Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

I. Introduction / Context

1.At the Lisbon Summit, the Heads of State and Government mandateda review of NATO’s overall postureindeterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in theevolving international security environment. Over the past year, NATO has undertaken a rigorous analysis ofits deterrence and defence posture. The results of this review are set out below.The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations againstattack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be itsadversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to bethreatened. NATO will ensure that it maintains the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defendagainst any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise. Allies’ goal is tobolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of theAlliance.The review has reinforced Alliance cohesion and the continuing credibility of its posture. The review has alsodemonstrated anew the value of the Alliance’s efforts to influence the international security environment inpositive ways through cooperative security and the contribution that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation can play in achieving its security objectives, objectives that are fully in accord with the purposesand principles of the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO will continue to seek security at thelowest possible level of forces.NATO’s Strategic Concept describes asecurity environmentthat contains a broad and evolving set ofopportunities and challenges to the security of NATO territory and populations. While the threat of conventionalattack against NATO is low, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. The persistence of regional conflictscontinues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance as are increasing defence spending in other parts ofthe world and the acquisition of increasingly advanced capabilities by some emerging powers. Globalisation,emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats, key environmental and resource constraints, including therisk of disruption to energy supplies, and the emergence of new technologies will continue shaping the futuresecurity environment in areas of interest to NATO. A number of vulnerable, weak and failed or failing states,together with the growing capabilities of non-state actors, will continue to be a source of instability andpotential conflict. These factors, alongside existing threats and challenges such as the proliferation of ballisticmissiles and weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and terrorism, will continue to contribute to an unpredictablesecurity environment.The currenteconomic environmentis a challenging one, as evidenced by recent reductions in many Allies’defence budgets and the probability of further cuts. In particular, Allies recognise that the challenge ofmaintaining modern, effective conventional forces is especially acute in an era of limited budgets. Allies arecommitted to the maintenance of the full range of capabilities necessary to meet the Alliance’s level of ambitiondespite these financial difficulties, and are developing innovative approaches to cooperating in the developmentof our capabilities to help achieve this goal.Developments in the strategic environment since the Lisbon Summit and the review itself have confirmed thevalidity of the three essential core tasks identified in the Strategic Concept. We reaffirm our commitment tocollective defence,which remains the cornerstone of our Alliance, tocrisis management,and tocooperativesecurity.A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion, including the transatlantic link, throughan equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens.

II. The Contribution of Nuclear Forces

8.Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defencealongside conventional and missile defence forces. The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear forceposture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.9.The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated areextremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The supremeguarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularlythose of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, whichhave a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.1/4

10.Allies acknowledge the importance of the independent and unilateral negative securityassurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Those assurances guarantee, withoutprejudice to the separate conditions each State has attached to those assurances, including the inherent rightto self-defence as recognised under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that nuclear weapons will not beused or threatened to be used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are party to the Non-ProliferationTreaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Allies further recognise the value thatthese statements can have in seeking to discourage nuclear proliferation. Allies note that the states that haveassigned nuclear weapons to NATO apply to these weapons the assurances they have each offered on anational basis, including the separate conditions each state has attached to these assurances.11.While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, Allies concerned1will ensure that all components of NATO’snuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Thatrequires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planningguidance aligned with 21st century requirements.12.Consistent with our commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weaponsexist, Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to develop concepts for how to ensure thebroadest possible participation of Allies concerned1in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including in caseNATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe.

III. The Contribution of Conventional Forces

13.The Allies’ conventional forces, their effectiveness amplified by the Alliance structures andprocedures that unite them, make indispensable contributions to deterrence of a broad range of threats and todefence. By their nature, they can be employed in a flexible fashion and can provide the Alliance with a rangeof options with which to respond to unforeseen contingencies. They also contribute to providing visibleassurance of NATO’s cohesion as well as the Alliance’s ability and commitment to respond to the securityconcerns of each and every Ally.14.Among their key characteristics, the Allies’ forces must be modern, flexible, and interoperable,capable of meeting a wide range of circumstances, including if necessary high-intensity combat operations.Such forces must be able to successfully conduct and sustain a range of operations forcollective defenceandcrisis response,including at strategic distance. They must be rapidly deployable and sustainable; able tooperate alongside other nations and organisations; and be adaptable enough to respond to unforeseendevelopments. They must also contribute to meeting future security challenges such as cyber attacks,terrorism, the disruption of critical supply lines, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Allies arecommitted to increasing the opportunities for their conventional forces, especially those in the NATO ResponseForce, to train and exercise together and in that way, among others, to strengthen their ability to operate inconcert anywhere on Alliance territory and beyond.15.The bulk of the conventional capabilities that are available now and will be available in the futurefor Alliance operations are provided by the Allies individually; they must therefore provideadequate resourcesfor their military forces so that they will have the required characteristics, notwithstanding current and probablycontinuing financial difficulties.16.Nevertheless, fielding and maintaining the capabilities needed for the full range of Alliancemissions in a period of severebudgetary restrictionsrequires a new conceptual approach, one that places apremium on the identification and pursuit of priorities, multinational cooperation, and specialisation asappropriate, and on increased efforts to ensure that the Allies’ and, as appropriate, our partners forces areinteroperable. The work underway to outline how the Alliance intends to meet its future capabilityrequirements, referred to as NATO Forces 2020, will be key in this context. This package will continue theimportant work ontransformation and reformof Alliance structures and procedures that are already underway,as part of an effective and financially responsible approach to the development of capabilities. This shouldinclude further developing cyber defence capacities and integrating them into Allied structures and procedures.As also stated in the Strategic Concept, it will be important for NATO and the European Union to cooperatemore fully in capability development as agreed, to avoid unnecessary duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.17.Allies’ conventional forces have important roles to play in fosteringcooperative security,including through cooperation and contacts with the armed forces of partner countries. Such activities canhave broader stabilising effects by helping to shape and improve the Alliance’s security environment, projectstability, and prevent conflicts.

the Alliance’s capabilities for deterrence and defence. It will strengthen our collective defence commitmentagainst 21st century threats. In Lisbon, Allies agreed on a missile defence capability that provides full coverageand protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, against the threat posed by theproliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATOsolidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the levelof threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessmentsagreed by the Alliance. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance’s overall defence posture,further strengthen the transatlantic link, and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.19.In Chicago, Heads of State and Government announced that NATO has achieved an InterimCapability for its missile defence. The United States will contribute the European Phased Adaptive Approach toNATO missile defence. Alliance leaders also welcome decisions by individual Allies to contribute to the NATOmissile defence mission, encourage calls for possible additional voluntary contributions by Allies, includingthrough multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities. The Alliance will continue to implement thecommitment made in the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs to build a trulyinteroperable NATO missile defence capability based on the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defencecommand and control network as the enabling backbone.20.Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitutefor them. This capability is purely defensive and is being established in the light of threats from outside theEuro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO’s missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary’splanning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision spacein times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete andenduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces,will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to thesafety and security of our populations.21.NATO missile defence is not oriented against Russia nor does it have the capability to undermineRussia’s strategic deterrent. The Alliance, in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutualconfidence, will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and, in accordance with NATO’s policyof engagement with third states on ballistic missile defence, engage with other relevant states, to be decided ona case-by-case basis.

V. The Contribution of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

22.Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation playan important rolein the achievement ofthe Alliance’s security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on thethreat environment of NATO and therefore affect NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. When successful,they have contributed to more secure, stable and predictable international relations at lower levels of militaryforces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements, and in the case ofdisarmament, through the elimination or prohibition of whole categories of armaments. Existing agreements cutacross almost all aspects of the Alliance’s work. However, they have not yet fully achieved their objectives andthe world continues to face proliferation crises, force concentration problems, and lack of transparency.23.NATO has beeninvolved in a variety of ways,such as the coordination of positions on someconventional arms control issues, and serving as a forum for consultations and exchange of information,including with partners, on disarmament and non-proliferation. In conventional arms control the Alliance hastaken a direct coordinating role in both negotiations and implementation. In other instances regardingdisarmament and non-proliferation, NATO has contributed to raising international awareness.24.The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create theconditions for a worldwithout nuclear weaponsin accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way thatpromotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.25.Allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-buildingideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals onand increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.26.Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readinessof nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Against thisbackground and considering the broader security environment, NATO is prepared to consider further reducingits requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps byRussia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in theEuro-Atlantic area.27.Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to further consider, in the contextof the broader security environment, what NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions toallow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.3/4

VI. Conclusions – Maintaining the “Appropriate Mix” of Capabilities

31.The review of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture has confirmed that NATO must have thefull range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety of its populations and thesecurity of its territory, which is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility. As outlined above, NATO has determinedthat, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development aresound.32.NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missiledefence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept.These capabilities, underpinned by NATO’s integrated Command Structure, offer the strongest guarantee of theAlliance’s security and will ensure that it is able to respond to a variety of challenges and unpredictablecontingencies in a highly complex and evolving international security environment. Allies are resolved todeveloping ways to make their forces more effective by working creatively and adaptively together and withpartners as appropriate to maximise value and strengthen interoperability, so that their forces are better ableto respond to the full range of 21st century security threats, achieving greater security than any one Ally couldattain acting alone.33.Allies are committed to providing the resources needed to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrenceand defence posture remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable, and to implementing the forward-looking package of defence capabilities, which will also be agreed in Chicago. In the course of normal Allianceprocesses, we will revise relevant Alliance policies and strategies to take into account the principles andjudgements in this posture review.34.NATO will continue to adjust its strategy, including with respect to the capabilities and othermeasures required for deterrence and defence, in line with trends in the security environment. In this context,Allies will keep under review the consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security of theacquisition of modern military capabilities in the regions and countries beyond NATO’s borders. This posturereview confirms that the Alliance is committed to maintaining the deterrence and defence capabilities necessaryto ensure its security in an unpredictable world.i.e. all members of the Nuclear Planning Group

I. Introduction / Context

II. The Contribution of Nuclear Forces

III. The Contribution of Conventional Forces

IV. The Contribution of Missile Defence

V. The Contribution of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

VI. Conclusions – Maintaining the “Appropriate Mix” of Capabilities