OSCEs Parlamentariske Forsamling 2013-14
OSCE Alm.del Bilag 37
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AS (14) RP 1 EOriginal: English
REPORTFOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ONPOLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY
Helsinki +40: Towards Human Security For All
RAPPORTEURMs. Pia KaumaFinland
BAKU, 28 JUNE - 2 JULY 2014

REPORT FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ON

POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY

Rapporteur: Ms. Pia Kauma (Finland)

Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Vienna Document

The Vienna Document is one of the most important politically binding documents of the politico-military dimension of OSCE. It encompasses the goals of the Helsinki Final Act Decalogue of 1975and incorporates them into a politically binding document. The Helsinki Final Act principles createdthe initial confidence- and security-building measures that would be elaborated upon, first in theStockholm Document (1986) and later in the first Vienna Document. The first document, ViennaDocument 1990, would have successors in Vienna Documents 1992, 1994, and 1999. All of the ViennaDocuments have sought to strengthen transparency and openness in the OSCE area.The participating States exchange information annually on their military forces concerning the militaryorganization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems. The information is provided to allparticipating States by 15thof December and is valid on January 1stthe next year. Apart from theexchange of various kinds of information, other obligations to the signatories include Confidence- andSecurity-Building Measures such as inspection and evaluations of military sites, areas, and exercises.In the 2013 Istanbul Declaration, the OSCE PA underlined the need to proceed with the ongoingdiscussions and negotiations in order to update and modernize the 1999 Vienna Document. It alsounderlined the need for further updating the Vienna Document in order to create predictability byincreasing openness and transparency. The questions remain: should the thresholds at which States areobliged to inform each other about their military exercises be lowered, should the opportunities forverification activity be increased, the exchange of military information be modernized, risk reductionmechanisms be strengthened, and the scope of confidence and security-building measures be enlarged?The democratic control of armed forces refers to the norms and standards governing the relationshipbetween the armed forces and society in general. This definition includes the oversight of all types ofsecurity forces in a given country. For this purpose, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-MilitaryAspects of Security was entered into force in January 1995. It both echoes and is in accordance withthe principles and commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. The fundamentalbasis for democratic control1over one’s military is strong and effective parliamentary oversight, whichshould be based on principles of constitutionality, legality and accountability. The role of parliamentsis to adopt an appropriate legislative basis from which to derive the necessary framework andconditions.The next Annual Implementation Discussion will take place in July 2014, and is seen as a milestoneevent in light of the Code of Conduct’s 20th anniversary. Highlights of the year 2013 included thetranslation of the Code into Arabic by Germany and Switzerland and a regional conference for theMediterranean region held in Malta in September. It was stated that the Code of Conduct remains a
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This should be interpreted as democratic oversight by the parliaments, entailing shared responsibility between thelegislative and the executive branches for the effectiveness of the military, police and security structures of a given state (asdefined in FSC.GAL/146/02/Corr.1).
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relevant and valuable document in the current political context. The League of Arab States displayedgenuine interest in the document.In order for the exchange of information to be truly open and transparent in the spirit of the ViennaDocument, we must be able to count on the fact that the armed forces are truly subjected to the controlof the democratic process. It is hardly possible for the armed forces to be controlled this way if the restof the society is also lacking in freedom and democracy. Military spending must be decided solely bythe national parliaments without any kind of shortcuts or work-arounds. As a community of countriescommitted to democracy, the OSCE places great emphasis on promoting democratic elections. Thecommitments agreed upon by all OSCE participating States in the 1990 Copenhagen Documentemphasize fundamental principles that are central to a democratic tradition and can be summed up inseven key words: universal, equal, fair, secret, free, transparent, and accountable. After all, the peoplewho in the end are tasked with carrying out the parliamentary control of armed forces must themselvesbe elected according to truly democratic processes.

On the Future of the OSCE

The most important thing is to strengthen the common political will of all 57 participating States of theOSCE. I truly hope that there is enough political will and ambition in this forum also in the future inorder for us to reform previous documents and to promote openness and transparency in the politico-military dimension. The OSCE has the potential to reclaim its role as a constructive, transformativeforce in the field of international relations and security policy.The nature of security threats varies widely around the world and inside the OSCE area. The situationin the Caucasus is completely different from Switzerland or Luxembourg, for example. Nevertheless,consisting of 57 countries, the OSCE is the world’s largest regional security arrangement underChapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. It brings together 57 participating States spanning theglobe from Vancouver to Vladivostok and 11 additional partner countries to discuss vital issuesaffecting the OSCE area. Through its partners for co-operation, the OSCE can also influence events inAsia and North Africa. Ensuring future commitment to previously agreed-upon documents continues tobe a critical objective.

Updating the Vienna Document and the future of Conventional Arms Control

Developing and finding new substance to the Vienna Document is one of the most important taskscurrently facing the Organization. The Document is related to the Treaty on Conventional ArmedForces in Europe (CFE and adapted CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty.The CFE consists of 5 different categories of key armaments and weapon systems that can be used forlarge-scale offensive operations. We should in particular look back to our successes. The Code ofConduct has proved itself useful in reforming armed forces, for example with Bosnia-Herzegovina.Although there have been doubts about the future of the CFE treaties, we should not forget that sincethe adoption of CFE, the number of Treaty-Limited Equipment, or TLE, has been reduced by asignificant number – 118,000 units. Of these, more than 40,000 have been main battle tanks. And theOpen Skies has been generally seen as a success.One particular challenge has been the way states interpret details in the treaties differently. Somemilitary maneuvers have not been reported since they have been conducted with local forces – and2
according to one interpretation, only troops transferred from other areas must be counted. In somecases, forces not belonging to the direct control of the Ministry of Defence have also been deliberatelyignored. And there has not been consensus on whether all maritime and paramilitary forces, borderguard units, etc., should also be included in the limits.Some countries have suggested that training units, logistics, and repairing installations and air transportunits should be included in the existing information exchange obligations. Some have also suggestedthat the focus should be on smaller combat units, which would reflect the growing importance ofbattalion-sized units in military actions.In this regard, the Parliamentary Assembly should consider whether more statistical indicators could begathered about the adherence to the VD and whether there is a need for a new arbitration system thatcould enhance co-operation and resolve situations where participating States have differentinterpretations of the meaning and details of the documents.In total, there are more than twenty so-called VD Plus proposals and other suggestions. To name a few:expanding information exchange on military matters, the notification for military exercises, maritimearms control procedures, monitoring of rapid deployment forces and large force transfers and theimprovement of the effectiveness of inspections and evaluation visits.

The Changing Geopolitical Situation and New Threats

We should remind ourselves about the geopolitical situation that created the need for these treaties andhow the situation has changed in the last few decades. Since the end of the Cold War, new threats haveemerged with new operational tactics and weapon systems. Terrorism, cyber warfare, unmanned aerialvehicles and the way they can be used to conduct more limited operations are more relevant to modernsecurity policy, and demand new responses. The growing danger to privacy and human rights posed bypotential cyber attacks must be recognized. Future efforts could be co-ordinated with the EU’s cybersecurity strategy, and there should be regular reporting and classification of attacks, should they occur.As threats have changed, the quantitative assessments of troop and material counts do not carry thesame weight they used to. In an age when one can theoretically cripple an entire nation with asuccessful cyber attack, simple counts of a country’s main battle tanks or other equipment are of littlevalue. Future treaties should increasingly focus also on parameters that measure quality and potential ofdifferent elements of military force. Even small steps in this direction would be welcome.The list of modern security issues is long and varied, and as said earlier, is not limited to what isunderstood as traditional military warfare in the form of large-scale operations. Some additional issuesthat must be addressed are: chemical and biological weapons, missile defence programs, conventionallong-range precision weapons, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and issues of proliferation. Therole of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and compliance for United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution 1325 should be carefully observed. New regional conflicts also pose additionalchallenges for the OSCE.Last year, the United Nations adopted the first treaty regulating international arms trade, which is animportant step forward and was fully supported by the OSCE PA in accordance with the MonacoDeclaration. The states that have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) are prohibited from exportingarms to countries that have human rights violations and that have been placed under UN arms embargo.3

Current Conflicts and the Road Ahead

The crisis in Ukraine and the unilateral annexation of Crimea by Russia has challenged the wholeinternational order and the sovereignty of independent states. As the UN General Assembly declared inits measure adopted on the 27thof March, the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimeaand the city of Sevastopol was not authorized by Ukraine and thus is not valid. The General Assemblyalso stressed that the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders mustbe respected. The active role taken by the Swiss Chairmanship in pursuing a diplomatic solution to thecrisis is welcomed. The OSCE can and should take a leading role as it has been considered the onlyinternational body whose mediation could be accepted by all affected parties. The recent deployment ofan OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine represents a clear step forward in this regard.Despite the challenges ahead of us, the OSCE has the potential to reclaim its role to increase security,openness and transparency. As the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act is approaching, theOrganization needs to move forward in the Helsinki +40 process. This process is an opportunity tostrengthen mutual trust and confidence and improve co-operation among the participating States. Wehope to see substantial results over the coming year. We have a shared commitment to ensure that wewill live in a secure, peaceful world. How we achieve that goal depends solely on us and our commonpolitical will. I hope that we can live up to the challenge.
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