethiopia reports that GGGI do an excellent job in policy terms, playing a key role
in Ethiopia’s National Green Growth Plan. However, corporate systems have been cited as weak and
still being developed, but that they have rapidly improved only the past year. However they have no
concerns about misspent finance or mismanagement of the programme. They did have some issues
with delayed reporting, and it took GGGI many months to request final payment.
Joint Donor Review
258. Denmark, Australia, Norway and the Republic of Korea conducted a second Joint Donor Review
52
(JDR) in September 2013. Concerns raised by the review team included:
259. GGGI is in a ‘double transition’ from a Korean NGO to an international organisation and between the
previous and new top management; and this double transition will continue to affect all parts of GGGI’s
operations in the coming year. However, the JDR also commended the efforts of the GGGI Secretariat
to transform the operations of the organisation within a short time frame. GGGI Management
confirmed that the reform process had already produced significant results and that it remained on
track and would continue until members are satisfied that the organisation’s work represents best
practice against international organisation benchmarks.
260. The JDR stressed the need for GGGI Headquarters to provide more support to GGGI country teams.
GGGI management agreed to this need and is in the process of strengthening contact through
improved communication and information flow. GGGI Management also agreed to give priority to
placing more qualified GGGI staff on the ground in partner countries to provide a diversified set of skills
and experience.
261. The JDR raised the need for better integration and consolidation of the organisation’s activities. GGGI
Management fully agreed with this conclusion and is working to ensure that both the country strategies
and corporate strategy integrate the three GGGI work streams.
262. GGGI needs to intensify internal and external communication at all levels and localities. GGGI
management sees communication as a key to achieving GGGI’s overall goals and fully agreed to the
JDR recommendations in this area.
263. The new Executive Management Group (EMG) clearly recognizes the problems with the administrative
systems, including the inadequate systems for country level operational needs, and much of its current
efforts go into addressing the problems, including the key issue of privileges and immunities. New
improved administrative procedures and guidelines have, or are being, developed across areas of the
organization. A new manual for delegation of authority has been developed to address the issue of
delegations to country offices, in particular to decentralize the responsibilities for key areas such as
planning, budgeting, financial management and programs. Hover, these initiatives are all new and
therefore concrete improvements were not picked up in the JDR.
264. The JDR review team found that the intense effort is a positive step, which reflects real commitment to
address the weaknesses in the systems. It will be important to communicate to country teams the
52
Second Joint Donor Review of the GGGI 2013, November 2013.
Available online at
http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Politik-og-
diplomati/Nyheder_udenrigspolitik/2013/GGGI/15%20%20Joint%20Donor%20Review%20%20management%20response%
202013.pdf
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planned improvements, and efforts should be made to involve the country program staff in identifying
needs and testing the systems and procedures developed.
265. A status update on progress against the recommendations of the JDR was also prepared for and
presented at the second Donor Consultative Group meeting on 24 February 2014. Donors commented
that the EMGs efforts in addressing their concerns should be commended.
266. DFID will encourage GGGI to continue its progress against the recommendations of the JDR.
Deloitte Assessment for Norwegian Government
267. The Norwegian Government also commissioned three assessment reports, carried out by Deloitte, to
look at GGGI’s corporate functions at Headquarters level, as well as the Indonesia and Ethiopia
country programmes and offices.
268. The primary objective of these reports was to assess the effectiveness of internal controls related to
the financial management of the Norwegian funding to GGGI. The assessment was positive overall,
demonstrating that GGGI had successfully addressed issues raised in an earlier audit which covered
the period before GGGI was an international organisation but included recommendations for
improvements in GGGI’s financial management system that links with and supports GGGI country
programmes. The assessment covered the nine months to September 2013 while GGGI was rolling
out many significant changes to its accounting and controls.
269. By the last quarter of 2013, GGGI had already addressed many of the issues raised by the
assessment team including introducing new and enhanced internal controls and procedures in the
areas of budget management, procurement, contract monitoring and accounting.
Norway’s
satisfaction with the outcomes of the audit was demonstrated by its decision to release to GGGI funds
that had been temporarily frozen.
270. However, there continues to be challenges in ensuring the implementation of necessary financial
control and support rules at the country level. This was especially the case in Ethiopia, while the
situation was found to be better in Indonesia without being fully satisfactory. The management
response to the Deloitte reports shows that the GGGI management have addressed or are in the
process of addressing the identified weaknesses.
271. The full assessment and management response can be found at:
http://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/GGGI-Response-without-cover-letter.pdf
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KLD/KL/Seoul.pdf
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KLD/KL/Ethiopia.pdf
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KLD/KL/Indonesia.pdf
272. GGGI has also prepared technical and financial project reports to external project donors on a number
of projects initiated and implemented in the last 2 years that have been already approved. Some of the
donors are BMU (Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit), and the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
GGGI Response
273. The GGGI Draft Work Plan and Budget 2014-2016 identifies a number of priorities to strengthen the
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management arrangements. The most relevant priorities are recorded here.
274. Ensuring that the Management and Administration (M&A) division is fully operational and able to
deliver the administrative and support services on the basis of the principle of best VFM. This is a
centralized support function, that serves all GGGI projects for routine administrative transactional
processes, including user support, individual human resources servicing, staff recruitment, legal
support vendor management and accounts payable, as well as for sustainability and safeguards, and
project performance monitoring and evaluation.
275. The prioritisation of deploying the Global Resource Efficiency Management System (GREMS) to
ensure that corporate processes and systems are fully standardized in HQ and all projects. The
process of streamlining will involve the development of common rules and procedures to replace
various practices followed by different divisions and departments
276. The HR division will prioritise attracting, developing and retaining a skilled and diverse workforce. The
IT and legal teams will be strengthened. The Finance department will be further strengthened in 2014-
15 to better respond to the recommendations of the JDR. Priorities will include developing the highest
standard Financial Management and Reporting System (FMS) that fully integrates work program
budgets, spending, financial accounts and reporting at the Headquarters` level but also at the level of
satellite offices and in-country operations.
277. The establishment of the Organization and Delivery Unit (ODU) which is independent from the other
program divisions and will be responsible for:
Monitoring and Evaluation
Reporting
Sustainability management and safeguards
Procurement & consultants
278. These initiatives are expected to significantly strengthen the management arrangements in GGGI and
address the concerns raised by the JDR. Progress is already evident:
279. DFID will continue to scrutinise these management arrangements through its position of the Council,
through the Donor Consultative group and through bilateral engagement.
Informal Working Group on the new Medium Term Strategy
280. In November 2013, GGGI published a concept note which will inform the development of its new
strategic plan for 2015-2020. DFID will play a key role in influencing this strategic plan as it participates
in the Informal Working Group that will develop the document. The strategic plan will set out three
different levels of results: (i) global goals (or impact); (ii) organisational and functional outcomes and
(iii) organisational outputs.
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281. This will consist of a six-step process which will involve representative of ministries of the member
states, external green growth experts and representatives of GGGI Secretariat. As part of this process,
there will be a strategy meeting held between Denmark, Norway, The United Kingdom and GGGI held
in May 2014 to ensure donor concerns and priorities are included in the strategy.
53
GGGI (2013)
Concept Note for Preparing GGGI Strategy 2015-2020,
November 2013
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Key Performance indicators
282. The annual tranches will also only be disbursed following satisfactory performance against key
indicators, which have been identified based on the findings of the due diligence assessment. Criteria
for the 1st and 2
nd
tranche are outlined in Table 15 below, whilst the criteria for the 3
rd
year’s funding
will be detailed during the Joint Donor Review scheduled for 2015. These are expected to be in similar
thematic areas.
283. . If performance is mixed, DFID will be able to provide part of the funding if appropriate. In the event
that GGGI does not perform to the level of expectation, DFID may modify or terminate its financial
contribution to the project giving three months’ notice in writing.
Table 15: Key performance indicators
1.
Good
policy
framework
and
operational planning
1.1 Credible 2015-2020
Strategy agreed and
implemented
1
st
tranche – November 2014
2
nd
tranche – from July 2015
Indicators:
High quality strategy finalised
following a consultative process
Strategy includes commitment
to expand share of low income
countries in GGGI portfolio from
30% to 50%
Indicators:
Evidence that GGGI’s budgeting is shifting
towards 50% of activities in LICs.
Confirmation of programmes in new LIC to
start 2015 and 2016 consistent with
strategic objective on LIC focus
MoV: Council approves Strategy
Timing: November 2014
1.2 2014-16 work plan and
budget updated. Improved
budgeting within identified
financial resources
MoV: Documentation for June 2015 Council
meeting
Timing: July 2015
Indicators:
Credible 2015-17 budget and work plan
with clear revenue and expenditures and
credible plans to close any financing gap .
Enterprise Resource Planning tool in use in
GGGI and used for planning based on
different resource scenarios
MoV: Revised annual budget submitted to June
2015 Council
Timing: June 2015
1.3 Financial planning
demonstrating value for
money
Indicators: targets for cost reductions set for
2014 based on cost saving measures specified
by Division.
MoV: Cost saving measures specified by
Division along with 2015-17 budget/work plan
approval
Timing: Nov 2014
1.4
Strengthened
Divisional
Results
Framework operational
Indicator:
GGGI’s
Corporate
Results
Framework aligned with annual work plan and
specifying results at divisional level
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MoV: Divisional Results Framework included in
work plan presented to Nov 2014 Council
Timing: Nov 2014
1.5 Improved performance
on
monitoring
gender
impact of programmes
Indicator: Provision for gender
specialist to be recruited in 2015
MoV: Budget and work plan
presented to Council in November
2015
Timing: November 2015
Indicators:
Routine evaluation template for all projects
monitor gender performance
Progress note presented to June Council
meeting on drafting of Gender strategy
under preparation to be discussed at
November 2015 session
MoV: Operational Delivery Unit confirms 90%
compliance from programmes
Timing: mid-2015
2
nd
tranche – from July 2015
Indicator: ERP rolled out and functioning in all
GGGI countries
MoV: GGGI confirm to DFID if real time
reporting is taking place
Timing: Roll out by end-2014; ERP functioning
and used for reporting by mid-2015
2. Strengthened financial
and HR management
2.1 Enterprise Resource
Planning
tool
(ERP)
designed, rolled out and
operational
1
st
tranche – November 2014
2.2 Finance system linking
country offices with HQ in
real time
Indicator:
Quarterly
reports
including
comprehensive information from whole of
GGGI using ERP
MoV: GGGI reporting to Council
Timing: June 2015
2.3 GGGI staff based in
countries with appropriate
financial
and
other
programme management
skills
2.4 Systematic reporting
on adherence with travel
policy
Indicator: Monthly reporting by
GGGI travel management company
to
Deputy
Director
General
Administration
MoV: Confirmation to DFID by
GGGI
Timing: November 2014
3.
Robust
risk
management framework
3.1
Strengthened
risk
management framework
1
st
tranche – November 2014
Indicator: Staff trained in ERP systems
MoV: Reporting
Committee
Timing: June 2015
Indicator: Report on compliance with travel
policy to Audit and Finance Sub-Committee
MoV: Audit and Finance Sub-Committee
Timing: June 2015
to Audit and Finance Sub-
2
nd
tranche – from July 2015
Indicator: Approach to Enterprise Risk
Management submitted to management for
approval during 2014
MoV: Reporting to Audit and Finance Sub-
Committee
Timing: Dec 2014
3.2 Office of Internal Audit
(OIA)
and
Integrity
functioning effectively
Indicator 1: Work plan of audits on track
Indicator 2: Procurement audit included in OIA
work plan for 2015
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MoV: Reporting to Audit and Finance Sub-
Committee
Timing: June 2015
Exit Strategy
284. As set out in the Appraisal Case, in the event that GGGI does not perform to the level of expectation,
DFID may modify or terminate its financial contribution to the project giving three months’ notice in
writing.
285. If GGGI proves to be successful and an appropriate partner for DFID beyond this 2016/17, it will be a
candidate for additional support from the ICF.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
In operational
countries, there
are adverse
exogenous shocks
to the economy or
to political stability,
making the case
for green growth
harder to
demonstrate.
Impact
High
Likelihood
Medium
Mitigation Measure
A significant number of countries that will be engaged
are likely to be fragile and potentially conflict affected.
Programme design will require provisions for the
challenges of operating in these countries (e.g.
security) and review the political environment for
growth policy reforms when selecting partner country
programmes.
The programme should also identify key reformers
inside and outside of government and work with them
to influence the elites in choosing policy options for
accelerating economic growth, ideally also working
with domestic think tanks in partner countries. The
stability and longevity of the programme should be
enhanced through multi-stakeholder and cross-
governmental engagement.
Residual
Risk
Medium
Poor planning and
programme
management
adversely affects
timely delivery of
outputs for policy
Medium
Medium
Lack of demand
from policy makers
in developing
countries,
especially DFID'
focus countries
Failure to attract
and maintain
expertise within
GGGI
High
Low
especially
post
Rio+20
The JDR found failings in the existing management
systems. However, GGGI have devoted resources to
improving these. They have rolled out the Global
Resource Efficiency Management System (GREMS)
to ensure that corporate processes and systems are
fully standardized in HQ and all projects. However
there is a residual risk that there is a lag between
having the systems in place and having staff that are
fully trained on how to use them.
Currently, demand for work on green growth from
policymakers in developing countries has been high.
The programme will need to maintain a high standard
in order to create reputation and sustain demand.
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Following the transition to a treaty based international
organisation, GGGI implemented a personnel
structure and compensation scheme that has been
benchmarked
against
other
international
organizations. Nevertheless the JDR found staffing to
be an issue and criticised the extensive use of
Medium
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Lack of political
appetite to adopt
policy
recommendations.
High
Low
Lack of capacity
within country
governments to
implement reforms
High
Medium
The speed of the
reform process
and the fact that
many new
initiatives and
guidelines are
being implemented
simultaneously.
Poor
communication
between HQ and
country offices and
a
disjointed
approach to green
growth
Financial
management
systems
High
Medium
High
Low
consultants that worked alongside GGGI staff. The
Draft Work Plan and Budget 2014-2016 identifies this
as a priority area and will seek to strengthen human
resources.
Selection of countries will be based on demand and
any advice will need to be strongly tailored to
country's political circumstances. GGGI is frequently
approached by governments to conduct work with
them on green growth planning and implementation.
Programs will be designed to ensure cross-
governmental buy-in and engagement at the highest
levels to ensure adoption of policy recommendations.
The Research Strategy will ensure it remains
responsive to emerging growth policy issues.
The JDR found that GGGI had successfully
established itself into a trusted adviser to the
Governments of Ethiopia and Cambodia.
The programme will need to strengthen its ability to
assess capacity upfront, before engaging. It will
assess capacity to implement policy reforms and to
ensure that capacity building will be an integral part of
the green growth planning process. The GGGI will
focus on capacity building throughout the programme.
While a number of improvements were advocated in
the JDR, the fast pace and parallel process in which
the improvements and guidelines are being
developed and introduced could risk leading to
procedures that are off target or inconsistent with
each other. GGGI have postponed plans for
expansion beyond their existing countries to
consolidate and adapt to new processes.
The JDR found that there were benefits from a
decentralized approach where country offices were
flexible and able to meet local demands but
recognised the risk that this posed to ensuring a
consistent approach. GGGI have committed to
significantly
strengthening
their
internal
communications.
GGGI is introducing a new accounting system to
enable better cash flow analysis as a basis for
simulating financial scenarios over 1-2 years. The
financial scenario analysis will help identify risk
factors and so aid measures to prevent or mitigate
risk. A spreadsheet based model will complement the
financial risk analysis relating to liquidity, currency
and contractual liabilities. Alternative funding sources
are being examined as a way of expanding resources
and mitigating emerging risks
The main climate and environmental risk is that the
programme fails to deliver its objectives. Hence the
mitigation and risk rating are the same as those for
the overall programme.
Ensuring
GGGI
has
international
standard
environmental policies and safeguards in place
Low
Medium
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Medium
Climate
and
environment risks
Overall
Climate
and
Environment
safeguards
Medium
High
Low
Medium
Low
C. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
Monitoring
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286. GGGI’s Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is attached at Annex VI. GGGI is in the process of
changing its results framework with a target completion date of September 2014 and would make the
monitoring framework more tightly aligned with the overarching framework at the HQ level and country
programming framework at decentralised entities. This would entail establishment of SMART
indicators with clear baseline, milestones and targets. This would be supplemented by a metadata
handbook with definition of indicators, methodology, and frequency of data collection and associated
costing.
287. Once projects have begun implementation, they are monitored on a quarterly basis. There are two
essential reporting formats that the GGGI teams are required to update on a regular basis. The first is
that teams are required to produce Quarterly Internal Reports (QIRs) within one month of the end of
every quarter. The QIRs form the basis for Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs) which are put together
by the Organisation and Delivery Unit. The QPR is an aggregate at portfolio level of all the variables
tracked at project level.
288. Teams are also required to produce and update, on a monthly basis, project Master Decks, which
serve as the repository of the content and analytical framework of the project. Master Decks are
reviewed by Directors across departments.
289. QIRs include risk ratings that cover institutional risk assessment and political risk assessment. Risk
feedback is provided by the teams and reviewed/assessed by Regional Directors and the Deputy
Director General. This information is summarised in the QPRs, in which it is also included a “watch
list” of projects with disbursements lower than 40%, a list of projects with scoping of set-up delays, and
projects that are closing.
290. QIRs also include ratings on project performance (unsatisfactory, satisfactory, and highly satisfactory)
and on project risk (low, high, and medium). Performance ratings include disbursement, procurement,
financial management, and overall implementation progress.
291. The ERP tool that is scheduled for implementation during 2014 for GGGI will greatly facilitate
information flows, timeliness, reporting and reduce both transaction costs and the reporting burden on
teams. It will provide a single source for information For example, project work plans and contract
award and disbursement projections that are developed and approved as part of the budget process
will be used directly by ODU for monitoring and reporting purposes – allowing real-time monitoring.
Project achievements in producing outputs and reaching milestones – which they monitor as part of
effective project management – will be updated in ERP as they occur and allow ODU to generate
reports without having to revert back to the teams requesting duplicative reports.
292. This will also allow the management teams in the workstream to request and generate reports tailored
to their needs and answer key queries in real time; for example, (i) what is the status of contract
awards and disbursements against projections today?; (ii) what projects have fallen more than 30%
behind their projections and what are the causes of those delays?; (iii) what have been the key outputs
and milestones achieved in the last quarter?; (iv) what has been the breakdown of assistance by
sectors (which are now aligned with the DAC definitions); among many other possible queries. In this
regard, the process of data collection through QIRs will change dramatically as the ERP comes online.
For example, generating key achievement reports can be timed to precede key Council meetings and
disbursement / contract award report updates can be timed to precede budget reviews.
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293. In preparation for the ERP, the Organisation Delivery Unit has been working closely with the
workstreams to map the project processes, required documentation, approvals etc. which will be
integrated into the ERP system. The system will have some core project management capabilities and
allow, for example, use of the logical framework as an implementation tool.
294. DFID will continue to monitor progress being made on the updated results framework and the
establishment of SMART indicators with clear baseline, milestones and targets. DFID will also ensure
that introduction of the ERP tool progresses effectively. DFID’s logframe will be updated once GGGI’s
new strategy and results framework have been finalised in late-2014.
295. Strategic Outcome indicators will measure progress in terms of commitment and capacities that HQ
and country programs put in place to contribute to the global goals. Strategic Outcome indicators will
provide the clear basis of aggregation of results delivered in countries as well as structured profile by
country.
296. A balanced set of indicators for organisational outputs for each strategic outcome and functional
outcome will be formulated.
297. DFID will monitor progress under the GGGI with reference to the log frame, the business case, agreed
work programmes and delivery of key milestones.
Evaluation
298. As set out above GGGI and DFID are establishing sound procedures to monitor programme delivery,
management and outputs. In addition mechanisms have been established to monitor the impact and
outcome levels of the programme through the logical framework. These will be important sources of
information on which to base evaluations.
299. Annual reviews will take stock of overall progress against planned results, agree forward strategic
priorities and work programmes, identify key lessons and risks, and consider what changes are
needed to maximize the likelihood that long term outcome indicators are achieved. Annual reviews will
also focus upon progress by GGGI in undertaking key institutional reforms and strengthening their
management arrangements.
300. To ensure impartiality and to ensure GGGI’s impact is evaluated robustly an independent evaluation
will be undertaken as part of the Climate and Environment Department’s ICF Evaluation programme,
managed and funded separately from GGGI. Climate and Environment Department will explore
potential to undertake a join evaluation of GGGI with CDKN.
301. This will help ensure that GGGI’s impact and influence is evaluated as one player in the overall green
growth, sustainable development and climate landscape and will allow a degree of independent
‘benchmarking’ against similar institutions and programmes.
302. The first round of independent evaluation be undertaken in time to inform, (and as part of) the joint
donor review of the programme in 2015. This will be conducted in a similar format to the Joint Donor
Review of 2013. Terms of Reference can be found in Annex 2 of this document:
http://gggi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/GGGI-Management-Response-to-Second-JDR_Final_04112013.pdf
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Logframe
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: 4487838
Indicators in the logframe are based on the work plan for 2014-16.The logframe will be revised when the
GGGI’s medium term strategy 2015-2020 is finalised in late-2014. In particular Global Goals will be
developed in the medium strategy that will constitute impact indicators in the logframe. These will show
GGGI’s contribution to assisting national governments progress towards achieving growth and low carbon
and sustainable development objectives.
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Appendix: GGGI operational approach
Notes: GGP&I = in-country work with governments and private sector; KDM = knowledge development; PPC = public private cooperation
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