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Europaudvalget 2013-14
EUU Alm.del Bilag 472
Offentligt

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This report was prepared at the request of the Government of Ukraine. On 3 March

2014, ODIHR and the HCNM received an invitation from the Acting Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Andrii Deshchytsia, to send a Human Rights Assessment

Mission (HRAM) to Ukraine, including to Crimea. On 4 March 2014, ODIHR and the

HCNM responded positively, indicating readiness to undertake such an HRAM in

accordance with their respective institutional mandates. The two institutions outlined

their task to be an assessment of the compliance of the human rights and minority

rights situation in the country with OSCE human dimension commitments and other

applicable human rights standards. In accordance with their respective institutional

mandates, ODIHR and the HCNM have carried out their fieldwork independently in

line with their established methodologies. This is also reflected in this report as the

presentation of facts, assessments, findings and recommendations is contained within

two separate sections of this document, by ODIHR and the HCNM respectively.

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Table of Contents

SECTION I: ODIHR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE ........ 6

II.

III.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS ............................................. 6

RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 12

BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT .............................................................. 20

Methodology ........................................................................................................ 20

Focus of the Human Rights Assessment .............................................................. 21

Human Rights Standards...................................................................................... 22

Structure of the Report ......................................................................................... 22

Background to the February 2014 events ............................................................ 22

IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT ................................................................ 25

Attacks against Journalists and Activists ............................................................. 25

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly ........................................................................... 30

Freedom of the Media .......................................................................................... 39

Manifestations of Intolerance .............................................................................. 42

Freedom of Movement and IDPs ......................................................................... 44

Human Rights Situation in Crimea ...................................................................... 49

SECTION II: HCNM ON THE MINORITY RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE 77

II.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................. 77

BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT .................................................................. 81

III.

Methodology and Focus of the Minority Rights Assessment.................... 81

Demographic and Political Context ........................................................... 82

Minority Rights Standards ......................................................................... 86

National Legal Framework ........................................................................ 88

MINORITY RIGHTS ASSESSMENT............................................................ 91

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General and Underlying Minority Rights Concerns ............................................ 91

Specific Minority Rights Concerns ...................................................................... 95

Human Rights Concerns for Minorities..................................................... 95

Language Rights ........................................................................................ 96

Education Rights...................................................................................... 101

Effective Participation in Public Affairs ................................................. 103

Equality and Non-discrimination............................................................. 106

Crimea ................................................................................................................ 109

10.

11.

12.

IV.

General Situation ..................................................................................... 109

Lack of Human Security .......................................................................... 111

Issues of Concern..................................................................................... 114

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 122

ANNEXES ......................................................................................................... 126

ANNEX I

Letter from the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs ................ 126

ANNEX II List of official interlocutors .......................................................... 128

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SECTION I: ODIHR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN

UKRAINE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS

This report was prepared following a request by the Government of Ukraine

on 3 March 2014. The information it contains was gathered by a Human

Rights Assessment Mission (HRAM) deployed by the OSCE Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Information

from other reliable sources was also included or taken into consideration

while preparing the report.

This section of the report presents the findings and recommendations of

ODIHR concerning the human rights situation in Ukraine. It is based on the

ODIHR HRAM fieldwork from 6 March – 1 April 2014, which took place

against the backdrop of events in Kyiv from November 2013 to February

2014. At the time the HRAM concluded its fieldwork, an escalation of

tensions, including violent conflicts, had taken place in the eastern and

southern parts of Ukraine. It must, therefore, be stressed that the assessment

of Maidan events in Kyiv up to February 2014, and the subsequent and

ongoing developments and events in Ukraine after 1 April 2014, remain

beyond the scope of this report.

ODIHR’s assessment of the situation in the regions of Ukraine visited by the

HRAM found a significant number of serious violations of human rights.

These include murder and physical assaults, as well as cases of intimidation

and enforced disappearances. The victims were primarily pro-Maidan

activists and journalists, and those in Crimea also included Ukrainian

military personnel and members of the Tatar community.

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A pattern of violent, simultaneous assemblies organized by pro- and anti-

Maidan groups has emerged since late February 2014. Most often these were

located in central squares near regional state administration buildings.

Sporadic instances of violence were followed by more intense clashes in

which several people were killed and many more injured. With varying

degrees of seriousness and frequency, these have taken place in all locations

visited by the HRAM, but particularly in Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolayiv,

Odessa, Sevastopol, Simferopol and Yalta. The methods used by the

perpetrators of these violent acts have included, but have not been limited to,

arson attacks on cars, threats over online social networks, intimidation via the

posting online of personal data, the stigmatization of individuals in leaflets

posted at their private addresses (depicting them as criminals), aggressive

media campaigns, blackmail and police investigations into victims rather

than alleged perpetrators.

In the assemblies where the most violent clashes occurred, violence often

erupted at the instigation of individuals known either as “titushky”

(mercenary support agents of various groups), or members of so-called “self-

defence” groups, or both. The “self-defence” groups describe themselves as

volunteers who, faced with the alleged inability of the police to discharge

their duties, perform law-enforcement functions during assemblies, often

including the use of violence. As of late February, in cities such as Donetsk,

Kharkiv and Luhansk, this phenomenon reportedly became both more

widespread and more systematic in its use, in particular by anti-Maidan

groups. Organized groups started arriving in buses or private vehicles, some

of which had either no license plates or Russian Federation license plates.

There were allegations that anti-Maidan demonstrations included individuals

who were paid for their participation. According to credible sources, many of

these individuals came from neighbouring small cities or from across the

border with the Russian Federation. They benefited from logistical

arrangements and funding that enabled them to travel and to disrupt pro-

Maidan assemblies.

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Most regions visited by the HRAM were characterized by a volatile and

polarized environment. This environment has brought to the forefront

entrenched structural deficiencies existing before the recent events. In the

reporting period, the HRAM received credible allegations of enforced

disappearances. In Crimea, the targeted individuals primarily included pro-

Maidan activists, journalists and members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In a number of these cases, victims were reportedly subjected to torture and

other ill-treatment while in custody. Any steps taken by law enforcement and

prosecutorial bodies to investigate enforced disappearances and related acts

appear to have been ineffective. Throughout the HRAM deployment period,

and in all the regions covered by the HRAM, the police have shown bias

against pro-Maidan groups on the one hand, and a complacent, if not

permissive, attitude towards members of opposing groups, on the other.

Journalists, in particular, have been targeted, with a view to preventing them

from reporting on assemblies and other events. In Crimea, as in other regions

visited by the HRAM, notably Kharkiv, Luhansk and Odessa, journalists

have reportedly been subjected to physical attacks, as well as other forms of

harassment, threats and intimidation, which have contributed to an

atmosphere detrimental to the freedom of the media. Alleged victims have

included both local and international journalists. The perpetrators were

usually described as unidentified men, in some cases wearing a uniform but

without insignia or any other identification. Attacks have often involved

damage to or the destruction of equipment used by journalists. In fear of

reprisals, not all victims have filed complaints. Serious incidents also

involved the storming of television stations. These include a station in

Luhansk by anti-Maidan groups, and one in Kyiv by members of the

Svoboda party, including deputies of the Verkhovna Rada. In both cases

employees were reportedly intimidated and threatened. These were not

isolated incidents. Reports point to the passivity of police officers in several

instances, and to their alleged inability to protect the victims and effectively

investigate these incidents. The resulting atmosphere of intimidation, where

alternative views could not be heard or aired in public, has had a chilling

effect on the work of journalists and has made the challenge of upholding the

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freedom of the media and a pluralistic media landscape in Ukraine even more

acute.

Manifestations of intolerance have increased against the backdrop of

amplified polarization within Ukrainian society, serious infringements on the

freedom of the media and the intensification of biased information,

disinformation and propaganda. In this context, instances of hate speech

towards ethnic and religious groups have been widespread. In eastern and

southern Ukraine, in particular, there has been a trend of conflating political

orientation (pro- or anti-Maidan) with ethnicity. Ukrainian symbols have

been targeted on a number of occasions, as have vehicles carrying Ukrainian

flags and other national symbols. Pro-Maidan activists have often been

labelled “banderovtsy”, “Nazis” and “fascists”. Supporting the territorial

integrity and unity of Ukraine has been depicted as a sign of intolerance and

nationalism. Instances of hate speech towards ethnic and religious groups

have been widespread also in Crimea, where Crimean Tatars form a sizeable

community. While they had perceived the attitude towards them as tolerant,

there were reports during the HRAM deployment pointing to a growing anti-

Tatar sentiment. This translated occasionally into instances of intimidation,

such as putting up signs to mark households as belonging to Crimean Tatars,

the sending of threatening, anonymous text messages, and of verbal

harassment of Crimean Tatar schoolchildren. No increase in anti-Semitic

hate speech was identified within the reporting period. The same holds true

for the Roma community, who, rather, continue to face entrenched

discrimination. No increase in the manifestation of intolerance or escalation

of violence against the Russian-speaking population was observed in the

regions covered by the HRAM during its deployment.

As of 1 April, around 3,000 people, mainly women and children, had fled

Crimea after its annexation by the Russian Federation, out of fear for their

own safety and future status. Eighty percent of these were Crimean Tatars.

The remainder were primarily the families of Ukrainian military and service

personnel. Reassignment of service members to bases on the territory

controlled by the Ukrainian government has also proved to be a difficult

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process, entailing personal risks for families. A number of local religious

leaders also left Crimea, including priests from the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church (Kyivan Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church,

although some reportedly returned subsequently to Crimea.

10.

Freedom of movement has seen significant restrictions in Crimea, with

checkpoints set up and identity checks conducted also outside these. Reports

point to numerous checks by “self-defence” groups on a daily basis. The

identity of the groups involved in these acts remains unclear, however, with

the individuals involved reported as wearing a variety of uniforms and acting

as members of “self-defence” groups or the “Crimean Army”, as Cossacks,

or as members of other groups. Acting outside the law, these groups appear

to have enjoyed the acquiescence and, in some cases, the active complicity of

the authorities exercising

de facto

control, including their law-enforcement

bodies. Those they held as suspects were allegedly taken from their vehicles

and not permitted to travel further. The Ukrainian Border Guard Service has

reported that some individuals attempting to leave Crimea were not allowed

to cross into Ukrainian-controlled territory. As regards entry into Crimea, the

checkpoint at Armyansk was reportedly being operated by “self-defence”

forces and former Berkut troops. Journalists, in particular, were turned back

at checkpoints when trying to enter Crimea. The Ukrainian military units

stationed in Crimea have faced a particular restriction on their freedom of

movement, as they have found themselves under siege.

11.

The situation of legal uncertainty that arose from the change in the

authorities exercising

de facto

control over Crimea carries with it a number

of risks, including potential infringements of the rule of law and human

rights. Specific concerns exist with respect to citizenship and residency

status, employment and the right to work, and land and property rights, as

well as with respect to the situation of particularly vulnerable groups. There

is a reported lack of clarity on the future residency status of those choosing

not to take Russian citizenship and to retain their Ukrainian citizenship

instead. Many representatives of the Crimean Tatar community expressed

concerns that they could lose the land they have held in Crimea. In general,

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there is a fear that the change in the authorities exercising de facto control

over Crimea could have a regressive effect on the enjoyment of human rights

in these and other areas.

12.

ODIHR wishes to thank all who facilitated the preparation of this report. The

report would not have been possible without the co-operation of the

Government of Ukraine and a broad range of authorities at the local level.

The office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine provided invaluable

insights, as well as logistical support and office space enabling smooth

operation of the HRAM. ODIHR is particularly grateful to the many

individuals who provided personal accounts of their experiences, as well as

to non-governmental organizations that shared their information with the

HRAM.

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II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For parties to the 17 April 2014 Geneva Accords on Ukraine:



To implement the commitments under the Accords in good faith;

To refrain from imparting public messages that can directly or indirectly

contribute to the escalation of tensions and conflict;

To call for all illegal armed groups to be disarmed; all illegally seized

building to be returned to legitimate owners; and all illegally occupied

streets, squares and public places in Ukrainian cities and towns to be vacated.

For the Ukrainian authorities:

General recommendations:



To ensure effective, prompt, thorough and impartial investigation into

allegations of actions by state and non-state actors resulting in human rights

violations and to ensure that those responsible are identified and prosecuted,

as well as to ensure access to effective remedies for the victims;



To conduct prompt, thorough, independent, effective and impartial

investigations into all allegations of torture or ill-treatment and to ensure that



those responsible are identified and prosecuted;

To co-operate with international human rights monitoring and judicial bodies

in matters related to allegations of human rights violations and criminal



responsibility;

To strengthen the independence of democratic institutions, with particular

emphasis on the judiciary, as well as enhance the capacity and integrity of

law enforcement;



To promote participatory, transparent and inclusive public decision-making,

with a special emphasis on the involvement of civil society groups and

National Human Rights Institutions;



To undertake an overall reform of the security sector and to ensure that, in this

context, law-enforcement officers receive adequate training with regard to

international human rights norms and standards, including the

UN Code of

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Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;



To promote an enabling environment for freedom of expression and of the

media, with special attention to ensuring independence, pluralism and

diversity in the media;



To promote a conducive environment that enables and empowers civil

society activists to pursue their activities freely and without undue

limitations, in particular ensuring that they are able to exercise their freedom

of expression without undue impediment;



To promote diversity and human rights in formal and non-formal educational

setting, and to develop and implement education campaigns promoting an

open, tolerant and inclusive society and raising awareness of human rights

and of the need to combat discrimination and intolerance.

Attacks on journalists and activists:



To ensure that the appropriate mechanisms and procedures are put in place to

protect journalists and activists from attacks, threats, harassment and

intimidation;



To ensure that journalists are provided full access to all forms of public

assembly, including the possibility to report on policing operations;

To ensure that any attacks, enforced disappearances, harassment, threats or

intimidation targeting journalists and activists are effectively, promptly,

thoroughly and impartially investigated with a view to bringing those

responsible to justice and preventing a further recurrence;



To ensure that all journalists and activists can obtain full reparations,

including compensation, for any attacks, threats, harassment and intimidation

they have encountered;



To ensure a policy of zero tolerance for any attacks, threats, harassment and

intimidation against journalists and activists, or the involvement therein, by

public officials.

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Freedom of peaceful assembly:



To comply with the applicable international standards and constitutional

guarantees on freedom of peaceful assembly. ODIHR and the Venice

Commission’s

Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

provide a

framework to facilitate the implementation of the freedom of peaceful

assembly;



To develop and adopt a law governing the exercise of the right to freedom of

peaceful assembly ensuring clarity on issues such as time limits for advance

notification of assemblies, long-term notification and a human rights

approach to the policing of assemblies, including simultaneous assemblies

and any counter-demonstrations; the law should be developed through broad

consultations involving judges, law-enforcement personnel and civil society

actors; to request ODIHR to review the draft law for compliance with

applicable OSCE commitments and other international human rights

standards;



To ensure the uniform application of the law by the courts and to provide

training for judges and other stakeholders, including law-enforcement

personnel, on the conduct of risk assessments and on the criteria to be used

when testing the validity of arguments put forward in support of restrictions

upon the freedom of assembly;



To ensure that the police are adequately trained and equipped to facilitate

assemblies, including simultaneous assemblies and any related counter-

demonstrations;



To ensure that law-enforcement officials protect participants of peaceful

assemblies as well as journalists reporting on and independent observers

monitoring assemblies, from any state or non-state actors, including

agents

provocateurs

and counter-demonstrators, that attempt to disrupt or inhibit the

assembly in any way, enabling participants to take part without fearing

physical violence;



To ensure that adequate assistance and medical aid are rendered to any

person injured or otherwise in need of such assistance at the earliest possible

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moment and that his/her family or another person of choice is notified as

soon as possible;



To ensure that policing of public assemblies is performed by the law

enforcement and that under no circumstances is this function to be assigned

or delegated to the civilian population or the military;



To ensure that law-enforcement officials maintain strict neutrality in the

course of policing assemblies, which includes refraining from political or

content-based bias at all times while in official capacity;



To conduct prompt, thorough, independent, effective and impartial

investigations into all allegations of criminal misconduct by state or non-state

actors perpetrated in the course of public assemblies.

Freedom of the media:



To ensure that coverage perceived as biased is countered through self-

regulation and the creation of a truly pluralistic environment where all media

outlets would be able to fully exercise their freedom of expression.

Manifestations of intolerance:



To train relevant state actors, in particular the police, on tolerance, non-

discrimination and hate crimes;

To take steps publicly to condemn hate speech and other manifestations of

intolerance;

To combat social exclusion of minority groups, with a special focus on the

Roma;

To make efforts to improve relations between law-enforcement agencies and

communities, with a view to improving trust and confidence in law

enforcement, to encourage victims to report hate crimes and witnesses to

contribute to solving and prosecuting hate crimes;

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

To develop and implement education campaigns promoting an open, tolerant

and inclusive society and raising awareness of human rights and of the need

to combat discrimination and intolerance.

Freedom of movement and IDPs:



To ensure the co-ordination of services rendered at the central and local

level, including by setting up a centralized IDP registration system and



ensuring that adequate funding is provided;

To facilitate the voluntary return of IDPs;

To identify, as appropriate, durable solutions for IDPs that may provide long-

term safety, security and freedom of movement, an adequate standard of

living, including, at a minimum, access to adequate housing, health care and

basic education, and access to employment, with due consideration of the

specific needs of men and women, and with particular attention to the most

vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, and people with special



needs;

To endorse a humanitarian and non-punitive approach to IDPs in particular

by refraining from taking measures that could have a negative impact on

their residency and citizenship status, as well as their enjoyment of human



rights, including social and economic rights;

To draw upon the UNHCR’s extensive experience in dealing with and

resolving issues relating to IDPs.



Human Rights Situation in Crimea

For the authorities exercising

de facto

control in Crimea:

General recommendations:



To promptly disband “self-defence” groups and any other groups

de facto

exercising the functions of law-enforcement agents;

To apply the principle that the change in the authorities exercising effective

control over Crimea should not have regressive effects on the enjoyment of

human rights by all individuals with particular attention to ensuring that, in

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this process, the rights of indigenous peoples, and minorities, including

ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, are fully respected.

Attacks against Journalists and Activists:



To ensure that journalists and activists are protected from attacks, threats,

harassment and intimidation so that they can carry out their activities freely



and without fear;

To ensure that any attacks, harassment, threats or intimidation targeting

journalists and activists are effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially

investigated with a view to bringing those responsible to justice.

Enforced Disappearances, Torture and Other Ill-treatment in Custody:



To ensure that all individuals are protected from abductions and enforced

disappearances by state or non-state actors;

To ensure that individuals are only deprived of their liberty by competent

agents of the state, acting strictly in accordance with the law, and are



afforded full human rights protection;

To ensure that individuals deprived of their liberty are allowed, promptly

after their arrest, to notify members of their family or other appropriate

people of their detention and the place where they are being kept in custody;

communication with the outside world, and in particular with their family



and lawyer, should not be denied;

To ensure that all individuals deprived of their liberty are treated humanely,

and are not subjected to torture or any other cruel, inhuman or degrading



treatment or punishment;

To ensure that law-enforcement agents act promptly and exercise due

diligence in preventing and impeding any abductions by state or non-state



actors;

To ensure that any allegations of abductions or enforced disappearances,

including allegations of complicity by agents of the state in abductions by

non-state actors, and any allegations of causing death, torture and other ill-

treatment in custody, are effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially

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investigated with a view to clarifying the fate and whereabouts of the



disappeared and bringing those responsible to justice;

To ensure that all victims of enforced disappearances obtain full reparations,

including compensation.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly:



To ensure that law-enforcement agents effectively protect participants of

public assemblies, including journalists and activists, from attacks,

harassment or intimidation by state or non-state actors.

Manifestations of Intolerance:



To promote diversity and human rights in formal and non-formal educational

settings, and to develop and implement education campaigns promoting an

open, more tolerant and inclusive society and raising awareness of human

rights and of the need to combat discrimination and intolerance;



To make efforts to improve relations between law-enforcement agencies and

minority communities, with a view to improving trust and confidence in law

enforcement, to encourage victims to report hate crimes and witnesses to

contribute to solving and prosecuting hate crimes;



To train relevant actors, in particular the police, on tolerance, non-

discrimination and hate crimes;

To promote media self-regulation and self-regulatory enforcement of ethical

norms, with a particular emphasis on tolerance and impartiality in reporting.

Rights of Military Personnel and their Families:



To ensure effective, prompt, thorough and impartial investigation of

allegations of harassment and violence towards Ukrainian military personnel

and/or their family members.

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Other issues:



To secure appropriate education and training, including requalification

training courses, for those who may need them to be able to continue to be

employed in the public administration, should additional requirements be



introduced;

To ensure that all individuals permanently resident in Crimea, including both

Russian and Ukrainian citizens, retain all their rights, including permanent

residency status, employment rights, property and land rights, without

discrimination. Those employed in the public sector should continue to

perform their duties whenever possible or should be offered alternative

positions commensurate with their skills and experience, without loss of

salary.

For the Ukrainian authorities:

Rights of Military Personnel and their Families:



To ensure that Ukrainian service members who did not change allegiance and

do not wish to continue military service can be honourably discharged,

without negatively affecting their rights and entitlements.

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III. BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT

Methodology

The fact-finding for the ODIHR HRAM took place from 6 March to 1 April

2014. A total of 19 experts from ODIHR participated in various stages of the

HRAM, working in teams of two to collect information. Most of the

information in this report is based on individual accounts gathered from

interviews and direct observation by HRAM experts. The report also includes

information collected in meetings with government officials at all levels,

elected representatives, the national human rights institution, community

representatives, national and international non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) and international organizations.

Special attention was devoted to assessing the disparities in the impact of the

events on groups at risk, such as displaced persons, indigenous peoples and

minority communities.

The HRAM focused on the following rights and freedoms during its

assessment:

a. Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention;

b. Prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

or punishment;

c. Freedom of peaceful assembly;

d. Freedom of expression, freedom of the media;

e. Attacks against journalists and activists;

f. Freedom of movement and internally displaced persons (IDPs);

g. Manifestations of intolerance.

The ODIHR advance team deployed on 6 March to Kyiv and subsequently to

Donetsk and Luhansk. The full deployment of HRAM monitors unfolded as

follows:

a. 18-25 March in Crimea: Bakhchisaray, Feodosia, Kerch, Sevastopol,

Simferopol, and Yalta (three teams);

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b. 18-25 March in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk (four teams);

c. 25 March-1 April in the vicinity of Chervonohrad and Lyubovichi, as

well as in Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolayiv, and Odessa (three teams).

Two HRAM teams visited locations near Ukraine’s border with the

Transdniestria region of Moldova and at the Armyansk checkpoint on

the newly established demarcation line with Crimea.

The teams conducted a total of 187 interviews with individuals in the above

locations. Besides individual interviews, teams also conducted group

interviews. The HRAM guaranteed full confidentiality for the identity of the

interviewees, with the exception of public officials interviewed in their

official capacity. A code was attributed to each interview report to protect the

confidentiality of those interviewed. References to HRAM interview reports

are provided in the footnotes to this report (e.g., 14-03-27-T8-LV-01-01).

First-hand accounts, whether by interviewees or the HRAM experts

themselves, were, when possible, cross-checked with information from other

individuals and other sources. The fact finding on the ground was

complemented by desk research and analysis of secondary sources such as

video recordings, photographic images, and text documents, including media

reports and other materials available online.

Focus of the Human Rights Assessment

The focus of this report is on the human rights situation in Ukraine within the

timeframe of the HRAM’s work. The information it contains relates

primarily to events and incidents in the locations where the HRAM teams

were deployed.

This report is not intended to provide a comprehensive compilation of human

rights issues in Ukraine or to identify perpetrators for individual acts that

may invoke criminal responsibility. Nonetheless, the report does provide a

compendium of information from personal accounts and other information

that point to a number of serious human rights violations that occurred for the

duration of the HRAM. References to alleged human rights violations that

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occurred before 6 March may, however, be found in several parts of the

report as background information.

Human Rights Standards

The primary human rights and minority standards employed for the HRAM

and in the preparation of this report are the human dimension commitments

of the OSCE, all of which Ukraine has committed to as an OSCE

participating State. Ukraine is also bound by its international obligations

under such human rights treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights (ICESC), and the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).

Ensuring the protection of human rights is the responsibility of governments.

However, they bear responsibility for the protection of human rights only in

areas where they exercise effective control. The recommendations included

in this report are mostly addressed to the government of Ukraine. Other

recommendations are addressed to the authorities exercising

de facto

control

in Crimea.

10.

A brief reminder of the relevant international standards is inserted in each

section of Chapter IV.

Structure of the Report

11.

The report is structured thematically, with a separate section on the human

rights situation is Crimea in recognition of the fact that this particular region

presents specific risks and challenges given the developments that led up to

its annexation by the Russian Federation.

12.

The report includes a list of recommendations for the Ukrainian authorities

and others.

Background to the events leading to the invitation of the HRAM

13.

Mass protests started in November 2013 in Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine

as a reaction to the decision of the then Ukrainian leadership, on 21

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November 2013, not to sign an Association Agreement with the European

Union. The protests were initially peaceful in nature.

14.

With assemblies gathering pace already on 24

November 2013, the turning

point for the situation in the country was 30 November as the authorities

attempted to forcefully disperse the protesters from the Independence Square

in Kyiv, deploying Berkut riot police forces. Clashes between participants in

the assembly and police then continued sporadically such as on 11 December

with a repeated attempt by authorities to clear the Independence Square.

Tensions further escalated on 16 January 2014 following the adoption by the

Parliament of a package of laws placing severe restrictions on freedoms of

assembly, expression and association, among others.

These events were

accompanied by reports of attacks on activists and journalists, cases of

enforced disappearance and ill treatment of the participants of assemblies.

The situation worsened on January 22, 2014 when

the unrest turned deadly

for the first time as two people died from gunshot wounds after clashes with

police and one Maidan

activist was found dead with signs of torture near

Kyiv. The events had a spill-over effect into other regions of Ukraine, where

protests became more numerous and clashes with police became more

severe.

15.

Violence peaked from 18-21 February 2014 resulting in a high number of

casualties due to the excessive use of police force and the engagement of

snipers, whose identity was unclear at the time. More than 100 protesters and

emergency medical personnel were killed and 17 police officers. A number

of individuals remain unaccounted for.

16.

On 20 February, President Yanukovych met with the Foreign Ministers of

France, Germany and Poland. On 21 February, the Agreement on the

Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine was signed by President Yanukovych and the

representatives of the parliamentary opposition, and witnessed by the foreign

For details, see “Opinion on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine passed on 16 January 2014”,

OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, 10 February 2014, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/111370?download=true.>.

Originally termed Euromaidan activists because of their support for Ukraine’s association agreement

with the European Union and because the protests began on the Independent Square (Maidan

Nezalezhnosti) in Kyiv, as their demands broadened to include combating corruption and end of

violence associated with the previous regime, they came to be referred as pro-Maidan activists. By

contrast, anti-Maidan activists came to denote the supporters of the previous regime. At the same time,

the pro- and anti-Maidan groups came to be recognized as pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian, respectively.

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ministers of Poland, Germany, and France, as well as the special envoy of the

Russian Federation. The agreement provided for the restoration of the 2004

Constitution, the creation of a government of national unity, the calling of

presidential elections in the course of the year, the investigation into recent

acts of violence and the refraining from the use of violence.

17.

Yet on the same day, 21 February 2014, President Yanukovych fled Kyiv.

On 22 February, the Parliament elected Oleksandr Turchynov as the new

Speaker of the Parliament. On 23 February the Parliament voted to appoint

Oleksandr Turchynov as acting President until presidential elections are held

on 25 May. On 27 February, uniformed armed men without insignia seized

key government buildings in Crimea. Around the same time also the so-

called “little green men” started guarding military bases and other important

facilities throughout the peninsula. These disciplined military units without

insignia were later acknowledged by the Russian President Putin to be

Russian Army personnel.

18.

The events that took place from November 2013 to February 2014 in

Ukraine, principally in connection to protests on the Independence Square in

Kyiv, give rise to serious concerns about human rights violations. In essence,

they principally concern the right to life, the prohibition of torture and ill-

treatment, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. These

violations have already been well documented by several sources.

What has

yet to take place is a credible investigation into the events that will identify

individual criminal responsibility for the deaths and ill-treatment that have

taken place. While the effects of the Maidan events have reverberated

Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, 17 April 2014,

http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034.

Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Report, “Infringement of human

rights and freedoms in Ukraine. The events of November 2013-Fbruary 2014” Kyiv, 2014,

<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/images/stories/special%20report%20of%20ukrainian%20ombudsp

erson_nov_2013_feb_2014.pdf>;

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,

“Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine”, Geneva, 15 April 2014,

<http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-15-april-2014>; “Recent

developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions”, Council of Europe

Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member

States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), 08 April 2014,

<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=20712&lang=en >;

“Report by Nils Muiznieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his

visit to Ukraine from 4 to 10 February 2014”, Council of Europe, CommDH(2014)7, Strasbourg, 4

March 2014,

<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImag

e=2489569&SecMode=1&DocId=2124234&Usage=2>.

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strongly in the developments in Ukraine, as such they remain beyond the

scope of this report.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT

Attacks against Journalists and Activists

19.

OSCE participating States are committed to abiding by the rule of law

and

to taking necessary measures to ensure that law-enforcement personnel act in

the public interest.

The ICCPR

and the ECHR

each protect the right of

everyone to physical integrity, which encompasses the right to be free from

torture and other ill-treatment. Freedom of expression and, in particular, the

right of the media to collect, report and disseminate information are

guaranteed in OSCE commitments

and in other international human rights

standards.

OSCE participating States condemn all attacks on, and

harassment of, journalists and are committed to endeavouring to hold those

directly responsible for such attacks and harassment accountable.

20.

HRAM experts received credible information from various interviewees

about attacks on, threats against, and intimidation of journalists and pro-

Maidan activists perpetrated in the context of assemblies across the country.

These included verbal and physical assaults by anti-Maidan protesters and

violent groups. In addition, it was also reported that some individuals have

experienced intimidation and pressure, including at their workplaces, to

prevent them from attending pro-Maidan meetings in their cities, and that

activists have encountered threats and harassment for their involvement in

pro-Maidan activities. Police reportedly often failed to provide appropriate

protection against such abuses or to effectively investigate them.

“Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”,

Copenhagen, 29 June 1990, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304> (Copenhagen Document).

“Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”,

Moscow, 4 October 1991, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14310> (Moscow Document).

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7.

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 3.

For example, Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2].

Article 19, ICCPR; Article 10, ECHR.

“Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, Budapest, 6 December 1994,

<http://www.osce.org/mc/39554> (Budapest Document).

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Findings

21.

HRAM received allegations of threats, harassment and intimidation of

journalists reporting from pro-Maidan assemblies, which resulted in some

being increasingly afraid to go to rallies due to the risk of being assaulted.

Moreover, journalists from certain media outlets allegedly chose not to report

from anti-Maidan assemblies out of fear for their safety.

22.

Data compiled by the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine included

about 300 cases of human rights violations against journalists in connection

with the exercise of their profession, including attacks on individual

journalists and journalists’ offices, between the beginning of the Maidan

events in November 2013 and the end of March 2014 (including in

Crimea).

Interviewees alleged that many journalists and other media

workers who were victims of attacks did not report the incidents to the police

because of their low level of trust in the law-enforcement system and because

they did not expect any redress or compensation for damages incurred. Of the

few cases reported to the police, most were not investigated because, as the

police allegedly explained to the complainants, there were no suspects due to

the fact that the victims could not identify the perpetrators.

23.

As reported by the Prosecutor-General’s Office to the HRAM, up to 70 cases

were investigated, including under Article 171 of the Criminal Code

(intentional obstruction of the lawful professional activities of journalists,

punishable by a fine or imprisonment). According to information provided to

the HRAM, about 40 cases remained open as of the end of March.

24.

HRAM experts received reports of incidents during which attackers

specifically targeted journalists and damaged their equipment. For example,

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T7-MY-04-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T5-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-03-03.According to the interviewee, two other

institutions – the Institute of Mass Information and Telekritika – regularly monitor attacks and threats

against journalists. Between 23 November 2013 and 24 February 2014, the Institute of Mass

Information recorded 206 cases in Kyiv and other cities in which media workers were injured or had

their equipment damaged. See “Evromaidan: spysok postrazhdalikh zhurnalistiv – 206 vypadkiv”

(“Euromaidan: list of the injured journalists”), Institute of Mass Information website, Kyiv, 07 March

2014, <http://imi.org.ua/analytics/42295-spisok-postrajdalih-jurnalistiv-30-vipadkiv-

onovlyuetsya.html>.Telekritika

recorded around 170 cases over the same period. See “Maizhe za try

misyatsi v Ukraini postrazhdaly 170 zhurnalistiv, dvoe z nikh zagynuly (“170 journalists were injured

and two of them died during almost three months of protests in Ukraine”),

Telekritika News

website, 25

February 2014, <http://www.telekritika.ua/profesija/2014-02-25/90766>.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-03-03.

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anti-Maidan demonstrators were reported as damaging the equipment of

journalist in Donetsk.

Moreover, according to information provided to

HRAM experts, four journalists were injured during violent attacks on a pro-

Maidan demonstration in Luhansk on 9 March 2014.

Allegedly, there were

only two journalists present who were not attacked at that demonstration:

those from the two Oblast-owned media, LOT Television and Radio and the

newspaper

XXI vek.

25.

The HRAM also obtained information on attacks by anti-Maidan protesters

against a TV crew at a rally held on 23 March in Kharkiv. Reportedly, the

crew was asked by the anti-Maidan protesters to show their ID cards and to

identify which outlet they reported for, and were subsequently assaulted. In

this case, the police intervened and protected the journalists from further

attacks.

26.

Following the violence at demonstrations in Luhansk on 9 March 2014, it

was reported that the private TV station IRTA TV was stormed on the next

day by anti-Maidan groups. Apparently the attack was linked to IRTA

journalists having recorded and later broadcast footage of participants in the

pro-Maidan assembly being attacked by anti-Maidan protesters.

According

to the Head of the Luhansk Regional Police Department, around 20 people

entered the IRTA building,

while another 30 individuals remained outside.

IRTA staff present were reportedly threatened and verbally abused.

Moreover, personal items belonging to IRTA staff and money were

reportedly stolen during the incident. Attackers reportedly demanded that an

apology be broadcast for the station’s perceived pro-Maidan policy. The

attackers stayed in the building for about 2.5 hours and threatened to return.

27.

According to information provided to HRAM experts, the police arrived at

the scene but did not intervene at the moment of the attack.

It was also

alleged that the subsequent investigation into the incident did not start until a

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T5-DO-03-01

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01.

Ibid.

HRAM report 14-03-23-T7-KH-field visit.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T6-LU-01-02.

HRAM meeting with General Vladimir Stanislavovich Guslavskiy, Head of the Luhansk Oblast

Police (GUMVD) HRAM interview 14-03-24-T6-LU-03-01.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T6-LU-01-02 and 14-03-19-T6-LU-01-04.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T6-LU-01-02 and 14-03-19-T6-LU-02-04.

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later stage and was focused on minor hooliganism.

Subsequently, the police

identified some of the alleged perpetrators; reportedly, three individuals were

detained while investigations were being carried out.

On 14 March 2014,

the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs confirmed that two leaders of the

group alleged to be responsible for the attack were charged under Article 294

(Riots) of the Criminal Code and remained under house arrest on the basis of

a court decision.

28.

In other reported cases, for instance, in Kyiv on 19 March 2014, a group of

members of the political party Svoboda, including some members of the

Verkhovna Rada, stormed the office of the acting President of the National

Television Company of Ukraine (NTU) because of the airing of what they

perceived as anti-Ukrainian content and forced him to sign a resignation

letter. On 17 March, a group of individuals stormed the office of the state

television network in the Chernigov region and forced its director to resign.

29.

The HRAM received numerous allegations of attacks, threats and

intimidation targeting pro-Maidan activists. Methods that were reportedly

used by anti-Maidan groups and local authorities to intimidate pro-Maidan

activists in some parts of Ukraine included arson attacks on cars,

display of

abusive and threatening posters and leaflets close to the homes of activists,

stigmatizing media campaigns,

questioning by the police of activists’

neighbours,

as well as police investigations against victims of abuses for

filing complaints rather than investigations to identify the perpetrators.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T6-LU-01-02.

HRAM meeting with General Vladimir Stanislavovich Guslavskiy, Head of the Luhansk Regional

Police Department (GUMVD) HRAM interview 14-03-24-T6-LU-03-01); HRAM meeting with Irina

Kostyantynivna Verigina, Deputy Head of the Luhansk Regional Administration HRAM interviews 14-

03-21-T6-LU-04-01 and 14-03-24-T6-LU-04-01.

See statement by Minister of Internal Affairs, “Po faktu zahvata Luhanskoi telecompanii

podozrevaemyi vziaty pod domashnii arest” (“Suspects of capture of Luhansk TV station are placed

under house arrest”), 14 March 2014,

<http://mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/ru/publish/article/1000161>.

See the press release by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, “OSCE media freedom

representative outraged by attacks against managers of Ukrainian National TV”, 19 March 2014,

<http://www.osce.org/fom/116599>.

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01 and 14-03-27-T6-OD-01-05.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01.

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Some activists described the threats and harassment they faced as

“psychological warfare”.

30.

According to a number of interviewees, some of these practices have stopped

since the change of power at the end of February, but others have continued

or even intensified. For example, an interviewee in Donetsk observed that it

had generally become dangerous to carry Ukrainian national symbols for fear

of attacks.

Interviewees from Odessa reported that pro-Maidan activists

have continued to experience threats through social media on a daily basis,

which have increased since the beginning of March.

Lists with names and

addresses of pro-Maidan activists have reportedly been published online,

which has endangered their safety.

31.

Similarly, activists in Luhansk have reported receiving threats on social

networks. In addition to a list of addresses and telephone numbers of activists

appearing on social media, films and pictures of an abusive nature were

allegedly posted online by members of anti-Maidan groups. Furthermore,

they reported that leaflets and stickers with derogatory content have appeared

near the homes of activists, depicting them as criminals and drugs users, and

alleging their actual or perceived sexual orientation. In addition, they

reported an incident in late March, in which unknown individuals sprayed

abusive graffiti on walls next to the office of their organization.

Reportedly,

several activists found posters affixed to the doors of their homes that called

them “terrorists”, “agents of the US State Department”, and revealed

sensitive private information. According to the interviewees, reports to the

police about these incidents did not result in any investigations.

Assessment

32.

The incidents described above point to a pattern of systematic intimidation of

journalists and pro-Maidan activists, often with the complicity or

acquiescence of local authorities, in particular law enforcement bodies. This

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-22-T4-DO-02-04 and 14-03-24-T6-LU-05-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T5-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T6-OD-01-05.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-14-AT-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T6-LU-05-02 and Annex to HRAM individual interview 14-

03-24-T6-LU-05-02. Copies of the leaflets and pictures of the graffiti are on file with ODIHR.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-21-T5-DO-01-01 and 14-03-24-T5-DO-03-01.

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gives rise to concerns about the failure of the competent authorities to

safeguard freedom of expression and freedom of the media, including by

exercising due diligence in protecting journalists carrying out their work.

33.

Moreover, concerns about freedom of expression arise from the failure of the

competent authorities

to protect activists from physical violence,

stigmatization, invasion of privacy and related abuses. In this respect, it is of

particular concern that local police authorities appeared to have been directly

participating in the intimidation of pro-Maidan activists. Furthermore, it is

worrying that in some cases, law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies

reportedly failed to adequately investigate these incidents with a view to

bringing to justice the perpetrators.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

34.

Article 11 of the ECHR, Article 21 of the ICCPR and para. 9.2 of the

Copenhagen Document protect the freedom of peaceful assembly. According

to Article 11(2) of the ECHR, any restrictions to this right should be

prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for

the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

35.

According to the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Commission for

Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Guidelines on Freedom of

Peaceful Assembly,

the policing of assemblies must be guided by the

human rights principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-

discrimination and must adhere to applicable human rights standards. The

state has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to

enable peaceful assemblies to take place without participants fearing physical

violence. Law-enforcement officials must also protect the participants of a

peaceful assembly from any person or group (including agents provocateurs

and counter-demonstrators) that attempts to disrupt or inhibit the assembly in

any way.

Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

(Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's

Commission for Democracy through Law, 2010), para. 5.3.

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36.

At the time of the HRAM, pro-Maidan

assemblies gathering hundreds of

people took place almost every day in all regions of Ukraine, including in the

south and the east. These gatherings were marked by sporadic violent

incidents, including intimidation, verbal threats and physical attacks of

participants. In particular, pro-Maidan assembly participants faced attacks by

anti-Maidan opponents, which were reportedly met by inadequate police

response. Pro-Maidan groups were often outnumbered by anti-Maidan

demonstrators in the eastern and southern parts of the country also because

the latter were reportedly bussed in and remunerated for their participation in

the protests. Challenges in facilitating peaceful assemblies were reportedly

exacerbated by the lack of a clear legal framework regulating this matter.

Findings

37.

Assemblies in Ukraine are regulated by Article 39 of the Ukrainian

Constitution, in the absence of a specific law on assemblies. According to

the acting Chair of the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeals, in the

absence of a law, it is difficult for the courts to make the “right decisions”.

This seems to point to the lack of criteria for judges to determine whether a

particular assembly is imposing unreasonable burdens such as risks of public

disorder, incitement to lawless action or infringements on the rights and

freedoms of others.

38.

The only requirement is that the organizers of assemblies inform the

executive or local self-government authorities in advance, that is, within a

reasonable time prior to the date of the planned event, but what is considered

a “reasonable time” is not defined anywhere.

Representatives of local

authorities met by the HRAM were concerned that too short a notice might

make it impossible for law-enforcement authorities to make all the necessary

arrangements to facilitate freedom of assembly and protect public order,

HRAM interview 14-03-21-T5-DO-04-02.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of April 19, 2001, No. 4-rp/2001 which provided

official interpretation of Article 39, para. 1 of the Constitution of Republic of Ukraine,

<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v004p710-01>.

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public safety, and the rights and freedoms of others.

Such concerns were

raised also in relation to some of the incidents of clashes between opposing

groups and attacks on peaceful assemblies described below.

39.

Interviewees from both pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan groups agreed that

violence often occurred as a result of holding simultaneous assemblies. The

holding of simultaneous assemblies is not regulated in the existing legal

framework.

40.

The overwhelming majority of testimonies collected by HRAM monitors

pointed to police inaction and passivity at the assemblies in Donetsk,

Luhansk and Kharkiv where violence erupted. Both anti-Maidan and pro-

Maidan groups complained that the police were unable to perform their

duties and in particular to ensure the safety of participants in assemblies.

According to several interviewees, the inability of the police to perform their

duties was also the reason that pro-Maidan activists and other related groups

initially set up so-called “self-defence” groups to protect participants at their

assemblies, particularly the most vulnerable of them (such as children and

elderly).

41.

Violence was reported to have occurred on 9 March 2014 in Luhansk,

when anti-Maidan counter-demonstrators allegedly disrupted a peaceful

assembly and attacked pro-Maidan participants. One of the interviewees

observed that the anti-Maidan activists were brought to Luhansk from other

regions in buses and that they significantly outnumbered the pro-Maidan

activists.

As a result of the attack, some of the participants sustained minor

The UN Human Rights Committee has held that a requirement to give notice, while a

de facto

restriction on freedom of assembly, is compatible with the permitted limitation laid down in Article 21

of the ICCPR. See UN Human Rights Committee,

Kivenmaa v. Finland

(1994). Similarly, the

European Commission on Human Rights, in

Rassemblement Jurassien

(1979), stated that: “Such a

procedure is in keeping with the requirements of Article 11(1), if only in order that the authorities may

be in a position to ensure the peaceful nature of the meeting, and accordingly does not as such

constitute interference with the exercise of the right.”

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T4-DO-03-01, 14-03-20-T5-DO-03-01, 14-03-21-T6-LU-01-

01, 14-03-21/23-T5-DO-01-01, 14-03-22-DO-T5-01-01, 14-03-23-T4-DO-01-01, 14-03-23-T6-LU-

01-01, 14-03-23-T7-KH-02-02.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T4-DO-03-01, 14-03-21/23-T5-DO-01-01, 14-03-23-T4-DO-

01-01.

For exemple, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-17-AT-LU-01-01, 14-03-19-T6-LU-01-04, 14-03-

19-T6-LU-02-04, 14-03-20-T6-LU-02-04, 14-03-21-T6-LU-02-01, 14-03-21-T6-LU-03-01, 14-03-21-

T6-LU-04-01, 14-03-23-T6-LU-01-01, 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01, 14-03-23-T6-LU-04-05, 14-03-24-T6-

LU-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-01-01.

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injuries.

The interviewees asserted that the police failed to provide

adequate protection.

Children in attendance needed to be protected from the

attack and were placed behind the Shevchenko monument.

The Chief of the

Luhansk Police Department, confirmed that an investigation had been

opened into the incident.

It was further reported that, following the attack,

anti-Maidan protesters stormed the Local Administration building, while the

police stood by.

The attackers allegedly threatened the Head of the

Regional Administration, forcing him to resign,

and placed a Russian flag

atop the building.

42.

Clashes in the context of assemblies were observed on several occasions in

Donetsk.

In particular, interlocutors indicated that there were sporadic

instances of violence on 4, 5 and 9 March.

However, the violence reached

its peak on 13 March 2014.

On that day, assemblies in Donetsk were

marred by violent incidents when anti-Maidan protesters broke through a

police cordon and

started physically assaulting

the participants of the

significantly

smaller

pro-Maidan assembly.

These incidents took place at

the end of the assembly, when no more than 50 police officers were

reportedly present.

43.

Interviewees described how a group of around 30 protesters were forced to

seek shelter in a police bus that was surrounded by attackers. The bus

windows were smashed, and irritant gas was dispersed inside, forcing the

group to exit the bus, where they were then subjected to beatings and verbal

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-17-AT-LU-01-01 and 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-02-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T6-LU-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T6-LU-01-01.

Ibid.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-22-T4-DO-02-04 and 2014-03-23-T4-DO-01-01.

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-14-AT-DO-02-07, 14-03-14-AT-DO-04-01, 14-

03-14-AT-DO-05-01, 14-03-15-AT-DO-02-01, 14-03-17-AT-DO-02-01, 14-03-19-T4-DO-01-01, 14-

03-19-T5-DO-03-01, 14-03-20-T4-DO-02-01, 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01, 14-03-20-T5-DO-03-01, 14-03-

21-T4-DO-03-01, 14-03-22-T4-DO-02-04, 14-03-22-T5-DO-01-01, 14-03-23-T4-DO-01-01, 14-03-24-

T4-DO-01-01, 14-03-24-T4- DO-02-01, 14-03-24-T4-DO-03-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-14-AT-DO-02-07, 14-03-17-AT- DO-02-01, 14-03-20-T5-DO-

01-01, 14-03-22-T5-DO-01-01.

Twenty people according to HRAM individual interview 2014-03-21-T4-DO-03-01; “far fewer than

initially”, according to HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T5-DO-03-01; 10 to 20 according to

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-03-01. Also, HRAM individual interview 14-03-22-T5-

DO-01-01.

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abuse.

One individual described being hit in the face with a stone and

having his hand broken from multiple hits.

Another interviewee described

being hit in the back of the head and losing consciousness.

Another person

was reported to have sustained a brain injury.

Moreover, it was reported

that one person – a member of the Svoboda party – was stabbed to death

during the incident.

44.

Witness accounts of the event, as well as video footage examined by

ODIHR,

point to a deliberate failure by police forces to take adequate

measure to protect the pro-Maidan assembly.

For example,

some

interviewees witnessed metal sticks and other weaponry being handed out to

anti-Maidan protesters without any police intervention.

Others observed

that anti-Maidan groups, widely believed to come from neighbouring towns,

were transported in cars and buses without license plates.

Some stated that

the police could be observed treating the anti-Maidan protesters in a

favourable manner.

According to some witnesses, some police officers

were not properly equipped for discharging their duties in the context of

violent assemblies (no truncheons, handcuffs or shields).

45.

According to reports, approximately 29 people sustained injuries as a result of

the clashes.

The HRAM also gathered information suggesting that medical

assistance was not provided in a timely manner.

Some interviewees

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T4-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T5-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T4-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T4-DO-02-01.

“Російський МЗС �½абрехав про До�½ецьк, і погрожує взяти його під захист”

(“Russian MFA has

lied about Donetsk and is threatening to take it under its [Russian] protection”),

Ukrainskaya Pravda

News

website,<

http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/03/14/7018762/>;

Radio Svoboda, “Sutychky v

Donetsku” (“Clashes in Donetsk”). Online video clip.

Radio Svoboda.

Web. Radio Svoboda, 13 March

2014, <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/media/video/25296762.html>.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T5-DO-03-01, according to which this witness allegedly

overheard the head of the police saying: “Let them kill one another!” Also HRAM individual interview

14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-15-AT-DO-02-01 and 14-03-19-T5-DO-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T4-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-14-AT-DO-05-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-15-AT-DO-02-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T4-DO-03-01.

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ascertained that several of those injured did not seek medical assistance, as

they were afraid of further assaults and retaliation at hospitals.

46.

In the aftermath of the assembly, prosecutors opened an investigation into

police negligence.

Some interviewees explained that, following the events

on 13 March, residents of Donetsk made a decision to forego the

organization of any further peaceful pro-Maidan assemblies out of fear for

their safety.

47.

Another reported incident involved a standoff between Ukrainian far-right

activists and anti-Maidan demonstrators that allegedly took place on 14

March 2014 on Rymarska Street in Kharkiv.

It was alleged that initially a

minivan with members of the right-wing group Right Sector drove to the site

of an anti-Maidan assembly and a confrontation ensued. Subsequently, the

van drove off to Rymarska Street, where the office of the Prosvita

organization is located. The anti-Maidan activists allegedly followed the

vehicle and subsequently stormed the building. It is further alleged that, as a

result of the confrontations, two people were shot dead and at least five were

injured.

48.

Moreover, some pro-Maidan supporters asserted that the anti-Maidan

protesters captured around 50 people and took them to the square in the

centre of Kharkiv. Those captured were forced onto a stage, where they had

HRAM individual interview 14-03-16-AT-DO-01-01.

“Prokuraturoju donetskoi oblasti rozpochato rozsliduvannia dij pratsivnykiv militsii pid chas

masovykh zavorushen (Prosecution of Donetsk oblast started investigation of police action during mass

disorder), 14 March, 2014.

<http://www.don.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=135467&fp=60>.

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T7-KH-03-01, 14-03-21-T7-KH-04-01, 2014-03-22-T7- KH-

01-03; furthermore, the incident was reported in the media. See, for example,

“V Khar’kove strel’ba u ofisa “Prosvity”, 2 pogibshih, 5 ranenykh” (“Two people are dead and five are

wounded during the shooting near ‘Prosvita’ office in Kharkiv”(video is available),

Donbass News

website. 14 March 2014, <http://novosti.dn.ua/details/220240/>; “Prorossiskie aktivisty obstrelivaiut

ofis v kotorom zabarrikadirovalis chleny “Pravogo sectora” (“Pro-Russian activists are shooting at the

office which members of ‘Right sector’ have barricaded in”).

Ukrainska Pravda News

website, 15

March 2014, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/03/15/7018848/>; “Nochnaya perestrelka v

Khar’kove: Ubity dvoe, zaderzhany okolo 30” (“Night gun fight in Kharkiv: two people are dead, 30

more people are detained”),

Podrobnosti News

website15 March 2014,

<http://podrobnosti.ua/criminal/2014/03/15/964695.html>; Zakharenkova, Elena, “MVD Ukrainy:

Posle stolknovenii na Rymarskoi zaderzhanu 38 cheloveka” (”Ministry of Interior of Ukraine reports

38 people were detained after the clashed on Rymarska Street”), Media group Objective, 15 March

2014, <http://www.objectiv.tv/150314/94437.html>.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T7-KH-04-01.

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to kneel down and had their faces covered with green liquid.

They were

also verbally abused. It was also reported that the police were present during

the incident but did not react to the situation.

Certain interviewees

described their reluctance to seek medical attention in the aftermath of the

violence out of fear of further assaults at hospitals.

As a result of the

violence, more than 100 people were injured.

49.

There have been credible allegations that anti-Maidan groups and assemblies

had in their ranks individuals who instigated or escalated the violence that

erupted at some assemblies, particularly in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk.

There are corroborating testimonies that these individuals benefited from

logistical arrangements to travel to the centre of the cities where the

assemblies took place from neighbouring small cities in Ukraine or from

across the border with the Russian Federation.

These individuals came in

buses or private vehicles, some of which had either Russian plates or no

plates at all.

Some of them carried metal sticks.

Several sources pointed

to their Russian accent or pronunciation.

The information collected by the

HRAM suggests that funding was made available to bring these individuals

to the locations of the assemblies and to remunerate them. Two sources

alleged that there was a well-established salary scale for these activists, with

greater remuneration for a small group of people directly involved in

committing beatings.

Reportedly, the individuals involved in the violence

were not activists, and their intention was not to counter-demonstrate and

express any views but to disrupt the assemblies of their opponents and inhibit

the exercise of their right to demonstrate. Local residents with genuine anti-

“1 marta 2014 izvinenie boitsov “Pravogo sectora” (banderovtsev) pered khar’kovchanami” or

“Members of “Right sector” (banderovtsy) apologies to Kharkovites on 1 March, 2014”). Online video

clip.

YouTube.

YouTube, 1 March 2014. Web. 16 April 2014,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aa63IjsaWIk>.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T7-KH-01-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-22-T7-KH-02-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T7-KH-04-01.

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-21-T6-LU-01-01 and 14-03-20-T6-LU-01-02.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-19-T5-DO-03-01, 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01, 14-03-22-T5-DO-01-

01, 14-03-23-T4-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-22-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T5-DO-01-02.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T4-DO-01-01 and 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

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Maidan views who joined the assemblies were often outnumbered by the

individuals who came from elsewhere.

50.

Some of these individuals are known as

titushky,

which can be broadly

defined as mercenary support agents of various groups, often posing as street

hooligans, and ready to use violence for money. They typically operate in

civilian clothes, without identifiable insignia and from behind the lines of

rallies. They are often known to the police, and have a criminal background.

Many are unemployed and make a living out of their activities as

titushky.

51.

Pro-Maidan groups have also been reported as having in their ranks

individuals who, while acting primarily as volunteers to ensure the safety of

participants in the assemblies (“self-defence”), have occasionally been

involved in violence at some assemblies.

52.

In the vast majority of cases, no proper or effective investigation was

allegedly conducted into the violent incidents that marred some assemblies.

While interviewees were generally able to register complaints, there were

corroborating testimonies highlighting the incapacity or unwillingness of the

police to open investigations.

Assembly participants who were victims or

witnesses of human rights violations in the course of an assembly expressed

a great deal of scepticism, if not distrust, as to the ability and willingness of

the police to conduct effective investigations. At times, police officers

themselves were dismissive of the possibility that such complaints “may

achieve anything”.

However, high-ranking law-enforcement officials

indicated that investigations were ongoing, for instance, in incidents that

occurred in Luhansk on 9 March.

Furthermore, proceedings have

reportedly been initiated against those who committed violent acts at the 13

March assemblies in Donetsk.

Assessment

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T5-DO-01-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T5-DO-01-01. For instance, in escalating the violence in

Donetsk on 5 March.

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-22-T5-DO-01-01.

Ibid.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T6-LU-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T4-DO-01-03.

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53.

The incidents reported above indicate a disturbing pattern of failure by law

enforcement agents to protect the freedom of peaceful assembly. In this

regard, it should be noted that the state has a positive duty to protect peaceful

assemblies, which also extends to simultaneous demonstrations and counter-

demonstrations. Security and safety should be provided entirely by the public

authorities and under no circumstances should this duty be assigned or

delegated to the organizer of an assembly or any other groups. Consequently,

the public or any formally or informally delegated group should not be

responsible for or involved in ensuring the safety of the participants of an

assembly. It is a matter of concern that physical attacks against participants

in peaceful assemblies, and in particular pro-Maidan activists gathering in the

east and the south of the country, resulted in loss of life and serious injuries

and were reportedly often met by inadequate police response.

54.

The state has an obligation to effectively investigate attacks against

participants in peaceful assemblies, as well as any allegation of serious police

misconduct resulting in its failure to protect and facilitate assemblies. It is

therefore paramount that investigations of the incidents described above be

opened and/or, carried out effectively. Failure to do so would result in a

violation of the right to life, the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment, the right to effective remedies, as well as freedom of peaceful

assembly.

55.

Freedom of peaceful assembly does not protect violent assemblies, nor does

it protect the activities of

agents provocateurs,

including individuals paid to

participate in protests to disrupt peaceful assemblies and foment violence. It

is therefore noted with particular concern that freedom of peaceful assembly

appears to have been instrumentalized, in particular by anti-Maidan groups,

to stifle the freedoms of assembly and expression and to disrupt public order.

56.

A lack of clarity in the legal framework regulating assemblies may

compound these problems and have a detrimental effect on the enjoyment of

human rights. Consequently, it is important to ensure that legal provisions,

meeting international human rights standards are adopted and fully

implemented.

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Freedom of the Media

57.

OSCE participating States have committed to promoting and protecting

freedom of expression, free media and information.

In particular,

participating States have acknowledged the key role of independent and

pluralistic media in a free and open society.

Participating States have also

highlighted that fomenting ethnic tension through the media can serve as an

early warning of conflict.

Freedom of expression is enshrined by

international and regional treaties binding on Ukraine.

Freedom of

expression is understood to subsume the freedom to receive and impart

information without interference by public authorities.

58.

The HRAM received information of interference with media freedoms by the

authorities, and of the manipulation of media by a foreign government and

powerful pressure groups. This resulted in a deterioration of media freedom

and, allegedly, biased reporting on unfolding events.

Findings

59.

The majority of those interviewed by the HRAM perceived the coverage of

the current events in Ukraine as biased.

In particular, a number of

interviewees indicated that they had suspicions that the Russian media

broadcasting also on the territory of Ukraine were intentionally distorting

facts to manipulate public opinion.

Interviewees also cited allegations of

distortion of facts by some Ukrainian media outlets (especially broadcast

media).

The HRAM also encountered examples of biased reporting

100

See, for example, “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act”, Helsinki, 1

August 1975,

http://www.osce.org/mc/39501

(Helsinki Final Act); Vienna Document1989,

op. cit.,

note 39; “Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980 of Representatives of the Participating

States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions

of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference”, Madrid, 9 September 1983,

<http://www.osce.org/mc/40871> (Madrid Concluding Document).

Budapest Document,

op. cit.,

note [7], para. 36.

Ibid.

ICCPR, Article 19; ECHR, Article 10.

ECHR, Article 10; also see ICCPR, Article 19.

Additional information concerning allegations of biased coverage was obtained through monitoring

Ukrainian websites such as www.stopfake.org (last visited on 14 April 2014).

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-10-AT-KY-02-01, 14-03-16-AT-DO-02-01, 14-

03-24-T5-DO-03-01, 14-03-26-T2-KY-01-02.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-01-02.

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events in Donetsk on 13 March that were observed directly by the HRAM,

and as discussed above. Moreover, the HRAM received indications that the

alleged conflation of political office and control over media outlets resulted

in state interference with news content.

101

60.

For example, some interviewees alleged that there was a degree of

arbitrariness in terms of granting journalists access to newsworthy events

(specifically, a claim that a city mayor restricted access to City Hall meetings

to loyal journalists),

102

as well as in the journalist accreditation system.

103

With regard to the latter, it was mentioned that editorial boards enjoy full

discretion over whom to issue press credentials to, and that the practice of

selling press credentials to individuals who are not in fact journalists or

issuing such credentials under pressure from sponsors is allegedly

widespread.

104

61.

On 11 March, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of

Ukraine, with reference to relevant Ukrainian legislation, called on Ukrainian

cable operators to stop broadcasts of the Russian television channels Rossiya

24, ORT, RTR Planeta and NTV-Mir. National Security and Defence

Council Deputy Secretary explained this decision by what she referred to as a

“media war” with an ensuing “threat to national security”.

105

On 25 March,

the Kyiv District Administrative Court reviewed the National Television and

Radio Broadcasting Council's lawsuit against one of the companies

rebroadcasting the above-listed channels, and ruled in favour of suspending

broadcasts of these Russian television channels on the territory of Ukraine.

106

“Ukraina Rossiya 22 SROCHNO! Sobytiya na Ukraine 13 – 15 marta” (“Ukraine Russia URGENT!

Event in Ukraine 13 – 15 March”). Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 15 March 2014. Web. 16

April 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubbtMSBpS2s>.

101

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-21-T6-LU-01-01, 14-03-21/23-T5-DO-01-01, 14-

03-24-T6-LU-01-01, 14-03-24-T5-DO-03-01.

102

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T6-LU-01-01.

103

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-03-03.

104

Ibid.

105

“Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council calls for review of Russian TV broadcast

licensing conditions”,

Kyiv Post News

website, 7 March 2014

<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraines-national-security-and-defense-council-calls-for-

review-of-russian-tv-broadcast-licensing-conditions-338704.html>.

106

Kyiv District Administrative

Court. Decree on implementation of administrative claim №

826/3456/14 as of 25 March 2014, Kyiv District Administrative Court, Kyiv,

<http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/37822378>.

100

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62.

The access of Russian speakers to media in their native language was

assessed as adequate overall with one interviewee pointing out that the

majority of media outlets in the Donetsk region use Russian as the language

of communication.

107

Assessment

63.

It is noted with great concern that the existence of propaganda and biased

reporting of events and developments covered by the HRAM contributed to a

deterioration in the security situation, including in the enjoyment of human

rights. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media cautioned against

the noxious effects of propaganda in times of conflict and its contribution to

the escalation thereof.

108

Attacks against journalists, as described in the

relevant section above, as well as other forms of political interference and

other forms of pressure on the media, have fuelled tension and violence, as

exemplified by attacks on peaceful assemblies described above.

64.

The imposition of restrictions on Russian television channels was justified on

grounds of national security, one of the permissible grounds for restrictions

on freedom of expression. However, it should be noted that a vaguely applied

notion of propaganda cannot be used to justify bans apparently affecting the

availability of all broadcasts by a number of Russian media outlets. It is a

matter of concern that attempts to counter propaganda have resulted in the

imposition of restrictions on broadcast media, which may be tantamount to a

violation of the freedom of expression, rather than placing emphasis on

increased media pluralism as an antidote to propaganda.

65.

The allegations the HRAM received of political interference on media outlets

provide worrying evidence of the negative effects on media freedom of

pressure exerted by power structures at the local and national level. Political

pressure further compounded problems arising from an already deteriorating

media freedom at a time of crisis.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T4-DO-02-01.

See the “Statement by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media on propaganda in times

of conflict”, 15 April 2014, < http://www.osce.org/fom/117701>.

108

107

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Manifestations of Intolerance

66.

OSCE participating States have undertaken to combat intolerance and

discrimination in general,

109

as well as against specific groups, such as Roma

and Sinti.

110

In particular, participating States have recognized the

importance of combating hate crimes.

111

A number of international human

rights instruments and other standards prohibit discrimination,

112

including

racial discrimination,

113

as well as condemn intolerance and negative

stereotyping on the basis of religion or belief.

114

67.

HRAM experts received allegations of manifestations of intolerance,

including hate speech, towards ethnic and religious groups. Such instances

did not appear to be of a systemic nature and, in particular, the HRAM did

not observe an escalation of violence against the Russian speaking

population in the east and south of Ukraine.

Findings

68.

As a number of reports suggest, there has been a considerable trend that has

seen political orientation conflated with ethnic background. This has been an

issue in particular in eastern and southern Ukraine, where Ukrainian identity

and symbols have been targeted for hate speech.

115

69.

Pro-Maidan activists in the east of the country have frequently been labelled

“banderovtsy”

116

(“the Bandera followers”), “Nazis”

117

and “fascists”.

118

See, for example, Helsinki Final Act,

op. cit.,

note 174; Vienna Document 1989,

op. cit.,

note 39;

OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No. 4/03, “Tolerance and Non-discrimination”, Maastricht 2

December 2003, <http://www.osce.org/mc/19382>, (Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03

on Tolerance and Non-discrimination).

110

See, for example, OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No. 3/03, “Action Plan on Improving the

Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area”, Maastricht, 27 November 2003,

<http://www.osce.org/odihr/17554>.

111

Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03 on Tolerance and Non-discrimination,

op. cit.,

note 206.

112

ICCPR, Articles 2 and 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article

2(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 2; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women, Article 2.

113

Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

114

UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 22/31 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on

religion or belief.

115

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-22-T7-KH-03-01, 14-03-20-T4-DO-02-01, 14-03-

28-T7-MY-01-01. HRAM report 14-03-23-T7-KH-field visit.

116

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T7-MY-01-04 and 14-03-28-T7-MY-01-01.

109

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should be noted that the word

banderovtsy,

in particular, carries connotations

of militant Ukrainian nationalism and as such perpetuates the harmful

stereotype of ethnic Ukrainians as intolerant and nationalistic. Local Party of

Regions politicians

119

and the media affiliated with them have allegedly used

this rhetoric.

120

On a number of occasions, vehicles carrying Ukrainian flags

and other national symbols have been reportedly vandalized.

121

70.

The HRAM also received a limited number of reports of ethnic intolerance

against the Russian minority in the west of Ukraine. A representative of the

Russian minority described how current events in Ukraine have impacted on

the Russian community in the Lviv region. Ethnic Russians are at times

perceived as opposing the Maidan movement and, as such, experience

implicit or explicit disapproval and at times provocations. For example,

ethnic slurs against Russians were reported as having been used at pro-

Maidan assemblies.

122

71.

Representatives of the Jewish community did not report an increase in anti-

Semitic hate speech during the HRAM.

123

In fact, allegations of a growth in

anti-Semitism have been publicly rejected by leading Jewish public figures in

Ukraine.

124

72.

The attitude of the Roma is allegedly perceived as apolitical. Incidents of

harassment and intimidation targeting members of the Roma communities

were reported to the HRAM in this connection. On one occasion, this

perception reportedly led to a mob attack in the Kyiv region against a Roma

man, whose assailants publicly accused all Roma people of not supporting

any party and of not supporting the Maidan in particular.

125

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T7-MY-01-01.

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-22-DO-T5-01-01.

119

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-22-T7-KH-02-02 and 14-03-28-T7-MY-01-01.

120

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T7-MY-01-01.

121

For example, HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T4-DO-02-01 and 14-03-22-T7-KH-02-02.

122

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-31-T8-LV-02-01.

123

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T5-DO-02-01.

124

See “Open letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin”,

International

New York Times,

27 March 2014, p. 9.

125

Ibid.

118

117

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Assessment

73.

Manifestations of intolerance reported to the HRAM have remained fairly

isolated, although, in the context of increasing tensions in the country, it is

paramount for the authorities to address them in an effective and timely

fashion in order to prevent discrimination and hate crimes and promote

tolerance. It is crucial, moreover, that unsubstantiated allegations of

manifestations of intolerance, extremism and hatred not be divulged by

actors outside Ukraine as these may contribute to the escalation of tensions

and deterioration of the security situation.

Freedom of Movement and IDPs

74.

OSCE participating States have committed themselves to removing all legal

and other restrictions with respect to travel within their territories and with

respect to residence for those entitled to permanent residence within their

territories.

126

They have further committed to facilitating the voluntary

return, in safety and dignity, of internally displaced persons in accordance

with international standards, recognizing also that the reintegration of people

in their places of origin must be pursued without discrimination.

127

International human rights law guarantees everyone the right to freedom of

movement within the borders of the state where they are located, and the

right to leave and enter their own country.

128

The OSCE recognizes the UN

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as the relevant framework.

129

75.

The situation in Crimea, particularly in the aftermath of the events of 27-28

February, forced an estimated 3,000 people to leave the region becoming

internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the territory controlled by the

Ukrainian government. They include mostly Crimean Tatars, but also the

families of Ukrainian military personnel originally stationed in Crimea.

Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2], para. 33.

“Lisbon Document 1996”, Lisbon, 3 December 1996, <http://www.osce.org/mc/39539>, para. 10.

128

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13; ICCPR, Article 12; ECHR, Article 2 of

Protocol 4.

129

Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03 on Tolerance and Non-discrimination,

op. cit.,

note 206, para. 13.

127

126

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Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, issues have

also arisen affecting the freedom of movement to and from the peninsula.

Findings

76.

Western Ukraine saw the first IDPs arrive from Crimea on 4 March 2014.

130

As of 21 March, the estimated number of displaced persons in western

Ukraine was reported to be around 2,000 (80 per cent of them being Crimean

Tatars).

131

The number of IDPs increased to an estimated 3,000 mostly

women and children by 1 April. They were accommodated predominantly in

Lviv, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and to a lesser degree in Ivano-Frankivsk.

132

77.

The IDPs and authorities interviewed by the HRAM cited a climate of fear,

uncertainty and intimidation as primary causes for their departure.

133

As one

Crimean Tatar family pointed out, people decided to leave out of fear of

war.

134

Another Crimean Tatar interlocutor reported that Tatars are especially

afraid of Russian and pro-Russian forces. They reportedly cited the conflict

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the deportations of Tatar people in

1944 as the main reasons for their fear.

135

They expressed concerns about the

property they left behind, as they were not certain what would happen to

it.

136

78.

In regions closer to Crimea, the families of Ukrainian soldiers formed a

sizeable portion of the IDPs. For example, as of 30 March 2014, Mykolayiv

hosted from 63 to 68 such individuals, according to various accounts, with 50

more families expected to arrive.

137

Odessa reportedly accommodated 65

members of the families of officers of the Border Guard Service with more

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T8-LV-01-03.

"Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #4", UNICEF, 21 March 2014,

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF_Ukraine_SitRep4_21March2014.pdf>.

132

“Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #6”,

op. cit.,

note 248. For instance, according to the Lviv

Regional State Administration, as of 27 March, Lviv alone was hosting 1,276 IDPs, mostly Crimean

Tatars, [HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T8-LV-03-10].

133

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T8-LV-01-03, 14-03-29-T8-LV-01-01 and 14-03-30-T8-

LV-01-02.

134

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T8-LV-05-01.

135

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T8-LV-04-01.

136

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T6-OD-01-03.

137

HRAM individual interview 14-03-30-T7-MY-01-01.

131

130

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expected to arrive.

138

Most IDPs were reported to be interested in relocation

further afield rather than staying in Mykolayiv, Kherson or Odessa.

139

79.

HRAM received information that given the absence of a central IDP

registration system,

140

efforts were underway to set up a registration system

on the regional level.

141

Moreover, the main responsibility for providing care

to IDPs was placed on self-governments at the regional level that had no or

very limited experience in handling such cases

142

and were without financial

support from the central authorities.

143

Regional authorities in Kherson,

Mykolayiv and Lviv thus set up regional co-ordination centres for the

reception, housing and provision of basic services to IDPs

144

while in

Kherson, the regional authorities set up migration points and camps for those

leaving Crimea.

145

IDPs were also accommodated in private housing.

146

80.

Although the range of services that IDPs have had access to has varied across

the regions,

147

it was noted that the solutions provided were temporary.

148

particular, the HRAM received reports of specific concerns affecting military

personnel such as the location of their residence and concerns over service

members’ personal files which may affect their contractual relationship with

the army.

149

81.

Concerns were raised over the freedom of movement of IDPs wishing to

return to Crimea and their ability to enter Crimea from the territory

controlled by the Ukrainian government.

150

Reportedly, difficulties have

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T6-OD-01-03 and 14-03-27-OD-T6-02-04.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T7-MY-01-04.

140

"Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #6", UNICEF, 5 April 2014,

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Ukraine%20SitRep%20No.%206,

%2005%20April%202014.pdf>.

141

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T6-OD-01-03 and 14-03-26-T8-LV-01-03.

142

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T8-LV-03-10.

143

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-27-T8-LV-03-10 and 14-03-28-T8-LV-02-02.

144

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T8-LV-01-03, 14-03-27-T7-KS-01-10, 14-03-27-T7-MY-

01-05.

145

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T7-KS-01-10 and HRAM report 14-03-30-T7-KS-04-field

visit.

146

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T8-LV-01-03 and 14-03-27-T8-LV-01-01.

147

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-30-T7-MY-11-01 and 14-03-28-T8-LV-04-01.

148

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-27-T8-LV-01-01, 14-03-28-T8-LV-02-02 and 14-03-28-T8-

LV-04-01.

149

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-30-T7-MY-01-01 and 14-03-28-T8-LV-03-03.

150

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T8-LV-01-03.

139

138

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been experienced both when leaving Crimea and leaving the territory

controlled by the Ukrainian government.

151

82.

While the HRAM was in Ukraine, a number of legislative initiatives were

under consideration, which, if adopted would affect freedom of movement in

Ukraine.

152

In its opinion on these drafts, the UNHCR recommended that a

humanitarian and non-punitive approach to ordinary citizens affected by the

crisis be adopted and expressed concern that this legislation “may exacerbate

the risk of displacement from Crimea, and may undermine the rights of

internally displaced persons as economic, property transaction and freedom

of movement restrictions included in the draft legislation are not in line with

international legal standards”.

153

Since then, the latest draft of the law on

guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens on the temporarily occupied

territory of Ukraine

154

has been amended to address the key concern raised

by the UNHCR by lifting restrictions on movement between Crimea and the

rest of Ukraine for those whose place of residence is registered in Crimea.

Assessment

83.

The presence of military personnel without insignia in Crimea has given rise

to a climate of fear and intimidation which has resulted in an outflow of IDPs

to the territory under the control of the Ukrainian government. The Crimean

Tatar community has been disproportionately affected by these developments

as have the families of the service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T3-CR-01-01.

Draft law on guarantee of rights and freedoms of citizens of temporarily occupied territory of

Ukraine No. 4473-1, registered as of 19 March 2014,

<http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50320>; Draft Law on legal status of

temporarily occupied territory, No. 4497-1 registered as of 20 March 2014,

<http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50324>;

Draft of Resolution

on urgent

measures in order to ensure the rights and freedoms of citizens of Ukraine, due to the occupation of the

territory of the Russian Federation, Ukraine”

No. 4497-1 registered as of 20 March 2014,

http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50325>;

Draft of Resolution on

taking

immediate action to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons in

connection with the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,

No. 4499, registered as of 20

March 2014, <http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50322>..

153

“UNHCR’s preliminary comments on draft legislation regarding the rights and obligations of

citizens on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”, UNHCR Regional Representation for

Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, 23 March 2014, <http://unhcr.org.ua/en/2011-08-26-06-58-56/news-

archive/1242-unhcr-concerned-by-ukrainian-draft-legislation-affecting-the-rights-of-displaced-persons-

from-crimea> (accessed on 10 April 2014).

154

Draft Law of guarantee of rights and freedoms to citizens on the temporarily occupied territory of

Ukraine, No. 4473-1, registered as of 19 March 2014,

<http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=50320>.

152

151

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The authorities exercising

de facto

control in Crimea are obliged to facilitate

the voluntary return of the displaced persons in safety and dignity, and their

reintegration into places of origin without discrimination and with due regard

for their right to land and property. For those preferring not to return, it is

paramount that effective durable solutions be found, in line with the UN

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and applicable OSCE

commitments and international human rights law.

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Human Rights Situation in Crimea

Background

84.

The mass demonstrations in Kyiv and in other Ukrainian cities that began in

November 2013 have had a powerful impact on the political situation in

Crimea, resulting in the organization of anti-Maidan demonstrations and

generally small pro-Maidan protests being organized since December 2013.

85.

Protests, including large anti-Maidan meetings, intensified at the end of

February 2014 following the change of government in Kyiv. On 23 February

a large pro-Russian demonstration took place in Sevastopol, and a “people’s

mayor” was appointed.

155

On 26 February, protesters at anti-Maidan and pro-

Maidan demonstrations (the latter including a significant number of members

of the Crimean Tatar community) clashed in Simferopol, the administrative

capital of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, near the building of the

Supreme Council, the local legislative body. The confrontation resulted in

the reported death of two individuals. During the protest, a number of pro-

Maidan protesters temporarily occupied the building of the Supreme Council

(also see below).

86.

In the early hours of 27 February, armed individuals seized government

buildings in Crimea, including the Supreme Council and the local Council of

Ministers. With the buildings reportedly in the control of armed individuals,

the Supreme Council held an emergency session, during which Mr. Sergey

Aksyonov, a representative of the Russian Unity party, was appointed as the

new Prime Minister of Crimea. The Supreme Council also voted to hold a

referendum on the status of Crimea.

156

While the central authorities in Kyiv

refused to recognize the new leadership in Crimea, Mr. Aksyonov, on 1

March, appealed to the Russian Federation to help maintain peace in Crimea.

87.

Also starting from around the end of February, disciplined military units in

uniform without insignia appeared in the streets of Crimean towns guarding

important facilities, particularly those serving military and administrative

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T3-CR-01-01.

The referendum was initially planned to take place on 25 May 2014. It was subsequently moved to

an earlier date, 16 March 2014.

156

155

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functions. The military units were later confirmed by the Russian President

to be Russian military personnel

157

88.

In the following days, unidentified armed individuals, some of whom

declared that they were part of “self-defence” groups, gradually took control

of key infrastructure in Crimea, established roadblocks, and also surrounded,

and in some cases gained control over, military facilities and bases belonging

to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Members of “self-defence” groups were also

reported as being involved in effectively exercising some law-enforcement

functions, e.g., during public demonstrations, including by reportedly using

force and otherwise imposing restrictions on the activities of peaceful

protesters and journalists. A number of individuals were reportedly detained

by members of “self-defence” forces (see below).

89.

On 16 March, a referendum was held in Crimea during which, allegedly,

over 96 per cent of the voters voted in favour of Crimea joining the Russian

Federation. Following the referendum, Crimea authorities exercising

de facto

control over this territory officially requested to join the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian authorities refused to recognize the legality of the referendum

and its outcome on constitutional grounds, an opinion shared also by the

Council of Europe’s Venice Commission

158

. In conjunction with the

ratification of a treaty between the Crimean authorities exercising

de facto

control and the Russian Federation on the accession of Crimea to the Russian

Federation, on 21 March the

Constitutional Law on Admitting to the Russian

Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian

Federation the New Constituent Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the

City of Federal Importance Sevastopol

was signed by the Russian President

and entered into force.

90.

Subsequent steps have been taken in the following period to adopt legislation

in the Russian Federation to regulate a variety of issues in the transitional

period, while the Crimean authorities continued to consolidate their

de facto

control over the territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops still stationed in

Crimea began to withdraw from the territory.

157

158

Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, 17 April 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034

See: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)002-e

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91.

An analysis of the legality of the events that led to a change in the authorities

exercising

de facto

control over Crimea falls beyond the scope of this report.

In particular, this report does not address the legality of the referendum held

on 16 March or its adherence to OSCE and other international standards

relating to the holding of democratic elections. In providing an assessment of

the human rights situation in Crimea, it takes into account the effects of these

events on the enjoyment of human rights, as enshrined in OSCE human

dimension commitments and in other applicable human rights instruments.

92.

In the course of the assessment, a number of concerns emerged in relation to

the presence and activities of individuals identified as members of “self-

defence” groups. In interviews with several people, the members of these

“self-defence” groups have been described as wearing various types of not

clearly identifiable uniforms.

159

These have included uniforms very similar to

those used by armed forces personnel (without insignia) and Cossack

uniforms. Although not all members of “self-defence” groups have been

visibly armed, the HRAM received numerous allegations suggesting that

many of them have been heavily armed, including with automatic firearms.

93.

As noted above, “self-defence” groups have been

de facto

involved in

carrying out functions that are normally within the competencies of law-

enforcement bodies. The commander of a local “self-defence” group

acknowledged that “self-defence” forces were effectively carrying out the

functions of the local police, who were described as “demoralized”.

160

94.

The HRAM was unable to clarify the chain of command or the legal

framework regulating the activities of the “self-defence” groups. It was

reported that these groups were operating in accordance with the Ukrainian

Law on the Participation of Citizens in the Protection of Public Order and

State Borders, which provides for the creation of groups of citizens assisting

in the maintenance of public order. However, this law provides,

inter alia,

that members of these groups should receive forms of identification from the

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T3-CR-03-01, 14-03-20-T3-CR-01-03, 14-03-24-T3-CR-01-

01, 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03, 14-03-20-T1-CR-01-01, 14-03-20-T1-CR-02-01, 14-03-21-T1-CR-03-

01bis

160

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T1-CR-04-01.

159

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competent authorities, be recognizable by using armbands,

161

and should not

use weapons in their activities.

162

95.

These forces were described by their commander as groups organized “from

below” and operating in co-ordination with local law-enforcement bodies.

163

In a number of testimonies collected by the HRAM, however, members of

the local police were reported as acting in such a way so as to demonstrate

that they had little or no control over the action of “self-defence” formations.

In fact, “self-defence” forces have been described by a number of credible

sources as armed groups effectively acting outside a clearly defined legal

framework, with the acquiescence and complicity of the local authorities

exercising

de facto

control, including law-enforcement agencies.

164

96.

It should be noted that the very existence and operation of such groups raises

concerns as to the adherence by the local authorities exercising

de facto

control to the rule of law and human rights principles that should be at the

core of the activities of any bodies carrying out law-enforcement functions.

In particular, the lack of clarity with regard to the identity and affiliation of

“self-defence” groups, their chain of command, as well as the legal

framework in which they have been operating, has a negative impact on their

accountability for any human rights violations for which they may have been

responsible. Specific allegations of human rights violations believed to have

been committed by members of “self-defence” groups will be discussed in

greater detail in the following sections.

97.

In addition to those people connected with the operation of “self-defence”

forces, the situation of legal uncertainty arising from the change in the

authorities exercising

de facto

control over Crimea raises a number of other

potential concerns. It should be noted that the court system in Crimea had, at

least in a number of cases, reportedly suspended its work during the reporting

period pending clarification of the applicable legal framework.

165

This led to

concerns about the rule of law and human rights protection.

Law of Ukraine “On the Participations of Citizens in the Protection of Public Order and State

Borders”, No. 1835-14, of 01 August 2003, Article 12.

162

Ibid, Article 14.

163

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T1-CR-04-01

164

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T1-CR-02-02.

165

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T1-CR-03-01.

161

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98.

Specific concerns exist regarding citizenship and residency status,

employment and the right to work, land and property rights, as well as the

situation of particularly vulnerable groups. It should be noted that the HRAM

did not receive allegations of occurred human rights violations in connection

with the above-mentioned issues. However, many individuals expressed

concern about their future enjoyment of rights during and after the transition

period.

99.

According to new Russian Federation legislation, all permanent residents on

the territory of Crimea, unless they explicitly denounce Russian citizenship,

will become citizens of the Russian Federation one month after the date on

which, according to the Russian Federation, Crimea was incorporated into its

territory.

166

A lack of clarity was noted concerning the future residency status

of those choosing not to take Russian citizenship and retaining their

Ukrainian citizenship.

100.

It is important to ensure that efforts to regulate the citizenship status of

individuals resident in Crimea do not result in any individual being made

stateless or arbitrarily stripped of their existing citizenship. Moreover,

procedures should be established that should not be unduly burdensome,

allowing those individuals with a permanent residency status to retain their

status regardless of whether they choose to become Russians citizens or not.

The acquisition of full citizenship rights for those considered as remaining in

Crimea as foreigners should be facilitated to the extent possible, including

beyond the currently envisaged deadline. For example, their residency status

before the change in the authority exercising

de facto

control over Crimea

should be taken fully into account for the purpose of granting citizenship at a

subsequent time.

101.

Citizenship and residency status are closely connected to employment status

and the right to work. A number of people interviewed by the HRAM

expressed concern at the potential effects of developments in Crimea on their

ability to continue to work.

167

This is the case in particular for those planning

Russian Federation Constitutional Law on “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of

Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities of the Republic of

Crimea and the city of federal level Sevastopol”, Article 4, 21 March 2014,

<http://kremlin.ru/news/20625>.

167

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T1-CR-01-10.

166

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not to acquire Russian citizenship. Additional specific concerns were raised

by those employed in the public sector, including in educational institutions

offering education in Ukrainian, as well as by those in the legal profession.

102.

It will be critical to ensure that all individuals permanently resident in

Crimea, including both Russian and Ukrainian citizens, retain their

employment rights in Crimea. Those employed in the public sector should

continue to perform their duties, whenever possible. Should this not be

feasible, they should be offered alternative positions commensurate with

their skills and experience, without loss of salary. Moreover, appropriate

training and requalification courses should be offered to those who may need

them to be able to continue to be employed in the public administration,

should additional requirements be introduced. It is important that vigorous

measures are taken to ensure that discrimination in employment in the public

or private sector, including on the grounds of ethnicity, language or religion,

is not tolerated and is actively combated.

103.

Concerns have also been raised in connection with land and property rights

during and after the transition period.

168

A number of interlocutors, in

particular members and representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, are

worried that that they may lose their land. This is a particular concern in a

reportedly significant number of cases where members of Crimean Tatar

communities have not regularized their presence on such land by acquiring

documents officially recognizing their property rights for the land and for

any buildings erected thereon. Such concerns have been compounded by

statements in the media, calling on Crimean Tatars to vacate part of their

land, required for “social needs”, in exchange for other plots of land whose

property is to be regularized.

169

More generally, the HRAM found a high

degree of uncertainty among many interviewees on how they will be able to

have their property rights recognized under the new system. This may

become a significant problem for those who may have lost, or otherwise may

not be in possession of, documents recognizing their title to real estate, or

who may have been in the process of acquiring property before the recent

168

For example, HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T2-CR-04-01.

See, for example, “Crimean Tatars Asked to Vacate Land, Regional Official Says”,

The Moscow

Times,

20 March 2014.

169

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events. During the reporting period, access to the Ukrainian electronic real

estate registry in Crimea was reported as being blocked by the Ukrainian

authorities, making it impossible to sell or buy property.

104.

In the transition period and beyond, the property and land rights of all sectors

of the population, and in particular of indigenous peoples, minorities and

other vulnerable groups, need to be respected. To this end, it will be crucial

to ensure the highest possible degree of continuity between the old and new

system of real estate registration. Moreover, those occupying land or

property in informal settlements, or otherwise lacking documents recognizing

their title to real property, should be afforded security of tenure, with a view

to fully regularizing their situation. No forced evictions should be carried out,

including in furtherance of reported plans to reallocate land currently held by

Crimean Tatars.

105.

In general, the current situation of legal uncertainty in Crimea has the

potential to have a particularly negative impact on the human rights of

vulnerable groups. Concerns have been raised, for example, about

individuals under any form of detention or imprisonment, or those requiring

long-term medical care or special forms of care. There should be regressive

effects on the enjoyment of human rights by all individuals. Particular

attention must be paid to ensuring that, in this process, the rights of

indigenous peoples and minorities, including ethnic, linguistic and religious

minorities, are fully respected.

Enforced Disappearances, Torture and Other Ill-treatment in Custody

106.

OSCE commitments prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention,

170

as do the

ICCPR,

171

the ECHR

172

and other instruments. OSCE participating States

have adopted numerous commitments prohibiting torture or other ill-

treatment.

173

In addition, legal obligations on the prevention of torture and

170

See, for example, Vienna Document 1989,

op. cit.,

note 39; Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2].

ICCPR, Article 9.

172

ECHR, Article 5.

173

See, for example, Vienna Document 1989,

op. cit.,

note 39.

171

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ill-treatment stem from provisions of the ICCPR,

174

the Convention against

Torture, the ECHR

175

and other instruments.

107.

In the reporting period, the HRAM received credible allegations of enforced

disappearances.

176

In a number of cases, victims were reportedly subjected to

torture and other ill-treatment while in custody. In one case, a victim of an

enforced disappearance was subsequently found dead. Individuals targeted

primarily included pro-Maidan activists, as well as Ukrainian military

personnel.

Findings

108.

Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar, reportedly left home in Simferopol at

approximately 7:30 a.m. on 3 March 2014. He reportedly went to Lenin

Square in Simferopol and stood in front of the building of the Council of

Ministers, where a number of unidentified men in uniform were stationed,

guarding the building. He was filmed at that location by the local television

channel ART. Beginning at 9 a.m., he was seen, and filmed, standing in front

of the building for more than one hour, apparently conducting a one-man

protest. Ametov disappeared, reportedly after having been taken away by a

small group of uniformed individuals at approximately 10:09 a.m. ART

video footage examined by the HRAM is consistent with these reports.

177

109.

On the following day, the victim’s family reported him as missing to the

local police and disseminated information about his disappearance through

social networks. Reportedly, the family did not receive any detailed

information about the victim’s fate or whereabouts from their police contact,

who alleged that Ametov had been briefly detained by “self-defence” groups

and subsequently released. Reportedly, a local representative of the “self-

ICCPR, Article 7.

ECHR, Article 3.

176

For the purpose of this report, an enforced disappearance is defined as the “arrest, detention,

abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of

persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to

acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared

person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law” (Article 1, International

Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance).

177

„Kak v Simferopole pokhishali zamuchennogo krymskogo tatarina” (How the tortured Crimean

Tatar was abducted), 27 March 2014, <http://www.ua-ru.info/news/8857-kak-v-simferopole-

pohischali-zamuchennogo-krymskogo-tatarina.html>.

175

174

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defence” groups informed the family that he was only taken away from the

square but was not subsequently held in custody by “self-defence” forces.

178

110.

Ametov’s body was reportedly found on 15 March, and he was identified by

his family on 17 March. He reportedly died as a result of a deep piercing

wound in the region of one of his eyes. Other wounds also found on his body

are reportedly consistent with ill-treatment.

179

The HRAM was unable to

obtain information from law-enforcement or prosecutorial bodies in Crimea

on the steps undertaken to ensure that Ametov’s reported enforced

disappearance and subsequent death were investigated.

180

111.

Reported victims of abductions or enforced disappearances in Crimea have

mainly included pro-Maidan activists and, in some cases, journalists. In one

case, two pro-Maidan activists were reportedly abducted on 9 March by

individuals believed to be part of “self-defence” groups at the train station in

Simferopol, as they were receiving a parcel with Ukrainian flags and other

materials to be used at a planned demonstration.

181

They were reportedly

initially taken to a police station near the train station, and were shortly

thereafter transferred to another location by car, with their heads covered.

Already in the police station, one of them was reportedly punched as he tried

to resist. According to one person’s testimony received by the HRAM, police

officers initially acknowledged that the men were transferred into the custody

of members of the Russian Unity party.

182

112.

While in custody, one of the men was reportedly severely beaten and injured

with a knife. Moreover, electricity was used to inflict pain on him, in what

has been described as an “electric chair” in testimonies collected by the

HRAM. Finally, he claimed that he was repeatedly and deliberately shot with

a pneumatic gun.

183

The other man did not report having been physically

tortured or ill-treated, apparently also as a result of his older age and a pre-

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T1-CR-02-01.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T1-CR-01-01 and 14-03-20-T1-CR-02-01.

180

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T1-CR-01-01 and 14-03-20-T1-CR-01-03.

181

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T2-KY-02-02.

182

HRAM individual interview 14-03-12-AT-KY-01-01.

183

ODIHR monitors were able to examine the wounds on the victim’s legs, and there were reports that

one of his arms had signs of injuries consistent with the use of a pneumatic weapon.

179

178

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existing health condition. However, both men were allegedly subjected to

significant psychological pressure while in custody.

184

113.

The captors reportedly identified themselves as members of the “Crimean

Army.” One of the captors was reportedly recognized as a member of the

disbanded Ukrainian special police unit Berkut. Others were believed by the

victims to be members of “self-defence” militias. The fate and whereabouts

of the two men remained unknown until 19 March, when they were released

jointly with seven other activists and one Ukrainian military officer who had

all previously disappeared. Notably, on 10 March, the Prime Minister of

Crimea had been reported in the media as stating that one of the activists was

“alive and well”, and had been detained by the Crimean special services

reportedly to prevent him from carrying out his activities in advance of the

referendum on 16 March.

185

114.

In another case, a pro-Ukrainian activist was reportedly abducted by

unidentified men wearing the ribbon of St. George (a symbol associated with

pro-Russian groups) on 11 March, after he took part in a pro-Ukrainian

protest. His fate and whereabouts remained unknown until 19 March, when

he was released. One of his captors allegedly identified himself as a member

of a “self-defence” group.

186

While in custody, he was reportedly wounded

with a knife by one of his captors, subjected to beatings, denied food and

water, and held in inhuman conditions in an unheated room. While being

held, the victim allegedly witnessed the torture and ill-treatment of other

individuals in the custody of the group, and in particular the torture of two

individuals believed to be Ukrainian military officers (also see below), who

were reportedly severely beaten and shot with pneumatic guns.

187

115.

The HRAM received reports

188

that one individual, a religious activist,

189

disappeared on 17 March in Simferopol. Police officers in Simferopol, to

whom the disappearance was reported, were unable to provide information

HRAM individual interview 14-03-27-T2-KY-02-02.

“Aksionov: Shchekun zhiv i zdorov, no dejatelnost provokatorov budet ogranichena” (Aksionov:

Shchekun is alive and healthy, but the activity of provocators will be limited), 10 March 2014,,

<http://rosukrinform.com/categ-news/item/12624-shchekun-giv-i-zdorov>.

186

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-02-01.

187

Ibid.

188

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T3-CR-01-01.

189

The activist was involved in the translation and promotion of the Quran.

185

184

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about his fate and whereabouts, although, according to unofficial

information, it was believed that the man was being held at a police pre-trial

detention facility in Simferopol. On 21 March, the HRAM monitors

witnessed how the lawyers of the alleged victim were prevented from having

access to the facility where the man was reportedly being detained. Neither

his lawyer nor his family were able to receive information on his fate and

whereabouts until 31 March, when he was reportedly released.

190

116.

The HRAM collected other testimonies and reports about the enforced

disappearances of individuals who were detained by unidentified forces,

usually in uniform, and subjected to treatment amounting to torture,

including severe beatings with rifle butts and the use of pneumatic weapons

to deliberately inflict pain and injuries.

191

In one case, one individual

reported having had a portion of his ear cut off by one of his captors. Two

women, an activist and a journalist, abducted at a checkpoint in Armyansk on

9 March and released on 11 March, were reported as having been physically

attacked by their captors, who reportedly included military men in uniform

without insignia and men reported as wearing Cossack uniforms.

192

Moreover, they were allegedly threatened, harassed and intimidated by those

holding them. In another case, two journalists were reportedly abducted on

16 March at one of the polling stations where the referendum was being

administered. The alleged perpetrators included members of “self-defence”

groups. The men were reportedly released on 22 March and subsequently

described how they were ill-treated during their detention.

193

117.

During the reporting period, the HRAM received allegations of enforced

disappearances targeting members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stationed

in Crimea. In one case, a military officer disappeared in the early afternoon

of 11 March. According to some reports, he was detained by armed

HRAM report 14-04-01-T3-CR-correspondence.

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-26-T2-KY-02-01 and 14-03-29-T2-KY-01-01. Reports of

torture in custody received by ODIHR are consistent with what has been reported by a variety of other

sources, including civil society human rights monitoring organizations and the media.

192

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-27-T2-KY-03-02 and 14-03-29-T2-KY-02-01.

193

“Operator Vavilon-13 rasskazal,, kak krymchane bili ego truboj iz-za otsa-deputata” (Operator of

Vavilon -13 told how he was beating with a pipe because of his father – deputy), 22 March 2014,

<http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/operator-vavilon-13-rasskazal-kak-krymchane-bili-ego-truboy-iz-za-otca-

deputata-356431.html >.

191

190

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individuals at his flat in Simferopol.

194

The abduction reportedly took place

in the presence of local police officers stationed nearby, who witnessed the

event but did not intervene. According to testimonies collected by the

HRAM, police officers acknowledged having witnessed the abduction but

stated that they were “powerless” to intervene. Despite attempts by his

family to trace him, his fate and whereabouts remained unknown until 27

March, when he was reported as having been released. Local and

international media reported about similar occurrences of abductions and

enforced disappearances targeting Ukrainian military officers.

195

118.

The HRAM was unable to obtain information from law-enforcement or

prosecutorial bodies in Crimea on their investigation of enforced

disappearances and related acts, both during the disappearance as well as

subsequently, also with a view to ensuring full accountability for any crimes

committed in the context of enforced disappearances in Crimea. According to

information it received from other sources, including the victims and their

families, any such steps appear to have been ineffective so far.

119.

In interviewing individuals reported as having disappeared and, in a

significant number of instances, having been tortured while in custody, the

HRAM received reports pointing to the detention of more individuals in the

same location. In such situations, individuals could describe to the HRAM

their treatment, as well as that of other individuals detained there.

196

particular, ODIHR received reports that some of the disappeared were held

and tortured in a military conscription centre in Simferopol, allegedly

controlled by “self-defence” groups.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T3-CR-01-01.

“V Krymu osvobozhdeny zakhvachennyje v plen ukrainskije ofitsery” (Ukrainian military officers

held captive in Crimea, released), 27 March 2014,

<http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25311041.html>, “Acknowledging defeat, Ukraine pulls

troops from Crimea”, 24 March 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/us-ukraine-crisis-

crimea-base-idUSBREA2N09J20140324>,

“What has happened to Ukraine's Colonel Nyet? Defiant

fighter pilot missing since Russians took him in for a 'meeting’”, 24 March 2014,

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2587895/Ukrainian-fighter-pilot-colonel-Yuli-Mamchur-

missing-taken-meeting-Russian-officers.html>.

196

In some cases, interviewed individuals described how they could hear the screams of others being

tortured.

195

194

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Assessment

120.

The incidents described above reveal a disturbing pattern of violations

entailing enforced disappearances and allegations of torture and other ill-

treatment primarily targeting pro-Maidan activists and Ukrainian military

officers. These violations appear to have been perpetrated by individuals

reported as wearing a variety of uniforms and acting as members of “self-

defence” groups, Cossacks, “Crimean Army,” etc. Although acting outside

the law, the groups responsible for such acts appear to have enjoyed the

acquiescence and, in some cases, the active complicity of the authorities

exercising

de facto

control, including their law-enforcement bodies. The

complicity of the law enforcement who either participated in carrying out

enforced disappearances or may have been aware of unlawful acts by armed

groups but did not take action to prevent them, gives rise to particular

concern.

121.

In relation to enforced disappearances, a matter of particular concern has

been the treatment to which the victims were reportedly subjected and which

may give rise to the violation of the right to life, the prohibition of torture

and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and of the

freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention.

122.

Given that authorities exercising

de facto

control have reportedly been

ineffective in investigating the incidents and holding the perpetrators to

account, this gives rise to significant concerns over the violation of the right

to effective remedies.

Attacks against Journalists and Activists

123.

OSCE participating States are committed to abiding by the rule of law

197

and

to taking the necessary measures to ensure that law-enforcement personnel

act in the public interest.

198

The ICCPR

199

and the ECHR

200

each protect the

right of everyone to physical integrity, which encompasses the right to be

free from torture and other ill-treatment. Freedom of expression and, in

197

198

See, for example, Copenhagen Document,

op. cit.,

note [1].

See, for example, Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2].

199

ICCPR, Article 7.

200

ECHR, Article 3.

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particular, the right of the media to collect, report and disseminate

information are guaranteed in OSCE human dimension commitments

201

and

in other international human rights instruments.

202

OSCE participating States

have condemned all attacks on, and harassment of, journalists and have

committed to endeavouring to hold those directly responsible for such attacks

and harassment accountable.

203

124.

The HRAM received a number of credible allegations of physical attacks,

primarily targeting journalists and pro-Maidan activists that took place in

Crimea during the reporting period.

Findings

125.

A Ukrainian journalist reported to the HRAM that she was attacked with her

colleagues on 7 March in Sevastopol as she was reporting on the storming of

a Ukrainian military base by unidentified forces.

204

The first attack took

place when a group of unidentified men dressed in sportswear allegedly

began attacking and beating the journalists.

205

Following this assault, she and

her colleagues allegedly ran to their car and attempted to leave the scene.

However, they were reportedly blocked by three other cars, from which

unidentified masked individuals armed with guns and bats exited and

proceeded to severely beat the male journalists, reportedly including a Greek

reporter. As a result, two reporters and two cameramen suffered injuries,

reportedly including fractures, a concussion and a punctured lung. Their

driver was also reportedly beaten, and all the journalists’ equipment was

allegedly taken away from them and destroyed. Following the assault, two of

the journalists were reportedly locked in the trunk of the journalists’ car by

their assailants, who then left the scene.

206

126.

Local journalists in Crimea reported having been attacked, harassed and

threatened by unidentified individuals, including members of “self-defence”

See, for example, Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2].

ICCPR, Article 19; ECHR, Article 10.

203

Budapest Document,

op. cit.,

note [7].

204

HRAM individual interview 14-03-29-T2-KY-03-01.

205

The same incident was also witnessed by a Russian journalist, who was reportedly attacked while he

was reporting on events in Sevastopol on 7 March. Following the incident, he sought medical

assistance in Simferopol, and the police received a report of the attack.

206

HRAM individual interview 14-03-29-T2-KY-03-01.

202

201

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groups. A Yalta-based journalist reported a number of incidents of

harassment and threats.

207

On 5 March, while she was reporting on a pro-

Russian assembly, unidentified men attempted to forcibly take away her

camera, as a result of which she was injured. Reportedly, this incident took

place in the presence of police officers, who did not intervene. Subsequently,

on 6 March, as she was reporting on developments at a military checkpoint,

she was allegedly forced to call her office and report information as dictated

to her by unidentified men, who stated they were there to protect the

checkpoint from Ukrainian nationalists. Following these incidents, she

received threats by mail and e-mail and, reportedly, was informed that a

photograph of her had been placed on the tent of pro-Russian protesters in

Yalta calling her a Ukrainian radical and provocateur.

208

127.

A Sevastopol-based journalist reported that she was assaulted on 3 March,

allegedly by members of “self-defence” groups, as she was reporting on the

situation near a Ukrainian military base in Sevastopol.

209

She claimed that

she was hit on the head and her camera taken away. She also claimed that,

subsequently, on 10 March, her office, where she was working, was searched

by individuals identifying themselves as members of a local “self-defence”

group and as an official of the Security Service. She reported that the stated

objective was to search for explosives. She also claimed that, during the

search, numerous personal and work-related documents were checked and

photographed.

210

128.

Staff from a local Crimean Tatar television channel also reported that they

have been subjected to significant pressure, constraining their ability to carry

out their work.

211

The HRAM received reports of abusive leaflets and posters

(also see below) targeting the chief editor of a local Ukrainian newspaper.

212

A number of journalists interviewed by the HRAM described how this series

of attacks had the worrying consequence of creating a chilling effect, making

it extremely difficult for the media to operate freely. Media outlets have

207

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T1-CR-02-01.

Ibid.

209

HRAM individual interview 14-03-26-T2-KY-04-01.

210

Ibid.

211

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03.

212

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08.

208

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experienced difficulties, for example, in hiring camera operators willing to

work in Crimea.

213

129.

Pro-Maidan activists in Crimea have reportedly been subjected to enforced

disappearances (see above) and attacks and other undue restrictions to their

freedom of peaceful assembly in the context of public events (see below). In

addition, the HRAM received reports of other forms of attacks, threats and

intimidation targeting them. In some cases, local pro-Maidan activists were

briefly detained by unidentified individuals believed to be members of “self-

defence” groups, and, on occasion, ill-treated.

214

Other reports alleged that

activists’ flats in Sevastopol were broken into and searched by unidentified

men, allegedly looking for pro-Ukrainian or nationalist propaganda. Such

incidents were reported as being particularly frequent in advance of the

referendum on 16 March.

215

130.

A lawyer at a Crimean NGO and a pro-Maidan activist

216

reported that she

was targeted through the dissemination in the local community of leaflets

bearing her name, photograph and home address. The leaflets, which the

HRAM was able to examine, describe her as a “traitor to Crimea” and a

supporter of the “criminal Maidan”, with “the blood of murdered people on

her conscience”. HRAM experts received reports of similar leaflets aimed at

other activists, posters with abusive and threatening messages hung in the

neighbourhood where they lived, on local buses, and in other public

spaces.

217

131.

While in some cases the victims of these attacks chose not to report them to

the police, including for fear of reprisals, in other cases criminal complaints

were filed or the police became aware of the incidents in another manner.

The HRAM was unable to obtain information from local law-enforcement

and prosecutorial bodies on any investigation into these acts with a view to

bringing those responsible to justice. According to information it received

213

214

HRAM individual interview 14-03-29-T2-KY-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T3-CR-04-01.

215

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T1T2T3-CR-03-02.

216

HRAM individual interview 14-03-12-AT-KY-01-01.

217

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08.

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from other sources, including the victims, any such steps appear to have been

inadequate so far.

218

Assessment

132.

The incidents described above indicate a disturbing pattern of physical

attacks, harassment, threats and intimidation of journalists and pro-Maidan

activists taking place in the reporting period in Crimea. The alleged

perpetrators were usually described as unidentified men who were, in some

cases, wearing a uniform and are reportedly associated with “self-defence”

groups. This gives rise to concerns over violation of freedom of expression

and the freedom of the media. Of particular concern is the apparent failure of

the police to exercise due diligence in protecting activists and journalists in

carrying out their work.

133.

Given their targets and frequency, many of these attacks appear to have been

aimed at restricting freedom of the media by undermining the safety of

journalists when they attempted to report on the events as they unfolded.

134.

Attacks, threats and intimidation directed at pro-Maidan activists appear to

have had a similar goal, i.e., to create an atmosphere of intimidation and a

climate where alternative views could not be heard or aired in public, thus

giving rise to violation of freedom of expression.

135.

Disturbingly, police officers present at the scene were reported as not

intervening to prevent or stop such acts, apparently failing in their duty to

exercise due diligence in protecting individuals, giving rise to concerns over

violations of the right to effective remedies.

Manifestations of Intolerance

136.

OSCE participating States have undertaken to combat intolerance and

discrimination in general,

219

as well as against specific groups, such as Roma

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-12-AT-KY-01-01, 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03 and 14-03-29-T2-

KY-03-01.

219

See, for example, Helsinki Final Act,

op. cit.,

note 174; Vienna Document 1989,

op. cit.,

note 39;

OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No. 4/03, “Tolerance and Non-discrimination”, Maastricht 2

December 2003, <http://www.osce.org/mc/19382>, (Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03

on Tolerance and Non-discrimination).

218

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and Sinti.

220

In particular, participating States have recognized the

importance of combating hate crimes.

221

A number of international human

rights instruments and other standards prohibit discrimination,

222

including

racial discrimination,

223

as well as condemn intolerance and negative

stereotyping on the basis of religion or belief.

224

137.

The HRAM received reports of public harassment and manifestations of

intolerance targeting primarily Ukrainian speakers and also members of

Crimean Tatar community as part of an overall increase in violence in

Crimea since the arrival of uniformed troops without insignia to the region.

Findings

138.

For example, the HRAM has received reports of public harassment of

individuals on grounds of their speaking Ukrainian in public places.

225

Some

interlocutors reported incidents of bullying of Ukrainian-speaking students

by their Russian-speaking peers.

226

One case of harassment of a Ukrainian-

language teacher by students and other teachers for allegedly preferring to

always speak Ukrainian was conveyed to the HRAM.

227

139.

Identifying as Ukrainian and supporting Ukrainian unity is allegedly

perceived negatively by a significant proportion of the population in

Crimea.

228

Interlocutors reported a growing portrayal of pro-Ukrainian

sentiment as an expression of ultranationalist right-wing views.

229

See, for example, OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No. 3/03, “Action Plan on Improving the

Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area”, Maastricht, 27 November 2003,

<http://www.osce.org/odihr/17554>.

221

Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03 on Tolerance and Non-discrimination,

op. cit.,

note 206.

222

ICCPR, Articles 2 and 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article

2(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 2; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women, Article 2.

223

Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

224

UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 22/31 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on

religion or belief.

225

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T2-CR-03-06.

226

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T2-CR-03-06.

227

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08.

228

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08, 14-03-23-T2-CR-01-01, 14-03-23-T2-CR-04-

01.

229

Ibid.

220

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particular, incidents of referring to supporters of Ukrainian unity as

“banderovtsy” and “fascists”, including in the media, were reported.

230

one occasion, a pro-Ukrainian schoolteacher of the Ukrainian language

allegedly had a swastika painted on her door.

231

One interlocutor reported

that even the Ukrainian flag is allegedly seen by some as fascist, adding that

his city had seen three “anti-fascist committees” spring up in recent

months.

232

140.

While, overall, Crimean Tatars had perceived the attitude towards them as

tolerant, the interviewees belonging to the Crimean Tatar community

reported growing anti-Tatar sentiments due to the general opposition of the

Crimean Tatars to the separation of Crimea.

233

They also reported instances

of intimidation of Crimean Tatars. These allegedly included putting up signs

to identify marked households as Crimean Tatar,

234

as well as sending

anonymous text messages threatening Tatar individuals

235

and verbal

harassment of Crimean Tatar schoolchildren by their peers.

236

It was reported

that, in most of these cases, the alleged victims did not report the incidents to

the police because of the alleged lack of trust in law enforcement agencies.

237

141.

Moreover, since a number of Crimean Tatars reportedly own and operate

successful businesses in the region, there is a fear, buttressed by recent

incidents where a Tatar-owned hotel and restaurant were burned down, that

Crimean Tatars may face higher risks of their property being destroyed or

illegally taken away.

238

Assessment

142.

The situation described above points to a failure by the authorities exercising

de facto

control in Crimea to promote tolerance towards all communities in

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-23-T2-CR-01-01 and 14-03-23-T2-CR-04-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08.

232

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T2-CR-03-01.

233

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-20-T2-CR-02-02 and 14-03-24-T2-CR-04-01.

234

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-02-02.

235

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T2-CR-04-01.

236

Ibid.

237

Ibid.

238

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-02-02.

231

230

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the region and to ensure that their members do not experience discrimination

on an ethnic or linguistic basis. Of particular concern is the situation of the

Crimean Tatar community as well as of the Ukrainian community. Both

groups appear to have been targeted in incidents of ethnically motivated

harassment and intimidation which were met by an inadequate response by

the authorities exercising

de facto

control.

Rights of Military Personnel and their Families

143.

OSCE participating States have committed to “[ensuring] that military,

paramilitary and security forces personnel will be able to enjoy and exercise

their human rights and fundamental freedoms as reflected in [O]SCE

documents and international law”.

239

They have also undertaken to “reflect in

their laws or other relevant documents the rights and duties of armed forces

personnel”.

240

144.

The HRAM team has received a number of allegations concerning

restrictions of access by Ukrainian military personnel to basic amenities,

including electricity

241

and food.

242

Findings

145.

This situation was reportedly caused by the blocking of military bases by

“self-defence” forces and other uniformed armed men without insignia.

243

Moreover, some interviewees reported that military personnel and their

families experienced problems withdrawing cash or making payments either

due to unspecified banking problems or specifically because their accounts

had been blocked.

244

Budapest Document,

op. cit.,

note [7], Decisions: IV. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects

of Security, para. 32.

240

Ibid,

para. 28.

241

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-06-AT-KY-01-02 and 14-03-30-T6-OD-02-01.

242

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T3-CR-03-01.

243

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-06-AT-KY-01-02; 14-03-08-AT-KY-01-03, 14-03-21-T3-CR-

03-01, 14-03-30-T6-OD-02-01.

244

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-10-AT-KY-03-01 and 14-03-30-T2-KY-01-01.

239

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146.

There have also been reports of varying degrees of harassment of the families

of military personnel.

245

In at least one instance, pressure was allegedly

applied to force the families of Ukrainian border guards to move out and

abandon their housing.

246

It should be noted, however, that while physical

assaults

247

on, and abductions

248

of, military personnel have been reported,

the alleged pressure on their families has largely been of a psychological

nature.

249

147.

Influence has also allegedly been applied to service members themselves in

order to induce them to change allegiance.

250

It reportedly varied from offers

of money

251

to orders and proposals transmitted by high-ranking officers

down the chain of command.

252

Reportedly, reassignment of service

members to bases in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government has

not been a straightforward process, and with ensuring that redeploying

military personnel have adequate access to housing and social services.

253

Some reports indicate that families have been left to make removal

arrangements by themselves

254

and at their own expense.

255

This situation

was allegedly exacerbated by the above-mentioned difficulties in

withdrawing cash

256

and also, allegedly, exposed the families to additional

risks, resulting in a group of families travelling together being robbed at a

checkpoint.

257

148.

One person expressed concern that the service members who hail from

Crimea and would rather retire and stay in Crimea but not change allegiance

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-06-AT-KY-01-02, 2014-03-07-AT-KY-04-08, 14-03-11-AT-

KY-01-01, 14-03-21-T1-CR-03-01, 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08; 14-03-24-T2-CR-02-01, 14-03-30-T2-

KY-01-01.

246

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-04-08.

247

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-11-AT-KY-01-01 and 14-03-21-T3-CR-03-01.

248

HRAM individual interview 14-03-10-AT-KY-03-01.

249

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T1-CR-03-01.

250

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-07-AT-KY-04-08, 14-03-19-T2/T3-CR-01-02, 14-03-23-T2-

CR-02-01.

251

HRAM individual interview 14-03-07-AT-KY-04-08.

252

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-19-T2/T3-CR-01-02 and 14-03-23-T2-CR-02-01.

253

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T2-CR-02-01.

254

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-23-T2-CR-02-01 and 14-03-30-T2-KY-01-01.

255

HRAM individual interview 14-03-30-T2-KY-01-01.

256

Ibid.

257

Ibid.

245

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risk being dishonourably discharged, which would result in the loss of their

military pensions.

258

Assessment

149.

Information relayed to the HRAM points to a pattern of harassment to which

the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been subjected,

and which has negatively affected their rights and entitlements. These acts

have allegedly been perpetrated largely by “self-defence” groups. The

situation of Ukrainian military personnel who did not change allegiance will

require due attention in order to prevent future violations.

Freedom of Movement and Displacement of Population

150.

OSCE participating States are committed to removing all legal and other

restrictions with respect to travel within their territories and with respect to

residence for those entitled to permanent residence within their territories.

259

They are further committed to facilitating the voluntary return in safety and

dignity of internally displaced persons, in accordance with international

standards, recognizing also that the reintegration of people in their places of

origin must be pursued without discrimination.

260

International human rights

law guarantees everyone the right to freedom of movement within the

borders of the state where they are located, and the right to leave and enter

their own country.

261

The OSCE recognizes the UN Guiding Principles on

Internal Displacement as the relevant framework.

262

151.

As of 1 April, some 3,000 people, mainly women and children, had left

Crimea to seek temporary refuge in, mostly, Lviv, Kyiv, and Vinnytsia, as

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T2-CR-02-01.

Moscow Document,

op. cit.,

note [2], para. 33.

260

Lisbon Document,

op. cit.,

note 240, para. 10.

261

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13; ICCPR, Article 12; ECHR, Article 2 of

Protocol 4.

262

Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/03 on Tolerance and Non-discrimination,

op. cit.,

note 206, para. 13.

259

258

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well as Ivano-Frankivsk.

263

Eighty per cent of the IDPs were reportedly

Crimean Tatars.

264

In addition to civilians, service members of the Ukrainian

military and border guards, as well as their families, had to withdraw from

Crimea (mostly to regions closer to Crimea, such as Mykolayiv and Odessa).

Findings

152.

While the conditions and issues faced by these IDPs are discussed in more

detail above, the current section looks specifically at the situation in Crimea,

including the root causes for displacement. In this context, it also addresses

restrictions on freedom of movement.

153.

The HRAM interviewed a number of people, including Crimean residents

who had already left Crimea as IDPs (including the families of Ukrainian

military personnel and communities such as Crimean Tatars and Roma).

According to the Ukrainian Border Guard Service, the people who have been

leaving Crimea have, to a large extent, not identified themselves as IDPs

since they are planning to return to Crimea at some point.

265

154.

The representatives of the religious communities interviewed pointed out that

a number of local religious leaders had left, including priests from the

Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyivan Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek

Catholic Church.

266

In some other cases, those priests who had left at the

outset of the events in Crimea returned again later.

267

155.

The representatives of the Roma community in Crimea conveyed to the

HRAM a general feeling of fear and uncertainty among the Roma about the

status of their passports and access to social benefits, one representative

pointing out that, while the numbers of Romani IDPs so far were not

particularly high, many Romani individuals were considering leaving.

268

According to one interviewee, a number of Roma families had sold their

“Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #6”,

op. cit.,

note 248. According to Lviv Regional State

Administration, for instance, as of 27 March, Lviv alone was hosting 1,276 IDPs, mostly Crimean

Tatars. [HRAM interview 14-03-27-T8-LV-03-10].

264

"Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report #4", UNICEF, 21 March 2014,

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF_Ukraine_SitRep4_21March2014.pdf>.

265

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T6-OD-01-01.

266

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-23-T2-CR-01-01 and 14-03-24-T2-CR-02-01.

267

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T2-CR-02-01.

268

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T2-CR-02-02.

263

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property in Crimea and were preparing to leave or had already left for the

Russian Federation (explaining that the Roma who came to Ukraine after the

collapse of the Soviet Union had strong family ties in the Russian

Federation).

269

156.

The HRAM received allegations of significant restrictions on freedom of

movement in Crimea. In particular, some interviewees reported that

checkpoints had been set up and that identity checks were being conducted

outside checkpoints as well. Following the referendum in Crimea, for

example, one interlocutor noted that there was a checkpoint on the road to

Sevastopol that was controlled by former Berkut members and “self-defence”

forces.

270

In Bakhchysaray, temporary checkpoints were reportedly installed

three or four days before the referendum in settlements populated by

Crimean Tatars.

271

157.

According to another interviewee who claimed to have researched the public

transportation situation in Crimea at the time of the HRAM, numerous

checks by “self-defence” groups occurred on a daily basis, both at

checkpoints and elsewhere on transportation routes.

272

Transportation

companies reportedly had roughly 30 per cent lower turnover due to people

being afraid to travel. At the same time, a plunge in demand and a spike in

fuel prices (by some 15-20 per cent) allegedly resulted in fewer buses being

dispatched. The interlocutor relayed that the “self-defence” groups can stop

any vehicle or train and conduct ID checks, as well as baggage searches.

Those people who are considered suspicious by the “self-defence” groups are

allegedly taken off the vehicles they are travelling in and not permitted

further travel. Bus stations have allegedly put up announcements

recommending that all passengers carry their travel identification documents

even for travel within Crimea.

273

158.

The Ukrainian Border Guard Service has likewise stated that some

individuals wishing to leave Crimea have not been allowed to cross into the

269

270

HRAM individual interview 14-03-29-T6-OD-03-06.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T2T3-CR-01-02.

271

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-01-01.

272

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03.

273

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03.

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territory controlled by the Ukrainian government,

274

the main reason

allegedly cited being either that their stated aim of travelling to Ukraine was

suspicious or that they lacked the proper documentation.

275

159.

Another interlocutor reported that he had witnessed people in green uniforms

and helmets checking everyone at checkpoints.

276

At least one checkpoint

(near Voinskiy) was reportedly manned by individuals in civilian clothes.

160.

As regards entry into Crimea, the route through Armyansk has been

described as particularly difficult. The checkpoint there was reportedly

operated by “self-defence” forces and former Berkut troops. In addition,

masked individuals in green uniforms were reportedly positioned at the

Jankoy train station at 10-metre intervals.

277

An interviewee also alleged that

paramilitary formations were conducting searches of passengers’ baggage

upon the arrival of trains in Simferopol.

278

It was conveyed to the HRAM

that some people, in particular journalists, had been turned back at

checkpoints.

279

It is unclear if these latter cases involved “self-defence”

groups or other paramilitary formations.

280

Reportedly, Crimean residents,

regardless of their ethnic background, were scared to move around the

peninsula because of the alleged random nature and unpredictability of such

checks.

281

At the same time, from the Ukrainian authorities’ perspective,

border guards would only turn people crossing into Crimea back in the event

that they did not have proper documentation or had a criminal record.

282

161.

The Ukrainian military units stationed in Crimea faced a particular restriction

on their freedom of movement where they found themselves under siege.

This was the case with the Belbek airbase and the Evpatoria naval base.

283

One family member of a Ukrainian naval serviceperson stationed in

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T6-OD-01-01.

HRAM report 14-03-30-T7-KS-04-field visit. This was also confirmed by the border guards

manning the post near Armyansk,

276

Ibid.

277

Ibid.

278

HRAM individual interview 14-03-24-T2-CR-04-01.

279

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-12-AT-KY-01-01 and 14-03-24-T2-CR-04-01.

280

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-10-AT-KY-03-01 and 14-03-12-AT-KY-01-01.

Around that time there were also allegations that identification documents were sometimes

destroyed during such checks, HRAM individual interview 14-03-10-AT-KY-04-NA.

281

HRAM individual interview 14-03-20-T2-CR-04-03.

282

HRAM individual interview 14-03-28-T6-OD-01-01.

283

HRAM individual interview 14-03-19-T2T3-CR-01-02.

275

274

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Sevastopol reported that service members were allowed by gunmen to leave

but not to return. This situation lasted for over a month.

284

Assessment

162.

The presence of military personnel in uniforms without insignia gave rise to

a climate of fear and lawlessness that has resulted in a number of persons

leaving their homes in Crimea and becoming IDPs, primarily on the territory

controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. The Crimean Tatar community has

been disproportionally affected. The climate of fear and uncertainty may

induce more people to leave in the future.

163.

Significant limitations to freedom of movement have aalso been observed

primarily due to the existence of checkpoints operated by “self-defence”

groups throughout the peninsula. The arbitrary nature of the checks and the

illegality thereof have given rise to a climate of fear that reportedly has made

residents less willing to travel. Journalists have reportedly been targeted at

checkpoints and denied entry into Crimea. Denial of entry into the territory

under control by the Ukrainian authorities has also been noted.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

57.

Article 11 of the ECHR, Article 21 of the ICCPR and para. 9.2 of the

Copenhagen Document protect the freedom of peaceful assembly. According

to Article 11(2) of the ECHR, any restrictions to this right should be

prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for

the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

58.

According to the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Commission for

Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Guidelines on Freedom of

Peaceful Assembly,

285

the policing of assemblies must be guided by the

human rights principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-

HRAM individual interview 14-03-30-T6-OD-02-01.

Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

(Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's

Commission for Democracy through Law, 2010), para. 5.3.

285

284

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discrimination and must adhere to applicable human rights standards. The

state has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to

enable peaceful assemblies to take place without participants fearing physical

violence. Law-enforcement officials must also protect the participants of a

peaceful assembly from any person or group (including agents provocateurs

and counter-demonstrators) that attempts to disrupt or inhibit the assembly in

any way.

164.

As in other parts of the south and east of Ukraine, assemblies in Crimea have

taken place in the context of a massive campaign against pro-Maidan

activists. Violent groups have frequently been aggressive towards assemblies

held in Crimea by pro-Maidan groups, forcing them to disperse.

286

Such

incidents were generally accompanied by little or no reaction from police

officers present at the scene.

Findings

165.

In addition to the harassment of journalists at assemblies, as discussed above,

the HRAM received reports of serious disruptions of peaceful assemblies

organized by pro-Maidan groups. For example, in Sevastopol, demonstrators

at an assembly organized on 9 March in support of the territorial integrity of

Ukraine were allegedly assaulted by unidentified individuals near the

assembly. Some of the participants of the assembly were injured.

287

166.

Similarly, on 13 March, a gathering in Yalta of around 70 supporters of the

territorial integrity of Ukraine, primarily students, women and children. The

event was disrupted by a pro-Russian “self-defence” group of 70 people,

which eventually grew in size to reach a total of 200 participants. Reportedly,

this was not a counter-demonstration but an attempt to forcefully disperse the

original assembly by using intimidation and verbal threats. The confrontation

resulted in minor violent incidents.288 There were allegedly no more than

six police officers present, and they were passive.

289

There was a perception

HRAM individual interview 14-03-21-T1-CR-03-01.

HRAM individual interview 14-03-12- AT-KY- 02-01. Also see HRAM individual interview and

14-03-22-T1-CR-02-02.

288

Ibid.

289

HRAM individual interviews 14-03-23-T1-CR-02-01 and 14-03-23-T1-CR-01-10.

287

286

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that the police were not neutral, and that they supported the pro-Russian

groups.

290

Assessment

167.

The incidents reported above point to the failure by law enforcement agents

to protect the freedom of peaceful assembly in the face of attacks by “self-

defence” and other groups. Authorities exercising de facto control in Crimea

have an obligation to effectively investigate attacks against participants in

peaceful assemblies, as well as any allegations of serious police misconduct

resulting in the failure to protect and facilitate assemblies. It must be noted

that these concerns are compounded by the presence of and active

participation by “self-defence” groups in incidents at assemblies, giving rise

to concerns over serious violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly.

290

HRAM individual interview 14-03-23-T1-CR-01-10.

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SECTION II: HCNM ON THE MINORITY RIGHTS SITUATION

IN UKRAINE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared at the request of the Government of Ukraine. It

represents one section of the report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission

(HRAM) conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and

the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Information collected during the mission has been complemented with data

and information from other reliable sources, including the reports and

findings of OSCE structures, such as the Representative on Freedom of the

Media (RFoM) and the Special Monitoring Mission, as well as other

international bodies, in order to provide context for the findings of this

report.

This section of the HRAM report presents findings and recommendations

concerning the minority rights situation in Ukraine. It has been prepared by

the HCNM based on several fact-finding missions undertaken by the HCNM

and her staff (HCNM delegations) between 8 March and 17 April 2014 to

various regions of Ukraine, including Crimea. The findings and

recommendations on the human rights situation prepared by ODIHR are

presented in the first section of this report. The HCNM and the ODIHR have

different mandates and had a different focus in the preparation of this report,

which is therefore presented in two sections. The two sections together

provide an overview of the recent situation concerning human rights,

minority rights in Ukraine, including Crimea.

This report first establishes the context to the emerging challenges

concerning minority rights in Ukraine by providing an overview of relevant

political developments and international and domestic legal standards

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pertaining to minority rights protection. The assessment provides key

conclusions regarding the framework for minority rights protection. It

focuses on the most relevant areas of minority rights, such as the use of

languages; education rights; the participation of persons belonging to

national minorities in public affairs and in cultural, social and economic life;

and anti-discrimination. The report features a separate section that analyses

the specific situation in Crimea.

The report acknowledges the high level of inter-ethnic tolerance that has

traditionally characterized Ukrainian society, as well as the support that the

Ukrainian authorities have provided for minority-language education and the

cultural activities of national minorities over the years. The report also notes,

however, that the underlying internal divisions within Ukrainian society have

not been effectively addressed by the successive authorities. In fact, issues

related to identity have been instrumentalized on several occasions by

various political forces. The politicization of minority rights can lead to the

polarization of society. It also diverts attention from the needs of smaller

minorities, who are thus more vulnerable.

Ukraine’s legal framework to protect and promote minority rights is

fragmented, outdated, and occasionally unclear and contradictory. Efforts to

implement the relevant laws have been inconsistent, due in part to

institutional weakness and underfunding. As a result, there is considerable

legal and practical uncertainty on particular aspects of minority rights

protection. The ongoing crisis has contributed to this uncertainty. It is

therefore important that the authorities start to address these issues through a

concerted, considered and participatory legal reform process. Although this

issue is urgent, the authorities should avoid taking any hasty steps, especially

in the current context.

This report outlines a number of concerns that pre-date the crisis, but which

have become more acute or urgent in light of the ongoing crisis. In addition,

new concerns have emerged. Rising inter-ethnic tensions are reflected in

various incidents and the political and media discourse when it is discussing

language and identity issues. This is contributing to minorities’ perceptions

of their own vulnerability. The authorities need to make a concerted effort to

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not only stabilize the situation in all regions of the country and reinstate the

rule of law, but also to ensure effective minority rights protection in law and

in fact.

The situation of national minorities in Crimea has suffered the most dramatic

changes over the past couple of months. Ethnic Ukrainians, especially those

who speak Ukrainian rather than Russian, have come to fear potential

violence and harassment based on their ethnic affiliation, as they are often

collectively viewed as staunch supporters of the “Maidan” movement and of

the territorial integrity of Ukraine. They are also increasingly concerned by

rumours

policy

changes,

such

the

possible

closure

Ukrainian-language schools. Crimean Tatars have also found themselves in

an increasingly precarious situation since they openly supported Ukraine’s

territorial integrity and many boycotted the so-called “referendum” on the

status of Crimea. Following a string of reported incidents, which have

included intimidation, verbal threats and physical attacks, Crimean Tatars are

now deeply concerned for the safety and security of their community, their

future representation in the elected bodies and executive structures in

Crimea, their socio-economic inclusion and, more generally, for the

observance of their rights, including to housing, land and property, as well as

freedom of religion. Ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who espouse

pro-Ukrainian views on the status of Crimea or manifest a will to uphold

their identity, especially their religious, cultural or linguistic rights, appear

increasingly vulnerable, and are in urgent need of protection – an obligation

borne first and foremost by the authorities exercising

de facto

control in

Crimea. The HCNM did not find violations of the rights of Russians in

Crimea during her visits or the visits of her delegations.

291

To assist the Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to identify key concerns

regarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in Ukraine,

including Crimea, and to improve the level of minority rights protection, the

HCNM has prepared a set of recommendations for immediate and medium

term action. These include general recommendations on minority rights,

In her press release issued on 6 March, following her visit to Crimea, the High Commissioner stated

that she found no evidence of violations or threats to the rights of Russian speakers in Crimea,

http://www.osce.org/hcnm/116180.

291

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measures that need to be taken at the institutional level and legal reforms, as

well as specific policy recommendations on language, education,

participation

and

anti-discrimination.

The

report

also

provides

recommendations addressed to the authorities exercising

de facto

control in

Crimea. All these recommendations should be read and implemented in

conjunction with those put forward by the ODIHR in the first section of this

report.

The HCNM expresses her appreciation to the Ukrainian national and regional

authorities for their logistical and administrative assistance in arranging the

relevant meetings throughout the country. Her thanks also go to the

representatives of minority communities and civil society organizations who

agreed to meet with her and her advisers, often at short notice and sometimes

in difficult circumstances. The HCNM remains at the disposal of the

Ukrainian authorities for further assistance on matters related to national

minorities.

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II.

BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT

Methodology and Focus of the Minority Rights Assessment

Based on the request addressed to the ODIHR and the HCNM by Ukraine’s

acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in his letter dated 3 March 2014 (see

Annex I), the HCNM has undertaken the necessary steps, in accordance with

her mandate, to prepare this report on the situation regarding the rights of

persons belonging to national minorities, as part of the Human Rights

Assessment Mission (HRAM) conducted in co-operation with the ODIHR.

Although the request was initially limited to the effect that the presence of

armed units in Crimea was having on the rights of persons of various ethnic

origins, the situation evolved in March and April, which affected the scope

and focus of the report. While the report focuses on developments in Ukraine

in the last few months, it also considers the wider context. Before the present

crisis unfolded, minorities faced issues with aspects of the legal framework

and specific policies relevant to them, such as those related to the education

system. Since the successive High Commissioners have been actively

engaged in Ukraine since the early 1990s, this report takes relevant long-term

observations into account.

The report is based on the findings of the HCNM delegations, which

participated in the HRAM between 8 March and 17 April 2014. It also draws

upon information gathered from the HCNM’s regular activities, including

contact with relevant stakeholders, and other reliable sources. Members of

the HCNM delegations visited Kyiv, Simferopol, Bakhchisaray, Donetsk,

Lugansk, Odessa, Lviv, Uzhgorod, Berehovo, Tyachiv, Nizhnaia Apsha and

Chernivtsi. They also met interlocutors from locations they could not visit

themselves, particularly Crimea. In some cases, security threats hampered

access to certain locations or the collection of additional information.

The

methodology

employed

involved

conducting

interviews

with

representatives of national, regional and local authorities; civil society,

including

community-based

international

organizations

and

local

and

experts;

other

and

civil

society

organizations;

international

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organizations. The HCNM delegations held over 75 meetings in the different

locations in Ukraine with more than 250 interlocutors.

Demographic and Political Context

Approximately 78 per cent of Ukraine’s population considers itself to be

ethnically Ukrainian, according to the 2001 census, the most recent data

available. Russians represent the largest minority, at 17 per cent. The

remaining five per cent is officially composed of the 130 “nationalities”

listed in the census, of which the largest groups, ranging from nine per cent

to 0.1 per cent of the population, are: Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean

Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, Jews, Armenians, Greeks,

Tatars, Roma, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Germans and Gagauz.

Although Ukrainian, as the State language, and Russian are the two most

commonly used languages, the linguistic situation does not coincide with the

ethnic one, as 29.5 per cent of the population reports that Russian is their

native language – a much higher proportion than that of ethnic Russians in

the country – compared to 67.5 per cent who described their native language

as Ukrainian.

292

The percentage of native Russian speakers is highest in the

country’s eastern and southern regions (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lugansk,

Zaporizhya, Crimea and Odessa) but the language is also widely used in

other parts of the country. Some other minorities as well as some ethnic

Ukrainians also consider Russian their primary language, and many citizens

are bilingual, adding complexity to the linguistic picture.

The population census planned for 2011 has been postponed to 2016, and the

outdated nature of the 2001 census data should be kept in mind when

considering Ukraine’s ethnic and linguistic composition.

The underlying internal divisions of Ukraine’s society began to surface in the

mid-1990s and have been brought into sharper focus by the “Orange

Revolution” and again by the events that have been taking place since

November 2013. Every election since 2004 has demonstrated the deep split

in society, in which political, geographic, ethno-linguistic and cultural lines

292

http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/d/mono_eng.pdf.

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largely coincide. Ukraine inherited the division between its mainly

Ukrainian-speaking northwest and Russian-speaking southeast. Although

ethnicity certainly plays into the divide, along with language, culture and

political attitudes, Ukraine has never experienced clear-cut ethnic tensions

that would pit ethnic Ukrainians against ethnic Russians.

Against this background, and taking the legacy of Soviet policies into

account, the issue of language – in particular, the relative positions of the

Ukrainian and Russian languages – has been prone to politicization. This

politicization has exacerbated polarization amid broader debates about the

country’s national identity and geopolitical orientation. Policies adopted to

promote the Ukrainian language under the administration of President Viktor

Yushchenko (2005–2010) were reversed by his successor, Viktor

Yanukovych, in the run-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections, culminating

in the hasty and controversial adoption of a new Law on the Principles of

State Language Policy (Language Law) in July 2012. Then-President

Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, which derived its strength from the

country’s east, had promised in its electoral campaign to instate Russian as a

second official language. Certain aspects of the Language Law led the

HCNM and the Council of Europe Venice Commission to give it a negative

assessment.

293

The Language Law provided that a language spoken by at least ten per cent

of the local population may be adopted as an official regional language.

Following the Language Law’s adoption, a number of oblasts and cities

declared Russian as an official regional language. Several communities in

western Ukraine declared Hungarian, Romanian or Bulgarian as official

languages.

On 23 February 2014, following the ouster of the Yanukovych regime, the

Verkhovna Rada voted to repeal the 2012 Language Law, sparking protests

in a number of cities in the south and east. The HCNM warned that repealing

the Language Law could lead to further unrest and called on the authorities to

consult widely in the development of a balanced and inclusive approach to

See: http://www.osce.org/node/92418 and

http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)047-e.

293

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language policy.

294

On 27 February, acting President Oleksandr Turchynov

announced his decision to veto the Verkhovna Rada’s repeal until a new

language law was passed, thereby keeping the 2012 Language Law in force,

and to create a Special Temporary Commission on Language Legislation to

urgently draft a new language law. Despite the veto, the Verkhovna Rada’s

decision to repeal the Language Law had already provoked anxieties among

minority communities and led to calls by some minority representatives for

stronger protection for minority languages. Prime Minister Arseniy

Yatseniuk reiterated on 18 March that the Government would keep the 2012

Language Law in force and that the right to use the Russian language freely

would not be affected.

In eastern Ukraine, rallies against the acting authorities in Kyiv began in late

February. Protesters voiced concerns about the exclusion of the

Russian-speaking population from the governance process at the national

level and called for the Russian language to receive the status of a second

official language. The situation escalated in April as protesters seized

Government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and other cities, calling

for a referendum on independence. The Ukrainian authorities struggled to

regain control of the security situation in the east, which remained extremely

tense as of 17 April, the end date of the period of this assessment.

Crimea

The situation on the Crimean peninsula, where ethnic Russians are the largest

ethnic group at 58 per cent and Ukrainians make up 24 per cent, is

particularly complex in terms of the situation of national minorities and

inter-ethnic relations. The return to Crimea in the late 1980s of

approximately 266,000 Crimean Tatars and other minorities (including

Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks) who had been deported during

the Soviet regime in the 1940s has posed significant integration challenges to

the regional and national authorities, which the HCNM commented on in a

294

See: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/115643.

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needs assessment.

295

Access to land and housing, the status of the Crimean

Tatar language, and questions of self-governance are among the issues that

have contributed to inter-ethnic tensions. Crimean Tatars have their own,

elected representative organ, known as the Mejlis, although it has no legal

status under Ukrainian legislation.

Clashes between pro-Russian demonstrators protesting against the acting

authorities in Kyiv and Crimean Tatars broke out in Simferopol in late

February. Amid preparations for a contentious 16 March “referendum” on

the status of Crimea, ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars on the peninsula

were in a particularly vulnerable position. The Mejlis publicly called for

Crimean Tatars to boycott the “referendum”, and incidents of harassment of

Crimean Tatars were reported in the days following the “referendum”.

An analysis of the legality of the events that led to a change in the authorities

in effective control over Crimea falls beyond the scope of this report. In

particular, this report does not address the legality of the “referendum” held

on 16 March or its adherence to OSCE and other international standards

relating to the holding of democratic elections.

296

In providing an assessment

of the human, including minority, rights situation in Crimea, this report limits

itself to the effects of these events on the enjoyment of such rights, as

enshrined in OSCE human dimension commitments and in other applicable

human rights instruments.

On 21 March, in spite of the objections raised by Ukraine and the

international community, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signed laws on

admitting the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into the Russian

Federation. The Mejlis rejected the new “constitution” of Crimea, which

declared Crimea a part of the Russian Federation, adopted on 11 April by the

State Council of Crimea.

The integration of formerly deported people in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs assessment,

http://www.osce.org/hcnm/104309.

296

The European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) disputes the

legality of the referendum. See its Opinion on “whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of

the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent

territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 constitution is compatible with

constitutional principles” adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th Plenary Session (Venice,

21–22 March 2014), CDL-AD(2014)002-e. No ODIHR election observers were present in Crimea

before or during the referendum.

295

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Minority Rights Standards

A) OSCE Commitments

Ukraine, as a participating State of the OSCE, undertook to respect the

OSCE commitments that, though not legally binding, represent the minimum

standards that the participating States of the OSCE agreed to adhere to and

implement in practice.

Ukraine has pledged to implement a wide range of human dimension

commitments, including those related to the protection of minority rights.

First and foremost, such commitments related to protection of minority rights

can be found in the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act.

297

Protection of

minorities is also enshrined in the 1983 Concluding Document of Madrid

298

and 1989 Concluding Document of Vienna,

299

the 1990 Document of the

Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the

CSCE,

300

in the Report of the CSCE 1991 Meeting of Experts on National

Minorities,

301

the 1991 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference

on the Human Dimension of the CSCE

302

and the 1992 Concluding

Document of Helsinki, which,

inter alia,

established the post of the OSCE

HCNM.

303

The protection of national minorities is a recurrent issue in many

subsequent OSCE commitments and decisions.

304

The 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to Security in Europe: 1(a) Declaration on

Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States – Principle VII), Co-operation in

Humanitarian and Other Fields.

298

Concluding Document of Madrid – The Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, 6 September 1983

(Questions Relating to Security in Europe: Principles; Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields,

pp. 31, 45, 59 and 68).

299

Concluding Document of Vienna — The Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 15 January 1989.

300

The 1990 CSCE Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension, paragraphs 30–

39.

301

The 1991 Geneva CSCE Expert Meeting on National Minorities, Geneva, 19 July 1991, parts II–

VII.

302

The Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 3

October 1991, paragraph 37.

303

The Fourth Follow-up Meeting, Helsinki, 10 July 1992 (Decisions: II. CSCE High Commissioner on

National Minorities), (Decisions: VI. The Human Dimension, especially paragraphs 23–28).

304

See OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, Volume 1, Thematic Compilation

Third Edition. OSCE/ODIHR at 149-163 (National Minorities):

http://www.osce.org/odihr/76894?download=true.

297

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Important contributions to the understanding of how these standards can be

implemented have been made by the successive HCNMs in their

Recommendations and Guidelines.

305

B) Regional Instruments

Ukraine is a member state of the Council of Europe and has ratified the

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

(ECHR).

306

Ukraine also signed and ratified Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR

concerning the general prohibition of discrimination.

307

Ukraine has ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of

National Minorities (FCNM),

308

which is the key binding European

instrument in this area. Ukraine is also a party to the European Charter for

Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML).

309

C) United Nations Instruments

Ukraine has signed and ratified an array of fundamental UN human rights

treaties.

310

The rights guaranteed in UN human rights conventions apply

equally to members of minority groups. Among them are two treaties that

include provisions that specifically cover minority rights. These are the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27) and the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 30).

Ukraine is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

311

In 1992, Ukraine recognized the

individual complaints procedure under Article 14 of the International

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

312

The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities

(1996),

The

Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities

(1998),

The Lund

Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life

(1999),

Guidelines on the use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media

(2003),

Recommendations on

Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies

(2006),

The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National

Minorities in Inter-State Relations

(2008),

The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse

Societies

(2012). See: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/66209.

306

Signed 9 November 1995, ratified 11 September 1997.

307

Signed 4 November 2000, ratified 2 March 2006.

308

Signed 15 September1995, ratified 26 January1998.

309

Signed 2 May 1996, ratified 19 September 2005.

310

http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=183&Lang=EN.

311

Signed 7 March 1966, ratified 7 March 1969.

312

Accepted 28 July 1992.

305

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Ukraine is also a party to the non-binding Declaration on the Rights of

Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic

Minorities.

313

National Legal Framework

Ukraine’s national legal framework regulating the rights of persons

belonging to national minorities includes, in particular, the 1996

Constitution, the 1992 Law on National Minorities and the 2012 Language

Law. In addition, specific aspects of the rights of persons belonging to

national minorities are further regulated in other laws of Ukraine, such as the

laws on Association of Citizens, on Education, on Culture, on Citizenship, on

Printed Mass Media (Press), in the Fundamentals of Ukrainian Legislation on

Culture, on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, on Local

Self-Government in Ukraine, on Refugees, on Immigration, and on Freedom

of Movement and Free Choice of Place of Residence in Ukraine, as well as in

the criminal and civil codes.

The Constitution of Ukraine (of 28 June 1996, with subsequent amendments)

provides that “The State shall promote the consolidation and development of

the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions, and culture,

well as the development of [the] ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious

identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.”

314

also provides that the State language is Ukrainian, and that the State shall

ensure its comprehensive development and functioning in all spheres of

social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

315

At the same time, the

Constitution guarantees the “free development, use, and protection of

Russian and [the] other languages of [the] national minorities of Ukraine.”

316

The Constitution contains a general equality clause which provides that all

citizens have equal constitutional rights and freedoms, and are equal before

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic

Minorities, 18 December 1992, A/RES/47/135.

314

Constitution of Ukraine, Article 11 (emphasis added).

315

Constitution of Ukraine, Article 10.

316

Ibid.

313

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the law.

317

The same provision enshrines the principle of non-discrimination

on the grounds of race, colour of skin, religious and other beliefs as well as

ethnic and linguistic characteristics. Although the Ukrainian authorities have

reported that the term “citizens” in this context is employed as a generic term

that includes foreigners and stateless persons as well,

318

the provision

remains ambiguous regarding its application to non-citizens. The

Constitution also guarantees that citizens belonging to national minorities

have “the right to education in their native language, or to study their native

language at the state and communal educational establishments or through

national cultural societies”.

319

Of note, the Constitution also provides that

ratified international treaties become part of the national legislation of

Ukraine,

320

thereby incorporating them into the domestic legal framework.

The 1992 Law on National Minorities guarantees to all citizens, regardless of

their national origin, equal political, social, economic and cultural rights and

freedoms, and supports the development of national self-awareness and

self-expression. This Law also provides that all citizens of Ukraine shall

enjoy equal protection of the State. Article 3 specifies that: “To national

minorities belong groups of Ukrainian citizens, who are not of Ukrainian

nationality, but show feeling of national self-awareness and affinity.”

National minorities are guaranteed basic human rights as well as the right to

“national-cultural autonomy”. That said, the 1992 Law on National

Minorities is widely regarded as outdated and not fully in line with Ukraine’s

subsequently assumed international obligations. Despite repeated public and

expert discussions over the past years about the need to amend or revise this

Law, such initiatives have yet to coalesce into a draft legislative text that

would enjoy sufficient parliamentary support.

The use of languages in Ukraine is regulated by the 2012 Language Law (see

section on Language Rights below), which replaced the Soviet-era Law on

Languages of 1989. In brief, the 2012 Language Law introduced a new

arrangement for the protection of minority languages through a system of

317

318

Constitution of Ukraine, Article 24.

ECRI 2012 Report on Ukraine (fourth monitoring cycle), page 11 paragraph 4.

319

Constitution of Ukraine, Article 53.

320

Constitution of Ukraine, Article 9.

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recognition and protection of “regional or minority languages” in specific

geographic/administrative areas. In areas where the number of people

speaking a minority language reaches the threshold of ten per cent, the use of

the regional or minority language is guaranteed and protected by law in a

wide range of domains, including public administration, the education

system, the judiciary, culture, and the media and advertising. The 2012

Language Law, while generally acknowledged as a significant step forward

compared to the 1989 Law on Languages, was nonetheless criticized by

various competent international bodies, including the HCNM and the

European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)

for failing to strike an adequate balance between the promotion and use of

the State (Ukrainian) language as a unifying factor in society and the

promotion and protection of minority languages, including less widely used

languages. In February 2014, shortly after the fall of the Yanukovich

Government, the new authorities of Ukraine sought to repeal the 2012

Language Law; however, the acting President vetoed the bill, and as a result

the 2012 Language Law remains in effect. In the meantime, a Special

Temporary Commission on Language Legislation was set up to draft a new

language law.

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III.

MINORITY RIGHTS ASSESSMENT

General and Underlying Minority Rights Concerns

Inter-ethnic tolerance in Ukraine, including between Ukrainian speakers and

Russian speakers, has generally been high since the country gained

independence in 1991. As in most societies, there were isolated cases of

interpersonal conflicts or hate crimes on ethnic or related grounds. The

Government has been providing support for national minorities’ cultural

activities

and

significant

funding

and

institutional

support

for

minority-language education at various levels.

Since the crisis began, national minorities have been facing new challenges

stemming directly from the recent events in addition to the underlying

minority rights concerns that predate the crisis. The continued inability or

unwillingness of the authorities to effectively address widespread corruption

also affects the human rights of all, including persons belonging to national

minorities.

321

The general population is concerned about the prevailing atmosphere of

uncertainty related to the country’s stability and integrity; the safety of

person and property in light of actual or threatened violence by various, at

times unidentified, actors; the political leadership; and policies and

legislation. These factors are even more destabilizing for vulnerable groups,

including minorities, as well as ethnic Ukrainians in areas where they are a

de facto

minority. This sense of insecurity is exacerbated by domestic and

international media reports of violations and even violent acts or plans to

perpetrate such acts, even when these are unsubstantiated. Some political

actors are also implicated in the spread of alarmist reports. This is creating a

climate of fear and poses serious and urgent risks to inter-ethnic relations. In

addition to the problems of misrepresentation or partial reporting, the general

lack of transparency and immediate and concrete actions to investigate

“Ukraine was ranked 144th out of 176 countries investigated in the 2012 Corruption Perceptions

Index of Transparency International, a leading anti-corruption watchdog agency

(http://www.transparency.org/country#UKR).”

321

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reported violations of human rights, including physical violence and

harassment, is further fuelling misperceptions and insecurities.

The far right nationalist organizations, including those co-ordinating their

activities through the Right Sector movement, became more vocal and

organized during the protests leading to the ouster of President Yanukovich

and in the following period. The Russian-speaking population in eastern

Ukraine is particularly concerned about the rise in the far right movement

and its prominence in spearheading the “Maidan” protests, including its

participation in violent clashes with security forces and its takeover of

administrative buildings. Many members of the Russian-speaking population

expressed fear of ultra nationalist ideology, anti-Russian rhetoric,

paramilitary organizations and threats of violence.

In addition, the current crisis is exacerbating underlying issues, including

through irresponsible, subjective and at times propagandistic reporting by

domestic and international media. It is important to keep in mind that any

immediate measures to address the most urgent concerns should not detract

from the long-standing need to address the root causes of tensions in a

structured and systemic manner.

Relevant regional and international actors have been expressing their

concerns regarding respect for the rights of persons belonging to national

minorities in Ukraine since long before the crisis emerged. These concerns

still need to be addressed, in line with Ukraine’s obligations and as a matter

of good governance.

322

The recent developments have added new concerns,

increasing the vulnerability of minorities. Due to the crisis, it has become

more urgent that the authorities reach out convincingly with reassuring

messages and tangible measures to ensure the protection of minority rights in

law and in fact.

See the First (1 March 2002), Second (30 May 2008) and Third (22 March 2012) Opinions of the

Advisory Committee on the FCNM (ACFC), available at

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/Table_en.asp#Ukraine. Also see the

relevant reports, recommendations and findings of other Council of Europe monitoring bodies, such as

the Commissioner for Human Rights, the ECRI and the Committee of Experts on the ECRML. Also

see the concluding observations of the relevant United Nations human rights treaty instruments.

322

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The issues previously raised by the HCNM, the Advisory Committee on the

FCNM and relevant UN bodies and mechanisms include,

inter alia:

1) Ukraine still lacks comprehensive and consistent legislation for the

protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities.

323

The 1992 Law on National Minorities is outdated. Although various

minority rights appear in a number of laws, including those on

language and education, there is a lack of coherence and clarity among

these various provisions. Moreover, the dispersal of these rights across

several documents may create uncertainties and a lack of awareness,

and thus inadequacies in protection. International interlocutors have

regularly raised this concern, but it so far remains unaddressed.

2) The institutional framework for designing and implementing policies

for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national

minorities remains weak.

324

The abolition of the State Committee on

Nationalities and Religion at the end of 2010 was not adequately

compensated for by the addition of functions to the Ministry of

Culture. Representatives of national minorities have expressed their

concerns, as noted also by the Advisory Committee on the FCNM, and

voice fears that the institutional change from a separate body to a

department within a ministry signals reduced priority attached to the

issues. The department of the Ministry of Culture that is responsible

for minority policies has insufficient human and financial resources to

function adequately at present. A well-designed institutional structure

with an executive body responsible for policies and an independent

institution to handle complaints and violations of rights is vital for the

proper functioning of a comprehensive minority rights system. Such a

structure would also provide minorities with clear mechanisms and

institutions to address their concerns and promote their rights,

combatting the current perception that their needs are a low priority.

These institutional shortcomings not only hamper the implementation

323

324

See the Third Opinion on Ukraine of the ACFC, adopted on 22 March 2012, paragraph 11.

Ibid.

Also see the Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Rita Izsák, following her

official visit to Ukraine, 7 to 14 April 2014.

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of consistent policies, they become critical at a time of crisis when

reassuring signals of inclusiveness are needed.

3) Minority representatives and international monitoring bodies have

consistently highlighted the lack of transparency in decisions affecting

minority rights in general or the interests of specific minorities,

including those that relate to funding opportunities.

325

This concern

remains to be adequately addressed systemically. Likewise, the lack of

effective consultation mechanisms has been pointed out repeatedly, but

remains unaddressed. While initiatives to consult with representatives

and organizations of national minorities, including under the auspices

of several ministries, are laudable, the procedures for including

minority representatives are unclear. Some minority representatives

have questioned the effectiveness of these initiatives, which also lack

transparency

and

co-ordination.

There

have

previously

been

recommendations to improve the functioning of the Council of

Representatives of All-Ukrainian Minority Associations. These

recommendations include ensuring that meetings are held regularly and

conducting a thorough review in order to strengthen or (re-)establish

consultative mechanisms that are set in law, providing balanced and

pluralistic composition, ensuring inclusive minority representation and

defining clear functions and competencies. These recommendations

have not been followed.

4) Despite a general climate of tolerance, several monitoring mechanisms,

including the Advisory Committee on the FCNM and the ECRI, have

been reporting worrying signs of rising intolerance in recent years.

326

This has been reflected in incidents, political discourse and, in some

cases, the lack of responsiveness, and even sometimes misconduct, in

law-enforcement structures. The Advisory Committee on the FCNM

327

See the Third Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC, adopted on 22 March 2012, paragraph 17.

See the Third Opinion on Ukraine of the Advisory Committee, ACFC, adopted on 22 March 2012,

paragraph 66. Also see the ECRI Report on Ukraine (Fourth Monitoring Cycle), adopted on 8

December 2011.

327

Third Opinion, ACFC, ACFC/OP/III(2012)002, 28 March 2013.

326

325

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and the HCNM

328

have also voiced concerns about the politicization of

language issues and minority rights, which can lead to the polarization

of society and diverts attention from the needs of smaller minorities,

who are increasingly vulnerable as a result. These bodies have

recommended various measures that the Ukrainian authorities could

employ to combat rising inter-ethnic intolerance and the misuse of

minority issues in politics.

Specific Minority Rights Concerns

Human Rights Concerns for Minorities

The current climate in Ukraine is characterized by widespread uncertainty,

including regarding the situation and rights of minorities. Open conflict and

violence, reports of harassment, forced disappearances and deaths have

deeply shocked a previously calm and peaceful society. As the initial

conflict, based on political differences, has spilled over into regional and

linguistic identity divisions, these grave human rights violations also have a

direct and harmful effect on inter-ethnic relations and increase the sense of

insecurity experienced by vulnerable groups, including national minorities.

In addition, there is a high degree of legal uncertainty in a situation that

remains fluid and where laws are abolished, amended or enacted at a rapid

pace. For minorities specifically, it is clear that the proposed abolition of the

Language Law triggered anxieties concerning future minority rights –

concerns that were shared by Russian speakers and speakers of less widely

used languages. Discussions regarding a new Constitution likewise raise a

series of concerns specific to minorities, beyond the general legitimate

interests of all citizens.

The uncertainty regarding political and, at times, institutional stability, also

in the context of the upcoming elections, is accompanied by concerns about

freedom of movement, freedom of expression and effective rights to

participation in public affairs as a matter of democratic governance.

HCNM statement of 26 July 2012 on the adoption of the 2012 language law, see

http://www.osce.org/node/92418.

328

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Opportunities for the democratic participation by all in governance have to

be guaranteed, the withdrawal of some political forces from Parliament

following the dissolution of the Party of Regions notwithstanding. For all

residents of Ukraine, particularly minorities, there is a clear need for

reassurance that the Government and regional authorities can and will ensure

inclusiveness and stability for all groups in the country.

Language Rights

Legislative Framework

Until 2012, the regulation of the use of languages in a wide range of areas,

such as public life, contact with the authorities, the media and education, was

fragmented and contradictory. The Law on the Principles of the State

Language Policy (Language Law) was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in the

summer of 2012. The Party of Regions took the lead in drafting the

Language Law, although the electoral promise to make Russian a second

State language was softened due to political realities and strong objections by

a substantial opposition in Parliament and significant parts of Ukrainian

society.

The Language Law aims to protect minority languages by recognizing and

protecting

“regional

minority

languages”

specific

geographic/administrative areas.

329

These areas vary from the level of region

to districts, cities, towns and even villages. In geographic/administrative

areas where at least ten per cent of people speak a minority or regional

language, the use of this language is guaranteed and protected by the law in a

wide range of domains, including public administration, the education

system, the judiciary, culture, and the media and advertising. The Language

Law further foresees removing all restrictions on the use of minority

languages in the media, cinema and advertising, and abolishing virtually all

restrictions on the use of minority languages in the education system.

In order to provide coherence, a potential revision of the ratification instrument of the European

Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has also been linked to the amendments of the language

legislation.

329

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The HCNM

330

and the Venice Commission

331

criticized successive drafts of

the 2012 Language Law. In a press release just before the adoption of the

Language Law, the HCNM noted that the Language Law was likely to lead

to further polarization of society and called on all parties “to engage in a

substantive dialogue on the issues raised by the law with a view to finding a

suitable compromise.”

332

This was not heeded.

On 23 February 2014, immediately after the ouster of the Yanukovich regime

which led to a change of the power balance in Parliament, a new majority in

the Verkhovna Rada voted to abrogate the 2012 Language Law. This was

done on the initiative of the Svoboda Party and the bill repealing the

Language Law was voted in by 232 deputies out of 450. After strong

domestic reactions and international pressure, acting President of Ukraine

and Speaker of the Parliament Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the 23 February

2014 decision abrogating the 2012 Language Law. Therefore, the 2012

Language Law currently remains in force in Ukraine.

On 27 February 2014, Turchynov created a Special Temporary Commission

on Language Legislation in the Verkhovna Rada to develop a new draft law

by 31 March 2014. The Commission agreed to work on the basis of the 2013

draft developed by a group of experts under Ukraine’s first President Leonid

Kravchuk, including accepting Ukrainian as the sole State language.

However, given fundamental disagreements, primarily on the status of the

Russian language, the Commission failed to agree on amendments that would

consolidate a draft law within the set timeframe.

For example, the HCNM’s assessment in December 2010 concluded that the draft language law was

likely to increase rather than decrease tensions

between groups of speakers of different languages and

to reinforce existing divisions in society, thus making the draft law counter-productive to the stability

of Ukrainian society. The HCNM therefore recommended that the Ukrainian authorities refrain from

considering the draft language law in its current format. The HCNM recommended that the authorities

pursue a

comprehensive reform

of Ukraine’s outdated legislative framework concerning minority rights

and language issues to bring it in line with the applicable international instruments that Ukraine had

signed in the preceding 15 years. The HCNM recommended that this reform should include a broad

and transparent

consultation process

involving representatives of national minorities, the different

linguistic communities, and civil society at large, in order to facilitate finding a reasonable societal

compromise and to ensure that State interests as well as those of all communities are upheld and

respected.

331

Venice Commission Opinion, 30 March 2011.

332

HCNM press release, 26 July 2012, http://www.osce.org/hcnm/92418.

330

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Issues of Concern

All national minority representatives interviewed by the HCNM delegations

cited the language issue as a primary concern. Virtually all the HCNM’s

interlocutors characterized the cancellation of the 2012 Language Law as a

factor that further aggravated the already tense situation throughout the

country, which was made worse by the haste, timing and lack of

consultations. It not only generated a perception of linguistic revanchism

among minorities, it also contributed to anxieties about the exclusive and

nationalistic character of the new authorities, anxieties that have been fed by

distorted public information and rumours, particularly in Crimea and the

predominantly Russian-speaking regions of the country.

The actions relating to the language legislation reignited the public debate

reflecting the insecurities and polarized positions on the issue. In

combination with the unrest in the regions, this led to a skewed reflection in

public discourse and even more entrenched demands from some parts of the

opposition for Russian to be instated as a second State language.

Many of the HCNM’s interlocutors, in addition to questioning the timing and

pace of these decisions, did not believe the Commission would be capable of

producing

balanced

and

agreed

draft

language

law.

Minority

representatives were also sceptical about the composition of the Commission,

which was not seen as inclusive. In interviews, representatives of the

Romanian and Hungarian minorities said they opposed the drafting of a new

language law. They were content with the status quo created by the 2012

Language Law because they feared that in the present situation any changes

could only lead to a decreased level of protection for minority languages

used regionally, including Russian, which is also widely used by minorities

of other ethnic communities.

However, implementation of the Language Law has been reported as very

diverse and contextual. In the field of public administration, several local

councils in regions with significant minority representation (predominately

concerning Hungarians and Romanians, and some Bulgarians) adopted their

language as an official regional language. However, this mainly reflected

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local practices that already existed. No additional funds were allocated for

supporting activities, such as translation and training. Cities and regions with

a majority Russian-speaking population also formalized existing practices

and officially switched to Russian as a “regional language”, reflecting

existing realities and everyday practices on the ground. It should be noted

that this does not imply that all public institutions in the regions completely

switched to Russian, as the practice is quite heterogeneous. No decision was

taken to grant Russian the status of a regional language in Crimea, even

though the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea had

campaigned strongly for the 2012 Language Law.

The HCNM’s interlocutors expressed divergent views on how well the

Language Law protected minority languages in the education sector.

Ukrainian speakers expressed concerns that the Ukrainian language would

not be sufficiently strengthened and promoted, and they saw the reversal of

the requirement to pass a unified exam in Ukrainian as a condition for

university entrance as a weakening of the role of Ukrainian. They also opined

that the 2012 Language Law created conditions that lessened the need to

know, and therefore study, Ukrainian, especially in regions with a majority

of Russian speakers. Speakers of minority languages, including Russian

speakers, reported that despite the formal provisions safeguarding teaching in

and of minority languages, the opportunities to realize these rights have

never been properly implemented (see section on Education Rights below).

At the same time, minority representatives were anxious that any

amendments to language legislation at present would entail a regression of

rights in the education area.

The 2012 Language Law lifted limitations on the use of languages in the

media, such as prescribed quotas on languages used in broadcasting and

advertising. The previous administrative regulation of language use in the

media, including in private media outlets, is questionable, as it may not be

necessary in a democratic society or proportional to legitimate aims, such as

promoting the official language. According to some HCNM interlocutors,

this lifting of limitations on the use of languages in the media was far-

reaching, unbalanced and endangered the presence of the official language in

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the media. They argue that the 2012 Language law, while respecting the right

to freedom of expression, ran counter the aim of promoting the role of

Ukrainian as a shared language for all linguistic communities.

Although the changes, which also encompass cinema and advertising, have

not been as dramatic as some expected, consumer demand has reportedly led

to the Russian language becoming more prominent in the media, while

Ukrainian-language media, especially in the southeast, struggles to compete

for a sizeable media audience. The Russian-speaking communities across

Ukraine viewed this change as a positive and long-awaited development,

while the Ukrainian-speakers perceived it as an encroachment on the

presence of the official language in the media. No efforts were made to

introduce positive incentives for promotion of the official language or to

establish a public TV and radio broadcasting network at the national and

regional levels to respond to the legitimate aim of promoting the official

language while also serving all linguistic communities in Ukraine.

The representatives of smaller minorities told the HCNM that the 2012

Language Law did not improve their access to media and that public

broadcasting in minority languages remains very limited. They also informed

the HCNM delegations that without sufficient support from the authorities,

those minority communities that can do so currently rely on the support of

their “kin States” to run media outlets in their languages. The absence of

locally produced media leaves minorities no option but to turn to foreign

media in their languages to satisfy their information needs and cultural

aspirations.

In conclusion, in addition to specific issues, in particular concerning

language use in education and the media, the HCNM’s interlocutors,

representing various minorities, expressed three overarching concerns: the

need to officially recognize the special role of the Russian language in

legislation, which would reflect its actual position in Ukraine in general and

in some regions in particular; the need to ensure that no new legislation or

policy regresses from the established status quo, especially taking care to

safeguard the rights and interests of speakers of the languages of numerically

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smaller minorities and, finally, the need to build trust and legislative stability

over time by ensuring constitutional guarantees for these rights.

Education Rights

Legislative Framework

Article 53 of Ukraine’s Constitution guarantees the right to citizens

belonging to national minorities to receive instruction in their native

language or to study their native language in State and communal educational

establishments and through national cultural societies. The 2012 Language

Law states that “citizens have the right to receive education in the State

language and regional languages or the languages of national minorities”

(Article 20, paragraph 2). The Language Law says the need for a particular

language of instruction shall be determined based on requests submitted by

students or, in the case of minors, by parents or guardians.

Issues of Concern

Ukraine has a well-established network of schools with instruction in and of

minority languages, including Russian, Romanian, Hungarian, Moldovan,

Polish and Crimean Tatar. More than two-thirds of schools with

minority-language education are Russian-language schools. Opportunities for

mother-tongue instruction in smaller minority languages tend to be limited or

unavailable.

Despite the strong legal guarantees of minority education rights, international

monitoring bodies have noted a number of problems concerning the

implementation of these rights in practice.

333

Decisions on provision of

instruction in or of minority languages are delegated to local authorities,

resulting in divergent regional practices. In the absence of clear guidance

from national authorities or a clearly established threshold for forming

Third Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC, 22 March 2012,

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_OP_Ukraine_en.pdf,

and

Report of the Committee of Experts of the ECRML, 15 January 2014,

http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Report/EvaluationReports/UkraineECRML2_en.pdf.

333

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minority-language classes, local authorities are often hesitant to open or

maintain such classes, sometimes “outsourcing” the teaching of minority

languages to elective Sunday schools. Minority representatives have noted a

persistent decline in the number of minority-language schools and in the

quality of education offered. Other problems include the availability of

updated quality textbooks in minority languages and the training and supply

of teachers to teach Ukrainian in minority schools and to teach in some

minority languages. Russian minority representatives have expressed concern

that the number of Russian schools does not correspond to the proportion of

Russians in the local population.

334

The HCNM’s interlocutors in western Ukraine noted problems with a lack of

pre-school education in minority languages and a tendency for Ukrainian

language classes to be opened in minority schools. Some minority

representatives reported that parents faced pressure to apply for the opening

of Ukrainian-language classes in Romanian-language schools. Concerns

were also expressed about the quality of instruction of Ukrainian as a second

language to minority students. Moreover, the Language Law reduced

incentives to learn Ukrainian, particularly in regions where minority

languages have gained recognition as regional languages.

335

In the longer

term, this could create additional obstacles to the integration of society, as

those minority school graduates who have had insufficient exposure to

Ukrainian may experience obstacles in effectively participating in all aspects

of life in the country.

External independent examinations for university admission, with the

exception of the tests on Ukrainian language and literature and foreign

languages, may be taken in the language of instruction, although problems

have been reported concerning the quality of translation into minority

languages. Higher-education institutions also provide instruction in the

Russian, Hungarian and Romanian languages.

336

Minority representatives in

Statement of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Rita Izsák, following her official visit to

Ukraine – 7 to 14 April 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?

NewsID=14518&LangID=E.

335

ACFC Ad hoc report on the situation of national minorities in Ukraine, 1 April 2014.

336

Third report submitted by Ukraine on the FCNM, 2009,

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_SR_Ukraine_en.pdf.

334

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western Ukraine told the HCNM of their concerns about a draft law on

higher education that has been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which

reportedly specifies that Ukrainian should be the only language of instruction

in both public and private higher-education institutions.

International bodies have joined civil society representatives in expressing

particular concerns about the educational situation of Roma, including

instances of segregation, either in separate classrooms or in different schools,

and difficulties in accessing education for Roma children whose parents lack

identity papers.

337

Effective Participation in Public Affairs

Legislative Framework

There are legal guarantees that prohibit discrimination against national

minorities regarding participation in public affairs, but these do not envisage

any obligations to promote the adequate participation of minorities. In

accordance with Article 9 of the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine,

“citizens of Ukraine belonging to national minorities have the right,

accordingly, to be elected or nominated on an equal footing for any posts to

bodies of legislative, executive and judicial power, local and regional

self-government,

the army,

enterprises,

institutions

and

organisations.” Article 18 states: “Any direct or indirect limitation of the

rights and freedoms of citizens based on national characteristic is prohibited

and punished by the law.”

Note should be taken of a recent reform to the election system that has

adversely affected minority representatives. As the Advisory Committee on

the FCNM noted in its Third Opinion on Ukraine, recommendations by a

number of international bodies for the introduction of a regional proportional

system based on open lists and multiple regional constituencies to allow for

stronger regional, including minority, representation have not been taken into

account in the amendments to the Law on Parliamentary Elections, adopted

337

ECRI, fourth report on Ukraine, 2012,

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-

country/ukraine/UKR-CbC-IV-2012-006-ENG.pdf.

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in November 2011.

338

The increase of the threshold from three to five per

cent, as well as the banning of electoral blocs, limits the chances for smaller

or new political parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, the 2002

Law on Political Parties requires that all political parties should be active

nationwide and register in a minimum of 17 (of a total of 27) regions of the

country, a requirement that is practically impossible for smaller and regional

national minority parties to meet. In addition, there is still no obligation for

the Central Election Commission to take the composition of the population

into account when establishing electoral boundaries, despite the long

standing demand of minority representatives, who feel that current

constituency boundaries split their electorates over different districts.

Issues of Concern

The level of public participation and representation of national minorities is

deemed insufficient by most of the HCNM’s interlocutors. National minority

representatives frequently pointed out that they do not feel that their

community or their interests are well represented in public bodies and

processes. Although there are some possibilities for members of minority

communities to sit on local councils, they feel that minority groups are not

very well or not at all represented in the composition of the Verkhovna Rada,

despite the fact that several members of the Verkhovna Rada have a minority

background. In addition, even though there are some minority representatives

in the decision-making structures of parliamentary groups, their communities

often consider them to be a token gesture to showcase the Government’s

willingness to deal with minority issues but without any practical effect.

See: Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Law on Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine,

adopted on 16 and 17 December 2005, paragraph 23; Opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft

law on Election of People’s Deputies of Ukraine, adopted on 12 and 13 December 2003, paragraphs 6,

7 and 42; and Recommendations of the ODIHR/Venice Commission International Conference, “The

European Democratic Heritage and the Development of Electoral Legislation in Ukraine”, item 1. The

Parliamentary Assembly urged the Ukrainian authorities to address these problems as soon as possible

given that “a fully proportional system with closed party lists and with all of Ukraine being treated as

one single constituency […] does not guarantee the election of a parliament representing Ukrainian

society in all its diversity.” See: PACE Resolution 1549(2007) on the Functioning of Democratic

Institutions in Ukraine, paragraphs 12 and 15.4.

338

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This situation is exacerbated by the fact that there has been no institution

capable of representing and dealing with national minority issues since the

State Committee on Nationalities and Religion was closed at the end of 2010

(see the section on General and Underlying Minority Rights Concerns

above).

339

In the southern and eastern parts of the country, where the population is

predominantly Russian-speaking, this perception of not being adequately

represented in executive and legislative structures – whether substantiated by

facts or not – is a particular problem in the current climate. This heightened

concern is linked to three main factors. First, the weakening of the position of

the Party of Regions, which is mainly supported by the population in eastern

Ukraine, has undermined the Russian-speaking community’s opportunities

for effective representation in political decision making. Second, some of the

HCNM delegations’ interlocutors consider the current Government to not be

inclusive, as it is dominated by members of the Batkivshchyna and Svoboda

parties, who are perceived as mainly representing the views of western

Ukraine. Many Russian speakers in the east expressed fears that their

interests are currently not represented correctly or at all in the Verkhovna

Rada and in central Government structures. Third, many of the HCNM’s

interlocutors referred to the new authorities’ decisions to replace a number of

high-level officials in the regions – such as governors, mayors and senior

police officers – with supporters of the new coalition parties, many coming

from western Ukraine. They feel that this has further undermined their role in

decision-making processes.

While biased media reporting sometimes reinforces unfounded fears of

exclusion or pressure to assimilate, the HCNM delegations did receive

credible reports from elected representatives of the Russian-speaking

community of pressure or intimidation being exerted on them or their

families. In some cases, this included the destruction of property, such as cars

and houses. The HCNM delegations also took note of reports that the

political representatives of minority communities had been harassed at public

339

See, among others: ACFC Third Opinion on Ukraine adopted on 22 March 2012,

ACFC/OP/III(2012)002, paragraphs 24 to 25.

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meetings, sometimes with threatened or actual physical violence. Such

incidents should be recorded and promptly and impartially investigated by

competent authorities to ensure the safety of all persons and their property. In

a climate where trust in the authorities has been eroded, an effective response

to such incidents is directly linked to the maintenance of legitimacy.

A recurrent concern expressed by the interlocutors was that even though

national minorities are – at least to some extent – represented in elected

bodies, there are significantly fewer representatives in the executive and

judiciary. Some minority representatives expressed a desire to have a system

of (near) proportional representation in executive bodies or at least to have

positive measures to promote adequate representation. Practical obstacles can

also limit the representation of minorities in the civil service or other parts of

executive bodies. Several interlocutors noted the cumbersome procedures to

recognize foreign diplomas, which negatively affects persons belonging to

the Hungarian and Romanian minorities who graduate from universities in

their “kin” States but wish to pursue a career in the public sector in Ukraine.

Persons belonging to national minorities reportedly may face linguistic

barriers in their interaction with local authorities. Even in areas densely

inhabited by national minorities, the local authorities and executive bodies

are rarely able to interact with minorities in their languages.

A specific concern emerging in the period covered by the report is ensuring

opportunities for full participation in upcoming elections, including by

residents of Crimea who are eligible to vote.

Equality and Non-discrimination

Legislative Framework

Ukraine has consistently held that its existing legislative framework to

prevent and combat discrimination is sufficient.

340

However, Ukraine does

not have comprehensive legislation on discrimination. Legal provisions

against discrimination are primarily confined to the Constitution and the

340

See reports submitted by Ukraine pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 2 of the FCNM.

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Criminal Code. Article 24 of the Constitution provides that citizens of

Ukraine shall have equal constitutional rights and freedoms; it guarantees

their equality before the law and prohibits discrimination based on the

grounds of race, skin colour, religious and other beliefs, ethnic and social

origin, and linguistic or other characteristics. Article 37 prohibits the

establishment and activities of political parties or public organizations whose

programmatic objectives or actions are aimed at inflaming inter-ethnic, racial

or religious enmity, or at impinging upon human rights and freedoms.

Article 161 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code lays down responsibility for inciting

inter-ethnic enmity or hatred; for disparaging national honour or dignity; and

for limiting citizens’ rights, or the institution of privileges in respect of their

rights, on the basis of ethnic origin or linguistic or other characteristics.

341

Some provisions are included in normative acts pertaining to specific areas of

law, including the Labour Code,

342

the Civil Procedural Code,

343

the Code of

Administrative Justice

344

and others.

Apart from these general and declaratory anti-discrimination provisions in

the Constitution and various codes, there are no detailed and comprehensive

civil or administrative provisions related to discrimination in specific

fields.

345

The current legal framework fails to provide a definition of

Law on Introducing Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine as to Crimes on the Grounds of

Race, National or Religious Intolerance, 5 November 2009.

342

All citizens have equal rights to work, regardless of their ethnic origin (Article 2(1)); any direct or

indirect limitation of the rights or the introduction of any direct or indirect privileges upon the

preparation, change or termination of the work agreement on the basis of one’s ethnic or racial

belonging, language, religious views, etc. is prohibited (Article 22). Upon the signature of the work

agreement, it is prohibited to inquire about person’s ethnic belonging (Article 25(1)).

343

According to Article 5 of the Civil Procedural Code, the Court shall respect the honour and dignity

of all participants of the civil procedure and pursue justice on the principles of equality before the law

and justice regardless of race, colour of skin, religious and other beliefs, ethnic origin, language and

other characteristics. Article 6 of the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine guarantees foreigners, stateless

persons and foreign juridical entities in Ukraine the same right to judicial protection as the citizens and

juridical entities of Ukraine.

344

In compliance with Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Justice, all participants of the

administrative process are equal before the law and justice and there can be no privileges or restrictions

of the rights of the participants of the administrative process based on race, colour, religion, ethnic,

linguistic or other grounds.

345

See, for example: the assessment of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the practical

effectiveness of Constitutional guarantees related to human rights and freedoms and the lack of their

implementation in Ukraine's legal system in

Pronina v Ukraine

(No. 63566/00, judgment of 18 July

2006). Also see: ACFC Second Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC/OP/II(2008)004, Strasbourg, 20 March

2011, paragraph 14. See also: European Roma Rights Centre, “Written Comments of the European

Roma Rights Centre Concerning Ukraine for Consideration by the United Nations Committee on the

341

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discrimination that fully meets international and regional human rights

standards. The legal framework lacks clarity on its scope and there are

questions regarding how the principle of equality is interpreted in Ukraine.

346

Issues of Concern

The HCNM delegations spoke with interlocutors from different minorities

and did not find evidence of systematic discrimination against minorities.

However, there have been reports of potentially discriminatory actions, such

as arbitrary inspections of identity documents on the street targeting certain

minority groups, higher exposure to incidents of police violence or other

forms of misconduct by some vulnerable ethnic groups, as well as alleged

cases of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity in education and at work.

There have also been reports of racist attacks, hate speech, threats and

violence targeting national minorities, including Crimean Tatars and Roma,

as well as asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, foreign students and

others.

347

As has been noted by several monitoring mechanisms, awareness of

discrimination issues tends to be low among representatives of the authorities

and the public at large and statistical data on cases are not kept. In addition,

effective registration, investigation and prosecution of incidents of hate crime

remain a challenge, despite previous efforts to address these issues.

348

The HCNM delegations heard several reports of alleged discrimination or

hate crimes targeting national minorities, including Russians, in areas

Elimination of Racial Discrimination at its 69th Session, July 31–August 18, 2006”, 19 June 2006, pp.

7–8 (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds69.htm).

346

Ibid.

347

ACFC Second Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC/OP/II(2008)004, Strasbourg, 20 March 2011, paragraph

18, ECRI Report on Ukraine (fourth monitoring cycle), CRI(2012)6, adopted on 8 December 2011,

published on 21 February 2012, paragraph 43. See also: detailed description of some instances reported

in the Statement of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Rita Izsák, following her official visit to

Ukraine – 7 to 14 April 2014.

348

ACFC Second Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC/OP/II(2008)004, Strasbourg, 20 March 2011, paragraph

14, ECRI Report on Ukraine (fourth monitoring cycle), CRI(2012)6, adopted on 8 December 2011,

published on 21 February 2012, paragraph 28. Also see examples in ECRI Report on Ukraine (fourth

monitoring cycle), CRI(2012)6, adopted on 8 December 2011, published on 21 February 2012,

paragraphs 49–50.

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generally characterized by a climate of inter-ethnic tolerance, such as western

Ukraine.

Although reported incidents of hate crime remain isolated and sporadic at

present, there is a risk that with increasing tensions they could become more

widespread. National minorities throughout Ukraine are following the

developments in Crimea and the eastern regions with concern. Many express

worries about rising intolerance in a context where they consider that the

legal/institutional framework and law enforcement structures are unable to

protect them.

Crimea

General Situation

The political crisis in Ukraine rapidly led to polarization within Crimea’s

multi-ethnic society. This became evident during 26 and 27 February 2014,

when Crimean Tatars supporting Ukrainian unity met pro-Russian

demonstrators in the centre of Simferopol. The stand-off between the two

groups resulted in a stampede, killing two people. The risk of an ethnic

conflict became acute in the days leading up to the so-called “referendum on

the status of Crimea” on 16 March 2014, which Crimean Tatars boycotted

masse.

Most HCNM interlocutors said that while the controversial decision to

revoke the 2012 Language Law (although vetoed by the acting President) and

discussions about a lustration law might not have been decisive factors in

fomenting instability in Crimea, they contributed to the mobilization of a

significant number of ethnic Russians against the new authorities in Kyiv.

Actual fears of revanchist policies directed against the Russian minority were

stoked by rumours and one-sided media reporting, further encouraged by

radical statements devoid of factual evidence made by some politicians.

Although the immediate risk of ethnic strife seemed to diminish, at least

temporarily, over the reporting period, the underlying tensions have not

subsided and could flare up at any moment. The new political and regulatory

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framework imposed on minorities following the annexation of Crimea by the

Russian Federation has affected their legal status, rights as minorities and

daily life, which is increasingly characterized by an atmosphere of

intolerance and prejudice.

The Crimean Tatars find themselves in a particularly precarious situation

because they openly supported Ukrainian Statehood and territorial integrity,

and boycotted the so-called “referendum on the status of Crimea”. The

Crimean Tatars’ political position regarding the “referendum” was

channelled through the Mejlis, a self-governing body that claims to represent

all Crimean Tatars. As a result, the Mejlis is under increasing pressure from

the authorities exercising

de facto

control in Crimea.

The Crimean Tatars are concerned about the security of their community and

uncertain of their legal status, especially as the majority of them reportedly

plan to retain Ukrainian citizenship. They are worried about their

representation in

de facto

elected bodies and executive structures of Crimea

and about guarantees for the preservation of their identity, as they view

themselves as an indigenous people of Crimea.

The Crimean Tatars’ situation reflects years of marginalization in the

economic life and public affairs of the peninsula. The community was

disturbed when Rustam Temirgaliev,

de facto

first deputy prime minister of

Crimea, announced that the authorities in

de facto

control would request that

Crimean Tatars vacate some disputed lands.

349

The issue of land ownership

has been a bone of contention for the community since they started returning

to Crimea in the late 1980s. For many Crimean Tatars, safeguarding their

land in Crimea is tantamount to preserving their identity.

350

Many Crimean Tatars believe that if they opt out of Russian citizenship, they

might encounter problems accessing education, employment and healthcare

or restrictions to their land and property rights.

See: http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2014/03/18/n_6020613.shtml.

See more on land conflicts involving Crimean Tatars in: HCNM,

Integration of formerly deported

people in Crimea, Ukraine, Needs Assessment,

August 2013. pp. 9–15.

350

349

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Some Crimean Tatars are also worried about potential persecution on

religious grounds, as they belong to organized religious communities that are

legal in Ukraine, but illegal in the Russian Federation.

The ethnic Ukrainian community has also become vulnerable in the current

context, especially if they are Ukrainian speakers and support the territorial

integrity of Ukraine. Many ethnic Ukrainians fear persecution on ethnic

grounds, as they believe that ethnic Russians view the entire community as

staunch supporters of the “Maidan” movement and the territorial integrity of

Ukraine.

Lack of Human Security

Against the backdrop of growing instability in Ukraine, especially in the run

up to the 16 March “referendum on the status of Crimea”, deeply entrenched

inter-ethnic divisions re-emerged in Crimea. As the events unfolded, the

various ethnic communities communicated less, and fear and intimidation

started to rise. In particular, the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian-speaking

community became more vulnerable. The presence of unidentified armed

forces, the emergence of “people’s self-defence” units and the precarious

situation surrounding Ukrainian military and law-enforcement units

contributed to an increasingly dangerous situation.

Since two groups of protesters engaged in a standoff in front of the Supreme

Soviet building in Simferopol on 26 February, mutual mistrust and fear

between the ethnic Russian and Crimean Tatar communities has increased.

Reports of intimidation against Crimean Tatars, especially by so-called

“people’s self-defence” forces and unidentified men in military fatigues,

have been recorded regularly. Such public harassment has contributed to a

sense of heightened vulnerability, anxiety and uncertainty among members

of the Crimean Tatar community. The Crimean Tatars have organized patrols

to protect areas densely populated by their community.

In the days following the so-called “referendum on the status of Crimea”, a

number of incidents indicated mounting pressure on the Crimean Tatar

community. In Bakhchisarai, a number of Crimean Tatar homes were

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reportedly marked as belonging to Crimean Tatars. The community viewed

this as an act of intimidation and a threat of a pogrom.

The murder in March of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar, was seen by the

community as an act of terror and intimidation against the whole community.

On 3 March, Reshat Ametov staged a one-man protest near the building of

the Council of Ministers by standing in front of “people’s self-defence”

forces guarding the building. The same day he disappeared. His mutilated

body was found two weeks later; he appeared to have been tortured.

351

Crimean Tatars interviewed by the HCNM before and after annexation

expressed their fear of possible reprisals for their position on the so-called

“referendum on the status of Crimea”. An overwhelming majority of

Crimean Tatars heeded the Mejlis’ call to boycott the “referendum” but

believed that this decision could backfire on the community. They also

reported experiencing intimidation and fears of attacks by so-called “people’s

self-defence” groups and formations of Cossacks as a result of their strong

support for Ukrainian unity. The community is apprehensive about the

authorities’ in

de facto

control of Crimea and “people’s self-defence” groups’

future plans towards them, especially related to property issues.

The Crimean Tatar leaders reported the lack of consultations during the

process to adopt the

de facto

“constitution of Crimea”, which thus, according

to them, failed to reflect the political and cultural aspirations of the Crimean

Tatar community.

352

In the first half of March, Crimean Tatar leaders

announced their intention to use their right to self-determination in the form

of territorial or national-cultural autonomy in Crimea. The HCNM’s

interlocutors believe that this confrontation led to further tensions between

See: http://rus.azattyq.org/content/crimea-tatar-ukraine-russia-annexation-minority/25302057.html.

It should be noted that on 11 March 2014, the Crimean Supreme Council of Crimea adopted a

Resolution On Guarantees of Restoration of Rights of Crimean Tatar People, which promised upon

adoption of “the new Constitution of Crimea” the provision of guarantees for the official status of the

Crimean Tatar language on a par with Russian and Ukrainian; a 20 per cent quota for Crimean Tatars in

official positions in executive bodies and their guaranteed representation in district and city councils

and other bodies; recognition of the status of the Kurultai as a self-governing body of Crimean Tatars

and all its structures; facilitation of use of historic geographic names on a par with the existing ones, as

other measures to support the Crimean Tatar people in the cultural, educational and social and

economic spheres. The so-called “constitution of Crimea”, adopted on 11 April, incorporates only one

of the “guarantees”, namely giving the Crimean Tatar language an official status.

352

351

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Crimean Tatars and the

de facto

authorities of Crimea. Some members of the

community believe that the Mejlis’ stance may encourage violence against

the Crimean Tatars; others blame the Mejlis for giving up moral ground in

exchange for temporary security guarantees.

The HCNM’s interlocutors believe that diverging opinions within the

Crimean Tatar leadership could render the community even more vulnerable.

Meanwhile, the community is beset by practical questions about citizenship,

land registration, property ownership, bank accounts and education, and is

concerned about possible conscription into military service.

The ethnic Ukrainian community is also vulnerable in the current context. In

a climate of escalating pressure before and after the so-called “referendum on

the status of Crimea” and the subsequent annexation of Crimea to Russia,

many active community members have felt compelled to leave Crimea or

move their families off the peninsula out of concern for their safety.

Ethnic Ukrainians increasingly express concerns about retaining their

identity in Crimea, especially their language and education rights. Reports of

intimidation of Ukrainian-language teachers and rumours that the authorities

exercising

de facto

control of Crimea plan to close Ukrainian schools fuel

perceptions of threats to their identity. There were also incidents in the two

weeks leading up to the referendum in which pro-Ukrainian journalists and

activists were specifically targeted; 15 were abducted by unknown assailants.

All were released after the so-called “referendum on the status of Crimea”,

but most said they had been ill-treated or even tortured.

353

Several ethnic Russians told the HCNM that they were concerned about the

rising tensions between the ethnic Russian and Crimean Tatar communities,

which they feared could develop into an inter-ethnic conflict.

353

Information from HCNM interviews in Crimea.

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Issues of Concern

Internally Displaced Persons

According to official numbers, some 3,000 people have registered as

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and are accommodated in official or

privately provided facilities on the Ukrainian mainland. The real number of

IDPs may be up to three times higher, as people often stay with friends or

family members. Ukrainian civil servants and members of the Ukrainian

military and their family members who were previously stationed in Crimea

did not register as IDPs.

Crimean Tatars, who are overrepresented among the IDPs, have temporarily

settled mostly in Lviv and the surrounding areas. Although initially

welcomed, this is already creating tensions with the local population on

issues connected to long-term presence, such as facilities for worship. Once

local support initiatives dry up, regional and central authorities may be

unprepared to handle longer or larger-scale IDP movements from Crimea.

Reportedly, many IDPs who initially fled Crimea did so out of a fear of

persecution on religious grounds, as they belong to organized religious

communities that are illegal in Russia.

As the majority of Crimean Tatars do not recognize the results of the

so-called “referendum on the status of Crimea” and Crimea’s subsequent

annexation to the Russian Federation, they view regulations for crossing the

Ukrainian–Crimea border as an infringement of their freedom of movement

within their country of residence. Members of the Crimean Tatar community

also cited concerns about restrictions on movement within Crimea. They

referred to roadblocks and extensive checks of identity documents, especially

targeting Crimean Tatars, raising concerns of ethnic profiling.

Access to Information/Minority Media

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation led to an erosion of

media freedoms. Ukrainian television stations, irrespective of language, are

no longer available in Crimea. The terrestrial signals of Ukrainian TV

channels

Inter, Briz, 1+1

and

5 channel,

and of local independent channel

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Chernomorskaya TV,

have been taken off air and replaced with Russian

channels.

The Crimean Tatar

ATR

channel has remained on air. However, it is

reportedly under pressure from the authorities exercising

de facto

control,

particularly concerning how the activities of Crimean Tatar leaders are

reported. According to the HCNM’s interlocutors, the

ATR

website was

attacked and temporarily shut down at the beginning of March.

Language and Education

Although the so-called “constitution of Crimea”, which was adopted by the

authorities exercising

de facto

control, introduces three State languages –

Russian, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian – the Crimean Tatar and ethnic

Ukrainian communities do not see indications that these provisions will be

implemented in earnest.

Ethnic Ukrainians are particularly fearful about the future status of the

Ukrainian language. Due to the strong anti-Ukrainian sentiment prevailing

among the ethnic Russian population, several of the HCNM’s interlocutors

reported feeling unsafe speaking Ukrainian in public places. The Crimean

Tatars are concerned about whether they will be allowed to use their

language with public administration bodies.

Minority communities are also concerned about whether they will be able to

retain their minority education rights. On the Crimean peninsula, 15 schools

provide instruction in Crimean Tatar (in primary grades only) and seven

schools provide instruction in the Ukrainian language, a number that is

regarded as low in relation to the needs of the population.

354

Ethnic Ukrainians are worried that the authorities exercising

de facto

control

soon will take a decision to cancel the teaching of the Ukrainian language in

Russian-language

secondary

schools.

They

fear

that

the

seven

Ukrainian-language schools in Crimea will be closed or transferred to

teaching in the Russian language. One school and the only department of

354

Third Opinion on Ukraine, ACFC, 22 March 2012.

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Ukrainian philology in Crimea, at the Vernandsky Tavrida University, are

perceived to be at risk of closure. Attempts to dismiss the director of a

Ukrainian gymnasium in Simferopol, instances of public harassment of

Ukrainian teaching staff in other schools and reports of parents being

pressured to take their children out of Ukrainian-language schools, are

further fuelling fears.

The Crimean Tatars are worried about whether schools with instruction in

Crimean Tatar will be able to continue operating, especially considering that

some of them have already started to introduce teaching in the Latin script, a

practice that may contravene the statutory requirements of the Russian

Federation.

The HCNM’s interlocutors in Crimea were also concerned that persons

belonging to national minorities who opt not to take Russian citizenship may

face problems with access to education.

Participation and Representation

The Crimean Tatar community appears to be divided on the question of

participation in public affairs. Some are seeking ways to work with the

authorities exercising

de facto

control; others are wary that those authorities

are trying to divide their community. The HCNM’s interlocutors anticipate

that the participation of Crimean Tatars in the social and political life of

Crimea will rapidly dwindle.

The Mejlis, which claims to act as a representative body of all Crimean

Tatars and not as a non-governmental organization (NGO), hopes to maintain

a status within the Russian Federation. Although the Ukrainian authorities

until very recently did not officially recognize its status, they tolerated its

activities and the Mejlis was often regarded, despite occasional attempts to

dispute this, as the legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatars.

355

However, the Mejlis may not be able to maintain this status, whether

On 20 March 2014, the Verhovna Rada adopted a resolution that includes the point that “Ukraine

recognizes the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the executive body of the Kurultay, and the

Kurultay as the highest representative body of Crimean Tatars.”

355

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registered or not, under the authorities exercising

de facto

control of Crimea

or even within the Crimean Tatar community. It should be noted that there

are also fears that all NGOs, including ethnic associations, will have to

re-register and that organizations that are not perceived as loyal to Moscow

will not be approved. Legislation and policies governing NGOs in the

Russian Federation are more restrictive than in Ukraine.

The Mejlis decided to nominate representatives for positions in the

de facto

Crimean government. The authorities exercising

de facto

control in Crimea

have accepted these nominations but have refused to regard the Mejlis as a

body representing the entire Crimean Tatar community. A number of posts in

the

de facto

executive structures were also offered to Crimean Tatars

representing groups that are more pro-Russian, such as Milli Firqa. So far,

the authorities exercising

de facto

control have not taken into considerations

specific concerns of Crimean Tatars in the development of a

de facto

legislative framework for Crimea (apart from mentioning the Crimean Tatar

language as an official language in the

de facto

“constitution” of Crimea).

Many Crimean Tatars view the policies of the authorities’ exercising

de facto

control as an attempt to stoke divisions within their community. Some

Crimean Tatars strongly oppose the Mejlis’ decision to participate in the

facto

Crimean government, perceiving it as a formal recognition that Crimea

is part of Russia and a strategy to protect businesses owned by prominent

Crimean Tatar leaders.

Citizenship

Under Article 5 of the Russian “treaty” on incorporating Crimea into the

Russian Federation, Ukrainian nationals permanently living in Crimea and

Sevastopol are to be considered Russian nationals as of the date when the

treaty enters in force, which under Article 1 is the date of the signature of the

treaty, effectively 18 March 2014.

356

The same Article gives the residents of

Crimea and Sevastopol one month to “choose” between Russian and other

citizenships. This “choice” appears to reflect the “right of optation”

356

http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20605.

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enshrined in Article 17 of the Russian Citizenship Law, which provides that:

“When a change occurs in the State Border of the Russian Federation under

an international treaty of the Russian Federation, the persons residing in the

territory which switched its state shall have a right to choose citizenship

(right of optation) in the manner and within the term established by a relevant

international treaty of the Russian Federation.”

Article 4 of the Russian Law of 23 March 2014 on the “Acceptance of the

Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of New

Federal Subjects – the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal

Significance Sevastopol” reiterates the provision of Article 5 of the Russian

“treaty” on incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation and

complements it with the requirement that after one month, holders of other

citizenship or people with a permanent residency abroad are banned from

occupying government and municipal jobs in Crimea.

357

As stated by the HCNM’s interlocutors, filing a statement to retain Ukrainian

citizenship and surrender Russian citizenship was in practice possible only

from 1 April 2014. Initially, there was only one place in Simferopol where

such statements could be filed and two in the rest of Crimea, in Belogorsk

and Bachchisarai. When the deadline for receiving such statements passed,

there were reception points in just eight territorial units (Yalta, Evpatoriya,

Saki, Feodosiaya, Jankoi, Simferopol, Sevastopol and Bachchisarai).

According to the personal accounts of people who filed such statements, the

limited number of reception points meant that many residents of Crimea were

not able to exercise their right to choose their citizenship.

358

Individuals who do not want to become Russian citizens or do not want to

lose their Ukrainian citizenship may experience problems related to this

decision. In many cases, such individuals are not even aware of the full

consequences of their decision. If they are treated as foreign citizens under

the Law on the Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, they

will have to leave the Russian Federation after 90 days, and are barred from

See: http://www.rg.ru/2014/03/22/krym-dok.html.

By 18 March, according to the Head of Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, around

3,000 residents of Crimea had rejected Russian citizenship. See:

http://www.regnum.ru/news/1793226.html.

358

357

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staying more than 90 days in any 180 given calendar days. According to the

Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, breaching these

rules may result in fines and deportation, as stipulated by part 1 of Article

18.8. These rules, if applied to residents of Crimea who opt out from Russian

citizenship, may create serious obstacles to their enjoyment of their property

and other rights on the territory of Crimea.

The HCNM delegations’ interlocutors also predicted that many employees of

State-funded organizations would be threatened with dismissal if they retain

Ukrainian citizenship. However, it should be noted that Russian legislation

only applies citizenship or permanent residency status restrictions to official

positions in the civil or municipal services. Under Russian law, persons

holding official posts cannot have dual nationality; they must have only

Russian citizenship.

359

In addition, draft laws currently being tabled in Ukraine as well as Russia

seem to suggest that both countries are contemplating further restricting their

laws and regulations on dual nationality and introducing sanctions for

violation of these rules. Such developments might negatively affect those

residents who decide to keep their Ukrainian passports while also obtaining

Russian citizenship.

Reportedly, residents of Crimea who refuse Russian citizenship will not be

eligible for Russian pensions, salaries and social benefits.

360

Article 7 of

Ukraine’s draft law on guaranteeing rights and freedoms of citizens and the

legal regime on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine provides that

Ukrainian citizens that reside on the temporarily occupied territory of

Ukraine would be entitled to Ukrainian Government social benefits and

pensions, unless they get them from the competent bodies of the Russian

Federation. The procedure is to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of

Ukraine.

361

According to the HCNM’s interlocutors, the Cabinet of Ministers

of Ukraine has not yet established this procedure. These interlocutors also

359

See: http://www.interfax.ru/world/365252.

See: http://pravo.gov.ru/laws/acts/29/505554.html.

361

The draft law was adopted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 15 April and is pending the signature

of the acting President as of the date of writing of this report. See:

http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18/page.

360

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opined that to get Ukrainian pensions and social benefits, citizens of Ukraine

residing in Crimea would probably have to travel to mainland Ukraine to

collect them, which may be problematic in the current context.

It should be noted that regulations and practices on citizenship matters in

Crimea are in a fluid state and conflicting commentaries come from the

facto

officials in Crimea and the authorities in Kyiv. The legal uncertainty of

the status of many residents of Crimea, especially Crimean Tatars and ethnic

Ukrainians, may seriously impact the exercise of their rights and the scope of

social benefits and pension coverage.

In practice, residents of Crimea have very little effective choice in deciding

on citizenship matters; unless they take Russian citizenship, and possibly also

surrender their Ukrainian citizenship, they are at risk of losing access to

certain rights.

Many Crimean Tatars may have no option but to take Russian citizenship to

maintain their right to use land for agricultural purposes, as according to

Russian legislation, such rights can only be held by citizens of the Russian

Federation. Further complicating the situation, many Crimean Tatars cannot

prove their residence on the peninsula because they do not have valid

residence registration, as they do not officially hold property rights.

In addition to concerns at the individual level, there are also considerations at

the inter-State level and questions of conformity with international norms.

Generally speaking, international law affords States broad latitude to confer

nationality. At the same time, a State’s ascription of nationality under

internal law, in accordance with Article 1 of The Hague Convention of 1930

on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, “shall be

recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international

conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally

recognized with regard to nationality”.

362

Contemporary developments

concerning citizenship do, however, increasingly set limits to sovereign

Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, the Hague, 12 April

1930. Available at: http://eudo-

citizenship.eu/InternationalDB/docs/Convention%20on%20certain%20questions%20relating%20to%2

0the%20conflict%20of%20nationality%20laws%20FULL%20TEXT.pdf.

362

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States’ freedom of action, including the general recognition that conferral of

citizenship should be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

363

It should also be noted that the

en masse

recognition of all residents of

Crimea as citizens of Russia renders inapplicable the provision from Article

19 of the Ukrainian Law on Citizenship stating that Ukrainian citizens lose

their nationality if they voluntarily acquire another one. In this context, it is

commendable that part 4 of Article 3 of the Ukrainian draft law on

guaranteeing rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime on the

temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine provides that the forced automatic

acquisition of Russian citizenship by the Ukrainians living in Crimea shall

not be legally accepted by Ukraine as a ground for withdrawing Ukrainian

citizenship. From an international law perspective, the acquisition of Russian

citizenship by Crimean residents under the conditions described above would

hardly qualify as “voluntary”.

364

Although Crimean Tatars are especially vulnerable with regard to the

citizenship question, for a number of ethnic Ukrainians, the pressure to

acquire Russian citizenship if remaining on the territory of the peninsula was

the decisive factor in their decision to leave Crimea.

In addition, en masse conferral of passports is manifestly at odds with paragraph 11 of The

Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter State Relations, as it undermines

territorial integrity and sovereignty, and goes against the fundamental principle of good neighbourly

relations.

364

The European Convention on Nationality, ratified by Ukraine in 2006, states that an acquisition of

another nationality is to be considered “voluntary” – and thus may serve as a valid ground for the loss

of another nationality – where the “acquisition [is] a result of a person’s own free will and not an

automatic one (ex

lege)”.

363

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IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Ukrainian authorities:

Immediate Steps



Assign high priority to the protection of human, including minority, rights in

practice and ensure prompt, effective and impartial investigation, in co-operation

with relevant international actors as needed, of all credible or validated reports of

violence, harassment and intimidation, in particular relating to ethnic, linguistic,



Ensure that all regular armed forces are under democratic control and are

accountable. Any special military or police units should operate strictly under a

firmly established legislative framework, in full respect of human rights and the

rule of law. All irregular armed groups should be disarmed and their activities

should be fairly and thoroughly investigated by competent authorities; if they are

found to be involved in intimidation, violence or other criminal behaviour, their



Ensure that any new or amended legislation is given due consideration and is based

on nationwide and inclusive consultations rather than being hastily adopted and

that it does not regress from the existing level of human rights, including minority

rights, protection.

activities should be ended.

cultural or religious background or political opinion.

General Recommendations



Implement all recommendations on minority rights stemming from various

international review procedures and mechanisms, including those of the United

Nations; the OSCE, including the HCNM and the ODIHR; and the Council of

Europe, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National

Minorities (FCNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages



To ensure the above, co-operate in a continuous, full and effective manner with

relevant international organizations, and address minority rights as a matter of

priority.

(ECRML).

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

Ensure that the process to revise the legal framework providing for effective

minority rights protection – including the Constitution, the Law on the Principles

of the State Language Policy and the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine – is

participatory by carrying out nationwide and inclusive consultations, drawing on



Adopt and implement a long term nationwide integration strategy and policy,

coupled with action plans setting specific targets and deadlines with follow up



Develop a systemic approach that ensures transparency, inclusiveness and the

participation of relevant stakeholders in all legislative, policy and institutional

developments that are relevant to minority rights.

monitoring provided at regular intervals.

international expertise as needed.

Institutional



Re-establish a dedicated institution or co-ordination point for national minority

rights and the integration of society at the institutional level. The reforms to this



Establish effective mechanisms to facilitate consultations with minority

representatives and to discuss and solve minority rights concerns, and ensure that

these mechanisms can function regularly and properly. In addition to a national

consultative body, consider establishing subsidiary regional ones, as appropriate, in

order to ensure inclusiveness and encourage effective participation by all relevant



Ensure that the Ombudsperson has sufficient competencies and resources to act as

an effective and independent protector of human, including minority, rights,

including by reaching out, handling complaints and addressing violations and

shortcomings at the national and regional levels.

minorities in Ukraine.

effect announced by the Government should be adopted and implemented.

Legal Reform



Review and revise legislation with the aim of developing comprehensive minority



Engage in effective consultations with an inclusive spectrum of national minorities

to ensure they have adequate opportunities to play a meaningful role in the legal

rights protection that is fully in line with international and regional obligations.

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reform process, especially on matters of direct relevance to them. Other relevant

civil society actors should also be given the opportunity to participate in

consultations on a regular basis.

Specific Policy Areas



language

use: revise the relevant legal framework only when the situation in

Ukraine has stabilized. Efforts to revise the legal framework should take place

through an inclusive, participatory and de-politicized process; care should be taken

that

legislation

language is

consistent

and

provides

for

coherent

implementation; the new language law should strike a balance between ensuring

that the State language functions as an effective a tool of cohesion for society and

fully respecting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. While

maintaining Ukrainian as the State language, the specific role of the Russian

language in Ukraine should be clearly recognized in the legal framework, while the

rights and interests of speakers of smaller minority languages should also be

protected. Constitutional guarantees would help re-establish predictability and



education:

promote appropriate education models, including multilingual

education, as a means of supporting the development of proficiency in both the

language of the minority concerned and the State language and ensure

implementation; institute clear procedures and criteria for establishing classes or

schools with instruction of or in a minority language, including at the pre-school

level, where there is sufficient demand; pay particular attention to inter-cultural



participation:

elaborate measures and mechanisms to ensure the full and

effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public affairs,

as well as in the socio economic and cultural life of Ukraine and review the



anti-discrimination:

revise the existing legislation to promote the full and

effective equality of all, including persons belonging to national minorities.

Introduce special and targeted measures for disadvantaged minorities, such as

Crimean Tatars and the Roma, particularly regarding access to education, housing,

healthcare and public services; in close consultation with civil society, develop

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stability.

education.

effectiveness of such procedures on a regular basis.

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comprehensive strategies and implementable action plans to achieve these aims;

provide additional capacity building for law enforcement and judiciary to handle

cases and situations of inter-ethnic concern, including manifestations of prejudice

and intolerance.

To the authorities exercising

de facto

control of Crimea:



Assign the highest priority to the protection of human, including minority, rights in

practice and ensure prompt, effective and impartial investigation, in co-operation

with relevant international actors as needed, of all credible or validated reports of

violence, harassment and intimidation, in particular relating to ethnic, linguistic,



Take immediate measures to promote the safety and reduce the insecurities of all

ethnic communities in Crimea, especially the most vulnerable groups, including the



Facilitate inter-personal contact, especially between family members who are now

separated, between those in Crimea and those in the rest of Ukraine. Those who

relinquish their conferred right to Russian citizenship should not be restricted in

their residence on the territory of Crimea and in the exercise of their rights in



Guarantee the right of residence on the territory for all residents of Crimea,

including foreign citizens and stateless persons, who hold relevant permits



Ensure citizenship issues do not negatively affect access to social benefits and



Provide objective and easily accessible information regarding the status and rights



Ensure that no discrimination arises out the different legal status of residents of

Crimea. All residents of Crimea should have access to their rights and entitlements



The authorities exercising

de facto

control of Crimea should ensure that domestic

and international observers gain unimpeded access to monitor the human and

minority rights situation on the peninsula.

based on presenting valid identity documentation, including Ukraine passports.

of different categories of residents on the territory of Crimea.

pensions for all current residents of Crimea.

according to the legislation of Ukraine.

comparison to other residents of Crimea who opted for Russian citizenship.

Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians.

cultural or religious background or political opinion.

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ANNEX II List of official ODIHR/HRAM interlocutors

Autonomous Republic of Crimea

1. Assistant to the Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Naval Forces,

Marina Kaneluk.

2. Assistant to the Chief Commander on legal work, Head of the Legal

Department of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, Leonid Zalubovski.

3. Assistant to the Representative of Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner

for Human Rights (Ombudsperson) in Crimea, Natalia Sergeevna

4. Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea and at the same

time First Deputy Chairman of the Party “Russian Unity”, Sergei

Tsekov.

5. Deputy Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

in Crimea, Sergiy Tatartsev.

6. Head of Bakhchisarai Regional State Administration, Ilmi Umerov

7. Head of the Mejilis of the Crimean Tatars, Refat Chuburov.

8. Mayor of Bakhchisaray city, Konstantyn Rubanenko

9. Press Secretary of the Mejilis of the Crimean Tatars, Lilia Muslimova.

10. Representative of the Ombudsman of Ukraine in Crimea, Natalia

Sharova

Donetsk

1. Acting Chair of Administrative Court of Appeals in Donetsk, Raissa

Khanova.

2. Acting Chair of District Administrative Court of Donetsk, Oleg

Konichenko.

3. Councillor of Deputy of the Head of Regional State Administration,

Sergey Zavialov.

4. Deputy of the Head of Regional State Administration, Oleksandr

Fomenko,

5. First Deputy of Regional Police Department, Valeriy Stanchenko.

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6. Former Head of Regional State Administration of Donetsk, Mr

Shishatskiy.

7. Head of Regional State Administration of Donetsk, Sergey Taruta.

8. Secretary of Donetsk City Council, Serghei Bogachev.

Kharkiv

1. Acting Deputy Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration,

Igor Rainin.

2. Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Economic Liaison and

International Relations in Kharkiv Regional State Administration,

Denis Tkachev.

3. Deputy Head of Kharkiv Regional State Council, Ludmila Davidova.

4. Member of the Kharkiv Regional Parliament and member of the

Permanent Commission of Human Rights, Freedom of Speech and

Information, Vladimir Alekseev.

5. Regional representative of Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for

Human Rights (Ombudsperson) in Kharkiv, Natalia Zurab.

6. Deputy Head of Mayor of city Kharkiv, Igor Terekhov.

Kherson

1. Head of Kherson Regional State Administration, Yuriy Odarchenko.

Kyiv

1. First deputy of Secretary of National Security and Defense Council of

Ukraine Viktor Chumak.

2. Member of Ukrainian Parliament, Parliamentary Committee on

Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Interethnic Relations, Mustafa

Dzhemilev.

3. Members of Ukrainian Parliament Defence Committee members

headed by MP Volodymyr Lytvyn.

4. Ukrainian

Parliament

Commissioner

for

Human

Rights

(Ombudsperson), Valeria Lutkovska.

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Mykolaiv

1. Adviser on International Relations in Regional State Administration,

Igor Meisner

2. Deputy Head of Mykolaiv Regional State Administration, Volodymyr

Lusta.

3. Head of the Department of Social Protection of Mykolaiv Regional

State Administration, Olga Syvoplyas.

4. Member of the Mykolaiv Regional State Council, Oksana

Janiszewski.

5. Specialist in the Department for National Minorities and Religions in

Mykolaiv Regional State Administration, Viktor Chebatarov.

Luhansk

1. Deputy Head of Department for External Relations in Luhansk

Regional State Administration, Svetlana Bondar.

2. Deputy Mayor of the city Luhansk, Zaza Zukhbaya.

3. First Deputy Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration, Irina

Verigina.

4. Head of Department of Internal and Information Policy of Luhansk

City State Administration, Oksana Tereshchenko.

5. Head of Economic Department, Luhansk City State Admnistration

Svetlana Drobotenko.

6. Head of Main Section of the Regional Police under Ministry of

Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Luhansk Oblast, general Vladimir

Guslavskiy.

7. Member of Luhansk Regional State Administration Council, Maksim

Chelenko.

8. Member of Luhansk Regional State Administration Council, Yurii

Khovolov.

9. Mayor of the city Luhansk, Serhii Kravchenko.

10. Regional coordinator for the contact with citizens of the Ukrainian

Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson),,

Valeriy Arkhipov.

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Lviv

1. Chief of Halitsky District Police Department, based in Lviv, Ivan

Ivanochko.

2. Deaputy of Mayor of city Lviv, Oleh Berezuyk

3. Deputy of Head of Lviv Regional State Council, Andriy Holyavka.

4. Deputy Head of the Department of Social Protection of Lviv Regional

State Administration, Oksana Yakovets.

5. Head of Office of Western Regional Border Guard Service of

Ukraine, Igor Andrusik.

6. Head of the Department of Culture, Nationalities and Religions of

Lviv Regional State Administration, Natalia Gamkalo.

7. Head of the Department of International Relations in Lviv Regional

State Administration, Pavlo Hobzey

8. Head of the Department of Legal and Human Rights of Lviv Regional

State Council, Oleg Risniy.

9. Head of the Department of Social Protection of Lviv Regional State

Administration, Vasil Martynyak.

10. Head of Lviv Regional State Administration, Irina Sekh.

11. Head of Lviv Regional State Council, Petro Kolodii.

12. Member of border control unit, Western Regional Border Guard

Service of Ukraine, Gennadiy Torop.

13. Member of Department of Nationalities and Religions of Lviv

Regional State Administration, Vera Otich.

14. Representative of Department of International Relations, Western

Regional Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Mikhail Slobodynuk.

15. Responsible for work with foreigners in Western Regional Border

Guard Service of Ukraine, Igor Kaval.

16. Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in Lviv,

Irina Sagay.

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Odessa

1. Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Economic Activity and

European Integration in Odessa Regional State Administration,

Anastasia Andronova.

2. Deputy Head of Department of Culture and Tourism, Nationalities

and Religions and Head of Sub-Department of Nationalities and

Religions in Odessa Regional State Administration, Elena Petrova.

3. Deputy Head of Odessa Regional State Administration, Serhiy

Kalinchuk.

4. First Deputy of Regional Police Department, Valeriy Stanchenko.

5. Head of Odessa Regional State Administration, Volodymyr

Nemyrovskyi.

6. Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regional office in

Odessa (AoR: Kherson, Kirovograd, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Vinnytsya

regions), Anna Goncharova.

7. Representative of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Southern

Regional

District,

International

Cooperation

and

Border

Representation Activity Sector, Fedir Belinskyi.

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