URU, Alm.del - 2011-12 - Bilag 159: DIIS Report 2012:04: Addressing Climate Change and Conflict in Development Cooperation Experiences from natural resource management

AcknowledgementsAcronymsAbstract1. Introduction2. Climate change and conﬂict in Africa2.1 The link between climate change and conﬂict2.2 Climate change as a conﬂict multiplier2.3 Impacts of climate-related conﬂicts3. Examining the lessons from natural resource management4. The nature and causes of natural resource conﬂicts4.1 Types of natural resource conﬂicts4.2 Root causes of natural resource conﬂicts5. Conﬂict prevention, management and resolution in natural resourcemanagement5.1 Conﬂict prevention in natural resource management6. Experiences from the local level6.1 Local conﬂict prevention and management in natural resourcemanagement6.2 Lessons learnt7. Experiences from the national level7.1 National conﬂict prevention and management in natural resourcemanagement7.2 Lessons learnt8. Experiences from the transboundary level8.1 Transboundary conﬂict prevention – lessons learnt8.2 Transboundary conﬂict management – lessons learnt

This report has been prepared by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, who funded the study. The report waswritten by Mikkel Funder, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Ida Peters Ginsborg ofDIIS in collaboration with Nanna Callisen Bang of CARE.The authors would like to thank the following individuals and institutions for theirassistance with and comments on the report: Gilbert Muyumbu and Yussouf Artain(ActionAid, Kenya); Olga Mutoro, Tabitha Kilatya and Dhahabu Daudi (PeaceNetKenya); Eric Kisinagani and Benedict Mukoo (Practical Action); Prof. KennedyMkutu (USIU, Kenya); Jeanette Clover (Regional Coordinator, UNEP, Kenya);Klaus Ljørring Pedersen (Regional Coordinator, Danish Demining Group DDG,Kenya); Troels Bruun Jørgensen (NIRAS, NEMA, Kenya); Keith Fisher (DFID)and Prof. Kassim Farah, ASAL Secretariat, Kenya); Mohammed Halakh, (Ministryof the Northern Regions and Other Arid Lands, Kenya); Marie Haug Jørgensen andAnne Nyaboke Angwenyi (the Danish Embassy, Nairobi); Jens Emborg (KU LIFE);Vibeke Vindeløv (KU); Mogens Laumand Christensen (Danida); Ced Hesse (IIED,London); Oli Brown (UNEP, Sierra Leone) for useful discussion, comments andadditional input into the report.

Alternative Dispute ResolutionArid and Semi-arid LandsAssociation of Southeast Asian NationsCommunity Based OrganisationsCommunity Based Natural Resource ManagementDevelopment Assistance CommitteeDistrict Peace CommitteeFood and Agriculture OrganisationInternational Institute for Sustainable DevelopmentIntegrated Water Resources ManagementNational Adaptation Plan of ActionNon Governmental OrganisationNational Peace CommissionNational Policy on Peace-building and Conﬂict ManagementNatural Resource ManagementOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentRiver Basin OrganisationReduced Emissions from Deforestation and DegradationSouthern African Development CommunityUnited NationsUnited Nations Environment Programme

This report presents the main ﬁndings of a desk study of experiences with conﬂictprevention and resolution in natural resource management, and how these can beapplied in development cooperation in relation to climate change.The report brieﬂy discusses the link between climate change and conﬂict, includingthe need to see climate change as a conﬂict multiplier rather than as a major directcause of conﬂict in itself. The report then goes on to review approaches and lessonslearnt from conﬂict prevention, management and resolution in natural resourcemanagement at the local, national and transboundary levels respectively.On this basis, the report provides recommendations on how development coopera-tion can address the potential conﬂict multiplier eﬀects of climate change, includingguiding principles and key entry points for support. The latter include (i) enhanc-ing so-called structural conﬂict prevention measures, (ii) supporting institutionalmechanisms for managing and resolving conﬂict, and (iii) ‘conﬂict prooﬁng’ policiesand development interventions.

This report presents the main ﬁndings of a desk study on experiences with conﬂictprevention and resolution in natural resource management, and how these can beapplied in development cooperation in order to address the potential conﬂict multipliereﬀects of climate change. The study was undertaken by the Danish Institute forInternational Studies, with funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.A number of previous studies have addressed the topic of climate change and conﬂictfrom an overall perspective and/or in relation to security studies (Brown & Crawford2009). The current study examines the issue from the perspective of natural resourcemanagement and -governance, which is closely related to that of climate change andwhere stakeholder conﬂicts are a well-known issue. On this basis, the study providesrecommendations for possible approaches and key elements when addressing climate-related conﬂict in development cooperation.The study has a particular focus on land and water aspects, and an emphasis on theAfrican setting. However, many of the ﬁndings and recommendations also apply toother aspects of climate-related conﬂict and natural resource management in theSouth. The main implications for development cooperation can also be found ina shortened version of the current report, which has been published as a Danida‘How to Note’.The study has drawn its information and analysis from several sources, namely:(i) A review of literature on addressing conﬂict in natural resource management,with a particular emphasis on land and water in the African setting. Thisinvolved an initial literature search which produced a longlist of titles on thesubject, including both academic articles and ‘grey’ literature which reportedthe ﬁndings from studies related to speciﬁc projects etc. The literature in thislonglist was categorised by type into case studies of natural resource conﬂicts(stand-alone and comparative), and general reviews and recommendations onaddressing conﬂict in natural resource management. A total of 50 referenceswere selected for review from the ‘case study’ category. These were studied withthe aim of extracting information on (a) what caused natural resource conﬂictsand (b) what are the experiences from eﬀorts seeking to prevent conﬂicts and(c) what are the experiences from eﬀorts to manage and resolve conﬂicts? This9

information was entered into a matrix for each title, allowing us to gain anoverview of cross-cutting issues and approaches. To this was added the ﬁndingsand recommendations from the more general (non-case speciﬁc) literature.(ii) Three desk-based case studies of particular natural resource conﬂict/cooperationsituations, namely (i) the ‘Wells of Peace’ in Niger; (ii) conﬂict and conﬂictresolution in Northern Kenya, and (iii) the Nile Basin Initiative.(iii) A general review of the literature on climate change and conﬂict, conﬂictresolution methods and conﬂict sensitive development.(iv) Consultations with relevant practitioners, policymakers and researchers, includinginterviews in Kenya, and comments on draft versions of this document fromstaﬀ at relevant policy and action research institutions.The following section provides an introduction to the relationship between climatechange and conﬂict (chapter 2). This is followed by the review of experiences fromnatural resource management (chapter 3), the nature and causes of conﬂict (chapter4), conﬂict prevention, resolution and management (chapter 5) at local, national andtransboundary level (chapters 6, 7 and 8). The ﬁnal section provides recommendationsfor addressing climate-related conﬂict in development cooperation (chapter 9).

2.1 The link between climate change and conﬂictAccording to most studies, the impacts of climate change in Africa and beyond willbe severe, and are already ongoing in many places. It is nevertheless important toavoid across-the-board assumptions that climate change will automatically lead toconﬂict. There are a number of reasons for this:• Predicting the nature of climate change in individual countries and locationsis notoriously diﬃcult. In fact, increasingunpredictabilityof rainfall, droughtand ﬂooding patterns seems to be a key characteristic of climatic change on thecontinent (Brown & Crawford 2009). Several studies have furthermore pointedout that diﬀerent regions will be diﬀerently aﬀected, with some areas due toexperience increasing overall rainfall, and others less (Stern 2006).• Human responses to climate change will also most likely be varied and unpredictable:the particular social, cultural and economic context in any given location playsan important role in determining how its institutions and individuals respondto climate change. Whether or not climate change contributes to conﬂict in agiven society will, to a large extent, depend on its resilience and character – e.g.the magnitude of shock that it can absorb, the nature and capacity of socialorganisation, and the ability to adapt (Adger & Thomkins 2004; Bob 2010).• The scientiﬁc evidence for the relationship between climate change and conﬂictis as yet limited, and frequently also inconclusive. In 2009 it was widely reportedthat a statistical study had established a historical link between rising temperaturesand civil war in Africa (Burke et al. 2009). Shortly afterwards, another study usedthe same data to arrive at the opposite conclusion (Buhaug 2010a/b). A key issuehere is that conﬂict tends to be caused by numerous factors, and it is thereforeoften diﬃcult to identify and single out individual causes.• Scarcity of natural resources frequently leads tocollaborativeactions andarrangements rather than conﬂict. This has been documented in recent studiesof water governance, both at the transboundary and local levels (Wolf et al.2005; Ravnborg et al. 2012) and is also evident in the way many local Africansocieties organise the management of scarce natural resources through commonproperty arrangements. Often, conﬂict is simply too costly or too risky for statesor individuals to engage in.• Climate change is rarely the only or even main cause of conﬂict. Typically, whenclimate conﬂicts are examined in detail they turn out to be rooted in a number11

of other or additional issues. Examples of this include the pastoralist conﬂicts inNorthern Kenya, which have been described as some of the world’s ﬁrst climateconﬂicts (Christian Aid 2006; Yale Environment 2011).However, as recountedlater in this report, these conﬂicts are by no means only about climate change.2.2 Climate change as a conﬂict multiplierClimate change is therefore best seen as a conﬂictmultiplier,rather than as a majordirect cause of conﬂict in itself. Climate change may aggravate and extend the scopeof existing conﬂicts, or trigger underlying and latent conﬂicts to break out into theopen.Previous studies have identiﬁed a number of areas in which climate change maycontribute to a worsening of conﬂicts (Brown & Crawford 2009). These include:• Land and water access. Access and use rights to land are a key feature in mostsituations where climate change has contributed to natural resource conﬂicts sofar. Climate change can intensify existing conﬂicts over land, as land becomes lessfertile or is ﬂooded, or if existing resource sharing arrangements between diﬀerentusers and land use practices are disrupted. In some parts of Africa, climate changemay lead to a decline in available water resources of some 10–20% by the end ofthe century (op cit.). This may intensify existing competition for access to waterat intra-state and/or subnational levels.• Food security. Reduced rainfall and rising sea levels may lead to a decline inagricultural production and a substantial loss of arable land in some parts ofAfrica. Reduced yields for own consumption and increasing domestic food pricesmay in some cases lead to civil unrest, and competition over access to land mayintensify.• Migration and displacement. In some cases, increased scarcity of and competitionover access to water and arable land may contribute to internal or regional migration,and disasters such as ﬂoods may lead to temporary or long-term local displacement.This may in turn strengthen conﬂicts between host societies/communities andmigrants looking for access to new land and resources.• Increasing inequality and injustice. Through processes such as the above, somepopulation groups may be particularly hard hit, leading to increased inequality anda sense of injustice. This may intensify existing grievances and disputes betweennatural resource users and/or between resource users and outside actors such asgovernments – thereby increasing the risk and intensity of conﬂict.12

• A further and sometimes overlooked way in which climate change can contributeto conﬂict is through the adaptation and mitigation eﬀorts themselves. Forinstance, the demand for climate-friendly fuels has meant that large agriculturalareas have been set aside for production of crops used in biodiesel or ethanol inseveral African countries. In some places this has meant that local farmers havelost access to important land and water resources, leading in turn to local protestsand disputes. Another example is the controversies surrounding the proposedglobal mechanism for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation(REDD), which if handled poorly could trigger or intensify conﬂicts over rightsto forest areas between local forest users and external stakeholders and within theparticipating communities, e.g. over beneﬁt sharing.It should be noted, however, that there are still only a few cases where the contributionof climate change to conflict has been clearly and thoroughly documented.Many examples of climate-related conﬂicts provided in the current literature areanecdotal or hypothetical, and our knowledge of the processes involved is thereforeincomplete.2.3 Impacts of climate-related conﬂictsConﬂict is an inevitable feature of human society, and can lead to important socialchanges when grievances are brought out into the open and social injustices arechallenged. Not all conﬂicts are necessarily negative, but when they escalate intoviolence and/or abuse of power they can have signiﬁcant negative impacts in bothhuman and developmental terms. In this respect, experiences from natural resourceconﬂicts in general suggest that:• Conﬂicts over natural resources often have particularly negative impacts on thepoor, who typically lack the necessary means to defend their interests and rights,and who are frequently the worst hit when conﬂict leads to breakdown of locallivelihoods or displacement.• Conﬂicts over land and other natural resources may, in some cases, have signiﬁcantmacro- economic costs, including reduced food production and capital ﬂight.Conﬂicts may also impact signiﬁcantly on the structure and vulnerability ofnational economies, which tend to see decline in manufacturing and a greaterreliance on exports of primary resources.• Natural resources conﬂicts may, in some cases, contribute to institutional erosionand reduce the reach and capacity of statutory or customary institutions to govern,13

regulate and deliver services. Implementation of particular development policiesand programmes may be constrained or misdirected in situations where conﬂictsover natural resources persist. This includes cross-sectoral impacts, e.g. wherehealth and education programmes are constrained by ongoing natural resourceconﬂicts.• Conﬂicts may also lead to degradation of the natural resource base itself, e.g.when rules and enforcing authorities lose legitimacy, or when natural resourcesare drawn upon to ﬁnance armed conﬂict.While these potential impacts are serious, care should be taken to avoid assumptionsabout vicious circles whereby local societies disintegrate in a spiral of poverty, resourcedegradation and violence. Studies suggest the need for a balanced understanding,which avoids undue romanticism, but which also recognises that community membersfaced with environmental change continuously seek to innovate and adapt withintheir available circumstances (Leach et al. 1997).It is furthermore important to emphasise that the responses of local stakeholders tonatural resource conﬂicts do notnecessarilyhave negative impacts on local societies ornational economies. Migration, for example, is a livelihood strategy already appliedby millions of households across Africa, and plays an important part in economicdevelopment through e.g. the provision of a labour force in cities and rural economicdevelopment through remittances. Conﬂict may also have positive outcomes, suchas in cases where it provides opportunities for local stakeholders to learn about eachother’s ways of life and diﬀerent strategies for coping in times of stress.

The potential contribution of climate change to conﬂict is strongly related to thegovernance and management of natural resources.1Firstly, factors such as increasedﬂooding, more frequent drought and a general increased unpredictability of rainfall,all impact directly on the quantity and quality of natural resources in a given setting.Secondly, many of the already existing conﬂicts that climate change may exacerbateand multiply take place within the realm of natural resource management and itsassociated institutions. And thirdly, because natural resource management has alwaysbeen subject to conﬂict, a range of eﬀorts and mechanisms to prevent and resolveconﬂicts already exists.A review of the experience of eﬀorts to address conﬂict in natural resource managementcan therefore provide important pointers for how to understand, approach and addressclimate-related conﬂicts in development cooperation.Speciﬁcally, our review of experiences with conﬂicts in natural resource managementexamined:(a)The nature and causes of natural resource conﬂicts.Conﬂict studies have repeatedlyshown that successful prevention and management of conﬂicts requires an understandingof their nature and their root causes (e.g. OECD 2001; Brown & Crawford 2009).While this will diﬀer from case to case, it was possible to draw out a number of cross-cutting features that are also highly relevant to climate-related conﬂict prevention andmanagement.(b)Approaches and measures to address conﬂict.Eﬀorts to address conﬂicts typicallyinclude an emphasis on one or more of the following elements:• Conﬂictpreventionmeasures, that seek to prevent new conﬂicts from developing• Conﬂictmanagementmeasures, that seek to contain, limit and mitigate ongoingconﬂicts1

• Conﬂictresolutionmeasures, that seek to end conﬂicts by resolving the underlyingincompatibilities(c)Levels of intervention.Prevention, management and resolution may take placethrough a variety of diﬀerent mechanisms and at diﬀerent scales. In natural resourcesmanagement, this typically includes:• Local mechanisms, e.g. customary and informal mechanisms, local governmentetc.• National frameworks, e.g. statutory institutional systems and legal frameworksat national level• Intergovernmental mechanisms, e.g. regional or transboundary water managementbodiesOn this basis, we conducted a review of experiences to be found in the literature, asking(i) what are the causes of natural resource conﬂicts; (ii) what are the experiences ofconﬂict prevention in natural resource management, and (iii) what are the experienceswith conﬂict management and resolution. These questions were stratiﬁed accordingto the intergovernmental, national and local level.The following section reviews the nature and causes of natural resource conﬂicts, whilethe subsequent sections presents the ﬁndings on experiences with conﬂict preventionand management/resolution at local, national and transboundary levels.

4.1 Types of natural resource conﬂictsNatural resource-related conﬂicts are essentially social conﬂicts (violent or non-violent)that primarily revolve around how individuals, households, communities and statescontrol or gain access to resources within speciﬁc economical and political frameworks(Turner 2004). Such conﬂicts may express disagreements about distribution of resources,inequalities, land rights and maintenance issues. Natural resource conﬂicts are a commonfeature in many areas in the developing world, and reﬂect the widespread dependenceon access to natural resources for local livelihoods (FAO 2005). Particularly in ruralareas, where material conditions are poor, local conﬂicts are often resource-related.Natural resource conﬂicts typically involve one or more of the following: (i) micro–micro conﬂicts, i.e. between or among local stakeholders; (ii) micro–macro conﬂicts,e.g. between local and national or international stakeholders, and (iii) macro–macroconﬂicts, e.g. intergovernmental conﬂicts. The table below shows examples of thediﬀerent types of conﬂicts arising in natural resource management.

Examples of natural resource conﬂictsMicro–micro conﬂicts:• Intra-community conﬂicts where some households are excluded or furtherdisadvantaged and beneﬁts captured by other community members• Conﬂict over land access between pastoralists and crop farmers• Conﬂicts over water access between long-standing resident groups and new-comer households• Conﬂicts between neighbouring clan leaders over the control of pastureMicro–macro conﬂicts:• Conﬂicts between customary and government authorities over control ofland allocation• Conﬂicts between local farmers and the state over protected areas• Conﬂicts between ﬁshermen and the state over hydropower productionMacro–macro conﬂicts• Conﬂicts between two riparian states sharing a river course• Conﬂicts between international NGOs and the state over logging• Conﬂicts between international companies over diamond and fossil fuelresourcesSource:Format adapted from Warner 2000, with examples from the reviewed literature

In practice, a particular area or river may be the subject of all three types of conﬂictat the same time, and the stakeholders involved may move across both local, nationaland transboundary dimensions. The above distinction should therefore not be takentoo literally. It does however highlight how diﬀerent institutional mechanisms andforms of organisation (or diﬀerent combinations of these) may be necessary fordiﬀerent types of conﬂict.4.2 Root causes of natural resource conﬂictsThe causes of natural resource conﬂicts are often complex and multi-layered. Abasic distinction can be made between contributing causes (e.g. climate change, orproliferation of arms), and root causes (e.g. governance, inequality etc.). Understandingthe root causes of conﬂicts is considered crucial in conﬂict-sensitive developmentcooperation as it provides the basis for assessing the potential for future conﬂicts, thedynamics of existing conﬂicts, and the necessary strategies for conﬂict preventionand resolution (OECD 2001).In the literature reviewed, the following root causes of natural conﬂicts frequentlyoccurred:Natural resource scarcity/distribution.The natural scarcity of a resource is sometimesa root cause of climate-related conﬂicts. This includes competing interests amongpowerful stakeholders at various levels over the control of resources, or conﬂicts overaccess between diﬀerent types of production systems. However, absolute scarcity ofwater and other resources are in many cases managed without major conﬂict. At heart,many conﬂicts are often more about how land and water resources aredistributedamong stakeholders, and the failure of institutions to manage scarce resources of highvalue in a peaceful and equitable manner (Ashton 2002; Fiki & Lee 2004; Odgaard2006; Thébaud 2002).State policies and priorities.National policies such as collectivisation or privatisationof land have in some cases had unintended eﬀects and can ignite land and waterconﬂicts. Policies that deliberately or inadvertently prioritise some sectors, producersand regions at the cost of others have historically been the source of numerous landand water conﬂicts (Bob 2002; Castro 2005).Market changes.The advent of new markets and associated changes in productionpatterns, ownership and resource values, are an underlying factor in some conﬂicts over18

e.g. land grabbing, new commercial water users and rising land values (Hughes 2001;Van Leeuwen 2009; Odgaard 2006). For instance in Somalia pastoral communities arehighly aﬀected by land degradation due to the charcoal industry for export to SaudiArabia. Before these trade mechanisms existed, communities were more resilient toclimate change (Baxter 2007).Competing and insecure rights.Insecurity and inequality in land and water rightsis a key factor in many natural resource conﬂicts. Customary rights systemshave been undermined in many areas, but have frequently not been replacedwith clear and defensible rights (Odgaard 2006; UNEP 2009). The overlappingand competing nature of resource rights in many areas means that they can berepeatedly challenged and tend to be captured by the more resourceful local orexternal stakeholders.Governance constraints.Authoritarian approaches and poor accountability in thegovernance of natural resources, and in society more generally, is another key factorunderlying many conﬂicts. Government institutions at international, national andlocal levels also frequently lack the capacity and legitimacy to eﬀectively collaborateand fairly enforce rights and legal frameworks. In some cases customary conﬂictprevention and resolution mechanisms have been eroded or are unable to respond tolarge-scale conﬂicts. More generally, wider political struggles over power, inﬂuenceand territory may be rhetorically or symbolically linked to land and water, and/or mayﬁnancially exploit these resources to ﬁnance such struggles (Campbell & Crawford2009; Huggins et al. 2005; Matthew et al 2009).Poverty and inequality.Poverty does not necessarily lead to overt conﬂict, as the poormay lack the necessary means to express discontent and engage in conﬂict. However,from a development point of view, latent conﬂicts between poor and better-oﬀstakeholders will often be important to address, and may in any case eventually eruptinto explicit conﬂict if livelihoods come under extreme stress. Unequal access topolitical representation and rights of diﬀerent population groups is also a commonfactor in natural resource conﬂicts (Castro 2005; Grahn 2005).Demographic change.In some locations population growth has led to increasedcompetition over land and water, e.g. through the reduction of land plot sizes.Likewise, internal or regional migration and displacement may, in some cases, cause orcontribute to natural resource conﬂicts (Theron 2009; Baechler 1999). Nevertheless,universal assumptions should be avoided. Some studies have shown the opposite19

5.1 Conﬂict prevention in natural resource managementConﬂict prevention forms an implicit and often unspoken part of natural resourcemanagement practices (Baechler 1999). Traditions, norms, common rules, laws,institutions and policies in natural resource management are ideally all basic elementsof conﬂict prevention, which essentially aims to clarify rights and uses and to bringcoexistence to situations of potential resource competition and conﬂicts of interest(UNEP 2009). The following discussion cannot explore all of these issues, but insteaddraws out a selection of features related to conﬂict prevention measures, as found inthe literature review.Conﬂict analysis typically operates with three overall types of conﬂict preventionmeasures namely (i) early warning; (ii) direct conﬂict prevention and (iii) structuralconﬂict prevention. Natural resource management mechanisms and interventions havenot typically operated with these concepts. Nevertheless, elements of all three typesof conﬂict prevention can be found in the natural resource management practicesand interventions reviewed:��

All three elements of conﬂict prevention may be carried out at local, national andinternational levels. While each type of prevention is important in its own right, theliterature reviewed indicates that early warning systems and direct conﬂict preventionmeasures are of limited eﬀect if they are not backed by structural conﬂict preventioneﬀorts that address the root causes of conﬂicts e.g. by addressing inequalities inresource access, institutionalising rights and agreements, and providing supportingnational frameworks (Benjaminsen & Ba 2009; Brockhaus et al. 2004). If this is notdone, the duration of agreements made through direct prevention measures may beshort-lived, and new conﬂicts may erupt and escalate.5.2 Conﬂict management and resolution in natural resourcemanagementConﬂictmanagementmeasures seek to contain, limit and mitigate ongoing conﬂicts,and conﬂictresolutionmeasures seek to end conﬂicts by resolving the underlyingincompatibilities. However, in both practice and in much of the literature, the twoaspects ﬂow together and thus they are discussed together in the following sectionsunder the overall heading of ‘conﬂict management’. This can take a variety of forms,but typically involve one or more of the following elements:��

Customary systems may be legally recognised by law, but are distinguished fromnational statutory systems by their customary and often localised nature, speciﬁc to,for example, a particular ethnic group or production system.Different settings may require a different emphasis on each of these differentmechanisms, depending on the history and outlook of conﬂicts, the existing meansfor governing conﬂicts, and the nature and aim of policies and of developmentcooperation. No single approach is necessarily superior and ﬁts all. They all possessstrengths and weaknesses, and their success depends upon analysis of the contextand conﬂicts in question.

6.1 Local conﬂict prevention and management in naturalresource managementCustomary mechanismsThese frequently consist of general ‘traditional’ authorities in communities such as,for example, chiefs or headmen who are asked to settle disputes through mediation,arbitration or adjudication (Baechler 1999; Edossa et al. 2005). In addition oralternatively, conﬂict prevention and management may involve village councilssuch as a ‘council of elders’ whose mandates often include explicit reference toensuring harmony and peace in communities (Adan & Pkalya 2006 a/b). Whilemost interventions in support of conﬂict prevention and management tend to focuson these traditional authorities, there are also a range of other important conﬂictprevention and management mechanisms which are ingrained in local customs andnot necessarily visible to outsiders. Such measures described in the literature include:(i) village assemblies and inter-community meetings (Grahn 2005); (ii) naturalresource management agreements between diﬀerent resource users, e.g. irrigationmanagement agreements (Wolf 2000) or mutually agreed timing of when herdersmove cattle across the ﬁelds of sedentary farmers; (iii) reciprocal beneﬁt systems, e.g.mutually dependent pastoral and farming systems; (iv) inter-community alliances, e.g.alliances and intermarriages between diﬀerent communities or ethnic groups with theaim of avoiding conﬂict over resources (Adan & Pkalya 2006 a/b); and (v) everydaycultural practices that are indirectly aimed at fostering mutual understanding andreducing tension, e.g. ‘dilemma stories’ and family banter in Burkina Faso (Brockhauset al 2003).In addition to this, individual livelihood coping strategies contain important conﬂictavoidance aspects, such as seeking oﬀ-farm beneﬁts or regulating herd size with the24

indirect aim of increasing room for action to avoid conﬂict with fellow farmers(Baechler et al. 2002; Campbell et al. 2009). Ongoing climate change adaptationpractices employed by herders in dryland areas can also be seen as indirect butimportant conﬂict prevention eﬀorts (Beyene 2010; Mwangi & Dohrn 2008).Community-based natural resource managementIn most cases, customary conﬂict prevention and management measures have beenapplied to address conﬂicts between users at the local level (i.e. micro–micro conﬂicts,although the geographical extent of the ‘local level’ may be far-reaching and cut acrossnational boundaries). Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)interventions have typically had a diﬀerent point of departure, namely addressingconﬂicts between local users and the state or other national or international stakeholders(i.e. micro-macro conﬂicts). Eﬀorts found in the reviewed literature that are relevant toconﬂict prevention include: (i) full or (more commonly) partial transfer of use rightscommunities, either for communal resource management among community members,or as joint resource management with state authorities or private entrepreneurs; (ii)transfer of responsibility for speciﬁc resource management tasks to communities, e.g.implementation of management actions, enforcement of regulations, monitoring ofresources etc.; (iii) development of resource sharing agreements and ParticipatoryLand Use Planning; (iv) establishment of Community Based Organisations (CBOs)as the management entity for such resources, frequently with national or internationalNGOs as facilitators, and in some cases involving capacity development to enhancethe voice and networks of CBOs; (v) development of beneﬁt-sharing arrangementsas incentives for sustainable use, e.g. transfer of forest and wildlife revenues from stateto community, and (vi) alternative incomes and livelihoods as a means of reducingpressure from scarce or protected resources.Multi-stakeholder fora and committeesThese constitute collaborative mechanisms for the management of natural resourcesbetween the national and community level. They include mechanisms that aretypically deﬁned by resource boundaries rather than administrative ones, such asWater user Associations, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) basinor sub-basin committees, Protected Area management boards or Participatory LandUse Planning fora. They typically consist of stakeholder representatives from resourceuser organisations, as well as government sector bodies and/or Local Governmentauthorities, and may be charged with collaborative planning and development ofregulations. Some fora, such as sub-basin IWRM committees may also have a conﬂictmanagement mandate, and may be charged with organising public consultations.25

District level institutionsLocal government authorities and government agencies at district level sometimesplay an important de facto role in everyday conﬂict prevention and management.For instance, district staﬀ who work in water aﬀairs or other technical departmentsfrequently engage in close contact with community members and may be informallyused as mediators or arbitrators if they are trusted and respected. This aspect is rarelymentioned in the literature, and has not been a frequent focus of interventions toaddress conﬂicts. Speciﬁc conﬂict prevention and management fora involving multiplestakeholders have been developed at district level in some countries, frequently inpost-conﬂict situations where broader security concerns are involved.Private sector engagementThe private sector can, in some cases, play a part in innovating and disseminating newtechnologies and practices that may provide access to new resources or reduce demandfor existing ones. This can ideally help reduce the pressure on scarce resources andthereby indirectly contribute to conﬂict prevention and resolution. Examples includenew water technologies (e.g. deep pumps) that can provide access to groundwaterresources previously beyond reach and/or associated payment and managementschemes. Traditionally private sector engagement in such areas has focussed ontechnology development, but increasingly also involves broader schemes, such aswater payment and management schemes.6.2 Lessons learnt• A cross-cutting ﬁnding in the cases reviewed is that customary mechanisms arekey in local level conﬂict prevention. Much of the literature highlights the positivepotential of customary dispute settlement mechanisms because of their accessibilitydue to low cost, ﬂexibility in scheduling and procedures, their knowledge of localcustoms and values, and use of local languages. Moreover, local customs can helpreconciliation of the parties after an agreement is reached (Castro 2005). Conﬂictprevention eﬀorts that have engaged customary institutions have thus in severalcases been successful, whereas other eﬀorts that have sought to bypass them havefrequently not. However, customary measures are frequently described as beingeroded, as a result of increasing pressure on natural resources and/or impositionof new rules and regimes by the state. This suggests that supporting and engagingcustomary conﬂict prevention mechanisms should be a priority.• Most prior support to customary conﬂict prevention measures seems to have hada rather narrow emphasis on supporting traditionalauthorities.While these are26

clearly very important, there appears to be scope for a more integrated approachthat works with the wider range of customary prevention mechanisms, such asdeveloping reciprocal relationships between land users, supporting agreementsfor shared management between local users, and integrating support to localadaptation practices as part of a conﬂict prevention strategy.• CBNRM interventions have in some cases succeeded in reducing or overcomingconﬂicts between local stakeholders and the state or other external parties (e.g.Child & Jones 2006; Mustalahti & Lund 2010), but have failed in others (e.g.Turner 1999; Oldekop et al. 2010). Where CBNRM interventions have failed toreduce conﬂicts, two key factors are that (i) incentives/beneﬁts for communitymembers have been insuﬃcient compared to the associated restrictions in resourceuse and access under CBNRM; and (ii) thede factodevolution of rights andauthority to communities has been limited, and frequently remains with stateagencies. In addition to this, alternative income generating activities and livelihoodoptions have in some cases failed due to a lack of understanding of local livelihoodstrategies, or insuﬃcient attention to market needs (Wollenberg et al. 2001).Hence while CBNRM includes a number of elements that can help address futurenatural resource conﬂicts, particular attention is needed to ensure that they arebased on an in-depth understanding of local livelihood and market dynamics,and that they arede factosupported by national policies and legal systems.• While both customary and CBNRM measures for conﬂict prevention can provideimportant entry points to conﬂict prevention in natural resource management,they also have limitations. Firstly, they may not be legally recognised and cantherefore sometimes be easily undermined by external actors. Secondly, local leadersmay beneﬁt from disputes to pursue their own interests. Thirdly, both types ofmechanisms are frequently dominated by local elites and are not necessarily pro-poor: while poor local households may prefer dealing with customary institutionsin local conﬂicts, it is not necessarily in their long-term interest to do so. Exclusionof women (who often bear the heaviest consequences of conﬂict) and young men(who are sometimes key actors in local conﬂicts) from both customary institutionsand CBOs is also frequently reported as a problem, and may contribute toconﬂict (Baechler et al. 2002; Brown & Crawford 2009). Community level forafurthermore tend to emphasise consensus-based decisions, which in some casesdisfavours stakeholders with limited negotiating power.• Addressing the issue of exclusion in customary and CBNRM institutions istherefore an important aspect of ensuring pro-poor and sustainable conﬂictprevention and management. Research on local water conﬂict and cooperationsuggests that excluded groups can beneﬁt from using alternative institutional spaces27

for venting their grievances when the ‘normal’ spaces are dominated by elites withopposing interests (Funder et al. 2012.)2Other checks and balances that can helpsupport marginalised stakeholders include regular monitoring and supervision ofwhether agreements and decisions are upheld by the involved parties (e.g. Child2006).• In general the role of women in both conﬂict and peace building eﬀorts isunderestimated. In armed conﬂicts, women are often victims, suﬀering fromphysical, economic and psychological stress as armed conﬂict tends to exacerbateexisting gender discriminations. Furthermore, relative resource scarcity has diﬀerentimpacts on men and women’s coping strategies. For example, in pastoral settingswomen are often responsible for children and cannot easily migrate, and femaleheaded households are particularly vulnerable due to tenure insecurity (Omolo2011). Studies from the upper eastern region in Kenya, however, also show thatwomen may take part in the cultural reproduction of conﬂict, by e.g. singingsongs that encourage men to raid cattle and carry out revenge attacks. In theKaramoja region in Kenya and Uganda pastoralist women may also be involvedin ammunition trading (Mkutu 2008). Eﬀorts to work with women throughsensitisation to address these issues have proved successful in some cases.3Womenare also potentially important peacekeepers as they play a key role in establishingcontinuity, which enables families and communities to move forward in post-conﬂict situations. The development of District Peace Committees in Kenya isthus based on an initial initiative taken by a group of women in Northern Kenya(see Annex 2).• Customary institutions and CBOs do not necessarily in themselves have thereach to address conﬂicts that take place across multiple communities or on awider geographical scale. They may be most suited to reconcile members of thesame social group, as they may not be considered legitimate by people coming infrom the outside or other countries, as they may be biased towards members oftheir own social group. It may therefore be necessary to engage other institutionsat other levels.• In some cases district authorities are mentioned as imposing authoritarianapproaches to community members in situations of conﬂict (Berger 2003; Castro2005). However, while this is clearly the case in some locations, they may also serveimportant de facto roles in conﬂict prevention and management as mentionede.g. where a chief or headman is biased against the grievances of a poor household, the latter may beneﬁt fromseeking the support of a local government councillor or a CBO. Or vice versa.3Author interview with PeaceNet Kenya, 2010.2

above. Cases from Ethiopia, Kenya and some other sites furthermore point to thebeneﬁts of approaches that foster collaboration between customary institutionsand local government and district agencies in conﬂict prevention and resolution,for example the District Peace Committees (DPC) in Kenya (see annex).Multi-stakeholder fora and committees such as IWRM committees or water userassociations at sub-basin level or joint protected area management boards are stillunder development in many areas. Experiences so far suggest that such fora canbe beneﬁcial for aligning interests and planning between stakeholders in somerespects, but also that they suﬀer from challenges of equitable representation(Höynck & Rieser 2002). They may also, in some cases, be too far removed from ornot aligned with the de facto patterns of decision making and conﬂict resolutionsought by local stakeholders. Hence, while such institutions may be beneﬁcialfor speciﬁc resource planning exercises, it should not be assumed that they are apanacea for resolving conﬂicts at e.g. community level (Barham 2001).The range of third parties that community members choose to involve may be wide,and are not necessarily exclusively either customary or statutory mechanisms. Thirdparties may be elders, local chiefs, judges and/or local government representatives(Beyene 2010; Grahn 2005; Theron 2009). Third party involvement does notnecessarily entail that conﬂicts get resolved (Castro 2005; Lund 1998; von Benda-Beckman 1981; Moore 1992). If local authority structures or other circumstanceschange, cases may be retried or reopened by losing parties (Barrière & Barrière 2002;Moore 1992). This is not necessarily because the conﬂict managing mechanismsdo not function properly; it rather reﬂects how things often work at the local level,and that institutions should be supported in ways that allow them to handle theinevitable re-emergence of some conﬂicts (Moore 1992). It is moreover importantto pay attention to petty corruption and bribery in third party involvement as thisreproduces inequality and may aggravate conﬂicts (Benjaminsen & Ba 2009).In general, the above experiences point to the beneﬁts of involving a broad rangeof institutions and mechanisms in local conﬂict prevention and resolution. Thisnot only helps avoid conﬂicts over authority between the various institutionsinvolved, but also helps draw on the comparative advantages of diﬀerent institutions.For example, the degree of trust often aﬀorded to customary institutions can becomplemented by the options for advocacy by civil society institutions, while localgovernment agencies can provide alternative options for voicing grievances, andcoordinate activities across locations and upwards to central government (Swatuk2005).Private sector engagement in the innovation of new technologies and approacheshas in some cases helped to introduce improved technologies and management29

schemes in rural areas, especially within water development. This has frequentlyhelped address important local stakeholder needs. However, the extent towhich it has contributed to conﬂict prevention and resolution in practice is lessclear. In some situations, the development of new water resources can in itselfinduce conﬂict between local stakeholders who compete for access to new waterinfrastructure (Bolwig et al. 2009; Funder et al. 2010). As private sector engagementis furthermore based on marketing terms, technologies may not be equally attractiveor aﬀordable to diﬀerent stakeholder groups (e.g. upstream/downstream; poor/wealthy; or farmers/pastoralists), leading to bias and possible conﬂict as a result.The contribution of the private sector to innovation and dissemination of newtechnologies and practices thus needs to be balanced by careful attention to issuesof access and ownership of the resources in question.

7.1 National conﬂict prevention and management in naturalresource managementDevelopment of national institutional frameworks for conﬂict prevention andmanagementThis can include developing the legal system in order to resolve conﬂicts throughstandard judicial procedures, or developing speciﬁc national bodies aimed at conﬂictprevention (Theron 2009; van Leeuwen 2009. See also Danida 2010 a/b). The basicprinciple of the latter is to provide mechanisms that prevent emerging and existingtensions from developing into actual conﬂict, by e.g. monitoring through early warningsystems, and addressing key issues of concern early on. Typically such institutionsalso have a conﬂict management and resolution mandate, and the emphasis is notnecessarily on natural resources speciﬁcally. A case in point is the National SteeringCommittee on Peace Building and Conﬂict Management in Kenya (see annex).Cross-sectoral policy coordination and planning related to natural resourcesA recurrent ﬁnding in the study is the call for better harmonisation between diﬀerentland use and development policies and interests. At the national level, measuresto address this typically include cross-sectoral policy integration and provision ofappropriate frameworks for practical planning eﬀorts such as IWRM, strategicenvironmental assessment, land use planning etc.Reforms and revisions of the allocation and governance of land, water and othernatural resourcesThis includes measures such as land reform, development of new processes andprinciples for water allocation and payment, and devolution of authority and revenuesin natural resource management (Bob 2002; Hughes 2001; Herrera & Gugliema daPassano 2006; UNEP 2009). While such reforms may have a number of purposes,they ideally address basic aspects of resource allocation and can serve to address rootcauses of many conﬂicts, such as conﬂicts over unequal land access for example, and31

unclear land tenure or infringement of local water rights. Examples include a range ofoptions such as land reform (Hughes 2001), incorporating customary law and localrights into the formal legal system and policy frameworks (Mwangi & Dohrn 2008),or devolution of forest and wildlife management rights and revenues (Mustalahti &Lund 2010).Alternative Dispute Resolution approachesAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a range of processes and techniques fordispute resolution outside the judicial process (Herrera & Guglielma da Passano2006). It can be used at local, national and transboundary levels, but is discussed hereas there is increasing attention to develop ADR capacity among NGOs and (so farto a lesser extent) government institutions. ADR processes may include:•Conﬂict assessment:to identify issues, interested parties, and possible pathwaysfor action early on•Interest-based negotiation:between diﬀerent groups or individuals to understanddiﬀerent parties interests and ways to address them•Mediation:intervention by a neutral third party to assist the parties in reachinga solution•Arbitration:third party listens to facts and arguments presented by the parties ortheir representatives to render a binding or non-binding decision•Negotiated rulemaking:multiparty negotiations to formulate environmentalregulations•Policy dialogues:discussions among diﬀerent interest groups to encourage mutualunderstanding.•Quasi-judicial processes:expert opinions to interest groups through techniques suchas early neutral evaluations, mini-trials, settlement judges, and fact-ﬁnding.

7.2 Lessons learnt• Cross-sectoral eﬀorts and structural reforms such as those mentioned above areconsiderable and challenging tasks, but are nonetheless key elements of structuralconﬂict prevention in natural resource management. In a number of the casesreviewed, such national level measures are lacking, and this is frequently describedas a major reason why conﬂicts develop and persist in the ﬁrst place, or why localeﬀorts to address conﬂicts fail.• A recurrent ﬁnding in the literature is thus that while conﬂicts should ideallybe prevented locally and through local institutions, national frameworks and32

reforms are essential to provide the overall regulatory frameworks and coordinatea concerted nationwide eﬀort towards replication of successful institutions andarrangements (e.g. Kameri-Mbote et al. 2007).Elements of ADR can be seen in civil society approaches to conﬂict resolutionin a number of countries in the South, although experiences within naturalresource management are still limited (Castro 2005). The case study on thePeace Wells in Niger (see annex) applies several approaches that can be foundunder the overall ADR umbrella. ADR approaches are also subject to critiquein some of the reviewed literature, namely that they do not necessarily addressstructural inequalities and may serve to perpetuate or exacerbate powerimbalances (Cousins 1996).The beneﬁts of using oﬃcial legal systems in dispute resolution are that it strengthensthe rule of law and fosters the principle of equity before the law. However, theliterature review found that national legal systems can be inaccessible to the poor,women, remote communities or other marginalised groups due to cost, distance,language barriers, ethnicity, political obstacles, and discrimination (Herrera &Guglielma da Passano 2006; Huggins et al. 2005). People may lack knowledgeof procedures and, moreover, adjudication of cases may take a long time. ‘Accessto justice’ initiatives have sought to address this, although primarily outside thenatural resource management sector (e.g. Danida 2010 a/b).Attempts to make oﬃcial governance systems more accessible and accountablehave been taken in the form of bureaucratic reforms. For example, decentralisationreforms have been widely implemented both in the form of deconcentration(delegating responsibility to ﬁeld units of ministries) and devolution (transferringsubstantive power to the local level). In practice, however, decentralisationprocesses have often been slow to implement in reality, and power inequalitiesat the local level have sometimes undermined the democratic reform intendedby decentralisation. Evidence from the literature review thus suggests thatdecentralisation sometimes exacerbates, rather than reduces local naturalresources conﬂicts (Ribot 1999; 2002), because local political and economicelites take advantage of pursuing new opportunities provided by decentralisation(Castro 2005).In many cases appropriate national level frameworks for preventing and managingconﬂict in natural resource management are thus in fact in place on paper, but arenot de facto implemented. Reasons described in the literature include capacityand funding constraints, resilient institutional cultures and conﬂicting sectoralinterests. Control of the productive resources and their associated revenues canbe important funding and power bases for central sector institutions, who may33

be reluctant to actually devolve resources. International stakeholders that bypassnational policies and legislation have, in some cases, added to this, e.g. land-grabbingas a result of corruption and/or individual exemptions (Cotula et al. 2009).Approaches that have had some success in reducing these constraints include:• Highlighting and demonstrating to national policymakers the actual beneﬁts ofcross-sectoral coordination and reforms, as well of particular types of land use,e.g. in terms of national economic beneﬁts, eﬃciency savings and the costs ofconﬂicts to national budgets (UNEP 2009; Uitto & Duda 2002).• Anchoring reforms and policies in broad public consultation processes, therebyenhancing legitimacy and reducing the scope for central government retrenchmenton the issue (Campbell et al. 2009; Nielsen Raakjær et al. 2004).• Ensuring that reform and policy development is accompanied by appropriate andinclusive conﬂict prevention, management processes and fora that can monitorand address key issues during formulation and implementation, and provide forafor expressing grievances (Campell et al. 2009; Edossa et al 2005).• Enhancing the capacity and frameworks for civil society advocacy and monitoringof natural resource governance, including ensuring that policies and laws arefollowed through in practice (Theron 2009).• Strengthening platforms and networks for local government authorities orcustomary institutions to claim revenues and authority vis-à-vis central authoritiesas provided in formal policies and laws (Yurdi et al. 2006; Van Leeuwen 2009).• Supporting integration of customary tenure and resource management institutionsin formal national legislation and policy, where this is in accordance with pro-poordevelopment (Byene 2010, Castro 2005; Mwangi & Dohrn 2008).

Transboundary conﬂict prevention and management in Africa has especially focussedon river basin management. Apart from this, major lakes such as Lake Victoria andLake Chad also have transboundary, intergovernmental collaboration. In addition, inrecent years cross-border protected area management has developed in various partsof the region in the form of so-called ‘Peaceparks’ that help ensure collaboration andconﬂict prevention across international borders. There have also been emerging eﬀortsto address issues of cross-border conﬂicts, for example between pastoralists in theHorn of Africa, through cross-border collaboration between local authorities.The following section draws mainly on experiences generated by transboundaryriver basin management, which is where the bulk of documentation currently exists.However, many of the emerging experiences from Peaceparks and local cross-bordercollaboration are similar to these.8.1 Transboundary conﬂict prevention – lessons learntOf the 63 river basins in Africa, approximately one third are covered by some formof collaborative River Basin Organisation (RBO) (Boege and Turner 2006). Inaddition to this, more than 150 bi- or multilateral agreements have been developedfor international river basins on the continent (Lautze & Giordanio 2005). Thesegenerally consist of three overall types, namely (a) agreements that cover all shared waterbodies between countries (e.g. between Namibia and South Africa); (b) single watercourse agreements (e.g. the Niger, Zambezi and Nile basins), or (c) agreements thatcover speciﬁc shared water course projects such as dams (Boege & Turner 2006).Many of the current RBO frameworks and collaborative agreements are – at leastnominally – based on the UN Convention on International Water Courses, whichsets down (i) a principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation; (ii) a do no harmprinciple, and (iii) a duty to cooperate with other, co-riparian states. In accordancewith these principles, ratifying governments are obliged to notify other basin statesof any major developments they plan to undertake on the water course, and canproceed if other signatories have no objections.Although disagreements between riparian states have frequently occurred, actualacts of violence and military aggression over transboundary water resources have35

been very rare between African states.4This is also evident on a global scale, asdocumented in the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, which has shownthat the vast majority of actions between riparian states are collaborative rather thanconﬂictive (Wolf et al. 2003; see also Ravnborg 2004). Indeed, analysis shows thatsuch agreements have often proved surprisingly enduring in the longer term (Wolfet al 2003op cit.).This does not, however, mean that all is well. Although most of the major river basinsin Africa are now covered by transboundary agreements, two thirds of the continent’sbasins remain without agreements. Moreover, only 25% of the existing agreementsinclude all riparian nations (Lautze & Giordanio 2005). Progress in developingtransboundary collaboration has furthermore been protracted in many river basinsacross the continent, and diﬀerences of interest abound. Even where more substantialcollaborative mechanisms have materialised, they have typically developed out oflong-term processes over several decades, involving an erratic but gradual build-upfrom single-issue agreements via setbacks and diversions to a gradually wider scope ofcollaboration. An extreme example of this includes the Nile Basin Initiative describedelsewhere in this report, but a similar process is evident in the long-standing eﬀorts todevelop a collaborative mechanism for the Zambezi River. Increasing demand for waterin the face of recurring droughts and increasing economic development is, in somecases, adding further to intensify competing demands, as in the case of negotiationsbetween Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya on the extraction of water resources fromLake Victoria (Kagwanja 2007).Our review of the literature also found a number of more speciﬁc experiences relevantto conﬂict prevention and management at transboundary levels:• National interests override all other concerns in negotiation processes. This isrepeatedly found throughout the literature. Collaboration for the sake of a highercollective purpose is rare. Collaborative agreements therefore need to generategenuine added value for the involved nation states – whether in terms of economic,political, cultural, security – or environmental beneﬁts (Qaddumi 2008).• Approximately half of the existing agreements lack clear allocation of water rightsbetween riparian states (Lautze & Giordanio 2005). In some cases this is the resultof a deliberate strategy which seeks to develop mutual beneﬁts (e.g. mobilising4

investments and addressing joint risks) before addressing thorny issues of resourcesharing. While such a strategy has been successful in the short term in some cases,it also means that critical issues of allocation are only postponed and may lead tobreakdown of collaboration at a critical point – especially if water scarcity increasesas in the case of climate change (Lautze & Giordanio 2005; Mekkonen 2010).A dual process is therefore needed which works simultaneously on optimisingbeneﬁts and negotiating clear user rights (Mason 2004).Cost sharing arrangements can be as important as beneﬁt sharing arrangements.Options for economic compensation are frequently not fully exploited, e.g.compensation from one country to another for loss of downstream water ﬂow(Qaddumi 2008).Collaborative programmes that foster economic interdependence and economicintegration across boundaries have a stabilising effect on transboundaryrelationships (Mason 2004), e.g. joint projects to sustainably exploit waterresources or the tourism potential of transboundary protected areas.Generation of mutual information and data for water course management can act asan important initial platform for collaboration, upon which further collaborationcan be built. Positive experiences are quoted from jointly conducted assessments ofresources, conﬂicts and common risks in river basins, and collaborative productionof technical data on e.g. water ﬂows and climate change (including early warningof ﬂooding etc.).Anchoring transboundary agreements and collaborative activities in widerregional frameworks (e.g. SADC for the Zambezi) has contributed to fosteringpolitical will and momentum in some cases, and, furthermore, helps ensureintegration with wider regional policies and development eﬀorts.Bilateral agreements are far more numerous than multilateral ones, and typicallyeasier to establish Building on bilateral relationships and exploiting thecomparative advantages of two states has proved successful in several instances.However, developing bilateral agreements in a context of multiple riparianstates can also be risky, because it may preclude multilateral agreements byexcluding other riparians, and can defeat the purpose of basin-wide approaches.Bilateral efforts therefore need to be carefully coordinated with multilateralefforts.Support to enhancing water use eﬃciency and policies in individual countriescan help facilitate and sustain transboundary agreements, because the projectedwater demands of individual countries are reduced (Qaddumi 2008).Multi-track negotiation and communication approaches have generally shownfavourable results (Mason 2004). This entails working at several levels and in37

8.2 Transboundary conﬂict management – lessons learntJust over half of Africa’s existing transboundary agreements contain conﬂict resolutionmechanisms, which is in fact a higher proportion than in some other parts of theworld (Lautze & Giordanio 2005). Such mechanisms may stipulate provisions fora designated body within the RBO to act as a third party and oversee negotiationsbetween two disputing riparians. If disputes cannot be settled they may, in somecases, be referred to a higher authority outside the RBO, e.g. a regional collaborativebody. Mechanisms described in the agreements are, however, not necessarily clearor applied in practice (see e.g. Schulz 2007). Attention to development of clear andwell-functioning conﬂict resolution mechanisms in RBOs is therefore frequentlycalled for (Boege & Turner 2006).38

Power asymmetries and economic inequity between states has been a core challengein transboundary conﬂict resolution (e.g. Jägerskog & Zeitoun 2009). Attempts toaddress this have included:• Identification of incentives for powerful states to shift from conflictive tocooperative behaviour, e.g. through collaborative projects in poor upstream statesthat help ensure the water security of powerful downstream states.• Capitalising on the increasing water demands from powerful economies (whethercaused by increasing demand or water scarcity) to engage them in collaborativeschemes. For example, South Africa consumes some 80% of water resources inSouthern Africa, but contributes only 8% and has escalating demands (Scheumann& Neubert 2006). While such a situation poses a potential risk of conﬂict, it alsoprovides a potential opportunity to engage the country in collaborative negotiationsover riparian rights, as is currently the case.• Enhancing the capacity of weaker states to engage in negotiations and technicalmanagement issues (op cit.).• Undertaking the above activities alongside eﬀorts to develop frameworks inaccordance with UN principles on equitable sharing of water courses (Mekonnen2010).Experiences from such efforts suggest a need for long-term engagement andinvolvement of third parties, and may be particularly challenging in situations wherethe powerful riparians are located upstream. Other experiences related to conﬂictresolution in transboundary water governance include:• Building human resources capacity for transboundary conﬂict resolution, includingtraining of legal experts for mediation and brokerage at the regional level, whichare often lacking• Initiating practical, on the ground, projects as vehicles for collaboration• Addressing local transboundary conﬂicts by establishing joint border commissionsor regular exchange visits between local authorities, as applied in parts of NorthernKenya• Engaging international donors as third parties/facilitators to support dialogueand practical collaboration, although care should be taken to avoid agreementsand collaborative frameworks becoming essentially donor-driven

The following section proposes key principles and elements for addressing climate-related conﬂict in development cooperation. The recommendations are based on thereview of experiences from natural resource management discussed above, as well ason literature relating to climate change and development speciﬁcally. Experiencesfrom conﬂict and security studies and ‘conﬂict sensitive development’ approachesare also drawn upon.9.1 Guiding principles for addressing climate-related conﬂicts indevelopment cooperationGuiding principles for addressing climate-related conﬂict resolution include:•Climate-related conﬂicts should be seen in the perspective of other developmentchallenges.Conﬂicts are serious and should be addressed. However, climate-relatedconﬂict is not necessarily the only or indeed the biggest development challengein a given setting, and it should not divert attention or funding from eﬀorts toaddress other fundamental development issues.•Interventions should be based on careful analysis of the links between climate change,conﬂict and development.Climate-related conﬂicts are typically complex andmulti-layered, and prior assumptions about the role of climate change in conﬂictsoften turn out to be wrong or only part of the story. Thorough analysis is thereforeneeded prior to interventions.•Interventions should help prevent and resolve conﬂicts, not suppress them.The aimof addressing climate change conﬂicts is not to suppress or subdue them, but toprevent and resolve them to the satisfaction of those involved. Experience showsthat interest-based negotiation is often more eﬀective than agreements based onnominal consensus.•Attention to poverty alleviation and inequality.Mechanisms for addressingclimate-related conﬂicts should have an emphasis on equitable access and pro-poor outcomes. This may include special eﬀorts such as innovating means for theinterests of the poor to be considered in consensus-based mechanisms, which arenot necessarily pro-poor in themselves.•Draw on existing mechanisms and principles for resolving conﬂict as far as possible.Where relevant, existing principles and mechanisms for addressing conﬂicts40

should be supported and built upon. These may range from customary conﬂictresolution mechanisms, through the emerging body of private sector institutionsand NGOs specialised in conﬂict resolution in e.g. Africa, to national frameworksand the various initiatives on conﬂict prevention and resolution in the AfricanUnion.•Balancing support to micro and macro scales.Experience show that local conﬂicts arebest solved locally, and that the principle of subsidiarity should apply in addressingconﬂicts. However, the underlying causes of many climate-related conﬂicts arenot generated locally, but from the national and even international level. Reformsand eﬀorts may be needed at these levels to provide the frameworks that makelocal conﬂict prevention and resolution possible and sustainable.•Cross-sectoral approach.Addressing climate-related conﬂicts will typically takeits outset in the ‘green’ sectors, i.e. agriculture, natural resource management andenvironment, etc. However, conﬂict prevention and resolution requires engagementwith institutions and eﬀorts in other sectors, e.g. governance, legal systems, socialdevelopment etc.•Donor harmonisationis particularly critical when addressing climate-relatedconﬂicts. Engaging with the root causes of climate-related conﬂicts requires eﬀectiveharmonisation across development eﬀorts. Moreover, because interventionsthemselves may cause or contribute to such conﬂicts, it is essential that eﬀortsare coordinated. DAC principles on conﬂict-sensitive development can form apoint of departure for this.9.2 Key questions to considerKey questions and issues to consider when addressing climate-related conﬂict preventionand resolution in the programming of development cooperation include:Is climate-related conﬂict actually an issue?As discussed earlier, climate change doesnot necessarily contribute to conﬂict. A careful assessment of the situation is thereforenecessary, which avoids prior assumptions about the links between climate changeand conﬂict in the target area for support, and which considers whether externalintervention may actually do more harm than good to existing conﬂict preventionand resolution processes.What types of conﬂicts may be fuelled by climate change?In order to determine how andto what extent development cooperation can help address climate-related conﬂicts, anassessment must be made of the nature and scope of such conﬂicts in the target area41

of support. This should include an assessment not only of ongoing conﬂicts (whereconﬂict resolution may be needed), but also of the potential for future conﬂicts(where conﬂict prevention measures may needed). The conﬂicts that climate changemay contribute to can take a variety of forms and may be latent and not immediatelyvisible, as well as ongoing and explicit. Section 3.2 discussed root causes of naturalresource conﬂicts, which are also often at the heart of climate-related conﬂicts.What are the root causes of climate-related conﬂicts?The various forms of conﬂict towhich climate change may contribute are in most cases originally caused by otherunderlying factors. Policymakers cannot address all such root causes at any one time,nor can development cooperation hope to engage with equal force in all these issues.These root causes are, however, necessary to understand in order to assess the potentialfor future conﬂicts, the dynamics of existing conﬂicts, and the necessary strategies forprevention and resolution. Section 3.2 discussed the root causes of natural resourceconﬂicts, to which climate change may contribute.What is the intensity of the conﬂicts?The intensity of climate-related conﬂicts hasimplications for the nature of development cooperation. Violent conﬂicts are usuallyparticularly urgent and critical to address, but may range from a ﬁght at a local streamto actual warfare. Careful consideration is needed of which aspects of violent conﬂictdevelopment cooperation can address, and which aspects are beyond the scope ofsuch support. In addition to this, consideration of non-violent conﬂicts is important.The vast majority of land and water conﬂicts are non-violent, and yet constitute acritical issue for large numbers of people.What is the scale of the conﬂicts?Land and water conﬂicts typically involve one or moreof the following: (i) micro–micro conﬂicts, e.g. between or among local stakeholderssuch as pastoralists and farmers; (ii) micro–macro conﬂicts, e.g. between local andnational or international stakeholders such as farmers versus the state or a hydropowercompany, and (iii) macro–macro conﬂicts, e.g. between countries such as two statessharing a river course. All three types of conﬂict are equally important to address. Localconﬂicts may be less ‘visible’ but are numerous and may therefore aﬀect considerablenumbers of people in total. They may also eventually have implications at nationaland international levels.What is the scope of climate-related conﬂict prevention, management and resolution?Inorder to address climate-related conﬂict, donor cooperation eﬀorts need to identifyhow their support should be related to the wider process of conﬂict prevention,42

management and resolution, and what the necessary scope of such support should be.Diﬀerent settings may require a diﬀerent emphasis on conﬂict prevention, managementand resolution, depending on the history and outlook of conﬂicts in the area, theexisting means for governing conﬂicts, and the nature of the support framework. Itshould be noted that studies of land and water conﬂicts show that conﬂicts rarelyconstitute perfect conﬂict cycles. Instead, conﬂicts may ﬂuctuate between conﬂictiveand cooperative situations, or they may include sub-conﬂicts that are at diﬀerentstages. An integrated approach involving prevention, management and resolutionmeasures is therefore often needed.What types of institutional frameworks and mechanisms exist and should be supported?As discussed in the review of experiences from natural resource management, a rangeof mechanisms exist for addressing conﬂict prevention, management and resolution.The following table provides an overview of the main options:

remit of most development agencies and partners, the main thrust of developmentcooperation in this area should be on supporting the basic enabling environments andframeworks for addressing climate-related conﬂicts, and ensuring that developmentinterventions themselves do not contribute to such conﬂict. Possible entry pointsfor support include:9.3.1 Structural prevention of climate-related conﬂictsPreventing conﬂicts from arising in the ﬁrst place is the most eﬀective and sustainablemeans of addressing any conﬂict. This requires structural conﬂict prevention measuresat policy level, which address the basic sources of conﬂict. In climate-related conﬂicts,this entails engaging with root causes such as land and water scarcity, distribution,rights, markets, governance and inequality.Clearly, policymakers cannot address all root causes at any one time, nor candevelopment cooperation hope to engage with equal force in all these issues. However,from a strategic and long-term perspective, enhancing and expanding existing eﬀortsto address these issues is a fundamental entry point for support to climate-relatedconﬂict prevention. This also ensures a ‘no regrets’ approach, as eﬀorts to addressthese fundamental aspects of natural resources governance and management willbe of importance to overall development and environmental goals, regardless of thespeciﬁc outcomes of climate change.The following selected elements are of particular relevance to land, water and othernatural resources. Several of the elements are already being addressed in existing naturalresource management and adaptation eﬀorts, but will require increased attention,funding and expansion if climate-related conﬂicts are to be eﬀectively prevented.Enhancing governance mechanisms in land and water.Representative and transparentgovernance institutions are key in preventing climate-related conﬂicts, because theycontrol and regulate access to valuable natural resources, and prioritise development.Eﬀorts to enhance and pilot democratic and inclusive representation in naturalresource governance are underway in many countries, ranging from community-basedapproaches through to local government, national and regional bodies. These provideexperiences to build upon and adapt, but there is still much progress to be made andmany issues to resolve. This includes (i) supporting institutional arrangements thatinnovate mechanisms for equal representation in multi-stakeholder settings; (ii)addressing the constraints that often blockde factodevolution of natural resourcecontrol from national to lower levels; (iii) enhancing and clarifying the role of local44

government institutions in natural resource governance; (iv) strengthening customarydecision-making mechanisms where these are viable and pro-poor; and (v) replicatingand scaling up best practices from the multitude of existing pilot models for jointand community-based natural resource management.Addressing property rights and tenure security.Access and use rights to land andwater are a central feature in most situations where climate change has contributed tonatural resource conﬂicts so far. Addressing these issues is therefore a challenging butcrucial aspect of preventing climate-related conﬂicts. This may include (i) support tonational reforms and frameworks that provide transparent and equal opportunity foraccess to and ownership of land, water and other natural resources; (ii) measures thatregulate and ensure transparency in large-scale land deals to avoid conﬂicts caused byland-grabbing etc.; and (iii) strengthening or adapting customary rights systems forcollective resource sharing in multiple user contexts where these are sustainable andpro-poor (e.g. common property arrangements, reciprocal arrangements betweenfarmers and herders, etc.)Improving food security and expanding livelihood options.Sustainable and equitablelivelihoods and food security are a key factor in the resilience of communities toexternal shocks and pressures, and experience suggests that this reduces the riskof conﬂicts and social grievances. Elements include (i) enhancing opportunities,policy frameworks and investments in agriculture, including an emphasis on small-scale producers at national and local levels through e.g. increased access to capital,markets and improved technologies; (ii) development of opportunities for livelihooddiversiﬁcation and alternatives, including new means of income generation and oﬀ-farm employment; and (iii) enhancing adaptation practices and disaster preparednessin agriculture and natural resource use to prevent climate change from adding toexisting risks and insecurities.Increasing and sustaining the supply of land and water resources.Ensuring sustained orimproved availability of natural resources can in some cases help reduce the risk thatresource scarcity (whether natural or relative) contributes to conﬂict. This may includesupport to (i) regulation of resource use, enhanced use and conservation practices, andrestoration of degraded lands, including attention to the fact that resource degradationmay just as often be caused by international and national stakeholders as by localones; and (ii) infrastructure and technology development to enhance provision ofe.g. rural water supply, or reduce demand for natural resources such as fuel wood.Development of alternatives to existing natural resources such as wood and wild foods45

is a further option. Development cooperation can help facilitate innovation of newpractices by providing initial support to innovation and/or institutional frameworksthat support dissemination of new ideas and technologies. This can include supportto private sector engagement in developing/adapting and piloting new technologiesand associated schemes. However, development of new resources and technologiesalso has a conﬂict potential in itself (as a result of competition for access and/orunequal dissemination), and must therefore be complemented by careful attentionto access rights, resource governance and planning.While these are substantial issues, they are not issues that are new to existingdevelopment cooperation programmes, many of which already seek to address issuesof natural resource governance, access and management. Solidifying and scaling upsuch existing support can therefore provide important steps in preventing climate-related conﬂicts, while at the same time enhancing natural resource governance andmanagement more generally. These dual beneﬁts can form the basis of high-level policydialogues between (and within) national governments and development partners onpreventing climate-related conﬂicts.9.3.2 Institutional frameworks for managing and resolving conﬂictsIn many areas, conﬂicts are already ongoing and climate change may further intensifythem. Moreover, even if conﬂict prevention measures are successful it is inevitablethat some new conﬂicts will appear or re-emerge. Support to eﬀective institutionalframeworks for managing and resolving conﬂicts can help avoid that climate-relatedconﬂicts escalate or become intractable, for example by providing opportunities fornegotiation and resolution between parties. While formal legal systems are in placein many areas, they are often diﬃcult for ordinary people to access, or may not havethe capacity or ‘reach’ to address climate-related conﬂicts, including transboundaryones. Customary conﬂict resolution mechanisms are widely used for resolving localconﬂicts, but are in some cases eroded, biased or lack the mandate and scope to addressnew issues related to climate change, or large-scale conﬂicts. Existing support tonatural resource management and climate change adaptation has only rarely includedconﬂict management and resolution features. Supporting institutional developmentin such cases is therefore an obvious entry point.As discussed in previous sections, a range of methods and approaches for conﬂictmanagement and resolution exist, although frequently these are applied as one-oﬀeﬀorts in particular crisis situations. In the following the emphasis is on supportingthe institutionalisation of climate-related conﬂict management and resolution, which46

can thereby help avoid the escalation of emerging new conﬂicts, as well as resolvingexisting ones. Possible elements for development cooperation include:Supporting national frameworks for climate-related conflict management andresolution.This can include (i) development or enhancement of national strategiesfor conﬂict resolution, including attention to land, water and climate change issues;(ii) integrating conﬂict resolution measures in national climate change plans, e.g.National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), disaster preparedness plansetc.; (iii) developing or strengthening national organisational mechanisms for conﬂictresolution and associated policy development including, for example, cross-sectoralfora and platforms for multi-stakeholder interaction including government and civilsociety; and (iv) capacity development and awareness-raising in government andsecurity agencies on conﬂict management and resolution related to land, water andother natural resources.Enhancing capacity for conﬂict management and resolution in local institutions.Inmany cases, conﬂict management and resolution related to land, water and othernatural resources is most eﬀective if carried out by local institutions. This includesconﬂicts that are geographically widespread, but where a concerted and coordinatedeﬀort by local institutions has been undertaken. Particular success has been achievedin locations where district authorities and customary institutions have joined forcesto address conﬂicts. Support to local institutional frameworks will complementthe decentralisation process underway in many countries. Elements can include: (i)support to district level frameworks for conﬂict management and resolution, throughe.g. enhancing awareness and capacity in local government authorities and/or existingland and water fora of conﬂict management/resolution approaches, or supportingthe development of ‘Peace Committees’ or similar at district and local levels; (ii)forging better links between district authorities and customary conﬂict resolutioninstitutions, including establishing collaborative mechanisms for conﬂict managementand resolution related to natural resources, and clarifying the respective roles of districtand customary institutions in this respect; (iii) Strengthening customary conﬂictresolution mechanisms where these are deemed to be representative, transparent andtimely, including enhanced abilities to address new or larger scale issues brought onby climate change, and (iv) including women as active stakeholders in peace buildinginitiatives and supporting women’s representation in e.g. district level institutions.Improving access to formal and informal dispute resolution and justice systems.Formallegal systems are frequently poorly accessible to rural populations and the poor in47

particular, and while customary conﬂict resolution mechanisms can be highly eﬀective,they are not always impartial and may be biased against some population groups, thepoorest or women. Enhancing access to resolution of disagreements and disputes canhelp avoid escalation into intensive and/or large-scale conﬂicts. Options for supportinclude (i) improving access to formal justice systems, such as enhancing the capacityof/accessibility to local courts in land and water dispute resolution, and training oflawyers in environmental justice issues; (ii) supporting platforms and methods formediation and negotiated rule-making that are ﬂexible and low-cost; (iii) providingalternative spaces for unbiased third-party arbitration (e.g. similar to an ombudsmanfunction) in land, water and other natural resources; (iv) innovating mechanisms tomonitor and enforce agreements and rules on land and water allocation, in order toensure they are not violated by powerful stakeholders; and (v) enhancing opportunitiesfor voicing grievances through support to civil society advocacy, environmentaljustice networks etc.Addressing transboundary resource management challenges.Transboundary waterconﬂicts between nation states are rare and a signiﬁcant number of transboundaryagreements exist over jointly shared water bodies. Nevertheless, progress indeveloping wider regional governance mechanisms is frequently hampered byopposing national interests. Climate change may create new challenges in thisrespect, such as increased ﬂooding and/or water scarcity as a result of droughts, orincreased migration across borders in some cases. Experience from transboundarywater cooperation and other eﬀorts such as Peaceparks suggests that transboundarycollaboration on conﬂict management and resolution can be enhanced throughsupport to (i) ensuring that policy dialogues in multilateral natural resourceorganisations (e.g. river basin organisations) are linked to regional politicaland/or economic bodies (e.g. SADC, ASEAN etc.); (ii) applying ‘multi-track’approaches that work at several levels at once with diﬀerent stakeholder groups;(iii) incorporating/building on bilateral agreements, where these exist, in orderto foster trust and collaborative projects between countries; (iv) establishingmechanisms for local cross-border cooperation and conflict management/resolution, e.g. joint border commissions or regular exchange visits between localauthorities; (v) building capacity for regional cooperation and conﬂict resolution,e.g. training legal experts for mediation and brokerage at the regional level, andinnovating economic compensation models; (vi) focusing on information sharingas an initial platform for collaboration, including provision of technical climateand natural resource data, and joint resource and conﬂict assessments, and (vii)supporting in-country eﬀorts to increase internal water use eﬃciency and policies,48

thereby reducing possible in-country stumbling blocks and constraints to regionalcooperation and resource sharing.9.3.3 ‘Conﬂict prooﬁng’ policies and development interventionsNational policies and associated donor cooperation programmes on agriculturaldevelopment, natural resource extraction, climate change adaptation and suchlikemay, in themselves, set oﬀ conﬂicts over, for example, land use, to which climatechange can further contribute. Moreover, climate change-related conﬂicts mayimpact the outcomes of development cooperation. In some cases, climate screeningof development interventions is now carried out, but traditionally these have onlyaddressed conﬂict risks to a very limited extent. The planning and implementation ofsuch policies and development programmes is therefore a signiﬁcant possible entrypoint for building ‘ conﬂict prooﬁng’ measures into such eﬀorts.Strengthening policies and planning in land use, natural resource management andeconomic development.A frequent cause of conﬂicts in land and water has been theimplementation of economic and land use policies that are not harmonised with localland use practices or eﬀorts in other sectors, or which marginalise particular productionsystems. Development cooperation can therefore help support (i) identiﬁcation andharmonisation of diﬀering development goals, sector goals and land use practices inand across policies and plans, and (ii) ensuring that policies and plans do not undulymarginalise particular regions, production systems or stakeholders. Examples includeharmonisation of national agricultural development plans with pastoral strategies, orensuring that water and energy needs for urban development priorities do not drainthe water supplies of rural areas.Application and facilitation of climate-related conﬂict analysis.A number of methodsof conﬂict analysis and strategic conﬂict assessment exist, and have been successfullyapplied in emergency relief and development interventions. However they have rarelybeen used in connection to climate change, land use planning and natural resourcemanagement. Good scope exists for adapting such methods for use in developmentcooperation that addresses these issues, as well as in related government policy andsector planning. This can include joint conﬂict analysis involving multiple stakeholdersfrom diﬀerent sectors and at diﬀerent levels. Although such methods should involvemore than merely ticking boxes, they need not be overly time consuming. They canbe formalised into programme design procedures and will thereby also improve theoverall quality of risk assessment, climate change screening and donor harmonisationin programme development.49

Linking to conﬂict management and resolution mechanisms in programme designand implementation.Development cooperation programmes in agriculture, naturalresource management and adaptation to climate change frequently introduce newapproaches that are sound and well considered (and which may help address the rootcauses of conﬂicts), but which are often unprepared for the fact that they may setoﬀ conﬂicts in themselves. Examples include collaborative and inclusive approachesto natural resource management, such as benefit sharing and establishment ofcommunity-based organisations for resource management. Programme designs shouldtherefore include measures for resolving conﬂict that may arise from the programmeinterventions themselves. This can be done by engaging existing conﬂict resolutioninstitutions as collaborating partners in the implementation of agricultural naturalresource management and adaptation to climate change, or by innovating/adaptingmethods and approaches for conﬂict resolution as an integrated part of support tothese ﬁelds.The extent to which the above entry points can be engaged with will depend on arange of factors in the particular context, scope and framework of the developmentcooperation eﬀort in question. Individual policies and programmes targeting areaswhere climate-related conﬂicts are assessed to be a potential issue should, as a minimum,work on ‘conﬂict prooﬁng’ the interventions in question. This can be extendedwith support aimed speciﬁcally at the other entry points, either by enhancing andsupplementing existing policies and programmes working in the ﬁelds of naturalresource management, climate change and governance issues, or (where none exist)by developing new eﬀorts in these ﬁelds.9.4 Monitoring conﬂict prevention and managementinterventionsMonitoring of climate-related conﬂict prevention and management/resolutioneﬀorts may consist of:• Monitoring whether interventions aimed at preventing and managing/resolvingconﬂicts are successful• Monitoring to ensure that interventions do not contribute to or create conﬂicts(i.e. whether ‘conﬂict prooﬁng’ eﬀorts are adequate)In the former case, monitoring should be an integrated part of the institutionalmechanisms and measures supported/developed by the intervention. Including50

establishment or strengthening of conflict monitoring systems can thus be animportant output in itself. For interventions where the scope is limited to no-harm‘conﬂict prooﬁng’, selected indicators and means of veriﬁcation on conﬂicts can bebuilt into the policy/programme design, preferably drawing on existing measures ingovernment or community frameworks. In both cases, baselines can be developedon the basis of initial conﬂict analysis, for which methods exist.A range of early warning systems for monitoring conﬂict have been developed outsidethe ﬁeld of natural resource management, which can be adapted. These seek to forecastwhen, why and where conﬂict will erupt. Early warning measures may include bothqualitative and quantitative approaches or a combination of both, and can be appliedat transboundary, national and local levels. Speciﬁc methods for monitoring climatechange, drought, ﬂooding and other natural disasters exist and are already appliedby governments in some countries. Participatory, village-based versions of suchmechanisms have also been developed. Some of these apply indigenous knowledge,thereby building on rather than duplicating existing local knowledge. In addition tothis, participatory methods for monitoring natural resource governance and beneﬁtsat community level have been established in some parts of Southern Africa, whichcan be adapted for use in conﬂict monitoring.

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Conﬂicts over natural resources in Niger are often the result of a combination of arange of socioeconomic, political and climatic factors including: high levels of povertywith Niger being the third poorest country in the world, increasing and extremelyhigh population growth with the highest fertility rate in the world (7.1 births perwoman), processes of sociopolitical marginalisation depriving most vulnerable groupsfrom accessing resources and diﬃcult climatic conditions including erratic rainfall,extreme heat and prolonged dry seasons leading to increased pressure on naturalresources including water, arable land and pastures.In the intermediary zones of the country, the dominant livelihood strategies includeagriculture and animal husbandry in various combinations depending on ethnic groupand socioeconomic background. Droughts in the 70s and 80s forced herders, who hadlost all or most of their cattle, to move further south where rainfall is more abundantand settle around existing villages and attempt new livelihoods, often combiningagriculture and herding. However, higher population densities in the south lead togreater competition and conﬂicts over access and usage (Cotula 2006).Causes of conﬂictsConﬂicts often arise between diﬀerent users of natural resources i.e. farmers and herdersand in relation to access to water. Livelihood strategies in these zones are changing towardsmore integration (agriculture, cattle and other income generating activities) as a way toreduce risks by diversifying strategies. Also, decreasing soil fertility and increasing populationpressure leading to cultivation of more and more land is restricting the necessary movementof cattle which, combined with changing mobility patterns outside the normal post-harvestseason, is leading to crop damage in the ﬁelds and hence conﬂicts (Cotula 2006).In the dry eastern part of the country, where pastoralism is the dominant livelihood, diﬀerentpastoral communities including the Fulani and their sub groups (Fulbe, Woodabe, etc.),Toubou and their sub-groups (Azza, Daza, Tedda), Arabs and their sub groups (AwladSlimane, Mogharba, Mohamid, etc.) and the Touaregs, live with only limited agriculturepossible in the south. Here mobility is a precondition for the pastoral livelihood like in mostparts of the Sahel (Thébaud 2002: 82). In the pastoral areas, land ownership is less ﬁxedthan in the agricultural zones, because there is more mobility. The pastoral communities,however, do have a conception of a ‘home territory’ (Thébaud 2002: 230). The home63

territory is determined by the digging of wells. Historically, claims to territory are, thus,intimately tied to the digging of wells. The wells are owned by diﬀerent clans and familieswho thereby control access to the pastures. A complex system of traditional wells exists;the depth and size of a well determines the availability of water, which in turn determinesthe rhythm of consumption of the pastures around it, which also depends on the size of theherds. Access to these wells and water points is regulated by agreed rules, traditionally basedon the principles of prior negotiation and reciprocity. It is customary to allow guests access tothe well; you never know when you will be the guest in another part of the country. Whenthere is plenty of pasture, visitors can stay for long. When pastures and water are limited,the visitors have to move on. In this way the owners of a well can ensure that resources arenot overused and depleted (Cold-Ravnkilde 2009; Thébaud 2002).Previous attempts to develop water infrastructure in Niger provide an example of howproject interventions can cause conﬂicts. The government of Niger and donors, in theirattempt to help the pastoral population, laid the foundation for many of the conﬂictsthat dominated Niger in the 80s, 90s and on. (Thébaud 1990; 2002) To ensure a betterand more eﬃcient use of the pastures many large expensive wells were establishedthroughout the country. However, these modern wells with public status and free accesswere implemented with little understanding of pastoral land tenure regimes and led tomany problems; especially regarding insuﬃcient maintenance (no ownership); overusewith premature depletion of surrounding pastures, and poor management and regulationleading to tensions and violent conﬂicts between user groups (Cold-Ravnkilde 2009;Thébaud 1990; 2002). Some of them have even been illegally privatised which inevitablycontributes to the existing messy institutional setup. The failure of government anddonors to understand complex links between water, land and livelihoods, combinedwith the collapse of the Hissein Habré regime in neighbouring Chad in 1990, has hada very negative and long lasting impact in the country.Efforts to address conﬂictsThe costs of conﬂicts are high for the human beings directly involved, for governments,for neighbouring countries and for the international community. Resolving conﬂicts iscumbersome and expensive. Unfortunately, conﬂict prevention provides no quick ﬁxeseither, but rather requires a long-term presence and a holistic approach that recognisesthat conﬂicts over natural resources are about livelihoods, attitudes and power.CARE has worked with conflict prevention in Niger since 1974. In both theintermediary zones (Dakoro and Maradi area) and in the eastern zone (Diﬀa) the64

organisation has approached conﬂict prevention as embedded in a broader andlonger-term programme approach aiming at livelihood security. This entails workingin several dimensions including 1) alleviating pressure on the natural resource basethrough improved agricultural techniques and natural regeneration techniques,diversiﬁcation of livelihood strategies, alternative income generating activities,rehabilitating water points and wells, establishing cattle corridors etc. 2) supportingparticipatory land-use planning at community and district level 3) facilitating inter-community dialogue and collaborative natural resource management and 4) raisingawareness about relevant policies including decentralisation, water and land, as wellas inﬂuencing national policy and strategies.

The CARE Denmark, EU– Danida funded pilot initiative ‘Wells for Peace’ thus formsan integrated part of a longer-term programme in Niger aiming at livelihood securityfor pastoral communities. Other initiatives include peace caravans targeting the youthand their attitudes as the young are often the ﬁrst players in a conﬂict; inter-communitydialogue fora bringing communities together which may not have spoken for years;training in decentralisation, civic rights etc. as well as food security initiatives thataim to improve cattle production and establish food and fodder stocks.The Wells for Peace initiative sought to respond to the challenges of access to water inEastern Niger characterised by high levels of tension and a history of armed conﬂictsover access to natural resources – not least following the establishment of publicwells by the government in the 80s and 90s – and more speciﬁcally to propose a newsustainable approach for establishing wells in the pastoral zones in Niger. The startingpoint for the initiative was the non-existence of a recognised approach for establishingwells in pastoral areas characterised by high mobility and ethnic diversity.The ﬁrst phase of the Wells for Peace initiative ended mid 2011. Three major outputshave been produced: 1) a new approach for pastoral water has been developed, testedaround 15 wells and documented; 2) a manual for facilitation has been developed65

and recognised for national purposes and, 3) a contribution has been made in termsof approach and methodology to the national strategy for pastoral water which iscurrently being ﬁnalised by the government.Whereas CARE and other NGOs have worked with collaborative natural resourcemanagement institutions and agreements in Niger before, the main innovationin Wells for Peace is that the initiative has developed a thoroughly participatoryapproach in which a social agreement amongst key stakeholders and users is reachedbefore the infrastructure – in this case a well – is established.5This serves to promotecollaborative and sustainable management of scarce resources from the onset througha transparent and inclusive process. The social agreement between users, in this caseboth sedentary and mobile, is negotiated over a period of time before a request forthe infrastructure can be lodged with the relevant authorities.Although the initiative is still young (ﬁrst phase 2005–2011, second phase 2011–2013)reviews conclude that the social agreements between diﬀerent user groups contributeto keeping the social tensions low in a period where the Diﬀa region has been aﬄictedby repeated and severe droughts and food insecurity. While the approach thus seemspromising for similar socioeconomic settings, it is clear that establishing the socialagreements is not a quick ﬁx for conﬂicts. Rather it is a very time consuming andcomplex process requiring respect, humility and patience, with a broad and in-depthknowledge of the diverse social dynamics in the communities. This investment is,however, preferable to conﬂicts and instability with consequences for livelihoodsand humans in the short and long term.In the process of supporting the social agreements, and hence preparing for transparentand inclusive collaborative management, recorded challenges include:• User groups have diﬀerent interests and there is a strong likelihood of elite capture andof more vulnerable or marginal groups losing out. It is diﬃcult for even good facilitatorsto overcome the challenges of reconciling diverse interests and power relations.• The social agreements remain fragile and are only agreed upon for particular pointsin time. Social relations and livelihoods are changing over time and thus the socialagreements need to be reviewed on a regular basis, not least when newcomersarrive or changes in the environment occur.5

• The anchorage in the decentralisation process is an important learning opportunityfor institutionalising processes of local governance around infrastructure; i.e.including citizens in local planning, prioritisation and decision making, tendering,surveillance, construction, management, maintenance etc.Initial feedback has been positive and the Nigerien authorities are keen to see thisnew approach adopted for the creation of all new water wells in pastoral areas. Thesecond phase of Wells for Peace is focusing on greater anchorage to the communesand the relevant public authorities, which is regarded as central to successfuladoption. It is estimated that the additional costs of the new approach for waterwell establishment can be signiﬁcant (up to + 30%), but could be reduced througheconomies of scale.

Box 2. The social agreement, which subsequently has been widelyshared, covers key elements including:• Location of the well taking into account relevant climatic, hydrological andsocioeconomic dimensions, existing web of wells and water points and theinterests of diverse user groups: sedentary, mobile, highly mobile, small herds,large herds etc.• Clariﬁcation on the status of the land and recognition of pastoral land tenureregimes, as the digging of a well changes the rights to a territory• Type of well (small or large diameter) according to the carrying capacity of thepastures to avoid overgrazing• The composition of the local management committee to ensure democratic andaccountable representation, representation of diﬀerent user groups, includinggroups with high mobility• Roles and responsibilities for all actors including the more mobile user groups• Rules for access to the well for diﬀerent users: sedentary, mobile, highly mobile,small herds, large herds etc.• Financial contributions to the well, investment and maintenance costs• Maintenance and protection of the well (eg. sand dune ﬁxation), identifyingtimetable and responsibilities• The complete request, including the request for digging with the consent oflocal leaders, the signature of the councillor, representatives for all diﬀerent users(sedentary and mobile)• The publishing of the social agreement, to ensure recognition of the status of thewell by all parties and potential visitors and to increase accountability of leadersto uphold the agreement

Box 3. Promising resultsIn 2005, when the CARE Danmark/Danida funded programme PROGRESstarted in Diffa region, 56% of all conflicts in the area turned violent. In2008 this figure had decreased to 24%. In 2010, despite the catastrophicpastoral season, project data shows that 0% of recorded conflicts descendedinto violence.Several instances of potential violent conflict surrounding the Wells for Peacewells have been defused as a result of the social agreements and the collaborativemanagement mechanisms in place that provide for consultation among thevarious interests and powers concerned. No conflicts were recorded aroundthe Wells for Peace Wells during the 2009–2010 crisis, rather the wells offeredsomewhat of a safe haven for stricken herders with nowhere to go, even if thatalone was insufficient to save many of their cattle from death.

ConclusionThe Wells for Peace project exempliﬁes how NGO development intervention canalso oﬀer an opportunity for conﬂict prevention, despite the fact that previouslywater infrastructure projects in Niger have been a source of conﬂicts due to ignoranceof pastoral land tenure regimes (Thébaud 2002; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995). Thenew approach of the Wells for Peace project has conﬂict prevention potential byvirtue of bringing stakeholders together, agreeing upon the rules of resource use inwater-starved areas and setting up institutional frameworks of resource regulationbefore the infrastructure is implemented, in areas where conﬂicts would otherwisebe a likely scenario. It may also have helped to put together the necessary agreementfor use of resources, regardless of scarcity, for present and future users as well aspeople coming in from other areas.A key observation is that power is at play and that, even with a conscious anddeliberate approach to avoid elite capture of resources and management institutions,this remains a potential scenario. Development staﬀ and partners must be aware ofthe power relations in project interventions and of the potential negative impact – interms of conﬂicts and further marginalisation of vulnerable groups – that can arisefrom external projects and limited understanding of context and socioeconomicdynamics. The social agreements and the emphasis on consensus and transparencyin rules of access is an attempt to promote more peaceful, sustainable and inclusiveaccess to resources.68

Box 4. Other tools and approaches1. Regular review and discussion of historical and social ties in communities.Analysis of the successes and weaknesses of these ties2. Regular analysis of needs and interests of conﬂicting parties and communities,and also analysis of the remote supporters of each group. Analysis of whateveryone wins and loses to ensure everyone’s interests. Include the role of youthin conﬂict dynamics. Poor young men may engage in cattle theft simply ‘tobecome men’ and start their own family3. Bringing players to analyse their own situation, needs and interests to betterunderstand what has triggered and sustained the conﬂicts at one time or another.Supporting players to make recommendations for resolution and decide ownmodalities for implementation of recommendations4. Identiﬁcation of positive leaders or agents for change in all communities and atall relevant levels from community to national level, carefully including leadersfrom all ethnic, age and gender groups5. Organisation of forums for leaders to ensure commitments from all stakeholdersfor peace between communities and peace culture development. These forumsmust be held at neutral sites and include the invitation of policymakers fromnational and regional levels. The forums can lead to the development of simplerecommendations and plans with clear responsibilities for their implementationand the ﬁxing of accountability for the leaders as regards implementation andmonitoring/evaluation of the recommendations. Subsequent forums willinclude presentation of progress and new recommendations

Annex 2 – Case study: drought and conﬂict in northernKenyaThe pastoral conﬂicts in northern Kenya have been labelled ‘the world’s ﬁrstclimate change conﬂicts’ by some observers and development agencies (ChristianAid 20066However, climate change is – if anything – only part of the story. Thefollowing review of the conﬂicts in the area demonstrates both the dangers of makingquick assumptions about climate change and conﬂict, but also provides examplesof eﬀorts that can help address climate-related land and water conﬂicts.The arid and semi-arid lands of northern Kenya (commonly referred to as ASAL)are among the poorest in the country, and are primarily inhabited by some threemillion pastoralists of various ethnic groupings. In recent years conﬂicts over accessto land and water resources in the region have escalated. The conﬂicts primarilytake place among pastoralist clans, but also involve disputes between pastoralistsand sedentary farmers. The conﬂicts are frequently violent and involve mutualarmed attacks and cattle raids among pastoralist clans. Historically, cattle raidshave been a way of distributing wealth within pastoral communities and a meansof dowry payment and building alliances with other groups. Raids were alsorelated to role of themoran(young warrior), who had to prove himself worthy ofmanhood through participation in cattle raids (Mkutu 2010; 2008; Meier et al.2007; Omolo 2011). However, during the last 25 years, these conﬂicts have beenaggravated due to the increased numbers of small arms which are coming in alongarms ﬂow routes from neighbouring countries (Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan)(Mkutu 2008). Furthermore, outside, often urban-based, actors with commercialinterests in livestock are contributing to the conﬂicts by paying the young men toraid and livestock is no longer kept within the communities (FAO 2001; Meier etal 2007). This has escalated the conﬂicts and produced wider eﬀects, including lossof human life and property, disruption of socioeconomic activities, degradation ofresources, displacement of a substantial number of people across the region7as wellas cross-border clashes between pastoralist groups (Campbell et al. 2009; Mkutu2008; 2010; Omolo 2011; Pkalya et al. 2003).

Root causes of the conﬂictsBehind the conﬂicts are a number of root causes:•Reduction of rangeland.Colonial land appropriation in Kenya was followedby a land allocation process characterised by patronage and corruption amongnon-pastoral political elites. After independence Kenya introduced private landtenure, discriminating against non-settled peoples. Pastoralists were among thelosers in this process, losing access to parts of their former rangelands (Mkutu2008). Recent decades have furthermore seen an expansion of protected areasand sedentary agriculture on pastoral grazing lands. Pastoral and non-pastoralpopulation expansion over the past century has contributed further to reducingavailable grazing land per capita.•Regional marginalisation.Northern Kenya has suffered from economicmarginalisation as both colonial and independent governments have prioritisedother parts of the country with sedentary agriculture on the grounds thatpastoralism was a backward way of life (author interview 2011; Mkutu 2008).Road infrastructure is minimal, there have been few investments in developmentand cattle rearing, and law enforcement and basic security services have not beenprioritised. Political representation from the region in central government hasbeen weak (Campbell et al. 2009).•Politicisation of ethnicity and resource competition.As elsewhere in Kenya, somelocal and national politicians have played a signiﬁcant role in conﬂicts by framingland access as an ethnicity issue in order to generate votes and patronage, wherebyethnic identities are manipulated to serve political agendas. Furthermore,competition for resources is mobilised around ethnicity, which creates mistrustbetween communities (Campbell et al. 2009).•Long-standing rivalries over access to land, water and cattle.While shared grazingarrangements have been common among pastoralist clans, there has also beenhistorical competition and conﬂict between them over the control of naturalresources. As grazing lands have been reduced, these conﬂicts have intensiﬁed.•Commercialisation of raidslinked to foreign markets and the proliferation of smallarms provide additional incentives to engage in cattle raiding (Meier et al. 2007;Mkutu 2010). Young pastoral men are hired and armed by businessmen to raidfor commercial trade and export (FAO 2001). For theMoransfacing increasinglevels of poverty and unemployment, raiding has gained new dimensions as socialrecognition is no longer gained solely from marriage and participation in thelocal community. To prove manhood and pride requires economic means andthe possession of arms (Meier et al. 2007; Mkutu 2010).71

•Inappropriate responses to conﬂicts by government.Government responses tothe conﬂict have typically consisted of reactive, ad hoc deployment of armedsecurity forces in eﬀorts at disarmament without planned eﬀorts at managingor resolving conﬂicts (Mkutu 2008). The authoritarianism of the approach tothese operations and of district government authorities has generated localresentment, a paradoxical increase in arms and has alienated customary conﬂictresolution institutions (Mkutu 2008; Pkalaya et al. 2003). Furthermore, someauthors argue that government oﬃcials are deliberately fuelling conﬂicts to fundpolitical campaigns (USAID 2002). According to Meier et al., “The Kenyangovernment’s neglect or uneven responses to exacerbating pastoral ﬁghting is anindicator of vested interests and should be considered a causal factor in pastoralconﬂict” (2007: 719).The conﬂicts of northern Kenya are, in other words, to a large extent caused by nationaland local governance failures, and unresolved land and water rights. Climate changehas therefore not caused the conﬂicts, but it may be aggravating them:The impacts of drought on conﬂictDrought cycles in Kenya have, in recent years, contracted from once every 9–10 yearsto once every 2–3 years (Campbell et al. 2009), most recently evident in the severedroughts of 2009 and 2011 (Omolo 2011). The causes of the contracted droughtcycles are disputed: while several sources attribute them to climate change, othersrefer to natural weather cycles caused by El Niño.Regardless of their origin, the droughts illustrate how extreme climatic variationmay contribute to existing land and water conﬂicts. The recurring droughtshave led to severe famine in the region, with some studies claiming stock lossesof 80–90% in some communities (Kimenye 2007). Historically, herders haveresorted to outlying grazing areas reserved for droughts and other crisis situations.However, such areas have increasingly become oﬀ-limits or over-exploited as aresult of the general reduction in available grazing land over the past decades.This has prompted herders to extend their search for pastures beyond customaryboundaries, thereby intensifying conﬂict over access to land and water amongclans (Pkalaya et al. 2003).The recurring droughts have, furthermore, prompted herders to employ the traditionalcoping strategy of migrating cattle to other regions of Kenya and beyond the national72

borders to e.g. Ethiopia (Huho et al. 2009; Huho & Mugalavai 2010). In some areasthis has led to conﬂicts with resident farmers or other pastoral herders (Campbellet al. 2009). An opposite trend of incoming herders from the surrounding countriesseeking pasture in Kenya has also been reported, further contributing to conﬂictsin the area.Efforts to address conﬂictA number of initiatives have been launched to address natural resource conﬂicts inKenya in general, and in the northern region speciﬁcally:A National Policy on Peace-building and Conﬂict Management (NPPCM)has beendeveloped, funded through development cooperation and drawn up on the basis ofa national consultative process (Republic of Kenya 2009). The policy addresses theneed for an integrated framework to address conﬂict management and resolution,and emphasises the need to form partnerships for conflict resolution amonggrassroots, traditional institutions, civil society, government, regional organisationsand development partners. The policy is not, however, speciﬁcally linked to climatechange aspects, just as the National Climate Change Response Strategy and othergovernment eﬀorts in climate change are silent on conﬂict prevention and resolutionissues (Campbell et al. 2009).A National Peace Commission (NPC)has been established in Kenya, charged withaddressing conﬂict prevention and resolution within the country in general. Thecommittee acts as an inter-agency body of state and non-state members and partners,including government line agencies, civil society organisations and academics.The committee works to facilitate and coordinate conﬂict management initiatives(Republic of Kenya 2009).Formation and replication of District Peace Committees (DPC) across Kenya.Originallybased on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as theAlfatahcouncils ofelders in Wajir district in northern Kenya in the 1990s the Peace Committees wereformalised into the district level structure across the country following the post-electionviolence of 2007 (Republic of Kenya 2009). In principle they operate at village, divisionand district levels and are charged with coordinating and resolving conﬂicts betweenand within communities, including issues such as grazing, land and water conﬂicts.While memberships vary, the committees typically include representatives from localwomen’s and youth organisations, religious groups, NGOs, local government and73

the district line agencies and administration, and the customary conﬂict resolutioninstitutions (e.g. councils of elders). Problems have included elite capture and genderbias in representation, and a lack of clarity on whether the committees are merelymediators (who facilitate negotiations) or arbitrators (who make judgements) (Adanand Pklaya 2006b). Furthermore, e.g. in Isiolo, the DPCs have been used as politicalplatforms to gain votes, which has hampered their legitimacy in the eyes of thecommunities (author interview 2011). Nevertheless, some Peace Committees havebeen successful in brokering agreements between pastoralist communities over grazingrights, and have in some instances managed to reduce tensions between customary andlocal government and district authorities (Adan & Pkalaya 2006b) Finally, with theprospect of Kenya’s new constitution and the devolution to the county governments,the future mandate of the DPCs is uncertain (author interview 2011).Establishment of Joint Community Conservancies.These consist of communitytrusts established with private sector support to manage and own natural resourceconservancies. While initially focussed on wildlife management, the conservancies haveevolved to include conﬂict resolution in rangeland and natural resource managementmore broadly. Joint grazing committees have been established consisting of elders fromdiﬀerent ethnic groups and clans, charged with establishing and enforcing bylaws inconﬂict-prone shared grazing areas, and resolving conﬂicts and disputes that arise.Where conﬂicts cannot be resolved, a task force sanctioned by traditional authoritiesis brought in to mediate. The joint grazing committees undertake collaborativeconﬂict analysis exercises, and have successfully resolved a number of conﬂicts in thearea, including long-standing ones. Joint land use planning activities are undertaken,and income generation activities have been initiated including tourism and livestockmarketing. Problems have included a lack of involvement of young warriors, who aretypically the key actors in conﬂicts, and development of a conﬂict resolution structurethat is parallel rather than linked to District Peace Committees and local governmenteﬀorts (Campbell et al. 2009; author interview 2011).Climate change predictions for Kenya vary, but recent models predict that theexpected increased rainfall will be oﬀset in the arid and semi-arid areas by increasingevapo-transpiration due to rising temperature. As a result, growing periods and cropproductivity are not expected to increase, and may even decrease in some areas.This has prompted some analysts to conclude that mobility-oriented livelihoodssuch as pastoralism may be the only viable economy in these areas in the future. Aprogramme of development cooperation eﬀorts is currently underway to restorepastoral livelihoods and the cattle economy in the region, including funding fromDanida and other possible development partners.74

ConclusionThe case is noteworthy for the attempts to institutionalise conﬂict prevention andmanagement mechanisms, and for seeking to do so through a nationwide programmeof district level collaborative eﬀorts (the District Peace Committees), supportedby national level policies and fora. Although these national and local institutionalmechanisms are not oriented speciﬁcally towards natural resource management (orindeed towards northern Kenya speciﬁcally) the approach illustrates how conﬂictsthat extend over a large geographical area can be addressed from the national, districtand local levels. The relatively successful approaches associated with joint grazingcommittees in connection to community conservancies illustrate how linkages canbe (re-)established in inter-community conﬂicts, but also how such institutions caneasily be captured by elites and used for political purposes.The experiences with these approaches are, however, still in their early stages, andthe extent to which they are truly successful remains to be seen. Broader governanceissues clearly remain a key factor: critics have complained that the governmentresponse to early warnings of the 2011 famine in northern Kenya and the restof the Horn of Africa was minimal, and that delivery of food aid is plagued bycorruption. This highlights the importance of parallel eﬀorts to address governancemore generally.

The Nile Basin is in many respects an ‘extreme case’ in transboundary watergovernance. It encompasses a greater number of riparian states than any otherriver basin in the world, and is entangled in myriad geopolitical relationshipsthat, in some cases, extend well beyond the basin itself. It is arguably also theriver basin in Africa where intergovernmental tensions have been most severe.Despite this, some progress towards collaboration has been made in recentyears, and the brief description below is focused on the approaches applied inthis respect.Home to the longest river in the world, the Nile Basin covers approximately 10% ofAfrica’s land area and encompasses eleven riparian states populated by 336 millionpeople.8Its source, Lake Victoria, contributes 14% of the river’s water, while mostof the remaining water originates in Ethiopia (Tadesse 2010). The river forms thebackbone of Egypt’s economy, which is entirely reliant on its waters for irrigation andhydropower. Sudan has, to a lesser extent, sought to exploit the river’s hydropowerpotential, while large-scale extensive use of Nile water has historically been relativelyless developed in the countries further upstream.Root causes of the conﬂictEgypt’s all-important reliance on the Nile for food security and energy lies in contrastto its downstream position on the river. Any major development in upstream countriesthat threatens to reduce downstream water quantity and quality is therefore of acuteinterest to the country. Historically, these concerns have also been shared by countriesoutside the region, due to the country’s strategic position in the Middle East. In 1929Egypt and Britain thus signed the Nile Water Agreement which bound all Britishcolonies in the region to refrain from any action that would diminish the volume ofwater reaching Egypt, and allowed Egypt to inspect and veto any upstream plan orproject (Kagwanja 2007). A water allocation ratio between Egypt and Sudan wasincluded in the agreement, revised in 1959 after Sudan’s independence to an allocationratio of the river’s water of 3:1 in favour of Egypt.

The hydro-politics of the Nile Basin have since evolved around the efforts of Egyptand Sudan to maintain influence over the river’s waters vis-à-vis the remainingeight riparian states further upstream. Of the latter, Ethiopia has consistentlyrefuted the agreement and reserved the right to make unilateral claims on Nilewaters, while the remaining countries have since gained independence and areincreasingly laying claim to the basins’ water resources as part of their economicdevelopment process. In the 1970s this led to overt threats of war from Egypton any country that endangered its water supply, and alleged efforts by Egyptto stall development projects in upstream countries through a variety of means,including blocking loans through the ADB (Kagwanja 2007; Tadesse 2010). Thedispute has nevertheless continued. Ethiopia is in the process of constructing anumber of dams on the Blue Nile, despite protests by Egypt that some of thenew dams will reduce water levels downstream as a result of evaporation fromthe reservoir. Meanwhile Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have proceeded withplans to exploit the waters of Lake Victoria, thereby in principle violating the1929 and 1959 treaties.9Efforts to address conﬂictA number of eﬀorts have been made to enhance collaborative management of theNile waters:Bilateral cooperationPreceding multilateral collaboration, a variety of bilateral cooperation activitieshave been undertaken, of which several have been at the initiative of member statesthemselves (Mason 2004; Kagwanja 2007). Examples include:• Uganda–Egypt collaboration on controlling the eﬀects of excessive rains in LakeKyoga (ostensibly caused by El Niño). The rains led to accumulation of islandsof papyrus and water hyacinth, which in turn caused local ﬂooding and blockedthe outﬂow from the lake to the Nile• Egyptian technical and ﬁnancial support to groundwater development in Kenyaand Tanzania, thereby reducing potential future surface water uses• Uganda–Egypt agreement on controlling aquatic weeds in Lake Victoria, whichconstrain local ﬁsheries and increase evapo-transpiration.9

While these and similar projects and agreements have not always been technicallysuccessful, they exemplify tangible interventions that build upon the respectiveinterests of two collaborating countries. They have not, however, been backed by anyoverarching bilateral agreements between the involved countries.Multilateral cooperationMultilateral collaboration in the Nile Basin has proven a far more cumbersomeexercise than the individual bilateral projects and agreements. However, during thelate 1990s and until recently the collaborative eﬀort between the riparian states haveimproved on several fronts. There have been several reasons for this, including astrategic shift by recent Egyptian governments from confrontation to collaborationas a more eﬀective means of inﬂuencing upstream water development (Kagwanja2007; Tadesse 2010). In addition, a variety of regional collaborative eﬀorts paved theway for talks between the riparian states (seeMekonnen 2010). The most prominentmultilateral eﬀort, however, has been the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), funded by awide range of international development partners and initiated from 1999 onwards.This has included:• Establishment of a Nile Council of Ministers, which holds annual meetings atministerial level, and a Technical Advisory Committee which prepares suggestionsfor the former• Negotiations towards the establishment of a Cooperative Framework Agreementwhich sets the principles for a new water sharing agreement in the Nile Basinbased on equitable sharing, and aimed at replacing the temporary NBI with anactual Nile Basin Commission• A ‘Shared Vision Programme’ and a ‘Subsidiary Action Programme’ of speciﬁccollaborative water management activities undertaken throughout the basin atregional, national and (to a lesser extent) local level, including joint hydropowerprojects with shared costs and beneﬁts, collaborative training programmes, jointwater management schemes, etc.• A mechanism for civil society involvement throughout the region known as ‘TheNile Discourse’, facilitated by and engaging NGOs in the basin• Development partners acting as third party facilitators, including the World Bank,UNDP and CIDA.The negotiation process under the NBI has been protracted and suﬀered numeroussetbacks, and has been criticised by observers on a number of fronts, including for atendency to allow for too much ambiguity and ﬂexibility in the negotiation process,78

and insuﬃcient attention to ensuringde factocivil society involvement. Nevertheless,most analysts agree that the NBI has contributed to bringing the collaborative processforward by establishing a regular framework and schedule for negotiation, as opposedto the previously intractable situation (Cascao 2008; Kagwanja 2009; Mekonnen2010; Tadesse 20010. Mason (2004) identiﬁed those approaches in the NBI processthat have been most successful in enhancing cooperation, namely:• Multi-track communication: facilitating and mediating stakeholder dialogueat diﬀerent levels, i.e. ministerial, technical, formal and informal dialoguessimultaneously• Separating joint interests from disagreements and moving ahead on both frontsthrough separate channels and negotiations• ‘Packaging’ beneﬁts, i.e. applying the principle that not all parties had to beneﬁtequally in each individual project, as long as the total sum of beneﬁts fromcombined packages of interventions were felt to be equal• A two-pronged approach that combined negotiation and mediation processeswith simultaneous hands-on implementation of actual projects and programmes,in order to achieve momentum and ‘irreversibility’ of collaboration• Linking public debate to formal negotiation, i.e. identifying key issues and intereststhrough public conferences and civil society hearings, and feeding these intoformal negotiations through mediators and facilitatorsHowever, while these approaches have contributed to breaking the deadlock of earlierdecades (when the involved states were not even able to agree on when or where tomeet), a ﬁrm agreement remains to be approved by all parties, and new developmentshave further complicated matters: the recent droughts in East Africa have aﬀectedfood security and reduced hydropower generation in these countries, thereby addingfurther to the perceived need for further development of irrigation and hydropower tomeet increasing populations and economic development in countries such as Ethiopia,Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi (Tadesse 2010; Kagwanja 2009). At the same timeSaudi Arabia, South Korea and other countries have engaged in substantial landacquisitions in Ethiopia and other riparian states for commercial crop production,thus adding more to the pressure from upstream countries to exploit Nile waters(Brown 2011). The emergence of South Sudan as a new riparian state on the scenehas also complicated matters.Meanwhile, negotiations under the NBI have led to the formulation of a draftCooperative Framework Agreement which provides the premise for a new, more79

equitable, water sharing. While this has now been ratiﬁed by most of the upstreamstates, Egypt and Sudan continued to refuse to do so in 2010, leading to a major crisisin negotiations. However, following the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the temporarynew government has showed renewed interest in further negotiations. Most recently,the upstream states have agreed to delay initiation of the Cooperative FrameworkAgreement in order to engage Egypt and Sudan in a further round of negotiations.ConclusionThe above brief sketch of the Nile Basin Initiative thus illustrates the particularchallenges of addressing intractable conﬂicts where multiple stakeholders andgeopolitical concerns are involved. Nevertheless, several of the dynamics seen herecan be applied equally to conﬂicts at any level: for example, the complicationsfostered by historical precedents, the challenges posed by inequality and the ability ofpowerful parties to defend unequal access rights, and the impacts of global politicalprocesses on the evolution of particular conﬂict and cooperation situations. Suchfeatures emphasise the need to avoid assumptions of ‘quick ﬁxes’ in the resolutionof complex conﬂicts, and the need for a longer term intervention/mediationstrategy which addresses the key underlying factors of conﬂict, and which providesinstitutional frameworks that can accommodate a changing context. Apart fromthis, the fact that the NBI has contributed to at least providing a regularised forumand mechanism for negotiation and cooperation among the parties suggests thatsuch interventions are not necessarily fruitless, even if the process is cumbersomeand long term.