PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Europaudvalget 2011-12
EUU Alm.del Bilag 558
Offentligt

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

This report has been prepared with the financial support of the European Commission.

The views expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

European Commission or of its services.

The content of this report may not be reproduced, or even part thereof, without explicit reference to the source.

POSEIDON, MRAG, COFREPECHE & NFDS, 2012. - Ex-post evaluation of the current Protocol to the

Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Republic of Kiribati, and ex-ante

evaluation including an analysis of the impact of the future Protocol on sustainability, Framework contract

MARE/2011/01 - Lot 3, specific contract n°01. Final report: final version, May 2012. Bruxelles, 138 p.

COFREPECHE: 32 rue de Paradis, 75010 Paris, France.

[email protected]

Version: Final Report,

final version

Report ref: KIR95R01E1

Number of pages: 138 (all included)

Date issued: 21 May 2012

Action

Authors

SURNAME

MACFADYEN

First name

Graeme

Organisation

Position

POSEIDON

Director /

Team leader - Fisheries economist

POSEIDON

Director /

Fisheries economist

MRAG

Managing Director /

Senior fisheries expert

POSEIDON

Director

COFREPECHE

Project officers

COFREPECHE

Projects Director

COFREPECHE

Deputy Managing Director

Category

BANKS

Richard

Peer review

(draft final report)

Proof reading

Edition

Approval

Validation

MEES

Chris

HUNTINGTON

PICAULT

LE FOL

DEFAUX

SILVA

Tim

David

Gwendal

Vincent

Jean-Pierre

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page i

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Acronyms and abbreviations

ACP

ADB

AFAD

AER

ALC

AUS$

B/C

BET

CCM

CCS

CFP

CIF

CMM

CNM

CPPL

African, Caribbean and Pacific

Asian Development Bank

Anchored FAD

Annual Economic Report

Automatic Location Communicator

Australian Dollar

Benefit/cost

Bigeye Tuna

Commission Cooperating Member

Catch Certificate Scheme

Common Fisheries Policy

Conservation International

Carriage Insurance and Freight

ins

INTERCO

IUU

KDP

LDC

MCS

MDGS

MFED

MFMRD

MoU

MPA

MSY

MTC

MTU

NEA

OFP

OPAGAC

ORTHONG

PACP

PAE

PIPA

PNA

PNAO

PNG

PROCFISH

RERF

Inches

International Code of Signals

Information Technology

Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported

Joint Committee

Kiribati Development Plan

Kilogrammes

Pounds

Lesser Developing Country

Monitoring, Control and Surveillance

Millennium Development Goals

Ministry of Finance and Economic

Development

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine

Resources Development

millimeters

million

Memorandum of Understanding

Marine Protected Area

Maximum Sustainable Yield

Minimum Terms and Conditions

Mobilisation Transmission Unit

Management Year

New England Aquarium

Oceanic Fisheries Programme

Organización de Productores Asociados

de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores

Organisation de Producteurs de Thon

Congelé

Pacific ACPs

Party Allowable Effort

Phoenix Islands Protected Area

Parties to the Nauru Agreement

Parties to the Nauru Agreement Office

Papua New Guinea

Pacific Regional Coastal Fisheries

Development Programme

Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund

Conservation and Management Measures

Commission Non Cooperating Member

Central Pacific Producers Limited

Committee of Representatives of

CRGA

Governments and Administrations

CRISP Coral Reef Initiative for the Pacific

DCF

Data Collection Framework

DCR

Data Collection Regulation

DEVFI The Development of Tuna Fisheries in the

Pacific ACP Countries Project

DFAD

MARE

DWFN

EAFM

EBIT

EDF

EEZ

ENSO

EPA

EPO

Drifting FAD

Directorate General for Maritime Affairs

and Fisheries

Distant Water Fishing Nations

Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries

Management

Earnings Before Interest and Tax

European Commission

European Development Fund

Exclusive Economic Zone

El Niño Southern Oscillation

European Parliament

Economic Partnership Agreement

Eastern Pacific Ocean

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page ii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

FAD

FAME

FAO

FFA

FFC

FMIS

FMSY

FOB

FPA

FSM

FSMA

FTE

GATT

GDP

GSP

HSP

IATTC

IEO

IEPA

IMF

European Union

Fishing mortality

Fish Aggregation Device

Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine

Ecosystems

Food and Agriculture Organisation

Forum Fisheries Agency

Forum Fisheries Commission

Fisheries Monitoring Information System

Fishing mortality rate that would give

Maximum Sustainable Yield

Free OnBoard

Fisheries Partnership Agreement

Federated States of Micronesia

FSM Arrangement

Full Time Equivalent

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Gross Domestic Product

Generalised System Of Preferences

High Seas

High Seas Pockets

Implementing Agreement

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

Insituto Español oceanografico

Interim Economic Partnership Agreement

International Monetary Fund

Regional Fisheries Management

Organisation

RMI

Republic of the Marshall Islands

Scientific Support for the Management

SCICOFISH of Coastal and Oceanic Fisheries in the

Pacific Islands Region

SEAPODY Spatial Ecosystem and Populations

Dynamics Model

SIDS

Small island developing states

RFMO

SJK

SMACFish

SOE

SPC

TAE

TCC

TUFMAW

UNICEF

UNFSA

US$

USLMT

VDS

VDSC

VMS

WCP

WCPFC

WCPO

WTO

YFT

Skipjack Tuna

Sustainable Management of Aquaculture

and Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific

Region for Food Security and Small-

scale Livelihoods

State Owned Enterprise

Secretariat of the Pacific Community

Total Allowable Effort

Technical and Science Committee

Tuna Fisheries Database Management

System

United Nations International Children's

Emergency Fund

United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement

United States Dollar

United States Multi-Lateral Treaty

Vessel Day Scheme

Vessel Day Scheme Committee

Vessel Monitoring System

Western Central Pacific

Western Central Pacific Commission

Western Central Pacific Ocean

World Trade Organisation

Yellowfin Tuna

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page iii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Currency Exchange Rates used in this report (www.oanda.com)

€1 =

2007

2008

2009

2010

US$

1.35

1.58

1.41

1.22

AUS$

1.59

1.64

1.74

1.44

2011

1.45

1.35

2012

1.34

1.25

Rates are mid-year rates, except for 2012 which is rate at time of writing (Feb/March 2012)

Acknowledgements

The consultants are grateful to all stakeholders who shared their time, thoughts, information and data with the

consulting team which completed this specific contract.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page iv

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

XECUTIVE

UMMARY

NTRODUCTION

This report provides an ex-post evaluation of the current Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement

(FPA) between the European Union and the Republic of Kiribati. It also provides an ex-ante evaluation

and analysis of impacts of a potential future Protocol on sustainability. The evaluation covers the period

September 2006 to March 2012. The FPA provides fishing opportunities for EU purse seine and longline

vessels to fish in the waters of Kiribati.

OUNTRY BACKGROUND

ii.

Kiribati is a remote Pacific nation made up of 33 widely dispersed islands (21 inhabited) divided into

groups (Gilbert Group, Phoenix Group and the Line Group) that straddle the equator. While the total land

area is only 726 km

, the related exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the largest EEZ of the Pacific islands

countries at 3.55 mn km

. Kiribati’s population was 103,280 in 2011 and is almost entirely concentrated in

the Gilbert Islands. At the current population growth rate of 1.25 %, the population is expected to double in

the next 20 years. Kiribati is a sovereign democratic republic within the Commonwealth.

The Kiribati economy faces significant constraints common to other island atoll states. Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) stands at

€109

mn (2010), expanding by an estimated 2-3 % per annum. GDP per capita is

one of the lowest of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) nations at

€1,047

and Kiribati is classified

as a least developed African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) State. Challenges to economic development

include size, remoteness and geographical fragmentation, infertile soils, limited exploitable resources and

an expanding population. A major distinctive feature of national resources is the Revenue Equalisation

Reserve Fund (RERF) with a value of around

€410

mn (in 2011). Initially established from royalties from

phosphate mining, the RERF is used to fund fiscal deficits. The Kiribati Development Plan (KDP) 2008–

2011 builds upon the previous National Development Strategy 2004–2007 with actions to address fiscal

management, population growth, and improved access to international labour markets. While progress in

implementation has been slow, the strategic focus remains: (i) improving the economic environment in the

outer islands, particularly Kiritimati (Christmas Island); (ii) strengthening access to health services; and (iii)

addressing climate change.

Kiribati relies heavily on licence fees from distant water fishing nations (worth an annual average of

€24.4

mn in the period 2009 - 2011) that provide 23-30 % of government revenue and remittances from Kiribati

citizens employed abroad, mainly as seafarers. Fishing is also an important subsistence activity, with over

80 % of households involved in fishing. Fish consumption per capita per year is high by global and Pacific

standards (between 72 kg and 207 kg for the entire country). The fishing sector contributes around 10 %

of GDP. Kiribati has bilateral fisheries arrangements with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, and the

Republic of Korea, as well as private company agreements with vessels from Ecuador and El Salvador.

Kiribati also receives revenue from a multilateral treaty signed with the United States.

EU relations with the Pacific ACP countries, based on the Lome Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement

have been aimed at supporting stabilisation following decolonisation, while at the same time supporting

economic and social progress. At the regional level the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) (2008-

2013) includes as a priority the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment, with

support to programmes under the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and Secretariat of the Pacific

Community (SPC). While Kiribati benefits from regional initiatives, fisheries remain outside the 10th EDF

Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Kiribati. Fisheries-specific support is

instead provided through the sectoral policy support component of the FPA. The Kiribati fisheries sector

also benefits from regional initiatives by other donors (notably Australia, New Zealand and the US) and

national support under the Australian-Kiribati Partnership for development.

In September 2004, the EU and 14 Pacific ACP countries, including Kiribati, opened negotiations on an

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which should eventually replace the preferential access scheme

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page v

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

iii.

iv.

vi.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

contained in the Cotonou Agreement that expired at the end of 2007. EPA negotiations are still in

progress. Whilst there is presently no trade in fishery products between Kiribati and the EU, the country

has future aspirations in trading fresh tuna loins.

UNA FISHERIES IN

IRIBATI AND THE REGION

vii.

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is the main fishing ground for tunas, accounting for

around 60 % of world catches. Total WCPO tuna catch for 2010 was estimated at 2.28 mn tonnes, with the

purse seine fishery accounting for 80 %, pole-and-line fishing 6.5 %, and longline fishing about 6 %. EU

purse seine vessels account for 2 % of catches in the WCP.

Purse seine fishing expanded rapidly during the 1980s, mainly through the operations of Japanese and US

fleets. More recently the composition of the fleet became more diverse, with an expansion to include other

Asian fishing nations, New Zealand and EU vessels. Vessels predominantly target skipjack tuna (81 % of

the total catch) along with yellowfin (17 %) and bigeye (2 %) and overall dependency on free school fishing

has increased over the years. Access to fishing by distant water purse seine vessels takes the form of

regional or bilateral fisheries partnership arrangements or agreements, including: bilateral

intergovernmental agreements; EU FPAs; commercial agreements between associations or companies;

individual agreements between countries which are Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA); and the US

Tuna Treaty.

The longline fishery catches mainly yellowfin and bigeye tunas, but also albacore, billfish, swordfish and

other species including pelagic and reef sharks. The total number of vessels involved in the tropical

WCPO fisheries has generally been around 3,000. European longliners operate primarily south of 20°S,

outside the tropical area and the EU longline vessels have never fished in Kiribati waters. Together EU

longliners account for less than 1 % of total WCPO longline catches.

The status of the three main tuna stocks exploited in the WCP equatorial area is monitored by the

Scientific Committee installed under the Western Central Pacific Commission (WCPFC) (the tuna Regional

Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) for the WCPO). Currently skipjack is being exploited at

moderate levels and overfishing is not occurring, yellowfin is currently fully exploited and there is a 50 %

chance that overfishing is occurring, and recent assessments show that overfishing of bigeye tuna is

currently occurring with present catch levels unlikely to be sustainable.

The key governance and fishery management organisations for tuna and related species in the WCPO,

and the tuna purse seine fisheries in particular include: The WCPFC; The Parties to the Nauru Agreement

(PNA); Regional organisations that provide management services to the WCPFC and the PNA, in

particular the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) based in Solomon Islands, and the SPC based in New

Caledonia; and the PNA national governments. A number of WCPFC Commission Management Measures

(CMMs) have been formulated in the annual sessions of the Commission. The PNA has also introduced a

Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) for the Management of the Western Purse Seine Fishery, with Party Allowable

Effort (PAE) days allocated to PNA countries, and agreed that a minimum fee of US$5,000 /

€3,450

per

fishing day shall be applied to foreign fishing vessels from 2012 onwards.

Within Kiribati itself, the Kiribati Development Plan focus for fisheries includes maximizing the sustainable

economic benefits from the tuna resource; conserving coastal resources in the face of rising demand for

food and cash incomes; and managing the transition from government research to commercial production

and export. Overriding governance priorities are identified as: maintaining close collaboration with the PNA

and FFA and to obtain maximum sustainable EEZ access fees; promoting public-private partnerships with

reputable foreign investors in catching and onshore domestic processing of tuna; conducting participatory

education programmes with fishers and communities engaged with vulnerable species/stocks; and

ensuring legal sanctions are observed to enforce the conservation regime and prosecute when necessary.

Responsible for this is the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development with a staff of 115.

Kiribati has established the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) which is one of the largest Marine

Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Pacific at 408,250 km².

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page vi

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

viii.

ix.

xi.

xii.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

VALUATION

xiii.

The Protocol provides for 4 purse seine fishing authorisations (1 for France and 3 for Spain), and 12

longline fishing authorisations, evenly split between Portugal and Spain. Apart from two longline fishing

authorisations taken during the first year of the FPA there has been 0 % utilisation of the longline fishing

authorisation possibilities, and no longline catches made during the FPA. On the other hand utilisation of

the 4 purse seine fishing authorisations has been 100 % for each of year of the FPA, and utilisation of

catch possibilities in excess of 100 % each year of the FPA. In 2011 catch utilisation is expected to exceed

200 % of the reference tonnage of 6,400 tonnes for the first time.

Payments made to Kiribati during the FPA have averaged

€1.2

mn per year, with 2/3 paid by the EU and

1/3 by vessel owners. The average payment over 2007 to 2011 was

€3,350

/ US$4,675 a day i.e. close to

the current PNA benchmark price of US$5,000/day.

The covenants and obligations of the FPA and Protocol are generally being complied with by all parties.

However some areas of concern include: the failure of the Joint Committee (JC) meetings to take place

until 2011; the slow payments in recent years for the financial support for the sectoral policy; the failure by

Kiribati to supply inspection certificates and observer reports to shipowners; and the lack of any real

impetus towards joint enterprises or local landings for processing.

The economic analysis of the Protocol shows that ex-vessel fish prices are lower than international

standards, probably due to smaller fish sizes caught in the FAD fishery, but that fish prices have risen by

around 50 % over the period of the evaluation. Given the increasing trend in catches made in Kiribati over

the evaluation period, the landed value of fish caught under the Protocol also shows a rising trend and in

2010 exceeded

€14

million.

A total of

€6.4

mn of value-added is accrued each year when considering the benefits to both the

European Union and Kiribati. 75 % of this accrues to the EU and 25 % to Kiribati. EU value-added is most

prominent in the catching and upstream sectors, and less marked in downstream processing. In Kiribati

value-added is almost entirely focused in the upstream/input sub-sector, principally in the form of

payments made to the Government for access and sectoral support, but also from vessel support services

i.e. transshipment. Some small value-added is made through the employment of Kiribati crew and

observers.

In terms of costs and benefits, for the EU as a whole the Protocol generated an average annual

benefit/cost (B/C) ratio of 4.0, demonstrating that the Protocol provides good value for money with every

€1

invested by the EU and fleet owners generating

€4.0

of benefit in terms of value-added. The cost of

access for vessel owners (€35/tonne) represents 4.1-4.4 % of the average weighted sales prices received

for catches made under the Protocol. Annual average catch values made under the Protocol are

€9.5

mn,

and vessel profits as a proportion of sales revenues range between 11 % and 23 % for the two vessel

classes (84m and 100+m). The benefits to Kiribati were

€1.2

mn per year on average from the EU, plus

smaller benefits in the form of value-added made from port calls by EU vessels and from local crew and

observers onboard EU vessels.

The contribution of catch made under the Protocol to the EU processing sector was small at around 2 % of

loined imports to the EU in 2010, while fish caught under the Protocol and imported to the EU in canned

form represented around 1 % of EU imports of canned tuna in 2010.

The employment generated by the Protocol is estimated at 98 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) jobs. This

employment generation represents 116 tonnes of fish caught under the Protocol for every job, and

€23,810

of payments by the EU and vessel owners for every one job. Employment creation is divided

roughly equally between the EU and Kiribati. The social clause elements of the Protocol in terms of wage

levels, seamen having contracts, etc., are being fully complied with.

xiv.

xv.

xvi.

xvii.

xviii.

xix.

xx.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page vii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

xxi.

xxii.

xxiii.

xxiv.

xxv.

xxvi.

With respect to effectiveness, the EU fleet plays only a small role in terms of overall fleet activity in both

Kiribati and WCP. Its ability to impact on responsible fishing is therefore limited. However some concerns

are noted in relation to responsible fishing in terms of high percentages of catches being comprised of

bigeye tuna (which is assessed as being over-exploited), vessel discards, vessels exceeding high seas

days limits, bycatch of pelagic sharks, and weaknesses in MCS capacity in Kiribati. The Protocol has been

effective in supporting the EU catching sub-sector in particular, but not in creating any joint enterprises or

any significant developments of the Kiribati fish catching or processing sub-sectors, due largely to the

economics of doing so. As noted above, the Protocol has also been effective in creating some

employment in both the EU and Kiribati.

With respect to efficiency, the Protocol has been efficient for the EU in providing access at an affordable

rate for EU vessels owners, and in generating a good benefit/cost ratio of 4.0. But the cost per EU job has

been

€23,810.

For Kiribati, payments made by the EU under the Protocol have represented 4-7 % of

national fishing licence revenue and 1-2 % of total annual government revenues.

The Protocol has significantly contributed to the viability and sustainability of the EU purse seine catching

sub-sector operating in the Pacific and its related employment, but has made no contribution to the

sustainability of the longline sector, and only small contributions to the sustainability of the EU upstream

and processing sub-sectors. The Protocol does not appear to threaten the sustainability of the Kiribati

fishing sector. The Protocol has not however been successful in resulting in any sustainable joint catching

sub-sector operations, or in making any contributions to sustainable Kiribati processing sector operations,

although has contributed to sustainable upstream/vessel support activities.

The EU is a Commission Contracting Member to the WCPFC, and the Protocol is consistent with both the

CFP and WCPFC policies management measures, as well as with the Food and Agriculture

Organisation’s (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and with the International Labour

Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. There are no inconsistencies in

the Protocol text or its implementation, and EU trade policy. The Protocol is also consistent with national

Kiribati policy and national legislation. Perhaps the key issue of concern in relation to consistency

however, is the fact that the Protocol is a tonnage-based Protocol, with payments for access made per

tonne. National Kiribati policy, in line with evolving regional initiatives, is now strongly in favour of

negotiating and providing access based on vessel days.

All of the above comments mean that the Protocol is relevant to the needs of the EU, and in particular to

its purse seine fleet (although not to the longline fleet). The generation of access fees means the Protocol

is also relevant to the needs of Kiribati. The Protocol does not however satisfy the needs/desires of Kiribati

as expressed to the consultants to have a Protocol which is structured around paying for access based on

vessel days, although this desire has not been formally expressed to the EU. This is explained by the fact

that the VDS was not in place when the Protocol was negotiated, but has evolved in recent years. In

addition, while the Protocol has an objective for the creation of joint enterprises and support for local

processing activity, which satisfies the needs of Kiribati, implementation of the Protocol has not managed

to bring about any such activity or to satisfy these needs and aspirations.

Looking forward to a potential future Protocol, potential new management measures being considered in

the region to improve the management regime (e.g. a one month extension of the Fish Aggregation

Device (FAD) closure, an increase in minimum mesh sizes, closure of the Phoenix Island Protected Area

to fishing, high seas closures around the Kiribati EEZ) would have a negative impact on the activities and

profitability of EU purse seine vessels. Other changes which could have an impact if mandated by the

WCPFC include potential changes in crewing requirements to 10 % and then 20 % being from PNA

countries – this would require changes to the text of the Protocol to ensure coherence, as the text

currently states a minimum of 6 crew on the fleet of purse seiners, which represents around 5 % of current

vessel crew numbers (this figure is exceeded by the EU fleet, with around 9 % of total crew already

sourced from Kiribati).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page viii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

xxvii.

It is likely that a future Protocol would generate considerable levels of value-added to both the EU and to

Kiribati, but few changes in employment or the balance of value-added creation between the EU and

Kiribati. It would be in the interest of both the EU and Kiribati to have a new Protocol. For the EU fleet a ‘no

Protocol’ would cause fishing rights as a proportion of sales revenues to rise considerably, while for

Kiribati a failure to sign a new Protocol would eliminate the ear-marked funds for special sectoral support

provided by the EU under the Protocol, and could result in under-utilisation of Kiribati’s PAE days under

the VDS.

ECOMMENDATIONS

xxviii.

The recommendations made in this report are necessarily brief, given that it is not the job of the

consultants to present a strategy to the EU for negotiation, but rather to provide the EU negotiators with

the economic data to prepare for the negotiations. Thus the principal recommendation made is to base the

negotiations on the economic and social data provided in this report, and to ensure that there is indeed

signature of a new Protocol.

The ongoing CFP reform also means that there is as yet, not clear direction or guidance on changing the

balance of access payments per tonne between the EU and fleet owners, and the current balance should

therefore be retained.

From a purely technical perspective, this evaluation recommends that the longline fishing opportunities be

removed from the Protocol, given the fact that there have been zero catches made by the longline fleet

under the Protocol. However a final decision on this issue would also need to reflect the political wishes

and agreement by EU Member States.

Given the high level of juvenile bigeye tuna catches taken in the FAD fishery by the EU fleet, the

evaluation also recommends that direct measures should be included in the Protocol (and Annex) to

mitigate against this problem. Such measures should be agreed jointly by all parties, but could include the

use of, and reporting on, FAD management plans.

The levels of payments in a future Protocol, and the basis on which they are paid (e.g. tonnage or vessel

days), will be the subject of negotiation, but should be informed by recent catch levels, rates of utilisation,

and fish prices.

A recommendation is made for greater emphasis and recognition by all parties of the importance of the

Joint Committee meetings. These meetings represent a vital monitoring mechanism for implementation of

the FPA – a mechanism which has historically not been especially effective. The Joint Committee

meetings must be yearly as required in the text of the FPA, and should be used both to review sectoral

policy implementation, and to ensure ongoing compliance with the covenants and obligations laid out in

the FPA and Protocol (and necessary action if such compliance is found to be lacking). Current areas of

weakness in compliance with other covenants and obligations required in the FPA and Protocol should

also be addressed as a matter of urgency.

The evaluation recommends that focus be given to the issue of strengthening MCS capacity in Kiribati. For

example, FPA sectoral funds, and other EU development support, could be used to enhance observer

capacities so as to ensure mutual recognition by WCPFC and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

(IATTC) of each other’s observers. The evaluation also recommends greater recognition by EU

development projects of the important nature of the Kiribati FPA, and therefore for the use of funds to

support Kiribati. The view of this evaluation is that there should be a special effort to better align sectoral

policy support provided by the FPA with other EU development aid in a mutually enforcing manner, while

being careful to avoid duplication. This could be supported by the appointment of a fisheries attaché to the

EU Delegation in Fiji, and the EU is believed to be in process of recruiting someone to such a position.

Finally, the evaluation notes the importance of the EU continuing to engage actively with the WCPFC in

efforts to ensure responsible fisheries in the WCPO. As part of this process, given some of the

weaknesses identified in the evolving VDS system, the evaluation recommends that the EU supports the

establishing of target and limit reference points for tuna stocks, so as to ensure the integrity of the scheme

by linking stock status to the management system.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page ix

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

xxix.

xxx.

xxxi.

xxxii.

xxxiii.

xxxiv.

xxxv.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

ÉSUMÉ

NTRODUCTION

Ce rapport fournit une évaluation ex-post du protocole de l’Accord de Partenariat dans le secteur de la

Pêche (APP) entre l’Union européenne (UE) et la République de Kiribati (ci-après citée ‘Kiribati’). Il

procure également une évaluation ex-ante et une analyse d’impacts en termes de durabilité d’un possible

futur protocole. L’évaluation couvre la période de septembre 2006 à mars 2012. L’APP garantit des

opportunités de pêche pour les senneurs et les palangriers de l’UE dans les eaux de Kiribati.

ONTEXTE DU PAYS

ii.

Kiribati est une nation éloignée du Pacifique, constituée de 33 îles fortement dispersées (dont 21

habitées) divisées en groupes d’îles (îles Gilbert, îles Phénix et îles de la Ligne) et chevauchant

l’équateur. Alors que la superficie des terres émergées est de seulement 726 km

, la Zone Économique

Exclusive (ZEE) associée est la plus vaste ZEE des pays insulaires du Pacifique avec 3,55 millions de

. La population de Kiribati était de 103 280 habitants en 2011 et est presque exclusivement concentrée

dans les Îles Gilbert. Au taux de croissance démographique actuel de 1,25 %, il est prévu que la

population double dans les 20 prochaines années. Kiribati est une république démocratique souveraine

parmi le Commonwealth.

L’économie de Kiribati fait face à des contraintes non négligeables communes à d’autres états atoll. Le

Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) est de 109 millions d’euros (2010), avec une croissance estimée de 2- 3 % par

an. Le PIB par habitant par an est parmi les plus bas des Parties à l’Accord de Nauru, PAN (en anglais,

PNA) à 1 047

€

et Kiribati est classé dans les états ACP (Afrique, Caraïbes, Pacifique) les moins

développés. Les contraintes limitant son développement économique incluent la taille de l’archipel,

l’isolement et la fragmentation géographique, l’infertilité des sols, les ressources exploitables limitées et

une population croissante. Un aspect majeur et distinct des ressources nationales est le fonds de réserve

d’égalisation de revenu (en anglais, RERF) ayant une valeur d’environ 410 millions d’euros (en 2011).

Etabli initialement à partir des redevances issues des mines de phosphate, le fonds de réserve RERF est

utilisé pour compenser les déficits fiscaux. Le Plan de Développement de Kiribati 2008-2011 se base sur

la précédente Stratégie de Développement National 2004-2007 avec des actions ciblant la gestion fiscale,

la croissance de la population et un accès amélioré aux marchés du travail internationaux. Alors que la

mise en

œuvre

a été lente, la stratégie reste focalisée sur : (i) améliorer le contexte économique dans les

îles périphériques, particulièrement Kiritimati (île Christmas) ; (ii) renforcer l’accès aux services de santé ;

et (iii) gérer les effets de changement climatique.

Kiribati est fortement dépendante des droits de licences de pêches lointaines d’autres nations (valeur

moyenne de 24,4 millions d’euros dans la période 2009 - 2011) qui procurent 23 – 30 % des recettes de

l’état ainsi que des envois de fonds des citoyens de Kiribati employés à l’étranger, principalement en tant

que marins. La pêche est aussi une activité de subsistance importante, avec plus de 80 % des foyers

impliqués dans le secteur. La consommation annuelle de poisson par habitant est élevée selon les

standards mondiaux et les standards du Pacifique (variant entre 72 kg et 207 kg dans l’ensemble du

pays). Le secteur de la pêche contribue à 10 % du PIB. Kiribati a signé des accords de pêche bilatéraux

avec l’Union Européenne, le Japon, Taiwan, et la République de Corée ainsi que des accords privés avec

des navires venant d’Équateur et du Salvador. Kiribati reçoit aussi des revenus du traité multilatéral signé

avec les États-Unis.

Les relations de l’UE avec les états ACP du Pacifique, basées sur les Conventions de Lomé et les

Accords de Cotonou visent à renforcer la stabilité suite à la décolonisation, tout en favorisant le progrès

économique et social. Au niveau régional le 10ème Fonds Européen de Développement, FED (2008 -

2013) inclut en tant que priorité la gestion durable des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement, avec

l’appui de programmes sous l’égide de l’Agence des Pêches du Forum des îles du Pacifique

(communément nommé par son acronyme anglais FFA) et le Secrétariat Général de la Communautés du

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page x

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

iii.

iv.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

vi.

Pacifique (SCP). Alors que Kiribati bénéficie d’initiatives régionales, les pêcheries restent exclues du

Document de stratégie et du Programme Indicatif National du 10ème FED. L’appui spécifique aux

pêcheries se fait plutôt à travers de la composante de l’APP d’appui de mise en

œuvre

d’une politique

sectorielle. Le secteur de la pêche de Kiribati bénéficie aussi d’initiatives régionales par d’autres

donateurs (notamment l’Australie, la Nouvelle Zélande et les États-Unis) ainsi qu’un soutien national sous

le Partenariat pour le développement entre l’Australie et Kiribati.

En septembre 2004, l’Union européenne et 14 pays ACP du Pacifique, dont Kiribati, ont ouvert des

négociations sur un Accord de Partenariat Économique, APE, qui devrait à terme remplacer le régime

d’accès préférentiel, ayant expiré à la fin de 2007 et contenu dans l’Accord de Cotonou. Les négociations

sur l’APE sont toujours en cours. Alors qu’il n’y a pas actuellement de transactions de produits de la pêche

entre Kiribati et l’UE, le pays a des aspirations futures portant sur le commerce de longes de thon frais.

A PECHE AUX THONS A

IRIBATI ET DANS LA REGION

vii.

L’Océan Pacifique occidental et central, OPOC est la zone de pêche principale pour le thon, représentant

autour de 60 % des prises mondiales. La prise totale de thon au sein de l’OPOC pour 2010 a été estimée

à 2,28 millions de tonnes, dont 80 % sont représentés par la pêcherie des thoniers senneurs, 6,5 % par

les canneurs et environ 6 % par les palangriers. Les navires senneurs européens représentent 2 % des

prises dans le Pacifique occidental et central, POC.

La pêche à la senne a connu un essor rapide dans les années 1980, principalement par le biais des

opérations de flottes japonaises et américaines. Plus récemment la composition de la flotte s’est

diversifiée, avec une augmentation, pour inclure d’autres nations de pêche asiatiques, la Nouvelle-

Zélande et les navires européens. Les navires ciblent préférentiellement le listao (81 % de la capture

totale) en parallèle avec l’albacore (17 %) et le thon obèse (2 %) ; la dépendance globale de la pêche sur

banc libre a augmenté au fil des années. L’accès à la pêcherie par des navires de pêche lointaine à la

senne prend la forme d’arrangements ou d’accords de partenariat de pêche régionaux ou bilatéraux,

incluant : des accords bilatéraux intergouvernementaux, des APP avec l’UE, des accords commerciaux

entre associations ou sociétés, des accords individuels entre pays Parties à l’Accord de Nauru (PAN) et le

traité américain portant sur le thon (US

Tuna Treaty).

La pêcherie palangrière capture principalement de l’albacore et du thon obèse, mais aussi du germon, des

poissons à rostre (e.g. espadons) ainsi que d’autres espèces dont des requins pélagiques et de récifs. Le

nombre total de navires impliqués dans les pêcheries tropicales de l’OPOC a généralement été de3 000.

Les palangriers européens opèrent principalement au sud de 20°S, en dehors de la zone tropicale et les

navires palangriers de l’UE n’ont jamais pêché dans les eaux de Kiribati. Ensemble les palangriers

européens représentent moins de 1 % des captures totales à la palangre dans l’OPOC.

L’état des trois principaux stocks exploités dans la zone équatoriale du POC est surveillé par le Comité

Scientifique installé sous la Commission des Pêches du Pacifique occidental et central, CPPOC (en

anglais, WCPFC), organisation de gestion régionale des pêches thonières, ORGP, pour l’OPOC. Le listao

est actuellement exploité à des niveaux modérés sans cas de surpêche. L’albacore est actuellement

exploité pleinement avec une probabilité de 50 % que de la surpêche ait lieu. Des évaluations récentes

montrent que la surpêche de thon obèse est avérée avec des niveaux de capture ayant peu de chance

d’être durables.

Les organisations clés de gestion et de gouvernance pour le thon et les espèces associées au sein de

l’OPOC, et pour les pêcheries à la senne en particulier, comprennent : la CPPOC, les PAN, en particulier

la FFA basée aux Îles Salomon, le SCP basé en Nouvelle Calédonie et les gouvernements nationaux des

PAN. Un certain nombre de Mesures de Gestion de la Commission (Commission

Management Measures,

CMMs) ont été formulées durant les sessions annuelles de la Commission. Les PAN ont aussi présenté

un régime de contrôle par jours de mer par navire,

Vessel Day Scheme

(VDS) pour la gestion des pêches

à la senne du Pacifique ouest, avec des jours d’effort autorisés par partie (Party

Allowable Effort,

PAE)

alloués aux pays PAN, et se sont mises d’accord pour qu’un tarif minimum de 5 000 US$/ 3 450

€

par jour

de pêche soit appliqué aux navires étrangers à partir de 2012.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xi

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

viii.

ix.

xi.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

xii.

À Kiribati même, les éléments centraux du Plan de Développement de Kiribati portant sur la pêche

incluent la maximisation des bénéfices économiques durables issus des ressources thonières, la

conservation des ressources côtières face à la demande croissante en revenus alimentaires et en

espèces, et la gestion de la transition d’une recherche gouvernementale à une production commerciale et

à l’exportation. Les objectifs majeurs de gouvernance sont identifiés comme étant : maintenir une

collaboration étroite avec les PAN et la FFA, obtenir des droits durables d’accès à la Zone d’Exclusivité

Économique (ZEE) à leur niveau maximum, promouvoir des partenariats public-privé pour les captures et

la transformation domestique à terre du thon avec des investisseurs étrangers réputés, animer des

programmes éducationnels participatifs avec des pêcheurs et des communautés engagées dans des

pêches sur des espèces/stocks vulnérables, et s’assurer que des sanctions légales soient appliquées

pour mettre en

œuvre

les mécanismes de conservation, en engageant des poursuites lorsque nécessaire.

Cette responsabilité incombe au Ministère des Pêches et du Développement des Ressources Marines

employant 115 personnes. Kiribati a établi l’Aire Protégée des Îles Phénix (Phoenix

Islands Protected

Area,

PIPA), qui est l’une des Aires Marines Protégées (AMPs) les plus vastes du Pacifique mesurant

408 250 km

VALUATION

xiii.

Le protocole dispense de 4 autorisations de pêches à la senne (1 pour la France et 3 pour l’Espagne), et

12 autorisations de pêche à la palangre partagées équitablement entre le Portugal et l’Espagne. À part

deux autorisations de pêche à la palangre prises durant la première année du protocole, il y a eu 0 %

d’utilisation des possibilités de pêche à la palangre, et aucune capture à la palangre n’a été effectuée

durant le protocole. D’autre part, chaque année du protocole, l’utilisation des 4 autorisations de pêche à la

senne a été de 100 %, et l’utilisation des possibilités de captures en excès de 100 % chaque année du

protocole. En 2011, l’utilisation des captures est prévue de dépasser les 200 % du tonnage de référence

de 6 400 tonnes pour la première fois.

Les paiements effectués auprès de Kiribati durant le protocole ont été en moyenne de 1,2 millions d’euros

par an, dont les 2/3 payés par l’Union européenne (UE) et 1/3 par les armateurs des navires. Le paiement

moyen entre 2007 et 2011 était de 3 350

€/

4 675 US$ par jour, proche du seuil actuel de prix des PAN de

5 000 US$ par jour.

Les engagements et obligations de l’accord et de son protocole ont généralement été respectés par toutes

les parties. Cependant, certains domaines de préoccupation comprennent l’échec de la tenue des

réunions de Commission mixte jusqu’en 2011 ; la lenteur des paiements au cours des dernières années

de l’appui financier à la politique sectorielle ; l’échec de la transmission par Kiribati de certificats

d’inspection et de rapports d’observateurs aux armateurs ; ainsi que l’ absence d’un élan réel vers des

sociétés mixtes ou vers des sites de débarquement locaux pour la transformation.

L’analyse économique du protocole montre que les prix de poissons en sortie navire sont plus bas que les

standards internationaux, probablement en raison des tailles plus faibles de poissons capturés au sein

des pêcheries sur DCPs (Dispositifs de Concentration de Poissons), mais les prix ont augmenté d’environ

50 % durant la période de l’évaluation. Étant donné la tendance à la hausse des captures réalisées à

Kiribati durant la période de l’évaluation, la valeur au débarquement des poissons capturés dans le cadre

de l’APP présente une tendance à la hausse et a dépassé 14 millions d’euros en 2010.

Une valeur ajoutée totale de 6,4 millions d’euros est accumulée chaque année lorsque l’on prend en

compte les bénéfices pour l’Union européenne et pour Kiribati. La valeur ajoutée est plus marquée pour

l’UE en amont dans les secteurs de la capture, et moins marquée en aval de la transformation. À Kiribati

la valeur ajoutée est presque entièrement concentrée dans le sous-secteur en amont, principalement sous

forme de paiements au gouvernement de Kiribati pour l’accès et l’appui sous-sectoriel, mais dans les

services d’appui aux navires, notamment le transbordement. Une petite plus-value est réalisée au travers

de l’emploi d’équipages et d’observateurs de Kiribati.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

xiv.

xv.

xvi.

xvii.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

En termes de coûts et bénéfices pour l’UE dans son ensemble le protocole a généré un ratio moyen

bénéfices/coûts (B/C) de 1:4,6, démontrant que le protocole fournit un bon rapport qualité/prix ; chaque

euro investi par l’UE et les armateurs générant 4,60

€

de bénéfice en termes de valeur ajoutée. Le coût

d’accès pour les armateurs (35

€/tonne)

représente 4,1 - 4,4 % du prix moyen des ventes à la pesée pour

les captures réalisées sous le protocole. Les valeurs moyennes annuelles des captures réalisées dans le

cadre du protocole sont proches de 9,5 millions d’euros, et les profits pour les navires en tant que

proportion du revenu des ventes sont compris entre 11 % et 23 % pour les deux classes de navires (73 m

et 100+ m). Pour Kiribati, les bénéfices en provenance de l’UE étaient de 1,2 millions d’euros par an en

moyenne, s’y ajoutant des bénéfices plus faibles générés par la plus-value issue des escales portuaires

des navires de l’UE ainsi des équipages locaux et des observateurs à bord des navires de l’UE.

xix.

La contribution des captures réalisées dans le cadre du protocole au secteur de transformation de l’UE a

été faible à environ 2 % d’imports de longes par l’UE en 2010, alors que le poisson capturé dans le cadre

du protocole et importé par l’UE sous forme de conserves a représenté autour de 1 % des imports de

conserves de thons par l’UE en 2010.

xx.

L’emploi généré par le protocole est estimé à 98 emplois en équivalent temps plein. Cette génération

d’emploi représente 116 tonnes de poisson capturés sous le protocole pour chaque emploi et 23 810

€

paiements par l’UE pour chaque emploi. La création d’emploi est divisée approximativement en part égale

entre l’UE et Kiribati. Les clauses sociales du protocole en matière de niveaux de rémunération, de la

nécessité pour les marins d’être sous contrat, etc., ont été complètement respectées.

xxi.

En ce qui concerne l’efficacité, la flotte de l’UE ne joue qu’un petit rôle sur le plan de l’activité de la flotte

totale présente à Kiribati et dans le POC. Sa capacité à influencer une pêche responsable est donc

limitée. Cependant, des préoccupations sont à noter en relation avec la pêche responsable. Elles portent

sur le pourcentage élevé de captures composées de thon obèse (qui est estimé en surexploitation), les

rejets des navires, le navires dépassant le nombre de jours autorisé en haute mer, les captures

accessoires de requins pélagiques, et les faiblesses en capacité de suivi, contrôle et surveillance (SCS)

de Kiribati. Le protocole a été efficace dans son appui au sous-secteur UE des captures en particulier,

mais ne l’a pas été dans la création de sociétés mixtes ou dans le développement significatif des sous-

secteurs de capture ou de transformation de Kiribati, largement pour des raisons de coûts. Ainsi qu’il a été

mentionné précédemment, le protocole a aussi été efficace dans la création de l’emploi tant pour l’UE que

pour Kiribati.

xxii.

S’agissant de l’efficience, le protocole a été utile pour l’UE en fournissant un accès à un coût raisonnable

pour les armateurs des navires de l’UE, et en générant un bon ratio bénéfice/coût de 4,6. Cependant le

coût par emploi de l’UE a été de 23 810

€.

Pour Kiribati, les paiements effectués par l’UE dans le cadre du

protocole ont représenté 4-7 % du revenu national des licences de pêche et 1-2 % du revenu

gouvernemental annuel total.

xxiii.

Le protocole a contribué de manière significative à la viabilité et à la durabilité du sous-secteur des

captures à la senne de l’UE opérant dans le Pacifique et de ses emplois liés, mais il n’a aucunement

contribué à la durabilité du secteur palangrier ; et a contribué faiblement à la durabilité des sous-secteurs

en amont et de transformation de l’UE. Le protocole ne semble pas menacer la durabilité du secteur de la

pêche de Kiribati. Le protocole n’a cependant pas eu de succès dans le développement d’opérations de

captures par des sociétés mixtes, ni en contribuant durablement aux opérations du sous-secteur de la

transformation de Kiribati, bien qu’il ait contribué aux activités durables en amont/de soutien aux navires.

xxiv.

L’UE est une partie contractante de la CPPOC, et le protocole est en cohérence avec à la fois les mesures

de gestion politiques de la Politique Commune des Pêches (PCP) et de la CPPOC, ainsi qu’avec le Code

de Conduite pour des Pêcheries Responsables de la FAO (Food

and Agriculture Organisation),

et avec la

Déclaration de l’Organisation Internationale du Travail sur les Principes Fondamentaux et les Droits au

Travail. Il n’y a pas d’incohérences entre le texte du protocole ou sa mise en

œuvre

et les politiques

commerciales de l’UE. Le protocole est aussi cohérent avec les politiques nationales et les législations

nationales de Kiribati. L’élément-clé de préoccupation au sujet de la cohérence pourrait cependant être

que le protocole est basé sur le tonnage, avec des paiements par accès par tonne. La politique nationale

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xiii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

xviii.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

xxv.

xxvi.

xxvii.

de Kiribati, en accord avec des initiatives régionales en évolution, est maintenant fortement en faveur

d’une négociation et de fournir des accès basés sur des jours de mer par navire.

Tous les commentaires précédents signifient que le protocole est pertinent vis-à-vis des besoins de l’UE,

et en particulier de ceux de sa flotte de pêche à la senne (bien que ne l’étant pas pour ceux de la flotte

palangrière). La génération des droits d’accès signifie que le protocole est aussi pertinent aux besoins de

Kiribati. Le protocole ne satisfait cependant pas les besoins/souhaits de Kiribati d’avoir un protocole

structuré autour de paiements par accès basés sur des jours de mer, bien que ce souhait n’ait pas

formellement été exprimé à l’UE. Ceci s’explique par le fait que le VDS n’était pas en place lorsque le

protocole était négocié mais qu’il a évolué dans les récentes années. De plus, alors que le protocole a un

objectif de création de sociétés mixtes et de soutien à l’activité locale de transformation, satisfaisant les

besoins de Kiribati, la mise en

œuvre

du protocole n’a pas réussi à créer de telles activités ou à satisfaire

ces besoins et aspirations.

En se projetant vers un éventuel futur protocole, de nouvelles mesures de gestion potentielles étant

considérées dans la région pour améliorer le mode de gestion (ex : une extension d’un mois de la clôture

des Dispositifs de Concentration de Poissons (DCPs), une augmentation des tailles minimales de

maillage, la fermeture à la pêche de l’Aire Protégée de l’Île Phénix, les fermetures de zones de haute mer

autour de la ZEE de Kiribati) auraient un impact négatif sur les activités et la profitabilité des navires

senneurs de l’UE. D’autres changements qui pourraient avoir un impact si mandatés par la CPPOC

comprennent des changements potentiels dans les exigences d’équipages à 10 % puis 20 % d’origines

des pays PAN – ceci nécessiterait des changements de texte du protocole afin d’assurer sa cohérence,

puisque le texte actuellement cite un minimum de 6 hommes d’équipage dans la flotte de senneurs, ce qui

représente environ 5 % du nombre total de marins à bord (ce chiffre est dépassé par la flotte de l’UE avec

environ 9 % de l’équipage total déjà originaire de Kiribati).

Il est probable que le futur protocole génère des niveaux conséquents de valeur ajoutée à la fois pour l’UE

et Kiribati, mais peu de changements sur l’emploi ou la répartition de la création de valeur ajoutée entre

l’UE et Kiribati. Il serait ainsi dans l’intérêt de l’UE et de Kiribati d’avoir un nouvel protocole. Pour l’UE, un

« non protocole » signifierait une hausse importante des droits de pêche dans le revenus des ventes,

pendant que pour Kiribati l’absence de signature d’un nouveau protocole éliminerait les fonds réservés à

l’appui sectoriel spécial fourni par l’UE sous le protocole et pourrait résulter par une sous-utilisation des

jours de PAE sous le VDS.

ECOMMANDATIONS

xxviii.

Les recommandations soumises dans ce rapport sont nécessairement brèves, puisque il n’est pas du rôle

des consultants de présenter une stratégie à l’UE pour la négociation, mais plutôt de fournir à l’UE les

données économiques pour préparer les négociations. C’est pourquoi la recommandation principale est

de baser les négociations sur les données économiques et sociales fournies dans ce rapport afin de

s’assurer qu’il y ait ainsi signature d’un nouveau protocole.

La réforme en cours de la PCP signifie aussi qu’il n’y a pas encore de direction ou d’orientation sur un

changement de ratio de droits d’accès à la tonne entre l’UE et les armateurs, et que le ratio actuel doit

donc être maintenu.

D'un point de vue purement technique, cette évaluation recommande que les possibilités de pêche à la

palangre soient retirées du protocole, compte tenu du fait qu'il n'y ait eu aucune capture effectuées par la

flottille palangrière au titre du protocole. Toutefois, une décision finale sur cette question devra également

tenir compte des souhaits politiques et de l'aval des Etats membres de l'UE.

Compte tenu du niveau élevé de juvéniles de thon obèse capturés dans la pêche sous DCPs par la flotte

de l'UE, l'évaluation recommande également que des mesures directes soient incluses dans le protocole

(et son annexe) afin d'atténuer ce problème. Ces mesures devraient être adoptées conjointement par

toutes les parties, mais pourrait inclure l'utilisation de, et des rapports sur des, plans de gestion des DCPs.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xiv

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

xxix.

xxx.

xxxi.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

xxxii.

xxxiii.

xxxiv.

xxxv.

Les niveaux de paiements dans un futur protocole, et la base sur laquelle ils sont payés (ex. tonnage ou

jours de pêche des navires), seront sujets à négociation, mais devront être renseignés des niveaux de

captures récents, des taux d’utilisation et des prix du poisson.

Une recommandation est exprimée pour une plus grande mise en évidence et reconnaissance par toutes

les parties de l’importance des réunions de la commission mixte. Ces réunions représentent un

mécanisme de suivi vital pour la mise en

œuvre

de l’APP – un mécanisme qui n’a pas été historiquement

très efficace. Les réunions de la commission mixte doivent être annuels, tel que requis dans le texte de

l’APP, et devraient être utilisés pour revoir à la fois la mise en

œuvre

des politiques sectorielles et pour

s’assurer du respect des engagements et des obligations détaillées dans l’APP et le protocole (et les

actions nécessaires à un tel respect sont insuffisants). Les zones de faiblesse actuelles dans le respect

des autres engagements et obligations requises dans l’APP et le protocole devraient aussi être traitées en

urgence.

L’évaluation recommande que l’accent soit mis sur le renforcement de la capacité de suivi, contrôle et

surveillance (SCS) à Kiribati. Par exemple, les fonds sectoriels de l’APP, et autres appuis au

développement de l’UE, pourraient être utilisés pour augmenter les capacités d’observation afin d’assurer

une reconnaissance mutuelle des observateurs de la CPPOC et de la Commission Inter-américaine du

thon tropical (CIAT ; en anglais IATTC). L’évaluation recommande aussi une plus grande reconnaissance

par les projets de développement de l’UE de l’importance de l’APP avec Kiribati, et donc pour l’utilisation

des fonds d’appuis à Kiribati. Le point de vue de cette évaluation est qu’il devrait y avoir un effort

particulier pour mieux aligner l’appui à la politique sectorielle fournie dans le cadre de l’APP avec d’autres

projets de développement de l’UE de manière à se renforcer mutuellement tout en prenant garde à éviter

des duplications. Ceci pourrait être appuyé par la nomination d'un attaché à la pêche à la délégation de

l'UE aux îles Fidji, l'UE serait sous le processus de recruter pour pourvoir un tel poste.

Enfin, l’évaluation note l’engagement actif de l’UE à collaborer avec la CPPOC dans le but de garantir des

pêches responsables au sein de l’OPOC. En tant que partie intégrante de ce processus, étant donné

certaines des faiblesses grandissantes identifiées du système VDS en évolution, l’évaluation recommande

que l’UE soutienne l’établissement de points de références cibles et de références limites pour les stocks

de thons afin d’assurer l’intégrité du programme VDS en liant l’état des stocks au système de gestion.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xv

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

ABLE OF

ONTENTS

INTRODUCTION - PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS EVALUATION................................................. 1

GENERAL BACKGROUND AND SITUATION IN THE PARTNER COUNTRY ................................... 2

2.1

OUNTRY BACKGROUND

...................................................................................................................... 2

2.1.1 Geography.................................................................................................................................... 2

2.1.2 Population .................................................................................................................................... 3

2.2

OLITICAL

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

............................................................................................ 3

2.2.1 Political and institutional aspects.................................................................................................. 3

2.2.2 General economic situation and outlook....................................................................................... 4

2.2.3 National budgetary and social objectives ..................................................................................... 5

2.2.4 Contribution of fisheries to national economy............................................................................... 5

2.2.5 Balance of trade ........................................................................................................................... 6

2.2.6 Employment ................................................................................................................................. 7

2.2.7 Food security................................................................................................................................ 7

2.3

AND

IRIBATI RELATIONSHIPS IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

.................................................................. 7

2.3.1 EU cooperation strategy ............................................................................................................... 7

2.3.2 10th EDF commitments................................................................................................................ 8

2.3.3 9

EDF commitments..................................................................................................................10

2.3.4 Millennium Development Goal Initiative.......................................................................................10

2.3.5 Trade relationships between Kiribati and the EU.........................................................................10

2.4

THER DONOR RELATIONS

..................................................................................................................11

TUNA FISHERIES IN KIRIBATI AND THE REGION ..........................................................................13

3.1

EGIONAL OVERVIEW

.........................................................................................................................13

3.2

HE PURSE SEINE FISHERY

..................................................................................................................14

3.2.1 Fleet evolution .............................................................................................................................14

3.2.2 Purse seine catch by species ......................................................................................................15

3.2.3 Purse seine effort ........................................................................................................................17

3.2.4 FAD and free school set dependencies.......................................................................................18

3.3

ONGLINE FISHERY

......................................................................................................................18

3.3.1 The fleet ......................................................................................................................................18

3.3.2 Longline catch by species ...........................................................................................................19

3.4

TATUS OF

ISH STOCKS IN THE REGION

..............................................................................................20

3.5

COSYSTEM ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH TUNA FISHERIES

........................................................................22

3.6

ANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE

WCP

AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

.......................................................24

3.6.1 The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) ............................................24

3.6.2 Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and related management arrangements........................28

3.6.3 The Palau Arrangement and Vessel Day Scheme (VDS)............................................................33

3.6.4 Niue Treaty..................................................................................................................................38

3.6.5 Regional Organizations (FFA and SPC)......................................................................................39

3.7

ASTERN

ACIFIC

ISHERY

: S

TATUS AND

ANAGEMENT ISSUES

.....................................................41

3.7.1 Status and management issues ..................................................................................................41

3.7.2 Issues of special concern to vessels fishing under the Kiribati FPA ............................................42

3.8

LEETS FISHING IN THE

IRIBATI

EEZ ..................................................................................................43

3.8.1 EU purse seine fleet ....................................................................................................................43

3.8.2 EU longline fleet ..........................................................................................................................46

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xvi

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.8.3 Non-EU distant water fishing activity in the Kiribati EEZ..............................................................46

3.8.4 Domestic sector...........................................................................................................................50

3.9

ISHERIES GOVERNANCE IN

IRIBATI

....................................................................................................51

3.9.1 Policy and institutional framework ...............................................................................................51

3.9.2 Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development (MFMRD) Budget.............................55

3.9.3 National Fisheries Laws ..............................................................................................................56

3.9.4 Specific national marine protected area measures......................................................................57

3.9.5 Monitoring, control and surveillance ............................................................................................58

3.9.6 Catch certification........................................................................................................................60

EX-POST EVALUATION SPECIFIC TO THE PROTOCOL OF THE FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP

AGREEMENT ......................................................................................................................................61

4.1

NTRODUCTION TO THE

ISHERIES

ARTNERSHIP

GREEMENT

...............................................................61

4.2

TILISATION

.......................................................................................................................................62

4.2.1 Fishing authorisations and uptake of the possibilities negotiated ................................................62

4.2.2 Catches and utilisation of the possibilities negotiated..................................................................63

4.3

OSTS OF THE

ROTOCOL

..................................................................................................................63

4.4

OMPLIANCE WITH THE COVENANTS AND OBLIGATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE

FPA.........................................66

4.5

CONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

ROTOCOL

....................................................................................................67

4.5.1 Findings and discussion of the economic and financial impacts of the Protocol..........................67

4.6

MPLOYMENT ANALYSIS OF THE

ROTOCOL

..........................................................................................75

4.7

FFECTIVENESS

– T

HE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SPECIFIC

FPA

OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED

.....................77

4.8

FFICIENCY

– T

HE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DESIRED EFFECTS WERE ACHIEVED AT A REASONABLE COST

.....79

4.9

USTAINABILITY

– T

HE EXTENT TO WHICH POSITIVE

NEGATIVE EFFECTS ARE LIKELY TO LAST AFTER THE

FPA

HAS TERMINATED

.................................................................................................................................80

4.10 C

ONSISTENCY

– T

HE EXTENT TO WHICH POSITIVE

NEGATIVE SPILL

OVER ONTO OTHER ECONOMIC

SOCIAL

OR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AREAS ARE BEING MAXIMISED

MINIMISED

............................................................82

4.11 R

ELEVANCE

– T

HE EXTENT TO WHICH THE

FPA’

S OBJECTIVES WERE PERTINENT TO THE NEEDS

PROBLEMS

AND ISSUES FACED BY STAKEHOLDERS

..........................................................................................................83

5.1

5.2

5.3

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS AND EX-ANTE EVALUATION OF A FUTURE PROTOCOL OF THE

FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT........................................................................................85

TAKEHOLDERS TO A FUTURE PROTOCOL AND THEIR VIEWS

...................................................................85

ECTORAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

........................................................................................................86

ANTE EVALUATION CRITERIA

...........................................................................................................89

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................92

6.1

ONCLUSIONS

...................................................................................................................................92

6.2

ECOMMENDATIONS

...........................................................................................................................94

APPENDICES

PPENDIX

A: R

EFERENCES

......................................................................................................................................................................96

PPENDIX

B: P

ERSONS CONSULTED

........................................................................................................................................................102

PPENDIX

C: C

OMPLIANCE WITH KEY COVENANTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN THE

GREEMENT

, P

ROTOCOL AND

NNEX

......................................104

PPENDIX

D: C

OSTS AND

ARNINGS MODELS FOR

M AND

100+

PURSE SEINE VESSELS UTILISING FISHING POSSIBILITIES PROVIDED BY

THE

ROTOCOL

............................................................................................................................................................................113

PPENDIX

E: M

ETHODOLOGY USED IN THIS EVALUATION

..........................................................................................................................114

PPENDIX

F: P

URSE SEINE CATCHES IN THE

WCPO

BY NATIONALITY

, 2006

2010 (

TONNES

) .................................................................116

PPENDIX

G: L

ONGLINE CATCHES IN THE

WCPO

BY NATIONALITY

, 2006

2010 (

TONNES

)......................................................................117

PPENDIX

H: P

URSE SEINE AND LONGLINE CATCHES IN

IRIBATI

EEZ

BY NATIONALITY

, 2007

2010 (

TONNES

) ........................................118

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xvii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Figures, Tables and Boxes

Figures

IGURE

1: K

IRIBATI

XCLUSIVE

CONOMIC

ONE

.........................................................................................................................................2

IGURE

2: W

ORLD TUNA CATCH

, 2008-2010 (

TONNES

)..............................................................................................................................13

IGURE

3: D

ISTRIBUTION OF CATCHES OF TUNAS IN THE

WCP

AREA BY GEAR OVER THE

2000-2009

PERIOD

AND

2010................................14

IGURE

4: T

RENDS IN ANNUAL EFFORT

(

DAYS AT SEA

)

FOR THE TOP FOUR PURSE SEINE FLEETS

, FSMA/

DOMESTIC AND OTHERS OPERATING IN

THE TROPICAL

WCP, 2001–2010 ...................................................................................................................................................17

IGURE

5: D

ISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATIVE

WCPFC

YELLOWFIN TUNA CATCH FROM

2000-2009

DEGREE SQUARES OF LATITUDE AND

LONGITUDE AND FISHING GEAR

;.......................................................................................................................................................21

IGURE

6: P

ERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF THE

MAIN SPECIES CAUGHT BY UNASSOCIATED

LOG

DRIFTING

FAD

AND ANCHORED

FAD

PURSE

SEINE SETS

(

BY WEIGHT

)

IN THE

WCP–CA

DETERMINED FROM RECENT OBSERVER DATA

(2001–2006). .............................................23

IGURE

7: WCPFC H

IGH

EA POCKETS

....................................................................................................................................................27

IGURE

8: M

EAN DISTRIBUTION OF SKIPJACK LARVAE

, 1

QUARTER FOR THE DECADE

1990-1999................................................................28

IGURE

9: DWFN / FSMA

AND

OMESTIC

URSE SEINE EFFORT BY

PNA

LICENSED PURSE SEINE FLEET

.....................................................35

IGURE

10: M

ONTHLY CATCHES BY

PURSE SEINE VESSELS FOR

2010

BY SPECIES

(

TONNES

) ..................................................................44

IGURE

11: F

ISHERIES

IVISION ORGANISATION CHART

..............................................................................................................................54

IGURE

12: A

VERAGE MONTHLY IMPORT PRICES PAID BY

ANGKOK CANNERIES FOR PURSE SEINE CAUGHT FISH

URO

TONNE

, 2006

ULY

2011)............................................................................................................................................................................................68

IGURE

13: A

NNUAL VALUE OF CATCHES MADE IN

IRIBATI

EEZ

VESSELS UNDER THE

ROTOCOL

UROS

)........................................69

Tables

ABLE

1: K

IRIBATI

ROSS

OMESTIC

RODUCT BY

CONOMIC

CTIVITY AT

ONSTANT

2006 P

RICES

, 2007–09 (€

MNS

).................................6

ABLE

2: B

ALANCE OF EXTERNAL TRADE

(€,

)..........................................................................................................................................6

ABLE

3: B

REAKDOWN OF PURSE SEINE DISTANT WATER VESSELS

(EEZ

AND HIGH SEAS

)

FISHING IN THE

ESTERN

ACIFIC

, 31 J

UNE

2010

AND AT THREE PRIOR TIMES IN THE FISHERY

.....................................................................................................................................15

ABLE

4: P

URSE SEINE CATCH

(

TONNES

)

BY TROPICAL TUNA SPECIES IN

WCPO, 2010................................................................................16

ABLE

5: PNA

CATCH BY SET TYPE

(

AVERAGE

2005-2009) ........................................................................................................................18

ABLE

6: L

ONGLINE CATCHES IN THE

WCPO,

TONNES

, 2010. ....................................................................................................................20

ABLE

7: WCPFC

MEASURES RELEVANT TO THE FISHERIES UNDER ASSESSMENT

........................................................................................25

ABLE

8: PNA VDS

ALLOCATIONS

UPTAKE BY MANAGEMENT YEAR

(2008-2011)

AND TRANSFERS

...............................................................36

ABLE

9: I

MPLEMENTATION OF

PAE A

LLOCATIONS BY

PNA

MEMBERS AT

EBRUARY

2011 ..........................................................................37

ABLE

10: S

TRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE

VDS .............................................................................................................................37

ABLE

11: EU

ZONAL PURSE SEINE CATCHES IN THE

WCPO (EEZ

AND

HS) 2007-2010 .............................................................................43

ABLE

12: EU

PURSE SEINE SPECIES CATCH IN THE

WCPO (EEZ

AND

HS) 2006-2011. .............................................................................44

ABLE

13: EU

PURSE SEINE FISHING DAYS BY ZONE

(2007-2010) ..............................................................................................................45

ABLE

14: C

ATCH STATISTICS FOR

FLEET IN

IRIBATI PROVIDED BY DIFFERENT MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS

(2007-2010) ...................45

ABLE

15: EU

CATCH BY

IRIBATI ZONE

(2007-2010)................................................................................................................................46

ABLE

16: C

ATCHES OF TUNA

(

TONNES

)

DWFN

AND

FSMA

PURSE SEINE AND LONGLINE VESSELS IN THE

IRIBATI

EEZ .........................47

ABLE

17: S

UMMARY OF FOREIGN VESSELS LICENSED TO FISH IN

IRIBATI WATERS

, 2011 ...........................................................................48

ABLE

18: E

STIMATES OF ANNUAL AVERAGE LICENCE REVENUES ACCRUED TO

IRIBATI IN THE PERIOD

2009-2011.......................................49

ABLE

19: U

SE OF

IRIBATI

PAE

DAYS

, 2007

2010..............................................................................................................................50

ABLE

20: MFMRD E

XPENDITURE

RAMEWORK

, 2011

AND

2012 (AUS$

AND

€)

.......................................................................................55

ABLE

21: M

ARINE

ROTECTED

REAS IN

IRIBATI

....................................................................................................................................57

ABLE

22: U

TILISATION OF FISHING AUTHORISATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE

ROTOCOL

..............................................................................62

ABLE

23: U

TILISATION OF CATCH POSSIBILITIES PROVIDED FOR IN THE

ROTOCOL

.....................................................................................63

ABLE

24: P

AYMENTS MADE TO

IRIBATI BY THE

AND FLEET OWNERS

....................................................................................................65

ABLE

25: P

AYMENTS MADE TO

IRIBATI PER TONNE OF FISH AND PER DAY

, 2007-2010..............................................................................66

ABLE

26: C

ARRIAGE

NSURANCE AND

REIGHT

(CIF)

PRICES PAID FOR FISH CAUGHT BY

PURSE SEINERS FISHING UNDER THE

ROTOCOL

.....................................................................................................................................................................................................67

ABLE

27: A

VERAGE YEARLY IMPORT PRICES PAID BY

ANGKOK CANNERIES FOR PURSE SEINE CAUGHT FISH

URO

TONNE

).........................68

ABLE

28: A

VERAGE YEARLY EX

VESSEL PRICES

(€/

TONNE

) .......................................................................................................................68

ABLE

29: A

VERAGE ANNUAL VALUE ADDED ACCRUING TO THE

AND TO

IRIBATI FROM THE

ROTOCOL

...................................................70

ABLE

30: B

ALANCE OF VALUE

ADDED BETWEEN SUB

SECTORS

AND BETWEEN THE

AND

IRIBATI

..........................................................72

ABLE

31: A

VERAGE ANNUAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

(€)

OF THE

ROTOCOL

(2007

2011) ........................................................................73

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xviii

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

ABLE

32: EU

IMPORTS OF CANNED AND LOINED TUNA AND ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTIONS OF CATCH MADE UNDER THE

ROTOCOL TO

IMPORTS

........................................................................................................................................................................................74

ABLE

33: E

MPLOYMENT GENERATED BY THE

ROTOCOL

...........................................................................................................................76

ABLE

34: E

ANTE EVALUATION OF THE RENEWAL OF THE

EU/K

IRIBATI

ROTOCOL

....................................................................................89

OXES

1: S

UMMARY OF FISHERIES PROGRAMMES COVERED UNDER THE

EDF............................................................................................9

2: F

ISHERIES

ERFORMANCE

NCENTIVE

UND

, 2010-2011) ................................................................................................12

3: C

ONTENTS OF THE

AURU

GREEMENT

.........................................................................................................................................29

4: T

ARMONISED

INIMUM

ERMS AND

ONDITIONS FOR

OREIGN

ISHING

ESSEL

CCESS

.........................................................32

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page xix

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

INTRODUCTION - PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS EVALUATION

This evaluation provides a retrospective ex-post evaluation for the existing Protocol to the Fisheries

Partnership Agreement (FPA) between the EU and the Republic of Kiribati (hereafter, Kiribati)

. The evaluation

considers the Protocol in terms of its relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. It also

provides a prospective analysis of impacts and ex-ante evaluation of a future Protocol, in order to provide

sufficient data and information for the negotiation and implementation of a new Protocol.

The framework and scope of the evaluation are influenced by the Terms of Reference provided to the

consultants, the Council Decision of 19

July 2004 on Fisheries Partnership Agreements (COM (2002) 637

final), the Specific Methodological Guidelines for Evaluation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (Oceanic

Developpement & Megapesca Lda, 2008), and the European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines

(2009). The period of the Protocol evaluated in this report is from 16

September 2006 until March 2012.

According to the Article 27(4) of the Financial Regulation and Article 21 of its Implementing Rules, Commission

Services have to ensure that the spending activities they manage are subject of an ex-post and/or ex-ante

evaluation in terms of the human and financial resources allocated and the results obtained in order to verify

consistency with the objectives set. These evaluations must be proportionate to the resources mobilised for,

and the impact of, the programme and activity concerned. The Commission requires the evaluation and

analysis of impacts to support its focus on improving the quality and coherence of the policy development

process.

Before the Commission begins negotiating a new Protocol with Kiribati, it requires:



Factual information and an analysis of the general situation in Kiribati and its fishing sector, covering

the economic, financial, political, institutional, social and environmental aspects, and likely

developments in the short and medium term;

A cost-benefit analysis for the European stakeholders, as regards both the conditions of access to the

waters and resources for the European distant-water fleet, fishing authorisations and other elements

provided for or to be provided for in the Protocol; and

A cost-benefit analysis of a Protocol, and assess its impact on Kiribati, at the political, institutional,

economic, financial, social and environmental levels.

This report presents information collected from various sources, including various Directorate Generals of the

European Commission (EC), the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Parties to the

Nauru Agreement Office (PNAO), the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) of the Secretariat of the Pacific

Community (SPC), the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and the professional association groupings of European

Union (EU) shipowners, Organización de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores

(OPAGAC) and Organisation de Producteurs de Thon Congelé (ORTHONGEL), concerned with the utilisation

of fishing possibilities. It also includes the findings of a mission in Kiribati that took place between 26

January

and 5

February 2012 during which discussions were held with Kiribati stakeholders (government authorities,

private sector).

Throughout this report when referring to the ‘FPA’ we refer to the FPA, Protocol, and Annex. And when referring specifically to the

‘Protocol’ we refer to both the Protocol and the Annex.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 1

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

2.1

2.1.1

GENERAL BACKGROUND AND SITUATION IN THE PARTNER COUNTRY

Country background

Geography

Kiribati is a remote Pacific nation made up of a large number of widely dispersed islands that straddle the

equator (Figure 1). The country is made up of 33 islands, 21 of which are inhabited with a total land area of

some 811 km

. The related exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is equal in size to the continental United States

and at 3.55 mn km

is the largest EEZ of the Pacific islands countries, lying within the tropical tuna range

bounded by 20°N and 20°S. The islands are divided into three widely spread groups; the Gilbert Group, the

Phoenix Group and the Line Group.

Figure 1: Kiribati Exclusive Economic Zone

Source:

http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/296.aspx.

The Gilbert Islands (or Tungaru Group) is a chain of 11 atolls and five other islands which have no lagoon but

are of similar origin. Often considered alongside this chain is the isolated island of Banaba, a raised atoll

reaching a height of some 81 meters similar to Nauru, and the only “high” island in the country. The Phoenix

Islands include three atolls and five other islands with fringing reefs. There are also at least two other

submerged reef structures (Winslow and Carondelet) which have no associated islands. The Line Islands in

the east fall into a northern and southern group. The northern group includes the island of Teraina and the

atolls of Tabuaeran and Kiritimati (Christmas Island). The southern Line Islands are mostly uninhabited and

include the atoll of Millennium Island (formerly Caroline Island) and three other islands with fringing reefs, as

well as at least one other submerged reef with no associated island. The total land area is only 726 km

, of

which over half (388 km

) is on Kiritimati (Christmas Island).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 2

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The capital (Tarawa) on South Tarawa is over 2,000 km to the west of Kiritimati. The islands are very low-lying

with few places being more than two meters above sea level. This makes them particularly vulnerable to rises

in sea level and also to pollution, unsustainable depletion of the underground water resources, and coastal

erosion brought about by both man-made and external factors. The predominant climatic influence comes from

the southeast trade winds which create a pronounced windward side to the reefs. The western islands are

generally wetter, while the Line Islands lie in the dry equatorial zone. Rainfall is also significantly higher in all

areas during El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events. Although tidal ranges tend to be low (less than 2

meters at spring tides) there is variation in sea level through the year (10-20 cm variation in mean monthly

levels) which can increase by up to 40 cm during El Niño years. The atolls comprise a diversity of habitats,

including channels, lagoon reefs and shallow reef flats as well as reef slope environments. There is a clear

difference between windward and leeward sides, with the windward (eastern) sides typically having a

continuous reef margin, narrow reef flat and well developed islands. The leeward reefs are typically much

wider, but in some places show a more gradual slope with a less developed reef flat, often submerged at low

tide.

2.1.2

Population

Kiribati’s population was 103,280 in 2011, with an annual population growth rate of 1.25 %

. At the current rate

of growth, the population is expected to double in the next 20 years.

The population is almost entirely concentrated in the Gilbert Islands. The combination of high population

growth and lack of employment on the outer islands is causing the population to drift to Tarawa, the capital.

About 43.6 % of the population live on South Tarawa and the population density (2,558 people per square km)

is high, especially on the islet of Betio. Rapid urban population growth, overcrowding and unsustainable

development are taking their toll, particularly in South Tarawa - there are serious problems with potable water,

sewerage and waste disposal, coastal erosion, over-fishing of coastal resources and health issues.

The Phoenix Islands are largely uninhabited, in the main because freshwater is not always available. Just over

3,000 people live on Kiritimati. 58 % of the population of Kiribati is under the age of 24. A major part of the

young population has no skills or employment. 98.8 % are primarily Micronesians and speak a common local

language, with Asian and European minority populations the remainder. English is the official government

language.

2.2

2.2.1

Political, economic and social issues

Political and institutional aspects

Kiribati is a democratic republic within the Commonwealth. The constitution promulgated at independence

establishes Kiribati as a sovereign democratic republic and guarantees the fundamental rights of its citizens.

The President is both the head of state and the head of government, and is elected by members of the

parliament known as the Maneabani Maungatabu. The Maneabani Maungatabu is a 46-member unicameral

parliament. After each general election, the new Maneaba nominates at least three but not more than four of

its members to stand as candidates for president, locally referred to as "His Excellency Te Beretitenti." The

voting public then elects the president from among these candidates. A cabinet of up to 10 members is

appointed by the president from among the members of the Maneaba.

National Statistics Office estimate

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 3

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Although popularly elected, the president can be deposed by a majority vote in the Maneaba. In this case, a

new election for President must be held. A person can serve as president for only three terms, irrespective of

term duration.

The President appoints the cabinet, which comprises the President, Vice-President, Attorney-General and no

more than 10 ministers.

Presidential elections were held on 13 January 2012. Anote Tong of the ruling Boutokaante Koaua (Supporting

the Truth Party) was re-elected for a third term as President of the Republic of Kiribati, winning with an overall

margin of almost 42 %. A new Fisheries Minister, Tinian Reiher was appointed on 20th January 2012. The

Fisheries Minister is a member of the ruling party, and a former Fisheries Secretary.

2.2.2

General economic situation and outlook

Kiribati's economy faces significant constraints common to other island atoll states. These include its small

size, remoteness and geographical fragmentation, a harsh natural environment with infertile soils, limited

exploitable resources, and the need to create jobs and promote growth for an expanding population. Kiribati is

classified as a least developed ACP State under Annex 6 of the Cotonou Agreement. There is little potential

for agricultural development, and limited fresh water supplies. Low-lying atolls are threatened by any

substantial rise in sea levels. There is minimal manufacturing sector activity and agriculture is predominantly

subsistence in nature. The major commercial activity is the harvesting of coconuts for domestic consumption

and for the export of copra and coconut oil. The main source of formal employment is the public sector.

Notwithstanding the limited range of economic assets, Kiribati has largely had a solid record of financial

stability since independence in 1979. Governments have traditionally adopted a cautious approach to

domestic spending combined with a deliberate policy of accumulating offshore investments. A major distinctive

feature of national resources is the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF), initially established from

royalties from mining the Banaba phosphate deposits. The RERF has a value of around AUS$554 mn/

€

410

mn (2011) and is used to fund the annual fiscal deficit. However, it recently suffered from exposure to failed

Icelandic banks and the continuation of a high level of draw-downs to fund the budget deficit and distressed

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms (Asian Development Bank [ADB] Pacific Economic Monitor Feb 2011).

Concern has been raised as to the long term sustainability of the fund, and it has become even more urgent

that the government constrain expenditures to a level in line with revenue. Privatisation of financially

distressed SOEs is underway and these reforms are likely to create space for private sector development,

reduce SOE’s drain on the budget, and improve the government’s future financial position.

The Kiribati Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stands at AUS$147 mn /

€109

mn (Table 1), expanding by an

estimated 2-3 % per annum (IMF, 2011). GDP per capita is one of the lowest of the PNA nations at US$1,518 /

€1,047

(World Bank, 2011), and compares to GDP figures for Federated States of Micronesia of US$2,883 /

€1,988,

Rep Marshall Islands US$2,587 /

€1,784,

Papua New Guinea US$1,383 /

€954,

and Solomon Islands

US$1,261 /

€870.

GDP growth is likely to be higher in 2012 as large donor-funded infrastructure development

programmes commence. These include the upgrading of international airports in Tarawa and Kiritimati,

upgrading of the South Tarawa Road, and the extension of Betio Port. Inflation was estimated at 2.5 % in

2011.

According to analysis carried out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2011), key externally financed

infrastructure projects are expected to spur growth over the next few years. The main challenge is to manage

the investment boom underway without creating inflationary pressures. Risks to future economic growth are

mainly external and relate to higher inflation pressures from a further escalation of international fuel and food

prices and a stalled global recovery that would hit Kiribati’s remittances and wealth funds. These are balanced

by the potentially faster rebound in domestic demand driven by large public investments in the pipeline.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 4

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

2.2.3

National budgetary and social objectives

The Government endorsed the Kiribati Development Plan (KDP) 2008–2011 , prepared by Ministry of Finance

and Economic Development (MFED) in April 2008, which specified actions to address the core weaknesses of

fiscal management, addressing population growth, and improved access to international labour markets (to

promote invisible earnings from national workers abroad). The KDP also builds upon the previous National

Development Strategy 2004–2007, which had guided the previous strategic focus on (i) improving the

economic environment in the outer islands, particularly Kiritimati Island (Christmas Island); (ii) strengthening

access to health services throughout the country; and (iii) addressing climate change.

The Government’s progress in implementing its development priorities has been slow, due in part to capacity

limitations but also to lack of financial and skilled human resources (ADB, 2009).

2.2.4

Contribution of fisheries to national economy

Kiribati relies heavily on licence fees from distant water fishing nations and remittances from Kiribati citizens

employed abroad, mainly as seafarers. The contribution of the fishing sector to the real GDP is around 10 %.

Kiribati, like other FFA members, also receives revenue from a multilateral treaty signed with the United

States. It has bilateral fisheries arrangements with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of

Korea, as well as some specific private company agreements with vessels operating from Latin America

(Ecuador and El Salvador).

These licenses produced AUS$30 mn /

€

17.2 mn in 2009, AUS$41.7 mn /

€28.9

mn in 2010 and AUS$26.9

mn /

€19.9

mn in 2011 (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Variations in revenue are usually in response to El Niño

events. There is a strong relationship between higher stock abundance/availability and environmental

conditions in the eastern region (Langley

et al.,

2008).

Revenues from fishing licences traditionally provide between 23-30 % of Kiribati’s government revenue (IMF,

2011).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 5

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 1: Kiribati Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity at Constant 2006 Prices, 2007–09

(€mns)

Agriculture

Fishing

Seaweed

Mining and Quarrying

Manufacturing

Electricity, Gas & Water Supply

Construction

Wholesale & Retail trade

Hotel &Restaurants

Transport and Storage

Communications

Financial Intermediation

Real Estate

Owner Occupied Dwellings

Business Services

Public Administration and Defence

Education

Health

Other Community, Social & Personal Services

Less Imputed Bank Service Charges

Plus Taxes on Products

Less Subsidies

% fishing

Source: IMF.

2007

13.1

8.7

0.1

4.9

0.3

1.9

4.7

0.8

3.8

4.3

6.4

1.7

8.7

0.8

16.7

7.0

3.0

1.5

-3.6

12.3

-5.1

91.9

9.4%

2008

12.9

8.5

0.1

0.0

4.8

0.3

1.3

4.8

0.7

3.6

4.2

6.2

1.7

8.7

0.7

16.8

7.2

3.2

1.3

-3.5

9.3

-4.6

88.2

9.7%

2009

12.4

8.2

0.1

0.0

4.3

0.3

1.4

4.5

0.7

3.1

4.1

5.8

1.7

8.3

0.7

14.8

6.8

2.7

1.3

-3.3

7.4

-2.5

82.6

10.0%

2.2.5

Balance of trade

Copra has historically been the leading export earner, but has now fallen to fairly low levels (less than AUS$1

mn /

€740,000

per year). Fish product exports are very small and include shark fins and seaweed, but not

tuna, and there are no exports of fish products to the EU.

Table 2: Balance of external trade (

€

, mn)

2007

Total exports

7.04

Of which are fishery

products

0.38

Total imports

44.03

Balance of trade

-37.04

Source: IMF, 2011.

2008

5.24

0.24

44.94

-39.70

2009

3.62

0.34

38.28

34.66

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 6

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

2.2.6

Employment

The labour force comprises 37,000, 20,000 of whom are male, and the remaining 17,000 female. Fishing is

also an important subsistence activity, and an estimated 80 % of households either make a living or survive

through some involvement with fishing (IMF, 2011).

2.2.7

Food security

Fish and taro cooked in coconut cream, is the staple diet in Kiribati. According to the latest statistics published

by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2011) on the food balance sheet of fish and fisheries

products, consumption of such products in Kiribati is high by both global and Pacific standards (between 72 kg

and 207 kg for the entire country). The FAO food security indicator reports an undernourishment rate of 5 %,

with dietary deficiency of 5,420 persons. Fish is an important component of the diet as it is estimated to cover

more than 85 % of animal protein consumption and 30 % of total protein consumption (UNICEF, 2008). All

fisheries products consumed in Kiribati are derived from artisanal and subsistence fishing. There are no

organised landings of tuna into the islands, but lower quality tunas or purse seine bycatch may be traded on

occasions to islanders or the recognised SOE, Central Pacific Producers Limited (CPPL), which has four retail

outlets on Tarawa. This practice is fairly common during transshipments from purse seiners to carrier vessels.

2.3

EU and Kiribati relationships in the regional context

This section considers DG DevCo support to Kiribati. In addition to the support outlined below, revenues from

the FPA are drawn from the No 4 Development Account to support fisheries structural and policy development

initiatives. The sectoral support programme under the FPA focuses on supporting a number of projects.

Additional comment is provided in later evaluation sections of the report.

2.3.1

EU cooperation strategy

The EU relations with the Pacific ACP countries are structured, and have been so for decades, first on the

basis of the Lome Conventions, and now by the Cotonou Agreement (EC, 2008). In political terms an

important objective for the EU has been to underpin a successful stabilisation following decolonisation, while at

the same time supporting economic and social progress. Considering the political volatility experienced in a

number of Pacific ACP countries, the EU considers that this goal has not yet been convincingly attained (EC,

2006), and that a concerted effort needs to be made to accelerate progress to achieving the Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs) (EC, 2010).

In 2006, the EU tabled a proposal for a strengthened partnership with the Pacific islands (document COM

(2006) 248) further adopted by the Council. The strategy proposed consists of three components:



Strengthened relationship between the EU and ACP Pacific States and region, to pursue a broad

political dialogue mostly with and through the Pacific islands Forum, but also at national level with key

Pacific ACP countries in accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement;

More focused development action on three priorities: governance, regional integration and sustainable

management of natural resources. Fisheries is seen as a sector with great potential for cooperation,

including promotion of sustainable utilisation of resources and of good governance practices; and

More efficient aid delivery: facilitation of donor coordination; a more efficient and effective cooperation

with the smallest countries; and increased use of budget support, are the three axis identified by the

EU.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 7

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

In a resolution adopted in February 2007 (document P6_TA (2007) 0022), the European Parliament (EP)

welcomed the initiative of the EU to develop the first EU integrated strategy for the Pacific after 30 years of

cooperation. The EP emphasises the potentially positive role of fisheries in the development of the Pacific

islands and supports the initiative of the EU to support monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) and fight

against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Interestingly, the EP has encouraged the EU to

negotiate any future tuna agreements with the entire region, rather than with individual States, given the high

degree of regional integration of fishery management functions adopted by Pacific island Countries.

The 2010 revision to the Contonou Agreement (Article 23a: Fisheries) (EC 2010, ibid) also stresses the

importance of the development and implementation of fisheries development strategies and management

plans, the mainstreaming of fisheries into national and regional development strategies, the development of

infrastructure and technical know-how to enable ACP countries to achieve maximum sustainable value from

their fisheries, capacity building of ACP countries to overcome external challenges that hinder them from

taking full advantage of their fisheries resources, and the promotion and development of joint ventures for

investment in the fisheries sector of ACP countries. It is also stated that any fishery Agreement that may be

negotiated between the EU and ACP States shall pay due consideration to the consistency with the ACP

development strategies.

2.3.2

10th EDF commitments

At Kiribati level

The Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme concluded between the EU and the Republic

of Kiribati (Kiribati/EU 10th EDF), for the period covered by the 10th EDF (2008-2013) focuses on sectoral

policy programmes for water sanitation and renewable energy (€10.8 mn), as well as an additional component

(€1.9 mn) for a non-focal ‘technical cooperation facility’. Fisheries remain outside the 10th EDF programme for

Kiribati, with the reliance for fisheries specific support interventions being the sectoral policy support

component of the FPA

. The remaining support under the 10th EDF (€1.1 mn) (The B-envelope) is allocated

for unforeseen needs.

Under the 11

EDF, the EU is considering support for the development of Christmas Island.

At Regional level

At the regional level, the two main priorities under the 10th EDF 2008-2013 are detailed in the Regional

Strategy Paper and the Regional Indicative Programme approved by the EU and the 15 ACP Pacific States,

which include Solomon Islands, Micronesia and Kiribati (Pacific region – EU, 10th EDF (2008)). They are:



Regional economic integration:

€45

mn available for development of human resources, key industries

and trade capacity, trade arrangements and integration into the world economy. Regional integration

is seen as a way of bringing stability and development to the Pacific islands; and



Sustainable management of natural resources and the environment:

€50

mn to support measures to

help low-lying atolls respond to rising sea-levels, protect biodiversity and support fishery development.

The later includes

inter alia

initiatives to promote greater regional integration of fishery management,

increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the local tuna processing industries, strengthen the

region capacities to fight IUU fishing, including stock assessment and the development of the MCS

strategy. These are encompassed by three programmes:

The Development of Tuna Fisheries in the Pacific ACP Countries Project (DevFish II, 2008), an

€8.2

mn programme managed by FFA in collaboration with the South Pacific Commission (SPC);

Article 7(2) of the Agreement (the Community’s financial support for promoting responsible fishing and the sustainable exploitation

of fisheries resources in Kiribati waters)

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 8

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Scientific Support for the Management of Coastal and Oceanic Fisheries in the Pacific islands

Region (SciCOFish, 2008), a

€9

mn programme managed the Oceanic Fisheries Programme of

the South Pacific Commission in collaboration with FFA ; and

Sustainable Management of Aquaculture and Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Region for Food

Security and Small-scale Livelihoods (SMACFish, 2008), a

€10

mn programme managed by the

Coastal Fisheries Programme of SPC.

A brief synopsis of these programmes is summarised in Box 1.

Box 1: Summary of fisheries programmes covered under the 10

EDF

DEVFISH II:

Focuses on support in development in national fisheries management plans; strengthening industry

associations and artisanal fishers' representation in decision making; providing training and advice on fishing

access agreements and licenses to national government staff; providing support to the EU-approved ‘Competent

Authority’ to certify fish exports so as to meet EU export standards, and to comply with the IUU catch certification

standards; to implement regional strategies, such as strengthening regional MCS capacity, supported by an

coordination centre and training and technical assistance in each country - this also includes legislative reviews,

providing advice for the implementation of FAO’s Port State Measures, and supporting feasibility studies trialling

new technologies, and planning for the acquisition of new enforcement asset; supporting regional integration of

surveillance operations through strengthening of an electronic system for monitoring and surveillance of vessels

at sea; and facilitating information exchange between national agencies and other surveillance partners such as

the US, Australia, New Zealand and France.

SciCOFish:

Focuses on: the strengthening of SPC’s scientific capacity by strengthening observer training

systems; extending the Tuna Fisheries Database Management System (TUFMAN) data base to all countries;

improving the quality of bio-economic and ecosystem modelling to support stock assessments of all tuna, tuna

like species and sharks; support to tuna tagging; developing management advice; and developing local capacity

for implementing field monitoring protocols.

SMACFish:

Focuses on: supporting coastal marine resource management through institutional strengthening

and co-management; developing community based awareness training; reviewing vulnerability to long term

climate change; and developing appropriate marine-based and other alternative livelihood programmes.

Source: EDF Concept notes.

In addition, there is an ACP Fish2 project, coordinated from Brussels, which commenced activities in 2010.

This project provides technical support to ACP fisheries administrations. Kiribati is not eligible under ACP Fish

II component 1 (policy/legal instruments) and 2 (MCS and enforcement) however because they benefit from a

FPA

To date, aside from multilateral components of the EDF support programme, there has not been any specific

support from these EDF funds allocated to support Kiribati

. This is perhaps surprising given the importance

and high utilisation of the FPA as discussed later in this report, and may in part be explained by a lack of

sufficiently robust engagement by Kiribati in the regional organisations managing fisheries-related EDF funds

i.e. FFA and SPC.

DEVCO decided that countries having signed a FPA with the EU should not be supported by ACP Fish II under components 1 and

2 (except through a regional program). This was not foreseen in the ACP FISH 2 project document and is specific to ACP Fish II.

The same countries were not excluded from the previous EC-funded SFP programme for instance (Strengthening Fishery Products

Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries).

Director MFMRD, Pers. Comm., January, 2012

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 9

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

2.3.3

EDF commitments

Under the 9th EDF (2003-3007), the following projects were funded to support strengthening of fisheries

management, including research and control:



Pacific Regional Coastal Fisheries Development Programme (PROCFISH) signed with SPC (€10.2

mn), with a focus on management of certain coastal fisheries and oceanic fisheries, and with an

extension (CoFISH,

€2

mn) to cover ACP States not included under PROCFISH;

Development of Tuna fisheries in the Pacific ACP countries (DEVFISH) signed with FFA (€3 mn in

total) with a focus on development of locally based tuna industries, training to fisheries access

negotiation, and support to fishery policy development in certain Pacific countries; and

Scientific support to Oceanic Fishery Management in the WCP area (SCICOFISH) signed with SPC

(€6.5 mn) with a focus on improvement of scientific advice (data collection, stock assessment) and

pilot projects on control of fishing activities (e.g. use of modern technology, including satellite-based

technology to detect IUU fishing).

SPC has supported high level research into stock assessment and management, providing the basis

for the fishery management decisions that exist to date;

FFA provides multinational support in capacity building across a range of management areas:

licensing, statistics, observer training and MCS.

Millennium Development Goal Initiative

Kiribati benefited from these in the following ways:



2.3.4

Under the EC-funded MDGS Initiative, Kiribati has been allocated

€4.2

mn. These funds, which must be

committed during 2012 and will probably be spent over the next three years, are to be used for water and

sanitation improvements on Kiritimati (Christmas Island), subject to the government presenting the project prior

to commitment of funds by the EU.

2.3.5

Trade relationships between Kiribati and the EU

In September 2004, the EU and 14 Pacific ACP countries, including Kiribati, opened negotiations on an

Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which should eventually replace the preferential access scheme

contained in the Cotonou Agreement that expired at the end of 2007. These negotiations target an ambitious

and development-oriented arrangement, which should promote regional integration and economic

development, policy reform, and sustainable management of resources, such as fisheries, and thus also help

to reduce poverty. EPA negotiations entered a crucial phase during 2007, as the deadline jointly set by the

ACP and EU in the Cotonou Agreement was approaching. Under time pressure, negotiations focused on

preserving ACP market access and complying with the parameters for a World Trade Organisation (WTO)

compatible free trade area (as per Article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)). Papua

New Guinea (PNG) was anxious to avoid trade disruption with the EU as of 1 January 2008 and to benefit from

preferential tariffs as has historically been the case for canned tuna (HS code 1604) and new favourable rules

of origin for canned tuna offered by the EU in such context, and signed the Interim Economic Partnership

Agreement (EU/IEPA, 2008). Fiji also initialled the Interim EPA, however it has not so far ratified it. So far, this

agreement has not been implemented by any other Pacific ACPs (PACPs). Negotiations for a comprehensive

EPA with all PACP countries are still in progress.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 10

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Under existing rules, without the EPA, the six Pacific Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the PACS,

including Kiribati, fall back on the “everything but arms” preferential access to the EU market provided under

the EU Generalised System of Preferences, although this is a unilateral and not a contractual arrangement

and does not contain improved EPA rules of origin for processed fishery products. The other eight non-LDC

PACPs, whose goods exports to the EU are relatively limited at present, are eligible for the EU’s Generalised

System of Preferences (GSP) tariff reductions. So whilst the thrust towards regional economic integration of

the PACPs has been accelerated by the IEPA initialled with Papua New Guinea and more recently Fiji, a

regional Agreement still remains outstanding. Among the reasons for the delay is that the smallest PACPs are

now seeking to expand the rules of origin concessions to include semi-processed seafood products, mainly

fresh tuna loins (HS 0304 and 0305).

Both the PACPs and the EU remain committed to building a long-term partnership and concluding a

comprehensive EPA supportive of development and regional integration.

Whilst there is presently no trade in fishery products between Kiribati and the EU, the country has some future

aspirations in trading fresh tuna loins to the EU market, linked to a new joint venture arrangement in Tarawa,

Kiribati Fish Limited, which is seeking to establish a loining operation linked to the Chinese longline fleet

operations. So far, Kiribati is not among countries entitled to export fishery products to the EU as it is non-

complying with the EU IUU and sanitary legislations.

2.4

Other donor relations

The EDF support notwithstanding, most donor support in the PACP fisheries sector is provided at the

multilateral level, including institutional strengthening programmes (by Australia and New Zealand); aerial

surveillance and surface patrol capacity to combat IUU fishing (by Australia, New Zealand, France, and USA);

and various fisheries development projects (by Japan). These budgets are in some cases substantial; for

example, to address IUU fishing issues Australia is expected to devote up to

€330

mn to the on-going Pacific

patrol boat project.

Kiribati is receiving support from the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for support to develop

human resource and workforce skills. This is a facility available to all national government administrations, and

includes fisheries training support to the PNA Crewing Agency agreed to be based in Tarawa (approximately

$5mn /

€3.4

mn, over 5 years), and support to develop the first ever Pacific purse seine training curriculum

which is being trialled in Kiribati

Kiribati has also received support from the Australian-Kiribati Partnership for development, and Australian Aid

funded an AUS$1 mn /

€0.74

mn ‘Fisheries Performance Incentive Fund’ to strengthen the fisheries

administration to generate more revenue for government and new fishery legislation (see Box 2 for further

details). The programme was for two years, 2010-2011. The fund comprised four milestones, each supported

by AU$250,000 /

€185,185.

PNA policy is to promote crewing (10%) on all Distant Water Fishing Vessels operating in the Pacific

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 11

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Box 2: Fisheries Performance Incentive Fund (Aus Aid, 2010-2011)

Milestone 1: Legislative Drafting – Fisheries Act and Regulations

Amending the Fisheries Act to include changes in Offences and Penalties under the Fisheries Ordinance,

including coastal fisheries-related offences and penalties and to make provision for offences and penalties that

are effective deterrents in modern commercial fishing.

Milestone 2: Review of Access and other Cooperative Arrangements

Independent review of access, licensing, joint venture and other cooperative arrangements, including those for

coastal fisheries and potential targets for revenue generation. The review took into account implementation of

obligations under the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Vessel Day Scheme and the Western and Central Pacific

Fisheries Commission. The milestone will be complete when a review is presented to the Minister and the

Cabinet, and the Government provides a response to the recommendations.

Milestone 3: Development of Policy, Operational Guidelines

Development of clear policy and operational guidelines and procedures for administration of access and licensing

and joint venture arrangements by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development (MFMRD).

Milestone 4: MoU between Police Maritime Unit and MFMRD

Understanding between MFMRD and Police Maritime Unit on the operation of Kiribati fisheries monitoring,

control and surveillance, including targets for active patrol days and other performance measures and the

potential establishment of a government fund for costs associated with fisheries monitoring and surveillance.

Source: Aus Aid, 2011.

The United States Pacific Development Fund, a component of the US Multi-Lateral Agreement, also provides

development assistance. This is used to support the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development

(MFMRD) development budget.

Non-fisheries sector support activity was provided in 2011 by Australia (AUS$28 mn /

€20.7

mn), Taiwan

(AUS$11 mn /

€8.1

mn), New Zealand (AUS$6 mn /

€4.4

mn), the World Bank (AUS$4 mn /

€3

mn), and the

Asian Development Bank. These donors support projects with a focus on wider fiscal and institutional support

(human resource management, governance, health, education and law enforcement), urban development and

addressing the issue of rural deprivation.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 12

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.1

TUNA FISHERIES IN KIRIBATI AND THE REGION

Regional overview

World catches of the three major tuna species (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye) for all types of gears combined

totaled over 4 mn tonnes on average per year over the 2008-2010 period. The Western and Central Pacific

Ocean is the main fishing ground for tunas, accounting for 57 % of world catches on average, ahead of the

Indian Ocean (21 %), the Eastern Pacific (14 %) and the Atlantic Ocean (8 %) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: World tuna catch, 2008-2010 (tonnes)

Source: WCPFC

, IATTC, IOTC and ICCAT annual reports.

The total WCPO tuna catch for 2010 was estimated at 2.28 mn tonnes, slightly lower than the highest ever

annual catch in 2009 at 2.37 mn tonnes. During 2010, the purse seine fishery accounted for an estimated 1.82

mn tonnes (80 % of the total catch), with pole-and-line fishing taking an estimated 150,000 tonnes (6.5 %), the

longline fishery an estimated 135,000 tonnes (6 %), with the remainder taken by coastal handline, ring net,

and troll fishing methods. These latter catches are mostly taken in eastern Indonesia, the Philippines and

Japan. The WCP tuna catch (2.28 mn tonnes) for 2010 represented 82 % of the total Pacific Ocean catch of

2.8 mn tonnes. Figure 3 presents the distribution of catches in the WCP area. Most of the WCP tuna fisheries

are concentrated in the tropical area bound by 20°N and 20°S. SPC data show that the waters under the

jurisdiction of PNA account for 76 % of the overall tropical tuna catch of the equatorial purse-seine fleet in the

WCP, and 22 % of the yellowfin/bigeye longline fleet. The latter catches 44 % in the WCPO High Seas (HS)

zones, and the remaining 44 % from other non PNA zones.

Data from WCPFC extracted from SPC ‘catch by EEZ for distribution, SPC, Nov, 2011’.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 13

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Figure 3: Distribution of catches of tunas in the WCP area by gear over the 2000-2009 period, and 2010.

Source: Tuna Fishery Yearbook, 2010.

The following sections review the two main fisheries in which EU operators have some interests, namely the

purse seine fishery and the longline fishery.

3.2

3.2.1

The purse seine fishery

Fleet evolution

The purse seine fishery of the Western Central Pacific evolved from a series of trials largely sponsored by the

Japanese during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Gillett, 2007). The purse seine technique evolved from other

regional fisheries, namely eastern Pacific and off Japan, but faced particular development problems in the

Pacific because of characteristically clear water and a deep thermocline in the equatorial Pacific which created

unfavorable conditions for purse-seining – the tuna schools tend to be smaller, faster-moving, and diving

deeper than those in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. By the late 1970s there were several fully commercial

Japanese and American purse seine operations in the western equatorial area of the Pacific islands. The

number of purse seine vessels operating in the Pacific islands increased rapidly during the early 1980s. The

USA purse seine fleet moved in quickly from the eastern Pacific, due partly to the very strong El Niño event of

1982–83 and partly in response to pressure to reduce dolphin mortality in their traditional fishing grounds. In

1983, 62 USA seiners caught 179,000 tonnes of tuna in the Pacific islands area. During the period from the

mid-1980s to 2003, the regional purse seine fleet expanded, albeit at a slower rate, and the national

composition of the fleet became more diverse (Table 3), with an expansion to include other Asian fishing

nations, firstly Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines, followed by China and New Zealand. The EU, along with

Latin American vessels from El Salvador and Ecuador, beneficially owned in Spain, represent a more recent

group of entrants to the fishery. Access for all groups of vessels takes the form of regional or bilateral fisheries

partnership arrangements or agreements, including:



Bilateral intergovernmental agreements between individual fishing states and individual PNA Parties;

European Union FPAs (between the EU, and Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Federated States of

Micronesia (FSM));

An assortment of commercial agreements between associations or companies and individual PNA

Parties; and

The US Treaty (between the Governments of certain Pacific States and the USA).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 14

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Pacific island countries have also sought to promote investment in their countries by encouraging reflagging,

chartering, joint ventures or similar arrangements between Island states and foreign investors. This has led to

growth in Pacific island fishing capacity, with agreed access to PNA EEZs through the FSM Arrangement

Table 3 below highlights the evolution of the different purse seine fleet groupings.

Table 3: Breakdown of purse seine distant water vessels (EEZ and high seas) fishing in the Western

Pacific, 31 June 2010 and at three prior times in the fishery

Country grouping

1988

1995

2003

2010

Korea

Taiwan

Japan

New Zealand

Vanuatu

China

Philippines

Spain (EU)

Ecuador

El Salvador

Indonesia

Other (now non active)

Total DWFN

122

147

159

FSMA

Domestic to Pacific islands

n/a

Total DWFN FSMA and

119

177

191

232

Domestic

USLMT

Source: Gillett, 2007 and updated from PNAO vessel records, 2010. Note: Indonesian industrial purse seiners (>30 GT)

are excluded from the above table, but are reported at 18 vessels fishing within the Indonesian EEZ. DWFN: Distant

Water Fishing Nations; FSMA Federated States of Micronesia FPA; USLMT: United States Multi-Lateral Treaty.

3.2.2

Purse seine catch by species

The WCPO 2010 purse-seine catch of 1.8 mn tonnes (Williams

et al.,

2011) was the third highest on record for

this fishery, at 80,000 tonnes lower than the record attained in 2009. The majority of the historic WCP purse

seine catch has come from the four main distant-water fleets (see Table 4). Additional data for other years is

provided in Appendix F.

The

FSM Arrangement was developed as a mechanism for domestic vessels of the PNA to access the fishing resources of other parties. It came

in force in 1995. Signatories are Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.

The FSM Arrangement aims to: provide access for Domestic Vessels to parties’ waters on terms no less favourable than those granted to distant

water fishing nations; secure maximum sustainable economic benefits from tuna resources; promote greater participation by nationals of Parties in

fisheries and assist in development of national fisheries industries; and allow access to vessels on terms consistent with the Palau Arrangement.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 15

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 4: Purse seine catch (tonnes) by tropical tuna species in WCPO, 2010.

Japan

Korea

USA

Taiwan

Early DWFN entrants

China

European Union

El Salvador

New Zealand

Recent post 2000 DWFN

entrants

FSM

Kiribati

Rep Marshall Is

Papua New Guinea

Solomon Is

Tuvalu

FSMA and domestic

Vanuatu

Philippines

Indonesia

Other Pacific

Grand total

Source: SPC, 2011.

Yellowfin

38,544

58,314

25,686

29,203

151,747

10,513

4,890

707

765

16,875

2,673

4,686

7,028

48,174

4,212

1,996

68,769

2,452

39,789

20,670

62,911

300,302

Bigeye

2,679

2,972

4,251

3,437

13,339

948

6,666

1,203

131

8,948

380

3,593

1,546

4,473

546

10,637

237

3,722

6,201

10,160

43,084

Skipjack

200,011

216,026

215,587

166,211

797,835

42,255

26,363

5,461

23,615

97,694

19,395

23,153

47,387

149,780

8,207

8,459

256,381

21,031

123,679

179,826

324,536

1,476,446

Total

Per cent

241,233

13%

277,312

15%

245,524

13%

198,851

11%

962,920

53%

53,716

37,919

7,371

24,511

123,517

22,448

31,432

55,961

202,427

12,965

10,554

335,787

23,720

167,190

206,697

397,607

1,819,831

11%

18%

11%

22%

100%

These groups are divided into the following:



The early entrants:

Taiwan, Japan, USA and Korea, which numbered 95 vessels in 1988, but which

have gradually increased vessel numbers to 139 vessels in 2010. This group of vessels caught 53 %

of the total catch in 2010 (almost 1 mn tonnes). Fourteen of the US vessels are beneficially owned in

Taiwan;

Vessels from Pacific islands fleets:

These totalled 54 vessels in 2010, with a catch of 336,000 tonnes,

or 18 % of the total. PNG represents the largest contingent of this fleet. Vessels from this group are

divided into two groups, domestic (21) allowing access to only respective national flag EEZs and their

archipelagic waters, and PNG FSMA vessels (33 vessels). The ownership structure within the FSMA

group of vessels comprises predominantly Taiwanese and some other foreign beneficial owners

including 1 Spanish owned vessel in Kiribati. Non-FSMA vessels, defined as ‘domestic’ vessels are

registered in the Solomon Islands, PNG, FSM, and two in Kiribati. These are owned by a combination

of foreign and domestic owners, but in most cases, fishing activities directly support domestic

investments in the onshore processing and servicing sectors.

New distant-water entrants:

This group includes the European Union (Spain), New Zealand and

China, as well as a more recent increase of vessels from Ecuador and El Salvador. This group of

vessels was not present in the Pacific before 2000. Catches are now collectively around 124,000

tonnes (7 % of the total). The Latin vessels (Spain and South America) fish in both the Western and

Eastern Pacific Ocean.



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 16

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1



Other Pacific:

Philippines and Vanuatu, as well as a number of Indonesian vessels. The Vanuatu fleet

comprises vessels chartered through Vanuatu but beneficially owned in Taiwan, and these vessels

fish through bilateral arrangements with specific countries. Filipino vessels fish both inside their own

EEZ, as well as through specific bilateral arrangements, whilst Indonesian vessels (18 in number) fish

inside their EEZ and in Indonesian archipelagic waters.

It is noteworthy from the above table that the fleets predominantly target skipjack (Katsuwonus

pelamis),

accounting for 81 % of the total catch. However, yellowfin tuna (Thunnus

albacares),

accounting for 17 %, may

be caught in large numbers. The other target species, bigeye tuna (Thunnus

obesus),

accounts for 2 % of the

total catch and is often caught in large numbers when using Fish Aggregation Devices (FADs). The EU fleet,

which is particularly reliant of FADs, has a much higher dependency on bigeye tuna (18 %) than the other

fleets.

3.2.3

Purse seine effort

Figure 4 below summarizes the historic levels of purse seine effort by the major countries/groups in WCPO

waters. The data show the significant growth in effort by Pacific island based vessels, whilst most other groups

have remained stable. However, there are two other notable changes with the decline and resurrection of the

US Multilateral fleet (USMLT), following a transfer of 14 Taiwanese vessels to the US register in 2007, and an

increase in other vessel catches, mostly from China, Philippines and Vanuatu.

Figure 4: Trends in annual effort (days at sea) for the top four purse seine fleets, FSMA/domestic and

others operating in the tropical WCP, 2001–2010

Source: SPC.

The above figures do not contain any adjustment for weighting against effort as set out in the VDS weighting

scheme. Details of this are provided in Section 3.6.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 17

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.2.4

FAD and free school set dependencies

Whilst different fleets demonstrate different dependencies on set types, the overall dependency on free

school fishing has increased over the years. Fishing on drifting FADs evolved from a traditional

dependency on log sets in the mid-1990s. The current distribution (2011) between set types shows 79 %

on free schools (no doubt partly a response to the three month closure from 1 July to 30th September), 14

% on set FADs, and 7 % on drifting FADs. Table 5 shows that EU purse seine vessels have the highest

dependency on drifting FADs of all the main fleets operating in the region.

Table 5: PNA catch by set type (average 2005-2009)

Free

Drifting Anchored

Log

Other

school

FAD

63%

18%

19%

42%

40%

18%

41%

42%

16%

14%

77%

27%

69%

50%

20%

22%

58%

33%

28%

11%

13%

48%

43%

30%

28%

25%

89%

88%

87%

22%

24%

32%

Total

100%

Korea

Taiwan

Japan

USA

New Zealand

Vanuatu

China

Philippines

Spain (EU)

Ecuador

El Salvador

Total DWFN

FSMA and Domestic

Source: SPC / Williams

et al.,

2010.

3.3

3.3.1

The Longline fishery

The fleet

The longline fishery fishing in the WCPO accounts for around 6 % of the catch of total tropical tuna species

caught inside the range in the tropical area bounded by 20°N and 20°S, mostly yellowfin and bigeye tunas,

but also albacore (Thunnus

alalunga),

and a range of billfish including three species of marlin (blue marlin,

striped marlin and black marlin), swordfish (Xiphias

gladius),

pelagic and reef sharks (mostly blue shark,

shortfin mako, silky shark, oceanic whitetip and hammerhead) and a bycatch of other species.

There are four types of fisheries that occur using longline within the area of the Pacific islands:



Fisheries for yellowfin and bigeye, targeted by large distant sashimi freezer longliners (typically

>250 GRT). These vessels almost exclusively operate from Japan and Korea and fish long

voyages, transshipping at sea, exclusively supplying the sashimi market in Japan and Korea. They

fish in the HS, in the HS Pockets (HSPs) and within national EEZs, the latter under bilateral

agreements.

Fisheries for albacore, targeted by smaller (typically <100 GRT) offshore vessels, undertaking trips

of less than one month, with freezer, ice or chill capacity, and serving frozen markets, with product

transshipped or landed direct into one of a small number of regional hubs including Fiji, American Samoa

and French Polynesia. Most product is destined for canneries, specializing in albacore (which provides

‘white meat tuna’ for the US market), but may also be sold fresh, frozen and or as cooked loins to EU

and Japanese markets. The largest component of these fleets are Taiwanese and Chinese, operating

through bilateral or domestic charter agreements with Western Pacific islands including Solomon



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 18

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1



Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, FSM, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and Kiribati. In addition, there are

some 200 vessels domestically owned and operated from a number of Western, Central and South

Pacific countries and territories including French Polynesia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Cook Is, Samoa and

PNG.

A South Pacific distant water fishery, which is a new fishery comprising distant water vessels.

These vessels exclusively target swordfish, in the HS South of 20°S.

Domestic fisheries in sub-tropical and temperate waters comprising vessels targeting different species

in sub-tropical and temperate waters. Fleets include those from Japan, Australia, New Zealand and

USA.

The total number of vessels involved in the tropical WCPO fisheries has generally been around 3,000, but

around 780 vessels operate in the Pacific island waters, with a further 500 or so operating specifically on the

high seas. Of the vessels known to be fishing in the island EEZs, the group has seen an increase by around

180 vessels in the last 5 years, with new entrants joining the fishery from the Indian Ocean

(FFA, 2011). The

bulk of this increase has taken place post Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) 2008-01.

SPC data (WCPFC, 2010) show that the number of EU longliners from Spain operating for at least part of

their fishing time in the WCP area has declined from 18 vessels in 2008 to 5 in 2010. The Spanish vessels

operate on the South Pacific distant-water swordfish fishery, which is a relatively new fishery and lies outside

the EEZs of Pacific island countries. This fishery is very distinct from the longline fisheries exploiting tropical

tunas and albacore.

3.3.2

Longline catch by species

The WCPO catch by the longline fleet amounted to 232,000 tonnes in 2010. Table 6 shows the total catch of

Pacific island and distant water fleets by species for 2010. Additional data for other years are provided in

Appendix G.

A representative from the Taiwanese fishing vessel company, Yuh Yow, stated that this was largely in response to piracy in the

Indian Ocean (Pers. Comm., December, 2011).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 19

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 6: Longline catches in the WCPO, tonnes, 2010.

Group

Yellowfin

Bigeye

Pacific island EEZs

Albacore

Billfish

Total

dependence

Island

EEZs

31%

26%

28%

24%

100%

42%

dependence

High Seas

69%

74%

72%

76%

100%

58%

45,150

27%

Japan

Korea

Taiwan

China

Pacific islands

Total

5,486

3,578

3,383

982

8,398

21,826

Yellowfin

1,785

3,145

1,057

1,212

2,706

9,906

Bigeye

5,749

11,591

10,600

7,653

35,602

45,508

27%

562

1,035

685

289

1,834

4,405

High Seas

Albacore

Billfish

4,064

4,887

11,656

1,081

21,695

56,861

33%

5,627

2,247

7,156

1,864

1,001

17,895

22,300

13%

1,499

665

10,839

1,158

21,003

35,165

9,332

8,423

15,964

3,641

33,942

71,302

Total

21,138

23,613

41,068

11,680

1,018

98,517

169,818

100%

Japan

Korea

Taiwan

China

Pacific islands

Total

Grand total

% by species

5,698

4,887

11,656

1,081

23,325

45,150

27%

Source: SPC.

However, when excluding the fisheries in non-Pacific island Country EEZs, and associated HS, the total

catch of the principal species amounted to 169,000 tonnes. Several countries have bilateral longline

agreements with Kiribati (China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Indonesia, Vanuatu, Fiji, FSM, Philippines and

Indonesia). The Korean catch was the largest at 5,300 tonnes in 2010, 50 % of which was comprised of

bigeye tuna. The EU longline fleet has never fished in Kiribati waters.

3.4

Status of Fish stocks in the region

The status of the three main stocks exploited in the WCP equatorial area is monitored by the Scientific Committee

installed under the WCPFC. The following text summarises the latest scientific advice produced by this

Committee. The status of stocks in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO), as stated by the IATTC, is provided in

Section 3.7.

Skipjack

Skipjack tuna is a fast growing, short-lived species (maximum age ~3 years) that has a rapid population

turnover. It has high resilience to fishing and can support annual catches at the current level (1.7 mn

tonnes). The majority of exploitation occurs on fish that have already reached reproductive maturity (age 1+).

Most skipjack therefore have the opportunity to reproduce before they are exposed to intensive fishing.

According to the key conclusions of the models presented in 2011 (Hoyle

et al.,

2011), the skipjack species is

being exploited to moderate levels, overfishing is not occurring and the stock is not in an overfished state. The

high recent catches (2009-2011) are considered to be sustainable unless recruitment falls persistently below

the long-term average. The Summary Record of the WCPFC 7

Scientific Committee notes that: current

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 20

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

high catches can result in range contractions of the stock (para 224); WCPFC should consider developing

limits on fishing for skipjack (para 225); and catches are specially high in the western equatorial region and

additional purse seine effort will yield only modest gains in long-term skipjack catches and may result in a

corresponding increase in fishing mortality for bigeye and yellowfin (para 226).

Yellowfin

Yellowfin tuna has a life span of up to ~7 years of age, grows rapidly and has a moderate population turnover.

Yellowfin begins spawning at ~1.5-2 years of age (~100 cm fork length or 20 kg). Yellowfin are taken by a

variety of gears - purse seine (>50 % of the WCPO catch by weight, with a wide size range of fish), longline

(16 %, mostly adults), pole-and-line (4 %), plus a range of gears in the domestic fisheries in Indonesia and

Philippines, taking mostly smaller fish (25-30 %). The total WCPO yellowfin catch has been between 270,000

and 440,000 tonnes since 2000, but reached a record 543,000 tonnes in 2008 before falling back to 350,000

tonnes in 2010. Langley

et al.

(2011) undertook the most current yellowfin assessment on a regional basis

across 6 regions within the WCPO (Figure 5), where Kiribati falls into region 4. The assessment (Langley

al.,

2011) concludes that the WCPO yellowfin stock is not in an overfished state, but that depletion has

increased steadily over time and is considerably higher in equatorial region 3. Recent depletion levels in region

3 are approximately 0.30 for total biomass (i.e. a 70 % reduction from the unexploited level). Impacts are

moderate in region 4 (37 %), lower (about 15-25 %) in regions 1, 5, and 6 and minimal (9 %) in region 2. If

stock-wide over-fishing criteria were applied at the level of the stock assessment model regions, region 3

would be fully exploited and the remaining regions are under-exploited. The Langley

et al.

(2011) stock

assessment for yellowfin indicates that the stock is at least fully exploited and that there is a 50 % chance that

overfishing is occurring. The WCPFC Scientific Committee has recommended that fishing mortality be reduced.

The attribution of depletion to various fisheries or groups of fisheries indicates that the associated purse-

seine fishery and Philippines/Indonesian domestic fisheries have the highest impact, particularly in region 3,

while the unassociated purse seine fishery has a moderate impact.

Figure 5: Distribution of cumulative WCPFC yellowfin tuna catch from 2000-2009 by 5 degree squares

of latitude and longitude and fishing gear;

Source: Langley

et al.,

2011. Longline (blue), purse-seine (green), pole-and-line (grey) and other (principally Indonesia

and Philippines, dark orange). The grey lines indicate the regional spatial stratification of the assessment models.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 21

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Bigeye

Bigeye tuna lives to at least 12 years of age, grows more slowly than yellowfin, has lower natural mortality,

and a smaller stock size. Bigeye reaches a maximum size of ~120 kg, and begins spawning at ~3-4 years of

age (~110 cm fork length or 30 kg). Bigeye is caught in large quantities by both the longline and purse

seine component of the catch (Harley, 2010). Purse seine and other surface fisheries have an equal or

greater impact on the spawning stock biomass than longliners (WCPFC, 2011). This is because a

significant exploitation of juveniles occurs in the purse-seine FAD fishery

, as well as in the domestic

fisheries of Philippines and Indonesia. These juvenile catches have high impact on the subsequent adult

population, and at the same time, the adult spawning stock continues to decline (Davies

et al.,

2011).

Recent assessments show that overfishing of bigeye tuna is currently occurring. Catches are still around 7 %

higher than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of 131,400 tonnes. This is despite current high levels of

recruitment into the fishery. Therefore, the current levels of catch are unlikely to be sustainable (WCPFC SC 7,

2011). The WCPFC Scientific Committee has recommended that fishing mortality be reduced by a minimum

of 28 % from the average levels for 2001—2004. These years are the set reference years for effort

restrictions applied under CMM 2008-01 (See Section 3.6.1).

3.5

Ecosystem issues associated with tuna fisheries

The purse seine bycatch species varies according to whether sets are associated (FAD fisheries) or

unassociated (i.e. free swimming schools). Molony (2007) estimated retained catch of non-target species (i.e.

other than skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin tuna) to be around 1.8 % by weight of the total purse seine catch in

the WCPFC Convention Area, equating to approximately 36,000 tonnes in 2008.

Langley

et al.

(2008), analysed fishery observer data from the equatorial purse-seine fishery for the period

2001−2006 to determine the species composition of catches (by weight) from unassociated (free-school) and

associated (log, drifting FAD and anchored FAD) sets (Figure 6).

Apart from skipjack tuna, yellowfin and bigeye tuna are clearly the main species taken in the purse seine

fishery. Langley

et al.

(2008) found that all set types were dominated by catches of skipjack tuna and yellowfin,

with these two species accounting for 99 % of the unassociated sets and 91 % of the catch from the

associated set types.

Other species represented less than 0.2 % of the catch from unassociated sets, and 1–2 % of the catch from

associated sets, of which rainbow runner (Elegatis

bipinnulata)

was the most significant component. The

remainder of the catch from associated sets is comprised of surface-orientated species that are principally

oceanic in habitat (e.g. mackerel scad (Decapterus

macarellus),

frigate tuna (Auxis

thazard)

and mahi-mahi

(Coryphaena

hippurus))

or occupy both reef and oceanic habitats (e.g. rainbow runner; oceanic triggerfish

(Balistidae), silky shark (Carcharhinus

falciformis)

and oceanic whitetip shark (C.

longimanus)).

Kirby (2006) attributed fishing mortality by purse seine set type and ranked by productivity risk. Of the main

bycatch species identified as taken in FAD fisheries, frigate tuna, spotted and black triggerfish, mahi-mahi and

mackerel scad were assessed as relatively low risk, whilst silky shark was assessed as having the highest

relative risk. The rate of shark bycatch is significantly greater in FAD fisheries, recording 88 % and 93 % of the

sharks respectively in regions 3 and 4 respectively (Clarke

et al.,

2011), with an estimated 1-10 silky sharks

caught per day, amounting to between 48,000 to 84,000 silky sharks, 1,000 oceanic whitetip sharks caught per

annum (Lawson, 2011). Oceanic whitetip sharks are found throughout the WCPO between 30

N and S

latitude. This species is also commonly encountered in the purse seine fishery, particularly in areas just south

of the equator. Silky sharks have a similar distribution to oceanic whitetips but appear to be concentrated in a

Catches

of bigeye tuna in the free school fishery and 0.8% (Hampton, 2009), whilst in FAD fisheries catches are upwards of 5 % or greater

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 22

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

narrower latitudinal band between 20

N and S latitude. Silky sharks interact with purse seine fisheries over

nearly the entire geographic range of the fishery. Silky sharks were particularly skewed toward juveniles in

tropical waters. However, both species have experienced progressive reductions in Catch Per Unit Effort

(CPUE) since 1999 (Lawson, 2011). As part of the current shark research programme (WCPFC SC7),

preliminary results show that silky sharks are in an overfished state.

Figure 6: Percentage composition of the 20 main species caught by unassociated, log-drifting FAD and

anchored FAD purse-seine sets (by weight) in the WCP–CA determined from recent observer data

(2001–2006).

Source: Langley

et al.,

2008.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 23

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.6

Management agreements in the WCP and their implications

The key components of the governance and fishery management framework for tuna and related species in

the WCPO, and the tuna purse seine fisheries in particular include:

i) The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the tuna RFMO for the WCPO;

ii) The Parties to the Nauru Agreement, known as PNA or the Nauru Group;

iii) Regional organisations that provide management services to the WCPFC and the PNA, including and

in particular the FFA and the SPC; and

iv) The PNA national governments.

3.6.1

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)

The WCPFC is the one of the newest and one of the largest RFMOs. The Commission has 25 members,

comprising Australia, Canada, People‘s Republic of China, Cook Islands, European Union (EU), Federated

States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, France, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Nauru,

New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei,

Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America (USA) and Vanuatu (WCPFC, 2009a).

Several other states are granted cooperating non-member (CNM) status on an annual basis, agreeing to

comply with WCPFC measures, participating as observers, and entitled to authorise their vessels to fish in the

WCPO within set limits. At WCPFC6, the CNM status of Belize, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico and Senegal

was renewed, and CNM status was extended to Ecuador and Vietnam (WCPFC, 2009b, (paras 22-49).

WCPFC Commission Management Measures (CMMs) have been formulated in the annual sessions of the

Commission (Table 7) by consensus

(WCPFC, 2004), with the support of Scientific (SC) and Technical and

Compliance (TCC) committee meetings. The SC meetings deal with collection and validation of data from the

fishery, monitoring and assessment of stocks, monitoring and assessment of the ecosystem and evaluation of

management options. However, proper scientific work such as stock assessments is conducted by an external

body (scientific services provider) – the SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme. Only since 2011 has the TCC

dealt in a substantial manner with assessing compliance with the CMMs based on a trial Compliance

Monitoring Scheme (CMM 2010-03). Unlike compliance committees in most RFMOs, the WCPFC TCC has a

broad agenda similar to that of the Annual Commission Session and works as a pre-plenary for discussion on

all items to be tackled at the Annual Meeting. Small Pacific islands often are represented by the same

delegates to SC, TCC and Annual Meetings, partly due to insufficient numbers of technically qualified

personnel in national administrations. The WCPFC Secretariat undertakes a number of compliance duties

which relate to monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) on the HSPs and collation of specified reports on

compliance from the members. These reports include details on: the WCPFC vessel monitoring system (VMS),

high seas boarding and inspection, the regional observer programme, transshipment verification and Port

State Measures.

The WCPFC has a consensus-based decision-making process, with provision for a two-chambered voting process requiring a 75% majority in

both chambers if all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted, (WCPFC, 2004), (Rule 22). From the meeting records, it is

evident that the voting provision has not been used for deciding on conservation and management measures, Rules of Procedure for the WCPFC.

Available from http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/commission-01/rules-procedure

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 24

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 7: WCPFC measures relevant to the fisheries under assessment

Measures

Key Relevant Features

CMM 2007-

Ensure vessels have

Automatic Location Communicator

(ALC) on in high seas

: VMS

Not undermine measure by transferring purse seine effort to areas N of 20N or S of 20S.

Within 20N to 20S:

CMM 2008-



Limit high seas purse seine effort to 2004 levels or average 2001-04;



Limit EEZ effort to 2004 levels (PNA) or take compatible measures;

Yellowfin



FAD closure – 3 months from 2010;

and Bigeye



Closure of 2 high seas pockets;



100% catch retention/no discards (for tuna species);



100% observer coverage; and



capacity of “other fisheries” generally limited to 2004 levels or average 2001-04.



Implement FAO Guidelines;

CMM 2008-



Comatose turtles to be brought on board and resuscitation attempted;



Proper handling and release techniques and equipment to be applied as per WCPFC

Sea Turtles

Guidelines;



Purse seine operators to follow specific procedures to avoid /release turtles; and



Purse seine operators to report all interactions and provide reports to WCPFC.

CMM 2009-

Specific rules for FAD closure and catch retention, including prohibiting, during the FAD closure,

FAD

conducting any part of a set within one nautical mile of a FAD.

Closure

and Catch

Retention

CMM 2009-

Regulation

No purse seine transshipment at sea, except in designated special cases.

Transshipm

ent

Monitoring and reporting systems implemented to ensure that members implement:



Catch and effort limits;

2010-03



Catch and effort reporting;

Compliance



Spatial and temporal closures and gear restrictions;

monitoring



Observer and VMS requirements; and



Scientific data provision, reporting and handling.

CMM 2007-02, Commission Vessel Monitoring scheme. http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2007-02/commission-vessel-monitoring-system

CMM 2008-01, Conservation and management measure for yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the WCPO, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-

2008-01/conservation-and-management-measure-bigeye-and-yellowfin-tuna-western-and-central-pa

WCPFC CMM 2008-03, Conservation and management of sea turtles, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-03/conservation-and-management-

sea-turtles

WCPFC 2009-02, High Seas FAD closure and catch retention, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2009-02/conservation-and-management-measure-

application-high-seas-fad-closures-and-catch-ret WCPFC CMM 2008-03, Conservation and management of sea turtles,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-03/conservation-and-management-sea-turtles

WCPFC CMM 2009-06, Conservation and management measure on the regulation of transshipment, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2009-

06/conservation-and-management-measure-regulation-transshipment-0

WCPFC CMM 2010-03, Conservation and management measure for compliance monitoring scheme, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2010-

03/conservation-and-management-measure-compliance-monitoring-scheme

WCPFC

WCPFC,

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 25

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Measures

Key Relevant Features

Members comply with reporting systems confirming confirmation of the Implementation of the

National Plan of Action on Sharks



Require full utilisation through retention of carcass; and



Implement 5% fin to weight ratio.



Prohibit retention, transshipment or trading in fins caught in contravention



Encourage live release of sharks in non-target fisheries

2010-07

Sharks

Source: WCPFC.

The WCPFC has adopted a core package of measures in CMM 2008-01 (WCPFC, 2010) for the Pacific purse

seine (and longline) fisheries with the objectives to:



Ensure through the implementation of compatible measures for the HS, HSPs and EEZs that bigeye

and yellowfin tuna stocks are maintained at levels capable of producing their maximum sustainable

yield; as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors including the special requirements

of developing States in the Convention area as expressed by Article 5 of the Convention;

Achieve, through the implementation of a package of measures, over a three-year period commencing

in 2009, a minimum of 30 % reduction in bigeye tuna fishing mortality from the annual average during

the period 2001-2004 or 2004;

Ensure that there is no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin tuna beyond the annual average

during the period 2001-2004 average or 2004; and

Adopt a package of measures that shall be reviewed annually and adjusted as necessary by the

Commission taking account of the scientific advice available at the time as well as the implementation

of the measures. In addition, this review shall include any adjustments required by Commission

decisions regarding management objectives and reference points.



CMM 2008-01 is a complex measure which imposes purse seine effort limits and longline catch limits, a

closure relating to purse seine fishing using FADs, the closure of two HSPs to purse seine fishing, and

measures relating to observer coverage, development of FAD management plans, catch retention, and

juvenile tuna catch mitigation research, to be progressively implemented during the period 2009-2011.

For 2009, for the purse seine fishery, effort in PNA EEZs and the HS was limited to 2004 reference levels; the

FAD closure was applied from August 1

to 30

September, with mandatory observer coverage during that

time; and bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin tuna were required to be retained, and not discarded; and the purse

seine fishery on the high seas was also subject to the FAD closure, an effort limit, catch retention and

mandatory observer coverage.

The 2004 reference levels for the purse seine effort limits included effort obligated under existing agreements,

which had been registered with the Commission (para 7). Twelve agreements have been registered with the

Commission (WCPFC, 2008). In most cases, the effort provided for in these agreements was fully subscribed

in 2004, but in the case of the United States Multi-Lateral Treaty (USMLT), only 21 of the 40 vessels provided

for in the Treaty were active in 2004. Vessels of Small Island developing State Members are exempt from the

purse seine effort limits.

As an incentive to encourage exploration of innovative arrangements to mitigate bigeye bycatch, Commission

Cooperating Members (CCMs) meeting certain conditions were authorised to apply a 10 % reduction in purse

seine bigeye bycatch as an alternative arrangement to the high seas FAD closure (para 15).

WCPFC CMM 2010-07, Conservation and management measure for sharks, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2010-03/conservation-and-

management-measure-compliance-monitoring-scheme

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 26

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

For the second two years of the measure applying (2010-2011), effort limitation continues to apply, the FAD

closure is extended to cover the period July 1

to 30

September each year (3 months), and the closure of two

HSPs wholly enclosed by the EEZs of CCMs (and one Commission Non Cooperating Member (CNM)), as

shown in Figure 7, applies from 1

January 2010. From January 1

2010, and 100 % observer coverage from

the Commission’s Regional Observer Programme has been required.

Figure 7: WCPFC High Sea pockets

Notes: The WCPFC Convention Area, with the two HSPs wholly enclosed between 20

N and 20

S are shown in black.

The PNA EEZs are shown in yellow, and the archipelagic waters of PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu are in white

(CMM 2008-01).

For the longline fishery, the total catch of bigeye by longline gear will be subject to phased reduction such that

by January 2012, the longline catch of bigeye tuna is 70 % of the average annual catch in 2001-2004 or 2004,

with a phased 30 % reduction for CCMs, with 10 % in the first year, 20 % in the second and 30 % in the third

year. Exemptions apply to CCMs which caught less than 2,000 tonnes in 2004, provided that their catch does

not exceed 2,000 tonnes in each of the years 2009-2011, with other exemptions applying to small island

developing states (SIDS) and longline fleets catching less than 5,000 tonnes of bigeye and landing exclusively

fresh fish.

All CCMs are required to report to each regular session of the Technical and Compliance Committee on the

implementation of CMM 2008-01 measure (para. 45), and the measures are reviewed annually in conjunction

with the scientific advice to measure the impact and compliance with the measure (para. 46).

Information on the effectiveness of CMM 2008-01 is discussed below.

WCPFC CMMs also place an increasingly important emphasis on ecosystem management. CMM 2010 now

places binding obligations on CCMs to implement national plans of action on shark management. The current

focus is to minimise shark retention, but it is also likely that shark mitigation measures will form the basis of

CMMs in the near future, pending the outcome of research into the status of silky sharks.

Additional comment is also relevant on the issue of observers. Appendix C highlights the failure of Kiribati

observers to regularly supply observer reports as reported by EU fleet owners, and this can only compromise

efforts aimed at effective management and responsible fisheries. This assertion is backed up by the 2011

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 27

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

WCPFC 3rd Annual report for the regional observer programme, which highlighted that 57 % of observer trip

reports due had not been submitted. Section 3.7 provides additional comments on the issue of observers

pertaining to WCPFC and IATTC requirements.

With respect to fisheries management in archipelagic waters, these waters can be important spawning areas

for tuna, however the majority of spawning probably takes place widely throughout the western and central

tropical Pacific where suitable habitat exists and is not just restricted to archipelagic waters. For skipjack,

yellowfin and bigeye tuna, this is where the sea surface temperature is greater than about 26

C and

productivity is suitable to enable adult tuna to enter spawning condition. Modelled distribution of skipjack tuna

larvae by Lehodey

et al.

(2011) based on the Spatial Ecosystem and Populations Dynamics Model

(SEAPODYM) shows very wide distributions across the Pacific (http://www.wcpfc.int/node/3633).

Figure 8: Mean distribution of skipjack larvae, 1

quarter for the decade 1990-1999

Source: Lehodey

et al.,

2011.

3.6.2

Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and related management arrangements

The PNA is an alliance of Pacific island states whose EEZs collectively account for a significant bulk of the

region’s tuna catch and 54 % of the purse seine catch. The Nauru Agreement is a regional Agreement

concerned with Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest (see Box 3 for further

details). The Agreement is a binding Treaty-level instrument considered to be a sub-regional or regional

fisheries management arrangement for the purpose of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)

and the WCPFC Convention. The countries of Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New

Guinea, Nauru, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, have worked collaboratively since 1982 to manage

the tuna stocks within their national waters through the Agreement. PNA coordinate the implementation of

management measures with a view to enhancing economic benefits from the fishery (PNA, 1982), including:



Harmonizing the terms and conditions of access for distant water fishing vessels/fleets; and

Granting preferential access to vessels of the Parties in order to encourage domestic participation in

the fishing industry.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 28

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The Organisation operates its secretariat from the Marshall Islands. Its objectives are to:



Enhance regional solidarity; and

Promote economic control and participatory rights over the tuna resources in PNA waters.

Maximise the profitability of the fishery and ancillary industries within the PNA;

Develop initiatives to maximise the sustained direct and indirect economic benefits to the Parties; and

Develop strategic fisheries conservation and management initiatives.

Its primary focus is to:

The PNA countries operate an access and management regime, which optimises revenue collection for the

parties, as well as promoting the development of the Parties’ indigenous fishery sector.

Box 3: Contents of the Nauru Agreement

Article I

The Parties shall seek to establish a co-ordinated approach to the fishing of the common stocks in the

Fisheries Zones by foreign fishing vessels and in particular:

(a) shall establish principles for the granting of priority to applications by fishing vessels of the Parties to fish

within the Fisheries Zones over other foreign fishing vessels;

(b) shall establish, as a minimum, uniform terms and conditions under which the Parties may licence foreign

fishing vessels to fish within the Fisheries Zones regarding:

(i)

the requirement that each foreign fishing vessel apply for and possess a licence or permit; the

placement of observer on foreign fishing vessels;

(ii)

the requirement that a standardized form of log book be maintained on a day-to-day basis which

shall be produced at the direction of the competent authorities;

(iii)

the timely reporting to the competent authorities of required information concerning the entry, exit

and other movement and activities of foreign fishing vessels within the Fisheries Zones; and

(iv)

standardized identification of foreign fishing vessels.

to fish within the Fisheries Zones, including:

(i)

the payment of an access fee, which shall be calculated in accordance with principles

established by the Parties;

(ii)

the requirement to supply to the competent authorities complete catch and effort data for each

voyage;

(iii)

the requirement to supply to the competent authorities such additional information as the

Parties may determine to be necessary;

(iv)

the requirement that the flag States or organisations having authority over a foreign fishing

vessel take such measures as are necessary to ensure compliance by such vessel with the

relevant fisheries laws of the Parties; and

(v)

such other terms and conditions as the Parties may from time to time consider necessary.

Article II:

The Parties shall seek to establish a co-ordinated approach to the fishing of the common stocks in the

Fisheries Zones by foreign fishing vessels and in particular:

(a) shall establish principles for the granting of priority to applications by fishing vessels of the Parties to fish

within the Fisheries Zones over other foreign fishing vessels;

(b) shall establish, as a minimum, uniform terms and conditions under which the Parties may licence foreign

fishing vessels to fish within the Fisheries Zones regarding:

(i)

the requirement that each foreign fishing vessel apply for and possess a licence or permit;

(iii)

the requirement that a standardized form of log book be maintained on a day-to-day basis

which shall be produced at the direction of the competent authorities;

(iv)

the timely reporting to the competent authorities of required information concerning the entry,

exit and other movement and activities of foreign fishing vessels within the Fisheries Zones;

and

(v)

standardized identification of foreign fishing vessels.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 29

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

vessels to fish within the Fisheries Zones, including:

(i)

the payment of an access fee, which shall be calculated in accordance with principles

established by the Parties;

(ii)

the requirement to supply to the competent authorities complete catch and effort data for each

voyage;

(iii)

the requirement to supply to the competent authorities such additional information as the

Parties may determine to be necessary;

(iv)

the requirement that the flag States or organisations having authority over a foreign fishing

vessel take such measures as are necessary to ensure compliance by such vessel with the

relevant fisheries laws of the Parties; and

(v)

such other terms and conditions as the Parties may from time to time consider necessary.

Article III:

The Parties shall seek to standardise their respective licensing procedures and in particular:

(a) seek to establish and adopt uniform measures and procedures relating to the licensing of foreign fishing vessels,

including application formats, licensing formats and other relevant documents; and

(b) explore the possibility of establishing, without prejudice to the respective sovereign rights of the Parties, a

centralised licensing system of foreign fishing vessels.

Article IV:

The Parties shall seek the assistance of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency in establishing

procedures and administrative arrangements for the exchange and analysis of:

(a) statistical data concerning catch and effort by fishing vessels in the Fisheries Zones relating to the common

stocks of fish; and

(b) information relating to vessel specifications and fleet composition.

Source: Nauru Agreement (PNA 1982).

The Nauru Agreement is implemented through binding Implementing Arrangements and associated

Arrangements, which include:



Implementing Arrangement (PNA, 1983),

setting minimum licensing standards, including

reporting, inspection and onboard observation, vessel identification and “good standing” on the FFA

regional register;

2nd Implementing Arrangement (PNA 1990),

adding additional conditions relating to VMS, high

seas reporting and a prohibition on transshipment at sea;

FSM Arrangement (PNA 1994),

establishing arrangements for preferential access among the parties

for vessels meeting certain standards for the provision of domestic economic benefits;

Palau Arrangement (PNA, 1995),

limiting the purse seine fishery, initially by limiting vessel numbers,

but now through the VDS which is described separately in more detail below;

Implementing Arrangement (3IA) (PNA, 2008),

applying a FAD closure, 100 % observer

coverage and catch retention/no tuna discards in PNA EEZs, and prohibition of fishing in HSPs for

licensed vessels

. The high seas closures were extended (PNA, 2010) to run from 1 January 2011,

applicable to purse seine vessels licensed to fish in PNA EEZs.

These arrangements apply to all vessels, with the only differential applied in the amendment to the 3IA, with a

derogation to allow domestic vessels to introduce large mesh size. The proposed extension of a four month

FAD closure is to be applied to DWFN only.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 30

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The present management measures are also in the process of amendment to include additional elements of

the PNA 3IA, including:



A ban on the setting of whale sharks (PNA, 2010);

Introduction of additional HS closures (high seas areas between 10˚N and 20˚S and 170˚E and 150˚W

20˚S and 170˚E and 150˚W)

(which is not scientifically supported and which would have a major

impact on EU vessels fishing in Kiribati waters and high seas areas outside the EEZ); and

An increase in the minimum mesh size for purse seine nets to 90 mm (3.5ins) measured from knot to

knot in the bunt and 240 mm (9ins) in 70 % of the body of each purse seine net.

References to the Palau and Nauru agreements are usually explicit in each of the Party’s national fishery acts,

and as such adoption of PNA Agreements are binding on the Parties.

The PNA also collaborate to achieve the objectives of the Nauru Agreement and other regional and

international instruments through a coordinated approach to their participation in broader groups, including the

FFA, SPC and the WCPFC and to their relationships with fishing access partners. In this respect, the First and

Second Implementing Arrangements provide the basis for the FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and

Conditions (see Box 4) and for many of the compliance elements of the WCPFC Convention and the WCPFC

compliance programmes, and the 3IA provides the major purse seine elements of WCPFC CMM 2008-01. The

amendments to the third implementation Agreement (PNA, 2010) will formulate the PNA’s proposals for

change to CMM 2008-01, but are already binding on the parties and will be applied to the DWFNs through the

Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTCs).

The closure of additional High Seas areas between 10N and 20S and 170E and 150W, effective 1 January 2011, PNA Circular

2010-01, 24 May 2010, Outcomes of the 29

Annual Meeting of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA29), 19-23 May 2010,

Majuro, Marshall Islands. It was noted that this had not been introduced as part of the Kiribati Minimum Terms and Conditions

(MTCs).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 31

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Box 4: The Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessel Access

Common Regional Licence Form to be carried on board at all times;

Good Standing on the FFA Vessel Register: that the vessel and its operator to have good standing on

the FFA Vessel Register; and vessel to be registered on the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels;



Transshipment: no purse seine vessel, except for group seiners, to transship at sea; 72 hours’ notice;

submit full reports on transshipping;



Pay all fees required;



Maintain and Submit Catch Logs in Zones and High Seas;



Reporting: each Wednesday; within a reasonable time of entry into and departure from the zone, and

entry into a port. Out-turn documentation, and landing and dock receipts to be provided;



Observers to be allowed and assisted to undertake their duties, every effort to be made to achieve 100

% coverage ;



Agent to be appointed to receive and respond to any legal process ;



Vessels in Transit to have fishing equipment stowed or secured for fishing;



Port State Control: FFA members to exercise powers of port State over fishing vessels in their ports;



Inspection/Enforcement: operators to comply instructions and directions given by an authorised and

identified person;



Copy of the International Code of Signals (INTERCO) to be accessible at all times;



Vessels to be identified in accordance with FAO Standards;



Flag States or Fishermen's Associations to be required in agreements to take measures to ensure

compliance by their vessels;



Vessel Monitoring System to be implemented;



Fish Aggregating Devices to be clearly marked and identified; and



Compulsory pre-fishing inspections to be carried out.

Source: FFA, 2010.



Hampton

et al.,

(2011) drew a number of conclusions in assessing the WCPFC CMM 2008-01 and PNA third

party implementation arrangements:



Purse seine effort has expanded since the introduction of CMM 2008-01, with effort (excluding

domestic purse seiners based in Indonesia and Philippines) in 2010 estimated to have increased by

approximately 18 % compared to effort in 2004. VMS data to 30 September 2011 indicates a further

increase in effort of approximately 7 % over the same time in 2010;

Catches of skipjack and yellowfin were moderately reduced during the closures, but bigeye catches

were strongly reduced. In 2010, the proportions of effort associated with FAD usage outside the

closure period, particularly the months immediately before and after the FAD closure, had lower FAD

usage than is typically the case. While catches were reduced during the closures, the average size of

the catch was higher for all species, particularly yellowfin, during the closures because of the larger

average size of fish caught in unassociated sets. These larger average sizes have higher unit values;

Available data from all sources indicate that the HSP closure since 1 January 2010 has largely been

respected. Since January 2010, effort has been concentrated mainly in the EEZs, with no apparent re-

distribution of effort to the eastern high seas;

The 2010 longline catch of bigeye tuna of 61,676 tonnes (as reported by CCMs) is approximately 74

% of the average catch for 2001-2004.

The reduction in purse seine FAD effort in 2010 had the greatest effect in terms of removing

overfishing (67.4 % of overfishing removed on bigeye tuna) followed by the reduction in longline catch

in 2010 (34.7 % of the overfishing removed). For purse seine closures, there was a relatively small

incremental reduction in fishing mortality (F)/FMSY compared to that achieved by a FAD closure; and

It was estimated that if the CMM was implemented without exemptions, approximately half of the

overfishing that is estimated could occur under the CMM, could be removed (reduction of bigeye tuna

F/FMSY from 1.35 to 1.17).



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 32

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Sibert

et al.

(2011) applying the Spatial Ecosystem and Populations Dynamics Model (SEAPODYM) found

that:



Simply closing areas to purse-seine fishing, produces only very small increases in bigeye biomass.

Area closures could even be counter-productive in some cases if fishing effort is simply displaced and

the closure is used as a justification to increase fishing effort outside of the closed areas. Provisional

analysis of the 2010 purse seine closure of areas alone shows that the closure was fairly well

respected by the purse seine fleets, but total purse seine effort increased by 10 % and was deployed

in the EEZs surrounding area. This outcome suggests that the response of the purse seine fleets to

the closures was not only to deploy effort in areas adjacent to the closed areas but also to increase

effort in these areas. The 2010 situation almost certainly increased fishing mortality of juvenile bigeye.

However, closed areas for highly migratory species can be useful fishery management tools, if the

displaced effort is eliminated, i.e. when combined with an overall reduction in effort, as opposed to

transferring effort elsewhere;

FAD prohibition with redistributed effort to free school sets resulted in a significant improvement in the

adult bigeye biomass in the WCPFC convention area with a strong positive impact on bigeye stock

conservation; and

Benefits from any bigeye conservation measure will only be detectable after 10 years and be fully

realized after two decades, i.e. in the 2030s assuming timely implementation.

The Palau Arrangement and Vessel Day Scheme (VDS)



3.6.3

The VDS is a scheme under the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Purse Seine Fishery

(PNA, 2004), which establishes a system of tradable fishing days allocated to the Parties as Party Allowable

Effort (PAE). The Arrangement was established to



Regulate the number of purse seine vessels to be licensed by the Parties at any one time, in response

to scientific advice on resource sustainability and the rapid influx of foreign purse seine vessels into

the WCPO; and

Provide a basis for increasing economic benefits to resource-owning states and economic returns to

participating vessel owners.



Prior to the coming into force of the Palau Arrangement, the PNA had already set in 1990 a provisional limit of

164 purse seine vessels to be licensed by the Parties. The license allocation limit under the Palau

Arrangement in 1995 was for 205 purse seine vessels until the license allocation management scheme was

replaced by the VDS in December 2007. The introduction of the VDS was the result of an external review

commissioned by the Parties in 2000 (Geen, 2000) to assess the effectiveness of the license allocation

management scheme in achieving its objectives under the Palau Arrangement. The review by Geen (2000)

recommended the adoption of the VDS to regulate the number of fishing days by purse seine vessels as a

long term approach to the management of the purse seine fishery. The Parties adopted the VDS in 2006

following the completion of the signing by all Parties of the MoU for the provisional application of the

amendments to the Palau Arrangement to facilitate the implementation of the VDS.

The VDS scheme is managed by the PNA Office (PNAO). The VDS is overseen and reviewed by an Inter-

Party VDS Committee (VDSC), and reports to the annual meeting of the Parties to the Palau Arrangement.

The role of the VDSC is to have oversight on the operational aspects of the VDS and provide

recommendations as appropriate to the plenary meetings of the Parties to the Palau Arrangement, unless

mandated to decide on certain operational aspects of the VDS.

A Total Allowable Effort (TAE) was set at 28,469 days based on the 2004 TAE in PNA waters, and specific

Party Allowable Efforts (PAE) were decided based on a combination of two factors: the average level of purse

seine effort in the waters of the Parties for the period 2001 to 2004 (50 %); and the relative biomass within

each Party EEZ (50 %).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 33

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Other important factors include the following elements:

VDS PAE management: The sequence of events leading to the present PAE management arrangement was:

As from 2008-2009 (MY 1-MY2):

Parties could transfer days between Management Years of the same Management Period, and

between Management Periods;



Parties could seek temporary increases subject to the approval of the Parties;



VDS applied a rolling three year over Management Period; and



Exchanges between parties were allowed to make up for any excesses and shortfalls.

As from 2010 (MY 3):

The ability to transfer days from one year to the next ceased;

Exchanges between parties allowed in order to avoid over excesses in individual PAEs, or

corresponding shortfalls;



A hybrid adjustment was introduced to the original allocation allowing for 50/50 % or 100/0 % historical

effort/biomass formulation and applying whichever ratio results in a higher PAE for each Party; and



The resultant adjusted TAE based on the hybrid PAE formulation was 33,798 days. The Parties

agreed in the same meeting in June 2009 to strictly apply a limit of 28,469 days for MY3 (2010)

irrespective of the hybrid Adjusted TAE total of 33,798 days, which meant that each Party could use

up their hybrid PAE provided that the agreed limit of 28,469 days was not exceeded.

As from 2011 (MY 4):



In determining the TAE/PAEs for 2011, the Parties adopted the approach of applying the higher PAE

of the hybrid 50/50 % and 100/50 % effort/biomass formulation and this time to standardize the PAEs

such that the total of the standardized PAEs equate to the agreed limit of 28,469 days;

In agreeing to apply a hard limit of 28,469 days in MY4 (2011), the Parties agreed to further amend

the VDS Management Scheme (Attachment C), not to allow transfer days between Management

Years and between Management Periods and not to allow temporary increases for special

circumstances;

In enforcing the hard limit of 28,469 days, each Party thus needed to ensure that its agreed respective

PAE was not exceeded by enabling the transfer/trading of days from other Parties which have surplus

days available for transfer/trading, provided the agreed overall limit of 28,469 days was not exceeded,

otherwise for the Party that has reached its PAE to close off its EEZ to foreign fishing vessels under

bilateral access agreements and to FSMA vessels of other Parties; and

With respect to PAE overruns in 2010, if the level of fishing in the EEZ of a Party exceeds its PAE for

a Management Year, that Party’s PAE for the following Management Year shall be adjusted by

deducting in the case of the overrun 120 % of the excess. In this case the Administrator alerted the

Parties and those who were likely to exceed their PAEs by the end of the year of the possibility. In

agreeing to apply the hard limits in 2011, and also in standardizing the hybrid model as adjusted by

the Parties in April 2010, the Parties effectively reduced their individual PAEs by 18 % in order to

arrive at the Hard Limits of a PAE of 28,469 days.



Definition of a Fishing Day: For the purpose of the Scheme, a fishing day is defined as any calendar day, or

part of a calendar day, during which a purse seine vessel is in the waters of a Party outside a port, but does

not include days for which advance notice has been given that a vessel will be in the waters of a Party but will

not be undertaking fishing activities, such as when a vessel is in transit. Vessel days involving fishing in more

than one zone in a day shall be apportioned according to the distribution of reported positions in a day

between zones. This principle also applies to days involving reporting from the waters of non-parties and the

High Seas.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 34

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Fishing Power: Recognising that the fishing power of vessels varies, particularly with the size of vessels, the

Parties decided that fishing days by vessels of different sizes should be accounted for as follows:



Small vessels of less than 50 meters in length: 0.5 days;

Vessels in the 50 to 80 meters range as equal: 1 day; and

Vessels over 80 meters: 1.5 days.

Allowance for FSM and the Multilateral Treaty: In order to meet their obligations under the FSM arrangement

and the Multilateral Treaty with the US, the Parties have set aside pools of fishing days to provide for fishing

effort by FSM Arrangement vessels fishing outside the waters of their Home Parties and US Treaty vessels.

The number of days in these pools has been calculated as the average fishing days based on the 2004 TAE in

PNA waters. These determined the allocations for vessels fishing under the FSM Arrangement and the US

Treaty. These were originally set at 2,670 and 3,540 but subsequently adjusted to 3,122 and 5,838 days to

take account of adjustments in fishing effort and revisions made in CMM 2008-01. Both these limits have been

consistently exceeded. The US to 5,838 days, 7,477 days, 8,920 days in 2008, 2009 and 2010; and FSMA by

3,122 days, 3,435 days and 5,592 days in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Under the current USMLT negotiations the

US is seeking an allocation of 9,000 days, which will include 1,000 days from non-PNA parties.

Bringing the US fleet under the VDS scheme will reduce the Parties’ individual PAEs and limit their

development aspirations and ability to maintain existing fisheries arrangements. Negotiations reconvene in

February 2012. However, based on recent communiqués between FFA and the US, it appears likely that PNA

may well agree on a limit of 7,000 days.

Figure 6 shows the adjustments to vessel days, following the application of the weighting system.

Figure 9: DWFN / FSMA and Domestic Purse seine effort by PNA licensed purse seine fleet

Source: PNAO.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 35

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 8 below provides the outline of the allocation between the parties under the VDS.

Table 8: PNA VDS allocations, uptake by management year (2008-2011) and transfers

Party

alloca

tion

Party

allocation

FSM

Kiribati

Marsh. Is

Nauru

Palau

PNG

Sol. Is

Tuvalu

Total

Annual

adjustments

Per

cent

Uptake in MY 1-MY3

2008

2009

2010

Adjusted

PAEs

MY 4 (2011)

Uptake

2012

2012 PAEs

6,253

22%

5,047

4,591

5,648

5,522

19%

5,040

5,522

6,194

22%

3,998

5,687

4,795

5,450

19%

4,379

5,474

2,727

10%

712

456

637

2,234

1,452

1,511

1,507

2,139

1,653

1,699

1,653

595

163

118

514

543

514

7,907

28%

12,286

10,606

15,030

10,073

35%

11,144

12,170

2,361

2,302

2,202

2,548

2,146

1,899

2,310

979

588

1,022

973

877

940

1,055

28,468

100%

26,607

26,151

31,888

28,469

100%

27,878

30,932

MY1 (2008): Adjusted to take account of 13 month operational period, and transfers from MY2 to MY 1 (PNG);

MY2 (2009): Transfer of unused fishing days (2008), underutilised days and extra credit to PNG (5,000 days) and

Solomon Is (547 days); MY3: Overshoot in annual TAE 4,978 days, but VDS days in surplus from preceding

years.

Source: PNAO.

The PNA countries established a MoU (PNA, 2011) setting a minimum benchmark fee on 20

July

, 2011

agreeing the following:



A minimum bench mark fee of US$ 5,000 (€3,448) per fishing day under the Vessel Days Scheme

shall be applied to foreign fishing vessels from 2012 as a non-negotiable bench mark;

The minimum bench mark fee shall be applied to all foreign fishing vessels from the beginning of the

Management Year (MY5) (2012);

Parties shall inform each other of their negotiations with foreign fishing vessels and collaborate with

each other so that foreign fishing fleets do not play them off against each other; and

The Parties shall duly inform foreign fishing vessels of the implementation of the minimum bench mark

fee when they renew their bilateral access agreements for 2012.

The full operation of the VDS commenced with the first Management Year (MY1) of 12 months from 1 December 2007 to 30

November 2008 which was extended by an additional month to include December 2008 in order to align the subsequent

Management Years of the VDS to a calendar year from the second Management Year (MY2 – 1 January to 31 December 2008)

onwards

Kiribati

was not present at the meeting but subsequently signed the MoU in August 2011.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 36

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 9 below summarises the present status of implementation of national VDS effort limits by the Parties.

Table 9: Implementation of PAE Allocations by PNA members at February 2011

All agreements except for the one with the EU incorporated the VDS and fleets allocated days

per calendar year

FSM

As from 2010. The VDS rate of US$ 5,000/vessel day is incorporated into each Agreement upon

renewal.

Kiribati implemented VDS to all Bilateral agreements renewed in 2011 including Japan, Taiwan,

China and New Zealand. The agreements with Korea and EU lapse in April and September

Kiribati

respectively. Stakeholder consultations suggest that Korea may be willing to pay US$ 8,000 per

day.

Marshall Marshall Islands has implemented VDS limits for all Bilateral Agreements, and has actively

Islands

exchanged Vessel days with PNG, Nauru and Solomon Islands

Nauru operated an Olympic system, closing the fishery as and when the PAE was reached.

Nauru

Nauru closed is EEZ to purse seine fishing in October of 2011. As of 2012 Nauru sold its Vessel

Days by tender. The amounts have not been disclosed.

Palau

Palau operated an Olympic system up until 2011. VDS as from 2012.

Allocated vessel days to fleets in agreements. PNG traded days from Palau, FSM and Marshall

PNG

Islands at US $ 5,000/day

Vessel Days allocated to Korea, Japan and Taiwan in agreements.

Solomon Trading took place between the Solomon Is and RMI, with a rate / vessel day set at US $8,000

Islands

The Solomon Islands closed the fishery from 17

June 2011, but this was reopened to the EU

on 29

January on the basis of the existing FPA.

Tuvalu

Tuvalu operated an Olympic system up until 2011. VDS as from 2012.

Negotiations are taking place between the US and the Pacific island Parties. Negotiations

USMLT

(based on an exchange of letters) currently stand at a rate of $10,000/Vessel Day (US$ 60

million) per annum, with an additional development component separated.

Source: PNA Administrator.

The VDS is a very large management programme being applied by a group of developing countries of varying

capacities. Taken together with the various other measures of the 3IA and CMM 2008-01, the VDS provides a

central element in the management of the target stocks and is also an important element in the regional

strategy to conserve bigeye.

It is not the principal job of this report to evaluate the VDS; however Table 10 presents some strengths and

weaknesses of the VDS.

Table 10: Strengths and weaknesses of the VDS

Strengths



A binding Agreement on allocations of

fishing effort

Has mechanisms to account for effort

creep

Has high-level political support in the

PNA Leadership

Is based on an extensive consultative

process with stakeholders directly

involved

Is accepted by the WCPFC as

evidenced by its incorporation into



Weaknesses

The lack of a clear link between the PAE and scientific

advice on stock status

PAE allocation has been unsettled, and difficulties have been

addressed in part through increasing the TAE and individual

PAEs through

ad hoc

adjustments

Trading has been slow to develop

The

ad hoc

adjustments, lack of trading and high provisions

for transfers between years resulted in high adjusted PAEs

for 2010 and increased effort in 2010, including allowing the

transfer, instead of removal, of effort from the closed HSPs



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 37

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Strengths



CMM 2008-01

Uses a centralized monitoring of effort

by VMS

Has support from the FFA VMS and

the Regional Observer Programme

Has monitoring (logsheet) and

scientific support from SPC

Trading gathered momentum in 2011



Weaknesses

Some Parties have overrun their PAEs, and it is not clear

that the sanctions in the Scheme for over-runs are being

applied

Limits have only been partially applied at national level

There are inconsistencies in the treatment of non-fishing

days, with apparently high provisions for non-fishing days for

one Party, while no provisions are made for other Parties;

The Scheme does not apply to archipelagic waters and effort

has increased substantially in archipelagic waters of the

Parties since 2004;

The FSMA effort is capped at 3,907 days but was exceeded

in both 2010 and 2011; and

US effort is being brought into the VDS, but is likely to

require an additional 2,460 days

Not accepted by all CCMs to the WCPFC



Source: Consultants’ analysis;

In response to the early experience with the VDS, including the shortfalls in performance, PNA is reviewing

amending the VDS Management Scheme to improve the Scheme including:



Implementing target and limit reference points for skipjack tuna, which take account of the catch

throughout the range of the stock;



Requiring FSMA vessels to cease fishing once the cap for days outside home Party waters is

exceeded in a Management Year;



Revising the VDS weighting limits to take account of the catch, with the possibility of introducing a

further limit on super seiners;



Revising the PAEs to take account of changes to the USMLT; and



Improving the trading mechanism between Parties to ensure all allocations are used within each

Management Year (MY).

3.6.4

Niue Treaty

The Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement was adopted in 1993 and

all FFA Members, except Tokelau, are parties. The Agreement is legally a stand-alone Agreement

although it was adopted directly in response to Article 5 of the FFA Convention (calling for the promotion of

intra-regional coordination and cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement) and the FFA

has certain administrative responsibilities under the Treaty and so, in practice, taking account also of the

largely concurrent membership, the Treaty can be seen as a

de facto

subsidiary Agreement of FFA.

The Treaty is an Agreement on cooperation between FFA members on monitoring, control and surveillance

of fishing, and includes provisions on exchange of information and procedures for cooperation in

monitoring, prosecuting and penalising illegal fishing vessels. It is designed to complement the other

management frameworks in the region, and specifically defines its relationship to harmonized minimum terms

and conditions of access. Despite initial broad political support for the Treaty, there has to date been minimal

implementation of it. In recent years, however, there has been renewed interest resulting in the organisation

and implementation of joint deployment plans.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 38

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.6.5

Regional Organizations (FFA and SPC)

FFA and SPC play significant roles in the management framework for the fisheries under assessment because

of the support and services they provide both to PNA and the WCPFC.

3.6.5.1 Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)

Based in Honiara, Solomon Islands, FFA's 17 members are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of

Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,

Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. FFA was established to help countries sustainably

manage their fishery resources that fall within their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA

is an advisory body providing expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make

sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and participate in regional decision making on tuna

management through agencies such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

The joint aim of members of the FFA is captured in its Vision Statement, which states:

“We, the Member Countries of the Forum Fisheries Agency, will enjoy the highest level of economic and social

benefits that is compatible with sustainable use of our tuna resources.”

Approximately 50 staff at the regional FFA headquarters in Honiara support their national contact points in

each member jurisdiction. FFA focuses its work on:

a) Fisheries management – providing policy and legal frameworks for the sustainable management

of tuna;

b) Fisheries development – developing the capacity of members to sustainably harvest, process and

market tuna to create livelihoods; and

c) Fisheries operations – supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty

administration, information technology and vessel registration and monitoring.

Within the overall FFA programme, the Fisheries Management Programme is designed to assist FFA

Members including PNA Parties, to refine and maintain effective policy and legal frameworks for the

sustainable management of their tuna fisheries resources. This programme provides advice on:

ii.

iii.

iv.

vi.

vii.

viii.

appropriate legal frameworks for national tuna management, including members’ obligations under

various treaties and arrangements;

appropriate fisheries management frameworks including the incorporation of the principles of

ecosystem based fisheries management;

effective fisheries administration, including access arrangements, licensing of foreign and domestic

fishing vessels, economic implications of different management systems, and the use of new systems

and technologies;

development and implementation of monitoring, control and surveillance systems and effective

compliance regimes;

assisting members to keep abreast of best practice fisheries management models, and develop

stronger and deeper regional co-operation in fisheries management;

providing effective oversight, and where appropriate management of a regional vessel register, vessel

monitoring system, and observer program;

servicing regional fisheries treaties and arrangements; and

improving capacity in fisheries management.

Two key instruments in the implementation of these programmes are:

1 the Regional Tuna Management and Development Strategy; and

2 the Regional Monitoring Control and Surveillance Strategy.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 39

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

In addition to providing services to FFA Members, FFA supports the WCPFC VMS through shared facilities

with the FFA VMS, providing establishment, maintenance, diagnostic and support infrastructure and services,

mobile transmission unit (MTU) or automatic location communicator (ALC) management services and

communication gateways for the Commission VMS, along with training for Commission staff.

3.6.5.2 Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)

With its headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) is an

intergovernmental organisation that provides technical and policy advice and assistance to its Pacific island

members. SPC was established as an international organisation in 1947 and has 26 member countries and

territories, including American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands,

France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue,

Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau,

Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.

SPC services are provided primarily in the form of technical assistance, training and research.

The governing body of SPC is the Conference of the Pacific Community, which is held every two years, with

each member entitled to one vote on decisions. However, debates are usually resolved in the Pacific way by

consensus. The Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations (CRGA) meets annually,

and in the years that the conference does not meet, is empowered to make decisions on the governance of

SPC.

The focus of SPC’s work changes over time in response to evolving regional needs and regional collaborative

arrangements with other organisations. In 2010, the organisation has six divisions.

One of those Divisions is the Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems (FAME) Division which includes

the coastal fisheries and oceanic fisheries programmes, together with the project co-ordination unit of the

Coral Reef Initiative for the Pacific (CRISP). Within the FAME Division, the Oceanic Fisheries Programme

(OFP) aims "to

provide member countries with the scientific information and advice necessary to rationally

manage fisheries exploiting the region's resources of tuna, billfish and related species".

The OFP is the

WCPFC scientific services provider and a large portion of its scientific work is funded under the EDF

SCICOFISH programme functions

. It has three sections:

Statistics and Monitoring: including compilation of catch and effort data, data processing and technical

support for port sampling programmes and observer programmes in member countries and territories,

training in fisheries statistics and database management, statistical analyses and the provision of

statistical support to the WCPFC;

ii)

Tuna Ecology and Biology: including analysis of the biological parameters and environmental

processes that influence the productivity of tuna and billfish populations, focusing on age and growth,

movement and behaviour as observed from classical or electronic data archiving tags, and diet in a

more general study devoted to the food web of the pelagic ecosystem; and development of .

mathematical models to understand environmental effects of tuna fishery production, including

impacts of climate fluctuation; and

iii)

Stock Assessment and Modelling: including regional stock assessments, development of tuna

movement and simulation models, bio-economic modelling, National Fisheries Assessments and

scientific input to national tuna management plans and support for national Ecosystem Approach to

Fisheries Management (EAFM) analyses, tag-recapture database management.

See http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-2010-dp33/eu-report-article-30-convention-and-resolution-2008-01

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 40

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The FAME Division Strategic Plan (2010-2013) (SPC, 2009) addresses three priority areas in ways that are

designed to be closely coordinated with, and contribute to WCPFC-level research outcomes as follows:

To provide high-quality scientific information and advice for regional and national fisheries

management authorities on the status of, and fishery impacts on, stocks targeted or otherwise

impacted by regional oceanic fisheries;

ii) To collect and analyse accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries

management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic

species; and

iii) To improve understanding of pelagic ecosystems in the western and central Pacific Ocean.

The building of national capacity to monitor fisheries, manage data, provide technical support to fisheries

management and participate meaningfully in regional management discussions is a cross-cutting priority.

The annual budget for the core scientific services for WCPFC was US$700,000 /

€573,770

for 2010, with additional funding for specific high priority activities.

3.7

3.7.1

The Eastern Pacific Fishery: Status and Management issues

Status and management issues

Since the EU tuna fleet share fishing effort between the WCP area and the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO)

under the management of another RFMO (the IATTC), management and conservation rules adopted in the

EPO bear consequences on the fishing strategy of the EU fleet. This section is intended to briefly review the

main issues at stake in the EPO area and the likely consequences on the fishing possibilities available to the

EU tuna fleet.

The most recent evaluation (IATTC, 2011a) of stock status for tuna fisheries indicates that:



For yellowfin, MSY has been stable during the assessment period (1975-2010). However when a

stock-recruitment relationship is assumed, current effort is estimated to be above the level

corresponding to the MSY. There is uncertainty about recent and future levels of recruitment and

biomass, and there are retrospective patterns of overestimating recent recruitment;

For skipjack tuna, the main concern with the skipjack stock is the constantly increasing exploitation

rate. However, the data- and model-based indicators have yet to detect any adverse consequence of

this increase. The average weight was below its lower reference level in 2009, which can be a

consequence of overexploitation, but it can also be caused by recent recruitments being greater than

past recruitments. The continued decline in average length is a concern and, combined with levelling

off of catch and CPUE, may indicate that the exploitation rate is approaching or above the level

associated with MSY. The trend in many of the indicators changed in 2010, but it is uncertain what this

implies;

For bigeye tuna, the results indicate a recent recovery trend for bigeye tuna in the EPO (2005-2010),

subsequent to IATTC tuna conservation resolutions initiated in 2004. However, under the current

levels of fishing mortality, recent spikes in recruitment are predicted not to sustain this increasing

trend. There is however uncertainty about recent and future recruitment and biomass levels, and the

recent fishing mortality rates are estimated to be slightly above the level corresponding to MSY.



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 41

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The main management tool in force in the EPO for purse seine fisheries is a seasonal closure. In 2007, the

closure lasted approximately 1.5 month during the second half of the year. Given the need to further reduce

the catches, the scientific committee recommended in 2008 an extension of the seasonal closure to 12 weeks

(approx. 2.5 months) for the entire EPO with an additional closure of an offshore area located East of

Galapagos for a period of approx. 3.5 months. During the 79th meeting of IATTC in 2008, the parties could not

reach consensus and as a consequence, no management measures were adopted for 2008. At the 80th

meeting of the Commission held in June 2009, IATTC staff tabled the same recommendation and the parties

could finally agree on a 59 day closure in 2009, increased to 62 days in 2010 and 73 days in 2011. As

concerns the closure of the offshore area off Galapagos, the parties could only agree on a 1 month

moratorium, as opposed to the 109 days proposed by IATTC. At the most recent meeting, the 82nd meeting

held 4-8 July 2011, the IATTC agreed a multiannual programme for the conservation of tuna in the EPO for

2011-2013 (IATTC, 2011b). The measures agreed include: a 62-day closure period each year for purse seine

vessels; a closure of the fishery for yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack tuna by purse-seine vessels within the area

of 96º and 110ºW and between 4°N and 3°S from 0000 hours on 29 September to 2400 hours on 29 October;

all purse-seine vessels must retain on board and then land all bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin tuna caught,

except fish considered unfit for human consumption for reasons other than size (except for the last set of a

trip).

Additionally, IATTC regulates purse seining on tuna associated with dolphins to set annual limits of incidental

dolphin mortalities in the tuna purse-seine fishery in the Agreement area to levels approaching zero.

Association of tuna schools with dolphins is fairly frequent in the EPO unlike in the other oceanic regions.

Furthermore, IATTC imposes 100 % observer coverage of the larger purse seiners (includes all the EU purse

seiners) predominantly to monitor incidental catch of dolphins but also to collect scientific data and to monitor

compliance with IATTC management and conservation measures.

3.7.2

Issues of special concern to vessels fishing under the Kiribati FPA

Earlier comment has been made about the performance of Kiribati observers in the WCP. Additional comment

is necessary on the issue observers in the context of WCPFC and IATTC interplay. A MoU between the two

organisations was signed in 2011 to provide a cross endorsement of observers i.e. observers should be able

to cover both areas. However the MoU has not yet been implemented as the two secretariats do not agree on

the level of preparation and competency of observers, and further training is thus required. This means that

vessels have to have IATTC observers when fishing in the EPO and a WPCFC endorsed observer

when

crossing the 150 degree line. In practice this means they always have to have both observers onboard for any

trip where there is a chance of fishing in both areas. This requires vessel owners to have to pay for travel for

both observers.

A second issue affecting vessels operating under the Kiribati FPA, although not strictly a focus of this

evaluation, is the WCPFC and IATTC overlap, which requires vessels to implement both area management

provisions. This poses difficulties for vessel owners when such provisions are not harmonized i.e. closed

periods in the EPO do no coincide with the three month FAD ban in the WCP.

These observers are drawn from national observer programmes as there is currently no PNA/regional observer programme.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 42

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.8

3.8.1

Fleets fishing in the Kiribati EEZ

EU purse seine fleet

At present, the EU has three ongoing Fisheries Partnership Agreements in the WCP area, with the Republic

of Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Solomon Islands. These three partner countries are all

parties to the Palau Arrangement. The Spanish purse seine shipowner association (OPAGAC) has concluded

private agreements with Tuvalu (since 2009) and Tokelau (since 2011) and expects to conclude one with the

Cook Islands. An additional private agreement with Nauru has been allowed to lapse.

As outlined in the previous sections, the EU purse seine fleet is a minor operator in the WCPO with only

four vessels active and catches averaging below 29,000 tonnes per year (2007-2010). The EU purse

seiners represent around 2 % of the total purse seine fishery, which is dominated by fleets from Asia and

from Pacific island countries. The main fishing grounds of the European purse seine fleet remain the Indian

Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, with catches in the WCPO accounting for 7.25 % of total EU purse seine

catches.

Table 11 presents EU zonal purse seine catches in the WCPO illustrating a Kiribati EEZ catch dependency of

43 % over the length of the FPA, and a HS dependency of 48 %. A small amount of catches occurred in

Tuvalu waters (between 3,000-4,400 tonnes in 2008 and 2010 respectively), and Solomon Islands (around

400-1,300 tonnes in the same years). High Seas dependency is linked to dependency on Kiribati for EU

vessels due to the fact that the Kiribati EEZ is split by High Seas areas.

Table 11: EU zonal purse seine catches in the WCPO (EEZ and HS) 2007-2010

Kiribati

Solomon Is

Tuvalu

High

Seas

3,240

4,411

1,913

18,825

18,470

10,517

8,023

13,959

48%

Total

Kiribati

dependency

within WCPO

18%

48%

53%

High

Seas

dependency

82%

51%

40%

27%

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

Source: SPC.

4,133

17,308

12,806

15,717

12,491

43%

427

1,316

436

22,958

36,205

26,563

29,468

28,799

100%

The fleet is very much a ‘central pacific fleet’ compared to many other fleets which operate more strongly in

either the EPO, or in the WCP. Catches in Kiribati are not constant during the year, and fleet movements are

mainly determined by fish migrations, but also by management measures, as can be seen in Figure 10. During

the FAD closure in Kiribati vessels tend to move to the east.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 43

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Figure 10: Monthly catches by EU purse seine vessels for 2010 by species (tonnes)

Source: European Commission. (YFT: yellowfin tuna; SJJ: skipjack tuna; BET: bigeye tuna).

Species dependency shows a 73 % dependency on skipjack tuna, 13 % on bigeye tuna and 14 % on yellowfin

tuna (Table 12).

Table 12: EU purse seine species catch in the WCPO (EEZ and HS) 2006-2011.

Skipjack

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average (2006-2010)

Percent of total

Source: SPC.

15,354

25,553

19,677

20,517

17,890

73%

Yellowfin

4,322

4,789

3,070

4,040

3,382

14%

Bigeye

3,282

5,863

3.816

4,911

3,211

13%

Total

22,958

36,205

26,563

29,468

24,483

Table 13 illustrates a 47 % dependency and 46 % dependency on the Kiribati EEZ and HS. HS effort averaged

217 days over the period 2007 to 2010, exceeding the CMM 2008-01 (Table 2, Attachment B) effort limit of

103 days.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 44

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 13: EU purse seine fishing days by zone (2007-2010)

Kiribati

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

Percent of total

269

460

350

234

47%

Solomon Is

Tuvalu

172

274

209

168

228

46%

Total

270

585

748

564

496

100%

Source: SPC. Note that contrary to SPC data, EU vessels are known to have fished in Solomon Islands in 2009.

The above data is sourced from SPCs, statistics unit.

Data from the Insituto Español Oceanografico (IEO) (Spain) are the official catch data for the purpose of the

FPA as agreed by both the EU and Kiribati. These data (agreed by the EU and Kiribati for 2007 to 2009), are

different to the data held by SPC (see Table 14). The reasons for these discrepancies are not well understood,

especially given that the EU provides data to the WCPFC, but EU fleet owners suggest

may in part be

explained by the fact that SPC relies on logbook and port sampling which does not always cover the landings

places of the fleets, and relies on some information from processors that may not be reliable (e.g. Bangkok

processors record bigeye as yellowfin if under 5kg), while the IEO in Spain get information from logbooks and

IATTC records that sample fish unloaded in Ecuador and processing information in Ecuador and El Salvador.

As a counter balance to this, SPC data is cross checked against observer reports and VMS data

Table 14: Catch statistics for EU fleet in Kiribati provided by different management organisations

(2007-2010)

EU /IEO

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Average

8,671

12,269

10,625

12,268

13,247

11,412

SPC

4,133

17,308

12,806

15,717

12,491

Source: IEO/ European Commission and SPC.

Estimates of catch dependency on the four Kiribati fishing zones are shown below. The table shows a

marginally higher dependency on the Line Islands (43 %), followed by roughly similar dependencies in the

Phoenix Islands (31 %) and the Gilbert Islands (26 %).

OPAGAC, Pers. Comm., February 2012

SPC-OFP Pers. Comm., February, 2012

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 45

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 15: EU catch by Kiribati zone (2007-2010)

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

dependency

Source: SPC.

3.8.2

Gilbert Islands

8,490

2,683

1,734

3,227

26%

Line Islands

1,689

2,995

7,370

9,409

5,366

43%

Phoenix Islands

2,444

5,824

2,753

4,574

3,899

31%

TOTAL

4,133

17,308

12,806

15,717

12,491

100%

EU longline fleet

The activities of the European longliners operating in the Pacific Ocean take place primarily south of 20°S,

outside the tropical area, targeting the swordfish stock. The fishing grounds overlap the area of competency

of both IATTC and WCPCF. Catches in the WCPO originate essentially from the high seas east of New

Zealand or from outside the EEZ of French Polynesia, but mainly as a continuation of fishing activities in the

Eastern Pacific area.

The EU longline fleet commenced its activities in 2003, consisting of 10-15 surface longliners, and attempted

to expand their fishing grounds towards zones in the Central South Pacific, with the area around 120º W

becoming a new fishing zone, as an alternative to supplement the traditional grounds located closer to the

South-America mainland in the SE Pacific. In 2004 and 2005 experimental fishery activities were undertaken

in areas located in both the North and South Pacific, within the WCPFC convention area, which may explain

why fishing authorisations were drawn under the FPA with Kiribati although no fishing has taken place inside

the Kiribati EEZ. These experimental fishery activities involved the development of fishing patterns that were

different from those used in routine commercial operations. Over the course of this activity, substantial differences

were found in terms of the prevalence among the species caught, in both the target species as well as the

bycatch species. The EU longliners returned to their traditional fishing grounds after estimating that the

continuation of their usual fishing strategy targeted on swordfish and oceanic sharks was more lucrative than

trying to enter and compete on the equatorial longline fishery for sashimi or albacore dominated by Asian

interests. The number of vessels operating in this fishery fell to 6 in 2010 (WCPFC, 2010).

3.8.3

Non-EU distant water fishing activity in the Kiribati EEZ

Distant water nations and FSMA vessels both have a strong dependency on the Kiribati EEZ. Fleet

dependencies may of course vary from year to year, but the US, Korea and Taiwan, together with the EU,

make up two thirds of the average annual catch (Table 16), and FSMA vessels a further 20 %, including the

four vessels registered in Vanuatu. These FSMA vessels, whilst registered in Kiribati, operate throughout PNA

waters, and have no specific links to onshore activities.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 46

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 16: Catches of tuna (tonnes) by DWFN and FSMA purse seine and longline vessels in the

Kiribati EEZ

2007

Purse seine

DWFN

Korea

Taiwan

Vanuatu

Ecuador

New Zealand

El Salvador

China

Japan

Total Distant Water

FSMA

Marshall Is

Papua New Guinea

Kiribati

Tuvalu

FS Micronesia

Total FSMA

Total Purse seine

Longline

Korea

Taiwan

China

Vanuatu

Japan

Kiribati

Total

Pole and line

Japan

Kiribati

Total

Source: SPC.

2008

2009

2010

23,053

57,657

11,915

4,133

11,090

7,143

8,611

2,203

365

2,086

128,256

28,379

12,882

1,136

107

42,504

170,760

6,886

678

652

8,309

250

45,466

66,202

20,265

17,308

9,563

20,226

3,885

7,818

3,521

5,089

199,343

7,307

19,265

1,818

28,390

227,733

4,958

900

268

6,192

621

87,500

92,692

38,059

12,806

15,257

3,344

6,531

6,064

1,907

3,007

267,166

19,251

26,078

3,432

2,525

1,646

52,932

320,098

3,766

573

1,376

500

114

6,329

450

160

610

64,721

53,381

26,661

15,717

5,120

6,033

5,144

4,268

1,252

182,352

19,582

19,835

12,160

2,000

1,967

55,544

237,897

3,766

340

4,134

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 47

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 17: Summary of foreign vessels licensed to fish in Kiribati waters, 2011

Country

Purse seine

Longline

Pole & line

Vessel numbers

112

Korea

Taiwan

PNG

Ecuador

Vanuatu

New Zealand

El Salvador

China

Japan

USA

Kiribati

Micronesia

Marshall Is

Tuvalu

Source: MFMRD.

Additional data on catches by species and country for both purse seine and longline vessels are provided in

Appendix H.

Kiribati historically has operated bilateral arrangements with 9 fishing nations, as well as being a participant in

the USMLT. Specific agreement details are not available due to the confidential nature of the settlements,

even though the consultants have made attempts to obtain such information. However, based on a number of

indicators provided, it is possible to extract an estimate of the values by fleet segment (Table 18).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 48

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 18: Estimates of annual average licence revenues accrued to Kiribati in the period 2009-2011

Number of purse seine vessels covered by agreements (excluding USMLT and

139

EU: (Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China, New Zealand, Ecuador, El Salvador, USA)

Number of longline vessels covered by agreements (Korea)

Number of pole and line vessels covered by agreements (Japan)

Average licence access fee per longline vessel (AUS$ /

€)

Average licence access fee per pole and line vessel (AUS$ /

€)

Average fee per non EU purse seine vessel (AUS$ /

€)

Estimated fees from longline ‘000s (AUS$ /

€)

Estimated fees from pole and line ‘000s (AUS$ /

€)

Estimated fees from non EU purse seine ‘000s (AUS$ /

€)

EU fees from purse seiners ‘000s (AUS$ /

€)

Average annual income (2009-2011) all vessels ‘000s (AUS$ /

€)

Average fee/tonne (11,447t) caught for EU purse seine vessels (AUS$ /

€)

Average fee/tonne (194,279t) caught for other purse seines (AUS$ /

€)

Average fee/day (396 non-adjusted days) (adjusted for PNA weighting (1.5)) for

EU purse seine vessels (AUS$ /

€)

Average fee/day (4,657 days) (adjusted for PNA weighting for other purse seine

(AUS$)

112

40,000 / 26490

40,000 / 26,490

201,000 / 133,133

4,500 / 2,980

160 / 106

25,293 / 16,750

1,919/ 1,271

31,872 / 21,107

160 / 106

130 / 86

3,299 / 2,185

5,431 / 3,597

Source: Consultants’ calculations. Notes: EU fees/figures average of 2009 to 2011 using provisional catch data for 2011,

and based on SPC catch data and European Commission records of payments. Average X-R conversion of

€1

= AUS

1.51 for 2009-2011.

Table 18 shows that EU purse seiners have been paying roughly the same as other fleets on a per tonne

basis. The table also shows that the EU fleet paid AUS$ 2,788 (€2,050) per weighted vessel day, as compared

with AUS$ 5,431 (€3,993) paid by other fleets.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 49

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

A number of access agreements have been secured for 2012 which are all now based on Vessel Days. These

are with Korea (1,235 vessel days), Taiwan (240 vessel days), and New Zealand (185 vessel days). These

agreements are up to and including December 2012. All the access fees have been based on the PNA MoU of

US$ 5,000/Vessel Day (PNA, 2011). Additional agreements are expected to be concluded with China and

Japan in 2012, ending December 2012. As of March 2012, 2,790 days remained unallocated with the EU,

Vanuatu, Taiwan, El Salvador and Ecuador still to negotiate access rights. It is noteworthy that Kiribati has a

PAE of 5,450 Vessel Days (Table 9) which are likely to be undersubscribed. This potentially represents

additional access opportunities for EU purse seine (and other), or provides Kiribati with the opportunity to trade

unused days with other Parties within the PNA. However, it also unclear as to how additional USMLT days

may be accommodated, but it is believed that the current USMLT is requesting a contribution from Kiribati of

1,000 days. The negotiations presently stand at 7,000 Vessel Days from PNA. Kiribati’s Minister has stated

that all agreements will follow the PNA MoU on renewal

The use of PAE days by foreign fleets in Kiribati is shown in the table below.

Table 19: Use of Kiribati PAE days, 2007 to 2010

VDS

weighting

1.1

1.0

1.5

1.2

1.3

1.0

1.3

1.0

Average PAE

days

allocated,

Current

2007-2010

uptake

1,679

1000

1,622

1235

898

240

195

225

162

176

185

108

5,246

2,660

Fleet

USA

Korea

Taiwan

Vanuatu

Ecuador

New Zealand

El Salvador

China

Japan

Grand Total

2007

680

1,448

447

347

207

239

114

4,716

2008

1,596

1,570

866

269

257

350

135

173

159

189

6,518

2009

2,567

2,063

1,210

460

264

104

204

131

119

100

8,698

2010

Average

2,544

1,847

1,406

1,622

1,067

898

350

292

168

259

167

207

127

176

122

135

7,756

5,618

Kiribati PAE

5450

Unallocated

days

204

2,790

Source: SPC. Note that given that there was no allocation of VDS for the EU, the average figure of 195 in the table

above for the EU is only an indicative figure for the purposes of this calculation.

3.8.4

Domestic sector

As noted earlier in this report, a very large percentage of the Kiribati population is engaged in small-scale

fishing of some form or another, either commercially or on a subsistence basis. Whilst there are a number of

vessels registered in Kiribati, there is no domestically based industrial tuna fleet. Small-scale fishing activities

are concentrated around, but not exclusively based in, Tarawa where market conditions are better than in

other parts of the country, and where the majority of the country’s population is based. Catches are comprised

of a mix of both tuna and reef fish, and are mainly made by small-scale vessels of under 7m in length.

Minister of Fisheries Kiribati, Pers. Comm., February 2012.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 50

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Some tunas, and non-target species, such as rainbow runners, trigger fish and mahi-mahi, are also provided

by purse seiners when offloading. These are sold through the agents, CPP through its domestic retail shops in

Tarawa.

Domestic (small-scale and industrial) activity, along with the activities of visiting industrial vessels generates a

certain amount of a) upstream activity in terms of vessels repairs, fuel, engines, b) unloading/transshipment

services e.g. stevedores, and c) some downstream marketing/trading activity of domestically caught fish, and

of sales of bycatch by foreign-flagged vessels.

Sales of bycatch from EU purse seine vessels can have some impacts on domestic market prices given the

quantities involved, and the authorities are reported to be investigating methods of storing such catch so as to

better release it onto the market more slowly and during periods of low domestic catches.

Chinese owners are also in the process of building a loining plant to cater for longline caught tunas. It is

unlikely whether this will absorb landings from purse seiners, as the distribution chains are distinctly different.

This activity will still however provide employment for up to 70 workers, and may provide an additional source

for some food fish for the domestic economy.

Generally however, there is no tuna processing activity in Kiribati of any commercial scale. The costs of

processing tuna (especially into cans) would mean that resulting sales would probably not be able to compete

with processing locations elsewhere in the world (e.g. Bangkok) given both low labour productivity and the

costs of production (e.g. cans, oil, power, cartons, water, etc.), which would be high given the need to import

most inputs and the remote location of Kiribati.

3.9

3.9.1

Fisheries governance in Kiribati

Policy and institutional framework

The Kiribati Development Plan (KDP) defines the policy focus as a:



Need to maximize sustainable economic benefits from the tuna resource;

Need to conserve coastal resources in the face of rising demand for food and cash incomes; and

Managing the transition from government research to commercial production and export.

Other policy areas emphasize the need for:



Private commercial investment in marine and mineral resources and tourism;

Strengthening the agricultural and fisheries extension service;

Identifying most promising income-earning opportunities in outer islands and demonstrate commercial

feasibility;

Identifying participatory development strategies to manage increasing risk and design; and

Cost effective adaptation.

Overriding governance priorities are identified as:



Maintaining close collaboration with the PNA and FFA and to obtain maximum sustainable EEZ

access fees promote public-private partnerships with reputable foreign investors in catching and

onshore domestic processing of tuna;

Conducting participatory education programmes with fishers and communities engaged with

vulnerable species/stocks; and

Ensuring legal sanctions are observed to enforce conservation regime and prosecute when

necessary.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 51

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development (MFMRD) is responsible for the definition of

fisheries policy in Kiribati. It has five core Divisions and a staff of about 115:



Fisheries Division;

The Mineral Division (Management of Mineral resources);

Resource Economics and Policy Division;

Accounts, Administration and Human Resources Division; and

Information Technology.

Staff from the Ministry’s Fisheries Division represent the country at WCPFC, PNA and Forum Fisheries

Committee (FFC) meetings, but higher level meetings (e.g. FFC and PNA) and meetings where there are

Ministerial forums and binding decisions, may also be attended by the Minister and the MFMRD Permanent

Secretary.

The Ministry is solely responsible for negotiating access agreements, but does so in consultation with the

Minister of Fisheries. This task falls to the responsibility of the Resource Economics and Policy Division. This

Division provides the management services that ensure planned results of the ministry are achieved. Its

services include policy and planning, statistics, progress monitoring, asset maintenance, financial and human

resource management. In addition to negotiating fisheries agreements, this Division deals with collection and

formulation of project requirements from the other fisheries units and other projects identified priority for further

submission for public funding and donor support. The unit is also responsible for monitoring projects such as

the development components as specified in the annual recurrent budget, the Aus Aid Incentive Fund

programme (see Box 2), and the implementation of sectoral policy/promotion of sustainability as specified in

the EU/Kiribati FPA. The management of the EU funds is dealt with under budget issues.

Each of the five Divisions reports to the Permanent Secretary, and ultimately to the Fisheries Minister.

The Fisheries Division (FD), under the auspices of the MFMRD, is specifically responsible for the exploration,

exploitation, development, utilisation, proper management and conservation of fisheries and marine resources

encompassed within the EEZ. The long-term goal of the division is to maximize returns from these resources

and ensures that resources are being utilized on a sustainable basis to ensure the attainment and continued

satisfaction of human needs for the present and future generations of Kiribati. The FD consists of three

principal sections (Figure 11), Oceanic Fisheries, Coastal Fisheries and Mariculture and Aquaculture.

Oceanic Fisheries is divided into two units - the Licensing unit, and the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance

unit. The main objectives of the latter are to generate revenue from Kiribati marine resources through fishing

access, to generate employment for workers on fishing vessels, manage the marine resources on a

sustainable basis, and to carry out enforcement duties to protect the country’s marine resources. To achieve

these objectives the unit is tasked to carry out and to accomplish the following:



Securing of fisheries access agreements with foreign partners;

To carry out observer placements on foreign vessels to carry out scientific data collection on catch and

gear technology;

To implement the VMS Register and monitor the system;

Registration and Licensing of Foreign fishing Vessels;

Promoting of employment opportunities on foreign fishing vessels;

Cooperating in monitoring, control and surveillance at regional and national level;

Maintenance of the Unit’s fisheries database management information system, simply known as

(Fisheries Monitoring Information System (FMIS); and

To carry out port sampling work to verify catches made by fishing vessels, and disseminating of

information.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 52

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Fisheries statistics form a component of this Unit, concentrating in the collection and analysis of relevant

fisheries data. All purse seine and longline catch data is entered from the vessel logbooks onto the SPC Tuna

Fisheries Database Management System (TUFMAN) data base.

Legal Counsel is seconded permanently from the Attorney General’s office for drafting and implementing

prosecutions.

Coastal Fisheries: This section inputs into the work of the Fisheries Division by monitoring of the fish resources

through the collection of relevant fisheries data and surveys, monitoring of the export activities through the

collection of fisheries data and issuance of commercial inshore licenses (<12 nautical miles), promoting the

utilisation of marine products in a sustainable manner, providing assistance to local fishermen in the

development of the fisheries on the island, monitoring fisheries ponds and compliance with closed areas.

Data are collected from commercial and subsistence fishermen where they fish mainly in the lagoon, reef and

the ocean areas within 12 nautical miles. Other data of equal importance are compiled from the private fishing

enterprises, fish and marine exporters that export their product overseas, marine products send from the outer

islands to Tarawa and marine products send overseas as personal consignments.

This section also undertakes training for the fisheries staff both internally and at overseas institutions including

training fishermen in the rural areas in the form of workshops. In addition, the section is also tasked with

dissemination of fisheries related information to the general public in the form of posters, pamphlets, radio

announcement and videos.

A unit also operates the Kiritimati Fisheries Development Branch which supports coastal fishers. The Gilbert

Islands are also supported by Fisheries Assistants.

Mariculture and Aquaculture: The objectives of this section are to conduct research on marine resources that

have potential for development and to coordinate collaborative research activities with regional research

organisations. Past and current research activities include:

Clam growth for the aquarium trade;

Creation of a bêche de mer hatchery, site selection and management;

The Seaweed Growth Monitoring Programme, which investigates

Eucheuma

seaweed growth rates at

various locations and under various conditions with the aim of determining optimum sites and

seasonality for farming;



Giant clam stock assessment, including plans to investigate the potential for farming.

The section’s Aquaculture Unit is also involved in research aimed at eradicating tilapia from the Tarawa

milkfish ponds.



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 53

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Figure 11: Fisheries Division organisation chart

Director of Fisheries

Principal Fisheries Officer

Aquaculture

Principal Fisheries Officer

Oceanic Fisheries

Principal Fisheries Officer

Coastal Fisheries

Senior Fisheries Officer

Licensing

Senior Fisheries Officer

Licensing

Senior Fisheries Officer

MCS

Support Staff

1 x Fisheries Assistant

2 x Field Assistant

Support Staff

1 x Fisheries Officer

3 Data Technician

Support Staff

1 x VMS Officer, 2 x MCS Officer,

1 x Observer Coordinator

Senior Fisheries Officer

Development and Planning

Senior Fisheries Officer

Extension (Support to Outer Islands

Senior Fisheries Officer

Statistics

Senior Fisheries Officer

Research

Senior Fisheries Officer

Training

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 54

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.9.2

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Development (MFMRD) Budget

The national budget is sourced from two elements: the budget to cover recurrent costs appropriated from

Parliament; and the development budget covered to a large part by donor contributions. These are divided into

two accounts (No 1 and No 4). Account No 1 deals with recurrent fund expenditure for each Ministry, whilst

account No 4 deals with Development expenditure. As EU contributions are divided into payment for access

and support for development, the access fees (including payments by the fishery sector) are fed into account

No 1, and the development contributions for sectoral policy fed into account No 4. The MFMRD budget is also

divided into recurrent and development budgets. MFMRD recurrent and development budgets were

AUS$1.85 mn /

€1.37

mn in 2011, then reduced to AUS$1.3 mn /

€1

mn in 2012. The development budget

was around AUS$ 4 mn /

€2.9

mn in 2011 with an anticipated increase to AUS$4.1 mn /

€3

mn in 2012.

Table 20: MFMRD Expenditure Framework, 2011 and 2012 (AUS$ and €)

2011

Description

Recurrent fund

expenditure

Salaries and staff

amenities

Travel

Direct purchases

Services and hire of

plant

Utilities

Other

Total Recurrent Budget

Development fund

expenditure

Fisheries Observer

scheme

Nonouti fish centre

Donor development

projects

EU sectoral policy

Total Development

Budget

Total FPA EU

payments as % of Total

Development Budget

Source: MFMRD.

AUS$

1,270,543

134,205

42,500

135,000

178,124

90,993

1,851,365

€

882,322

93,198

29,514

93,750

123,697

63,190

1,285,670

AUS$

972,013

34,148

22,500

224,662

52,588

2012

Notes

€

720,010

25,295

16,667

166,416

38,954

967,341

Around 65% of total costs

are attributed to MFMRD

activities

1,305,911

560,000

177,014

2,911,686

375,970

4,024,670

388,889

122,926

2,022,004

261,090

2,794,910

31%

560,000

177,014

3,000,000

375,970

4,112,984

414,815

131,121

2,222,222

278,496

3,046,655

29%

Government of Kiribati

Other external funds

Of all the fisheries access agreements, only two specify development support components: the USMLT allows

for a development component of 15 %; and the FPA. The development budget was also the recipient of the

Australian Incentive Fund in 2010 and 2011. The Development budget may also be supported by some

contributions from national recurrent expenditure for specific activities such as the Nonouti Fisheries Centre.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 55

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.9.3

National Fisheries Laws

Fisheries management in Kiribati is governed by the Act for Conservation, Management and Development of

Kiribati Fisheries and Control of Foreign Fishing and for Connected Purposes (the Act), 2010.

The Act’s objectives are to:



Promote the sustainable management of fisheries of Kiribati and the development of the use of

fisheries resources for the benefit of Kiribati, including the recovery of fees that reflect the value of the

resource; and

Protect marine stocks and the environment of Kiribati.

The Act lays down provision for the development of fisheries management plans which comply with the

following requirements:



Specifying the management and development strategies to be adopted;

Providing for a scheme of licensing and if necessary other appropriate license measures;

Specifying the license regime to be applied including limitations to be applied to local fishing

operations and the amount of fishing to be allocated to foreign fishing vessels;

Specifying information and other data needs to be provided by persons licensed to fish for that fishery;

and

Taking into account any relevant traditional fishing methods and practices.

When preparing a management plan, the Fisheries Director must consult with appropriate government

ministers and departments, as well as fishermen, local authorities and other persons affected by the plan.

Kiribati has a draft management plan for tuna, but this has not been formerly adopted.

The Act lays down the basis for penalties for infringements which may be in the range of AUS$50,000 /

€37,037

to AUS$1 mn /

€740,740.

Contraventions of the conditions of a license for foreign fishing vessels are

$250,000 /

€185,185

for the ship’s master, and $1 mn /

€740,740

for the owner (or charterers).

Foreign fishing vessel licenses provide for fishing in Kiribati waters, loading, unloading and transshipping in

Kiribati waters, and loading and unloading fuel supplies in Kiribati waters.

The Act specifies compliance with various international treaties including WCPFC CMMs, the Nauru

Agreement and the Niue Treaty. These are implemented into Law following agreement at international

(WCPFC) and regional (PNA) levels, and are binding. PNA Implementation Arrangements are underwritten by

Ministerial Memorandums of Understanding, and transposed into the licensing regulations through the

Minimum Terms and Conditions. However, despite agreeing to the amendments to the Third Implementation

Agreement, Kiribati has been very slow to implement the required changes.

Foreign licensing conditions are provided in the license schedule by the Minimum Terms and Conditions, as

advised by FFA (Box 4). These are required to specify compliance with the CMMs, the Nauru arrangement

(and its subsidiary and associated arrangements) and any specific national measures.

The Act is currently being revised to include three additional amendments:

To extend Kiribati’s authorities legal jurisdiction to act on infringements in the HSPs – an evaluation of

the legal basis for this within international law is not within the scope of this evaluation, but changes to

the Act are motivated by the wish by the Kiribati authorities to ensure that it’s Act enables it to act on

behalf of WCPFC, primarily through providing for powers for inspection on the High Seas, and

participation of observers;



Strengthening the provision to include the implementation of the PNA 3 IAs; and



Allowing for use of evidence and actions by non-Kiribati actions in enforcing fisheries regulations.

The Act is likely to be submitted for approval by Parliament in April, 2012.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 56

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version



PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

3.9.4

Specific national marine protected area measures

Kiribati has established the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) which is the largest marine protected areas

(MPA) in the Pacific islands at 408,250 km². In addition, there are 11 MPAs in Kiribati, totalling 590 km² in area

(Table 21).

Table 21: Marine Protected Areas in Kiribati

Designation

Closed Area

Name

Cook Islet Closed Area

2°00’N

157°20’W

(Kiritimati WS)

Motu Tabu Islet Closed Area

2°00’N

157°20’W

(Kiritimati WS)

Motu Upua Closed Area

2°00’N

157°20’W

Ngaontetaake Islet Closed Area Ia

2°00’N

157°20’W

(Kiritimati WS)

North-west Point Closed Area

2°00’N

157°20’W

(Kiritimati WS)

Wildlife

Birnie Island

3°35’S

171°33’W

sanctuary

Kiritimati

2°00’N

157°20’W

32,100

Malden Island (Closed Area)

4°03’S

155°01’W

3,930

McKean Island

3°35’S

174°02’W

Phoenix Island (Rawaki)

3°42’S

170°43’W

6,500

Starbuck Island (Closed Area)

5°37’S

155°56’W

16,200

Vostock Island

10°06’S

152°23’W

Relevant IUCN MPA categories are as follows: Ia: Strict Nature Reserve: protected area managed mainly for science; IV

Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention;

UA Unassigned.

Source: IUCN database (http://www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/data/pacific.htm).

IUN

Category

Country

year

Purse seiners

Sub-total

Longliners

TOTAL

Reference

tonnage

% utilisation

Sub-total

2006 2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

2011Average 2007 to

2011

9,980

6,400

156%

11,416

6,400

178%

2,799 8,671 12,269 10,625 12,268 13,247

0 2,799 8,671 12,269 10,625 12,268 13,247

0 6,400 6,400

44% 135%

6,400

192%

6,400

166%

6,400

192%

6,400

207%

Source: European Commission. Note data for 2011 provisional. ES = Spain. FR = France. PT = Portugal.

4.3

Costs of the Protocol

The total finances received by Kiribati under the Protocol for items specifically referred to in the Protocol text,

are shown in Table 24. They are based on a number of elements:



Financial contribution for access paid by the EU based on the reference tonnage;

Financial support for sectoral policy paid by the EU;

Financial contribution for access paid by the EU for catches over the reference tonnage;

Payments made by vessel owners based on the reference tonnage in the form of fishing authorisation

payments;

Payments made by vessel owners for catches over the reference tonnage; and

Payments made by vessel owners for vessel registration.

Table 24 shows that one payment which should have been paid (for sectoral policy) has not yet been paid

(pending the JC meeting). Further comment is provided on this issue in Section 4.4 below and in Appendix C.

Payments amounted to an average of more than

€1.2

mn.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 63

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Further analysis of the payments made compared to the tonnages caught and the days spent fishing in Kiribati

waters, again for the period 2007-2011, is provided in Table 25. The data serve to highlight some important

points:



Payments equate on average to

€106/tonne,

and to

€5,016/day

spent by EU vessels in Kiribati waters

i.e. considerably more than the current PNA benchmark price of US$5,000/day. However when these

payments are converted into weighted days (with EU vessel days representing 1.5 vessel days – see

earlier discussion on PNA weighting to reflect greater catching capacity of larger vessels), the

payment per day on average over 2007 to 2011 was

€3,350

/ US$4,675 i.e. close to the current PNA

benchmark price of US$5,000/day. These data are however strongly affected by low catches in 2007

which increase the payments made per day, and analysis for the last three years (2009 to 2011)

presented earlier in Table 18 show considerably lower payments per EU-vessel day;

Payments made by the EU against the reference tonnage of 6,400 for the financial contribution for

access each year and the financial support for sectoral policy, total

€478,400,

which equates to

€74.5

/tonne (€65 /tonne for access plus

€62,400

per year for the sectoral support);

The payments for sectoral policy and access are based on the annual year of the Protocol i.e. starting

September, not the calendar year starting January. However, as the catches are reported in line with

the regional reporting by calendar year, the money for additional catches are paid based on calendar

years;

Payments per tonne of fish caught have remained constant during the period of the Protocol, while as

noted below, prices have risen by around 50 % over the same period. Payment per tonne as

previously highlighted is broadly consistent with payments made by other countries and their

respective catches;

Payment by the EU in 2012 could for the first time be limited by the Protocol which states that EU

payment for excess catches can only be twice the reference tonnage payments, if catches continue to

rise; and

The EU pays for 67 % of the total payments made to Kiribati, with fleet owners paying 33 %.



Calculated as the EU plus fleet owner payments for each year summed and averaged, and divided by the averaged sum of the

weighted days reported by SPC

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 64

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 24: Payments made to Kiribati by the EU and fleet owners

EU PAYMENTS

A. Financial compensation for access

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sub-total

B. Financial support for sectoral

policy

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sub-total

TOTAL A+B

C. Financial compensation for

exccess catches

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011 (provisional)

2012

Sub-total

TOTAL EU PAYMENTS A-C

FLEET OWNER PAYMENTS

D. Reference tonnage licences

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sub-total

E. Registration

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sub-total

F. Excess catch

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011 (provisional)

2012

Sub-total

TOTAL FLEET OWNER PAYMENTS D-F

TOTAL ALL PAYMENTS A-F

219,485

345,415

287,875

345,380

379,645

not yet known

1,577,800

2,105,800

6,161,345

219,485

345,415

287,875

345,380

n/a

1,577,800

2,105,800

5,108,865

n/a

1,052,480

3,600

2,400

15,600

3,600

2,400

15,600

Amount due €/yr

334,880

287,040

191,360

1,387,360

Amount paid ( €)

334,880

287,040

191,360

1,196,000

Balance

191,360

143,520

191,360

287,040

1,483,040

2,870,400

143,520

191,360

287,040

621,920

1,817,920

287,040

861,120

1,052,480

147,615

381,485

274,625

381,420

445,055

not yet known

1,185,145

4,055,545

Amount due €/yr

92,400

84,000

512,400

147,615

381,485

274,625

381,420

n/a

1,185,145

3,003,065

Amount paid ( €)

92,400

84,000

512,400

1,052,480

Balance

n/a

Source: European Commission for EU payments, fleet owner payments based on tonnages and registration fees. Notes:

1/ Potential payments for excess catches in 2011 estimated based on provision catch data, but 2012 not included. 2/ In

2009 only 262,175 was actually paid by the EU for excess catches, with 12,450 offset by DG Budget following a recovery

by AIDCO of a Kiribati debt.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 65

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 25: Payments made to Kiribati per tonne of fish and per day, 2007-2010

EU Payments (€)

Fleet payments (€)

Total payments(€)

Tonnes caught

EU payment/t (€)

Fleet payment/t (€)

Total payment/tonne (€)

Days in Kiribati

Tonnes per day

EU payment/day (€)

Fleet payment/day (€)

Total payment/day (€)

Total payment/day ($)

Adjusted days (1.5)

Total payment/ adjusted day (€)

Total payment/ adjusted day ($)

2007

626,015

315,485

943,507

8,671

109

6,956

3,505

10,461

135

6,989

9,435

2008

859,885

431,815

1,293,708

12,269

105

269

3,197

1,605

4,802

404

3,206

5,066

2009

753,025

374,275

1,129,309

10,625

106

460

1,637

814

2,451

690

1,637

2,308

2010

859,820

431,780

1,293,610

12,268

105

350

2,457

1,234

3,690

525

2,464

3,006

2011

923,455

466,045

1,391,511

13,247

105

378

2,443

1,233

3,677

567

2,455

3,559

Average

804,440

403,880

1,210,329

11,416

106

309

3,338

1,678

5,016

464

3,350

4,675

Source: Consultants’ calculations with European Commission the source for EU payments and tonnages caught. SPC

source for days spent in Kiribati. Note: Data for 2011 estimated based on provisional 2011 catch data provided by IEO,

and assumes days in Kiribati based on catch rates per day as per.

4.4

Compliance with the covenants and obligations specified in the FPA

A detailed examination of the covenants and obligations required by the FPA, and the status of compliance

with them, is provided in Appendix C.

The Appendix highlights that in many areas the covenants and obligations are being complied with by all

parties. All vessels are duly registered and licenced, have VMS onboard, report catches, and take onboard

observers. The Kiribati authorities have two designated accounts for the financial contribution for access and

the financial support for sectoral policy as required. And the EU for their part have increased the percentage of

the reference tonnage financial payments for sectoral support to 60 % as required. However areas of concern

include:



The failure of the Joint Committee (JC) meetings to take place until 2011 and the associated lack

therefore of any monitoring of the implementation of sectoral policy against the specified indicators

(although the sectoral development funds are reportedly being applied, and during the technical

meetings the EU did request the relevant documents to enable such monitoring to take place);

The slow payments in recent years for the financial support for the sectoral policy, in part also due to

the failure of the JC meetings to take place, as the JC meetings are required to assess existing

performance before authorizing additional payments;

The failure to supply inspection certificates and observer reports to shipowners; and

The lack of any real impetus towards joint enterprises or local landings for processing. EU vessel

owners try to engage actively with the local sector, for example through permanent employment of

shore-based labour, but there have been no real attempts for joint investments by EU and Kiribati

private sector interests and no moves to support onshore processing. These requirements as laid out

in the FPA are standard language that appear in all of the FPAs, and their failure to take place is

explained by the fact that they make little economic sense in Kiribati where the private sector is weak

in terms of both financial and human capacity, and where the economics of processing into cans are

make little sense (see earlier discussion in Section 3.8).



Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 66

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

4.5

4.5.1

Economic analysis of Protocol

Findings and discussion of the economic and financial impacts of the Protocol

4.5.1.1 Sales values

Price data are available for product shipped to Ecuador for processing as provided by OPAGAC. The cost of

carriage to Ecuador is estimated at

€150/tonne

from Christmas Island, and

€200

/tonne from Tarawa (due to

the greater distance). The following table shows Carriage Insurance and Freight (CIF) prices in Ecuador, and

the estimated average FOB ex-vessel prices for the three main species caught under the Protocol over the

evaluation period. The table also shows percentage changes in prices over time for the three species. The

table highlights how prices have risen considerably over the period of the existing protocol, and typically by

around 50 % in absolute terms.

Table 26: Carriage Insurance and Freight (CIF) prices paid for fish caught by EU purse seiners fishing

under the Protocol

CIF to Ecuador

€/metric ton

Species

Skipjack

Yellowfin

Bigeye

2006

645

1,197

806

2007

762

1,392

950

2008

966

1,400

1,105

2009

706

1,039

904

2010

777

1,332

1,065

2011

964

1,575

1,226

Average 2007-2011

CIF

835

1,348

1,050

Average carriage

costs

175

Average 2007-2011

FOB

660

1,173

875

Price change 2006-

2011

Source: OPAGAC for CIF prices (in absolute terms).

% increase on previous year

Skipjack

Yellowfin

Bigeye

18%

27%

-27%

10%

24%

16%

-26%

28%

18%

16%

-18%

18%

15%

49%

32%

52%

Prices paid to vessels fishing under the Protocol, can be compared to import prices for tuna in Bangkok, as

shown in Figure 12. Even accounting for different carriage/transportation costs, the generally lower prices paid

for fish caught under the Protocol and sent to Ecuador for processing are thought to reflect the smaller fish

caught by EU vessels due to their high dependency on FAD-caught fish, and the smaller fish that tend to

congregate around FADs. Price differentials for different sizes of fish exist because larger fish offer better

quality meat and better processing yields. Bangkok reference prices for tuna 1.8-3.4kg may be increased by

around 5 % for fish over 3.4kg, and reduced by 15 % for 1.4-18kg fish, and by as much as 35 % for fish less

than 1.4kg.

However, it should also be noted that drawing firm conclusions about price differentials is difficult, as price data

for catches made under the Protocol may also be affected by the vertically integrated nature of the fish

catching and processing sector operation, and the potential for transfer pricing to be taking place between

different links in the supply chain i.e. prices paid to vessels may be set higher or lower than would normally be

the case, so as to reduce or increase respectively processing sub-sector profits. It has not been possible to

explore in detail within this evaluation the extent to which this might be taking place, if at all.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 67

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Figure 12: Average monthly import prices paid by Bangkok canneries for purse seine caught fish

(Euro/tonne, 2006 to July 2011)

Source:

http://www.customs.go.th/Customs-Eng/Statistic/StatisticIndex2550.jsp

Note: Prices are import prices to Thailand, and include carriage costs. Monthly $ prices converted to Euros using mid-

year exchange rate for each year 2006 to 2011. Bigeye tuna is not included in the price series/data due to the small

volumes compared to the other two species.

Table 27: Average yearly import prices paid by Bangkok canneries for purse seine caught fish

(Euro/tonne)

Year / species

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Av. 2007-2011

Source: as above.

Skipjack

723

966

1,059

811

1,031

1,106

994

Yellowfin

1,089

1,279

1,208

997

1,272

1,294

1,210

Species sales values used in the economic analysis are shown in Table 28 (FOB prices i.e. excluding carriage

costs to Ecuador).

Table 28: Average yearly ex-vessel prices (€/tonne)

Species Skipjack

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Average

470

587

791

531

602

789

628

Yellowfin Bigeye

1,022

1,217

1,225

864

1,157

1,400

1,148

631

775

930

729

890

1,051

834

Source: OPAGAC.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 68

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Given the catch data available from IEO, as shown in Appendix D, catches made by the 84m vessels

averaged

€801/tonne

over the period of the Protocol, whereas catches made by the 100+m vessels averaged

€851/tonne.

The difference is explained by the different species mix of the catch made by the two vessel

classes each year, and the different yearly fish prices, which as shown in the table above differ each year in

relation to one another i.e. the price differential between yellowfin tuna and skipjack tuna, and bigeye tuna and

yellowfin tuna, is not the same each year. Over the period 2007 to 2011, 70 % of the catch of the 84m vessels

was comprised of skipjack, 17 % of yellowfin, and 13 % of bigeye. The respective figures for the 100+m

vessels were 68 % skipjack, 13 % yellowfin, and 19 % bigeye. The 100+m vessels displayed higher average

skipjack prices over the period 2007 to 2011 (€781/tonne) than for the 84m vessels (€669/tonne), and so given

the dominance of skipjack in terms of total production, even though average prices for yellowfin and bigeye

over 2007 to 2011 were both slightly lower than for the 84m vessels, the weighted basket price of fish is higher

for the 100+m vessels.

Total yearly value of catch made under the Protocol is shown in Figure 13, and demonstrates how the Protocol

is becoming increasingly important for EU purse seine vessels in the Pacific.

Figure 13: Annual value of catches made in Kiribati EEZ by EU vessels under the Protocol (Euros)

Source: IEO catch data (2011 provisional) provided by the European Commission, and prices provided by OPAGAC.

4.5.1.2 Value-added

The following table (Table 29) provides an estimation of the average annual value-added accruing from the

Protocol, based on the methodology described above. The table shows that a total of

€6.4

mn of value-added

is accrued each year when considering the benefits to both the European Union and Kiribati.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 69

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 29: Average annual value added accruing to the EU and to Kiribati from the Protocol

Upstream sub-sector i.e. inputs % in EU

% in Kiri rate of VA

Port calls Kiribati

100%

75%

Insurance

100%

40%

Depreciation

100%

25%

Overhead/mgt charge

100%

Fishing access rights

100%

Total upstream sub-sector

Cathing sub-sector

Crew

60%

100%

Observers

100%

Vessel profit

100%

Total catching sub-sector

Downstream sub-sector

Fish processed in EU

45%

25%

Total processing sub-sector

TOTAL all sub-sectors

EU VA

114,168

890,269

285,096

1,289,533

639,412

1,821,584

2,460,996

1,060,847

4,811,375

Kiri VA

TOTAL

267,159

114,168

890,269

285,096

1,210,329

1,477,488

2,767,021

42,627

682,039

52,113

1,821,584

94,740

2,555,736

1,060,847

1,572,229

6,383,604

Notes: 1/ Upstream inputs only included if the value-added estimated is thought to accrue to either the EU or Kiribati

2/ Fuel not included in value-added estimations as taken at sea by tanker from international sources

3/ Repairs and mainteance assumed to take place in South America

4/ Port calls comprise the cost of labour for transshipment, supplies, management charges and taxes

5/ No repairs and mainteance take place in Kiribati, and vessels are assumed to split costs between Ecuador and the EU

6/ Vessels assumed to be insured and constructed in the EU

7/ Access fees considered and input and thus included in upstream sub-sector not in catching sub-sector

8/ Observer value-added based on standard $50/day fee paid by vessels for days in Kiribati zone x 1.25 to allow for travel time and

additional days vessels may have to pay observers to be onboard even when not fishing in Kiribati due to trip logistics

Source: Consultants’ calculations.

Upstream sub-sector

In the upstream sector, average annual value-added accrues to Kiribati to the tune of

€1.48

mn through port

calls, and through payments made by both the EU and vessel owners providing for EU vessels to fish in

Kiribati waters. The rate of value-added from port calls is high because of the large amounts of labour used

during transshipment (with a 100 % rate of value-added) comprised of around 80 people working to tranship

vessels over a 5-6 day period, and the transshipment taxes and other local taxes that are paid (also having a

value-added rate of 100 %).

Upstream value-added in the EU is comprised of value-added made on insurance, value-added on vessel

construction, and overhead/management charges. As Table 30 shows, value-added in the upstream sub-

sector is estimated at around

€1.3

mn.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 70

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Catching sub-sector

Catching sub-sector value-added (€94,740) accruing to Kiribati is limited to the 2-3 Kiribati crew onboard EU

vessels, and the one observer on each vessel (given the 100 % observer coverage required). Fishing crew are

onboard year-round, but the model and above table assume that only their earnings while fishing in Kiribati

under the Protocol are eligible for inclusion in the estimation of value-added derived from the Protocol.

Observers are onboard when vessels are fishing in Kiribati, but typically spend additional time on EU vessels

as they have to be taken onboard at the beginning of any trip in which a vessel may move into the Kiribati

EEZ, even when vessels may spend a part of that trip outside of the Kiribati EEZ.

For the European Union, the catching sub-sector generates considerable levels of value-added, primarily

through vessel profits (more than

€1.8

mn per year, and with vessel EBIT of 11 % for 84m vessels and 23 %

for 100+m vessels), but also through EU labour employed on the vessels fishing in Kiribati under the Protocol.

Downstream processing sub-sector

There is no downstream processing sector value-added derived in Kiribati from the Protocol, as there is no

processing of tuna caught under the Protocol. The model, and this evaluation, does not include any estimation

of the very small amounts of value-added that might be made from sales in Kiribati of bycatch landed by EU

vessels into Kiribati.

For the EU value-added is estimated at just over

€1

mn per year. Of the total average yearly catch made

under the Protocol (11,416 tonnes), it is estimated by OPAGAC

that 10 % is destined for processing in

Bangkok, and the remaining 90 % for Ecuador. Of the 10,274 tonnes estimated to be processed in Ecuador

each year, 50 % is processed into cans, and the other 50 % into loins which are then sent to the

EU/Spain/Galicia for processing into cans. Thus 5,137 tonnes whole weight and 2,677 tonnes of loined weight

(based on conversion factor of 0.485

) are estimated to be processed in the EU, with associated levels of

value-added in terms of labour and profits. It should be noted that labour value-added associated with the

processing in the EU is relatively small because the major labour inputs in processing take place at the loining

stage. Thus the Protocol is contributing to value-added in South America as well as in the EU. The fact that

canning continues to be viable in Spain compared to elsewhere, may in part be explained by the lower weight

of tuna cans in Spain compared to elsewhere in the world (a typical tuna can in Spain weighs 80g net and has

a 52g drained weight). This means that relative to the tuna weight the price of steel and packaging and the

vegetable oil are more important. When also considering marketing and distribution factors, and fact that Spain

has a highly technically advanced and automated process to transfer loins into cans, this explains why in

recent years it has still been economically viable to can in Spain.

Balance of value-added between sub-sectors and between the EU and Kiribati

Table 29 above allows for the calculation of the balance of value-added between sub-sectors, and between

the EU and Kiribati. As shown in Table 30, EU value-added is concentrated strongly in the catching sector

(51 % of total EU value-added), while for Kiribati almost all the value-added (94 %) is derived from the

upstream/input sub-sector in the form of payments made by the EU and fleet owners.

When considering the total value-added to the EU and to Kiribati, the analysis shows that 75 % of all value-

added accrued to the EU, and 25 % to Kiribati.

Pers. Comm., February 2012

See http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/TT-23-04-Tracking-and-certification.pdf

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 71

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 30: Balance of value-added between sub-sectors, and between the EU and Kiribati

Value-added

Upstream/input sub-sector

Catching sub-sector

Processing sub-sector

Total

Source: Consultants’ calculations.

% of EU % of EU & KI Kiribati

% of Kiribati % of EU & KI

1,289,533

26.8%

46.6% 1,477,488

94.0%

53.4%

2,460,996

51.1%

96.3%

94,740

6.0%

3.7%

1,060,847

22.0%

100.0%

0.0%

4,811,375 100.0%

75.4% 1,572,229

100.0%

24.6%

4.5.1.3 Costs and benefits

Table 31 below shows the costs and benefits of the Protocol to the European Union, to the fleet owners, and

to Kiribati.

For the EU as a whole, the Protocol generated an average annual benefit/cost (B/C) ratio of 4.0,

demonstrating that the Protocol provides good value for money with every

€1

invested by the EU and fleet

owners generating

€4.0

of benefit in terms of value-added.

For the fleet owners, benefits from the Protocol are significant given that a large proportion of the total EU

value-added benefits accrue in the catching sub-sector, while the vessel owners pay 33 % of the total

payments made to Kiribati with the remaining payments made by the EU. The cost of access for vessel owners

(€35/tonne) represents 4.1-4.4 % of the average weighted sales prices received for catches made under the

Protocol. Annual average catch values made under the Protocol are close to

€9.5

mn, and given operating and

fixed costs, profits as a proportion of sales revenues range between 11 % and 23 % for the two vessel

classes.

Kiribati received more than

€1.2

mn per year on average from the European Union, plus smaller benefits in the

form of value-added made from port calls made by EU vessels and from local crew and observers onboard EU

vessels. When considering the payments made over the course of the Protocol per PNA-weighted vessel day,

the analysis shows that there was not a significant difference in the payments received from the EU as

opposed to from other countries, although as noted earlier these differences are more marked when only

considering catches and payments over the last three years.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 72

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 31: Average annual costs and benefits (€) of the Protocol (2007 to 2011)

To European Community

Costs

Total value -added benefits

Total payments to Kiribati

1,210,329

Payments to Kiribati per tonne of fish

106

Payments to Kiribati per PNA weighted day

3,350

To Fleet owners

Payments to Kiribati

403,880

Payments to Kiribati per tonne of fish

Profit before interest and tax

Catch value

Operating costs per day

11,963 - 16,783

Profit as % of catch value

To Kiribati

Payments received per PNA-weighted day under FPA

Payments received per PNA weighted day from others

3,597

Value-added from port calls

Value-added from vessel crew

Payments made for access and sectoral support

Benefits

4,811,375

B/C ratio

4.0

1,821,584

9,503,211

11-23%

3,340

267,159

42,627

1,210,329

0.9

Notes: Kiribati Benefit/Cost (B/C) ratio estimated based on difference between average yearly

payments made under FPA over 2007-2011, and average yearly payments made by other countries

for access 2009-2011

Source: Consultants’ calculations.

Given the flow of product from Kiribati through Ecuador for processing and on to the EU, and the fact that EU

vessels operating in Kiribati are based out of Ecuador, the Protocol also generates considerable benefits to the

Ecuadorian economy in the form of vessel supplies, and value-added (profits and employment) in the

processing sector (both for canning and for loining). While to some extent these benefits may ultimately also

accrue to the European Union through EU beneficial ownership of Ecuadorian operations, due to time

limitations and budgetary constraints, this evaluation does not attempt to quantify the extent to which such

benefits occurring from the Protocol in Ecuador could be considered as benefits to the European Union.

4.5.1.4 Supplies to the market

As noted above, an estimated yearly average of 10 % of catch made under the Protocol is destined for

processing in Bangkok, and the remaining 90 % for processing in Ecuador. Of the catch processed in Ecuador

each year, an estimated 50 % is processed into cans, and the other 50 % into loins which are then sent to the

EU (Spain/Galicia) for processing into cans.

Canned tuna imports to the EU reached a high of 426,592 tonnes in 2007, but declined to 371,013 in 2010.

The table below (Table 32) shows that catches made under the Protocol and canned in Ecuador contribute a

small proportion of the total EU market for canned tuna (an average of 1.2 % per year). Kiribati FPA catches in

2010 represented 9 % of total canned exports from Ecuador to the EU (which itself represented 16 % of total

EU imports of canned tuna), and a relatively high percentage (19 %) of total Spanish imports of canned tuna

(28,362 tonnes) assuming that all cans from Ecuador using Kiribati FPA caught fish are destined for Spain.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 73

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

With respect to the import of loins to the EU, the FPA catch in Kiribati accounts for around 3 % of loined

imports to the EU market once a conversion ratio of 0.485

is applied to the whole weight, 4 % of the imports

of loins to Spain (which itself accounts for 64 % of total EU imports of loins), and 6.9 % of Ecuadorian exports

of loins to the EU.

Spanish canned tuna production was reported as 226,418 tonnes in 2010, with loins from catch made in

Kiribati under the Protocol contributing an estimated 1.2 % of Spanish tuna canning raw material imports.

Table 32: EU imports of canned and loined tuna and estimated contributions of catch made under the

Protocol to EU imports

Import of canned

tuna to EU

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

426,592

424,865

378,432

371,013

400,226

Import of frozen

pre-cooked loins

81,527

85,052

112,121

104,686

Imports from

Kiribati

Protocol

3,902

5,521

4,781

5,521

4,931

Imports from

Kiribati

Protocol

1,892.45

2,677.71

2,318.91

2,677.49

% of imports

0.9%

1.3%

1.5%

1.2%

% of imports

2007

2008

2009

2010

Average

95,847

2,391.64

Notes: Assumes constant 90 % of catch from

Protocol

destined for the EU,

and 50 % as cans and 50 % as loins

EU canned imports include tuna in pouches as same tariff code

Loin to whole conversion ratio estimated at .485

Source: EU trade statistics and IEO catch data provided by the European

Commission.

See http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/TT-23-04-Tracking-and-certification.pdf

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 74

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

4.6

Employment analysis of the Protocol

The employment estimated to be generated by the Protocol is shown in Table 33, and is estimated at 98 Full-

Time Equivalent (FTE) jobs. This employment generation represents 116 tonnes of fish caught under the

Protocol for every one job, or 0.009 jobs per tonne of fish caught under the Protocol. While total EU FTE jobs

are estimated at 51,158 EU jobs are in some way dependent on the Protocol (i.e. total jobs not accounting for

dependency on Kiribati catch). Total FTE in Kiribati is estimated at 47, and Kiribati thus accounts for 48 % of

the FTE resulting from catches made under the Protocol.

Catching sector FTE is estimated from the data on crewing nationalities

, the number of vessels operating

under the Protocol (four), and the dependency of vessels on catches in Kiribati. It is noteworthy that 2-3

Kiribati crew are permanently onboard EU vessels, and the total number employed by the fleet is more than

the six included as an objective in the Annex to the FPA. In addition the EU vessels take onboard Kiribati

observers. It is also noteworthy that of the total crew around 50 % are from the EU, with the balance of around

40 % being sourced from South America.

Upstream jobs in the EU are based on a figure provided in the Oceanic Developpement

et al.

2008

methodological guidelines for jobs per vessel, and dependency of vessels on catches in Kiribati, and may well

be over-estimated given the supplies and services to EU vessels operating in Kiribati waters coming from

South America; the Protocol certainly generates upstream jobs in South America as well as in the EU. On the

other hand it is likely that some of the jobs created in South America may be for EU nationals, but it is not

possible within the scope of this evaluation to provide more quantitative estimates of the extent to which this

might be the case.

Upstream jobs in Kiribati are based on three managers of logistical support employed in Kiritimati (Christmas

Island) and two in Tarawa, and around 100 people employed when vessels land/tranship in Kiribati (converted

in FTEs) for transshipment and other requirements, with each vessel landing taking an estimated 5 days (40 of

these 100 are now under permanent contract to OPAGAC but also work unloading other vessels). Temporary

manual labourers are reported to earn around

€2/hour.

There is no downstream employment of any note in Kiribati resulting from the Protocol, but the loins processed

in Ecuador and destined for the El Grove cannery in Galicia/Spain generate an estimated 9-10 jobs in the EU.

The extent to EU-based processing sector employment is limited by the loining process taking place in

Ecuador. A large proportion of the labour in canning is associated with cutting and cleaning tuna into loins, and

this helps to explain why much of the catch is loined in Ecuador where labour costs are cheaper than in the

EU.

OPAGAC, Pers. Comm., February 2012

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 75

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Table 33: Employment generated by the Protocol

Catching sub-sector

Fleet

Vessel crew

EU crew

Kiribati crew

Kiribati observers

Other crew

Total

Dependency on Kiribati

FPA related employment/vessel

EU FPA related crew

Kiribati FPA related crew

Kiribati FPA related observers

Other FPA related crew

Total FPA related jobs

Upstream sub-sector

EU Jobs per fleet segment

FPA related EU jobs

Kiribati jobs

Other country FPA related jobs

Downstream sub-sector

Employment at El Grove/Galicia

Yearly production capacity (t)

Input of loins from FPA (t)

FPA EU related jobs

Total EU FPA-related jobs

Total Kiribati FPA-related jobs

TOTAL FPA-related jobs

Jobs per tonne of fish

Payments to Kiribati per EU job

Tonnes of fish per job

73m

25%

3.7

0.5

0.2

2.5

6.9

10.9

not estimated

300

75,000

2,392

9.6

50.8

47.3

98.1

0.009

23,810

116

100m

31%

4.6

0.9

0.2

3.7

9.6

13.6

118

51%

37%

100%

Total for fleet %

16.7

2.8

1.0

12.4

33.1

24.5

43.5

51%

37%

100%

52%

48%

100%

Notes: 1/ Upstream jobs based on estimate of 22 jobs per vessel for EC purse seiners in the

Indian Ocean, quoted in Oceanic Developpment et al 2008 report on methodological guidelines

2/ All jobs estimated on Full-Time Equivalent basis

Source: Consultants’ calculations.

Also emphasized in Appendix C, and earlier in Section 4.4, the social clause elements of the Protocol in terms

of wage levels, seamen having contracts, etc., are all being fully complied with.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 76

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

4.7

Effectiveness – The extent to which the specific FPA objectives were achieved

To what extent has the Protocol contributed to the development of responsible fishing?

The EU fleet plays only a small role in terms of overall fleet activity in both Kiribati and WCP. Its ability to

impact on responsible fishing is therefore limited given the large number of purse seine vessels operating in

the region from other flag States.

However, EU vessels have exceeded their reference vessel days allocated under the WCPFC Convention for

time allowed in High Seas; while not directly relevant to this evaluation as outside the Kiribati EEZ, there is an

indirect link in that a) the Protocol provides the basis by which vessels can operate sustainably in the region

more generally, and therefore in high seas areas, and b) stocks exploited in the high seas areas are the same

as those exploited in Kiribati waters. In addition, and more directly related to the evaluation of the Protocol, the

strong reliance on FADs by the EU fleets (see Table 5) is a potential issue of concern given the higher catches

of juveniles (and some resulting discarding so as to high-grade as reported by observers during consultations

in Kiribati

contrary to Kiribati and CMM requirements) and the higher proportions of bigeye and yellowfin tuna

in catches made on FADs (see Table 4 and Table 12). Earlier text in this report (see Section 3.4) highlighted

concerns over bigeye stock status in particular. The strong reliance on FADs also results in high interactions

with pelagic sharks, some of which are estimated to be in danger of overexploitation.

It is for that reason that the EU is supportive of FAD management plans to be adopted by WCPFC (as stated

in a submission by the EU to the WCPFC in February 2012 on a CMM for the conservation and management

of tropical tunas (bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack) in the WCPFC Convention Area). The EU also actively

participates more generally in the WCPFC and its deliberations with regards to responsible fishing. Other ways

in which the Protocol is contributing to the development of responsible fishing include: provision in the Protocol

for a modification of the fishing opportunities should conservation and protection measures so require; support

for sectoral policy; and the Protocol being a means by which EU vessels fishing in the Kiribati EEZ can be

subjected to the management measures recommended by the WCPFC, the regional fisheries organisation

covering the region to which the European Union is a full Commission Cooperating Member.

Sectoral policy support provided under the Protocol should also be contributing to responsible fishing, both by

the Kiribati fisheries sector, and more generally by other nations fishing in Kiribati waters, through actions

aimed at reducing IUU, strengthening MCS and improving management capacities to strengthen compliance.

The extent to which this is in fact the case is difficult for the consultants to judge – as noted in Appendix C, part

of the reason for the lack of sectoral support payments in recent years has been the failure by the Kiribati

authorities to provide the EU with the documentation necessary to show that the sectoral policy matrix is being

implemented, and so such documentation is not available for review by the consultants. During the

consultants’ consultations in Kiribati, the government stated

that sectoral development funds are being

applied with the monies being committed to the various activities listed according to the matrix provided.

However the consultants were not provided with a breakdown of expenditure commitments to verify that this

was actually the case. It is also noteworthy that priority within MFMRD, focusses very much on deploying

development funds, specific to the EU and the USMLT agreement, the fisheries administration budget has

been cut. This is a worrying development against the background of the need to improve fisheries

management systems per se.

Pers. Comm., February 2012

Director of Fisheries, Pers. Com, February 2012

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 77

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Other areas of concern over the contribution and impact of the Protocol on responsible fishing include: some

weaknesses in MCS capacities in Kiribati (as noted in Section 3.9); and a failure of the parties to adequately

monitor the implementation of sectoral policy elements (noting that this does not necessarily imply that the

sector policy elements are not being implemented).

To what extent has the Protocol contributed to the processing industry and the market in both the EU

and the partner country?

The Protocol has not contributed to any forms of processing in Kiribati, as the only landings of catch in Kiribati

are very small quantities of bycatch which are destined for the local market. The Protocol has not resulted in

any joint processing enterprises being established in Kiribati. The reasons for this are explained by the

potential economics of establishing processing/canning for export, as highlighted in Section 3.8.

As highlighted in the analysis in Section 4.5, the Protocol contributes to the EU processing sector, with around

45 % of catch made under the Protocol loined in Ecuador before being exported for canning in the EU. These

loins represent around 2 % of the EU demand for imported loins. Canning of product in the EU generates both

employment and value-added within the EU. The Protocol also benefits Ecuadorian processing operations

which loin the tuna, and which also can around 45 % of catch made under the Protocol. The export of this

canned product to the EU represented an average of 1.2 % of the total EU imports of canned tuna over 2007

to 2011.

A very high percentage (around 90 %) of all fish caught under the Protocol is destined for the EU market.

To what extent has the EU fleet exploited the surplus available in Kiribati?

In part this evaluation question relates to the extent to which the Protocol has contributed to responsible

fishing, and comments made above therefore pertain. Earlier text in Section 3.4 demonstrated that while EU

fleets have been exploiting ‘surplus’ skipjack stocks, for yellowfin tuna the stock is at least fully exploited and

there is a 50 % chance that overfishing is occurring. However it is with respect to bigeye tuna that there is the

greatest possibility that EU fleets are making catches from a stock for which no surpluses are available.

Recent assessments show that overfishing of bigeye tuna is currently occurring, with catches around 7 %

higher than the MSY, and with current levels of catch unlikely to be sustainable.

It is however also of interest that Kiribati has a number of PAE days allocated to it which up to now, it is not

able to utilise. Some of this may be in response to climatic variations, which in the case of 2011 resulted in

much of the fishing taking place in the west of the WCPO. Some historic under-utilisation also suggests that

there may be some further opportunities for EU fleet activity. However, within the framework of the VDS, it is

important to ensure that the TAE is set against specific Limit and Target reference points in order to ensure

sustainable exploitation.

What has been the contribution of the Protocol to the activities of the EU catching sector?

The Protocol has been very significant for the four purse seine vessels utilising the Protocol. Catch rates and

revenues show an increasing trend over the period of the Protocol, and vessels show a high dependency on

catches made in the Kiribati EEZ. As a fleet based in the central Pacific and operating in both the WCP and

the EPO, access to the waters of Kiribati is critical for overall vessel viability. The important contribution the

Protocol plays to purse seine operations is evidenced from the high rates of utilisation as shown earlier in this

report, and in 2011 provisional data suggest that catches exceed 200 % of the reference tonnage for the first

time.

The Protocol has made no contribution to the activities of the EU longline sector. Two fishing authorisations

were taken in 2007 but no catches were made, and in subsequent years no fishing authorisations have been

taken and no catches made in the Kiribati EEZ.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 78

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

To what extent has the Protocol been successful in creating employment both for EU nationals, and

those in the partner country?

The Protocol is estimated to create roughly equal number of jobs in both the EU and Kiribati, and a total of 98

FTE jobs (see Section 4.6).

While 51 FTE jobs result from the Protocol in the EU based on catch dependencies, it is estimated that around

157 jobs are in some way dependent on the Protocol. The creation of EU jobs is lower in the processing sub-

sector than in both the upstream and catching sub-sectors, and particularly for the estimate 60 EU nationals

working onboard the EU fleet, the Protocol is important in creating and maintaining their employment.

In Kiribati employment creation is very strongly focussed in the upstream vessel support sector (e.g.

transshipment services, vessel support, etc.), and the failure of the Protocol to generate any joint enterprises

in either the catching or processing sub-sector has meant that few jobs are created in either of these sub-

sectors. The reasons for this failure have been explained earlier in this report and relate to a weak local private

sector, and the economics of local processing for export which would probably not create the conditions for

viable export processing of canned product.

The Protocol also creates employment in South America, and in Ecuador in particular, in the upstream,

catching and processing sub-sectors.

4.8

Efficiency – The extent to which the desired effects were achieved at a reasonable cost

To what extent is the cost of the fishing possibilities negotiated under the Protocol advantageous for

the EU fishing industry?

Indications that the Protocol has been efficient for the fishing industry include the fact that access payments

per tonne of fish have remained constant over the period of the Protocol, while ex-vessel fish prices rose by 49

%, 32 % and 52 % for skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna respectively over 2006-2011 (see Table 28). At the

same time as these price rises, vessel operational costs may not have risen significantly over the evaluation

period – the single most important operational cost item for purse seine vessels is fuel, which accounts for an

estimated 46-50 % of operational costs. Analysis of gasoil prices over 2007 to 2011 shows that the average

yearly price did not rise over this period, in large part due to significant reductions in prices in 2009 and 2010

before prices rose again in 2011 to above 2007 levels. The access fees paid by vessels represent 4.1-4.4 % of

the value of catches (see Appendix D). All of these factors help to explain the profits for vessels using the

Protocol (earnings before interest and tax of 11-23 % of sales revenues – see Appendix D), and suggest that

the cost of fishing possibilities negotiated under the Protocol are advantageous for the EU fishing industry.

However, the strong concentration of total EU value-added made in the catching sub-sector (see Table 29,

and the relatively small value-added in the upstream and downstream sub-sectors in the EU (in part due to the

reliance on South American vessel bases and processing) suggests that the Protocol is providing better value-

for money for fleet owners than for EU tax payers.

The Protocol has resulted in the creation of jobs for the EU, and a measure of efficiency can be inferred from

the fact that total combined payment from the EU (EU and fleet owners) per EU-job created over the

evaluation period was

€23,810

(see Table 33).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 79

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

To what extent is the cost of the fishing possibilities negotiated under the Protocol advantageous for

Kiribati?

Payments made to Kiribati over 2007 to 2011 were more than

€6

mn, at an annual average of

€1.2

mn (see

Section 4.3). For the years 2009 to 2011, payments made by the EU under the Protocol represented 7 %, 4 %

and 7 % of national fishing licence revenue. As described in Section 2, revenues from fishing licences

traditionally provide between 23-30 % of Kiribati’s government revenue, suggesting that Protocol payments

account for around 1-2 % of total annual government revenues.

In addition to the revenue to Government from the Protocol, value-added of around

€300,000

per year is

created through onshore services provided to vessels during port calls, and through fishing crew and

observers employed on EU vessels (see Table 29). The Protocol has however not been advantageous or

efficient in generating any downstream activity in Kiribati, and there has been a failure through the Protocol to

develop any on-shore processing capacity, for the reasons already elaborated in terms of the economic

viability of doing so. The Protocol has however been successful in generating interest by EU vessels in

supporting local employment creation, and this is reflected through MoUs between OPAGAC and the

government, updated yearly, covering observers, stevedores, cooperation in field of a donated cargo vessel

for inter-island transport, and a salt project in Kiritimati (Christmas Island).

The presence of the EU fleet provides an alternative to traditional fleets operating in the WCP, thereby

strengthening the hand of Kiribati negotiators of access rights, through having a larger number of nations

interested in negotiating access.

What is the cost-benefit ratio of the Protocol?

The Protocol has cost the EU an average of

€804,440

per year over the period 2007 to 2011, and fleet owners

€403,880

per year, with total payments from the EU thus averaging

€1.2

mn per year. These costs have

directly resulted in average yearly value-addition for the EU of

€4.8

mn, with a benefit/cost ratio for the EU

therefore of 4.0 i.e. for every Euro spent,

€4.0

of value-added has been created. The Protocol has thus been

efficient for the EU as described in Section 4.5.

Over the evaluation period of 2007 to 2011, the payments paid by the EU per PNA-adjusted fishing day, and

per tonne of fish caught, were only slightly less than payments made by other countries for access to Kiribati

waters (a benefit cost ratio of 0.9), although during the last three years payments received from the EU per

PNA-adjusted fishing day have been less than the average payments received from other countries (see Table

18).

4.9

Sustainability – The extent to which positive / negative effects are likely to last after the FPA has

terminated

How far has the Protocol ensured the viability of the EU fishing sector?

The Protocol has generated considerable levels of value-added (€2.5 mn) and profits for the EU catching sub-

sector (€1.8 mn, equal to 11-23 % profit on sales before interest and tax) which has supported the investment

capacity of the sector, thereby contributing to its sustainability (see Table 30.)

Financial and economic sustainability of the catching sub-sector in turn means that the Protocol has

contributed to sustainable employment for the estimated 60 EU-crew working in the catching sub-sector. The

strong dependency on Kiribati in terms of total catches (25 % and 31 % of total catches for the 84m and

100+m vessels respectively – see Appendix D), and the fact that the EU fleet is a central Pacific fleet, means

that the Protocol has been very important in ensuring the sustainability of the four vessels fishing under the

Protocol.

In contrast to the contribution to the viability of the purse-seine fleet, no longline vessels have been supported

under this Protocol so there has been no contribution to longline fleet viability. Longline vessels from the EU

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 80

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

operate in the swordfish fishery that lies outside the EEZs of Pacific island nations and is, in any case, distinct

from the tropical tuna longline fisheries.

In terms of the upstream sector in the EU, the Protocol has had no contribution to the sustainability of

suppliers of operational inputs to the catching sub-sector in the EU, but may have made small contributions to

the sustainability of vessel construction operations given the comments made above about the Protocol having

supported investment capacity in the catching sub-sector.

Downstream of the catching sub-sector there has also been a small contribution to the sustainability of

processing operations in the EU which process loins of tuna in cans, but this contribution is reduced by the

levels of processing that take place in South America.

How far has the Protocol ensured the viability of the partner country fishing sector?

The fisheries catching sub-sector in Kiribati is predominantly small-scale with a large percentage of the

population engaged in fishing activities in some form or other and the operations of the domestic fleet are such

that there is no direct competition for resources or interaction between the fleets. The EU purse seine fleet is

only a minor operator in the WCP, representing only 2 % of the total purse seine fishery. The limited catches

by EU vessels as a % of total WCPO catches, and the current under-utilisation of Kiribati PAE vessel days,

mean that the fishing under the Protocol does not appear to threaten the sustainability of the Kiribati fishing

sector. The Protocol has also contributed to the capacity development of local fishing crew employed onboard

EU vessels.

The activities and visits of foreign vessels, including those from the EU, contribute to the sustainability of the

domestic upstream sector by providing revenues and employment opportunities i.e. for transshipment

services, agents, etc.

The Protocol has not however been successful in resulting in any sustainable joint catching sub-sector

operations, or in making any contributions to sustainable Kiribati processing sector operations (while there has

been an initiative to develop a tuna loining plant, this has been an initiative related to the Chinese longline fleet

and it is unlikely to cater for purse seine caught tuna).

The Protocol has also made important contributions to government revenues that are used to support the local

fisheries sector. It is notable that the Protocol, along with US, is the only access Agreement where funds are

allocated to fisheries sector development rather than directly to Treasury. Through these payments, the

Protocol has contributed to the development of Kiribati fisheries sector by facilitating such activities as

contributing to coastal fishery development projects, capacity-building in the sector, participation of Kiribati

delegates in international meetings, and membership of international organisations. It could be argued that

these activities would probably have taken place even in the absence of the Protocol but, at the same time,

their financing would have reduced funding available for other initiatives. The administration and

implementation of the Protocol also makes some contribution to government staff capacities and the revenue

generated under the Protocol can support additional capacity development. Other comments have been made

earlier about the difficulties for the consultants in determining the extent to which the sectoral policy payments

are directly contributing to a sustainable and viable local sector.

Sales of bycatch from EU purse seine vessels may have had some negative impacts on the sustainability of

local traders of fish, through the effect of sales of bycatch from purse seine vessels on reducing domestic

market prices, although this issue has not been well researched during this evaluation. To the extent to which

this may have happened, there may also have been corresponding benefits to local consumers in terms of

reduced prices of fish. Both the government and the purse seine vessel owners are engaged in exploring

options for storing fish and releasing this to the market at times of low domestic supply so as to minimize any

negative impacts of the sale of purse seine bycatch in Kiribati.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 81

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

4.10 Consistency – The extent to which positive / negative spill-over onto other economic, social or

environmental policy areas are being maximised / minimised

How consistent is the Protocol with the CFP in general?

International fisheries instruments, including both the CFP and WCFPC management measures contain a

number of requirements to manage capacity and fishing effort, to control catches, and to minimise bycatch.

The CFP recognises the important role that RFMOs must play in managing regional stocks, and the need for

the EU to participate in them

, and so for the Protocol to be coherent with the CFP, it must also be

coherent/consistent with WCPFC management measures.

The EU is a CCM to the WCPFC, and the Protocol is coherent with both the CFP and WCPFC policies and

management measures. For example the Protocol is coherent with Commission Regulation (EC) No 500/2001

of 2001 laying down the rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 on the monitoring of

catches taken by EU fishing vessels in third country waters and on the high seas. The Protocol also contains a

VMS protocol which is being followed, and all vessels must be duly licenced and registered as per the

requirements of the CFP and WCPFC. In other aspects, there is coherence by the Protocol and vessel

activities with other CMM measures including 100 % on-board observer coverage and the 3 month FAD

closure, and because of the strong emphasis in the CFP on responsible fisheries and working within RFMOs,

the Protocol is thus also coherent with the CFP in this regard.

Comment has been made under the section on effectiveness (Section 4.7) about the extent to which the

Protocol is contributing to responsible fishing – a key principle of the CFP. The EU regulations and the

Protocol are coherent in terms of prohibiting fishing on marine mammals and on shark finning. There are

however some potentially worrying issues, most specifically the high discard rates of pelagic sharks, which as

yet have not been fully addressed within the Protocol or WCPFC, with a corresponding lack of coherence with

the CPF’s efforts to support sustainable fishing operations. In this regard, there is evidence that pelagic shark

species are heavily depleted, and the actions in force through CMM 2008-03, are inadequate.

The FPA also refers to, and is consistent with both the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and

with the International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

In what ways is the Protocol consistent with the other EU policies (i.e. development and cooperation

policy, trade policy, environmental policy, etc.)?

Whilst the Kiribati Protocol specifies a sectoral support component, this is provided separately from other

development assistance provided by the EU. The current 10th EDF (2008-2013) contains provisions for

support for water sanitation and renewable energy and non-focal technical cooperation. Fisheries have

remained outside of both the 9th or 10th EDF national programmes for Kiribati, and Kiribati is ineligible for

direct support through the ACP FISH2 programme as support is intended to be provided through the Protocol

(see discussion in Section 2.3). Given that the Protocol is so important to EU vessels, and that there are

pressing needs for capacity development and other support, for example in the field of strengthening MFMRD

capacity, this demonstrates a lack of coherence between direct development policy and the Protocol.

At the regional level there is better coherence in that regional 10

EDF focus includes fisheries issues such as

training and capacity development for access negotiations, training of observers, etc. Support for SPC under

regional programmes is entirely coherent with the Protocol and ensuring responsible fisheries.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Community - participation in Regional Fisheries

Organisations (RFOs):

COM/99/0613

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 82

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

To date, EU trade and FPA negotiations have been addressed separately, which might raise the prospect of

potential inconsistencies. However, there is currently no domestic processing of fish for export to the EU, and

the Protocol has no real bearing on Kiribati fish trade to the EU. There are therefore no inconsistencies in the

Protocol text or its implementation, and EU trade policy.

The current FPA and Protocol are coherent with EU environmental policy given the strong emphasis on

sustainable fishing (in the objectives of the Agreement and in Article 7 of the Protocol). The Annex also

contains many provisions to ensure responsible behaviour by fishing vessels in terms of environmental policy

e.g. respecting closed areas, the requirement for observers, and monitoring of vessel activity.

In what ways is the Protocol consistent with the fisheries and developing policy of the partner

country?

At the national level there is consistency between the Protocol and Government development objectives as

described in Sections 2 and 3. Access compensation under the Protocol can be used by the Treasury to

support national development objectives as it sees fit. In addition, vessel activities and operations at Kiritimati

(Christmas Island) make direct contributions to the government objective of development of the island and

employment creation so as to reduce population pressure on Tarawa. Furthermore the JC meeting in April

2011 incorporated the development of the jetty at Kiritimati (Christmas Island) into the sectoral policy matrix.

With regards to coherence between the Protocol and national fisheries policy, financial support for sectoral

policy development and implementation is based on the national development plan and the MFMRD plan and

objectives, and this ensures a strong level of consistency between the sectoral policy matrix and national

fisheries policy. However, in the implementation of the Protocol payments for sectoral policy implementation

have been delayed with the result that the programme has been operational only from the second half of 2011

and the next JC meeting will consider the implementation of the sectoral policy matrix. At this stage it is

therefore too early to assess how effectively the programme is being implemented or its impacts. The Protocol

is consistent with and also stresses compliance with the national fisheries Act.

Perhaps the key issue of concern in relation to consistency however, is the fact that the Protocol is a tonnage-

based Protocol, with payments for access made per tonne. National policy, in line with evolving regional

initiatives, is now strongly in favour of negotiating and providing access based on vessel days (although this

fact has not been directly communicated to the EU).

4.11 Relevance – The extent to which the FPA’s objectives were pertinent to the needs, problems and

issues faced by stakeholders

Does the Protocol satisfy various needs of the different interest groups in the EU?

The Protocol most strongly meets the interests and needs of the Spanish purse seine fleet, and is highly

relevant to this fleet. The Protocol has both a direct and strategic benefit for this fleet. The Protocol adequately

provides for the needs of the Spanish fleet in terms of catch possibilities, as evidenced by the fact that there is

no maximum quantity of catch specified in the Protocol. However, stakeholder consultations suggest that the

Protocol would be even more strongly aligned with the needs of the Spanish fleet if it included four fishing

authorisations for Spanish vessels, not the current three – at the present time Spanish vessels rely on the

goodwill of France to let them use the French fishing authorisation possibility not used by France. The

relevance of the Protocol to Spanish vessels is further evidenced from stakeholder comments about the

extreme negative impacts that would result from not having a Protocol. With regards to longline fishing

authorisations, Spain has indicated to the European Commission that it would like to retain three longline

fishing authorisation possibilities under a future Protocol, suggesting that the current Protocol more than meets

the needs of the Spanish private sector given that it currently contains six longline fishing authorisation

possibilities.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 83

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

While the FPA has provision for a French purse seine vessel, France does not maintain any purse seine

activity in the Pacific at present, and the one purse seine fishing authorisation available for French vessels is,

on its own, deemed by French stakeholders as an insufficient basis on which to commence activities given the

benefits of vessels working in pairs/groups when searching for free schools (the focus of French activities).

During the period of the existing Protocol French vessels have not attempted to fish in the Pacific, and

consultations with stakeholders suggest that even had France had more than one fishing authorisation, it

would have been unlikely that they would have been used. So in this sense the Protocol fully meets the

current

needs of French vessels, as well as fulfilling a requirement of French vessels to retain some possibility of

fishing under the Protocol in the future should they chose to expand the area of their operations into the

Pacific.

As evidenced by stakeholder consultations, the wishes of the Portuguese purse seine sector to have one

fishing authorisation under a future Protocol, and their wish to have fished in the Pacific in recent years, both

suggest that their needs have not been met by the existing Protocol. With regards to longline fishing

authorisations, Portugal has indicated to the European Commission that it would like to retain three longline

fishing authorisation possibilities under a future Protocol, suggesting that the current Protocol more than meets

the needs of the Portuguese private sector given that it currently contains six longline fishing authorisation

possibilities.

However, based on the actual utilisation of the Protocol, its provision for longline fishing has not been relevant

for either Spain or Portugal in terms of actual longline activity, with stakeholder consultation confirming that

there are no EU longline vessels operating in tropical waters. This is because EU longline vessels in the

Pacific target swordfish in temperate waters far to the south of Kiribati waters. It is also noteworthy that the

activities of this longline fleet in the WCPO have declined significantly since the formulation of the earlier

Protocol.

The Protocol is relevant to the needs of EU consumers as evidenced by the fact that it provides for tuna

supplies to the EU market, however, the quantities are small compared to the overall EU market as shown in

Table 32, so the relevance is also small.

The Protocol is also relevant to the needs of EU processors, and stakeholder consultations confirmed that

some catch made under the Protocol is destined for processing in the EU. However, the quantity of loins from

catch made under the Protocol which is imported to the EU for processing into cans is small compared to total

EU imports as evidenced by Table 32, and so the relevance of the Protocol to EU processors is not significant.

Does the Protocol satisfy the various needs of the different interest groups in the third country?

The Protocol is relevant to Kiribati, and satisfies its needs in terms of the income generated through selling

access to its resource. As noted above, for the years 2009 to 2011, payments made by the EU under the

Protocol represented 7 %, 4 % and 7 % of national fishing licence revenue, and 1-2 % of total annual

government revenues. And as commented earlier, payments in return for access have been broadly consistent

with payments made by other countries, on both a tonnage and days basis, over the evaluation period,

although in recent years EU payments have been less than those made by other countries.

The Protocol does not however satisfy the needs/desires of Kiribati to have a Protocol which is structured

around paying for access based on vessel days.

And while the FPA has an objective for the creation of joint enterprises and support for local processing

activity, an objective which satisfies the needs of Kiribati, implementation of the Protocol has not managed to

bring about any such activity i.e. these needs have not been realised, largely for the economic reasons already

specified (see Section 3.8.4Fleets

fishing in the Kiribati EEZ)

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 84

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

5.1

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS AND EX-ANTE EVALUATION OF A FUTURE PROTOCOL OF

THE FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Stakeholders to a future protocol and their views

The views of the stakeholders reported in this section, are the views reported to the consultants during the

consultations completed during the completion of the evaluation (see Appendix B).

Kiribati authorities

Kiribati’s Fisheries Minister, and the MFMRD are committed to following the VDS management system. They

are seeking to establish parity in their access arrangements with all countries and to sell access based on

days at sea, and not tonnage. They are also looking to establish an annual tender system which may be

introduced from 2013 onwards. A number of countries (e.g. China and Japan) whose traditional allocations

have been low, are now seeking to increase their access to the Kiribati EEZ, and the authorities in Kiribati feel

that this places them in a strong negotiating position with all countries when negotiating access. The vessel

day scheme also allows for unused days to be sold to other Pacific countries.

Kiribati would welcome a Protocol with the European Union on the basis of VDS. The benchmark figure for

access is US$ 5,000/vessel day, but the authorities are aware that higher access fees have been secured by

other Pacific island countries, up to as much as US$ 8,000/vessel day. This means that they are likely to be

reluctant to engage in a 6 year Protocol, unless the financial contribution for access was deemed to be

sufficient.

MFMRD is positive about the sectoral development component of the Protocol. There are internal struggles for

budget between the MFMRD and the Ministry of Finance, and this element of the Protocol, guarantees funding

to support fisheries specific development opportunities.

Kiribati is committed to implementing all PNA and WCPFC conservation measures. The requirement to

implement these is explicit in their Fisheries Act. Stakeholder consultations suggest that Kiribati will seek to

introduce the amendments to the 3 IAs including the increase in mesh size, closure of the high seas, and the

whale shark measure, and that these will be introduced as part of an amendment to licensing conditions for

foreign vessels fishing in Kiribati. The Kiribati Fisheries Act already contains a binding commitment to

implementing arrangements advanced through a number of international agreements including WCPFC and

PNA.

Private industry in Kiribati

Kiribati coastal fishers have no specific concerns about the activities of EU (or vessels from other countries),

and recognise that the Protocol generates support funding for the sector. There are also no perceived threats

to the sustainability of their activities posed by the activities of EU vessels.

The owners of the domestically-based purse seine fishing vessels, some of which are Spanish or South

American owned, had no specific comments on the Protocol. A representative of the private sector, Peter

Tiong, brother of the president., was not able to meet with the consultants, despite a number of attempts to

raise a meeting.

European Commission

The European Commission is in favour of a tonnage based Protocol, as the EU is not a party to the PNA, and

other FPAs in the region (Solomon Islands and Federated States of Micronesia) are tonnage based FPAs.

The European Commission recognises the importance of the Protocol to the EU private sector, and in

particular to the EU catching sector.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 85

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The European Commission has concerns over the transparency of the VDS, and has not yet been formally

notified by the Kiribati authorities that they intend to peruse a future Protocol based on the VDS.

Other concerns of a future Protocol relate in particular to the implications of potential WCPFC management

measures which could be put into force during the lifespan of a future Protocol, and which could significantly

impact on the value-added which would be generated for the EU.

The European Commission also hopes that under a future Protocol, the Kiribati authorities will be able to

ensure more timely provision of the documentation and information needed before sectoral policy payments

can be made.

The European Commission recognises the high level of juvenile bigeye (BET) tuna catches taken by EU

vessels in the FAD fishery, and is willing to consider some direct measures to be included in the Protocol

(Annex) to mitigate this problem.

Member States in the EU and their private sector industry interests

Stakeholder consultations with Member State officials and with private sector representation suggests that the

views of Member States and their private sector are aligned. They are thus discussed here together. Member

States and the private sector in the EU, especially the Spanish purse seine vessel owners, are keen to see a

future Protocol agreed between the EU and Kiribati. Spanish vessels are very dependent on catches made in

the Kiribati EEZ, and Spain would like to have a fourth fishing authorisation possibility for Spain included in a

future Protocol to reflect the four Spanish vessels currently operating in the Pacific. Purse seine catches also

generate benefits both upstream, and downstream, in Spain. While it is unlikely that Spanish longline vessels

would use a future Protocol, Spain would like to see at least three longline fishing authorisation possibilities

retained within as future Protocol.

The French purse seine sector wishes to see a future Protocol agreed, and for its purse sine fishing

authorisation possibility to be retained even though it has no intention of using it in the short-term.

Portugal has also expressed an interest to the consultants of obtaining one purse seine authorisation to fish in

Kiribati

, but does not appear to have any plans to utilise the longline fishing opportunities in the future.

Portugal has also expressed a desire to the European Commission to have three longline fishing authorisation

possibilities retained in a future Protocol.

The EU private sector as a whole is concerned about the implications of potential WCPFC management

measures which could be put into force during the lifespan of a future Protocol, and which could significantly

impact on the value-added they would generate.

5.2

Sectoral policy development

In thinking ahead to a future Protocol, and noting the lack of information provided to the consultants during the

mission to Kiribati completed as part of this evaluation, the consultants make a number of observations below

with respect to the existing sectoral policy matrix in terms of its structure, content and implementation. These

observations may serve to guide sectoral policy development supported by the EU within a future Protocol.

The general impression of the consultants is that the Objectives have been accurately identified, but that

clearer distinction is required between fisheries management functions, MCS and economic development.

This would be for a vessel which is currently Mexican flagged but beneficially Portuguese owned and already fishing in the Pacific.

The intention would be to re-flag the vessel with a Portuguese flag if a fishing authorisation could be obtained for it. The vessel

(called the Chac mool) is 62m in length and has a GT of 1,279.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 86

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

In some cases, objectively verifiable indicators should be clearer, with means of verification better defined, so

as to ensure that the deliverables directly relate to the EU programme, as opposed to other donor support

programmes.

The Logframe

Objective 1: To promote conservation and management in the Kiribati fishing zone

1.1 To carry out MCS activities

Fish stock assessment, fisheries social and economic surveys, and stock enhancement programmes are

activities that do not sit well within an MCS objective. All would be better placed under the Objective

‘

develop

sustainably fisheries in order to optimise economic benefits’.

MCS activities have been implemented and infringements detected. However, the achievement of three trips

per year, is itself not a sufficient deterrent to IUU fishing. Unlicensed fishing by longliners would appear to be a

specific risk for the Kiribati EEZ. Efforts should be made to increase the frequency of marine inspection under

the programme.

The logframe makes no specific reference to interaction with other MCS-coordinated activities, e.g. Operation

Kuru Kuru.

It is important to identify if surveillance at sea has been coordinated with International support

exercises such as this, or others supported by New Zealand and Australia.

No reference is made to the strengthening of the observer programme. Particular attention should be paid to

activities which relate to the FPA, most specifically, efforts should be made to monitor FAD catch and ensure

that there are no discards, in compliance with CMM 2008-01. Infringements are reported anecdotally, but no

actions have been taken, following observer debriefing.

Special attention should be paid to strengthening senior observer training and observer debriefing, and be

listed as an activity in the Logframe.

Apparent weaknesses in real-time VMS reporting have been indicated. Whilst this may have been dealt with,

the matrix should contain an indicator on the number of hours covered.

1.2 To improve management of fisheries

Development of management plans is a key priority, and is a laudable activity. However, the consultants could

not find any management plans for tuna purse seine or longline fisheries. These should be developed as a

matter of priority in conformity with PNA Implementation Arrangements and WCPFC resolutions. Specific

attention needs to be paid to vessels (domestic and FSMA) registered in Kiribati, and the status of these

vessels in terms of the application and control for management.

It is noteworthy that Fisheries Management Plans are central to the application of the Fisheries Act, so their

omission should be rectified as a matter of urgency. The Fisheries Management Plans should in themselves

contain details of specific Goals such as

Governance system strengthened, tuna resources exploited at

sustainable levels

and fishery impacts on bycatch, by-product species, ETPs and benthic vulnerabilities.

Results should be clearly defined with activities determined.

EEZ boundaries do not appear to have been finalised in the amendments to the new fisheries Act, and should

be clarified.

1.3 To Develop an Information Technology (IT) tools for fisheries management

There is evidence that IT systems have been strengthened. MFMRD now has a dedicated IT unit, and the

functionality of the VMS system and the use of the SPC TUFMAN database appears to have improved.

1.4 To increase knowledge of fisheries officials

It is apparent that in-house training has taken place. However, it is not clear whether this is directly in response

to the EU support programme, or wider regional support such as DEVFISH II. A clearer distinction should be

identified in the form of

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

and

Means of Verification,

allowing for a distinction

between the various support programmes.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 87

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Objective 2: To develop sustainably fisheries in order to optimise economic benefits

2.1 To improve fishing techniques

It is not clear what this activity is for. It would seem that activities mentioned under Objective 1 should be

transferred to this section.

It was reported that MFMRD was encouraging use of FADs for domestic fisheries, so as to encourage some

diversification away from coastal activities. This is not mentioned in the Logframe, and would appear to be an

appropriate activity, recognising the importance of the domestic industry.

2.2 To develop a fishing infrastructure

Number of jetties built, appears to have been a deliverable outcome, and would demonstrate good visibility.

2.3 To carry-out small-scale initiatives

No comment is provided on this objective due to a lack of information available to the consultants.

2.4 To increase the revenue from foreign/local fishing authorisations

This development would appear to be in progress. However, there may be a need to address fee structures for

the growing interest by foreign longliners, seeking to target albacore, yellowfin and bigeye tuna.

Objective 3: To improve safety and quality of fishery products for export

3.1 To develop an infrastructure for fisheries export

Development of ice plants to support the domestic sector might be better placed under optimising economic

benefits. The activity appears to be taking place.

Development of transshipment support services and an improved jetty at Christmas Island could be

considered under a future Protocol with potential support under the EU 11th EDF programme, investment

banks (such as the European Investment Bank), and private sector parties (e.g. fleet owners from the EU and

other nations which might seek to use an improved facility).

3.2 To establish the Competent Authority (CA)

This activity appears to be in process with training of officers and staff in Fiji. However, the indicators have not

been reported in the log frame. It is also not clear from the matrix if this objective relates to a CA with respect

to fish health and hygiene requirements and HACCP, or to the EU IUU regulation and the implementation of a

catch certification scheme and the issuance of catch certificates. Nevertheless this objective appears to be an

important one for a future Protocol.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 88

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

5.3

Ex-ante evaluation criteria

This final section presents in short tabular form some key points based on the ex-ante evaluation criteria

specified in Article 21(1) of the 2009 EU Impact Assessment Guidelines.

Table 34: Ex-ante evaluation of the renewal of the EU/Kiribati Protocol

Ex-ante evaluation Main points for consideration

criteria

Needs to be met

Short term

(short- and long- EU needs:

term)



Maintenance of existing fishing opportunities for the EU fleet, within the context

of fishing operations within the WCP, so as to generate value-added and

employment for EU companies and citizens, and viable and sustainable

fisheries-related activities;



Contribution of fish to the EU market; and



Compliance with the covenants and obligations of the FPA.

Kiribati needs:



Funds to support the general government budget, from the sale of access to

Kiribati resources;



Funds to support sectoral policy development and implementation;



Sale of access based on rates comparable with those charged of other nations in

Kiribati and in the region; and



Compliance with the covenants and obligations of the FPA.

Long term

EU needs:



As per short-term above.

Kiribati needs:



Development of viable and sustainable fishing-related activities to include not just

upstream vessel support and transshipment services, but also catching and

processing sub-sector activity; and



Plus as per short-term above.

Added-value of EU



Requirements of the FPA for separation of funds into access payments and

involvement

support for sectoral policy development means that the sector can benefit (in

terms of management, development and improved human capacity) from having

funds ear-marked for it, rather than having monies being passed to the national

treasury;



Potential ability to have coherence between EU development policy and related

financial support, and FPA-related sectoral policy matrix implementation;



Ability of EU vessel activity in Kiritimati (Christmas island) operating under the

FPA to support island development in line with Government policy, and

potentially to leverage funds for jetty improvements; and



Potential human capacity developments of Kiribati crew (by EU vessels), and

Kiribati observers (under sectoral policy support activities or other EU

development projects.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 89

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Objectives

achieved



The policy options



available, including

the risks associated

with them



Results and impacts

expected,

particular economic,

social

and

environmental

impacts



Promotion of responsible fisheries in Kiribati waters based on international

obligations and principles/best practice;

Monitoring of the results of sectoral policy implementation;

Sustainable economic and social benefits to both the EU and Kiribati arise from

the FPA;

Good economic and social governance, respective to the state of fish stocks; and

Employment of all FPA-related employment based on international obligations

and principles/best practice.

Increasing fishing authorisation possibilities, for example to address the desire of

Portugal to have a purse seine fishing authorisation and for Spain to have four

not three – associated environmental risks, and potential low fishing

authorisation utilisation;

Increasing reference tonnage – this would just reflect recent catch rates, but risks

are that a) if catch rates fell it could result in low utilisation and higher payments

by EU per tonne of fish if reference tonnage was not used, and b) if catches rates

increased further and above a new higher reference tonnage, this could mean

that the Protocol provides for fishing opportunities that would not be coherent

with responsible fisheries;

Payments based on tonnage or Vessel Days Scheme – either party may not

agree / potential/ongoing weaknesses in VDS;

Differing payment rates for access – potentially negative impacts on vessel

viability, generation of unequal benefits arising to the EU and Kiribati;

Kiribati policy option to let the market decide on payment rates per day, which

could increase rates even above the current $5,000/day

Enlargement of the protocol by including more elements concerning fisheries

governance – no real risks as long as coherence ensured with WCPFC

management and governance measures, and indeed may not be necessary

given that WCPFC addresses governance issues at the regional level, while at

the national level may also not be necessary given that sectoral policy support

covers governance issues

No Protocol – reduced ability of EU to influence responsible fisheries and no

funds earmarked for sectoral policy developments; and

WCPFC and PNA policy options with respect to FAD measures, mesh size

increases and closed high seas area around Kiribati – significant risks to EU

vessels because the cost of new net for each vessel is around

€650,000,

and

because EU vessels are dependent on the PIPA for around 30 % of their

catches. In addition it should be noted that FAD measures have been suggested

in recent reviews (see Section 3.6) as being an effective management tool from a

stock perspective, but closed areas much less so. The potential increase in mesh

size has not yet been the subject of a full evaluation to consider the potential

economic, social and environmental costs and benefits.

Considerable generation of value-added and employment in both the EU and

Kiribati;

Improved fisheries policy framework and its implementation;

Improved capacity development in Kiribati;

Contributions to responsible fisheries and improved fishing practices; and

Some negative environmental impacts in terms of bigeye tuna.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 90

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Lessons

learned



from the past



The most appropriate

method

implementation

The

internal

coherence of the

proposed

programme

activity

and

its

relations with other

relevant instruments

Monitoring system

and the indicators

and

evaluation

arrangements

needed to measure

them



Longline possibilities have not been used.

France has not used its one fishing authorisation possibility and has no purse

seine vessels operating in the Pacific. All four fishing authorisations are currently

used by Spain and this pattern continues likely under a future Protocol, although

France prefers to retain is fishing authorisation even if not used in case of future

fleet developments in the Pacific;

Value-added benefits from the Protocol appear to be balanced in favour of the

EU, but Kiribati also generates considerable benefits from the Protocol and is

expected to do so in the future;

Compliance with the covenants and obligations contained in the legal text of the

FPA have generally been complied with, but there have been some elements of

poor performance by all parties which should be addressed under

implementation of future FPA;

Kiribati human capacity for sectoral management and MCS requires

strengthening;

The EU is favour of a tonnage-based Protocol whereas Kiribati would prefer one

based on vessel days, raising potential difficulties over agreeing a future

Protocol;

Development of joint EU/Kiribati enterprises has not taken place, and may well

be rather unrealistic in the short- to medium-term, although vessel owners have

made efforts to engage with local capacity developments and local development;

Increasingly coordinated efforts by parties in the region to bring foreign fishing

fleets within their EEZs, based on the economic benefits of doing so; and

FAD measures have been suggested in recent reviews (see Section 3.6) as

being an effective management tool from a stock perspective, while closed areas

much less so.

A Protocol that benefits all parties; and

Improved involvement of the Joint Committee.

Future Protocol likely to be coherent with CFP (and its potential reform), with

WCPFC arrangements, and with national Kiribati sectoral policy.



Use of quantitative and qualitative indicators, which are objectively verifiable, and

contained with the sectoral policy implementation matrix. Indicators to be

determined on conclusion of any future Protocol; and

Evaluation arrangements based on ex-post and ex-ante analysis.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 91

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

6.1

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Catches made by the EU purse seine fleet represented just 2 % of purse seine catches in the WCPO in 2010,

while EU longline catches accounted for less than 1 % of longline catches and 0 % of longline catches within

Pacific country EEZs. The EU longline fleet thus makes no use of the longline fishing possibilities provided by

the current FPA between the European Union and Kiribati. The EU purse seine fleet utilising the FPA, is based

out of Ecuador, and also fishes in the EPO; the fleet is very much a ‘central Pacific fleet’, unlike many other

fleets operating in the region which tend to fish predominantly in either the WCPO or the EPO.

The principal fisheries management organisation in the WCPO is the WCPFC, of which the EU is a

Commission Contracting Member. The WCPFC sets management regulations, based on scientific advice, in

efforts to ensure that fish stocks are sustainably exploited.

The PNA is a treaty-level fisheries management Agreement by an alliance of Pacific island states (to which the

EU is not therefore a party), including Kiribati, whose EEZs collectively account for a significant bulk of the

region’s tuna catch and 54 % of the purse seine catch. The VDS is a scheme under the PNA, which

establishes a system of tradable fishing days allocated to the Parties. The VDS, and other management

measures (such as closure of high seas pockets) have increasingly sought distant water fishing nations to fish

within Pacific country EEZs rather than high seas areas, and to compensate Pacific countries for access to

resources, typically to at a cost of US$5,000/vessel day (€3,731/day at the current 2012 exchange rate). There

are both strengths and weaknesses of the VDS. Current access to the EU fleet of purse seine vessels

operating in the waters of Kiribati, as specified in the Protocol, is based on payments per tonne of fish.

Except for two longline fishing authorisations which were taken in 2007 (but not used), there has been no

interest by the EU longline fleet in fishing in Kiribati under the Protocol and no catches have been made in

Kiribati waters during the Protocol. However, as evidenced by 100 % utilisation of the fishing authorisation

possibilities and very high rates of utilisation (178 % of the reference tonnage of the Protocol of 6,400 over

2007-2011, and 207 % in 2011 based on provisional catch data), the Protocol is of critical importance for the

EU purse seine fleet operating in Kiribati. Catches in Kiribati represent around 50 % of vessels catches in the

WCPO. A feature of the EU purse seine fleet operations is their higher reliance on FAD fishing compared to

many other countries fishing in Kiribati and in the region more generally.

The Protocol is of less importance for the EU upstream sector, and for the EU-downstream processing sub-

sector. However, the Protocol generates some catches which are imported in loined form for canning in the EU

(representing around 2 % of the import of loins to the EU). Fish caught under the Protocol and canned in

Ecuador for import to the EU represents around 1 % of the EU import of canned tuna. A very high percentage

(perhaps as much as 90 %) of all fish caught under the Protocol is destined for the EU market.

The Protocol contributes an average of

€1.2

mn to Kiribati in the form of financial contribution for access, and

financial support for fisheries policy implementation. This represents around 4-7 % of government fishing

licence revenue, and 1-2 % of total government revenues. In addition to these benefits, the Protocol also

generates value-added and employment in the upstream/vessel supply sector, primarily through

transshipment-related services. The Protocol has not provided any meaningful developments to the local

fishing sector in Kiribati, and there have been no joint enterprises (with shared investments) set up between

EU and Kiribati companies. However the activities of the EU fleet have contributed to human capacity

developments in Kiribati for crew, observers, and onshore labourers.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 92

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Current stock status for the three main species of tuna caught by the EU fleet suggests that skipjack tuna is

not over-exploited, that yellowfin tuna is fully exploited, and that bigeye tuna is over-exploited. Noting the small

role of the EU fleet in the region as whole, this suggests that the vessels using the FPA, and others in the

region, may nevertheless not be exploiting just the ‘surplus stocks’ available, but may be contributing to

overfishing of bigeye tuna. It should however be noted that Kiribati has un-used vessel days in 2011 based on

the PNA VDS. There are also concerns over catches of pelagic sharks in the region, to which the EU fleet

contributes.

Payments for access to Kiribati waters per tonne of fish caught have remained constant over the period of the

Protocol, while fish prices have risen by about 50 % over the period 2006 to 2011. This may help to explain

why vessels using the FPA generate profits, and the value-added (i.e. profit plus crew earnings) made by the

catching sector, which ensure that payments made by the EU represent good value for money. It appears

however that ex-vessel prices are lower than international commodity prices paid for tuna in other main

processing locations, such as Bangkok.

The current Protocol has generated an average of

€6.4

mn per year for the EU and Kiribati combined, with the

EU accounting for 75 % of the total value-added generated. The benefit/cost ratio for the EU over the course

of the Protocol has been 4.0 i.e. for every Euro spent, 4.0 Euros of value-added have been generated for the

EU. The Protocol has also generated an estimated 98 jobs, split roughly evenly between the EU and Kiribati.

Given the payments made, this equates to

€23,810

per EU-job.

All parties (the EC, fleet owners, and the government of Kiribati), have generally complied with the covenants

and obligations laid out in the text of the Protocol. However, a particular concern, especially given the

importance and potential benefits of the sectoral support payments under the Protocol which is a unique

characteristic of Protocol compared to agreements between Kiribati and other countries (except the USA), has

been the failure of the Joint Committee to meet regularly since the commencement of the Protocol – despite

two technical meetings having taken place, one in 2008 and one in 2009, only one Joint Committee meeting

took place (in 2011). Also of concern given their potential role in contributing to responsible fisheries is the

current lack of mutual recognition by WCPFC and IATTC of observers operating in both the WCPO and the

EPO, which in turn requires vessels to have observers mandated by both organisations onboard for any trip

where vessels may fish in both the WCPO and the EPO), and the frequent failure by Kiribati observers to

provide observers reports as required.

Looking forward to a potential future Protocol, potential new management measures being considered in the

region to improve the management regime (e.g. a one month extension of the FAD closure, an increase in

minimum mesh sizes, closure of the Phoenix Island Protected Area to fishing, high seas closures around the

Kiribati EEZ) would have a negative impact on the activities and profitability of EU purse seine vessels. FAD

measures have been suggested in recent reviews as being an effective management tool from a stock

perspective, while closed areas much less so. Other changes which could have an impact if mandated by the

WCPFC include potential changes in crewing requirements to 10 % and then 20 % being from PNA countries

– this would require changes to the text of the Protocol to ensure coherence, as the text currently states a

minimum of 6 crew on the fleet of purse seiners, which represents around 5 % of current vessel crew numbers

(this figure is exceed by the EU fleet, with around 9 % of total crew already sourced from Kiribati).

It would be in the interest of both the EU and Kiribati to have a new Protocol. For the EU fleet a ‘no Protocol’

would cause fishing rights as a proportion of sales revenues to rise considerably, while for Kiribati a failure to

sign a new Protocol would eliminate the ear-marked funds for special sectoral support provided by the EU

under the Protocol. Although unlikely, a ‘no Protocol’ could also potentially also result in Kiribati not fully using

its PAE days, and it is surely the objective of the Government to ensure full utilisation (and the resulting

payments that would result).

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 93

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

However, we can conclude that while all parties in principal will be supportive a new Protocol, the forthcoming

negotiations are likely to be difficult for both parties; the EU because Kiribati is strongly in favour of a Protocol

based on the VDS, and Kiribati because the EU views the VDS as having certain weaknesses. Given its PNA

obligations, Kiribati may not be able or willing to compromise on the VDS, so some solution may need to be

found that somehow merges the VDS into a tonnage based Protocol. Furthermore, assessing a ‘fair’ price for

access may be disputed by the parties involved in the forthcoming negotiations given a) recent rises in fish

prices b) static prices per paid per tonne over the course of the current Protocol, c) the ability and willingness

of the EU to have FPAs with different countries based on different payment rates, and d) the increasing

‘market’ price for vessel days in the region with the $5,000/day benchmark fee having been exceeded in some

recent bilateral agreements.

6.2

Recommendations

The recommendations made in this report are necessarily brief, given that it is not the job of the consultants to

present a strategy to the EU, rather to provide the EU negotiators with the economic data to prepare for the

negotiations. Thus the principal recommendation made is to base the negotiations on the economic and social

data provided in this report so as to ensure that there is indeed signature of a new Protocol.

The ongoing CFP reform means that there is as yet, not clear direction or guidance on changing the balance

of access per tonne between the EU and fleet owners, and the current balance should therefore be retained.

From a purely technical perspective, this evaluation recommends that the longline fishing opportunities be

removed from the Protocol or at least substantially reduced, given the fact that there have been zero catches

made by the longline fleet under the Protocol. However a final decision on this issue would also need to reflect

the political wishes and agreement by EU Member States.

Given the high level of juvenile bigeye tuna catches taken in the FAD fishery by the EU fleet, the evaluation

also recommends that direct measures should be included in the Protocol (Annex) to mitigate against this

problem. Such measures should be agreed jointly by all parties, but could include the use of, and reporting on,

FAD management plans.

The levels of payments in a future Protocol, and the basis on which they are paid (e.g. tonnage or vessel

days), will be the subject of negotiation, but should be informed by recent catch levels and rates of utilisation.

A firm recommendation however is made for greater emphasis and recognition by all parties of the importance

of the Joint Committee meetings. These meetings represent a vital monitoring mechanism for implementation

of the FPA – a mechanism which has historically not been especially effective. The Joint Committee meetings

must be yearly as required in the text of the FPA, and should be used both to review sectoral policy

implementation, and to ensure ongoing compliance with the covenants and obligations laid out in the FPA (and

necessary action of such if compliance is found to be lacking). Current areas of weakness in compliance with

other covenants and obligations required in the FPA, as highlighted in Appendix C should also be addressed

as a matter of urgency.

The evaluation recommends that any future Protocol, and its implementation firmly align sectoral policy

support with the Government’s development and sectoral policy. Within this context focus should be given to

the issue of improved MCS capacity in Kiribati and efforts aimed at reducing IUU fishing and at supporting

responsible fishing by both EU and Kiribati fishers. FPA sectoral funds, and other EU development support,

could be used to enhance observer capacities and reporting for example and to ensure mutual recognition by

WCPFC and IATTC of each other’s’ observers.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 94

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

The evaluation also recommends greater recognition by EU development projects of the important nature of

the Kiribati FPA, and therefore for the use of funds to support Kiribati. The view of this evaluation is that there

should be a special effort to better align sectoral policy support provided by the FPA with other EU

development aid in a mutually enforcing manner, while taking care to avoid duplication of efforts. This could be

supported by the appointment of a fisheries attaché to the EU Delegation in Fiji, and the EU is believed to be

in process of recruiting someone to such a position.

Finally, the evaluation recommends the active participation by the EU within the WCPFC, so as to ensure

responsible fisheries. Most specifically, an important support action would be to encourage the setting of

Target and Limit Reference points across the three tuna species with explicit management measures tied to

these, but most specifically in provision of support to strengthen the VDS.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 95

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

APPENDICES

Appendix A: References

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 2008. - Country operations Business Plan, 2009-2011.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), 2009. - Country Operations Business Plan, Kiribati, 2009-2011.

AUSTRALIAN AID, 2009. - Australia-Kiribati Partnership for Development.

CLARKE S., 2011. - An indicator based analysis of key shark species data held by SPC-OFP, WCPFC SC 7,

EB WP-01.

DAVIES N., HOYLE S., HARLEY S., LANGLEY A., KLEIBER P. & HAMPTON J., 2011. - Stock Assessment of

Bigeye Tuna in the WCPO, WCPFC-SC7-2011/SA- WP-02.

DEVFISH II, 2008. - EDF Concept note, Development of Sustainable Tuna Fisheries in Pacific ACP Countries

Phase 2 – (DevFish II),

http://www.ffa.int/system/files/%252Fhome/ffaadmin/%252Ffiles/ffa/DEVFISH%20Phase%20II%20concept%2

0note.pdf

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2000. - Partnership Agreement

2000/483/EC

between the members of the

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member

States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002. - COMMISSION REGULATION (EC, EURATOM) No 2342/2002 of 23

December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No

1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COM. - 2002. 637 final, Communication from the commission on an integrated

framework for fisheries partnership agreements with third countries,

http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0637:FIN:EN:PDF

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006. - Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European

Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 May 2006 – EU relations with the Pacific

islands – A strategy for a strengthened partnership [COM(2006)

l248

– Official Journal C 184 of 8 August

2006].

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007. - Council Regulation (EC) No. 893/2007 of 23 July 2007 on the

conclusion of a Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the

Republic of Kiribati, on the other.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2008. - Proposal for a Council Decision of 16 December 2008 on the signature

and provisional application of the Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the

one part, and the Pacific States, of the other part [COM(2008)

858

final – Not published in the Official Journal.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2008. - Council Regulation (EC) No. 1006/2008 of 29 September 2008

concerning authorisations for fishing activities of Community fishing vessels outside Community waters and

the access of third country vessels to Community waters.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 96

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2009. – Impact assessment guidelines. 15 January 2009.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2010. - Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement, consolidated agreed texts,

March, 2010.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 2008. - Kiribati-European Community EDF 10, Country strategy paper

and national indicative programme, for the period 2008-2013,

http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_ki_csp10_en.pdf

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, Pacific Region, 2008. - EDF Regional strategy paper and regional

indicative programme for the period, 2008 – 2013,

http://ta2rao.org/Strategy%20Papers/10thEDF_RSP.pdf

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP), 2007. - ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly of 22 November

2007document

P6_TA (2007) 0022).

FAO, 2011. - Food Security statistics,

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/country_profiles/eng/Kiribati_E.

pdf

FFA, 2010. - The FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessel Access

Available from

http://www.ffa.int/mtcs

FFA, 2011. - Vessels of Good Standing

http://www.ffa.int/node/42.

FFA, 2011. - Working papers on the evolution of a harvest control strategy for Albacore tuna.

GEEN G., 2000. - Review of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine

Fishery, Report to the VDS Committee.

GILLETT R., 2007. - A short history of industrial fishing in the Pacific islands, Rap Publication 2007/22.

GOVERNMENT OF KIRIBATI, 2010. - Fisheries management in Kiribati is governed by the Act for

Conservation, Management and Development of Kiribati Fisheries and control of Foreign Fishing and for

Connected purposes.

HAMPTON J., 2009 - Implications for scientific data collection by observers of new requirements for 100%

observer coverage of purse seiners. WCPFC-SC5-2009/ST-WP-6. Available from

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/st-

wp-06/john-hampton-implications-scientific-data-collection-observers-new-requirements-100-obs

HAMPTON J. & HARLEY S., 2011. - Review of the implementation and effectiveness of MM 2008-01,

WCPFC8 -2011-43,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc8-2011-43/review-implementation-and-effectiveness-cmm-

2008-01

HARLEY S.J., HOYLE S., WILIAMS P., HAMPTON J. & KLEIBER P., 2010. - Stock assessment of bigeye

tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean.WCPFC-SC6-2010/SA-WP-04. Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 10-19

August 2010. Available from

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/sa-wp-04/harley-s-1-s-hoyle-1-a-langley-a-2-j-hampton-

1-and-p-kleiber-3-stock-assessment-bigeye-

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 97

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

HOYLE S., KLEIBER P., DAVIES N., LANGLEY A. & HAMPTON J., 2011. - Stock assessment of skipjack

tuna in the Western, Central Pacific, WCFPC, SC 7, 2011, SA WP-04,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/sa-wp-

04/stock-assessment-skipjack-tuna-western-and-central-pacific-ocean

IATTC, 2011. - Fishery Status Report—Informe de la Situación de la Pesquería No. 9. TUNAS AND

BILLFISHES IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN IN 2010 LOS ATUNES Y PECES PICUDOS EN EL

OCÉANO PACÍFICO ORIENTAL EN 2010

http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/FisheryStatusReports/FisheryStatusReport9ENG.pdf

IATTC, 2011b. - RESOLUTION C-11-01. RESOLUTION ON A MULTIANNUAL PROGRAM FOR THE

CONSERVATION OF TUNA IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN IN 2011-2013

http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Resolutions/C-11-01-Tuna-conservation-2011-2013.pdf

IMF, 2011. - Kiribati IMF Country Report No. 11/114, May, 2011

(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11114.pdf

LANGLEY A., WILLIAMS P. & HAMPTON J., 2008. - The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery: 2006

Overview and Status of Stocks. Secretariat of the Pacific Community Oceanic Fisheries Programme Tuna

Fisheries Assessment Report No. 8. Available at:

http://www.spc.int/OceanFish/Docs/Research/TFAR_2006_No8%20final.pdf, WCPFC, SC 2 2006, EB WP-1.

LANGLEY A. D. & HAMPTON J., 2008. - Stock assessment of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central

Pacific Ocean. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-4. Port

Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 11-22 August 2008.

LANGLEY A., HOYLE S., & HAMPTON J., 2011. - Stock assessment of yellowfin tuna in Western Central

Pacific, WCPFC SC 7, 2011 SA, WP-03,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/sa-wp-03/stock-assessment-yellowfin-tuna-

western-and-central-pacific-ocean

LAWSON T., 2011. - Estimation of catch rates and catches of key shark species in tuna fisheries of the

Western Central Pacific Ocean, WCPFC, SC7, 2011, EB IP 02.

LEHODEY P., SENINA I., CALMETTES B., HAMPTON. J., NICOL S., WILLIAMS P., MOLINA J., OGURA M.,

KIYOFUJI H. & OKAMOTO S., 2011. - SEAPODYM working progress and applications to Pacific skipjack tuna

population and fisheries. WCPFC-SC7-2011/EB-WP 06 rev. 1 http://www.wcpfc.int/node/3633.

KIRBY D.S., 2006. - An ecological risk assessment for species caught in WCPO longline and purse seine

fisheries: inherent risk as determined by productivity-susceptibility analysis. Second Scientific Committee

Meeting of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Manila, Philippines, 7-18 August 2006.

WCPFC-SC2-EB SWG/WP-1.

Available from

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/eb-wp-1/ecological-risk-assessment-

species-caught-wcpo-longline-and-purse-seine-fisheries

MIYAKE M., GUILLOTREAU P., SUN C. H. & ISHIMURA G., 2010. - Recent developments in the tuna

industry: stocks, fisheries, management, processing, trade and markets. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture

Technical Paper. No. 543. Rome, FAO. 2010. 125p.

MOLONY.B., 2007. - Overview of purse-seine and longline bycatch issues in the Western and Central Pacific

Ocean. Paper prepared for the Inaugural Meeting of the Asia and Pacific islands Bycatch Consortium,

Honolulu, 15–16 February 2007.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 98

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMY, 2008-2011 - Development Kiribati Development Plan.

http://www.sprep.org/att/irc/ecopies/countries/kiribati/87.pdf

OCEANIC DEVELOPPEMENT & MEGAPESCA LDA, 2009. - Specific contract No. 17 - Overall Evaluation

Study of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements (under Framework Contract FISH/2006/20), July 2009.

OCEANIC DEVELOPPEMENT & MEGAPESCA LDA, 2008. - Specific contract No. 4 – Establishment of a

Framework Contract Management Unit (FCMU) to manage, monitor and coordinate the activities under the

framework management unit and the relevant specific agreements - Specific Methodological Guidelines for

Evaluation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (under Framework Contract FISH/2006/11).

OCEANIC DEVELOPPEMENT & MEGAPESCA LDA, 2006. - Specific Agreement No. 32 – Kiribati Report –

Ex-post evaluation of the current Protocol to the Fisheries Agreement between the European Community and

the Republic of Kiribati, and analysis of the impact of the future Protocol on sustainability, including ex-ante

evaluation (under Framework Contract FISH/2003/02), August 2006.

OCEANIC DEVELOPPEMENT, MEGAPESCA LDA, & POSEIDON, 2005. - The European Tuna Sector.

Economic situation, prospects, and analysis of the impact of the liberalisation of trade. Specific Convention 12.

Internal document.

PNA, 1982. - Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest.

Available from

http://www.ffa.int/nauru_Agreement

PNA, 1983. - An Arrangement Implementing The Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms And

Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties,

http://www.spc.int/coastfish/Countries/nauru/nfmra/laws/PNA_First Implementing Arrangement.pdf

PNA, 1990. - A Second Arrangement Implementing The Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms And

Conditions of Access to The Fisheries Zones of The

Parties.http://www.spc.int/coastfish/countries/nauru/nfmra/laws/PNA_Second_Implementing_Arrangement.pdf

PNA, 1994. - Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access,

http://www.ffa.int/node/30#attachments

PNA, 1995. - The Palau Arrangement,

http://www.ffa.int/node/91#attachments

PNA, 2004. - Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (As

Amended), as revised by the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Parties to the Palau Arrangement, 18-19 May, 2004.

Available from

http://www.ffa.int/system/files/%252Fhome/ffaadmin/%252Ffiles/ffa/Palau%20Arrangement.pdf

PNA, 2008. - A 3

Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms and

Conditions of Access to The Fisheries Zones of The

Parties.http://www.spc.int/coastfish/countries/nauru/nfmra/laws/PNA_Third_Implementing_Arrangement.pdf

PNA, 2010. - Vessel records (Unpublished).

PNA, 2010. -

Statement by PNA Chair Glen Joseph to the Sixth Session of the WCPFC Technical and Compliance

Committee on the Conservation Measure to Prohibit Setting on Whale Sharks.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 99

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

PNA, 2010. - Resolution of the PNA of the PNA Ministers to Amend the Third Arrangement Implementing the

Nauru Agreement setting forth additional terms and conditions of access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties.

PNA, 2011. - Memorandum of Understanding between the Parties to the Palau Arrangement on the minimum

bench mark fee for a vessel day, 20

July, 2011.

PNA, 2011. - Working paper on the evolution of a longline vessel day scheme for bigeye and yellowfin tuna.

SIBERT J., SENINA I. & LEHODEY P., 2011. - Prospects for effective conservation of bigeye tuna stocks in

the Western Central Pacific Ocean. WCPFC SC 7, August, 2011.

SCICOFISH, 2008. - EDF Concept note (2008), Pacific Region/Scientific Support for the Management of

Coastal and Oceanic Fisheries in the Pacific islands Region () CRIS No. FED/2009/21370,

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2009/af_aap_2009_pacific.pdf

SMACFISH l., 2008. - EDF Project Concept Note, Sustainable management of aquaculture and coastal

fisheries in the Pacific region for food security and small-scale livelihoods,

http://www.spc.int/DigitalLibrary/Doc/FAME/Meetings/HOF/6/BP2.pdf

SPC, 2009. - SPC Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems (FAME): strategic plan 2010-

2013.

SPC, 2011. - Catch by EEZ Distribution_xls.

UNICEF, 2008. - Food price increases, nutrition security in the Pacific islands

http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/Report_1_Food_Price_UNICEF_Pacific_for_OG1.pdf

WCPFC, 2004. - First Session of the Commission Summary

Record,http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2004/inaugural-session-commission

WCPFC, 2009. - Review of CCMs Implementation of, and Compliance With, Conservation and Management

Measures, WCPFC-TCC5-2008

/31 (Rev1). Available from

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc5-200931-

rev1/review-ccms-implementation-and-compliance-with-conservation-and-management

WCPFC, 2009. - Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the

Western and Central Pacific Ocean, ,Sixth regular session, Papeete, French Polynesia 7–11 December 2009.

Available at

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc6-summary-report-final

WCPFC, 2010. - Tuna fishery yearbook, 2010. - OFP, SPC.

WCPFC SC7, 2011. - Summary report,

Scientific Committee Seventh Regular Session, Pohnpei, Federated.States

of Micronesia, 9-17 August 2011.

WCPFC, 2011. 3rd ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE REGIONAL OBSERVER PROGRAMME WCPFC8-2011/24.

WCPFC CMM 2007-02. - Commission Vessel Monitoring scheme.

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2007-

02/commission-vessel-monitoring-system

Should

be 2009

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 100

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

WCPFC CMM 2008-01. - Conservation and management measure for yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the WCPO,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-01/conservation-and-management-measure-bigeye-and-yellowfin-tuna-

western-and-central-pa

WCPFC CMM 2008-03. - Conservation and management of sea turtles,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-

03/conservation-and-management-sea-turtles

WCPFC 2009-02. - High Seas FAD closure and catch retention,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2009-

02/conservation-and-management-measure-application-high-seas-fad-closures-and-catch-ret

WCPFC CMM 2008-03. - Conservation and management of sea turtles,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-

03/conservation-and-management-sea-turtles

WCPFC CMM 2009-06. - Conservation and management measure on the regulation of transshipment,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2009-06/conservation-and-management-measure-regulation-transshipment-0

WCPFC CMM 2010-03. - Conservation and management measure for compliance monitoring scheme,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2010-03/conservation-and-management-measure-compliance-monitoring-

scheme

WCPFC CMM 2010-07. - Conservation and management measure for sharks,

http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-

2010-03/conservation-and-management-measure-compliance-monitoring-scheme

Williams, P. and Terawasi, P. 2011. - Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,

including Economic Conditions, 2009. Available from

www.wcpfc.int/.../WCPFC-SC7-2010-GN-WP-

01_WCPO_Overview_2010.pdf.

WORLD BANK, 2011. - Global economic trends, data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 101

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix B: Persons consulted

Name

In the Pacific

Dr. Transform Aqorau

Tinian Reiher

Mr. Beero Tioti

Mr. Kauto Toganibeia

Ms. Aketa Taanga

Ms. Mbwenea Teioki

Mr. Kaon Tiamere

Mr. Tekirua Riing

Mr. Taremon Korere

Mr. Ruria Iteraera

Mr. Sergei Dodzin

Mr. Yi Xiong

Mr. Tobias Haque

Mr. Xianyong (Eric) Gao

Mr. John Hampton

Mr. Peter Williams

Mr. Len Rodwell

Mr. Anton Jimwererly

In the EU

Dr. Julio Morón

Dr. Juan Pedro Monteagudo

Dr. Michel Goujon

Susana Salvador

Mr. Johathan Lemeunier

Mr.Constantin Alexandrou

Dr. Marek Beran

Ms. Gosia Lachut

Position, Organisation

CEO, PNA Office

Minister of Fisheries, Kiribati

Director – MFMRD

Resource Policy Advisor MFMRD-

Senior Fisheries Officer (Offshore Fisheries) – MFMRD

MCS

Senior Licensing Officer

Senior Observer coordinator

VMS officer

Legal officer

Senior Economist, Asia Pacific Dept, IMF

Economist, IMF

Economist, Pacific, World bank, Fiji

International officer, Public/ private partnerships

SPC-OFP

SP-OFP

FFA

PNA Administrator

Director Gerente, OPAGAC. Spain

Asesor Cientifico, OPAGAC. Spain

Directeur, Orthongel, France

Chefe de Divisão de Recursos Externos. Direcção-Geral das

Pescas e Aquicultura. Portugal

Head of the European and International Affairs Unit, Maritime

Fisheries and Aquaculture Directorate, Ministry in charge of

Fisheries, France

Head of Unit DG MARE.B.3, European Commission

Administrator for Greenland and Pacific. DG MARE B.3,

European Commission

Desk Officer

Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. Pacific

Division, Asia-Pacific Department. European External Action

Service

Deputy Head of Unit DG MARE.B.3 European Commission

DG MARE.B.3

European Commission

DG MARE.B.3, Control and Inspection issues, European

Commission

DG MARE.B.2, European Commission, fishing authorisation

and catch data officer

Mr. Emmanuel Berck

Mr. Alan Gray

Mr. Mario Alcaide

Mr. Yann Davalo

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 102

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Dr. Pavlina Nikolova

Mr. Pawel Swiderek

Ms. Ana-Maria Caraman

Mr. Attila Schoenbaum

Mr. Dominique Phillipe Levieil

Mr. Thierry Soyez

DG MARE.B.1, European Commission, administrator for

WCPFC

DG MARE B.4. (trade issues)

DG MARE A4 (IUU issues in the Pacific)

DG MARE.F.2, European Comission, evaluation and impact

assessment coordination in DG MARE

DG MARE.C.3, European Commission, Spain desk officer

DG DEVCO, desk officer for Kiribati

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 103

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix C: Compliance with key covenants and obligations in the Agreement, Protocol and Annex

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

Art, para

5.2

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

The Agreement

Access by Community vessels to fisheries in Kiribati

waters

The Kiribati authorities shall notify the Commission of any

amendments to that legislation and to any other legislation

which may have an impact on fishing legislation

Partial

The new Kiribati Act for the Conservation, Management and

Development of Kiribati Fisheries and Control of Foreign

Fishing and for Connected Purposes (2010) was notified to

the EC, but not until the Joint Committee meeting in 2011.

The reason being that the Kiribati authorities prefer to use

bilateral discussions as the medium of exchange.

PNA/WCPFC decisions are discussed through the WCPFC

TCC meetings. WCPFC members report through the annual

TCC Part 2 report which provides details of changes to

legislation and compliance with the measures.

Licence applications received and vessels owners informed

by September in time for fishing season which commences

There are two separate bank accounts as per the

requirements. However payments according the timeframes

specified have not always taken place - see comments under

Protocol Article 2.5 below on timing.

The strategy for managing the financial contribution is based

on the MFMRD Four-Year Strategic Plan (2010-2013) and

presented within the Sectoral Policy matrix. However,

irregular and delayed payments for sectoral policy have

meant that the programme has only been operational since

the second half of 2011.

The financial contribution payments are in principle made

yearly. But see comments under Protocol Article 2.5 below

on timing. Kiribati has also received payments from industry

based on their tonnages.

Kiribati legislation / letters from

Kiribati authorities to the EU /

consultations with owners and

EU / meeting minutes

6.1

7.1

Licences/fishing authorisations

Community vessels may fish in the Kiribati fishing zone only if

they have a valid fishing licence issued under this Agreement

Financial contribution

The Community shall grant Kiribati a financial contribution in

accordance with the terms and conditions laid down in the

Protocol and Annexes

The financial contribution shall be determined and managed in

the light of objectives identified by common accord between the

parties in accordance with the Protocol, to be achieved in the

context of the sectoral fisheries policy drawn up by the

Government of Kiribati and an annual and multiannual

programme for its implementation

The financial contribution granted by the Community shall be paid

each year in accordance with the Protocol

Yes

Licence records in Kiribati

EU records of payments /

Kiribati record of monies

received

Strategy plan, and sectoral

policy matrix / payment records

7.2

Partial

7.3

Partial

EU records of payments /

Kiribati record of monies

received

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 104

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Partial

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

8.2

Promoting cooperation among economic operators and in

civil society

The parties shall encourage exchanges of information on fishing

techniques and gear, preservation methods and the industrial

processing of fisheries products

8.4

The parties shall undertake to implement an action plan between

Kiribati and Community operators, with the aim of developing

local landings of Community vessels

No / Partial

There has been no formal expression of interest or requests

from Kiribati authorities or the Kiribati private sector to the EU

for information on such issues. But more general exchange

of views takes place through WCPFC, technical meetings,

and Joint Committee meetings.

In addition, the EU fleet owners have shown the authorities

how things are done on board, processes for loading,

handling. And there is some exchange of knowledge from

Kiribati crew onboard, and Kiribati observers.

Vessels make transshipments in Tarawa and Kiritimati

(Christmas Island). There is an MoU between OPAGAC and

the government (updated yearly) covering observers,

stevedores, cooperation in field of cargo vessel provision for

inter-island transport (a donated vessel), and a salt project in

Christmas.

But there is no formal action plan to develop local landings.

This is explained by the fact that there is no commercial

incentive for EU fleet owners to land product in Kiribati as

there are no processing facilities, and catches are

landed/processed in South America. The economics of

operating a processing operation, other than perhaps for

fresh sashimi product, would be very marginal. Low

productivity of domestic workers, allied to competing with

Ecuador, would suggest that efforts to develop local landings

would never be likely to succeed.

Documentation

showing

evidence of exchanges of

information / consultations

Documented action plan (or lack

of) and evidence of its

implementation as obtained

through consultations

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 105

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

8.5

Covenant

The parties shall encourage, in particular, the setting up of joint

enterprises in their mutual interest which shall systematically

comply with Kiribati and Community legislation

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

Consultations with DG MARE,

Kiribati authorities, and private

sector in EU and Kiribati on

demand and feasibility for such

joint enterprises

There are no real joint investments in the sense of shared

ownership/assets, and the private sector in Kiribati is not

sufficiently developed for that.

However OPAGAC employ CCPL (a local agent) with 40

people on permanent contract as stevedores.

There are four FSMA vessels, which are registered/flagged in

Kiribati, and one is Spanish owned (the

Pacific Star).

However, it does not provide any direct benefits to Kiribati,

and the FSM arrangement is not proving to be effective in

attracting local investment as was originally intended.

All these functions are theoretically performed by the Joint

Committee. However, the Joint Committee’s first meeting

was not until April 2011 although there were technical

meetings in 2008 and 2009.

It took Kiribati some time to leverage funds from the Ministry

of Finance, which it has now done successfully

In principle the parties try/seek to, but yearly meetings have

not always taken place due to diary clashes, distance and

logistical issues of travel, and other meetings being given

priority by both parties. There was however a technical

meeting in December 2008 and December 2009, and a Joint

Committee meeting in April 2011.

9.1

Joint Committee

The Joint Committee shall perform the following functions:

monitoring performance of agreement, liaison, forum for dispute

settlement, assessing level of fishing opportunities

Partial

Minutes of Joint Committee

meetings

9.2

The Joint Committee shall meet in principle once a year

Partial

Minutes of Joint Committee

meetings

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 106

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

Art, para

2.5

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Partial

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

Protocol

Financial contribution — Methods of payment

Payment of the financial contribution referred to in paragraph 1

shall be made no later than 30 June 2007 for the first year and

no later than 30 June 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

for the following years

Payments made but there have been delays. These delays

appear due to a failure by the Kiribati authorities to provide

information required before payments can be made. For

example there were some delays in payments for normal

contributions due to bank account details not being provided

in time. And one sectoral policy payment has been delayed

due the fact that there was no JC meeting and that Kiribati

did not provide requested documents. To be able to launch

the payment the next JC Meeting needs to agree on the

planned and actual implementation of the sectoral policy, and

this is expected to be completed during the next JCM.

Shipowners are paying on time

This takes place through the WCPFC.

EU records of payments /

Kiribati record of monies

received

3.2

Cooperation on responsible fishing — Annual scientific

meeting

During the period covered by this Protocol, the Community and

the Kiribati authorities shall monitor the state of resources in

the Kiribati fishing zone

Yes

Consultations with EU and

Kiribati Authorities to assess

their engagement with stock

monitoring e.g. participation in

annual meeting of the Palau

Agreement, WCPFC meetings,

etc.

Records on individual vessel

landings

4.1

7.1

Review of fishing opportunities by mutual agreement

The fishing opportunities referred to in Article 1 may be increased

by mutual agreement provided that the conclusions of the annual

meeting of the 'Palau Arrangement' members and the annual

review of the status of stocks made by the Secretariat of the

Pacific Community confirm that such an increase will not

endanger the sustainable management of Kiribati resources

Promotion of responsible fishing in Kiribati waters

30 % of the total amount of the financial contribution shall be

allocated the first year to the support and implementation of

initiatives taken in the context of the sectoral fisheries policy. This

percentage is fixed at 40 % the second year and at 60 % the year

n/a

Fishing opportunities remain at 4 purse seine and 12 longline

vessels i.e. fishing opportunities have not been increased.

However under VDS scheme, there may be opportunity to

increase access under the Palau Agreement VDS scheme.

Yes

The % of the total contribution allocated for sectoral has

increased.

Monies going into the two different

bank accounts in Kiribati. Review

of fisheries sector budgets.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 107

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

7.2

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Partial

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

7.4

thereafter

As soon as this Protocol enters into force and no later than three

months after that date, the Community and Kiribati shall agree,

within the Joint Committee provided for in Article 9 of the

Agreement, on a multiannual sectoral programme and detailed

implementing rules covering annual and multiannual guidelines,

objectives, evaluating the results

For each year of application of the Protocol after the first year,

Kiribati shall notify the Community of the allocation to fisheries

sectoral policy no later than 1 March of the year concerned

This was not done through the Joint Committee, which did not sit

until 2011. But it took place and was agreed by exchange of

letters and presented in the Sectoral Policy matrix in the technical

meeting

The Planning Department in Kiribati monitors the outcomes

This has not been systematic each year in terms of the allocation

to specific chapters/activities, even though the Kiribati authorities

have been reminded of its importance by letters.

Review of multiannual sectoral

programme

and

detailed

implementing rules

Partial

Documentation from Kiribati to the

EU providing notification, in due

time.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 108

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

Ch, Sect,

para

I 1.1-1.3

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

Annex

Registration

Fishing by Community vessels within the Kiribati fishing zone

shall be subject to the issuance of a registration number by the

Kiribati competent authorities. Applications for registration shall

be made on the form provided for that purpose by the Kiribati

authorities

Licences/Fishing authorisations

The Community authorities shall present to the Ministry

responsible for fisheries in Kiribati an application for each

vessel wishing to fish under the Agreement at least 15 days

before the date of commencement of the period of validity

requested

Applications shall be submitted to the Ministry responsible for

fisheries in Kiribati on a form drawn up in accordance with the

specimen in Appendix I, and accompanied by proof of

payment and other necessary documents or certificates

Licences for all vessels shall be issued to shipowners or their

agents via the Delegation of the Commission of the European

Communities to Kiribati (the Delegation) within 15 days of

receipt of all the documents

Validity and fees

The final statement of the fees due for year n shall be drawn up

by the Commission of the European Communities by 30 June of

the year n + 1 at the latest on the basis of the catch declarations

made by each shipowner and confirmed by the scientific

institutes responsible for verifying catch data in the Member

States. The statement shall simultaneously be notified to the

Ministry responsible for fisheries in Kiribati and the shipowners for

checking and approval

Any additional payments shall be made by the shipowners to the

competent Kiribati authorities by 30 September of the following

year at the latest, into the Kiribati Government account No 1

Yes

Registration

records,

application forms provided

and

I 2.4

Yes

OPAGAC agent works with Government to ensure that this

takes place. And this always takes place in advance. Vessels

are all on FFA good standing register.

Date of licence applications vs.

commencement date of validity

I 2.5 and

2.6

I 2.9

Yes

Licence application forms and

receipts of payment

Fishing authorisations are issued in time, but usually direct to

the shipowners because the Delegation to Kiribati is based in

Fiji.

Normal fee payments are always made within the time limit.

Payments for excess catches have been generally been

made at the end of the year n+1

There is a data inconsistency between SPC and IEO which

has been raised at the two formal technical meetings.

Consultation

owners

with

fleet

Yes/No

I 3.4 and

3.5

Partial

EU records and copy

communications

made

Kiribati

I 3.6

Partial

See above

Records of Kiribati receipt of

monies

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 109

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

II 1-3

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Yes

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

III 1.

III 3.1

III 8.

IV 1.

IV 4.

IV 6.

IV 7.

Fishing zones

Vessels not authorised to fish in closed areas, within 12nm of

base lines, within 3 n.m of FADs, and within 60nm from

baselines of the islands of Tarawa, Kanton, and Kiritimati

Catch reporting arrangements and landings declarations

Captains shall provide the Director of Fisheries with

information relating to the time, position of, and catch on

board of the licensed fishing vessel before entering zone,

while in zone, before entry into ports, after transhipping, prior

to refuelling

Vessels shall declare their catches on the corresponding

sheet in the logsheet, in accordance with the specimen in

Appendix III A and III B

The shipowners of purse seine vessels shall provide copy of

the landing receipt after completion of every fishing trip that

took place totally or in part within the Kiribati fishing zone

Embarking seamen

For the fleet of tuna seiners, at least six ACP seamen shall be

signed on during the tuna fishing season in the Kiribati fishing

zone. For the fleet of surface longliners, at least four ACP

seamen shall be signed on during the fishing season in the

Kiribati fishing zone

Where contracts have been signed with Kiribati nationals, in

accordance with point 1 of this Article, the shipowner or agent

shall inform the competent Kiribati authorities of the names of

the local seamen taken on board the vessel concerned

Kiribati seamen will be given employment contracts, which

will guarantee the seamen the social security cover, applicable

to them, including life assurance and sickness and accident

insurance

The wage conditions granted to local seamen shall not be

lower than those applied to Kiribati [other?] crews and shall

under no circumstances be below IL0 standards

Monitoring and control records

Yes

Fax and email records held by

Director of Fisheries (subject to

III 7.

Logsheets

Landing

receipt

records

provided by owners to Kiribati

authorities

Crewing is done through the Agency at Christmas island. 2-3

of crew on each vessel are from Kiribati.

Consultations with EU fleet

owners

Yes

Unknown

Not clear whether information is forthcoming from the Agency

Records

provided

shipowners or agents

Department of Fisheries

Consultations

Yes

Consultations

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 110

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

IV 9. And

10.

Covenant

VI 2.

Where no ACP seamen are taken on board Community

shipowners shall be obliged to pay, for each day of the fishing

trip in the waters of the ACP country concerned, a flat-rate

amount of EUR 20 per day. Upon its entry into the Kiribati

EEZ, Community shipowners will notify the number of ACP

seamen on board. This sum shall be used for training local

seamen and shall be paid into the account specified by the

authorities of the ACP country concerned

Technical measures

Vessels shall comply with the measures and recommendations

adopted by WCPFC in the region regarding fishing gear and the

technical specifications thereof and all other technical measures

applicable to their fishing activities

Observers

Vessels authorised to fish in Kiribati waters under the Agreement

shall take on board observers appointed by the WCPFC….the

WCPFC shall inform the shipowners concerned, or their agents, of

the name of the observer appointed to be taken on board their

vessel at the time the licence is issued, or no later than 15 days

before the observer's planned embarkation date

Within two weeks and giving 10 days' notice, the shipowners

concerned shall make known at which ports in the sub-region and

on what dates they intend to take observers on board

At the end of the observation period and before leaving the vessel,

observers shall draw up an activity report to be transmitted to the

WCPFC, with a copy to the master of the vessel

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

n/a

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

Records of financial payments.

Notifications of seamen provided

by vessels on entry as recorded

by Department of Fisheries.

Yes

May be some non-compliance with WCPFC HS regulation,

but this is outside the control of Kiribati and is a matter from

the EU.

Not always, and notification can be very late preventing

sufficient time to organise visas, flights, etc. for observers to

arrive in Ecuador on time. Observers decided by Kiribati

authorities, and WCPFC not involved. Done through national

observer coordinator. Some vessels have left Ecuador

without observers and get special agreement to pick them up

in Kiribati.

Observer reports, MCS records

of infringements

Partial

WCPFC

owners

communication

VI 6.

VI 13.

Unknown

Need to improve capacity of Kiribati observer capacity.

PNA have reportedly told observers not to supply report to

master. MFMRD does not allow observers to submit reports

to ships masters for fear that it will compromise their safety.

This requirement is not specified in the FFA Standard

Operating Procedures, which are followed by all Pacific

island countries.

Consultations

Observer reports

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 111

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Article,

Chapter,

Section,

Para.

VII 1.

VII 2.

Covenant

Compliance

status (yes,

no, partial,

n/a,

unknown)

Yes

Justification, explanation, evidence, and any additional

comments

Basis for evaluation of

compliance status e.g. source

of information

VII 3.

Monitoring

The European Community shall keep an up-to-date list of the

vessels to which a fishing licence has been issued under this

Protocol. This list shall be notified to the Kiribati authorities

Community vessels shall notify, at least three hours in advance, the

Kiribati authorities responsible for fisheries inspection of their

intention to enter or leave the Kiribati fishing zone

Control procedures

Once a boarding inspection has been completed, a certificate

shall be issued to the master of the vessel

Communication from EU to

Kiribati

Email,

fax

communication

Kiribati

Never inspected at sea, but don’t get certificate when

inspected on land. This requirement is not specified in the

FFA Standard Operating Procedures, which are followed by

all Pacific island countries. However the FPA is an

international agreement and thus it is an obligation for Kiribati

Consultations

other

records in

VII 5.

VII 9.

Satellite monitoring

All Community vessels fishing under this Agreement shall be

subject to satellite monitoring

Transshipment

All Community vessels wishing to tranship catches in Kiribati

waters shall do so within Kiribati ports. And the owners of such

vessels must notify the information in accordance with the

Appendix IV to the competent Kiribati authorities at least 48

hours in advance

Yes

VMS records,

consultations

fleet

owner

Notifications by vessels to

authorities and transshipment

records

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 112

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix D: Costs and Earnings models for 84m and 100+m EU purse seine vessels utilising fishing

possibilities provided by the Protocol

Figures in Euros and Tonnes

Operational information

Number of vessels in fleet

Average age of vessels

Average length (m)

Average GT

Vessel and engine cost

Vessel and engine lifespan

Gear cost

Gear lifespan

EU crew

Kiribati crew

Other crew

T otal crew

Fishing days per year

Fishing days in Kiribati

Fishing days in WCP

Fishing days in EPO

Average yearly skipjack catch in Kiribati

Average yearly yellowfin catch in Kirbati

Average yearly bigeye catch in Kirbati

T otal average yearly catch in Kiribati

T otal average yearly catch all areas

Dependency on Kiribati for catch

Average catch per day

Financial information

Sales Revenue

Sales revenue Kiribati zone

-Skipjack

-Yellowfin

-Bigeye

- T otal sales revenue Kiribati zone

- T otal sales revenues all areas

Average price per tonne

Operational costs

Fuel

Crew

Port calls

Yearly fishing related repairs and maintenance

Fishing rights

Other

T otal operational costs

Operational costs/day

Fixed costs

Insurance

Bi-annual major repairs/refit

Vessel depreciation

Gear depreciation

Overhead

T otal fixed costs

T OT AL COST S

Net profit/earnings before interest and tax

Net profit as % of turnover

Cost of fishing rights as % of average price/t

84m vessels

1999

2,490

24,000,000

600,000

300

135

165

1,393

338

255

1,985

8,000

24.8%

100+m vessels

2000

103.5

3,995

28,000,000

600,000

300

135

165

2,519

481

715

3,715

12,000

31.0%

931,568

422,720

234,958

1,589,245

6,405,341

801

1,650,000

900,000

250,000

500,000

138,943

150,000

3,588,943

11,963

128,107

500,000

1,200,000

120,000

192,160

2,140,267

5,729,210

676,131

11%

4.4%

1,967,167

547,632

647,562

3,162,360

10,216,267

851

2,500,000

1,000,000

375,000

750,000

260,015

150,000

5,035,015

16,783

204,325

750,000

1,400,000

120,000

306,488

2,780,813

7,815,828

2,400,439

23%

4.1%

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 113

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix E: Methodology used in this evaluation

The basis for the estimation of the economic and financial impacts of the Protocol presented in this report is as

follows:



Two separate costs and earnings profiles have been developed for the EU purse seine vessels

operating in Kiribati, based on two main vessel classes. One profile has been developed for the two

84m vessels (average 2,490 GT), and one for the 102+m vessels (3,500-4,500 GT). These two types

of vessels may be expected to have different costs/earnings profiles given differing catch rates and

investment costs. No model for has been constructed for longline vessels as none have used the

Protocol (and there is no perceived possible usage under a future Protocol). The costs and earnings

profiles are provided in Appendix D;

Data for each profile is presented to show an average yearly costs and earnings profile for the

Protocol period, with data being an average of 2007-2011 (and using provisional catch data for 2011).

Each profile calculates profit margins;

Each profile first provides some operational information on vessel size, fishing days in Kiribati and

elsewhere (based on SPC data), crew nationalities, the total estimated yearly catch, and the catch in

Kiribati waters based on IEO catch data and therefore dependency on Kiribati;

Sales revenue is then estimated based on fish prices by species (see Table 26 with all yearly prices

adjusted to reflect Free On Board (FOB) prices), to arrive at an average annual turnover, and average

fish price per tonne;

Variable and fixed costs are presented and broken down as far as is possible into different line items,

and are best estimates based on data presented in Miyake

et al.,

(2010) which provides a costs and

earnings profile for French purse seine vessels of around 73 m operating in the Indian Ocean in 2007

(and fishing on free schools of tuna), consultations with OPAGAC, and the balance of costs shown in

Spanish Annual Economic Report (AER) data for the over 40m purse seine fleet. The two profiles

make a number of assumptions with regards to input costs as follows:

Fuel price data for French purse seine vessels in the Indian Ocean has been indexed to

changes in gasoil prices over the period 2007-2011, based on average yearly gasoil prices

(which provides an index of 0.97 on 2007 gasoil prices

);

The 100+m vessels are 21 % larger in length than the 84m vessels, 60 % larger in terms of

GT, and are estimated to catch 50 % more per year/day. Input costs for the 100+m vessels

are therefore scaled up where appropriate from those estimated for the 84m vessels;

We acknowledge that approaches to depreciation may vary, but have used an approach

which bases depreciation cost on the lifespan of the capital item (vessel and gear), and an

estimated new build cost at the mid-point of the evaluation period (in this case mid-2009).

However, we also take the view that sources of finance may vary considerably and should not

be included. The profiles thus estimate a net profit per class of vessel, or earnings, before

interest and tax i.e. (EBIT – a commonly-used financial indicator).



Gasoil prices dropped in 2009 to 65% of 2007 prices before rising again in 2011 to above prices in 2007.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 114

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1



The two individual vessels models are then used as the basis for estimating total value-added

resulting from the Protocol based on the total fleet operating in Kiribati waters, and its dependency on

Kiribati relative to fishing in other areas. For each of the variable and fixed cost items, value-added to

the upstream/input sub-sector is estimated. Estimates are made of a) the percentage of the total

value-added derived/generated in both the EU and in Kiribati, and b) the rate of value-added i.e.

labour inputs represent 100 % value-added, while value-added from other physical inputs is sum of

the profit and labour made by suppliers of those inputs. The rates of value-added are acknowledged

as necessarily best estimates only;

Value-added in the catching sub-sector is estimated based on the crew earnings and the net profits

before interest and tax;

Value-added in the downstream processing sector is estimated based on the amount of product

destined for processing in the EU (i.e. the estimated tonnage destined for canneries in Spain/Galicia

after primary processing into loins in Ecuador). The rate of processing sector value-added in estimated

at 25 % based primarily on the Oceanic Developpement

et al.

report of 2005 on the tuna sector (which

reported a commercial margin of 16 % on the cost of fish for the EU tuna processing sector for

skipjack cans from loins, plus an additional 5 % labour costs), and on Spanish Data Collection

Regulation / Data Collection Framework (DCR/DCF) national aggregated data on the processing

sector as a whole for Spain which shows a rate of 35 % gross value-added in 2007, 29 % in 2008 and

32 % in 2009 (provisional data). There is no downstream processing in Kiribati; and

Based on all of the above, the economic model constructed allows for an estimation of the value-

added directly attributable to the Protocol to both the EU and to Kiribati, in the upstream sub-sector, in

the catching sub-sector, and in the processing sub-sector.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 115

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future

protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix F: Purse seine catches in the WCPO by nationality, 2006 to 2010 (tonnes)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

flag_id

Skipjack

Yellowfin Bigeye Skipjack

Yellowfin Bigeye

China

47,776

4,828

140

48,745

5,428

768

43,406

10,960 1,188

67,635

7,073 1,535

42,255

10,513

948

Ecuador

6,152

1,328 2,043

6,222

716 2,249

17,675

2,463 5,277

3,136

505

787

5,846

850 1,755

8,347

690 1,997

15,354

4,322 3,282

25,553

4,789 5,863

19,677

3,070 3,816

20,517

4,040 4,911

Micronesia

9,215

958

159

11,853

1,448

196

15,933

1,899

294

16,784

1,807

545

19,395

2,673

380

Indonesia

154,233

44,253 6,115

138,341

63,524 4,830

144,118

54,375 8,204

161,223

37,205 8,268

179,826

20,670 6,201

Japan

217,566

28,295 4,672

229,220

26,282 5,396

212,417

35,331 5,630

193,051

33,096 3,447

200,011

38,544 2,679

Kiribati

3,367

1,157

139

4,178

1,169

103

3,937

1,570

249

16,721

3,135 1,021

23,153

4,686 3,593

Korea

205,220

43,346 3,224

214,933

41,469 1,775

187,277

59,047 2,478

257,481

23,647 2,140

216,026

58,314 2,972

Marshall Is

38,881

1,436 2,032

53,916

3,370 2,118

26,500

4,151 1,567

39,674

1,532 2,233

47,387

7,028 1,546

New

Zealand

21,662

2,157

860

33,646

2,329

651

26,079

3,200

713

26,667

1,264

204

23,615

765

131

Papua

New

Guinea

184,087

39,224 5,693

181,475

41,042 4,250

146,954

51,039 4,765

160,782

41,976 6,512

149,780

48,174 4,473

Philippines

123,749

51,178 7,358

149,740

51,100 4,282

176,078

63,738 4,136

161,547

43,204 4,356

123,679

39,789 3,722

Solomon

12,333

8,816 1,355

10,164

6,225

918

6,413

9,187

9,557

8,133

193

8,207

4,212

546

Salvador

3,546

1,307 1,172

8,639

599 1,724

6,023

639 2,162

5,461

707 1,203

Tuvalu

3,991

392

8,459

1,996

Taiwan

189,392

19,793

987

209,002

21,147 2,386

165,007

35,770 3,196

173,725

16,237 2,113

166,211

29,203 3,437

USA

55,633

8,448 4,364

75,210

10,541 2,985

159,741

45,363 4,220

253,783

21,245 6,561

215,587

25,686 4,251

Vanuatu

55,050

5,982

871

62,631

7,886

764

30,512

7,634

572

35,454

2,035

351

21,031

2,452

237

Grand

Total

1,333,030 261,926 42,314 1,448,543 289,342 38,430 1,396,606 391,152 50,469 1,607,278 246,232 46,594 1,476,813 300,339 43,389

Source: SPC.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 116

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix G: Longline catches in the WCPO by nationality, 2006 to 2010 (tonnes)

flag_id

Australia

Belize

Cook Islands

China

Spain

Fih=ji

FSMicronesia

Indonesia

Japan

Kiribati

Korea

Marshall Is

New

Caledonia

Nauru

Niue

New Zealand

French

Polynesia

Papua New

Guinea

Philippines

Palau

Solomon Is

Tonga

Taiwan

USA

Vanuatu

Western

Samoa

Grand Total

2006

Yellowfin

1,830

106

262

3,997

127

2,231

270

9,482

14,658

9,529

414

690

2,139

484

Bigeye

499

254

166

9,790

771

172

3,011

26,393

12,489

177

498

216

Albacore

2,591

271

2,223

7,191

11,802

24,240

1,050

1,358

213

496

2,918

1,811

2007

Yellowfin

1,390

273

290

1,580

127

1,721

548

10,371

15,107

8,817

393

527

1,539

484

Bigeye

1,008

158

238

7,821

556

1,395

1,993

27,024

10,054

213

478

111

Albacore

1,925

164

2,644

5,453

7,145

25,658

1,433

1,324

137

357

3,957

1,598

2008

Yellowfin

1,650

129

247

4,562

2,763

328

9,564

13,194

7,846

424

447

2,259

484

Bigeye

1,027

292

8,761

671

970

6,704

20,144

17,001

375

133

490

201

Albacore

1,277

2,224

15,092

7,650

20,960

1,481

1,506

382

3,068

464

2009

Yellowfin

1,387

121

197

6,800

2,564

583

18,221

14,885

9,312

120

487

725

2,714

484

Bigeye

726

217

11,565

689

1,395

4,000

17,149

15,239

381

253

610

128

Albacore

1,523

1,551

20,149

7,166

24,550

1,608

1,649

147

422

3,865

906

2,010

Yellowfin

1,359

279

215

2,356

1,875

406

14,041

16,255

7,644

117

505

398

2,147

484

3,197

22,234

931

788

386

75,684

Bigeye

458

126

8,895

456

899

1,221

12,051

13,914

257

131

433

412

11,996

4,067

2,060

108

57,789

Albacore

745

1,536

16,790

4,119

24,498

1,337

1,939

456

3,572

883

7,966

124

14,795

4,273

12,293

2,529

98,098

227

18,654

1,450

799

264

67,661

117

14,295

4,562

1,651

128

75,370

414

11,027

4,334

8,804

2,113

82,856

341

16,668

1,473

967

305

62,982

129

14,760

5,599

2,122

101

73,957

390

10,918

5,426

8,388

3,113

80,030

291

16,418

1,169

539

317

62,758

15,300

4,781

860

106

78,230

220

7,015

3,848

5,582

2,342

73,206

109

17,895

827

514

412

78,387

13,338

3,990

1,300

117

71,344

124

11,166

4,063

7,992

2,816

89,843

Source: SPC.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 117

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DG MARE 2011/01/Lot 3 - SC1

KIR95R01E1

Appendix H: Purse seine and longline catches in Kiribati EEZ by nationality, 2007 to 2010 (tonnes)

2007

Purse

seine

flag_id

China

Ecuador

FSM

Japan

Kiribati

Korea

Marshall Is

New

Zealand

PNG

El Salvador

Tuvalu

Taiwan

USA

Vanuatu

Grand Total

Longline

flag_id

China

Japan

Kiribati

Korea

Taiwan

Vanuatu

Grand Total

Bigeye

1,844

1,240

617

1,111

271

206

236

195

981

224

6,979

Yellowfin

683

987

150

492

11,451

1,979

865

3,296

391

1,417

3,091

1,395

26,253

2007

Bigeye

3,935

508

535

5,045

Skipjack

321

4,616

1,906

1,919

620

45,589

25,289

7,474

9,379

1,576

10,303

18,980

9,471

137,528

Bigeye

3,915

2,628

1,176

107

209

389

899

563

1,204

331

11,616

2008

Yellowfin

2,241

1,674

2,260

494

3,594

26,068

2,055

1,281

6,552

325

8,885

17,513

4,303

77,246

2008

Bigeye

3,304

727

220

4,307

Skipjack

1,186

14,637

12,420

1,299

1,421

38,958

5,145

2,395

12,324

6,593

10,816

26,749

4,929

138,871

Bigeye

542

1,447

154

170

865

793

266

1,360

507

2,110

122

8,482

2009

Yellowfin

351

1,837

137

542

357

5,902

690

199

2,040

455

181

2,220

5,244

493

20,737

2009

Bigeye

1,063

2,400

429

422

4,375

Skipjack

1,800

2,451

9,522

1,455

2,310

2,905

85,925

17,769

6,284

23,772

4,249

2,317

35,332

80,146

14,643

290,879

Bigeye

1,620

2,150

1,971

755

702

366

668

597

1,303

10,325

2010

Yellowfin

138

773

2,286

332

1,986

11,486

1,842

234

2,728

447

2,891

5,621

232

31,030

2010

Bigeye

2,400

262

2,707

Skipjack

1,073

3,640

11,281

1,607

8,203

41,140

17,039

4,874

16,741

3,152

1,966

23,174

57,797

4,835

196,542

Alabacore

186

362

239

787

Yellowfin

2,951

170

117

3,264

Alabacore

124

239

Yellowfin

1,654

173

1,884

Alabacore

128

342

599

Yellowfin

313

1,366

143

1,952

Alabacore

128

404

633

Yellowfin

1,366

1,458

Source: SPC.

Consortium: COFREPECHE (leader) – MRAG – NFDS – POSEIDON

Page 118

Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts of a future protocol

Final Report – final version