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on

FURTHERING STABILITY AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC PROSPECTS OF THE WESTERN BALKANS^{*}

The Assembly,

1. *Reiterating* its firm commitment to NATO's "Open Door" policy and *inspired* by the unambiguous success of the previous rounds of NATO enlargement;

2. **Convinced** that the accession to NATO of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ as well as the accession to the European Union of all the aspiring countries, once they have met membership criteria, are essential steps towards fulfilling the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace and key elements in fostering the stability of the region and its political and economic development;

3. **Noting** that NATO membership is subject to the ability of aspirant countries to create genuinely democratic societies, to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, and to cultivate constructive relations with neighbours, and that no third country can veto the enlargement decisions;

4. **Congratulating** Croatia and its people on joining the European Union and **convinced** that this historic event provides a positive example and incentive for the entire region;

5. **Commending** the milestone agreement between Belgrade and Pristina of 19 April 2013 and **welcoming** the European Union's decisions to open accession talks with Serbia and to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, which open new stabilisation and co-operation perspectives for the entire region;

6. **Underlining** the importance of nurturing harmonious inter-ethnic relations and fully functioning multi-ethnic societies which resonates with the fundamental values NATO Allies and EU member states share;

7. **Aware of** persistent challenges in the region with regard to fighting corruption and organised crime and ensuring transparent administration and independence of the judiciary and the media;

8. **Commending** KFOR for providing security and safety to all individuals and communities in Kosovo and **welcoming** KFOR's readiness to assist the implementation of the 19 April Agreement;

^{*} presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

9. **Stressing** the urgent need for comprehensive constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both at state and entity levels, as a basis for the emergence of efficient and transparent institutions in the future;

10. **Welcoming** the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the defence sector and its decision to increase its contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, while **regretting** persistent blockages on the issue of immovable defence property;

11. **Commending** the progress the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made in the sphere of domestic reforms and particularly its efforts to build a multi-ethnic society, and **praising** its substantial contribution to operations led by NATO, the EU and the UN;

12. *Regretting* that the unresolved 'name issue' remains an important obstacle to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

13. *Welcoming* Montenegro's impressive efforts to meet the Euro-Atlantic membership criteria and *praising* its contributions to NATO-led missions;

- 14. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU:
- a. to reaffirm their commitment to the Euro-Atlantic perspective of the Western Balkans and Georgia and to consider taking the next steps in the process of NATO enlargement at its 2014 Summit, taking into account that the accession process is performance-driven and not calendar-driven, and that each candidate is judged on its own merits in accordance with criteria and preconditions set by NATO;
- b. to continue to provide incentives for further efforts undertaken to implement domestic reforms and to improve relations with neighbours;
- c. to maintain an international military and civilian presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo for as long as the situation requires;
- d. to encourage regional political leaders to accelerate necessary constitutional and other internal reforms and to cultivate a culture of compromise and open constructive dialogue with domestic opponents and regional partners;
- e. to step up technical and expert assistance aimed at further strengthening civil society;
- f. to facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue and to support the creation of peaceful multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious societies in the region;

- 15. **URGES** the government and Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
- a. to reach an agreement on a meaningful constitutional reform, which ensures the full implementation of the European Court of Human Rights' judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case;
- b. to promptly resolve the issue of immovable defence property;
- 16. **URGES** the relevant authorities in Kosovo and Serbia to remain fully and genuinely committed to the implementation of the 19 April Agreement;
- 17. **URGES** the government and Parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to foster constructive dialogue among all political stakeholders and to ensure the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media;
- 18. **CALLS UPON** both Skopje and Athens to redouble their efforts to solve the 'name issue', thus strengthening Euro-Atlantic integration as well as stability and prosperity in the region; and,
- 19. **URGES** the government and Parliament of Montenegro to further implement security sector reforms, to strengthen the rule of law, to enhance the administrative capacities of state institutions, and to raise public awareness about NATO and the rights and responsibilities of membership.

on

AFGHANISTAN: A RENEWED SECURITY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ROADMAP FOR 2014 AND BEYOND^{*}

The Assembly,

1. **Underlining** that NATO and its partner countries' strategic goals in Afghanistan are to ensure that the Afghan state will not again become a safe haven for terrorism, and to assist its government in bringing peace and stability to a war-weary population and a troubled region;

2. **Convinced** that Afghanistan, with the uninterrupted help of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is on the pathway to achieve these goals, with progress continuing to be made at all levels on the ground;

3. **Applauding** the achievement of 'Milestone 2013', which marks the official handover of security responsibility for the entire territory of Afghanistan from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), as well as ISAF's continued efforts as a Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF;

4. **Commending** the *Integal* transition programme, particularly the progress of the ANSF in their struggle against insurgent forces and their success in providing security for the Afghan people, but **expressing concern** for the rising casualty tolls seen over the past year;

5. **Underscoring** that long-term stability in Afghanistan depends on continued political, social and economic progress, as well as on the ANSF's capacity to reflect and protect the diversity of the Afghan population;

6. **Supporting** the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) in its efforts to reintegrate insurgents who renounce violence and their ties to armed groups and terrorist organisations;

7. **Recalling** the necessity for organising a credible, inclusive, and transparent presidential election in 2014 and **stressing** the importance of the international community's commitment to support democracy and pluralism in the Afghan institutions and among its political leaders;

8. **Recognising** the progress the Afghan government has achieved in building durable state institutions, a sustainable civil society and anti-corruption mechanisms, but **stressing** that additional efforts are needed;

9. **Emphasising** the imperative of renewed negotiations between the Afghanistan High Peace Council (HPC) and the designated Taliban representatives and other insurgents operating in the country, but **supporting** President Karzai's stated preconditions for reconciliation endorsed by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions: disarmament, breaking of ties with international terrorist organisations, including al-Qaeda, and acceptance of the Afghan Constitution;

^{*} presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

10. **Underscoring** and **understanding** the increased fiscal constraints the Afghan government will face after the drawdown of international forces and their associated revenues; and,

11. *Appealing*, therefore, to the international community to reinvest part of the 'drawdown dividend' into the future of the ANSF.

- 12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of countries contributing to ISAF:
- a. to express unequivocal political and economic support to the Afghan people after the drawdown in December 2014; and, to work with the government of Afghanistan as an equal partner and to create a mutually beneficial relationship based on trust;
- b. to commit themselves to maintaining Alliance cohesion, drive, and desire for a successful security transition to Operation Resolute Support, including the provision of a reserve rapid reaction force to protect it;
- to work diligently to negotiate and sign a post-2014 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) outlining the legal framework for foreign troops in the country after December 2014;
- d. to give financial, technical, and security assistance to the 2014 presidential election;
- e. to remain ready to advise and assist Afghan government institutions in the development and implementation of their border security policies, particularly those addressing illegal migration, drug trafficking and other threats to our societies;
- f. to build upon the Tokyo framework and to set clear and achievable benchmarks for the continued improvement of the strength, transparency, and efficacy of all Afghan state institutions, particularly the ANSF;
- g. to encourage the Afghanistan HPC in its negotiations with the designated Taliban representatives and other insurgents to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan;
- h. to prepare their publics for the range of possible outcomes of the Peace and Reconciliation Process, while simultaneously convincing them of the need to reinvest in the future security and prosperity of the Afghan state;
- i. to continue to promote respect for human rights and gender equality in Afghanistan beyond 2014 by encouraging a diverse and sustainable civil society;
- j. to support broad co-operation with relevant regional structures, in particular in the sphere of fighting drug trafficking from Afghanistan, extremism and challenges for regional stability;
- k. to include in all negotiations and agreements with Afghan authorities the commitment to maintain and improve progress in the domain of the rights of Afghan women and girls, to establish a mechanism for the assessment of this obligation and to make support conditional to compliance.

- 13. **CALLS UPON** the government and Parliament of Afghanistan:
- a. to work diligently with the United States and NATO to develop a mutually beneficial and feasible post-2014 SOFA;
- b. to recognise the vital importance of partnering with NATO and its partner countries to continue training and assisting the ANSF after 2014;
- c. to continue to strengthen and diversify the ANSF to ensure that they:
 - i. maintain the balance of power in the fight against the insurgency;
 - ii. continue with their insurgent reintegration programmes;
 - iii. represent the rich ethnic diversity of the country;
- d. to step up their efforts to negotiate a durable and peaceful resolution of the conflict with insurgents;
- e. to continue to build a robust democratic political sphere, dedicated to pluralism through continued electoral reform in order to represent the true will of all of the Afghan people;
- f. to continue to fight persistent institutional corruption; and,
- g. to expand their existing efforts to improve relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, as well as other international actors working to develop a stable, strong, and independent Afghanistan.

on

THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION*

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that revolutionary advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have dramatically reversed the decline in oil and natural gas production in North America;

2. *Affirming* that the continued expansion of unconventional gas and oil production in North America and elsewhere could dramatically alter regional and global energy markets and the energy security outlook of many countries;

3. **Appreciating** that if extracted with proper environmental safeguards, such as those outlined in the IEA's (International Energy Agency) Golden Rules, unconventional oil and gas production can generate a range of economic and security benefits;

4. **Concerned** about potential environmental damages and adverse social impacts linked to under-regulation or improper oversight of these emerging industries;

5. **Recognising** that this industry, like some renewable industries, has not always been entirely transparent about the potential environmental and other costs to regions where the drilling is occurring;

6. **Worried** that overreliance on the promise of unconventional oil and gas could divert political attention and financial resources from the development of more sustainable and cleaner energy technologies that have a far lower carbon footprint at a time when prices of these secure and clean energy sources are beginning to fall;

7. **Cognizant** that resistance to the shale oil and gas industry is widespread in some Allied countries, sometimes because of strong lobbying, sometimes for perfectly justified reasons, including population density and water shortages;

8. **Noting** also that Europe faces a potential competitive shock if its energy prices remain so much higher than those of North America as this will drive up the relative costs of production in Europe when these costs are plunging on the other side of the Atlantic;

9. **Recognising** that Allied nations in Europe and North America have an objective need to diversify energy supplies and to lessen energy dependencies on sole or oligopolistic suppliers;

10. **Concerned** that some European countries lack the know-how, investment capital, legal, regulatory and organisational structures needed to exploit unconventional energy endowments in an economic fashion;

^{*} presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

11. **Concerned** that countries enjoying very powerful positions in supplying oil and gas to Europe will undertake measures to discourage the development of unconventional oil and gas industries in the countries that they are currently supplying;

12. **Acknowledging** that the development of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) export and reception facilities will help globalise the trade in natural gas, further align highly differentiated regional prices, and provide a number of countries with new opportunities for diversifying their energy supplies;

13. **Understanding** that the boom in unconventional gas and oil might begin to challenge the traditional structure of the global energy industry which has long been dominated by cartels, oligopolies and state-run producers;

- 14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to work together to enhance energy security and to see environmentally responsible hydraulic fracturing as one but certainly not the only means of doing so;
- b. to pursue reforms that encourage energy efficiency by adopting sensible standards, employing emerging energy saving technologies and developing regulatory frameworks that will further lower the ratio between energy costs and GDP growth while enhancing energy security;
- c. to develop a more integrated and transparent marketplace for energy with the appropriate infrastructure and policies to make this possible;
- d. to work towards greater energy diversification through the development not only of unconventional oil and gas industries but also a range of sustainable energy technologies which will provide clean, safe and secure energy in the future;
- e. to develop a comprehensive energy policy that incorporates both CO₂ emission reductions and targets for renewable energy use;
- f. to ensure that externality costs are reflected in energy prices; and,
- g. to reach out to publics to explain in a transparent fashion the costs and benefits of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing and to determine a publicly acceptable path forward in the most effective and efficient manner possible.

on

THE GROWING STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF ASIA-PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that today's security threats - including failed or failing states, regional instability, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber security, and maritime piracy - are not confined to the Euro-Atlantic region but are global in nature;

2. **Understanding** that the Asia-Pacific region is of growing importance to the security and economic well-being of NATO member states and **noting** that the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the Alliance share a host of security challenges;

3. **Strongly condemning** the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) pursuit of a nuclear programme in defiance of its international commitments as well as its belligerent rhetoric towards its neighbours, including the United States, an Alliance member, as well as the Republic of Korea and Japan, two NATO partners;

4. **Aware** that various partner countries already co-operate with NATO in different ways and that partners have the option of engaging in a variety of flexible formats, based on common interests;

5. *Emphasising* that through training and military-to-military contacts, NATO can help partner countries to improve their ability to safeguard their own regional security and to manage and prevent crisis situations in their neighbourhood;

6. **Commending** NATO partners, including partner countries in Asia-Pacific - Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Singapore - for their important contributions to NATO-led missions, in particular in Afghanistan;

7. **Reminding** governments and parliaments of NATO member states that the 2010 Strategic Concept identifies co-operative security through maintaining a global outlook and partnerships as one of the three core tasks for NATO in the 21st century;

8. **Commending** the progress already achieved in co-operating with Asian partners, notably in areas such as managing crisis situations, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and cyber defence;

9. **Convinced** that future NATO engagements in Asia-Pacific would not include a military presence in the region, but would focus on harmonising positions on regional crises, on confidence-building measures and binding the maximum number of partners into a structured security community through consultations, information exchange, military training and maintaining force interoperability;

^{*}

presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

- 10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO:
 - a. to develop further NATO's partnerships, including with countries in Asia-Pacific, and identify new areas of joint interest and collaboration, while preserving the ability of each partner to form tailored co-operative relationships with the Alliance;
 - b. to devise a partnership policy that institutionalises the close operational co-operation with partners in Asia-Pacific that share the values of the Alliance, thereby allowing to maintain the military interoperability that has been achieved;
 - c. to explore ways to foster dialogue with Asia-Pacific countries which do not want to engage in a formal relationship with NATO;
 - d. to consider establishing a structured dialogue with China to promote openness, trust and information exchange; and,
 - e. to co-ordinate their policies in order to achieve a diplomatic solution to ending the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile programmes.

on

THE CRISIS IN SYRIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND BEYOND*

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** its Resolution 399 on *Developments in Syria: Security Implications for the Region and Beyond*, adopted in November 2012, and **reiterating** its policy recommendations;

2. **Condemning** the brutal and indiscriminate use of force against innocent civilians and the extensive and persistent violations of human rights by the regime of Bashar al-Assad and other parties to the conflict, which have resulted in the death of tens of thousands of Syrians, including many women and children, and in the displacement of over six million persons, including two million refugees in neighbouring countries;

3. **Outraged at** and **strongly condemning** the use of chemical weapons against an unprotected civilian population in the Damascus suburbs on 21 August 2013, which left well over 1,000 people dead and thousands injured, including infants, children and women;

4. **Noting** that the information available from a wide variety of sources implicates the Syrian regime as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in this attack;

5. *Affirming* that this attack constitutes a blatant violation of international law, and therefore a war crime and a crime against humanity;

6. **Condemning** the shelling of locations inside Turkey by the Syrian regime's forces, and **expressing** solidarity with Turkey in the face of these flagrant violations of its sovereignty;

7. *Warning* that the longer the conflict in Syria endures, the more likely it is to attract even more extremist groups whose goals are fundamentally undemocratic and profoundly threatening to regional stability and international security;

8. **Concerned** that the economic and institutional collapse of Syria is causing enormous human suffering that will affect the country and its citizens for decades;

9. **Bearing in mind** that NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Chicago Summit Declaration underline NATO's commitment to crisis prevention and to support for countries in crisis;

10. **Commending** Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq for hosting the bulk of the refugees from Syria and **recognising** that the flow of refugees to these and other countries is straining their infrastructure, water supplies, medical capacities, and economies;

^{*}

presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

11. **Applauding** the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on a framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons and **welcoming** formal accession of the government of Syria to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;

12. **Welcoming** also and **fully supporting** United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 which requires the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles, calls for reconvening the Geneva peace talks and endorses the establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria with full executive powers;

- 13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO:
- a. to monitor the situation in Syria closely in order to contain the dangers posed to the region, particularly to Turkey;
- b. to assist the moderate forces in the Syrian opposition to overcome current divisions, foster inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian reconciliation, curb the influence of extremist groups, and put an end to human rights violations and to the cycle of reprisals; and,
- c. to increase humanitarian aid into Syria and to provide more material aid to all countries that are now hosting approximately two million Syrian refugees;
- 14. **CALLS UPON** all relevant parties in Syria:
- a. to recommit to the Geneva Process;
- b. to enter into negotiations to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict; and,
- c. to create a viable political framework for Syria to engage and protect all factions of the population, including minorities; and,
- d. to install a transitional government with full executive powers, on a basis of mutual consent, with a view to establishing a political system that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people;
- 15. **URGES** the member countries of the UN Security Council:
- a. to encourage and facilitate a Syrian-led and inclusive political process that could lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict;
- b. to consider, in consultation with relevant UN agencies, the League of Arab States and Syria's neighbours, measures to aid those fleeing horrific violence within Syria;
- c. to ensure full implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction by the Syrian regime; and,
- d. as provided in UN Security Council Resolution 2118 to take measures under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to respond to cases of non-compliance, including the potential renewed use or transfer of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal by any party in the conflict.

on

IMPROVING THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO GROUND FORCES*

The Assembly,

1. **Convinced** that NATO remains pivotal in securing peace, prosperity, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

2. **Commending** the performance and dedication of member states' soldiers who represent the backbone of the Alliance, and **honouring** those who have lost their lives or were physically or mentally injured in support of NATO missions;

3. **Applauding** the contributions of the Alliance's armed forces, government services, families, and volunteer organisations to helping soldiers and veterans recover from physical injuries and rehabilitate from service-related mental injuries;

4. **Affirming** member states' duty and commitment to ensure the best chances for survival in military operations and for recovery and rehabilitation after deployment;

5. **Conscious** that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remain a severe threat to armed forces and civilians in current and potential operational environments;

6. **Saluting** the significant progress on all aspects of soldier survivability over the last decade, in particular in Counter-IED and combat casualty care; but **recalling** that many lessons needed to be learnt or re-learnt at great cost for the soldier;

7. **Aware** of the challenges of sustaining excellence in survivability in an environment of severe fiscal pressures and declining operational experience, especially after successful transition of security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014;

8. **Underlining** that NATO and its member states have a strong set of institutions in place that maintain and improve survivability;

9. *Highlighting* the decisive contribution of national military trauma registries in monitoring injury care processes to improve soldier survivability, and *recalling* the technical feasibility of a NATO Trauma Registry;

10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to fully embed lessons learnt and best practices regarding soldier survivability, including through NATO standardisation processes;
- b. to better understand the IED threat, fully prepare the armed forces for it, and actively undermine IED networks;
- c. to continue to improve multi-national and national Counter-IED efforts, including the NATO Counter-IED Action Plan;

^{*} presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

- d. to maintain vigilance and imagination in analysing future threat scenarios in order to avoid strategic surprises threatening soldier survivability;
- e. to increase funding for research and development on technological innovations that can improve survivability, and to initiate further research efforts at the NATO Science and Technology Organizations Human Factors and Medicine Panel;
- f. to actively pursue multinational solutions on survivability, including through NATO's Smart Defence and the European Union's Pooling & Sharing initiatives;
- g. to strengthen co-operation with the defence industry and NATO partners in improving survivability;
- h. to continue to provide Allied soldiers with optimal body armour and armoured vehicles meeting the full threat spectrum, in particular the IED threat;
- i. to ensure that female soldiers receive optimal body armour fitting their morphology;
- j. to reduce the weight and increase the configurability of body and vehicle armour while maintaining or improving protection levels;
- k. to maintain the medical skills of soldiers and military personnel through adequate training;
- I. to fully transfer military medical innovations to the civilian setting;
- m. to pursue the establishment of a NATO Trauma Registry;
- n. to adequately fund the care for injured soldiers and veterans after deployment; and,
- o. to intensify studies of early intervention and preventive health programmes to most effectively improve the quality of life of injured soldiers and veterans and mitigate secondary and tertiary effects of their injuries.

on

NEW ENERGY IDEAS FOR NATO MILITARIES: BUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY, REDUCING DEMAND, SECURING SUPPLY^{*}

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that NATO militaries' energy consumption has reached unprecedented levels and that military energy requirements will continue to soar in the years to come;

2. **Recognising** that, in times of austerity, high levels of military energy consumption contribute to undermining the financial solidity of Allies;

3. **Convinced** that current levels of Allies' military energy consumption are unsustainable in the long run;

4. **Concerned** about the negative impact of growing military energy dependence on the security of NATO soldiers and military installations;

5. **Considering** therefore the implementation of new energy ideas for NATO militaries an economic, environmental, and strategic imperative;

6. **Commending** recent efforts by NATO and certain Allies to increase military energy efficiency both at home and in theatre;

7. **Recognising** the successful launch of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence and its great potential to contribute to the military energy efficiency of NATO;

8. *Emphasising* the need to take a much more active approach to developing energy efficiency measures in future NATO operations;

9. *Recalling* the commitment undertaken by Allies at the 2012 Chicago Summit to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of their military forces;

10. *Affirming* that NATO's ability to promote new energy ideas among Allies will require active support and collaboration of member states;

11. **Bearing in mind** that NATO can help exchange best practices based on the norms established at national and European levels;

12. **Underlining** that activities aimed at increasing military energy efficiency should revolve around building accountability, reducing demand, and securing supply;

13. *Welcoming* the recent Danish-Lithuanian initiative aimed at strengthening NATO's "Green Defence" dimension;

^{*} presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 14 October 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

- 14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to make available sufficient resources for research on improving military energy efficiency, in spite of financial pressures;
- b. to create coherent national political frameworks and single points of contact on matters of military energy efficiency;
- c. to build even greater energy consumption accountability within their militaries by fostering energy awareness, promoting energy leadership and ownership mechanisms, and creating reliable benchmarking tools;
- d. to reduce military energy demands at fixed installations and in operations, including for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and for powering military platforms;
- e. to devise strategies aimed at diversifying energy supplies, putting a premium on pursuing renewable energy sources;
- f. to use off-the-shelf solutions available in the private sector whenever possible;
- g. to create a political framework at NATO-level in support of NATO Smart Energy initiatives, which should facilitate information exchange among NATO stakeholders and guide NATO towards practical, short-term results;
- h. to institutionalise current Smart Energy initiatives, such as NATO's Smart Energy Team, if they prove effective;
- i. to ensure that NATO-owned assets and installations, including the new NATO headquarters, are energy efficient;
- j. to avoid duplication of NATO and EU activities and to strengthen NATO co-operation with the EU and other regional organisations and groupings in the area of military energy efficiency; and,
- k. to strengthen NATO's political dialogue and technical co-operation with partner countries on issues of military energy efficiency.