Udvalget for Udlændinge- og Integrationspolitik 2013-14
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Policy Briefing
INSPIRE, RADICALISE, RECRUIT: COUNTERING
THE APPEAL OF EXTREMISM ONLINE
operational. Not enough has been done to
1. 0
EXE CUT IVE S UMMARY
date to tackle the use of the Internet and
social media by extremists and violent
extremists. Most effort has been focused on
reactive measures, such as take-downs and
filtering. While this is important, more focus
and resources need to be invested to enable
the silent majority to be better equipped to see
through extremist propaganda, take control of
online spaces, and actively push back on
extremist messages. There are three areas
where government should focus its efforts:
Strengthening digital literacy and critical
consumption among young people:
i.
Governments should support mainstream
digital literacy and critical consumption
programmes through state schools and
enable their provision through youth and
community organisations.
ii.
Governments should support at arm’s
length projects working with at risk youth
to deconstruct extremist messages.
Increasing counter-messaging, counter-
narrative and alternative narrative activity:
This report was commissioned by the Danish
Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and
Integration and written by the Institute for
Strategic Dialogue (ISD). It draws on
discussions and conclusions from three days
of meetings in Copenhagen in June 2013 with
a range of relevant stakeholders to discuss
means of tackling online extremism. Co-
organised by the Danish government and
ISD, these international meetings involved
academics, practitioners, central and local
government
policy
makers,
intelligence
agencies and representatives from the private
technology sector. The purpose of this paper
is not to summarise discussions, but to draw
on them to offer a framework and series of
recommendations
for
the
ways
that
governments should structure and resource
their responses to online extremism.
Extremists and violent extremists are using
the Internet and social media to inspire,
radicalise and recruit young people to their
cause, whether as passive supporters, active
enthusiasts or those willing to become
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
i.
Government strategic communications
need to be centralised and coordinated,
either through a dedicated unit or by
assigning lead status to a single unit or
department.
effective counter-messengers have the
information they need to work, such as
analytics, audience profiling, and the
sharing of good practice in alternative and
counter-narratives.
iv.
Government must work multilaterally to
pool resources in this area, taking an
active role in streamlining the cross-
border exchange of expertise and lessons
learned in capacity building.
ii.
Governments need to be realistic about
the challenges that limit their ability to
play the role of active ‘messenger’ in
counter-narrative work.
iii.
Governments should make significant
investments
into
funding
non-
governmental organisations able to offer
credible alternatives.
There are many challenges for governments
operating in this area of policy and practice,
but the biggest risk is inaction; there is a need
to move on rather than allow these risks to
hold things up.
Building
the
capacity
of
credible
messengers:
i.
Governments should make significant
investments in developing the skills and
expertise of the most effective counter-
messengers, to build their capacity in
technology, production, communications,
and campaigning.
ii.
Governments should use their convening
power to bring the private tech sector to
the table as their expertise can help the
voices of credible messengers.
iii.
Governments should fund centralised
information
gathering
to
provide
economies of scale and ensure that
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
2.0 Extremist
Messaging:
What are we trying to counter?
There has been considerable focus on how
violent extremists have used the Internet and
social media to plan and carry out their
attacks, but in recent years growing attention
has been given to the ways in which these
spaces and platforms are used to inspire,
radicalise and issue a ‘call to action’ to those
vulnerable
narratives.
i
There are few examples of radicalisation
happening entirely online, but it is certainly an
increasingly
important
tool
for
violent
extremists. One example was Arid Uka,
responsible for shooting US servicemen in
Frankfurt, Germany. Uka was reported to
have been compelled to action by a fabricated
Jihadi propaganda video depicting the rape of
an Iraqi girl by US soldiers. The video
production posted on social media had
actually utilised footage from Brian de Palma’s
fictional production,
Redacted.
ii
Groups differ in their approach, but there is a
tendency towards disseminating a high volume
of material, the use of wider range of multi-
media tools and techniques (images, video,
music), and compelling stories and arguments
delivered by charismatic individuals designed
to
extremist
messages
and
to influence a “computer savvy, media-
saturated, video game addicted generation”.
iii
Extremists have adapted their tactics over the
past couple of years in line with shifting
Internet patterns, and this change of approach
has potential benefits. There is less emphasis
placed on bringing core target audiences to
dedicated forums and websites (although this
does still occur) in favour of operating within
mainstream platforms, such as YouTube,
iv
Facebook
v
, Twitter
vi
and Instagram
vii
.
This allows extremist groups to continue to
reach, inspire and radicalise their traditional
constituencies, while continuing to grow their
tacit base of sympathisers. They are also
drawing audiences into events in real-time, as
was evidenced by the way the May 2013
Woolwich attackers encouraged onlookers to
film and upload the murder of Lee Rigby, or
how al-Shabaab offered real-time battlefield
updates throughout the Westgate attacks in
Nairobi in September 2013.
viii
2. 1 D OMIN ANT N ARRAT IVES AND
P ROPAG AND A TE CHN IQ UE S
Extremist messages mix ideological, political,
moral, religious and social narratives, based on
a range of real or imagined grievances. They
provide a simplistic, unifying ideological
framework, which combines historical and
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
political facts with half-truths, misinformation
and conspiracy theories. Using emotionally
engaging ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’, they often
convey one-dimensional interpretations of the
world and seek to dehumanise the ‘enemy’.
The messages and tactics used by violent
extremists online vary according to group and
target audience, as well as shifting over time
and in response to changing events. Yet, it is
possible to highlight a number of common
messages and calls to action:
Adventure
:
joining up is fun; you will
have access to weapons you can’t get
otherwise and fight alongside other
young, idealistic men.
In seeking to inspire and radicalise vulnerable
audiences, these movements and groups draw
on common propaganda techniques. These
include the following methods:
Bandwagon
:
encouraging their targets to
fit in with the crowd.
Scapegoating
:
blaming a problem on one
group even though there could have been
other factors involved.
Duty
:
you have a duty to protect, avenge,
stand up for and defend those ‘on your
side’,
whether
on
humanitarian
or
religious grounds.
Lesser of two evils
:
convincing targets to
make a bad choice by comparing it to
something worse when there could have
been another option.
Victimhood
:
you and your kin are the
victims
of
an
aggressor
or
wider
conspiracy and you need to do something
to stand up to it.
Down with the kids
:
acting differently in
order to be accepted and listened to by
the target group.
Religious reward
:
God rewards those
who fulfil their obligation to defend their
religion and fellow believers.
Assertion
:
stating something as if it is fact
when it is just a statement that may or
may not be true.
Identity
:
you need to fight to become a
real man.
Transfer
:
transferring what you think or
feel about one thing on to another thing
Belonging
:
you need to come together
with people like you to work together to
fight the aggressor.
Omission
:
excluding small facts that
would radically change the meaning of the
message.
ix
Wider purpose:
your day-to-day life is
meaningless so you need to find that
meaning by taking up arms.
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
2. 2 TH E SPE C IF IC CH ALLEN GE OF
F ORE IGN F IG HTE RS
3.0 Government Responses:
‘Negative’ and ‘Positive’
Many governments have been slow to
respond to the challenge presented by violent
extremists’ use of the Internet and social
media to inspire, radicalise and recruit young
people to their causes. In 2008, the United
Nations Working Group on Countering the
Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes
reported that only 12 of the 34 member states
that responded to its information request had
developed a programme to combat the use of
the Internet for violent extremism.
xi
3.1 ‘NEGATIVE’ RESPONSES
In the intervening years, governments have
increased their action, but their efforts have
tended to concentrate on reactive law
enforcement measures designed to reduce the
supply of ‘terrorist’ content, either through
removal, filtering or hiding information (see
Table 1). For example, the UK government
set
up
the
Counter-Terrorism
Internet
Referral Unit (CTIRU) to coordinate efforts
with private sector industries to remove illegal
content, from videos of violence with
messages of glorification for terrorists to
bomb-making instructions.
xii
Reports in 2013
indicate that the unit has taken down over
4,000 URLs which breach UK terrorism
legislation since it was established in 2010.
xiii
Many western governments are particularly
concerned about the ways in which the
Internet and social media are being used to
radicalise and recruit young people to become
foreign fighters in places such as Somalia,
Libya, Mali and Syria. Violent extremists are
using
many
of
the
same
propaganda
techniques and messages, combined with
narratives tailored to the specific histories and
geographies of their conflict zone.
The dominant messages related to foreign
fighters tend to amplify the ‘call to action’ and
the need to do
something.
These also seek to
contrast fighting with the futility of everyday
life in the West, and in the case of Syria, stress
the humanitarian case, the political legitimacy
of fighting, and the fact that the war can be
won. There has been a lot of ‘homemade’
amateur
content,
including
videos
and
testimonies from those claiming to be on the
frontline, offering an insight into the daily
routines of a foreign fighter. As with other
types of radicalisation, those seeking to recruit
foreign fighters often make available practical
‘how-to’ guidance including travel itineraries,
local contacts and tips about how to stay safe
when on the ground.
x
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
At the pan-European level, the Clean IT
Project
counter
has
led
multilateral
use
of
the
efforts
in
developing law enforcement responses to
terrorist
Internet,
streamlining public-private sector cooperation
and identifying best practises in removing
terrorist-related products online. This has
included advocating the need for streamlined
notice and take-down procedures; transparent
private sector involvement in the removal of
content embedded on their platforms; more
coherent
end-user
and
flagging
consistent
government
and
the
legislation addressing the issue; more efficient
mechanisms;
development of both public and private-sector
internet referral units.
xiv
Table 1: ‘Negative’ Activities to Counter Violent Extremism Online
xv
Activity
Description
Example
Removing
Make private sector industry
take down user-generated
content or websites usually
through legal means
US government forcing micro-
blogging platform Twitter to
suspend account linked to the
terrorist organisation al-Shabaab.
xvi
Filtering
Blacklist key words or web
addresses that are
intentionally dropped from
search results
Proposed legislation in the United
Kingdom requiring ISP’s to filter
hardcore pornography will
possibly extend to the filtering of
extremist and terrorist-related
materials.
xvii
‘Hacktivist’ collective,
Anonymous, calling upon Internet
users to upload altered copies of
Anders Breivik’s manifesto.
xviii
Hiding
Influence choice-architecture
of users by manipulating
search engine results to
boost or reduce content
While it is important for governments to
enforce the law and be seen to be doing so,
such strategies have very limited practical
effectiveness on their own in addressing
violent extremist content on the Internet and
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social media because of the following
challenges:
xix
Scale
:
100 hours of content are
uploaded to YouTube every minute,
xx
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
and 300 million photos are posted on
Facebook every day.
xxi
Only a fraction
of this content is posted by violent
extremists
for
the
purpose
of
inspiring, radicalising or recruiting, yet
the numbers are prohibitive to a take-
down approach.
example, the sermons of the Jihadist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki remain widely
available on mainstream video-sharing
sites.
xxiii
3. 2 ‘ P OS ITIVE’ RESPON SES
Resourcing
: the financial and human
resources needed to support a negative
approach make it unworkable.
Given these limitations, there is a need for
such efforts to be supplemented by more
proactive
approaches,
its
which
focus
on
reducing the demand for such content by
undermining
appeal
among
target
audiences.
xxiv
These alternative approaches
focus not on restricting access, but on helping
people to see through the propaganda and
miscommunication techniques of extremists
by enhancing their digital literacy and making
them critical consumers of content online;
supporting those who can offer alternative
narratives and calls to action; and by enabling
credible messengers to challenge extremist
messages. Table 2 below outlines three
approaches that governments should support
and deliver alongside a range of non-
governmental partners.
Take down ‘whack-a-mole’
: even
where
take-downs
have
been
implemented, the sites and forums
often reappear elsewhere.
Legal frameworks
: there is no legal
framework enabling the systematic,
cross-border regulation of extremist
content online.
xxii
Definitions of legality
: even if there
were a legal framework in place, much
of
the
content
that
successfully
radicalises and recruits individuals is
not illegal or fails to break ‘terms of
service’ of internet service providers
and social media platforms. For
Table 2: ‘Positive’ Activities to Counter Violent Extremism Online
Activity
Description
Example
Strengthen digital literacy
and critical consumption
Build capacity to enable users to
critically engage with extremist
Digital Disruption
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
content
Increase counter-messaging
activities
Enable the design and
dissemination of online products
that counter violent extremist
narratives or direct challenge via
forums and social media
platforms and promote credible
alternatives
NoNazi.net, RAN@, AVE
Build the capacity of
credible messengers
Assist civil society to provide
credible alternatives to violent
extremism online
Viral Peace
In most instances, governments are not
effective
slow
to
messengers
respond
because
due
to
they
lack
credibility among the target audiences, and are
bureaucratic
constraints. However, they can play an
important role in managing their own strategic
communications effectively, and providing
support, facilitation and resources to non-
governmental actors who have the scope and
credibility to conduct this work.
one in four failed to make any checks when
visiting a new website.
xxv
A survey of school
teachers in the UK found that 47% reported
that school children had produced arguments
which ‘contain[ed] inaccurate internet-based
content they regard as deliberately packaged
by the producers to be misleading or
deceitful’.
xxvi
This has implications for the radicalisation
potential of the Internet, which increasingly
hosts slick, appealing and deceiving extremist
content.
xxvii
In 2010, research found that
among violent and non-violent Islamists
sharing a strong anti-western ideology, the
non-violent subset had better critical thinking
skills than the violent, suggesting that digital
literacy and critical consumption might be
protective factors.
xxviii
4.0 Strengthen Digital Literacy
and Critical Consumption
While the Internet is a central part of life,
many users are ill equipped to judge the value,
authenticity and veracity of the content they
consume and share online. A survey in the
UK found that 31 per cent of 12-15 year olds
believed that if a search engine lists
information it must be truthful, while around
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
It is therefore important for governments to
promote and support efforts to improve
digital literacy and critical consumption of
online content among young people. There
are three broad areas of focus for this work:
schools. Such
initiatives help young people
through developing a better understanding of:
Propaganda
techniques:
Teaching
vulnerable audiences how to spot the use
of propaganda techniques by extremists,
thus enhancing their resilience to these
messages.
Critical consumption skills
: to help
young people to see and understand the
use of propaganda techniques online.
Source-verification:
assess
the
validity,
Providing
reliability
them
and
Digital literacy skills
: to help young
people to understand how the Internet
works, how search engine results are
generated, and how to use various online
tools to refine their searches.
with basic source-verification skills to
authenticity of the information they
consume, on or offline.
Understanding choice architecture:
Developing an understanding of the
architecture and functionality of the
Internet and how this impacts the nature
and quality of information presented to
the individual user.
Deconstruction
of
extremist
narratives
: to help those most at risk to
understand the narrative techniques used
by extremists and how to see through
them.
One of the important qualities of effective
4. 1 C RIT ICA L C ON S UM P T I ON AND
D IG ITAL LITE RCY SKI LLS
digital literacy programmes is that they treat
the target audience as the messenger as well as
the recipient. In
other words, they do not just
seek to teach young people passive skills
about how to access and process information;
they aim to empower them to become
proactive consumers and also producers of
information. This is based on the ‘ladder of
participation’ theory and practice, which seeks
to move people from passive consumers to
active participants, and which means that
digital literacy is a prerequisite of other
counter-narrative work. The further up the
There is a growing need for services, products
and programmes that will enable young
people to critically engage with extremist
propaganda online. Similar initiatives have
been undertaken in other areas of Internet
safeguarding, such as in relation to bullying,
paedophilia, pornography and e-fraud, but
there is very little tailored to the challenge of
radicalisation.
The Swedish government has
been leading on research in this area and will
be rolling out a digital literacy programme in
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
ladder and individual progresses, the more
likely they are to be critical information
consumers, but also active in challenging
misinformation when they see it:
Manipulation
Decoration
Tokenism
Assigned but informed
Consulted and informed
Adult initiated with youth input
Youth initiated with adult input
Youth initiated and owned
One innovative project that aims to enhance
digital literacy and critical consumption is
Digital Disruption, which is improving the
digital judgement of young people to counter
extremism.
Digital Disruption
Launched in 2008 by the creative design agency Bold Creative, Digital Disruption has been created to
raise the ability of young people to critically engage with content they consume, create and share
online. It does this through the delivery of research, tools, training and practical communications
activities that provide young people aged 11-19 with the skills needed to lead informed digital lives.
Developed following concern surrounding the spread of audio-visual extremist propaganda, Digital
Disruption launched its pilot project (2008-2010) in which a team of digital media specialists, youth
workers and filmmakers worked with groups of 12 young people identified as particularly susceptible
to extremist propaganda. The aim of the project is to investigate the ways misinformation had been
affecting young people, and to co-produce films to promote critical, independent thinking.
The programme designs activities that enable them to determine the authenticity of materials;
breaking down the tools and processes of conspiracy materials; encouraging discussion around the
way people are influenced by their social networks; and identifying and analysing propaganda
techniques. In addition to its practical training workshops, Digital Disruption has developed a series
of interactive modules aimed to provide educators with the tools to engage young people.
The project has trained 325 young people offline in 6 months, and its online digital literacy toolkits
have reached 600,000. Digital Disruption has currently expanded its focus to raising digital literacy of
11-16 year-olds across the United Kingdom, notably hosting a Digital Disruption summit in October
2012 of leading digital literacy experts from the public, private and third sectors.
xxix
4. 2
DE CONST RUC TI ON
OF
EXT RE MIST ME SS AGE S W IT H TH E
MOST VULNE RABLE
interventions with those most susceptible to
extremist messages to ensure they are
equipped to decipher and deconstruct the
detail and nuances of more subtle audio, visual
and text-based propaganda. These activities
Alongside broader educational programmes
delivered through mainstream institutions, it is
important to have tailored and focused
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
should be implemented through tailored
workshops – either one-on-one or in small
groups – where the practitioner is able to
deconstruct techniques of propaganda face-to-
face so they are able to have a dialogue and
answer questions.
In the UK, the grassroots community
organisation STREET (Strategy to Reach,
Empower and Educate) has worked with the
government
undermine
Channel
violent
Programme
to
extremist
propaganda
encoded within the text and the subtleties at
play that are deliberately put together for
effect and impact upon the viewer’.
xxxi
5.0 Increase Counter-
Messaging Activities
The term ‘counter-messaging’ has come to be
used in relation to a wide range of
communication activities, everything from
public
diplomacy
and
strategic
communications by governments to targeted
campaigns to discredit the ideologies and
actions of violent extremists. The counter-
messaging spectrum can be said to consist of
three main types of activities: government
strategic
communications,
alternative
narratives and counter-narratives. Table 3
below outlines the three elements of the
spectrum, their aims, how they are achieved
and
who
the
principle
actors
are.
disseminated specifically online.
xxx
Through its
Digital Deconstruction programme, it has
aimed to challenge the messaging of al-Qaeda
and their affiliates among vulnerable hard-to-
reach groups. As it has been reported, ‘the
deconstruction attempts to isolate the various
media components that have been utilised to
construct the media text in question...’ and
then ‘…identify the various messages being
Table 3: The Counter-Messaging Spectrum
What
Why
How
Who
Government Strategic
Communications
Action to get the
message about what
government is doing,
including public
awareness activities
Raise awareness,
forge relationships
with key
constituencies and
audiences and
correct
misinformation
Government
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
Alternative Narratives
Undercut violent
extremist narratives by
focusing on what we
are “for” rather than
“against”
Positive story about
social values,
tolerance, openness,
freedom and
democracy
Civil society and
government
Counter-Narratives
Directly deconstruct,
discredit and demystify
violent extremist
messaging
Challenge through
ideology, logic, fact
or humour
Civil society
5. 1
G OVE RN MENT
C OM MUN IC AT I ONS
S T RAT EG IC
(CSCC) at the State Department has created a
specialist Digital Outreach Team (DOT)
whose purpose is to proactively counter the
messaging of violent extremists on the
internet and social media. These kinds of units
systematise research and analysis capabilities,
invest
in
audience
as
analysis,
well
as
support
conducting
government departments on their strategic
communications,
communications work themselves. However,
there are challenges for governments working
within the counter-messaging spectrum:
The area where government has the most
natural and effective role to play on this
spectrum lies within the development and
streamlining
policies
are
of
its
own
strategic
that
communications. This aims to ensure its own
clearly
articulated,
government actions that help to build
relationships with key constituencies are
amplified,
challenging
government.
A number of governments have set up
dedicated strategic communications units that
streamline,
develop
and
implement
communications campaigns that feed into
national counter-extremism policy objectives.
In the UK, the Research, Information and
Communications Unit (RICU) sits within the
Home Office
xxxii
and in the US the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
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and
in
some
cases
directly
about
misinformation
Political
: while units such as these and
civil servants can do good sustained work
over time, one poorly conceived or
mistimed political statement can undo
their efforts overnight.
Resources
:
although
this
work
is
attracting more funding and human
resources, it will still be difficult to
compete with extremists who are able to
draw on large number of enthusiasts
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
willing to give freely of their time to post
extremist content online.
5. 2 ALTE RN ATIVE NARR AT IVES
Bureaucracy
: the slow and risk averse
machinery of governments makes it
difficult for them to be timely or bold in
their responses.
Alternative narratives play an important role
in countering the appeal of violent extremism.
They do not tend to challenge extremist
messaging directly, but instead attempt to
influence those who might be sympathetic
towards (but not actively supportive of)
extremist causes, or help to unite the silent
majority against extremism by emphasising
solidarity, common causes and shared values.
MyJihad is an example of an alternative
narrative project, which seeks to help the
silent majority to reclaim the term ‘jihad’ and
forge a centre-ground narrative on religion
and faith in contrast to that put forward by
extremists.
xxxiii
Emotion
:
governments need to balance
the need to transmit factual information
with the imperative to appeal to the
emotional instincts of target audiences.
Say-do gap
: governments communicate
more through what they do rather than
what they say. Saying one thing and doing
another merely reinforces the extremists’
messages.
MyJihad
Myjihad aims to derive a more moderate understanding of the term ‘jihad’. Designed to reclaim the
concept from extremist constituencies - ‘both Muslims and anti-Muslim’ - the initiative aims to
counter misinformation surrounding Islam and to “share the proper meaning of Jihad as believed and
practiced by the majority of Muslims”.
xxxiv
The initiative provides a platform of expression for users to share their individual ‘struggles’ online,
and thereby contribute to the development of a user-generated centre-ground understanding of the
term. These expressions are aggregated on the MyJihad website. The campaign gained publicity
through its offline advertising, on billboard and buses,
xxxv
and it is using the Twitter hashtag
#myjihad to involve users on social media. It also has a presence on Facebook and YouTube, which
hosts audio-visual content showcasing educational materials, interviews and campaigning videos. This
included a video-competition inviting audiences to highlight their own personal Jihad.
xxxvi
MyJihad is in the process of developing materials and online toolkits that can be taught in schools
and within communities. This includes a repository of audio-visual content exploring the true
meaning of jihad from prominent religious scholars, and other texts such as ‘Jihad against the Abuse
of Jihad’, ‘US Muslims Religious Council’s Fatwa Against Terrorism’, ‘Azhar-endorsed Fatwa on
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
Terrorism’, ‘Prophet Muhammad’s Rules of War’. As well as this, the initiative hopes to use its online
spaces to generate interest to connect activists to hold offline events and community-engagement
activities.
xxxvii
While #MyJihad was activated primarily to counter the narratives of prominent Islamophobic
movements, such as Stop the Islamisation of America (SIOA), other similar campaigns have aimed to
reclaim the concept of ‘Jihad’ within radical Islamist circles. This includes the ‘The J Word’, run by
conservative cleric Yasir Qadhi to undermine the use and abuse of the term by Al-Qaeda and other
“extremist groups of our times…[that] attempt to manipulate the Qur'anic verses and classical legal
rulings of military struggle type of jihad to substantiate their own perverted agenda and recruit
innocent minds”.
xxxviii
demonstrating how the means they adopt are
inconsistent
with
their
own
beliefs;
questioning their overall effectiveness in
achieving their stated goals and exploiting
their mistakes. There are a number of
examples of counter-messaging or counter-
narrative initiatives:
5. 3 C OUNTE R -NARRAT IVE S
There is a growing need for more targeted
activities
delegitimise
that
and
explicitly
de-mystify
deconstruct,
extremist
propaganda. These strategic communications
should be designed to directly erode the
intellectual framework of violent extremist
ideologies with the objective of influencing
the attitudes and behaviours of those who
sympathise or even identify with violent
extremist constituencies of belief through the
Internet and social media.
The primary objective of these activities
should be to sow seeds of doubt among at risk
audiences seeking out extremist content
online. These targeted counter-messaging
activities include attempting to mock, ridicule,
or undermine the credibility/legitimacy of
violent extremist messengers; highlighting
how extremist activities negatively impact on
the constituencies they claim to represent;
Radicalisation Awareness Network’s
Working Group on the Internet and
Social
Media
(RAN@)
:
European
Commission-funded network is chaired
by ISD and Google Ideas and connects
the private sector with practitioners to
produce counter-narrative products and
good practice.
xxxix
Against Violent Extremism (AVE):
global network of former extremists and
the victims of extremist attacks, run by
ISD with seed funding from Google Ideas
and the GenNext Foundation, that
promotes members’ stories as counter-
narratives and connects them to work
together and learn from one another.
xl
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
Sisters Against Violent Extremism
(SAVE):
developed by the Women
without Borders initiative the networks
aims to provide women with the tools for
critical debate to challenge extremist
thinking.
xli
The case study below provides a more detailed
account of one innovative counter-narrative
initiative: EXIT Deutschland’s ‘Trojan t-shirt
campaign.
EXIT Deutschland
EXIT Deutschland performs outreach work to enable individuals to leave extreme neo-Nazi
movements in Germany. In 2011 the initiative used music, clothing and social media to scale their
impact, seeding one of the most successful online outreach strategies designed to engage right-wing
audiences. Based around the theme ‘Get Out of the Scene’, Exit Deutschland set up a task force of
private sector representatives, former neo-Nazis and social media experts to assist in maximizing the
reach of Exit Deutschland’s campaign.
This resulted in the ‘Trojan T-Shirt’ campaign, in which Exit Deutschland distributed 250 white
power t-shirts at a neo-Nazi music festival that when washed altered the logo to ‘What your T-shirt
can do, so can you - we'll help you break with right-wing extremism’ and included the Exit brand.
xlii
The initiative made the headlines both on and offline, including mainstream and far-right forums,
which even temporarily shut down because of the positive reaction to the initiative. The campaign
increased overall awareness of EXIT among right-wingers, trebling the number of self-referrals to its
disengagement programme. To maximise the impact of the campaign, Exit produced a video
sequencing the production and distribution of the offline campaign.
xliii
5. 4
T HE
IM P ORT ANCE
OF
INN OVAT ION AND TE CHN OL OGY
measure how successful different types of
interventions have been. There are many tools
and resources that could be more widely,
systematically, and successfully applied to
counter-narratives: Google, YouTube and
Facebook ads; targeted ads on gaming
platforms; true view ads on YouTube;
effective use of titles, tags and descriptions on
videos; response videos; and serial content,
for instance. In the right hands, this
Any messaging is only successful if it reaches
the intended audience and it is here that
technology can assist. The science of audience
segmentation (i.e. working out who to target
and where to find them) is still poorly
understood among those involved in counter-
narrative activities. Similarly, little is also
understood about data analytics, which help
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
knowledge could transform counter-narrative
efforts.
Sustained
rather
than
sporadic
activity:
be it maintaining an online
community, a twitter following, or a chat
room relationship, engagement must be
5. 5 WH AT D O WE KN OW ABOUT
G OOD
PRACT ICE
AND
W H AT
W ORKS ?
sustained.
Professionalism is essential:
successful
online
effective
effective
counter-narratives
branding
use
of
share
in
often
in
common with their target content an
campaign,
music,
polish
Because we have still not fully utilised
analytics,
our
understanding
of
what
constitutes good practice is little more than
production quality and compelling stories.
informed guesswork. Based on the limited
experience of practitioners in this field, the
following lessons emerge:
Viral is a red herring
: viral is not
quantifiable, and even when qualifying
invokes the notion of having spread like a
virus in an unplanned – unpredictable –
manner.
xliv
Extremist messaging can be a
concern with just hundreds of individuals
having engaged with them, and rarely
have gained traction with millions.
Clarity of goals is essential
:
there are
many distinct targets for counter-narrative
work, which require different types of
campaigns, tactics, and approaches.
It’s not about ‘winning’
:
It is important
to remember that counter-narratives are
not about winning the argument or
winning over the target audience; they are
about gradual movement in the right
direction.
Counter-narratives can evoke counter-
counter-narratives:
online
counter-
narrative work is not without its risks.
Efforts to tackle extremist ideologies can
be attacked by extremists with false and
conspiratorial claims about motives, and
even worse online and offline threats.
Countering such ideologies can also make
them more alluring and clandestine.
Emotions are more important than
evidence:
given the thought patterns that
extremists typically adopt, success is not
achieved
in
counter-narrative
terms
through evidence, which can always be
refuted and countered. Instead, they need
to appeal to human emotions.
Online/offline link is critical
: online
success does not generally come in
isolation.
Humour, shock and subversion
: they
will be more successful than worthy
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
counter-narratives that will be a turn off
to young people.
messengers understand the basics of
campaigning.
There
is
substantial
opportunity
for
6.0 Building Capacity for
Credible Messengers
One of the greatest challenges in mobilising
non-governmental actors to play an active role
in alternative and counter-narratives is a gap in
skills and expertise. There are four key gaps:
governments to play a significant role in
building capacity among the most effective
alternative and counter-messengers, with the
private sector also potentially playing a large
role. There are a handful of examples of good
initiatives in this area. For example, the UK
Home Office has recruited communications
experts to support fifteen organisations to use
digital media more effectively.
xlv
In the US, the
New America Foundation has hosted online
workshops for Muslim community leaders,
financed by technology companies, such as
Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Twitter.
xlvi
In the US, the government-run Viral Peace
and
Generation
Change
programmes
represent efforts by US authorities to directly
empower credible moderates online. With the
assistance of US Embassies, the projects aim
to train ‘raw talent’ in local target communities
through the medium of one to two-day offline
workshops that include modules on effective
storytelling to more technical advice on social
media campaigning strategies. The programme
aim to increase the reach of these messengers
online, enabling them to take ownership of
the digital space by better promoting their
cause.
Technical:
many of the most credible
messengers have poor online technical
skills so they are not able to use social
media platforms, do not understand how
to use analytical tools, and are not making
best use of even basic tools, such as email
and websites.
Production
:
films and images are now
central to extremist propaganda online,
but many counter-messengers do not
even have the basic skills allowing them to
take and upload photos or create and
share videos using smart phones.
Communications
:
narrative
films
to
many
date
counter-
are
long
monologues to camera, which do not
appeal to target audiences.
Campaigning
:
messaging
is
not
communications
counter-narrative
just
about
However,
about
campaigning,
sustained over the long-term.
few of the most effective counter-
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
Viral Peace
Viral Peace aims to assist community activists in undermining the appeal of violent extremism
through adding strategy to their campaigning while also increasing their motivation, influence and
reach on the internet and social media.
It has delivered frontline training through a series of 1 to 2-day offline workshops in Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with further sessions scheduled in Nepal,
India and Pakistan. The initiative offers training and guidance but encourages participants enrolled on
the program to design and deliver their own campaigns, restricting its follow-up involvement to
monitoring progress and offering encouragement.
Through the delivery of seminars on social media strategies and related topics such as identity and
vulnerability online, participants are invited to learn about the tools and techniques that are relevant
to both the content and delivery of online campaigning, such as how to craft compelling narratives
and the basics of using social media for social good.
Viral Peace is often delivered in conjunction with Generation Change, a global network of young
leaders to inspire change and positive community impacts at a local and international level.
xlvii
6. 1 P RIVATE SEC TOR S UPP O RT
as the provision of
pro bono
filming and editing
space; advertising grants; marketing advice
and other ad-hoc consultancy services.
6. 2 C ROS S B ORDE R EXC HANGE OF
I NF ORMATION, G OOD P R ACT ICE
A ND ANALY SIS
Achieving private sector buy-in to these types
of activities should be a core priority for
government, especially in countries where
government-industry relations have already
been strained as a result of law enforcement
measures to counter Internet radicalisation.
Government must signal its commitment to
working with (and not against) its private
sector partners to counter the threat of violent
extremism online. It must also actively
encourage the provision of in-kind support to
credible messengers through outreach and
awareness-raising within these sectors. Private
sector support could range from such things
Given the cross-border nature of messaging
developed by violent extremist movements
and the digital mediums through which they
disseminate propaganda, governments must
work multilaterally to pool resources in the
counter-messaging space. While a number of
governments have begun implementing their
own counter-messaging strategies, there is a
need for greater cross-border exchange of
intelligence, expertise, best practises and most
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
importantly, lessons learned. This includes
commissioning and sharing monitoring and
analysis of violent extremist ecologies on the
internet and social media and sharing this with
non-government partners; sharing of best
practices and lessons learned in disseminating
counter-messaging strategies; the exchange of
private sector contacts and the development
of counter-messaging resource hubs, toolkits
and templates that can be used to challenge
extremist messengers online. Given that most
organisations working in this space are small
and poorly resourced, it would be useful for
government to commission this kind of
information centrally and roll it out to the
people who need it most.
Rachel Briggs
Sebastien Feve
i
ii
See Briggs, R. (June 2011) ‘Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet’.
Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
Rising, D. (2011) “Arid Uka, Frankfurt Airport Shooting Suspect, Starts Trial”.
Huffington Post..
Available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/30/arid-uka-frankfurt-airport-
shooting_n_941511.html
Last accessed 4 November 2013].
Hoffman, B. (May 2006) ‘The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists’.
RAND.
Available at
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf,
[Last accessed 4
November 2013].
iii
See Arthur, C. ‘Anwar al-Awlaki videos available on YouTube’.
The Guardian,
2 November 2010
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/02/anwar-al-awlaki-videos-youtube
[Last accessed 4
November 2013].
iv
See Bartlett, J. (2011) ‘The EDL: a Facebook group with a militant wing’.
Demos.
Available at
www.demos.co.uk/blog/edlfacebookmilitantwing
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
v
See Prucha, N. (September 2013) ‘66 Important Jihadist Twitter Accounts [Part 2]’.
Jihadica.com.
Available at
www.jihadica.com/66-important-jihadist-twitter-accounts-part-2/
[Last accessed 4
November 2013].
vi
See Stalinsky, S. (March 2013) ‘Online Jihadis Embrace Instagram’.
Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI).
Available at
www.memri.org/report/en/print7081.htm
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
vii
‘Tweeting terrorism: How al Shabaab live blogged the Nairobi attacks’.
Telegraph,
22 September 2013.
Available at
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10326863/Tweeting-
terrorism-How-al-Shabaab-live-blogged-the-Nairobi-attacks.html
[Last accessed 4 November
2013].
viii
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
These propaganda techniques are outlined in the educational resources provided by Bold Creative on
their interactive portal:
http://www.digitaldisruption.co.uk/teaching-tools/propaganda-
techniques/
ix
‘Dutch Muslims recruited online to join civil war in Syria’.
The Amsterdam Herald,
16 April 2013. Available
at
www.amsterdamherald.com/index.php/rss/789-20130416-dutch-muslims-recruited-online-
join-civil-war-syria-netherlands-security
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
x
See United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. (2008) ‘First Report of the
Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State
Programmes’.
United Nations.
Available at
www.un.org/en/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf
[Last
accessed 4 November 2013].
xi
xii
xiii
See
http://www.herts.police.uk/advice/counter_terrorism.aspx
‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism - Annual Report’. HM
Government, (March 2013). Available at
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8
583_v0_20.pdf
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
See The Clean It Project website
www.cleanitproject.eu/about-the-project/
[Last accessed 4
November 2013].
xiv
xv
xvi
See Briggs, R. (June 2011) ‘Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet’.
Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
‘Twitter of Terror: Somalia’s al-Shabaab unveils a new social media strategy for militants’.
Slate.com,
23
December 2011. Available at
www.slate.com/articles/technology/technocracy/2011/12/al_shabaab_twitter_a_somali_militan
t_group_unveils_a_new_social_media_strategy_for_terrorists_.html
[Last accessed 4 November
2013]
Killock, J. ‘Sleepwalking into censorship’.
Open Rights Group,
July 25 2013. Available at
www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/sleepwalking-into-censorship
[Last accessed 4 November
2013].
xvii
Whitney, L. ‘Anonymous lashes out at Norway massacre suspect’.
CNET,
25 July 2011. Available at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20083025-83/anonymous-lashes-out-at-norway-massacre-suspect/
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
xviii
xix
xx
See Neumann, P. (2012) ‘Countering Online Radicalisation in America’. Bipartisan Policy Center.
See YouTube’s press page,
www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html
[Last accessed 26
July 2013].
Andrews, R. ‘Facebook has 220 billion of your photos to put on ice’.
GigaOM,
17 October 2012.
Available at
http://gigaom.com/2012/10/17/facebook-has-220-billion-of-your-photos-to-put-on-
ice/
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
xxi
Osmonaliyeva, A. ‘Kyrgyzstan to fight online extremism’.
Central Asia Online,
6 May 2013. Accessible at
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2013/05/06/feature-01
[Last
accessed 4 November 2013].
xxii
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
Arthur, C. ‘Anwar al-Awlaki videos available on YouTube’.
The Guardian,
2 November 2010.
Accessible at
www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/02/anwar-al-awlaki-videos-youtube
[Last
accessed 4 November 2013].
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
See Neumann, P. (2012) ‘Countering Online Radicalisation in America’.
See Bartlett, J. & Miller, C. (September 2011) ‘Truth, Lies and the Internet: A report into young
people’s digital fluency’. Accessible at
www.demos.co.uk/publications/truth-lies-and-the-internet
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
xxvi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
xxx
Ibid.
See for example
www.martinlutherking.org
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
Bartlett, J. Birdwell, J. & King, M. (2010) ‘The Edge of Violence’. Demos.
See ‘Digital Disruption’
http://www.digitaldisruption.co.uk/[Last
accessed 26 July 2013].
See Barclay, J. (December 2011) ‘Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers (STREET): A
Case Study in Government-Community Partnership and Direct Intervention to Counter Violent
Extremism’.
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC).
Baker, A.H. (2008) ‘Rationale for a Extremism Deconstruct Programme & Counter Narrative Hub’.
STREET
, accessible at
www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/street-rationale%20-
counternarrative.pdf
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
xxxi
Travis, A. (2008) “Revealed: Britain's secret propaganda war against al-Qaida” Available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/26/alqaida.uksecurity
[Last accessed 26 July
2013].
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxv
See My Jihad website, About section,
http://myjihad.org/about/
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
See myjihadtv (December 2012),
MyJihad Ad Campaign Now on Chicago Buses,
www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=t0zsyJq-TMc#!
[Last accessed 26 July
2013].
See myjihadtv (March 2013),
#MyJihad Video Contest: Win a FREE trip to Turkey and get paid to help
kids!,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUxvS4tJqhE
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
xxxix
Interview with Angie Emara, Project Coordinator, MyJihad (19/02/2013).
See The J Word website,
http://thejword.org/
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
See DG Home Affairs website,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-at/index_en.htm
[Last accessed
26 July 2013].
See Against Violent Extremism website,
http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/
[Last accessed
26 July 2013].
xl
See Women Without Borders website,
http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/
[Last
accessed 26 July 2013].
xli
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Inspire, Radicalise, Recruit: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online
‘Trojan T-shirt targets German right-wing rock fans’.
BBC News,
9 August 2011. Available at
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14465150
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
xlii
See ExitDeutschlandVideo (March 2012),
OPS // Trojan T-Shirt / EXIT-Deutschland,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSIbsHKEP-8,
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
xliii
There is growing knowledge in this area. Some useful work is being conducted by Prof. Sandy Pentland
at MIT
http://web.media.mit.edu/~sandy/
[Last accessed 4 November 2013].
xliv
xlv
xlvi
xlvii
‘CONTEST: Annual Report’. HM Government, (2013).
Neumann, P. (2012) ‘Countering Online Radicalisation in America’.
See Generation Change Facebook page, About section,
www.facebook.com/generationchange.hq/info
[Last accessed 26 July 2013].
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