FOU, Alm.del - 2011-12 - Bilag 22: NPA-rapporten: "Finding workable solutions in Afghanistan: The work of the international community in building a functioning economy and society"

“War is always a mixture of different, conflicting stories, depending on whether you are crouchingin a ditch or sipping tea at the presidential palace.”Ahmed Rashid, Journalist“The Afghan War is an exercise in armed nation building and anyone who denies this is simply afool or a liar.”Anthony Cordesman, Defense Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies“It is one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders: quite another to alwayshave to be the fire chief.”Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff“The pessimists fail to understand how badly the Afghan state had failed in 2001 and thus are blindto how much it has improved in many areas -- particularly in economic and political reconstruction.”… “Although Afghanistan remains poor, violent, and poorly governed, it is richer, freer, and saferthan it has been in a generation.”Paul D. Miller, formerdirector for Afghanistan on theUS National Security Council“With all these individual elements of the United States' existing Afghanistan policy in serioustrouble, optimism about the current strategy's ability to meet its objectives reminds one of theWhite Queen's comment inThrough the Looking Glass:'Why, sometimes I've believed as many assix impossible things before breakfast.'”Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, former US Ambassadorto India.1*****

1.Occasionally, in matters of public affairs, serious people with shared values and aspirationswill look at the same problem and come to fundamentally different conclusions about how it shouldbe addressed. Undoubtedly, the war in Afghanistan poses one such problem. Any reviewer ofrecent writings published by an array of senior strategic thinkers will immediately note how variedperspectives are, not only on conditions in that country, but also regarding the policy mix needed toachieve an outcome with which everyone can live. In itself, this is hardly a good sign as it suggestsa fracturing of elite opinion on a matter of fundamental security policy as well as a lowering ofexpectations about the ultimate outcome of that war. In many ways, the war in Afghanistan isbeginning to divide “us”. Some observers suggest that a shroud of pessimism now hangs over adesperately unstable and impoverished country, which is seething with insurgent violence, tribalrivalries, corruption, and drug production. It must also cope with a not entirely coherentinternational presence that often seems out of its depth. Others believe that recent policy changeshave begun to turn the tide. As is so often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere betweenthese divergent outlooks.2.If there is any area of consensus in the Western countries about Afghanistan, it might lie inthe general recognition that fundamental mistakes in Western military and political strategy weremade between 2001 and 2008, and that these are at least partly responsible for the situation inwhich we now find ourselves. Our governments, our alliance, and the international communitycarried out lowest common denominator policies that were overly ambitious in intent, yetpoorly-coordinated, under-resourced, and tactically inappropriate in practice. This ultimately helped1

reopen the door to a Taliban insurgency which mounted over time and which has rendered parts ofthe country virtually ungovernable. In the view of many, these shortcomings have spawned anightmarish policy quandary with military, governance, political, diplomatic, humanitarian,developmental and economic dimensions – all of which now must be addressed through a“comprehensive” approach which, in fact, is an armed nation-building project in all but name.3.It was, however, the collective recognition that serious mistakes have been made and thatthe war effort was failing, that drove recent changes in the international community’s objectivesand tactics. In December 2009, the United States and its coalition partners embarked upon amid-course correction. It included a military and civilian surge of personnel, a counter-insurgencymilitary strategy predicated more largely on civilian protection although counter-terrorism was notabandoned, a significant increase in foreign assistance with a renewed dedication to bettercoordinating this aid and targeting these resources – both financial and human – on institutionalcapacity building. The increase of the Western military presence in Afghanistan wouldhypothetically – and perhaps paradoxically - better prepare Afghan society and its stillunderdeveloped institutions for assuming responsibility for the country’s overall security. At thesame time, however, Western leaders have sought to dampen down expectations. Admonitionsthat nobody should expect the emergence of a Swiss democracy are now frequently made atconferences dedicated to the fate of this country.4.Moderating expectations is especially important now that the United States and its Allieshave announced that they will gradually withdraw troops from Afghanistan. In June 2011, PresidentObama announced plans to withdraw the first 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2011.The remaining 20,000 troops from the 2009 “surge” of forces are to be withdrawn by summer 2012.According to its timetable, the United States aims to hand over the country’s security to Afghanauthorities by the end of 2014.2Shortly after the US decision had been make public, Franceannounced a “progressive” and “proportional” pullout plan, along a timetable roughly similar to thatof the United States. Germany also announced its intention to decrease its presence inAfghanistan, and in early July Canada completed its fighting mission in the country.3Theannounced drawdown, however, comes at a time when the security situation in Afghanistan seemsto be deteriorating. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)the first six months of 2011 saw the highest death toll of Afghan civilians since the start of the war.4In July 2011, shortly before the beginning of the handover, a series of attacks targeting PresidentHamid Karzai’s closest allies, demonstrated the sheer fragility of the security situation inAfghanistan’s. In early August US troops suffered their deadliest day in the history of the decade-long war when the Taliban shot down an American transport helicopter. Thirty US servicemen andeight Afghans died in that attack. These are only some of the latest of a series of setbacks forcoalition forces, whose numbers are set to decline over the coming months.55.It is now also broadly recognised that there will be no purely military solution to the manychallenges Afghanistan confronts. We will likely measure success by improved governinginstitutions so that most citizens recognise the state’s legitimacy; some kind of limitations on stillrampant and highly corrosive corruption; a functioning economy that provides adequate livingstandards to most Afghan people; and improved civilian security, not only from Taliban attacks, butalso the depredations of criminals and particularly certain local warlords-criminals, often allied with2

elements within the government, who have acted with great impunity against the interests of theAfghan people. We will also need to recognise that none of these will likely be fully achieved andthat some of these goals may be contradictory. And, finally, all of this must eventually lead down apath to national reconciliation – a process that would likely involve negotiations with all but themost hardened extremists (such as al-Qaeda and those working closely with it).6.The recognition of past failure has thus helped trigger a more honest and realistic discussionabout the nature of the challenges both ISAF and the Afghan government confronts and themetrics by which we ought to measure success. The good news is that appropriate strategyultimately depends on such honest appraisals; certainly the United States and its allies have nowadjusted their expectations and approach based on a frank assessment of previous policies. Thebad news is that there are many who doubt that even the new strategy has any realistic chance ofsuccess or even that an approach that is so all-encompassing in scope can even be implementedgiven the natural and indeed growing limitations on public funds, political will and actual leveragethat outsiders can exercise over Afghanistan’s traumatized and terribly divided people. Indeed, adebate is already unfolding about what to do should the newstrategiesof NATO/ISAF, the UnitedStates, and the international community broadly fail to yield acceptable results. That we employ theterm “strategies” here is indeed part of the problem. Indeed it is an acknowledgement that thereare still real divisions among the players. NATO member countries no doubt perceive criticalchallenges in working with the Afghan government, other allies, partners, quasi-partners likePakistan and India, rivals like Iran, international organisations and NGO’s. The coalition is nowrelying on many actors to pull the oars in unison. Not only are there many oarsmen in the boat,there are myriad boats in the river. The problem is they are not all headed in the same directionand some likely never will be. This alone suggests that we are moving towards a sub-optimalresolution of the crisis.

7.This report on Afghanistan’s humanitarian and development challenges must begin with therather gloomy observation that defining exactly how development policy fits into the securityequation is still a subject of considerable expert debate, despite the apparent comity among NATOmember states. First of all, some development experts suggest that the term “development” bestnot even be used in a situation of ongoing conflict, as development itself cannot really commenceuntil there is a modicum of stability in place. It is worth rating in this regard that since the Talibanwas overthrown, 90 per cent of the international assistance has gone to the security sector and ofthe remaining 10 per cent, 70 per cent has gone to actors besides the government. This could beone explanation for the failure to develop the capacity in an Afghan state at war.6Normal marketbehaviour is exceedingly rare in the high risk environment of civil war and short-term survivalcalculations tend to predominate over long term vision. Real development requires a degree ofsocial peace.8.Afghanistan’s development challenges are thus formidable, and would be even in peacetime.It is one of the poorest countries in the world and accordingly suffers from some of the world’sworst social indicators. Afghanistan has the world’s highest infant mortality rate, the second highestmaternal mortality rate and is the only country in the world where women have a shorter lifeexpectancy than men. Access to safe drinking water, sanitation, electricity and social services arealso among the lowest in the world. The literacy rate is under 30 per cent and only 25 per cent of6

rural children go to school. Afghanistan occupies the second to last slot on TransparencyInternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and suffers extremely high levels of violence,pervasive human rights violations and gender discrimination. It is also extraordinarily vulnerable tonatural disaster because it has virtually no risk mitigating institutions, policies and infrastructure inplace. The country is landlocked and its access to world markets is limited by the lack oftransportation links and a pervasive climate of insecurity.79.The absence of security is casting a dark shadow over Afghanistan’s longer-termdevelopment prospects. It is currently the world’s only complex emergency where virtually all majornational donors are also belligerents in the conflict. This creates a unique set of challenges for thecountry, for donors and for the international community more broadly. Not coincidentally, this waris also the only complex emergency where the UN’s Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA) cannot negotiate with both sides in the conflict. Insurgents now link the UN directlywith ISAF and thus treat it and its employees as enemies. The perceived link between the UN andISAF has thus made it very difficult for the UN to play its humanitarian function. In contrast, theInternational Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has managed to keep open channels withinsurgent groups, but this is because it has rigorously adhered to its neutrality principles. TheWorld Health Organization (WHO) has relied on the ICRC’s channels to conduct successfulimmunization campaigns throughout the country. This is one of the most impressive humanitarianadvances in recent years.10. Over the decade of the crisis, there has also been a tendency to categorize Afghanistan as apost-conflict society when this was not at all the case. OCHA was closed down in 2002 for this veryreason and was only re-opened again in 2009 when it became very apparent that the conflict inAfghanistan had worsened. OCHA has consequently been hampered by a lack of contacts on theground and scarce data on the depth and breadth of the humanitarian crisis.8It is now working tocatch up.11.•••••Humanitarian groups generally operate under the following five core principles of neutrality.The principle of humanity is the commitment to save lives, alleviate human suffering, anduphold human dignity.The principle of the humanitarian imperative is the right for the international community toprovide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed.The principle of independence is the freedom of humanitarian organisations from politicalgoals or ideologies. NGOs make their own decisions, programme plans and strategies.The principle of impartiality is the distribution of goods and services regardless of the identityof those suffering.The principle of neutrality is the commitment humanitarian NGOs make to not take sides inpolitical or military struggles.9

the development game. This is making life particularly difficult for genuine development agenciesoperating in the country. The ICRC recently warned that access for humanitarian workers inAfghanistan was at its lowest level in 30 years.10Yet, NATO, the governments in the coalition andthe UNAMA are all calling for greater co-ordination among the military, developmental andhumanitarian missions.11This is a genuine contradiction and it is too frequently swept under thecarpet rather than openly discussed.13. To cope with the problem, OCHA is now working to expand the space for humanitarianoperations. There are indications that some elements in the Taliban may be more accommodatingon this front. One suggestion is that both sides ought to adopt humanitarian confidence-buildingmeasures which would be of immediate benefit to the most vulnerable people. The Afghan Ministryof Health has also recognised the need to engage with the armed opposition to ensure the successof immunization campaigns. Here, too, the Taliban has recently shown more flexibility. Advanceshere could help pave the way for a broader dialogue which many believe will ultimately benecessary to end this war.14. Many parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan have experienced heavy fighting in recentyears. Civilians in those regions are necessarily more focused on survival than engaging in thekind of economic behaviour that might lead to sustained economic growth and development.Simply put, highly traumatized people are not in a position to invest in their future. MoreoverTaliban occupation has essentially cut off some of these lands and people from most of theinternational community. Because of the conflict’s intensity, humanitarian and developmentworkers are increasingly constrained in their movements throughout much of the country. TheTaliban and other insurgent groups have killed hundreds of these brave workers in recent years,and this has seriously limited their mobility; such attacks dramatically reduce the space in whichthey can operate.12Increasingly compelled to hunker down behind blast walls in Kabul and othercities, the international development community now finds it very difficult to operate in the field andto undertake the kinds of projects that would be possible in an atmosphere of greater peace andstability. They are expending scarce resources on self-protection rather than providing assistance,and much of the field work can only be carried out by local staff.13In recent years, moreover, thearea of insecurity has increased. Taliban infiltration into the northern and western reaches of thecountry, where coalition forces are far less concentrated, has unsettled areas which werepreviously assumed to be stable, beyond the reach of the insurgency, and embarked upon asustainable development path. Taliban fighters have also swarmed into cities like Kandahar wherethey have run intimidation campaigns to discourage citizens from collaborating with local ornational government authorities.1415. Sustained economic and social development also requires reasonably reliable stateinstitutions, a minimum level of government capacity, adequate judicial and policing structures, andsome kind of capacity to limit corruption. Afghanistan has enjoyed none of these over the past30 years. According to National Defense University (NDU)’s Paul D. Miller, under Talibanstewardship, Afghanistan suffered “Somalian-like anarchy, Haitian poverty, Congolese institutions,Balkan fractiousness, and a North Korean-style government.” Certainly there have been someimprovements since the overthrow of the desperately dysfunctional and cruel Taliban regime. Thequestion today is if these have been sufficient to foster security and loyalty to the Afghan state. Sofar, the answer to that question is “no”, although conditions are generally better in most of thecountry than they were during the years of Taliban rule. That said, some Afghans are looking at theyears of Taliban rule with ascertain nostalgia for the so-called order that they imposed. That initself is a sign that governance must be improved. It is not surprising that the Taliban frequently1011121314

trumpets its own incorruptibility and the blind, harsh frontier justice administered by its Shariacourts in Taliban controlled regions.16. NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan has most recently been premised on the notion of “shape,clear, hold, and build”. In a few words, this sequential approach to the challenge implies that thecoalition must shape the field of military engagement, clear insurgents from the area in question,hold that area and prevent it from falling prey to infiltration and then begin the process ofreconstruction and development.15It is a strategy recognizing that genuine development is notpossible until security has been established, but it also acknowledges that consolidating securityultimately does require reconstruction and development. Of course, security demands far morethan this. It also needs a functioning state that can earn a modicum of legitimacy for itself. Thechallenge for Afghanistan is not only its clear lack of governmental capacity, but also that it mustbuild this capacity in parallel with what has become, in effect, a civil war, which is imposing otherburdens on its scant capacity. The current strategy takes into account the fact that the“interconnectedness” between military and non-military facets of the challenge and thus lays out forthe alliance a Herculean task of constructing a context for self-sustaining security in afundamentally insecure region of the world.17. Increasingly though, voices from the US strategic community are putting forth the idea thatambitions need to be reduced radically. Ambassador Robert Blackwill, the former NationalSecurity Council Deputy for Iraq under President Bush, has recently advocated an outright ISAFretreat from Pashtun regions because he believes the war there is unwinnable. He argues thatNATO ought to focus instead on defending the North and the West of the country while making it atop priority to improve governance and institutions in those regions and in Kabul itself so that thestate does not succumb to an insurgency rooted in deep frustration. He also notes that “you areonly as good as the government you are supporting” and adds that the Afghan government isadministering a “gangster state.”16ISAF has, in fact, retreated from some of the more exposed andisolated valleys in these regions in order to defend population centres but there is no indication thatcoalition leaders are prepared to follow Blackwill’s suggestions, which are certainly controversial.Ahmed Rashid, among others, has suggested that no Afghan would accept the division of theircountry and that any attempt to allow ade factodivision would lead to massive bloodshed andinstability.17Many of the other critics simply suggest that ultimately Afghanistan itself must work outits own fate as western intervention only engenders negative reactions.1818. Nation-building occurs most successfully when it is the culmination of a long series ofdiscrete historic advances that together forge both a national consciousness and an institutionaland governmental framework tightly bound to an emerging national identity. What is beingattempted in Afghanistan is armed nation-building in which external actors of all kinds aspire toplay a galvanizing role and domestic players pursue a range of conflicting agendas. This is posinga daunting array of problems that developed democracies, like the United Kingdom, for example,had centuries to work out. In Afghanistan’s case, time is a luxury which neither the government northe international community enjoys. Indeed, the clock is ticking; 2014 is right around the corner andthere are no guarantees whatsoever that the situation on the field of battle and in the halls ofAfghan government will conform to NATO timelines.

19.The idea that development can not really begin without some modicum of stability hasbecome a central axiom of the development community operating in Afghanistan and in otherconflicted areas of the world. The war there has taken a turn for the worse since 2005 and this hasengendered a high degree of pessimism among development specialists. The NATO-led coalition,of course, has sought to address the problem. On 1 December 2009, The US Presidentannounced that an additional 30,000 US troops would be deployed to Afghanistan in 2010 and thatpopulation protection would be a top priority for the mission.19This represented a repudiation of the“light footprint” approach that had focused the military effort on anti-terrorism and essentially under-resourced capacity building and governance efforts, something that USAID all but admitted in a2007 review of its own efforts. The war in Iraq had drawn US resources and military power to theMiddle East. The Afghan theatre was meanwhile put on the back burner. Although the lightfootprint was essentially conditioned by the US’s onerous obligations in Iraq, it proved utterlyinsufficient to the task of building security in Afghanistan. Indeed, it could not even uphold theexisting security status quo.20. Over the past five years, insurgents managed to broaden their area of operations,challenging central and local government authority, establishing regional shadow governments andcourt systems and undermining the general security climate. Insurgents are also engaging in arange of criminal activities, attacking local leaders and those seen as collaborating with thegovernment and the coalition. They destroy government buildings and schools and are responsiblefor serious human rights violations including summary executions, kidnapping, child recruitmentand sexual abuse.20The NATO effort was also troubled and had difficulties adjusting to changingconditions on the ground. Coalition operations were hardly unified as so many national forces weresubject to mission caveats as to render the broader effort incoherent and often counter-productive.Rotation schedules often moved troops out of theatre just as they were coming to understandbattlefield conditions, local mores and the nature of the collective challenge.21.The problems, of course, were not simply military in nature. The notion of a light footprintwas partly a euphemism to obfuscate the lack of funding and political will to underwrite institutionalreinforcement in the country. The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, an NGO, suggested in2006 that public administration reform had been “cosmetic with superficial restructuring ofministries and an emphasis on higher pay rather than fundamental change.”21At one point, theAfghan government had, for example, estimated that it would cost $600 million to implement itsNational Justice Sector Strategy; yet, by the end of 2006 donors had only provided $38 million intotal to underwrite that effort. This was emblematic of the international community’s lack ofcommitment. This failure of imagination and political will created an opening for the Taliban which itfully exploited after 2005. The security situation in the country deteriorated steadily as a result.22.To its credit the Alliance has recognised the mistake and the coalition is now seeking toremedy the problem. President Obama announced a military and civilian surge soon after takingoffice and, at the NATO Lisbon Summit in December 2010, allies committed themselves to helpingposition the Afghanistan state, its military and its police to assume ever greater roles in defendingnational security with the goal of helping it assume full control in 2014. Additionally, US officialshave let it be known that they are prepared to keep troops in the country beyond then if necessary,signalling that the US commitment is a long-term one. They have also suggested that the promised

drawdown, which began in July 2011, may be much smaller than originally thought.22The fiscalcrisis in the United States and Europe, however, could well change the views of NATOgovernments, which are under increasing pressure to find budget savings.23. Over the short-term, the troop surge is intended to provide the security space needed to helpAfghan authorities reinforce governmental institutions while bolstering the state’s capacity to meetits own security and economic requirements. The goal is to better position the Afghan state toassume ever greater responsibilities over the course of the announced “transition”. In someprovinces, the transfer of leadership to Afghan hands is slated to start in early 2011 while AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) should ideally exercise full control of Afghan territorial security bythe end of 2014. The Afghan Army is slated to number approximately 300,000 by the end of 2011.Their operational capabilities and sustainability in the field, however, remain a serious concernalthough progress has been made in building a coherent and ready force.23The problem is that thesecurity situation in the country remains very tenuous, and the question is whether by 2014 Afghanforces will be prepared to play the leading role in the war with support from coalition forces, whichis a direct reversal of the manner in which the war has so far been conducted.24. Currently, 48 countries are contributing to the international community’s presence inAfghanistan. ISAF’s total strength amounts to approximately 132,381 troops. The United Statescurrently has deployed 90,000 troops, the United Kingdom 9,500, Germany 4,812, France 3,935,Italy 3,880, Canada 2,922 and Poland 2,560. Twenty seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRTs), units that perhaps best symbolize the integration between the security and developmentmission of ISAF, are operating throughout the country. The new line of argument is that in a warentering its tenth year, the United States and its allies in Afghanistan are finally dedicating theresources to put the Afghan state on a solid and secure foundation. In early 2010,General Petraeus, the then commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, claimed to havethe military forces, intelligence assets and civilian programmes needed to conduct acomprehensive and successful counter-insurgency campaign. This was not necessarily hearteninggiven that the war is entering its tenth year, there is now however an explicit recognition thatserious mistakes were made in the early years of the conflict.24Petraeus had pointed to theimproved security situation in and around Kabul, and recent progress in gaining and holdingground in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.25. US Special Forces are also conducting missions targeting insurgent commanders on bothsides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The May 2ndraid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound inAbbottabad, Pakistan, pointed to potential benefits of these operations. At the same time,however, coalition casualty figures are still substantial, suggesting that the level of violenceremains very high.25In the worlds of one analysts, there is still “a fully active insurgency not only allover the country but also along the whole spectrum of insurgent activities, from terrorist attacksand guerrilla activities to the political and shadow governance dimension [...].The bottom line is thatit is very difficult to assess the local successes that NATO talks about and, at a broader level,results are still, at best, mixed and open to interpretation. Whether conditions on the ground areimproving or deteriorating, one thing is quite clear: the war has not substantially changed and isstill going on.”26

26. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan has also dedicated far more resources andmanpower to train up Afghan soldiers and police. The expectation in NATO circles is that thisserious effort will help Afghan leaders both assume ever greater responsibility for their country’sinternal and external security and take full control by 2014. The general consensus, however, isthat the military is much further along in its transition than are the police. The latter are beset bycorruption and illiteracy and their predatory practices have done a great deal to undermine the ruleof law and respect for the state in the country. Correcting this serious deficiency is itself a majordevelopment challenge as the low level of literacy among the police as well as the questionableloyalties of some in the police simply reflects a broader social-capacity problem as well as politicaland tribal fragmentation in Afghanistan.27. There have already been some tentative signs of success with the new approach. ISAFforces with their Afghan counterparts have pushed into Taliban strongholds in the south, includingregions east of Kandahar. Rather than abandoning these forward positions, they are now diggingin at strategic points to prevent any re-infiltration of insurgent fighters. The expectation is that thereturn to stability behind these defensive lines will allow a degree of economic development tounfold. Greater stability and a modicum of economic activity will then help turn opinion in theseregions against the insurgents. An effort is accordingly underway to bolster assistance in liberatedregions and provide compensation for those who have suffered property damage due to combat. A“cash for work” programme has also begun in these largely Pashtun zones, but they have sprungup throughout the country. In Balakh and Jawjan provinces the European Commission’sHumanitarian Aid Office supports the Action Aid’s Cash for Work programme. In Kunar province -the Kunar PRT runs the Cash for Work programme in the region, which is funded by theCommander’s Emergency Response Programme. USAID is also administering Cash for Workprogrammes in the country.28. Nevertheless, according to the latest International Crisis Group (ICG) Report on Aid andConflict in Afghanistan, despite billions of dollars invested in aid, Afghan state institutions remainfragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of thepopulation or guarantee human security. The Report also maintains that despite progress in thesouthern theatre (or because of it), insurgency is spreading into areas, which were previouslyconsidered relatively safe.29. Pakistan remains an integral part of the puzzle but co-operation with that key country hasbeen extremely difficult, even more so since the US special forces killed Osama Bin Laden onPakistan territory. Pakistan continues to harbour Taliban and its military was extremely unhappythat the Obama Administration chose to act unilaterally in the operation against Bin Laden. TheAdministration could not be confident that elements in the Pakistani intelligence and militarycommunities could be trusted to support that operation and there was a potential that Bin Ladenwould have been tipped off before the operation were actually launched. In any case, that decisionhas adversely effected co-operation with Pakistan. Sanctuaries in Pakistan’s remote tribal regionsalong the Afghan border constitute a persistent problem, and no transition will be possible if theAfghan government is unable to enhance its effectiveness and if elements within the state ofPakistan continue to urge the Taliban to resist overtures for dialogue with the government inKabul.27That will not be easy; it is not even clear that the Pakistani military is capable of controllingits borderlands with Afghanistan as its troop strength has always been so concentrated along theborderlands with India.2827

30. Since Pakistan made the decision to support the United States and NATO in the war inAfghanistan, at least nominally, the key supply route (delivering both lethal and non-lethal items)has been running through its territory. Up to 700 large trucks travel from the Karachi port throughthe Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. Due to growing insurgency on the Pakistani-Afghani boarder aswell as attempts by the Pakistani government to use the route as a bargaining chip, in 2006 ISAFstarted negotiating other possible supply routes with Afghan’s neighbours. Two years later, theNorthern Distribution Network (NDN) was established – a new supply route starting either in Latviaor Georgia, continuing through Russia and crossing one of the Central Asian states bordering thenorth of Afghanistan. So far, the route has only been used for transporting non-lethal items.29Thisarrangement might, need to be re-negotiated in the near future should relations with Pakistancontinue to deteriorate.31. The security situation in Afghanistan thus remains very worrisome. Both combatant andnon-combatant casualties reached record numbers in 2010. According to the Afghan Ministry ofInterior, 6,716 security incidents, including ambushes, roadside bombings, suicide bombings androcket attacks were registered in 2010.30That same year, approximately 2,421 Afghan civilianswere killed and over 3,270 were injured (on average 6-7 civilians killed daily and 8-9 wounded) asa result of the deteriorating security situation throughout the country.31Afghanistan’s ArmedOpposition Groups (AOGs - Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani Group) caused most of thesedeaths (63 per cent), 21 per cent were attributed to US/NATO operations; and 12 per cent ofdeaths were attributed to Afghan government troops and their local militia allies. According to theUN, insurgents’ attacks rose by 66 per cent in 201032; and the number of civilian casualties jumped20 per cent from 200933. Coalition military fatalities in Afghanistan have also risen from 295 in2008, to 521 in 2009 and to 711 in 2010.3432. As many as 380 coalition troops have been killed during the first eight months of 2011,suggesting that the battle is far from won.35According to UNAMA’s Midyear Report on Protectionof Civilians in Armed Conflict, 1,462 civilian deaths were documented within the first six months of2011, which represents 15 per cent increase in comparison to the same period in 2010.36Moreover according to the United Nations refugee agency, an estimated 150,000 Afghans weredisplaced over the past year, a 68 per cent increase compared to the previous year. In all there areroughly 437,810 displaced Afghans now living in the country.37These displaced and oftendesperate people are a recruiting target the Taliban. Finally, the number of attacks on UN workersjumped 133 per cent in 2010, and at least 100 aid workers were killed in Afghanistan during 2010,the most ever in that conflict.38Most of the victims worked for aid contractors employed by NATOcountries, with fewer victims among traditional non-profit aid groups.3929

Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and the Afghan Insurgency,”Al Arabiya,20 July 2011,http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/20/158541.html.Michelle Nichols and Hamid Shalizi, “Afghan Violence in 2010 Kills Thousands: Government,”Reuters,3 January 2011.Afghanistan Rights Monitor,ARM Annual Report on Civilian Casualties of WarJanuary-December 2010Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.N. Maps Out Afghan Security,”The Wall Street Journal,26 December 2010.Nichols and Shalizi, “Afghan Violence in 2010 Kills Thousands: Government.”Icasualties.org,Operation Enduring Freedom(2011).Icasualties.com,Coalition Deaths by Year(2011),http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx.UNAMA,Afghanistan: Midyear Report 2011 – Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2011(Kabul:UNAMA, July 2011).Jack Healy, “In Afghanistan, a Village is a Model of Dashed Hopes,”The New York Times,9 August 2011.Rod Nordland, “Killing of Afghan Relief Workers Stirs Debate,”The New York Times,13 December 2010.Nordland, “Killing of Afghan Relief Workers Stirs Debate;” and Holly Fox, David Levitz and MartinKeuebler, “Merkel Condemns Deadly Attack on German Aid Worker in Afghanistan,”Deutsche Welle,25 December 2010,http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14735707,00.html.

33. There has also been increasingly sharp criticism of the practice of using armed forces as aidadministrators. Although winning hearts and minds is an admirable political objective, militaries arelargely structured and trained for achieving “kinetic” solutions. Militaries may have glossy andhighly optimistic PowerPoint briefings about their developmental missions, but they are generallynot structured to carry those out successfully,40although they can and do make criticalcontributions when responding to humanitarian emergencies. The Western militaries are nowplaying a leading role in Afghanistan policy formation and implementation, and this has led it intothe realm of development assistance.41NATO countries need to think more rigorously about thistrend because of the military’s low capacity in these specialised sectors.34. The US military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program, for example accordsbattalion level commanders the power to use development assistance and aid in theircounter-insurgency efforts. This programme has recently come under fire. The US government’sown reports suggest that many of the 16,000 humanitarian projects implemented over the last 6years quickly fell into a state of neglect after they passed on to Afghan control, suggesting thatscant attention was paid to project sustainability. The Afghans had serious problems maintaininghalf of the 69 projects reviewed in Eastern Lagham province according to a special inspector’sreport. The US government Accountability Office has cited a lack of monitoring by the Pentagon,particularly once projects are turned over to the Afghans. This violates good development practiceand it threatens to engender resentment and disdain rather than legitimacy and support for thestate and for western troops.42A recent Oxfam report has strongly asserted that far too much aid isbeing channelled through military forces and that such aid tends to focus on quick fixes in an effortto win hearts and minds rather than on producing long-term transformative results. In 2007 Afghanauthorities estimated that international military forces had by then delivered $1.7 billion ofdevelopment and humanitarian aid. Much of this support has been channelled through the27 PRTs, the Combined Security Transitional Command for Afghanistan and the Commanders’Emergency Response Program.43Oxfam and other NGOs also take umbrage at the notion that aidis, as one US military handbook suggest, “a non-lethal weapon”. This implies a degree ofpoliticization and indeed militarization that can easily backfire. Moreover, it threatens to unwittinglycast development workers in the role of quasi-belligerents.35. Non-Afghans, and particularly those with a military rather than development training, are notwell-positioned to judge what kinds of projects are locally sustainable. Foreign military donorperspectives are often clouded by notions of what might be sustainable in their own countries orwhat project might purchase a short-term military advantage rather than contribute to long-termdevelopmental benefits. This is precisely why genuine Afghan input and administration is essential,even if this poses other kinds of problems including the perennial risk of corruption and strains onthe country’s limited human and financial capacity.36. To be fair, even experienced development agencies are also having problems inAfghanistan. The United States has spent an estimated US$732 million to improve Afghanistan’selectrical grid since 2002. The $300 million Kabul generating plant may not function at capacitysimply because the central government cannot afford the diesel fuel needed to operate it. Lastyear, USAID’s inspector general said delays and contracting problems at the project had costnearly $40 million, out of the total expenditure of $300 million. The Kabul plant is often idle ascurrent prices for diesel fuel trucked into a war zone have driven its operating costs to roughly40 cents per kilowatt-hour, as compared to 6 cents that a kilowatt-hour imported over transmission4041

lines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan.44Cultural blind spots and lack of familiarity withthe country’s geology also pose problems. Some newly constructed villages for refugees, financedby donor nations and the UN, have been located far from water sources and these homes have notbeen surrounded by walls. This makes it difficult for women to go outside due to prevailing culturalmores so different from those of the West.45Again these problems raise compelling questionsabout project sustainability and cultural as well as economical appropriateness.46These failureshave political costs.37. Delays and rising costs have undermined many development projects due, in part, to pooroversight and planning as well as the country’s lack of security and corruption, according to the USOffice of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, which unfortunately, wasonly created in 2008. There are also problems with private contractors, many of which areoperating on a strictly for profit basis and which are structured to maximize their own profit, not toensure the development impact of their work. In tough wartime conditions, contracts are oftenrewarded on a no-bid basis and this lack of competition only exacerbates project cost overruns.

38. Despite the billions of dollars that have been poured into Afghanistan in recent years, itremains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income estimated at $500 ayear. Growth in the country has fluctuated wildly in recent years, ranging from 3 per cent in2008/09 to 21 per cent the following year. This particular increase was driven by record harvests, aboom in the service sector and foreign aid. Inflation has risen from 5 per cent in 2010 to18.4 per cent in January 2011 as a result of soaring food prices and loose monetary policy.39. Between 2006 and 2008, government revenues, at 8 per cent of GNP, were among thelowest in the world. This figure had risen to 11 per cent in 2010/11 due, in part to improved taxcollection, but government spending stands at 20 per cent of GNP and the gap has been made upby aid - one of many indications that the state is not yet operating in a sustainable fashion. Publicenterprise reforms have advanced only slowly, and a run on the banks precipitated by overtcorruption has undermined market confidence.4740. The weakness of the Afghan economy is tightly bound to the security situation and to theexceedingly low capacity of the state. NATO new strategy hinges on the transition of responsibilityto Afghanistan for its own security by 2014, implying that the state’s capacity will have to increasesubstantially. In many respects, this may be a greater challenge than the military mission ofclearing Taliban forces from their positions in the Pashtun regions of the country. The announcedtimeframe has precipitated an effort by the UNAMA to ensure that multilateral and bilateral aid isboth far better aligned with Afghan priorities and structured to help the state shoulder ever greaterburdens and responsibilities. Another Bonn conference is scheduled for November 2011 togenerate new revenues to support this effort.41. Among the reasons most often cited for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan hasbeen the exceedingly slow process in strengthening governing institutions and ensuring somedegree of accountability to the citizens they serve. Patronage and corruption are clearly the coin ofthe Afghan realm, but they are also a source of serious public alienation and anger both inAfghanistan and among tax payers in coalition countries. In Afghanistan itself, the state is444546

increasingly perceived with both hostility and fear. Corrupt officials operate at every level, thejustice system is bordering on the dysfunctional, police are poorly trained and paid, often illiterate,widely perceived as highly corrupt and are generally both loathed and feared. Their poorperformance and parasitic behaviour has done much to undermine loyalty to the state.42. The problem of poor governance is both a manifestation of under development and ahindrance to progress. It is also a problem exacerbated by Afghanistan’s tribal divisions andgovernment efforts to transcend them. In an effort to extend its reach, the government hasco-opted regional warlords, some of whom double as drug kingpins and smugglers, sometimes bygranting them senior positions in the government. From their newly-won governmental perches,these figures are able to expand their reach and run criminal operations and private armies withimpunity while tapping into public funds for their private benefit. Their approach to “government”,however, undermines the rule of law, the national justice system and security. Kabul itself isoverrun with the palaces of narco-kingpins, warlords and corrupt officials who typically plough theirprofits into local real estate markets rather than investing in productive industries. Their garishpalaces are widely seen as symbols of official decadence and a betrayal of the public trust.43. Undoubtedly, stolen aid money has helped line the pockets of some of these operators.Indeed, the lack of accountability and transparency within the Afghan state has made this country aparadise for rent seekers of all kinds. Corrupt officials are able to skim resources at all levels ofofficial transactions – undermining the effectiveness of the state, angering donors, and poisoningthe state’s reputation with the Afghan people and donor country tax-payers. This has had a seriesof negative effects. One is that it encourages donors to employ non-Afghan contractors to carry outlocal projects – a practice that obviously limits the developmental impact of these projects. Westerncontractors invariably lack the local knowledge to make culturally sensitive and economically viabledecisions. Their motivations, moreover, are profit not development-driven and their earnings areinvariably repatriated, which again lowers the multiplier effect of international assistance. Finally,relying on foreign contractors means that fewer locals are trained up to administer and carry outsuch projects. Relying on Western firms is thus a paradoxical response to the lack of capacity butit also perpetuates the problem in country.44. In response to this paradox, the international community has pushed for more localengagement in development projects while encouraging donors to work through the Afghan statebudget in accordance with the priorities laid out in the Afghan National Development Strategy(ANDS). That strategy lays out three priority areas in the development agenda: 1) governance,peace and stability, 2) sustainable livelihoods, and, 3) basic social services underpinned by issueslike human rights, gender equality, environment, mine action and counter-narcotics.48The idea isthat channelling aid through the state budget allows the Afghans themselves to establishdevelopment priorities which they see as most appropriate to their long-term needs. It theoreticallyalso provides them the means to carry out these projects and to gain governance experience as aresult.45. Many Afghans and development experts also feel that Afghanistan has been overwhelmedby a welter of national, international and NGO led projects which are poorly co-ordinated, notalways appropriate to local conditions and which collectively have the effect of taxing the verycapacity of the Afghan state and society, making it very difficult to put them to good developmentaluse. The international community continually vows to address the problem and indeed importantstrides have been taken to deepen such co-ordination, but the problem persists.46. President Karzai is now demanding that his government exercise financial oversight over alldevelopment projects in the country. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2011 he48

argued that infrastructure projects, aid to district authorities, and development work performed byProvincial Reconstruction Teams represent “an impediment to the Afghan government” when theseprogrammes and their funding are not first passed through the federal government budget.President Karzai has called these parallel structures and argued that these are undermining theauthority of the state.49He has also called for an end to the practice of private security firmsdefending development projects. This is strongly opposed by the United States government whichargues that these security firms are needed to protect development workers, recently builtinfrastructure and development projects that are underway.47. In 2009 foreign assistance accounted for 90-95 per cent of the Afghan state budget.50Clearly, the Afghan state has far to go before its operations become financially sustainable. Thecurrent military budget alone is approaching 50 per cent of GNP and obviously could not besustained without Western support. Indeed, a key priority for the international community has beento enhance the state’s capacity to generate domestic revenues and ultimately reduce itsdependence on foreign assistance. As a first capacity building step, there has been a commitmentto channel more aid funds through the Afghan state budget in order to bolster the state’slegitimacy, to give it greater latitude to define and implement its own spending priorities and to helpadministrators learn to manage public funds. Yet, most aid funds continue to be delivered outsidegovernment channels. Between 2001 and July 2009 most foreign aid (77 per cent) was channelledoutside of the Afghan government’s reach, in part, due to concerns about corruption and alsobecause donors have their own priorities for the use of such funds. The UK government’s Afghanaid policy is an exception in this regard as it channels approximately 80 per cent of its aid throughAfghan governmental channels. The Obama Administration has recently decided to move most ofits aid through the Afghan-managed budget process. It is concurrently demanding greateraccountability and transparency on the Afghan side.5148. Coalition governments thus confront a tricky dilemma. Their own taxpayers hold themaccountable for ensuring that aid money is properly spent and effective. When the recipientgovernment’s institutions cannot provide these guarantees, there is a natural inclination to operateoutside of them. But a “Catch 22” is at play here. As long as donors work outside of the recipientstate’s institutions, they reduce the accountability of the central government, slow the developmentof its capacity to deliver to its people, and thus undermine the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of itspeople.

decisions are made by directly elected Community Development Councils (CDCs), the NSP hashelped foster a climate of inclusive and democratic decision-making. Very importantly, women arewell-represented in these councils and are providing an essential perspective to local developmentprojects. It is also worth noting that corruption is rarer where decisions are made through localcouncils as accountability is easier to achieve if administration and decision making are local andwhen the public is directly engaged in the projects.52The NSP is largely supported by the WorldBank and has helped forge a positive link between the public and the central government at a timewhen the public perception of the state has generally not been positive. Members of theEconomics and Security Committee saw similar programmes achieving powerful results in Tigray,Ethiopia.50. Despite the myriad difficulties and security setbacks the development community hasconfronted over the past decade, Afghanistan has made progress. Most human developmentindicators show signs of improvement. By 2008 80 per cent of the population had access to somebasic health services, compared to 8 per cent in 2001. In 2008 Afghan children were beingimmunized at a rate higher than the rest of South Asia. The infant mortality rate has fallen by athird and life expectancy is somewhat longer. School enrolment rose from 1.1 million students in2001 to 5.7 million in 2008 – a third of whom are female. This could triple the country’s literacy rateover the next ten years and help the country cope with its capacity shortfalls. The most recent andmost comprehensive public opinion survey conducted by the Asia Foundation suggested thatnearly half of the Afghan people felt the country is moving in the right direction as opposed to 38per cent in 2008 due to a perception of better security, construction and rebuilding projects andschool openings. But that survey also showed acute recognition of outstanding challengesincluding ongoing security problems, unemployment and corruption.5351. Afghanistan’s infrastructure has also improved despite countless setbacks. USAID alone hasbuilt 1,600 miles of roads, and three-quarters of the main highway from Herat to Kabul has beenrebuilt. Thirty three per cent of all roads in the country were paved in 2008 as compared to13.3 per cent in 2001. Afghanistan has the same rate of access to telecommunications as most ofits neighbours and 27 per cent of the population now has access to clean water.54These are allconsequential changes but they must also be set against the violence and insecurity in the countryand persistent problems of governance, corruption, opium production and wasted developmentefforts including particularly egregious failings in delivering energy to a country where it isdesperately needed.

52. Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 places Afghanistansecond to last (no. 176) in its global rankings alongside Myanmar. Polls suggest that the Afghanpeople rank corruption as their country’s third greatest challenge after insecurity andunemployment. Seventy per cent of Afghans reluctantly recognise corruption as the cost ofconducting business with the state and holding together the various tribal groups that support it.This suggests a pervasive sense of resignation in the face of the challenge. They consider thesecurity apparatus (police), the judiciary, and municipalities as the state’s most corrupt stateinstitutions. Corruption undoubtedly undermines state legitimacy, fuels insurgency, and fomentssocial conflict. Half the Afghan people are convinced that corruption is a leading factor in theTaliban’s rise as it shockingly enjoys a more pristine image today among many Afghans than when52

it misruled the country. The Taliban has exploited sentiment by using its Islamic court system to trycorruption cases. The insurgents also adroitly exploit official corruption in their own propagandaand recruiting efforts. Afghans consider weak accountability systems (63 per cent), low civil servantsalaries (57 per cent), and the very large sums of capital in circulation (49 per cent) as the keydrivers of corruption. Corruption flourishes in war-torn and post-conflict societies and the influx offoreign assistance and high levels of security spending present enormous opportunities formalfeasance, particularly when state institutions are weak and accountability systems are virtuallynon-existent.53. There are, of course, myriad links between opium production, corruption and institutionalcrisis in Afghanistan. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC), most of theopium poppies cultivated today in Afghanistan are grown in the war-torn provinces of Helmand andKandahar. Not coincidentally, these are the regions most subject to insurgent activity, active ISAFmilitary operations and its here where the deficit of central state authority is most pronounced. Thecorrelation between insecurity and opium cultivation thus remains strong. The total area of poppycultivation in 2010 remained the same as in 2009 – 123,000 hectares. Opium production,however, fell by 48 per cent due to a plant disease which struck Helmand and Kandahar provinces.Robust demand conditions, however, meant that total farm-gate income from poppy productionrose from US$438 million in 2009 to US$604 million in 2010.55The rise in opium prices combinedwith falling wheat prices last year encouraged more farmers to move into opium cultivation and theearning differential between the two crops has moved from 3 to 1 to 6 to 1.5654. Opium thus remains an attractive cash crop, particularly given that traffickers will pick theproduct up at the farm gate. The worsening security environment has helped move farmers intoone of the very few businesses that seem to flourish as security degenerates. Accordingly, opiumremains a pillar of the Afghan economy and may be generating as much asone-third of Afghanistan’s GNP. According to the UN, nearly half a million Afghan farmers aredirectly engaged in the opium trade. The more serious problem is that many of the captains of thisindustry have close links to the state, and in some cases, may be operating from inside it. The realdilemma for the coalition is that targeting some of these regional and national leaders could pushthem back into the insurgency.57Once again, it is a very difficult choice for the coalition. Acrackdown could further undermine government support in the countryside, as regionalpowerbrokers linked to the opium trade are fickle allies who could easily move into the Talibancamp.55. It is possible that currently soaring global food prices might help divert cultivation back intofood production. This will largely hinge on government and coalition success in stabilizing theprovinces of Kandahar and Helmand, the government’s capacity to encourage participation in thelegal economy and the development of the infrastructure and institutions to create viable foodmarkets. Here again, the real driver is security and stabilization. Opium production flourishes inconflict regions simply because of the general breakdown in law and order. For all of thesereasons, fighting the opium trade may well be a second order priority for the coalition, although itslinks with matters of governance and security cannot be discounted. Providing positive incentivesto move into legal farming, including developing foreign markets for Afghan goods is probably thesuperior option.56. Corruption has also struck the financial sector. Kabul Bank, Afghanistan’s largest financialinstitution, gave large ill-advised loans to well connected businessmen and politicians and nearlycollapsed as a result. Several current and former ministers purportedly received improper55

payments from the bank. The Central Bank has taken control of that institution, and the IMF hasinsisted that the government put the bank into receivership.58But the head of the Central Bank,Abdul Qadir Fitrat, resigned during a June 2011 visit to the United States, claiming that his life wasat risk due to testimony he had given in Parliament about the problems of the Bank. Thegovernment subsequently issued an arrest warrant for the former governor, claiming that hehimself was responsible for the crisis.5957. Another banking scandal last year involved the New Ansari Exchange Hawala. Investigatorsuncovered evidence that this traditional bank was helping to launder opium trade profits andmoney earned by the Taliban through extortion. Following the money lead in both cases hasapparently demonstrated that many powerful political and commercial lenders including relatives ofPresident Karzai may have been engaged in corrupt financial dealings. Many Afghans and foreignobservers felt that the investigation led by the Afghan Sensitive Investigative Unit was a cover up.Between January 2007 and February 2010 couriers working for New Ansari carried $2.78 billionout of the country, much of it to Dubai. US investigators suggested that some of these funds werediverted Western aid and logistics money, opium profits and Taliban funds. It is estimated that thecapital outflow is, in fact, much larger than this and the scandal caused the US Congress to freezenon-urgent aid to the country.6058. Corruption thus constitutes a massive problem in Afghanistan and it is deeply embedded inthe political bargains holding the country together. Western leverage on corruption is limiteddespite countless efforts to advance the case for clean government. This is a fundamentalparadox, and it must be recognised that the international presence in the country has also been afactor in the spread of corruption. One German study suggested that of the 80 million euros ofGerman development aid to Afghanistan, in 2006 less than 25 million euros actually went toprojects; the rest disappeared in salaries and “administrative” costs.61Development aid money ishighly fungible and it has helped fuel corruption despite explicit entreaties from Western countriesthat they do not do so. It seems likely that the massive presence of Western countries inAfghanistan has itself been an inducement to corruption. If this is the case, rethinking thedimensions of that presence must be part of the international community’s reassessment. It shouldalso be noted that the greatest successes in development aid have been at the village level wherecitizens have participated directly in deciding how funds are allocated and directly overseendisbursement. That may provide an essential clue to resolving this paradox, or at least, learning tolive with it.

highly challenging, and there is a clear gap between the law as written and the law as practiced.Both foreign and domestic investors seek to mitigate uncertainty and will not invest whereuncertainty defines the political, legal and security climate. A country hampered by a weak stateand caught up in a civil war and, to some extent, a regional one is not likely to prove a particularlyattractive destination for investors.60. There are also a range of formal and informal barriers to investment in sectors, which ideallycould attract investor interest. Mining and hydrocarbons are two examples of very underinvestedsectors that have enormous potential but are hindered by daunting barriers to market entry.Bureaucratic obstacles to investing in Afghanistan are formidable, and the rules of the game areopaque. Business law is highly under-developed and the judicial system is subject to politicalinterference and bribery, both of which undermine essential property protection. Local businessleaders often cultivate strong connections with warlords and militias and use these links to blockcompetition in areas such as fuel transport or construction. In addition to these formidableobstacles, the exceedingly high rate of illiteracy among Afghanistan’s adult population (only28 per cent of people over 15 year-olds are literate) effectively puts a cap on the availability ofskilled labour. Indeed, many of the most skilled workers are already gainfully employed by theinternational community in Afghanistan or are, themselves, engaged in ultimately unproductiverent-seeking behaviour.61. The mining sector in Afghanistan has tremendous potential and apparently has one of theworld’s largest deposits of iron and copper as well as rare earths like lithium which is needed forcell phones.63The Hajigak iron ore fields are utterly underinvested because of high risks and entrycosts. The country also has large reserves of gold, cobalt as well as myriad gemstones and isseeking investors in all of these fields to help the country develop its potential. Again, the problemis grave uncertainty surrounding the military situation, insurgent violence, corruption and a lack ofcritical infrastructure needed to bring these minerals to market. Nevertheless, a number ofWestern, Chinese and Indian firms are seeking to play in the market, but allegations of corruptbidding have slowed down preparations to begin mining in Hajigak where in 2008 China promisedto invest $3.5 billion to develop the Aynak copper mine. Exporting mined ore will pose yet anotherset of potentially even greater challenges. The Chinese firm MCC has committed to build a$6 billion railway to move copper ore from the Aynak mines, but security concerns have held thisup as well.64

VIII. CONCLUSIONS62. Transition to Afghan responsibility for security by the end of 2014 is a realistic goal but willrequire not only a higher level of security in the country but far faster and deeper progress on thegovernance front. This in turn, is an essential prerequisite to catalyze economic and socialdevelopment in Afghanistan. The obstacles to improving State capacity, however, remainformidable. Until recently, both the war and development efforts were systematically underresourced. The good news is that steps were finally taken to address these problems. The badnews is that it is late in the day, the insurgency has grown more entrenched, the state has becomemore corrupted, Pakistan is more unstable and more hostile, and a number of developmentprojects have been squandered by very poor donor, government and civil society co-ordination.Moreover, economic crisis and fiscal crisis in Western countries threatens to deprive the effort ofessential resources needed to complete the mission.63. There is no choice now but to learn from and correct previous mistakes. But even then,improving the situation is likely to prove extraordinarily difficult. The coalition must brace itself for6364

sub-optimal outcomes at a time when domestic politics and fiscal realities in NATO membercountries are simultaneously pushing governments to draw down their presence in Afghanistan.Allied countries and their partners in that country need to be realistic about what is achievable inAfghanistan.64. That said, were the international community to withdraw precipitously, it would lead to ahuman and strategic catastrophe. It is the responsibility of all players now to ensure that thesituation improves so as to give Afghanistan the opportunity to live in relative peace. Otherwise,the regional rivalries, the cross-border nature of the insurgency, the deep tribal and ethnicdivisions, the country’s weak institutions and the ubiquitous narcotics trade will conspire tooverwhelm any effort to build greater security, stability and economic development. The 9/11attacks provide ample illustration of allied stakes in the outcome.65. Efforts need to be undertaken to ensure that humanitarian groups are accorded as muchspace as possible to operate throughout Afghanistan. The requirement has become even morecompelling since the recent surge of coalition forces. It is a fundamental pillar of humanitarianaction that those providing humanitarian assistance be allowed to operate in a neutral fashion. Thisallows them to work on all sides of a conflict in order to provide vital assistance to people in need.This imperative needs to be respected and negotiations with insurgent groups ought to beconsidered as a means to build a broader humanitarian consensus that creates more space for aidworkers. This could also be part of a confidence-building exercise that might be the first step in amore difficult and complex effort to explore potential political solutions to the crisis. It is worthnothing that in June 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates revealed that preliminarycontacts had been made with the Taliban.66. More efforts are needed to collect data on the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. This hasnot been a priority for military actors. The UN, which has the capacity to conduct this vital work,needs now to fill this gap. More information about the level and precise locations of humanitariancrises is essential to devise a proper response to these challenges. ISAF forces also need tobetter understand the humanitarian situation on the ground and to take measures to mitigate thecrisis. Failure here would not only represent a moral failure, it would also deal a terrible blow to thepolitical case ISAF is seeking to make.67. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Coordination (OCHA) should take thelead in improving humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. It should not be part of UNAMA’s remit;however, as that branch of the UN has become too closely identified with the Afghan governmentand ISAF. In other words, the UN itself may have to build “Chinese Walls” between itshumanitarian and political operations in Afghanistan. A humanitarian consortium of NGOs mightalso be formed to provide greater coherence to their efforts, to distinguish themselves from otheractors more closely identified with the belligerents and to stress their humanitarian mission andneutral status to those on both sides of the conflict and to the Afghan people.6568. There is a broader imperative to demilitarize the aid and development process. Militaries arenot efficient aid donors and insofar as it is possible should be relieved of responsibilities formanaging aid projects. Of course, in civil emergencies, they can play an essential part in providinghumanitarian relief, but in general terms, development ought to be left to other actors. Militaries arenot structured to administer aid projects, have no real systems of project assessment, lack thelocal knowledge needed to ensure project sustainability, and stand to be blamed whenwell-intended projects turn into “white elephants” that prove to be more a burden than a help tolocal populations.

69. Improving governance and the capacity of the Afghan state to deliver security anddevelopment are critical to successful transition to Afghan government responsibility. Militaryvictories in the field will only buy time but they will not solve the underlying problems which lie atthe root of the insurgency. To this end, the aid effort must be far better focused and co-ordinated.As much as possible, international donors should run aid through the Afghan government budgetand efforts are needed to help Afghanistan eventually put its budget on a sustainable basis so thatit is less dependent on foreign financial support - a fundamental if not often discussed dimension ofits transitions. To take one example of the problem, it costs an estimated $8 billion per annum tocover the costs of the Afghan National Security Force. This is 50 per cent of that country’s GDPand obviously this is a burden that Afghanistan is not ready to shoulder. This quandary perfectlyreflects the development-security nexus.70. Ultimately revenues must be generated through trade, mining, agriculture, construction andthe introduction of vastly improved tax collection methods. These are critical sectors whereAfghanistan needs support. Yet the path of development must be outlined by Afghans themselvesworking particularly closely with the World Bank and the IMF.66Some of the larger donors,including the United States, have had many agencies and various branches of the military involvedin providing development support. For these countries, it makes sense to have a singlereconstruction agency to eliminate confusing redundancy and interagency rivalries that ultimatelyonly penalize Afghanistan.In Iraq, for example, 62 different agencies including theUS Defence Department, the US State Department and USAID were involved in US rebuildingefforts. This was intensely wasteful and imposed huge burdens on Iraq. Yet plans to centralizethe reconstruction process are being strongly resisted in the Department of Defense and the StateDepartment.67This problem is probably most serious in the United States, but other countriescould also do a better job co-ordinating their own efforts.71. NATO and, more importantly, NATO member militaries thus need to improve their capacity tobe led by others in those areas like state building where national militaries have little experienceand know-how. There is a temptation to deploy Western soldiers and their “can do” spirit in statebuilding and development operations best left to local authorities and development agencies.Equally it is essential to work at communal levels and not simply to concentrate capacity building inthe capital city. Successful institutional development must be a bottom up rather than a top downprocess; working locally can reduce the potential for corruption.72. The international community should remain focused on gender related economic and socialdevelopment. This works against some of the mores of traditional Afghan culture, but it must beremembered that erasing women from the economic and political map of that country is preciselywhat the Taliban did, and it proved a recipe for sociological and economic disaster. Theinternational community, however, must find local partners to advance perspectives which bothrespect traditions but ensure fundamental improvements in conditions in that country. Theoppression of women will only impede Afghanistan’s development across a broad range ofindicators. Education in general and education of women in particular should be priorities ofinternational development support. Only 34 per cent of the population is literate but only12 per cent of women over 15 can read and write.6866

73. Afghanistan remains highly vulnerable to natural disasters and has few resources andinfrastructure for coping. Such disasters can be all the more devastating because the population isalready highly vulnerable. Although governance is a key priority for the donor community,improving Afghanistan’s capacity to cope with natural disasters should also be seen as a relatedpriority area.74. The opium trade is deeply ingrained in the Afghan economy and has flourished most whereinstability reigns. For that reason, it should be seen as a second order rather than first orderpriority. Farmers need alternatives to opium production, they need the means and theinfrastructure to move their produce to local and international markets, and the state itself must bestrengthened before it will be able to cope with the full range of challenges linked to opiumproduction. Expectations about progress on this front ought to be dampened as fundamentalchanges are needed elsewhere before this particular challenge can be comprehensivelyaddressed. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke had wisely recognised the importance of building upAfghanistan’s agricultural capacity as the best way to counter the scourge of opium. Theinternational community ought to build on his legacy. Developing Afghanistan’s agriculturalpotential, in fact, is fundamental to Afghan well being as 80 per cent of the population relies on itfor their living.69But this also makes its transition a delicate challenge as the interests of the mostvulnerable people must also be protected. Developing basic social safety nets should therefore belinked to agricultural reform.75. Equally, a more comprehensive strategy for coping with corruption, some of which isintimately linked to the opium trade, must be developed. Yet, we also need to be realistic aboutwhat can be achieved on this front. Corruption is an element of the grand political bargain amongthe myriad groups that at least nominally support the Afghan state. One analyst describes theproblems this way, “When multiparty systems emerge in clan cultures, they only strengthencorruption. As long as this can be financed, a level of satisfaction takes hold, which explains theearly successes in Afghanistan until 2006. As soon as resources waned, political pluralismgenerated corruption and war.”70At the same time, many of the security problems in Afghanistanderive from the lack of public loyalty to a state that is seen as both inept and corrupt. Thoseproblems must be addressed if the transition is to have any chance to succeed. But, Westernleverage here is frankly limited, and the best it can do is work to ensure that at least its owndevelopment funds are properly spent and put to good use. It can expose Afghans to bestpractices, but the Afghans themselves will ultimately be responsible for adapting these to their owncultural setting - or rejecting them as foreign impositions. We, in the West, believe that positivereform and better governance will facilitate efforts to reconciliation, which are key to stabilizingAfghanistan. But this means nothing if Afghans themselves do not embrace this logic. In any case,they will need to come up with the terms of the bargain that hold the country together and create amodicum of stability. Those terms may not be to our liking but these are decisions for the Afghansto make not the international community.76. Although the operative frame of reference for the transition suggests that by 2014 keysecurity responsibilities must be shifted back to the Afghan state, in reality that country will still bein great need of international support. Our governments and our people must therefore girdthemselves for a long-term commitment to that country even after ISAF troop levels are lowered. Atthe same time, the international community and the Afghan government must work hard toencourage a genuine national dialogue and reconciliation in Afghanistan as there is no purelymilitary solution to this insurgency. The political problems driving it must be taken up. But even thismay not prove sufficient as this war has an essential regional dimension. Indeed, an increasinglyunstable and alienated Pakistan continues to harbour key elements of the insurgency and some inits security services believe that a stable Afghanistan somehow poses a threat to it. Pakistan’s6970

military and its security services are using the Taliban and groups like the Haqqani Network inNorth Waziristan and Lashkar-e-Taiba as proxies in their struggle for regional influence - a strugglethat is largely driven by a long-standing rivalry with India over Kashmir. Pakistan, which has beenin the midst of tremendous domestic turmoil, must also be made part of the solution, and effortsare needed to make its positive engagement demonstrably in its own interest. That will not proveeasy because Western leverage there remains limited and relations with the United States haveworsened since US seals killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan without consulting officials from thatcountry - thereby demonstrating deep mistrust of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).77. For better or worse, the fiscal crisis pervading many Allied countries has become a centralfactor in how allied countries view national security matters. There are calls in many countries topull out of Afghanistan and governments will be challenged to the make the case for theircommitments to that country even as a draw down is now an official policy goal. It is vital, however,that the Alliance not abandon this impoverished and unstable country, even as they withdrawmilitary forces and lower expectations about what can actually be achieved in this distant country.To simply abandon Afghanistan to its fate would threaten to further undermine security in what is avery dangerous part of the world.78. Finally, very serious thought must be given to the lessons learned from the decade-longexperience in Afghanistan and this assessment must include a reappraisal of the limits of Westernpower, the proper relationship between values and security policy and the often unreasonableexpectations imposed on Western militaries. Ultimately, we need to reassess what can beachieved through military intervention in countries like Afghanistan.____________________