

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## Strategic Framework Document

### Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2013 - 2016



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## Cover page

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Department	MENA
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Title	Danish-Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP)
Country/Region	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Implementing Partners	Danish NGOs, MENA NGOs, multilateral organisations, media institutions, special interest organisations, educational institutions, independent institutions, municipalities, central government authorities and agencies, etc.
Implementation Period	July 2013 - December 2016
Budget	Annual allocations of DKK 275 million per year.
Strategic Objectives	1) To promote reform and democratisation processes in the Middle East and North Africa. 2) To improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA-Region.
Thematic Area I:	Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance
Thematic Area II:	Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality
Thematic Area III:	Knowledge-Based Societies
Thematic Area IV:	Economic Growth and Job Creation

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## Abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAPP	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DEDI	Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute
DKK	Danish Krone
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNI	Gross National Income
HR	Human Rights
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODA	Overall Development Assistance
SFD	Strategic Framework Document
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TAO	Technical Advisory Offices
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar

## Foreword

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has since its establishment in 2003 been a central pillar in Danish foreign policy in relation to the MENA-region. The programme attends to vital and strategic Danish interests by supporting the on-going development of democratic, prosperous and stable communities in North Africa and the Middle East.

The DAPP also enhances mutual understanding and contributes to counter stereotypes as Danish and Arab partners engage in reciprocal and mutually beneficial and respectful partnerships that contribute to dialogue and mutual trust.

From its outset, the programme has been designed to address complex reform-dynamics in a swift and flexible manner. This approach has proven its relevance during the popular uprisings across the Arab region. Due to its flexible and multidimensional approach, the DAPP has been instrumental in supporting dynamics of political reform throughout the region, where numerous local DAPP-partners have been and continue to be central players in ongoing processes of reform that among other things empower women, strengthen human rights and enhance the freedom of the media.

In order to support the ongoing processes of democratic transition, the programme has recently been expanded both in volume and in terms of its content. It now includes direct democracy support as well as support to economic development and job creation – vital elements for successful democratic transitions in countries like Egypt and Tunisia.

In order to address the opportunities and challenges present in a complex region in transition, the DAPP will over the coming years retain its flexible and multidimensional approaches to support ongoing processes of political reform with the aim of strengthening democratic prosperous and stable communities in the Middle East and North Africa while also continuing to nourish the vital dialogue between a broad range of partners from Denmark and the Arab region.

DAPP will continue to address key areas of mutual interest and further strengthen Denmark's ties with the MENA-region at a crucial time in history, where a number of Arab countries are undergoing major changes. This is an investment that has already benefitted the region as well as Denmark and Europe. The lessons learnt and the strong partnerships already established form a solid foundation for the continuation of the work and the further efforts to improve the programme in this new phase covering the period until the end of 2016.

## 1 Introduction

This Strategic Framework Document (SFD) is the main guiding policy framework for collaboration and partnerships between Denmark and the MENA-region.

The SFD outlines the overall objectives, rationale, context, strategic approach, thematic focus areas and risk-management of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) covering a period of three and a half years from July 2013 to December 2016. The SFD will be informed and adjusted through a midterm review planned for 2014.

The SFD builds on an analysis of the evolving context in the MENA-region and on the experiences and lessons learnt since the inception of the DAPP in 2003<sup>1</sup>. It also reflects the priorities of the new Danish Development Strategy: ‘The Right to a Better Life’<sup>2</sup>, including the ‘human rights-based approach’. The SFD is guided by the Danida Guidelines for Programme Management, while taking into account that the DAPP is implemented in complex, high-risk and politicized contexts.

The DAPP responds to the new possibilities for collaboration, which have arisen after the Arab uprisings. Results are not easily achieved, and a high level of risk-taking is necessary. The programme is therefore designed as a high-risk endeavour in a dynamic and volatile context. A context also characterized by high levels of insecurity, deeply rooted antagonisms and in some cases dramatic political changes unfolding at an unprecedented pace.

Consequently, the SFD needs to be highly flexible in order to be able to respond in an adequate and timely manner. The DAPP is therefore designed with carefully identified thematic intervention areas, knowing that it is difficult to foresee and predict all challenges and opportunities for impact in the coming years. This flexible approach enhances the likelihood of successful impact, as interventions can be refocused or redirected during implementation.

### 1.1 Program rationale

The DAPP has the following double strategic objective:

- To promote reform and democratisation processes in the Middle East and North Africa.
- To improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA-region.

From the outset in 2003, the dialogue objective was integrated into all DAPP activities. The main modality of the DAPP was direct collaboration between equal Arab-Danish partners, working together on reform-related issues of common interest, hence nourishing a dialogue between professional and equal peers.

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<sup>1</sup> This SFD builds *inter alia* on the following reports: 1) *Analyser af det Arabiske Initiativ of Anbefalinger til næste fase*, Udenrigsministeriet, Maj 2006. 2) *Review af det Arabiske Initiativ, dansk syntese rapport*, Skadkaer Consult, Juli 2009. 3) *Report to the Public Accounts Committee on the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme*, Rigsrevisionen, May 2010. 4) *Dialoguing Partnerships – An Analysis of the Dialogue-Assumptions of the Danish Partnership for Dialogue and Reform*, DIIS Report, November 2010. 5) *Dansk-Arabiske Partnerskaber i Mellemøsten og Nordafrika – Resultater af Partnerskab for Dialog og Reform 2009-2010*, Udenrigsministeriet, Marts 2011. 6) *Pre-study – Evaluation of the Partnership for Dialogue and Reform Programme*, Udenrigsministeriet, May 2011.

<sup>2</sup> <http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=b22d25a3-6402-4c0c-9d26-94accf4c5490>

Furthermore, a number of activities have had intercultural dialogue as their stated objective, be that activities of the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) or various partnership activities focusing on intercultural and/or interreligious dialogue.

The dialogue objective has proven to be highly relevant, not least for ensuring a mutually respectful and reciprocal approach and building long-lasting equal relationships between large numbers of Arab-Danish partners<sup>3</sup>. It has also proved valuable in as far as it has been able to address stereotypes and challenges, e.g. during the ‘cartoon crises’<sup>4</sup>.

With regard to the reform objective, the thematic focus of the DAPP has since the inception of the programme been framed by the 2002 UNDP Arab Human Development Report. This ground-breaking report written by Arab scholars assessed the state of human development across the region and offered concrete suggestions to accelerate progress. The report identified three key challenges for human development in the region, namely the enhancement of:

1. Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance
2. Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality
3. Knowledge-based Societies<sup>5</sup>.

These challenges, identified a decade ago by Arab experts, remain highly relevant as they point to some of the root causes of the Arab uprisings.

Yet, an additional fourth challenge has in recent years proven to be important for the development in the MENA-region, namely the stagnating economies and high rates of unemployment, not least among young people. The new democratic processes and institutions are confronted with high popular expectations of dignity and social justice, social and economic improvement and employment, as popular uprisings and ensuing political instability have further aggravated the economic stagnation. This is felt particularly by young people who face high levels of unemployment. With large youth populations entering the labour market in the coming years the challenge will only grow bigger.

In order for the processes of democratic transition to succeed, the new governments in Egypt and in Tunisia have highlighted the need to address the unemployment challenge in recent policy declarations and in their bilateral dialogue with Denmark. On this background, assistance to halt the economic downturn and to spur economic growth and employment has since November 2011 been added as a fourth corner stone in meeting one of the overriding DAPP development objectives of promoting democratization and reforms. Therefore the fourth challenge identified is: Economic Growth and Job Creation.


The four challenges form the basis for the four thematic reform areas addressed by the DAPP for 2013-2016 as illustrated below:

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<sup>3</sup> More than 250 Danish and 450 Arab partners have been involved to date.

<sup>4</sup> “Dialoguing Partnerships – An Analysis of the Dialogue-Assumptions of the Danish Partnership for Dialogue and Reform”, *DIIS Report, November 2010*.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf>



At the end of 2011, in light of the Arab uprisings, the Danish Government decided to increase the DAPP budget to DKK 275 Million annually, while also adding new modalities of collaboration, namely efforts to directly support democratisation processes and to promote job creation and economic growth in ‘transition’ countries. Yet, while expanding and adjusting to the new transition dynamics, the DAPP continues its long-term efforts to promote reform processes and dialogue through equal partnership, also in countries of the regions where political changes have been less dramatic in recent years, such as Jordan and Morocco.

Accordingly, the DAPP continues its previous geographic focus on a number of specific countries, either drawing on year-long experiences of partnership and collaboration (in Jordan, Morocco and Yemen) or in order to also support on-going and highly challenging processes of transition in other countries (these include Egypt, Syria, Tunisia plus Libya, where the involvement may be of a shorter term, due to GNI increases). Yet, to the extent possible, a regional approach is applied in order to promote synergies and exchanges of lessons learned between countries.

Finally, Denmark is but one of many countries with organizations collaborating with partners to address the political, social and economic challenges in the MENA-region. Moreover, the amounts of financing which Denmark brings to the table are limited in a macro-economic context. This has a number of important implications. First, the thematic areas where Denmark engages itself bilaterally have been carefully selected and based on detailed analyses of comparative advantages in each specific context. Secondly, an integrated element of the DAPP is to ensure that Danish partners also promote donor coordination to avoid duplication and enhance impact. Thirdly, an integral part of the DAPP is a very active multilateral engagement through the EU, the World Bank family, the UN and other multilateral agencies. This engagement involves a broad span of instruments from policy dialogue to secondment of Danish experts to relevant EU-institutions and multilateral organizations.



## 2 Previous DAPP phases

### 2.1 Historical development

DAPP was initiated in 2003 with the aim to create a platform for strengthened dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the Arab world. From the outset, the DAPP has been characterized by reciprocity, mutual respect and partnership with a long-term perspective and a flexible framework.

In November 2011, the Danish Government adopted a revised strategic framework for the DAPP. While continuing to use the UNDP Arab Human Development Report as the framework, the following three areas were identified for interventions:

- Danish-Arab cooperation on establishing democratic institutions with particular focus on North Africa, and increased collaboration with civil society and reform actors throughout the MENA region.
- Promotion of economic development and job creation.
- Strengthening of Danish efforts in the EU, in multilateral organizations and improvement of coordination among the Nordic countries.

Under each of these areas, a narrower set focus area was defined. Danish-Arab collaboration focused on *youth, human rights, women and gender equality, media, labour market, academic collaboration, decentralisation and public participation*. The cooperation under DAPP was mainly channelled through Danish Arab partnership programmes, but also through technical assistance directly to state institutions. The cooperating partners have been Arab and Danish CSOs, media organisations, political parties, parliaments and reform-actors within State Administration and legislative bodies.

Denmark furthermore promoted cooperation on *economic development* in the form of *creating jobs* for unemployed youth. The cooperation has also aimed at *creating strong labour organisations and inspiring social dialogue* on labour market issues. The activities under focus area have mainly been implemented through multilateral organisations and through cooperation with Danish labour market organisations.

Finally, the collaboration aimed at ensuring coordination between donors as well as to strengthen and align with EU initiatives in the MENA-region. A way of promoting this has been to second Danish national experts to the EU to contribute with their expertise. Another way has been to encourage multilateral organisations such as the UN and the World Bank to play a stronger strategic role in underpinning sustainable and democratic developments in the region.

### 2.2 Lessons learnt

In 2009, a review concluded that overall, the DAPP was a success<sup>6</sup>. Its ability to involve partner organisations, and especially the focus on professional partnerships was highlighted. The Review also mentioned that the focus on gender, media and youth could be strengthened, as could be the creation of synergies, coordination and exchange of information between the

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<sup>6</sup> *Review af det Arabiske Initiativ*, dansk syntese rapport, Skadkaer Consult, Juli 2009.

partners and donors in the region. The recommendations have subsequently been included in the updated phases of the programme, with an increased focus on gender, as well as with an increased participation in multilateral and bilateral forums.

The results published in March 2011<sup>7</sup>, covering the Programme period between 2009-2010, revealed that the DAPP has contributed to strengthening grassroots organisations and activists, strengthening youth and women's participation in society and reform processes, and finally, been part of institutionalising specific reform processes or creating new organisations that work with influencing reforms.

A Comparative Study of the DAPP and other comparable programmes and initiatives carried out by the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) concluded that DAPP's comparative best practices were: 1) Long-term commitment; 2) Relatively clear-cut design not overloaded with too many policy goals; 3) "Modesty" of the approach at various levels.

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) carried out an 'Analysis of the Dialogue Assumptions' of the DAPP in 2010<sup>8</sup>. It found that mutual prejudices generally are dismantled in the partnerships and that social capital is built between Denmark and the Arab world.

In 2012 an independent evaluation of the media interventions was launched. The results will be published in 2013 and guide the further development of the DAPP.

Summing up, the overall **key lessons** learnt in relation to the partnership approach from the various studies and reports carried out on the DAPP are:

- A large number of civil society organisations, NGOs etc. are engaged under the Programme. It should be explored how to focus on a more limited number of key partners in order to enhance the cost-effectiveness and at the same time maintain the high quality of the program.
- Working with partnerships taking place between professional peers should be maintained.
- Gender aspects should continue to be an essential focus area in the programme.
- Coordination and harmonisation with other relevant development partners in the region should continue to be practiced.
- The focus on long-term commitment should be maintained.
- DAPP's principles guiding its work are suitable and should be maintained.

These lessons learnt will contribute to shaping the current programme formulation for the period 2013-2016, ensuring continuity and the successful continuation of the Programme, and a continued use of the successful partnership approach applied by the DAPP.

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<sup>7</sup> *Dansk-Arabiske Partnerskaber i Mellemøsten og Nordafrika – Resultater af Partnerskab for Dialog og Reform 2009-2010*, Udenrigsministeriet, Marts 2011.

<sup>8</sup> *Dialoguing Partnerships – An Analysis of the Dialogue-Assumptions of the Danish Partnership for Dialogue and Reform*, DIIS Report, November 2010.

The immediate and limited experience after the expansion of the scope of the DAPP in 2011 with new modalities of direct democratization assistance and support to economic growth and job creation have also been taken into account developing this SFD.

### 3 Context Analysis

The following chapter highlights some of the main opportunities and challenges in the MENA-region. Although huge challenges persist for the region, the new dynamics unfolding with the Arab uprisings also create new opportunities and potential to expand collaboration to the benefit of partners in both the MENA-region and in Denmark.

#### 3.1 Re-politization and pressure for justice

Prior to the popular uprisings in late 2010, although degrees of relative freedoms and pluralism varied, the region was characterized by authoritarian governments, insufficient respect for human rights and very poor governance.

Since late 2010, wide parts of the Arab world have undergone unprecedented popular uprisings and a redynamization of politics. While these dynamics are still unfolding and vary considerably from country to country; it is clear that they in most countries have spurred a new politicization of the public sphere and have opened new spaces for discussing and demanding human rights, freedoms and good governance. Furthermore, the uprisings have changed the narrative about the region as a whole – while authoritarianism and fear still prevails in many countries, courageous people in Tunisia, Egypt and in several other countries have demonstrated that it is possible to overcome the year-long barrier of fear and that political change is indeed possible.

At present (early 2013) the situation in the different countries of the region varies considerably both with regard to political freedoms and human rights. In some countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the populations have succeeded in changing their rulers and have engaged in processes of democratic transition – the successes of which are, however, far from guaranteed as new popularly elected governments face dire socio-economic challenges, deep ideological cleavages and fragile democratic institutions in the making. Other countries, among them Bahrain and to an extreme degree Syria, have experienced violent regime repression of popular uprisings. Yet other countries have only seen limited popular demands – be that due to timid reforms introduced by the regimes in place (as in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco) or due to on-going internal conflicts (as in Lebanon and Palestine). Yet no country has been left unchanged from the uprisings. It is still far too early to judge the effects of the multiple dynamics offset by the uprisings, which are still unfolding in different ways throughout the region.

Despite the variations and changing configurations of political freedoms and human rights, people experience that change is in fact possible. A common characteristic is, however, distrust of nascent democratic institutions and political parties throughout the region. Even in countries that are currently undergoing democratic transition, the political scene is characterized by distrust among both citizens and political actors demonstrating that it takes a long time to establish mutual trust in democratic procedures.

A divisive issue across the region is the role of religion in politics. Recent years have demonstrated that wide groups of the populations (albeit far from all) place their trust in Islamist parties, when they are given the chance to express their political preferences in free elections. Distrust exists between liberal/secular and faith-based political activists (as well as

among many of these actors ‘internally’) – and increasing ideological divisions represent one of the most pressing challenges to the success of political transitions in countries like Egypt and Tunisia.

Enhancing dialogue and building of mutual trust and recognition between ideologically opposed political actors remains essential and is especially pronounced in countries, which have engaged in processes of democratic transitions. One of the key issues pertaining to the success of these processes concern the ability of key political players to recognize and acknowledge the legitimate participation of opponents despite differences in ideological background and references.

This issue also pertains to civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are in many cases restricted due to a continued lack of freedom of association. After the popular uprisings - especially in the countries, where ruling elites were toppled – civil society has flourished and takes up a far more active role than before the uprisings. New CSOs, including youth-led associations and movements, have been created and registered. New media organisations have also been established, and newly elected governments have expressed their intentions of increasing the involvement of civil society in policy processes. However, new practices of dialogue with civil society are only slowly being developed. Thus, many of the initiators of change, mainly younger men and women, feel discarded. Many organizations also continue to lack inclusiveness of youth and women.

In addition, both among civil society and political parties, many lines of division exist, the possibly most important one running along secular – religious lines. Another challenge concerns outreach, as especially many of the central advocacy organizations are based in the bigger cities and in many cases have limited outreach to and impact in rural and remote areas.

With regard to governance, the region also still faces challenges. While countries vary significantly, political and economic corruption is still prevalent as well as a source of frustration. The power is centred on small elites and closed networks ruling the public and private spheres. Corruption has become endemic in large parts of the region and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 2011 ranks relatively high for all countries in the region<sup>9</sup>. The Arab uprisings, however, do provide possibilities to support some development towards a new practise.

All in all, significant politization has occurred with the popular uprisings. Important new spaces for and demands of human freedoms, human rights and good governance have been articulated. Some positive results have been reached and the possibilities for Denmark to engage and develop new partnerships have expanded considerably, while important challenges remain pressing throughout the region.

### **3.2 Women’s empowerment and gender equality**

Empowering women, by enhancing gender equality, women’s participation in society, reducing violence against women, and increasing the respect for women’s rights, remain key challenges throughout the region. While women played important and very visible roles in recent popular

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011>

uprisings, women have to a large degree been left out of transitional institutions in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.

This development reflects the continued importance of patriarchal traditions in the region. Female labour market participation reaches an average of around 25% and the occupancy of female seats in parliament is similarly low. Deeply entrenched societal norms, combined with conservative interpretations of Islamic law, continue to relegate women to a subordinate status. Perhaps most visibly, women face gender-based discrimination in personal-status laws, which regulate marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and other aspects of family life; and violence against women is still only rarely an issue that comes to the forefront of public debate despite the prevalence and impact of the problem.

Yet, big variations can be noticed – both within and between countries. According to The Gender Inequality Index (GII), the region ranges from a top rank of 45 out of 183 countries for Tunisia to 146 for Yemen<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, the region includes a wide range of skilled and motivated women's activists, who from various backgrounds work tirelessly to enhance women's situation and possibilities in their societies. They hold important potentials in terms of paving the way for reforms towards greater gender equality that are based on local outlooks and experiences.

### **3.3 Knowledge society**

The Arab uprisings have also shed light on yet another challenge in the region – the necessity of building a knowledge society based on free and quality media; independent and quality academic institutions and a knowledge-based intercultural dialogue.

The popular uprisings demonstrate the increasing importance and use of social media in terms of sharing information, documentation, mobilization and networking across the region. Freedom of media in especially Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen experienced substantial improvements immediately following the uprisings as media freedoms were increased and new media organisations were established.

Yet, these gains are not yet secured and broad spectrums of substantial reforms continue to be needed to ensure the durability and development of recent improvements in the transition countries. In other countries, the uprisings have led to considerable deterioration of media freedom in recent years. This holds true for especially Syria, where popular uprisings have led to increasing regime crackdowns on the media in order to contain protest movements. Furthermore, social media remain accessible only to limited parts of the populations in the region; they in many cases remain subject to restrictions, and they have their limitations, not least with regard to reliability and quality assurance. All in all, challenges pertaining to media freedom in the region remain very serious<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2011\\_EN\\_Table4.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Table4.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Freedom House (2012) *Freedom of the Press in 2012: Breakthroughs and pushback in the Middle East* (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-press-2012-breakthroughs-and-pushback-middle-east>). It should be noted that Freedom House includes non-Arab countries like Iran in its ratings.

In addition, besides legislative challenges, the development of quality and reliable media remain a salient issue as does the development of higher professional and ethical standards. This has been clearly demonstrated in the transition countries. While many new media have been established and previously existing ones have been reinvigorated, much improvement is needed with regard to critical, in-depth, investigative and ethical reporting. Another concern is the often limited access to quality data and to unbiased, methodologically consistent and empirically based analyses and reporting.

This latter issue is intimately linked with and reflects another key challenge: the strengthening of critical, independent and quality academic research and teaching. The ranking and level of academia varies considerably in the region and within countries. Yet a number of important challenges are common to many institutions of higher learning. Especially the social sciences are faced with multiple challenges with regard to producing quality, reliable and independent research and of delivering strong methodological and theoretical tools to the increasing number of university students. Yet the sector holds important reform potentials. Meeting the increasing number of young Arab students with independent and critical research and education are both vital prerequisites for political reform and enhance the chances of successful and consolidated processes of reform and democratization.

Finally a central challenge also pertains to the strong and increasing needs to establish knowledge-based intercultural and interreligious dialogue in the Arab region. Especially but far from limited to the countries undergoing processes of democratic transition, increasing ideological segmentation and religious sectarianism can be witnessed. Increasing mutual knowledge is vital for ensuring inclusive processes of democratic change, that reach out to and encompass various and legitimate demands for cultural and religious recognition.

### **3.4 Dignity, growth and employment**

The MENA-region is characterised by large GDP disparities between the poorest and richest countries, with the wealth of the latter largely explained by access to vast incomes generated by natural resources in the rentier economies of Algeria, Libya and the Gulf states. Yet, despite these differences, noticeable similarities exist throughout the region with regard to a wide range of socio-economic factors, among them inequality of wealth and opportunities, large groups of unemployed young people and limited participation of women in the formal labour market. Furthermore, all countries in the region have seen their economies affected by the global financial crises, although again the degree of effects vary along with dependence on income from sources such as migrant remittances and tourism.

Looking specifically at the countries undergoing processes of democratic transition in general, the instability that has accompanied changes towards more just and democratic societies contribute to a slow-down in economic activity in the short term, with rising unemployment as a direct consequence. The new governments have inherited economic systems that require significant and painful reforms in order to pave the way for growth and job creation. These reforms, such as cutting subsidies and labour market reforms, are on the one hand needed for balancing of public finances as well as for stimulating private sector driven growth but are difficult to implement as they, in the short term, may hurt the less well of part of the population, and thereby require a lot of political determination and broad legitimacy around the

leaders. The longer it takes for the reforms to take off, the harder it gets as the lack of employment opportunities exacerbates already socially and political volatile situations, threatening democratic gains and social cohesion. Yet, the individual transitional countries also vary considerably in terms of access to resources with as a country like Libya having a considerable advantage and potential for securing foreign investment and employment.

All in all, strengthening economic growth and creating jobs and prospects for a better future, not least for young people and their families, represents key issues across the region and especially so in the countries undergoing processes of democratic transition.



## 4 Strategic Approach

A broad strategic approach is needed to accommodate this complex and political programme. Overall the programme development is guided by Denmark's general foreign policy objectives and the Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation, *The Right to a Better Life*.

The concrete DAPP-activities to be carried out during the period 2013 -2016 will be based on a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development cooperation. This phase of the DAPP will be an opportunity to more systematically learn and develop new interventions based on HRBA in a middle income context. "HRBA implemented in practice" will be one of the themes for a review planned for 2014.

Previous DAPP- interventions have not consciously been developed with HRBA in mind. However, in hindsight it is evident that indeed many interventions have actually been identified and implemented with an "HRBA-mindset" to development cooperation. It seems clear that HRBA is relevant to all of the four DAPP-thematic areas. In HRBA a distinction is made between rights-holders and their entitlements and duty-bearers and their obligations. The aspiration in DAPP is to strengthen both the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims and duty-bearers to meet their obligations. Focus is on empowering people to exercise their rights. The DAPP aspires to empower people to gain power and control over decisions and resources which determine their quality of life. This is relevant in transition countries, where new power structures and institutionalized practices of accountability are developed. Duty-bearers are also target of activities in particularly transition countries. In e.g. Tunisia the collaboration with the administration has developed rapidly in the past two years with inclusion of several ministries in concrete activities.

### 4.1 Guiding principles

DAPP will promote the fundamental principles derived from international human rights treaties of non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency and accountability.

Below are the overall principles guiding the DAPP:

- **"No size fits all"**. Reform processes will develop according to the specific political and societal considerations in each country. Context analyses are important.
- The interventions have to be **'demand driven'**. The activities within the programme reflect the wishes of, are formulated by and implemented in close cooperation between Arab and Danish partners.
- The interventions are **locally embedded** and carried out with a strong local ownership.
- Most activities are based on **'equal partnerships'** with a particular focus on professional collaboration and exchange of experience and knowledge between partners.
- Creating real partnerships and mutual trust takes time. The Programme therefore seeks to establish partnerships with a **'robust and long-term cooperation'** in mind.
- Reform processes are only sustainable if they are built on a **'broad inclusion and involvement'** of societal actors involved in democratic transitioning. Activities in the Programme aim at including partners from both civil society and government interested in reform and dialogue. Denmark should also have a dialogue with popular movements, even if they may be working from a different value-set.

- **Coordination** with other relevant donors is promoted to avoid duplication of efforts and enhance impact.

Promotion of **gender equality and the active participation of women and young people** in all aspects of social life are **mainstream elements** in all activities. Whilst these elements are the focus of independent thematic partnerships, gender equality, women's participation and youth experience has shown that in order to promote the participation of women and young people it is crucial to mainstream these focus areas in all programmes. In all activities under the DAPP, it must therefore be considered what more can be done in particular to promote the participation of women and of young people.

#### 4.2 From general themes to concrete activities and collaboration

As above mentioned, the 2002 UNDP Arab Human Development Report provided the framework for the original three thematic reform areas of the DAPP, to which a fourth focus on economic growth and job creation was added in 2011.

The operationalization of the reform objective within each of these four overall thematic reform areas into concrete activities of collaboration is based on iterative and consultative processes that systematically analyse the overall reform dynamics and potentials in each specific focus country; identify specific focus areas and partners with relevance, comparative advantages and potential; and reviews of previous activities. The final identification and formulation of specific concrete areas of collaboration is done directly by Arab and Danish partners in close collaboration based on identified areas of mutual interest and competence. To the extent possible, a regional approach is applied to promote synergies and exchanges of lessons learned between countries.

Whereas the DAPP has historically involved a very wide group of Danish partners, the programme will henceforth focus on a more limited number of strategic partnership organizations engaged in a longer term perspective. These strategic partnership organizations will be selected based on among other things their relevance vis-à-vis the overall thematic focus areas, their administrative capacity, their contextual knowledge of the MENA-region and the strength and reciprocity of their partnerships with local partners from the MENA-region.

#### 4.3 Dialogue as means and as end

Promoting dialogue, understanding and cooperation is one of the strategic objectives of the DAPP, and is a central aspect of all the interventions. The success of the programme has partly been due to the consistent efforts to establish and engage in dialogue both as a means and as an end.

DAPP not only encourages direct Arab-Danish dialogue. It also strives to further inter-regional dialogue, where Danish partners engage in and facilitate sharing of experiences and synergies between partners from different parts of the region within a specific reform-field of common interest. In addition, it also aims at enhancing inter-religious and inter-ideological dialogue, where Danish partners engage in and facilitate sharing of experiences and points of view between different partners from the same Arab country, who do not share the same religious and/ideological outlook. The ability to tolerate, listen to, respect and learn from diverging views is highly relevant not least in the countries currently undergoing processes of democratic

transition. The building of trust in democratic institutions and procedures risks being undermined by increasing sectarianism and ideological segmentation.

In practice, dialogue takes place at three different levels.

First and foremost, the programme aims at promoting *Arab-Danish dialogue* which is seen as an important means of overcoming mutual knowledge-gaps and of creating trust and understanding. The main means of engaging in Arab-Danish dialogue has from the outset been via Arab-Danish partnerships focusing on a specific reform related issue identified in common as an area of mutual interest and benefit. In addition, the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) has since 2006 worked as a platform for exchanges between Arab and Danish partners engaging in dialogue while also striving to become a center of excellence on intercultural dialogue.

Secondly, the DAPP promotes *Regional dialogue* by bringing together partners from different areas of the Arab region with Danish partners as well as to collaborate and/or share specific reform related experiences and insights, hence both creating synergies from preexisting bilateral Arab-Danish collaboration and nurturing regional network and sharing of knowledge and experiences within the Arab region.

Thirdly, the DAPP may also increasingly facilitate dialogue including ideologically and/or religiously different actors. This type of dialogue is relevant in the current context, where many areas are characterized by increasing sectarianism and ideological segmentation, not least in the countries that have recently engaged in processes of democratic transition. Besides contributing to local 'bridge building', Danish partners profit from facilitating such internal dialogue by gaining a broader outreach and more nuanced insight into the variety of local voices, perspectives and aspirations.

#### **4.4 Geographic focus**

The DAPP covers cooperation between Denmark and in principle all Arab countries. Collaboration covering the three original thematic areas may involve cooperation with state actors and civil society actors from across the region, hence promoting synergies and exchanges of lessons learned between countries.

Yet, in order to ensure a certain solidity of partnerships, a number of Arab countries have been identified as key focus countries of the DAPP. Based on identification missions and dialogue with civil society and national stakeholders, it was originally decided in 2004 to focus country specific interventions in Jordan, Morocco and Yemen. Separate Government to Government agreements were made to define the parameters of the partnerships and the collaboration. In addition to these three countries, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia have been added as focus countries following the Arab uprisings.

Whereas partnership collaboration within the three original thematic areas can potentially take place within one or several of all the seven DAPP focus countries, collaboration aiming at enhancing economic growth and employment is focused on the countries that are currently undergoing processes of democratic transition, as enhancing growth and employment are seen as vital for securing the success of these difficult on-going processes. Furthermore, as this type

of collaboration requires a certain financial volume and insight, it has been decided to concentrate these efforts for time being in Egypt and Tunisia.

Recognizing the long-term perspective of the DAPP and the commitments and trust being built in the concrete partnerships developed over the years, the DAPP continues with an engagement in all the seven countries. Although the results on progress and reform is mixed and varies from country to country it is the assessment that a reform potential exists in all countries. Activities in Libya may however be of a shorter timeframe if the country experiences considerable GNI growth.

When country-specific interventions have been implemented, attempts have been made to involve regional networks and international actors as far as possible. Such an approach fosters the creation of broad networks where not only knowledge is exchanged between a specific Arab country and Denmark, but also across the Arab region where lessons learnt can be used.


## 5 Strategic Objectives and Thematic Areas

This section provides an overview of the objectives and the various interventions, which will contribute to the achievements of the objectives in the period 2013-2016.

### 5.1 Strategic objective


The double strategic objective of the DAPP is:

- To promote reform and democratisation processes in the Middle East and North Africa.
- To improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA-region.




### 5.2 Thematic areas

The strategic objective will be reached through activities in the four thematic areas as illustrated in the figure below.



The various interventions under each thematic area– will have their own intermediate objectives. The interventions under the four thematic areas are to the extent possible designed to promote synergy and mutual learning between activities:



### Thematic area I – Promoting Human Rights, Human Freedoms and Good Governance

The intermediate objectives are:

- 1.1: To strengthen processes of democratic transition.
- 1.2: To strengthen human rights and to combat torture.
- 1.3: To strengthen young people's participation in public life.

Objective	Interventions
<b>1.1. Supporting democratic transition (only to 'transition' countries).</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting democratisation, good governance and transition processes (such as to preparing elections, mediating between political parties and 'national dialogue' processes) through both bilateral and multilateral assistance and through Danish-Arab partnership organisations.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>1.2. Strengthening human rights and combating torture.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promoting partnership collaboration between human rights networks, national human rights institutions, human rights organisations and human rights activists as well as Collaboration and partnership to combat torture.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>1.3. Strengthening young people's participation in public life.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Involving formal and informal youth groups and youth organisations actively in building a stronger civil society and promoting and facilitating young people's participation in local debate and their influence on local decision-making.</li> </ul>

## Thematic area II –Women's empowerment and Gender Equality

The intermediate objectives are:

2.1: To promote changes in legislation in favour of gender equality.

2.2: To increase women's participation in social, political and economic life.

2.3: To combat and prevent violence against women.

Objective	Interventions
<b>2.1. Promoting legislative changes that enhance gender equality.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Influencing legislative reforms for women's rights and gender mainstreaming and increase opportunities for women through changes in the law to reflect greater gender equality.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>2.2. Increasing women's participation in social, political and economic life.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increasing women's participation in political decision-making and in the labour market and thereby augmenting their financial opportunities and their contribution to societal changes.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>2.3. Preventing violence against women.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sharing knowledge, research and documentation of gender-based violence.</li> <li>• Improving the capabilities and quality of services of the institutions and organisations working with preventing and combating violence against women.</li> </ul>

### Thematic area III – Development of Knowledge-Based Societies

The intermediate objectives are:

3.1: To strengthen quality and independent media.

3.2: To strengthen critical and independent academia

3.3: To strengthen knowledge-based intercultural and interreligious dialogue.

Objective	Interventions
<b>3.1. Strengthening quality and independent media.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promoting transparent and responsible media contributions to the public debate, promoting diversity and respectful exchange of opinions.</li> <li>• Promote legislative changes to improve independence and quality of media as well as contribute to enhancing media ethics, training, monitoring, cooperation and organisation of journalists.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>3.2 Strengthening critical and independent academia.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote reforms that enhance critical and independent academia.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>3.3. Promoting intercultural and interreligious dialogue.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitate intercultural dialogue to promote understanding.</li> <li>• Facilitate interreligious dialogue in order to bridge understanding about religious values and create a basis for more peaceful and understanding co-existence.</li> </ul>



## Thematic area IV – Promoting Economic Growth and Employment

The intermediate objectives are:

4.1: To create jobs and lower unemployment.

4.2: To promote micro- and small enterprises and entrepreneurs.

4.3: To promote labour market reform and social dialogue.

Activities focus particularly on Tunisia and Egypt, and will be undertaken with a regional perspective where possible and appropriate.

Objective	Interventions
<b>4.1. Promoting job creation &amp; lowering unemployment.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote creation of jobs through labour demanding interventions.</li> <li>• Facilitate business opportunities that generate employment and exports by assistance to produce more products domestically, which could boost local employment and increasing export.</li> <li>• Promote improved use of existing resources e.g. through introduction of a value chain concept.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>4.2. Supporting micro- and small enterprises &amp; entrepreneurs.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting improved entrepreneurship in view of enhancing the use of the countries' human resources.</li> </ul>

Objective	Interventions
<b>4.3. Promoting labor-market reforms &amp; social dialogue.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhancing regulatory reform to create incentives for businesses to create more jobs, ensuring more just economic opportunities and improve social dialogue and the establishing of partnerships between labour market institutions/organisations and their members working on joint learning platforms.</li> <li>• Promoting increased dialogue between employers' and employees' organisations to have a labour market where workers and employers can contribute to resolving conflicts and creating a framework for a stable labour market.</li> <li>• Facilitate improved social dialogue between employees, employers and lawmakers.</li> </ul>

## 6 Annex A: Risk Management

DAPP is considered to be a high-risk programme that is likely to be affected by the political as well as security-related conditions in the Arab region. Yet, risks differ considerably due to very varied political, socio-economic and security dynamics in the region and among the focus countries, from Morocco in the West to Syria and Yemen in the East. The probability of the main risks outlined below accordingly varies considerably across the region.

Risk Matrix					
Parameter	Risk	Potential Adverse Impact	Probability	Impact	Risk Management Strategy
<b><i>Contextual</i></b>					
<i>Security &amp; Safety</i>	Political disagreements between differing political groupings turn violent and increases break down of law and order	Promotions of reforms becomes difficult and partnerships inhibited	Medium to High	High	Preventive efforts of intercultural, -religious and -ideological dialogue. Promote conflict resolution and international mediation through Arab League and/or UN.
	Reform activists (including Human Rights and democratisation activists) targeted	Weakened promotion of human rights and democratization	Low to Medium	High	Preventive efforts of intercultural, -religious and -ideological dialogue. International pressure to support victims
<i>Political &amp; Social</i>	Constitutional and legal reforms stall	Set-back for all reforms	Medium to High	High	Preventive efforts of intercultural, -religious and -ideological dialogue. Support to advocacy for constitutional reforms
	Impunity of human rights violations	Lack of trust in justice and of authorities' ability to protect citizens	Medium to High	Medium	Support to human rights activists. Pressure on duty bearers in bilateral and multilateral fora.
<i>Financial &amp; Economical</i>	Economic decline and increased unemployment	Social unrest and popular disengagement from formal political institutions	Medium	Medium	Support for economic development and employment, especially of young people.
	Increased control with money transfers from abroad to reform activists	Delays and obstacles in implementation	Medium	Low to Medium	Use alternative money transfers when needed and reassess planning
Parameter	Risk	Potential Adverse Impact	Probability	Impact	Risk Management Strategy

<i>Programmatic</i>					
<i>Security &amp; Safety</i>	Reduced security and lack of rule of law increases	Implementation slows down, projected results not achieved, partnerships become difficult	Low to Medium	Medium	Ongoing monitoring via representations, local partners and multilateral agencies. Reassess and adjust plans
	MENA DAPP partners harassed	Partnerships and dialogue becomes very difficult	Low	Medium	Partners meet outside of region and through other means e.g. Skype.
<i>Political &amp; Social</i>	Repressive political forces (re)gain power	Work to promote reforms and democratization meets stumbling blocs	Medium	High	Continue direct and indirect support to partners to extent possible
	Increasing strains and limitations on women's public participations	Women's engagement in DAPP activities become difficult	Low	Medium	Continue dialogue with all partners to ensure that women's empowerment and gender equality are mainstreamed and prioritised. Possibly reassess plans
<i>Financial &amp; Economical</i>	Foreign funding for civil society banned	Slow-down in DAPP activities	Low	Medium	Provide in-kind support, regional partnerships and reassess planning
	Foreign NGOs denied authorization to establish local offices	Slow-down in DAPP activities	Medium to High	Medium	Partners meet outside of region and through other means e.g. Skype.
<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Potential Adverse Impact</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Risk Management Strategy</b>
<i>Institutional</i>					
<i>Security &amp; Safety</i>	Increased security risks limits ability of partners to meet in region and of Embassy and programme staff to meet with programme partners	Ability to monitor progress and engage in dialogue reduced	Medium	Medium	Continue close dialogue with partners through meetings outside region and through other means e.g. Skype.
<i>Political &amp; Social</i>	Regress in political reforms	Effects of DAPP questioned	Medium	Medium	Stress the long-term track-record and commitment of DAPP
<i>Financial &amp; Economic</i>	Media reports on the misuse of funds and corrupt practices in the programme	Lack of commitment to continue DAPP	Low	Medium	Preventive efforts to strengthen transparency and good governance. Investigate accusations and follow-up via bilateral and multilateral channels.

## 7 Annex B: Indicators

A “DAPP Status and Results Report” is prepared every second year. The report includes the results achieved and reported from interventions and it will provide both quantifiable results and narrative reports about concrete results.

All recipients of DAPP funds will, as a minimum, need to include and report on a set of quantifiable and qualitative indicators to enable tracking of concrete results of the interventions. Some of the core indicators are as follows:

### Core Indicators<sup>12</sup>:

- Democratisation: Percentage of elections supported, which are democratically carried out according to EU election monitoring standards.
- Human Rights and Combatting Torture: Number of new partnership established in the area of human rights and combatting torture and thereby enhancing the capacity of human rights organisations as well as duty bearers within the area.
- Youth Participation: Number of youth organisation in the MENA-region and Denmark attains practical experience with dialogue and cooperation across political, cultural, geographical and other divides.
- Gender Friendly Legislation: Barriers limiting women’s access to the justice system are addressed and legal framework, which reflects greater gender equality, is enhanced.
- Women’s Participation: Number of partnerships with women’s organisations and networks established and maintained, thereby enhancing their capacity to address and further women’s participation in political processes in the MENA-region.
- Fighting Violence against Women: Establishment of a number of national networks and a regional network of shelter organisations, and an enhanced sharing of knowledge, research and documentation of gender-based violence.
- Media and Press Freedom: Number of networking, partnerships and exchange visits for international exposure of media workers contributing to public debate, promotion of diversity and enhancement of responsible media.
- Independent Quality Academia: Number of academic institutions in the MENA-region and Denmark that engage in academic cooperation and exchange within areas relevant for democratic transition and reform.
- Interreligious and intercultural Dialogue: Number of dialogue initiative facilitated in areas in particular need of enhanced interreligious and intercultural understanding.
- Job Creation: Number of jobs created through labour demanding programmes.
  - Number of jobs for women created.
- Entrepreneurship: Number of micro – and small private enterprises (MSMEs) established.

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<sup>12</sup> These are some of the indicators in the thematic reform areas. Concrete targets will be set during negotiation of agreements for concrete interventions. Results will be reported in the “DAPP Status and Results Report” mentioned above. Additional indicators are developed as part of concrete interventions.

- Labour Market Reform and Social Dialogue: Number of new social dialogue mechanisms established.

Additional indicators will be prepared to track the concrete results of a specific intervention.

#### Core Indicators: Partnerships and Dialogue

As a general requirement in each partnership agreement, partners are also requested to measure results in relation to dialog/partnerships. The following parameters are always measures in relation to partnerships:

- Number of professional partnerships established and maintained with participation from opinion makers in media, interest organisations and civil society.
  - % of participants expressing better understanding of “the other partner”.
  - % of participants expressing intent to continue partnership beyond DAPP-funding.
- Number of short-term partnerships/events, incl. conferences, festivals etc.
  - % of participants expressing better understanding of “the other partner”.
  - % of participants expressing intent to continue partnership beyond DAPP-funding.
- Increase in participation of faith-based organisations.
- Increase in activities outside capitals.
- Increase in outreach and communication activities measured by number of media reports resulting from partnerships, e.g. in TV, Radio, newspapers and the internet.