----Oprindelig meddelelse----

Fra: Ante Wessels [mailto:ante@ffii.org]

Sendt: 14. oktober 2011 10:33

Til: Signe Riis Andersen

Emne: FFII urges EP Civil Liberties Committee to formulate opinion on

ACTA

Dear Members of Cosac, Dear Permanent Representatives,

Please find below an FFII letter to the European Parliament Civil Liberties Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Ante Wessels

__

Dear Members of the Civil Liberties Committee,

In the coming months, the Parliament will have to take a decision on whether to

give consent to ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement). Research has shown

serious fundamental rights issues. We call upon you to formulate an opinion on $\ensuremath{\mathsf{ACTA}}\xspace.$

A group of prominent European academics published an opinion on ACTA. They conclude

that certain ACTA provisions are not entirely compatible with EU law and will

directly or indirectly require additional action on the EU level. They invite "the $\!\!\!$

European institutions, in particular the European Parliament, and the $\operatorname{national}$

legislators and governments, to carefully consider the above mentioned points and.

as long as significant deviations from the EU acquis or serious concerns on $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CP}}$

fundamental rights, data protection, and a fair balance of interests are not

properly addressed, to withhold consent." [1]

An INTA Committee commissioned study acknowledges deviations from EU law. The study $\ensuremath{\mathsf{E}}$

concludes: "There does not therefore appear to be any immediate benefit from $\ensuremath{\mathsf{ACTA}}$

for EU citizens". [2]

The Greens $\/$ EFA group commissioned two studies, on ACTA and Access to Medicines

[3] and on the compatibility of ACTA with the European Convention on Human Rights $\ensuremath{\text{\ensuremath{\text{G}}}}$

the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [4]. The second study was written by Professor

Douwe Korff, London Metropolitan University, and Ian Brown, Senior Research Fellow,

Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, both fundamental rights experts.

In their opinion, ACTA is incompatible with fundamental European human rights

instruments and standards. Below we attach the Summary & conclusions of this study.

If after careful considerations doubts still exist, we believe Parliament should

ask the European Court of Justice an opinion on the delicate issue of ${\tt ACTA's}$

compatibility with fundamental European human rights instruments and standards.

Only the Court may decisively resolve the uncertainties.

Yours sincerely,

Ante Wessels

Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure

Attachment

SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

ACTA was negotiated in unwarranted secrecy, without adequate input from civil

society or parliamentarians, but in close cooperation with major IP right holders.

Not surprisingly, this resulted in a text that gives disproportionate protection to

big business; fails to level the playing field between developed and developing $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$

nations in international trade relations; hampers innovation (especially by ${\tt SMEs}$);

fails to promote grassroots culture; and could impede the dissemination of

knowledge for people across the world (and access to health care and generic medicines).

Human rights were effective ignored, apart from the inclusion in the Agreement of

vague and ineffective without prejudice clauses that fail to redress the balance,

and are little more than fig-leaves. The inclusion of a detailed provision on the $\,$

need to respect human rights in the protection of IPR, on the lines of the 138

Amendment to Directive 2002/21/EC, was rejected as not needed .

This was wrong. Our analysis shows that ACTA, as currently drafted, seriously

threatens fundamental rights in the EU and in other countries, at various levels.

Specifically:

THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION:

Re Application of ACTA to trivial or small-scale, not-for-profit technical

infringements of IP rights, and to the dissemination of IP-protected information

without the agreement of the right holder where this is justified on higher public

interest grounds:

Article 23 ACTA requires State parties to lower the criminal threshold for IPR $\,$

infringements, and to widen the scope of the criminal offences, without a de

minimis exception;

Without such an exception and/or similar exceptions on the lines of the U.S. fair

use and fair comment rules, IPR enforcement will disproportionately restrict the

freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas;

Since a de minimis exception can be seen as a limitation on procedural matters $\$

rather than on the substance of IP rights, this is not remedied by the fact that

ACTA allows States to retain substantive exceptions to IP law;

In our opinion, an explicit de minimis rule and an explicit public interest defence

are the minimum that are required to bring Article 23 in accordance with the

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).

Re Application of ACTA to evasion of Digital Rights Management systems:

ACTA too easily assumes that right holders $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$

right holders can impose whatever kinds of DRM restrictions they like, and that

these are always lawful in terms of contract- and consumer law, no matter how

draconian.

In our opinion, in specific contexts, this will not be right, and this approach

therefore unduly and disproportionally restricts access to information, or the free

dissemination of information, in violation of Article 10 ECHR and Article $11\ \text{CFR}$.

Re Three strikes and extended ISP liability:

the revised, final text of Article 27.1 $\,$ 3. ACTA no longer requires States to

adopt the kind of draconian measures excessive ISP liability, three strike

rules, etc. that were clearly originally in the minds of the drafters, and that

the European Data Protection Superviser (EDPS) has shown to be clearly incompatible

with European human rights and data protection law;

However, it still suffers from some of the same defects as the criminal enforcement provision mentioned above. Article 27 is still excessively vague; it

encourages non-EU States to adopt such human rights-unfriendly measures in support

of mainly U.S. and EU corporations, who could not rely on such measures in their

own regions; and it could still be misread or misconstrued by EU States to adopt such measures.

In our opinion, without clear stipulations that require States that sign up to the

Agreement not to allow private-sector-imposed three strike rules and not to

impose excessive ISP liability in respect of IPR infringements, ACTA fails to

ensure that it will be applied (by EU and non-EU States) in accordance with

European and international human rights standards.

THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA:

Articles 11 and 27(4) allow for the following:

the surreptitious monitoring of the Internet use of millions of individuals without

any concrete suspicion of illegality, and the systematic recording and analyses of $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\}$

information on their Internet use;

the disclosure of the information gleaned from such surveillance to right holders,

even though it may be wildly unreliable as an indicator of illegality, without any

real safeguards to ensure that only information is disclosed which seriously

suggests widespread infringement by identified individuals;

on the basis of completely unclear standards (essentially, mere claims by right holders);

by judicial and other authorities, i.e. also by authorities that are neither

independent nor impartial in these respects;

across borders, including from EU Member States with strict data protection laws to

 ${\tt non-EU}$ Member States with inadequate data protection laws (or no data protection

laws at all); and

in proceedings to which the individuals do not have access, and in which they are

not heard (inaudita altera parte).

The above-mentioned suspicionless monitoring and disclosures of unreliable but

sensitive personal data are incompatible with European human rights and data

protection law, except under very stringent conditions, as outlined in our Opinion

with reference to the Opinion of the EDPS, which include:

limiting such monitoring to clear cases of major IPR infringements , and even $\ensuremath{\mathsf{E}}$

then only subject to a prior check by the relevant national data protection authority;

limiting transborder disclosures to right holders and law enforcement agencies in

non-EU countries that ensure adequate protection of the received data, but in

either case again only subject to such a prior check;

imposing serious checks on the validity of non-EU personal data disclosure orders,

and on assurances of limiting the use of the data by the non-EU recipient to the

purpose of the disclosure (which is not properly ensured by \mbox{ACTA} , in spite of

phrases suggesting this).

In our opinion, the absence of such stringent conditions in ACTA means that the $\,$

Agreement in these respects is incompatible with the ECHR, the CFR, and European $\,$

data protection rules.

FAIR TRIAL/DUE PROCESS ISSUES RELATED TO OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:

Re Criminal law enforcement of IPR under ACTA:

In our opinion, ACTA, by not including a de minimis exception to its compulsory and

draconian enforcement regime, fails to ensure adequate protection of the right to

freedom to obtain and disseminate information, the right to freedom from unreasonable search and arrest, the right to inviolability of the home, and the

right to the peaceful enjoyment of one s possessions, and thus violates those rights.

Re Civil-law enforcement of IPR under ACTA (including injunctions, provisional

measures, and the awarding of damages):

In our opinion, without clear provisions stressing that injunctions should be the

exception, and inaudita proceedings the high exception, and that for both, there

must be strong counterbalancing safeguards to preserve the equality of arms in

IPR enforcement proceedings, ACTA is incompatible with the $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$

in the ECHR and the CFR.

Re Privatisation of IPR law under ACTA

Rather than contributing to the upholding of freedom of expression and due process

rights by the dominant, private-sector players on the Internet, ACTA erodes the

development of the Rule of Law in that realm. It encourages the regulation of human $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$

rights-sensitive matters by private entities, outside the formal frameworks, and

without ensuring compliance with off-line human rights standards.

This privatisation of the IPR regime therefore, in effect, deprives individuals

from their right to have crucial issues of Internet freedom properly adjudicated in $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$

proceedings that meet all the requirements of Article 6 ECHR/Article 47 $\,$ CFR.

Overall, ACTA tilts the balance of IPR protection manifestly unfairly towards one

group of beneficiaries of the right to property, IP right holders, and unfairly

against others. It equally disproportionately interferes with a range of other

fundamental rights, and provides or allows for the determination of such rights in

procedures that fail to allow for the taking into account of the different,

competing interests, but rather, stack all the weight at one end.

This makes the entire Agreement, in our opinion, incompatible with fundamental European human rights instruments and -standards.

Douwe Korff & Ian Brown

Cambridge/London Oxford

8 October 2011

(The study is issued under a CC-BY-SA License)

- [1] Opinion European Academics on ACTA: http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/acta-1668.html
- [2] EP INTA study http://acta.ffii.org/?p=681
- [3] ACTA and Access to Medicines http://rfc.act-on-acta.eu/access-to-medicine
- [4] Opinion on the compatibility of ACTA with the European Convention on Human Rights & the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights http://rfc.act-on-acta.eu/fundamental-rights