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COMMENTS of the SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

on the

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED IN 2011
by the
NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

on

CYBER SECURITY*

- 1. **Recognising** the benefits offered by the cyber domain to our societies as well as to the defence and security sector, including opportunities for greater situational awareness and co-ordination among the armed forces of the Allies as well as for the Alliance's public diplomacy;
- 2. But also **concerned** with the emergence of a new category of threats that target national information infrastructures, and that could seriously undermine the security interests of the Alliance and its member states:
- 3. **Anxious** that cyber defence capabilities and awareness of cyber threats vary significantly across NATO member states thereby weakening the Alliance's overall cyber security;
- 4. **Welcoming** the decisions made by the leaders of the Alliance at the NATO Lisbon Summit and the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in June 2011, identifying cyber security as one of the key priorities of the Alliance;
- 5. **Welcoming** the recent start of the procurement process to pursue full operational capability for the new NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, which will result in significantly higher levels of protection of the Alliance's networks;
- 6. **Saluting** NATO's approach aimed at expanding its cyber defence policy to include centralised cyber protection of all NATO bodies and the use of NATO's defence planning processes in the development of the Allies' cyber defence capabilities;
- 7. **Believing** that, in view of the growing scope and severity of cyber attacks, in addition to exploiting fully the opportunities offered by Article 4, the potential application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in case of a serious cyber attack against the Alliance or its individual members, should not be ruled out;
- 8. **Noting** that legislative "black holes" still exist both at a national level and in terms of international law when it comes to setting security standards for the cyber domain;
- 9. **Emphasising** that stricter security regulations for the cyber domain should not come at the cost of reduced civil liberties and rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to communicate over the Internet, and **noting** the key role of the Internet in mobilising democratic movements in authoritarian countries;
- 10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to ensure swift implementation of the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and the related cyber defence Action Plan, adopted in June 2011, introducing the cyber dimension in all three of NATO's core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security;

^{*} Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania.

- b. to promote domestic awareness of cyber threats, taking into account lessons learned from milestone events including the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 and against Georgia in 2008 as well as the emergence of Stuxnet malicious software;
- c. to scrutinize domestic legal frameworks, ensuring that coherent and effective laws are in place to address the evolving cyber threats;
- d. to provide necessary support for the efficient functioning of national Computer Incident Response Teams, and to invest sufficiently in the training of national cyber security experts;
- e. to promote closer partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society organisations in order to ensure the security of government networks and improve the exchange of expertise in case of a breach of security:
- f. to ensure that the introduction of additional security measures in the cyber domain are accompanied by adequate mechanisms of parliamentary and public oversight over their respective government institutions;
- g. to support international efforts to develop universal norms of acceptable behaviour in the cyber domain against the use of cyber attacks on civilian targets, and that would promote exchange of best practices and establish mechanisms of international assistance to stricken nations, while ensuring full universal access to the Internet as a venue for the exchange of ideas and information;
- h. to ensure that adequate attention is paid to the physical protection of networks, including undersea fibre-optic infrastructures;

11. URGES relevant NATO bodies:

- a. to ensure that NATO Computer Incident Response Capability is fully operational by the end of 2012, and that NATO's cyber defence services are centralised;
- b. to facilitate, if requested, national efforts of NATO member states to acquire adequate cyber defence expertise and state-of-the-art technologies;
- c. to test the efficacy of NATO and member states' cyber defence efforts through NATO's periodic international exercises, and to ensure that these exercises are fully funded, staffed and well-attended;
- d. to use capabilities such as NATO Cyber Defence Management Board and NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, to analyse rapid developments further in the cyber domain and to develop strategies for strengthening cyber defences across the Alliance, while exploiting the advantages of the information age through initiatives such as NATO Network Enabled Capability;
- e. to develop further the existing co-operation mechanisms with the relevant EU institutions, with the particular aim of supporting the EU's legislative efforts to establish robust cyber security standards across the private sector;
- f. to increase assistance, if requested, to NATO partner countries in the field of cyber security, particularly by sharing best practices and raising awareness of cyber threats.

on CYBER SECURITY

As was already clearly stated in the Strategic Concept, cyber threats are one of the key challenges that the Alliance is facing today. The global nature of cyber threats requires international cooperation and agreements on common approaches.

In that vein, we welcome the NATO PA's resolution on cyber security, which will contribute to the international efforts under way in other international foras such as the UN and the OSCE.

Since the NATO Summit held in Lisbon, NATO has revised its policy on Cyber Defence, which is now being implemented under an Action Plan. That Action Plan is aimed at further enhancing NATO's Cyber Defence capabilities. An Alliance that is better prepared to defend its own networks and connected Allies' networks that are critical for its core tasks, will also be better prepared to contribute to international efforts to raise overall security in cyber space.

on

SUPPORTING THE LIBYAN PEOPLE*

- 1. **Welcoming** the courage of the Libyan people in overturning the rule of a tyrant;
- 2. **Affirming** its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya;
- 3. **Honouring** the many victims of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism;
- 4. **Lamenting** the loss of innocent lives and specifically **condemning** the violent acts against women and children during the struggle to end Muammar Qaddafi's rule;
- 5. **Condemning** the unlawful killings and violations of human rights committed by both Qaddafi supporters and groups opposed to his regime, as documented by human rights organisations;
- 6. **Recognising** that the Qaddafi regime deliberately undermined Libya's civil society and that this, as well as the recent civil war, will complicate the task of building new governing institutions in that country;
- 7. **Commending** NATO and partner state militaries for the skilled execution of Operation Unified Protector, which saved the lives of thousands of Libyan civilians;
- 8. **Underlining** the political context in which NATO acted, including a mandate from the United Nations Security Council invoking the principle of Responsibility to Protect, clear regional support, and demonstrable need for the Alliance's unique capabilities;
- 9. **Praising** the speed of the international response and the unprecedented co-operation with Arab states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Jordan, and with regional organisations such as the Arab League, before and during operations in Libya;
- 10. **Applauding** the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom to lead this important operation and **recognising** the vital support provided by the United States and other Allies and Partners;
- 11. **Welcoming** the outcome of the high-level meeting on political development and reconstruction in Libya, held in New York on 20 September 2011 under the auspices of the United Nations:
- 12. **Asserting** that the Alliance is most effective operationally when all member states participate to the fullest extent of their capabilities and **stressing** the need to consistently promote maximum political solidarity among member countries during military operations led by the Alliance;
- 13. **Noting** that Operation Unified Protector exposed compelling capability gaps among NATO member states, and **concerned** that dramatic reductions in national defence budgets and the

^{*} Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania.

failure to properly prioritise or find new efficiencies in collective defence spending could erode the Alliance's capacity to manage future crises effectively;

- 14. *Underlining* that the political process should be owned and led by the Libyan people;
- 15. **CONGRATULATES** the Libyan people and the National Transition Council on their hard-won gains;
- 16. **URGES** all parties in Libya, starting with the National Transition Council:
- a. to establish an inclusive and representative transitional governing structure, building on the success of the National Transition Council that will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and improved security in the country;
- b. to work towards a Libya that meets the aspirations of its people, based on democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and civilian control of the military;
- c. to ensure the protection of vulnerable innocents, particularly women and children, during the transition period;
- d. to bring to justice everyone who has committed criminal acts but to refrain from arbitrary score-settling and revenge killing;
- e. to facilitate broader engagement of women in policy-making and institution-building;
- f. to ensure that Libya's treaty responsibilities are fulfilled, that its weapons stockpiles are secured, and that violent extremism is rejected;
- 17. **PLEDGES** its own support where requested and appropriate to the democratic institutions of free Libya as they take these challenging steps forward;
- 18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to ensure that the financial resources and expertise necessary for a rapid and successful stabilisation and reconstruction are available to the Libyan people, as well as for the resettlement of vulnerable refugees;
- b. to study the hard-earned lessons the Libyan conflict has imparted and from these, to undertake those changes that will ensure that NATO is backed by the capabilities and political will necessary to continue to effectively carry out its crisis management responsibilities;
- c. to promote the future co-operation between NATO and Libya by inviting Libya to join the Mediterranean Dialogue Co-operation Programme.

RESOLUTION 388 on SUPPORTING THE LIBYAN PEOPLE

The Libya operation demonstrates the value of the Alliance's efforts since 1994 to reach out to the countries of North Africa and of the Middle East region to dispel misperceptions and contribute to better mutual understanding. These efforts laid the foundations for the operational contributions the Alliance has received from our four MD and ICI regional partners in OUP (Jordan, Morocco, Qatar and the UAE). Their political support has also been essential for the Libya operation, including in the GCC and Arab League Foreign Ministers meetings, where the decision to call for a UNSCR to enforce a NFZ over Libya was taken knowing that it would fall on NATO to implement it.

NATO could, if requested by the new Libyan authorities, assist the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya in the security field. We have an established framework for that, namely the Mediterranean Dialogue, and Libya could be invited to join the MD and develop an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with NATO which focuses on security institution building, if the country so requests.

Distinct from the above, on request, NATO could assist the country in building its armed forces and intelligence forces under civilian oversight. The Alliance could, for example, advise and assist in building a Ministry of Defence, a Joint General Staff and a National Security Agency, promoting best practices in the efficient and accountable management in the security structures of new Libyan Government. NATO's contributions, which will focus on bringing added value to Libya's transition, would be in complementarity with the UN and would be coordinated appropriately with other international institutions such as the EU, AL and OIC.

The NATO Defence Planning Process has already started to incorporate some of the early lessons from the Libyan conflict and will continue to do so as more detailed and comprehensive analyses of the conflict become available. The Report of the Defence Planning Capability Review endorsed by the Defence Ministers in October 2011 has highlighted some capability gaps among NATO members resulting from a preliminary assessment of the operation.

The identification of NATO's requirements for forces and capabilities is currently being carried out as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process and will culminate in the approval of the NATO Minimum Capability Requirement by the end of the year. This will take into account the latest lessons learned from the Libyan conflict.

The NATO Minimum Capability Requirement will be the base for setting targets to NATO and Allies for the development of new and enhanced capabilities necessary to ensure the Alliance can fulfil the full range of its missions to meet NATO's Level of Ambition.

on

CONFRONTING A DIFFICULT FISCAL ENVIRONMENT: ECONOMIC CRISIS, FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND THE RISK OF EUROPE'S STRATEGIC IRRELEVANCE

- 1. **Recognising** that the extraordinarily difficult fiscal conditions European and North American leaders currently confront pose an array of institutional, economic, social and political challenges;
- 2. **Acknowledging** that this fiscal crisis has potentially profound security implications for NATO countries insofar as it undermines their capacity to underwrite the costs of national defence at levels commensurate with traditional measures of security;
- 3. **Concerned** that the international monetary system has grown unstable and that structural budget deficits and rising sovereign debt levels are undermining market confidence and weakening trade:
- 4. **Worried** that slow growth and budgetary constraints undermine global trade and have also triggered unacceptably high levels of unemployment, especially among young people, and that this poses a threat to social cohesion, political stability and wellbeing;
- 5. **Recognising** the political difficulties associated with supporting international development assistance but **convinced** that support for development represents a cost effective security and economic investment:
- 6. **Concerned** that the global economic crisis could adversely affect allied defence budgets at a time when formidable security challenges persist;
- 7. **Worried** as well that some NATO members are shouldering more of the relative defence burden than are others:
- 8. **Recognising** that this burden-sharing dilemma could undermine the solidarity which has long held together this Alliance;
- 9. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to foster greater stability in the international monetary system by introducing and implementing much needed reforms in US and EU member fiscal and social-economic systems and in the international monetary system which remains dangerously unstable;
- b. to ensure that the public understands that even in difficult economic times, investing in security, diplomacy and international development assistance is both worthwhile and in the national interest;
- c. to abstain from making spending cuts at a level that would damage national and international security in this period of fiscal consolidation;

^{*} Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted during the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania.

- d. to undertake greater bilateral and multilateral co-operation on defence research and development, and procurement as well as in force specialisation and integration to generate new efficiencies to counteract the impact of tight fiscal conditions;
- e. to ensure that defence spending is underwriting critical capabilities rather than serving some other purpose like subsidising a particular firm or keeping local employment levels up which are worthy goals best pursued by other means;
- f. to conceive of NATO as a potentially powerful agency of efficiency-generating defence and security co-operation among its members and to encourage the Secretary General of NATO to form three task forces:
 - i. to identify areas in which NATO countries might better co-operate to ensure more efficient use of scarce defence funding;
 - ii. to improve consultation on defence budgeting processes among allied countries and thereby help ensure that defence cuts in any one allied country do not impose undue burdens on any of its allies; and
 - iii. to deepen procurement co-operation;
- g. to implement fully co-operation between NATO and the EU on defence and security matters and to seek new ways to improve this important relationship.

RESOLUTION 389

on

CONFRONTING A DIFFICULT FISCAL ENVIRONMENT: ECONOMIC CRISIS, FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND THE RISK OF EUROPE'S STRATEGIC IRRELEVANCE

We recognise that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 389 embraces some of the greatest concerns and anxieties regarding the stability, cohesion and vitality of the Euro-Atlantic region and NATO member states since the Alliance began.

The continuing debt crisis in the Eurozone, the increasing concern over renewed financial and economic recession in Europe, the fragility of economies on both sides of the Atlantic, together with the wider global economic imbalances and instability in the international monetary system, pose major challenges to the economic, political, social and institutional fabric and security of our democracies.

This ongoing financial and economic instability directly feeds into the fiscal and budgetary constraints facing NATO member states at present and in the medium-term. These constraints threaten to undermine the necessary commitment to defence spending and defence investment that is essential if we are to respond positively to a variety of emerging security challenges and threats. It is indeed vital that we better inform public opinion in member states of the importance of international development assistance and the vital contribution that it makes, along with essential defence spending, to ensuring national and collective security. The Alliance should be equipped with the appropriate resources in order to fulfil its core tasks and to meet its Level of Ambition.

The concern expressed regarding the consequences of inequitable burden-sharing in NATO defence budgets is shared. With the continuing financial and economic crisis and additional pressure being imposed on defence budgets on both sides of the Atlantic, we cannot expect the transatlantic gap to be significantly reduced in the near future. As has been have argued by NATO officials on many occasions, we must pursue a policy of cooperation in smart defence. This requires that we work together with greater flexibility to build security for less money, using multinational and innovative approaches to invest in key areas and to generate critical, deployable capabilities that are vital to sustaining and enhancing NATO's contributions to global security.

The proposal to form three task forces has been duely taken note of. It's been previously explained that the rising cost of military equipment coupled to the defence budget constraints makes it imperative that member states should work in small clusters to combine resources and build capabilities to the benefit of the Alliance overall. On those occasions it has also been pointed out that uncoordinated defence expenditure reductions and the lack of coordinated defence budgetary planning could put Europe's future security at risk. It is also vital to strengthen and develop innovative approaches that will avoid duplication between NATO and the EU and will support the more effective and transparent use of European defence resources and procurement.

on

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA*

- 1. **Supporting** the democratic aspirations and universal rights of all people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and worldwide;
- 2. **Inspired** by the determination and brave actions of peaceful political protestors across the region beginning in December 2010;
- 3. **Appalled** by the violence and brutality deployed by regimes against peaceful protesters, most notably in Libya and Syria, and **deploring** the tragic loss of innocent lives in the struggle for freedom;
- 4. **Acknowledging** the important role played by women in these revolutions and in promoting positive steps in the field of gender equality but **strongly condemning** violence against women;
- 5. **Noting** the diversity of the countries in the region and **recognising** that they will take different paths forward;
- 6. **Underlining** that political changes brought about by these revolutions must be designed and carried out by the people themselves;
- 7. **Welcoming** that Tunisia and Egypt have embarked on a path to democratic governance and will hold elections in 2011 and **stressing** the important role of democratically elected parliaments for the transparency and accountability of government action;
- 8. **Acknowledging** the commencement of the post-Qaddafi era and **welcoming** the stated commitment of the new Libyan transitional authorities towards democracy, the rule of law and respect of fundamental human rights;
- 9. **Stressing** that the countries of the MENA region and the Alliance share a host of security challenges and **fully supporting** NATO's engagement with the countries of the region;
- 10. **Commending** NATO and Partner countries for the success of Operation Unified Protector undertaken in conformity with UN Security Council Resolution 1973;
- 11. **Supporting** the commitment of the Alliance to the promotion of peace and stability in the region and **emphasising** the crucial contribution of NATO partnership programmes, in particular the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative, which can provide important tools in the process of transition;
- 12. **Reiterating** its commitment to dialogue and co-operation with the parliaments of the countries of the region;

^{*} Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania.

- 13. **URGES** the leaders of the MENA region to desist from violence against peaceful demonstrations and to embrace genuine political reform;
- 14. **CONDEMNS** the Syrian regime for its disproportionate use of deadly force against the Syrian people and **DEMANDS** that it puts an immediate end to it and engages in an open, meaningful dialogue with the opposition;
- 15. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to reaffirm their commitment to assist the new democratic governments of the MENA region in providing a secure and stable environment for citizens as they work through challenging political and economic transitions;
- b. to enable NATO to increase its practical assistance to the countries of the region and to enhance its political dialogue with those countries;
- c. to consider the need to rejuvenate and redefine NATO's partnerships with countries of the MENA region;
- d. to ensure for a maximum of co-ordination among the UN, the EU, NATO and other international organisations in assisting the democratic transformation of countries of the MENA region, including through security sector reforms;
- e. to help regulate the area's migration flows by ensuring close co-ordination with national governments and stimulating economic development and employment policies in the region;
- 16. **PLEDGES** to stand ready to provide support, when requested, to new parliamentary bodies during and after the transition period;
- 17. **CALLS UPON** all parties in the MENA region:
- a. to ensure the protection of civilians, particularly women and children, during the transition period;
- b. to engage actively in the promotion of reconciliation processes in civil societies ridden by instability and ethnic or religious conflicts;
- c. to bring perpetrators to justice and ensure due process in compliance with international law and human rights protection standards; and
- d. to facilitate broader engagement of women in the post-revolutionary policy-making and institution-building process.

RESOLUTION 390

on

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

NATO can offer assistance in support of ongoing transitions for all NATO's partners in the region, with a focus on security institutions building, defence transformation, modernisation and capacity development, civil-military relations and transparency, if so requested, using the existing set of cooperation tools and mechanisms.

NATO has already clearly indicated that its approach to supporting transition in North Africa and the Middle East should be coherent with other international efforts, as well as the support offered by individual Allies, and that it should focus on targeted programmes where NATO can add value.

on

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREATS*

- 1. **Concerned** by the potential of biological and chemical weapons to cause mass terror and casualties and to threaten international security and prosperity;
- 2. **Emphasising** the continuing threat posed by non-state actors to engage in terrorism using biological or chemical agents;
- 3. **Appreciating** that rapid advances in the life sciences hold great potential for humanity, but **conscious** that these sciences can also be used for malicious purposes;
- 4. **Stressing** the Alliance's commitments, made in its new Strategic Concept, to further develop its capacity to defend against the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to enhance its capability to detect and defend against international terrorism as well as to contribute actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament;
- 5. **Appreciating** the crucial contributions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to international security;
- 6. **Acknowledging** the contribution of other multilateral and national organisations and initiatives in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, including the 1540 Committee, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group as well as the efforts of the United Nations, NATO and the EU:
- 7. **Convinced** that, in particular, the global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regime for biological weapons is in need of strengthening and **conscious** that the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC in December 2011 provides an important opportunity to strengthen this regime;
- 8. **Mindful also** that future priorities for the CWC and its Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) must be set now in anticipation of the time when declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and agents will have been verifiably destroyed;
- 9. **Concerned** with political instability in states in likely possession of biological or chemical weapons, precursor materials and their means of delivery and with the attending proliferation risks and **stressing** the need to closely monitor these materials;
- 10. **Acknowledging** the necessity of balancing the need for strong and efficient export controls on dual-use technology with the benefits of peaceful scientific and technological exchange;
- 11. **Alarmed** that the capacity to detect and trace biological and chemical incidents as well as crisis response and recovery mechanisms at the local, national and international levels remain inadequate;

^{*} Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania.

- 12. **CALLS UPON** governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to strive towards a stronger web of arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation efforts regarding biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, including improving confidence-building measures;
- to focus on areas of agreement at the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, aiming in particular to consolidate, and possibly strengthen, the Implementation Support Unit at the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, the intersessional process between Review Conferences and the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological weapons;
- c. to resolutely push for universal membership of the BWC and CWC;
- d. to improve counter-terrorism measures at all levels, including enhanced threat analysis, intensified consultation and co-operation with partners as well as more appropriate military capabilities;
- to ensure sufficient availability of defence military capabilities to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons or improvised devices and their means of delivery, to protect against chemical and biological threats and attacks, and to recover in case of chemical and biological contamination;
- f. to foster the implementation of NATO's comprehensive Policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical and biological threats;
- g. to properly fund research and development of detection technology and counter-measures, such as vaccines and drugs, as well as the relevant forensic sciences;
- h. to ensure sufficient availability of counter-measures, such as vaccines and drugs, and to design effective distribution systems under crisis response and recovery mechanisms;
- i. to improve the protection of critical infrastructure against biological or chemical attacks;
- j. to improve co-operation on biological and chemical threats, incident detection, crisis response and recovery mechanisms as well as training and exercises, between civilian and military actors, the public and the private realm as well as states and multilateral organisations, including enhanced NATO-EU co-operation;
- k. to increase biosafety and biosecurity measures at all levels, including through strong and efficient codes of conduct for life scientists, and to encourage and help partners to do likewise;
- to better educate their citizens, in particular those working with dangerous biological or chemical materials, about the risks of biological and chemical terrorism and proper responses in a crisis;
- to continue to support programmes designed to redirect scientists, who were formerly engaged in research and development related to biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, to peaceful activities;

- 13. **CALLS UPON** the United States, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iraq to complete the destruction of their declared chemical weapons stockpiles in a responsible and timely manner;
- 14. **CALLS UPON** non-declared biological and chemical weapons' states to cease and desist such programmes, and, if they have not already, to join the BWC and CWC and declare their holdings;
- 15. **CALLS UPON** all parties in Libya to safeguard all chemical materials declared under the CWC, and to create due conditions for completing their destruction as appropriate.

RESOLUTION 391

on

COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREATS

NATO's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. This policy, alongside with reinforced partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations, is an essential element of NATO's active engagement in enhancing international security through cooperative means.

Therefore, the appeal contained in the Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 391 for intensifying international efforts with a view to diminishing and eliminating the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons, can be fully subscribed to.

NATO Heads of State and Government have emphasized the importance of the two main international legal instruments in this field: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). NATO Allies have always supported their universalization, compliance with and implementation. These Conventions will have important meetings at the end of 2011: the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC which will take place in The Hague from 28 November to 2 December 2011, and the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC to be held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December 2011. NATO will take part as an observer at both events.

The need for universal membership of the CWC and BWC can be particularly emphasized. Universalization of both Conventions will contribute significantly to furthering the non-proliferation and disarmament goals, and strengthening international security globally. We are convinced that NATO Allies will spare no effort for achieving this objective and urge all States that have not already done so, to accede to the Conventions without delay.

Please rest assured you that we are determinedly implementing NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats, and we shall continue our efforts in this field on the basis of the assessment on how NATO can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

DECLARATION 392

on

SUPPORTING TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN*

- 1. **Reaffirming** that 10 years after the tragic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, which were planned by al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, the security of Afghanistan remains directly linked to our own security;
- 2. **Stressing** that the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) plays a critical role in combating terrorism and in preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven for international terrorists;
- 3. **Commending** the performance and dedication of ISAF and Afghan military and civilian personnel and **honouring** those who have lost their lives or have been injured;
- 4. **Welcoming** progress in improving counter-improvised explosive device (IED) technology and capabilities, but **noting** that IEDs remain the greatest single cause of casualties in Afghanistan;
- 5. **Recalling** that ISAF nations have agreed to seek an end to their combat operations by the end of 2014 and have already started the process of transition through which Afghan authorities will take the lead for security throughout Afghanistan;
- 6. **Convinced** that strong military pressure on insurgents remains essential in order to consolidate security gains but also **underlining** that Afghanistan's long-term stability can only be achieved through an Afghan-led political solution; and therefore,
- 7. **Supporting** Afghan authorities' efforts to seek reconciliation with those insurgent groups which vow to respect the Afghan Constitution, including the rights of women, lay down their arms and renounce all links to terrorist organisations; and,
- 8. **Stressing** that a sustainable and irreversible transition will require the continued development of effective and accountable Afghan national security institutions, as well as further demonstrable progress in the fields of governance and economic development;
- 9. **Underlining** that transition plans need to take into account the fact that the planned end of the transition process will coincide with an important presidential election;
- 10. **Emphasising** that international assistance will remain necessary beyond 2014 to guarantee the viability and sustainability of Afghan institutions;
- 11. **Recognising** in particular the need to mitigate the negative impact on the economy of the progressive reduction in the international presence;

^{*} Presented by Hugh Bayley (United Kingdom), Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 10 October 2011, Bucharest, Romania

- 12. **Convinced** that a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan is in the interest of all of its neighbours; and,
- 13. **Recalling** that, in the 2002 Kabul Declaration and other subsequent documents, Afghanistan's neighbours committed themselves to constructive and supportive bilateral relations based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual respect, friendly relations, co-operation and non-interference in each other's internal affairs:
- 14. **Affirming** its support for the ongoing trilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at contributing to develop co-operation between Afghanistan and its regional partners and in this vein **welcoming** the Istanbul Statement on Friendship and Co-operation in the Heart of Asia, adopted at the Istanbul Summit on 26 January 2010;
- 15. **Recognising** and **appreciating** the contribution and sacrifice of the Pakistani authorities and the Pakistani people in combating extremism and seeking to enhance security particularly in the regions bordering Afghanistan;
- 16. **Recognising** that cross-border activity by terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan threatens the security of civilians and military personnel in both countries;
- 17. **Convinced** that the upcoming international conferences in Istanbul and Bonn provide a key opportunity for Afghanistan and its international partners to renew their mutual commitment to a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, and to set the conditions for an irreversible and sustainable transition;
- 18. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and of non-NATO ISAF troop contributing nations:
- a. to enhance efforts to explain to their citizens the ongoing need for an international military presence in Afghanistan and the necessity of sustaining international assistance beyond the planned end of the combat mission in 2014;
- b. to co-ordinate national decisions on troop withdrawals, taking into account enduring operational needs;
- to fill ongoing shortfalls of trainers and mentors for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and reaffirm their readiness to assist in sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014, as part of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership;
- d. to continue to support research and development and the sharing of operational knowledge and experience regarding IEDs as a matter of priority, and to step up training of the ANSF on counter-IED;
- e. to enhance international support for the development and functioning of sustainable structures of governance at the central and local levels able to deliver services to the population;
- f. to continue to increase the share of international assistance delivered through Afghan institutions, conditional upon progress achieved by Afghan authorities in implementing necessary reforms, particularly in anti-corruption;
- g. to increase support for and co-operation with the Afghan parliament;
- h. to seek agreement, at the upcoming Bonn Conference, on enduring economic assistance to Afghanistan, including measures to mitigate the negative impact on the economy of

- progressive reductions in the international presence, and to support the development of sustainable sources of income for the country;
- i. to strengthen political dialogue with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan, as a means to promote regional confidence building;
- 19. **CALLS UPON** the government and parliament of Afghanistan:
- a. to resolve outstanding sources of tension between the executive and legislative branches;
- b. to enhance their efforts to explain the benefits of the international military presence for the Afghan public;
- c. to continue to develop strong accountability mechanisms over the ANSF;
- d. to step up implementation of the ambitious programme of reforms outlined at the 2010 London and Kabul Conferences;
- e. to conduct electoral reform as a matter of priority, addressing the flaws demonstrated by the conduct of the 2009 presidential election and the 2010 parliamentary elections;
- f. to redouble efforts to combat corruption, and protect anti-corruption bodies from political interference;
- g. to favour the integration of Afghan civil society into the country's political and institutional sphere, and the development of independent media;
- 20. **CALLS UPON** the government and parliament of Pakistan:
- a. to continue their efforts to combat terrorism and further enhance operational co-ordination with ISAF and Afghan forces;
- b. to further intensify its co-operation with Afghanistan in seeking a political solution;
- c. to fully support initiatives for regional confidence building, security and co-operation, including efforts to resolve outstanding bilateral disputes;
- d. to further strengthen political dialogue with NATO to complement existing military-to-military co-operation;
- 21. **CALLS UPON** the governments and parliaments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent illegal cross-border movements by terrorists.

DECLARATION 392 on SUPPORTING TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

This is an important declaration which reflects the need for continued commitment in Afghanistan, not only by NATO, but by the wider International Community.

The declaration reflects the progress made in Afghanistan in the last 10 years, and as we prepare to implement the second tranche of the transition process, roughly 50% of the Afghan population now see fellow Afghans in the lead for security in their villages and towns. Against the backdrop of the recent Istanbul Conference for Afghanistan, which added further impetus to efforts towards enhanced regional cooperation, with a particular focus on Afghanistan, the forthcoming Bonn Conference will reinforce progress towards full Afghan ownership, and will establish the key objectives for Afghanistan and international partners in the years to come. This in turn will provide useful inputs for NATO in establishing its future goals for Afghanistan, which will be agreed by heads of State and Government at the 2012 Chicago Summit.

Afghan capacity has increased enormously, largely as a result of the international assistance that has been delivered in recent years. It is essential now to maintain this support: in practical assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces; in maintaining our dialogue with the Afghan government and parliament; and in maintaining the coherence of the overall international effort. Most importantly, the International Community must encourage and support the continued development of Afghan structures, including through robust development and capacity building support, ensuring that corruption is eradicated and that the rights of the Afghan population are respected and protected.

Finally, it is important to recognize that overall success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without the active support of regional stakeholders. Pakistan in particular has a key ongoing role to play in terms of addressing border security issues.