EUU, Alm.del - 2011-12 - Bilag 33: COSAC-sekretariatets 16. halvårlige rapport

Table of ContentsBACKGROUND........................................................................................................................ 4ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................... 5CHAPTER 1: MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE 2020STRATEGY............................................................................................................................. 111.1 Involvement of Parliaments in establishing the position of their Governments ................ 111.1.1 Scope of parliamentary scrutiny, procedures ............................................................ 121.1.2 Future involvement of national Parliaments ............................................................. 141.2 Proposal to shorten the duration of the MFF from seven to five years ............................. 151.3 Proposal to reduce the GNI-based contributions of Member States to the EU budget ...... 161.4 New system of EU own resources................................................................................... 181.4.1 EU own resources .................................................................................................... 181.4.2 Financial Transaction Tax ........................................................................................ 201.5 Support for the Europe 2020 Project Bond initiative ....................................................... 211.6 Implementation of the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy through the MFF 2014-2020... 221.7 Structure of EU budgetary expenditure in the MFF 2014-2020 ....................................... 231.7.1 Transfer of funds from Sub-heading 1b to Sub-heading 1a ....................................... 241.8 Unspent EU funds........................................................................................................... 24CHAPTER 2: TWO YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY OFLISBON - PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE ...................................................................... 262.1 Reasoned opinions .......................................................................................................... 262.1.1 Reasoned opinions adopted since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon .......... 262.1.2 Publication of reasoned opinions on IPEX................................................................ 312.1.3 Replies from the European Commission on reasoned opinions ................................. 322.1.4 Quality of the Commission’s replies to reasoned opinions........................................ 332.1.5 Dealing with the Commission's replies in national Parliaments................................. 332.1.6 Reflection of reasoned opinions in EU draft legislative acts ..................................... 342.1.7 Continued dialogue with the Commission after receiving its replies ......................... 352.1.8 Sufficiency of the eight-week period for the evaluation of EU draft legislative acts.. 352.1.9 Lack of a legal basis and lack of (or insufficient) subsidiarity justification ............... 372.1.10 Impact assessments of EU draft legislative acts ...................................................... 412.1.11 Internal subsidiarity control mechanisms of national Parliaments ........................... 462.1.12 Treatment of reasoned opinions and contributions by the European Parliament ...... 492.1.13 Reasoned opinions and contributions in documents of the European Parliament..... 512.2 Informal political dialogue.............................................................................................. 522.2.1 Number of contributions sent to the Commission ..................................................... 522.2.2 The Commission's replies to contributions ............................................................... 532.2.3 Quality of the Commission’s replies to the contributions.......................................... 542.2.4 Dealing with the Commission's replies in national Parliaments................................. 542.2.5 Further informal political dialogue after receiving Commission's replies .................. 552.3 Parliamentary scrutiny and delegated acts under Article 290 of the TFEU ...................... 552.3.1 Opinions on proposals that provide for delegated acts .............................................. 552.3.2 Possible cooperation with the EU institutions for monitoring delegated acts............. 60

ABSTRACTCHAPTER 1: MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE 2020STRATEGYAbouthalfof the national Parliaments/Chambers havenot yet discussedthe differentaspects ofthe Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020(hereinafter referred to as "the MFF").However, a majority of the Parliaments/Chambers expect the MFF to be on the agenda of theirrespective Committees on EU Affairsduring the autumn session of 2011.So far, the MFF hasbeen mainly discussed in theCommittees on EU Affairs,sometimes injoint meetings withother competent committees,to which Government representatives have been invited. SomeParliaments/Chambers have organisedpublic hearingsandmeetings with Members of theEuropean CommissionandMembers of the European Parliament.The issue of the MFF hasalso been dealt with in a number of parliamentaryreports.Most Parliaments/Chambers areagainstthe proposal to shorten the duration of the MFF. It isargued that the presentseven-year period guarantees long-term consistency and stability,while a five-year period would jeopardize the sustainability of the EU planning process withpotential disadvantages outweighing possible benefits. Proponents of the five-year period,including the European Parliament, advocate that it wouldmatch the tenureof the EuropeanParliament and of the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"), thusincreasingdemocratic responsibility, accountability and legitimacy.The proposal to reduce GNI-based contributions of Member States to the EU budget has notbeen thoroughly considered by the majority of Parliaments/Chambers, although theprevailingviewis in favour ofpreserving the present levelof GNI-based contributions.As far as the question of thenew system of EU own resourcesis concerned,a quarterofParliaments/Chambers areagainstintroducing new taxes, some of them underlining that the taxpolicy is an area of sovereign competence of the Member States. The Financial Transaction Tax(hereinafter referred to as "the FTT") is viewed by some Parliaments/Chambers as atool ofgenerating significant fiscal revenues.Other Parliaments/Chambers oppose the measurefearing that the introduction of the FTT might drive investors towards countries with more liberaltax regimes.Amajorityof the Parliaments/Chambers that have discussedthe Europe 2020 Project Bondinitiative believe it isa good idea.This is, however, not without reservations. Several of themwarn that the initiative of attracting private sector financing for the promotion of individualinfrastructure projects mustnot lead to the need for the EU to provide additional fundsbeyond what was originally allocated to the project.There is aconsensusamong Parliaments/Chambers which have already discussed the issue thatthe MFF should allow forthe full implementation of the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy.A majority of Parliaments/Chambers do, however, argue that the focus on the goals of theEurope 2020 Strategy in the MFF should be balanced with other EU priorities and theindividualsituation of Member States.

Concerning the Commission's proposed structure of the EU budgetary expenditure in the MFF,themajorityof Parliaments/Chambers, which have discussed the subject, donot think it issufficiently specificas it combines several different policy areas under one general heading.Furthermore,the lack of a special heading for cohesionis acommon concernof themajorityof Parliaments/Chambers.Balanceis again thekey focusfor Parliaments/Chambers which have discussed the issue oftransferring funds from Sub-heading 1b (Cohesion for growth and employment) to Sub-heading1a (Competitiveness). Although themajorityof Parliaments/Chambers that have replied donotsupport the suggestion,several point out that it is a matter of striking the right balance betweenthe two areas, thus combiningefficiency and solidarity.With regard to the question ofunspent EU funds being used as EU own resources,themajority of Parliaments/Chambers have yet to discuss the issue. However,more than halfof theremaining Parliaments/Chambersdo not supportthe suggestion that unspent EU funds shouldbe used in future accounting periods as EU own resources instead of following the currentpractice where the unspent funds are returned to the Member States.CHAPTER 2: TWO YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY OFLISBON - PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCESince the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amajorityof national Parliaments/Chambers,i.e.29,haveadopted at least one reasoned opinion.Out of40national Parliaments/Chamberselevenhavenot adoptedany reasoned opinion yet.Thelargest number of reasoned opinions,i.e.eight,has been adopted by thePolishSenat.The most frequently contested draft legislative actswith regard to their compliance with theprinciple of subsidiarity are the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common ConsolidatedCorporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)121)and the proposal for a Directive of theEuropean Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-countrynationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM(2010)379). NinenationalParliaments/Chambers issuedreasoned opinionson these draft legislative acts.Most national Parliaments/Chambers indicate that the Commissionreplies to all reasonedopinions.As to the Commission’s self-imposedthree-month time-limitfor replying to reasoned opinions,national Parliaments/Chambers indicate that usually the time-limit isnot respected.Fromamong 19 Parliaments/Chambers that have adopted reasoned opinion at least three months beforethe deadline for the replies to the questionnaire for this report1, amajority(i.e.13)note that thethree-month deadline wasnot metin at least one case. In some cases, nationalParliaments/Chambers have had towaitfor the Commission's replyfor four to six months.FourParliaments/Chambers aresatisfiedwith the quality of the Commission's replies, withoutany reservations. Some Parliaments/Chambers note that the quality of replies hasnot (yet) been

debated.However, several national Parliaments/Chambers arecriticalof the quality of thereplies believing them to betoo short and too general.The practices of dealing with the Commission's replies in national Parliaments/Chambers vary.Out of 40 national Parliaments/Chambers,17responded with their experience and practices. Forinstance, infourParliaments/Chambers information on the replies is provided only to theCommittees on EU Affairsand/or other relevantspecialised committees.The group ofrecipients of the Commission's replies is sometimes wider, including staff of political groups.Several Parliaments/Chambers state that theypublishthe replies on theirwebsites,print them asofficial documents, include them inweekly reportson documents received from theCommission or make them available in theirlibraries.The issue of howreasoned opinionsare reflected in the content of EU draft legislative acts isdifficult to examine at this stage because of thelimited available material.Nevertheless,twonational Parliaments/Chambers findpotential reflectionof their reasoned opinions in one draftlegislative act, i.e. in the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Councilon Deposit Guarantee Schemes COM(2010) 368.None of the 40national Parliaments/Chambers state that they havecontinued dialoguewith theCommission after receiving the Commission's replies to their reasoned opinions.Parliaments/Chambersare dividedon the issue of thesufficiency of the eight-week periodforthe assessment of the compliance of EU draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarityaccording to Protocol 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality ofthe Treaty of Lisbon (hereinafter referred to as "Protocol 2").TenParliaments/Chambersaresatisfiedwith the time-frame of Protocol 2,14although generally satisfied, have variousreservations, tenfind itinsufficient or problematicand the remaining five provide generalcomments without taking a formal position. The 24 Parliaments/Chambers which voicereservations and general dissatisfaction with the eight-week period as (potentially) too shortpoint out theneed to verify other aspectsof draft legislative acts, such as their compliance withthe principle of proportionality, adequacy of the legal basis and substantive provisions as well asthe time needed to comply with internal procedural requirements, such as the need to hearopinions of specialised committees or to have reasoned opinions voted in the plenary.Almost halfof the national Parliaments/Chambers (i.e.16 out of 33)which have sent in theirreplies, indicate that they havefound the lack of a legal basisand/orlack of (or insufficient)subsidiarity justificationto be aninfringementof the principle of subsidiarity and have as aconsequence adoptedreasoned opinions.A significant numberof national Parliaments/Chambers (i.e.17)comment on the consequencesof thelack of or insufficient justificationof draft legislative acts with regard to the principle ofsubsidiarity. They point out that it is theobligation of the initiatorof an EU draft legislative act,in most cases,the Commissionto produce proper justification of the acts in compliance with therequirements of Article 5 of Protocol 2, in particular a detailed statement, including anassessment of a financial impact and implications for national rules. On numerous occasionsParliaments/Chambers havecriticised the justification as insufficient, lacking in substance, orabsent all together.As to theCommission's impact assessments,Parliaments/Chambers generally consider themuseful and necessaryfor the parliamentary scrutiny of EU draft legislative acts. However,12

Parliaments/Chambers voicecriticismwith regard to thequalityof the impact assessments, attimes finding themschematic and lacking in substance,whilefourParliaments/Chambersvoiceconcernswith theirindependent nature,advocating,inter alia,the independence of theCommission's Impact Assessment Board.Furthermore,more than a halfof Parliaments/Chambers (i.e. 15 out of 24) that have expressedtheir views on the subject are of the opinion that thefull text of impact assessments should betranslated into all official languages of the EU.A further nine Parliaments/Chambers seelimited or no added value in this exercise.Out of 39national Parliaments/Chambers which have replied to the question on the amendmentsto their internal subsidiarity control mechanisms,20 consider them satisfactory.An equalnumber of Parliaments/Chambers report that such amendments have been introduced due to thenew role of national Parliaments in the EU enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. This Bi-annualReport details several examples of such amendments.Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, theEuropean Parliament amended itsRules of Procedurein order to implement the new mechanism under Protocol 2 andset up aninternal procedure for dealing with reasoned opinions and contributionsfrom nationalParliaments. According to the European Parliament'sdefinitions"reasoned opinions" aresubmissions of national Parliaments on the non-compliance of a draft legislative act with theprinciple of subsidiarity that are communicated to the European Parliament within the eight weekdeadline referred to in Article 6 of Protocol 2, while "contributions" are any other submissionswhich do not fulfil the criteria for a reasoned opinion.Upon receipt, allreasoned opinionsare referred to the committee(s) responsible for the draftlegislative act and forwarded to the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), which examines themand has themtranslated into all official languages of the EU.Reasoned opinions aredistributed to all Members of the competent committees,areincluded in the filefor thecommittee meeting andpublished on the committee website pageunder the heading "meetingdocuments". Furthermore,the text of draft legislative resolutions must make reference to anyreasoned opinions receivedin relation to their subject matter. In its reply to the questionnairefor the 16th Bi-annual Report the European Parliament also gives a detailed account of theprocedureto be followed in case the requisite "yellowcard" and "orange card"thresholds arereached.Upon receipt,contributions- which may also be submissions which positively assess a givenlegislative proposal's compliance with the principle of subsidiarity - arereferred to thecommittee(s) of the European Parliament that is responsiblefor the file. Transmission to therelevant committees is done by the Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments.Committee secretariats are then responsible for the transmission of contributionsto therespective committee Chairs and/or rapporteurswho may request translation.Furthermore, the European Parliament's Directorate for Relations with National Parliamentscirculates to all committee secretariats, political groups and any other interested EuropeanParliament services amonthly summary tableand an explanatory noteoutlining the reasonedopinions and contributionsof national Parliaments received during the preceding month. TheConference of Committee Chairs receives these documents for information.

It is noteworthy that the European Parliament is theonly EU institution to translate all reasonedopinions(and potentially contributions)in all EU official languages,thus allowing its Membersto fully take into account the views expressed by national Parliaments. The European Parliamentunderlines that itslegislative reports systematically make reference to reasoned opinionsreceivedin the context of Protocol 2 and gives four recent examples.Theinformal political dialogue(also known as "the Barroso initiative") was launched in 2006with the aim of encouraging national Parliaments to express their opinions on the Commission'sinitiatives not only in relation to the principles of subsidiarity but also in a more general way. Thistool has been in use ever since and its use is on the increase since the entry into force of the Treatyof Lisbon, as the Annual Report 2010 from the Commission on relations between the EuropeanCommission and national Parliaments confirms. Theactivityof Parliaments/Chambers within theframework of the informal political dialogue, however,greatly differs,with the number ofcontributions ranging from 0 to 220.NineParliaments/Chambers havenot yet usedthisopportunity.The number of the Commission's replies to the contributions of national Parliaments/Chambersdoes not coincide with the number of submitted contributions. Thehighest number of replieshas been given to the CzechSenát,i.e. 32 replies to its 52 contributions.Concerning thequalityof the replies of the Commission,the majorityof Parliaments/Chambersconsider themsatisfactory. A groupof Parliaments/Chambers finds themtoo generalor reportthat sometimes they aresent too late.In most cases, the Commission's replies to the contributions submitted within the framework ofthe informal political dialogue aredealt with in the same manner as the responses toreasoned opinionsunder Protocol 2. In addition to being distributed to the Members of theCommittees on EU Affairs they are sometimes sent to competent specialised committees andpublished on the websites of respective Parliaments/Chambers as well.Out of the large majority of Parliaments/Chambers that have replied to the questionnaire manyhave not (yet) discussed the issue or have not (yet) adopted an officialpositionon delegatedacts.Core elements of concernfor numerous Parliaments/Chambers are the potentialexcessiveuseof delegated acts, possiblescrutiny problems,the difficulty todefine and assess non-essential elements,and the possibleweakening of national Parliamentsas a result of theimproper application of Article 290 of the TFEU. A few Parliaments/Chambers highlight themonitoring role of theEU legislator,referring to the Common Understanding between theCommission, the European Parliament and the Council. Four Parliaments/Chambers refer to theirresolutionsin which they have voiced their concerns.In a few Parliaments/Chambers specificconcerns related to the actual subjectof delegatedacts have not yet been raised. Numerous Parliaments/Chambers voice their concerns, often inresolutions, reasoned opinions or other documents, and include examples, e.g. on the Citizens'Initiative regulation. Several Parliaments/Chambers insist that delegation of power to theCommission should be "kept to a strict minimum".On the issue of the adequatedescription of essential featuresof delegated acts only a handfulof Parliaments/Chambers have not yet identified problems. Others address a range ofissues thatare of concern,such as the lack of sufficient evidence toproof the needto resort to delegated

acts, thevaguenature of the objectives, theimprecisedescription of the content, the presence ofessential elementsin delegated acts, theinsufficiently explicitdefinition of the scope and theindeterminate periodof delegation of power to the Commission compounded by the narrowtime frame for EU legislators to react.Views on whether and how to cooperate with EU institutions range fromprudencetosupportfor the idea. Some Parliaments/Chambers donotconsider itas a first optionor state that the EUlegislators and finally the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as "theCourt of Justice") have a specific role to secure uniform application of the criteria. OtherParliaments/Chambers urgecloser cooperation between governments and nationalParliamentsor see,inter alia,reasoned opinionsand thepolitical dialogueas useful tools.Several Parliaments/Chambers say that they aregenerally open to (informal) cooperationand/or find it(very) useful,most of them without going into detail.Cooperation with theEuropean Parliamentin particular is advocated byfourParliaments/Chambers, while theEuropean Parliament itself willassess the Common Understandingwith the Commission andthe Council one year after it became operational and possibly initiate a revision of it.

With the publication of the Commission’s proposal on the MFF on 29 June 2011, a debate hasstarted.One of the aims of the 16th Bi-annual Report is to assess the present and future role of nationalParliaments as regards cooperation with and scrutiny of their governments throughout theprocess of developing the new MFF in view of the targets outlined in the Europe 2020 Strategy.Contrary to common hopes and expectations the European economic and financial crisis has notbeen fully overcome. Growing economic disparities between Member States and a lack ofappropriate measures to remedy this situation lead to controversial views, such as the need tobuild a multiple-speed Europe. Attempts to save the euro area by rationalising the EU budgetaryspending at the expense of the cohesion policy provoke unnecessary divisions within theEuropean Union. In principle, the successive EU budgets have been adjusted to their respectivegoals. Therefore, the new financial framework should make it possible to finance all theobjectives set in the Europe 2020 Strategy, including the consolidation of the EU’s internalmarket.Given the serious challenges currently facing the EU, it would be advisable to define the role andpowers of national Parliaments and the European Parliament in co-creating and scrutinising keyEU policies in the post-Lisbon era. This would require a concerted action by all decision-makers,both at the national and the EU level. European solidarity, which is one of the corner stones oftoday’s European Union, requires the achievement, without delay, of a broad consensus on thefull involvement of national Parliaments and the European Parliament in the EU governanceprocess, especially in order to prevent further global crises.

1.1.1 Scope of parliamentary scrutiny, proceduresParliaments/Chambers have been mainly involved in the work on the MFF through theirrespective Committees on EU Affairswhich sometimes closely cooperate withotherspecialised committees in organisingdebates, joint committee meetings, at times with theparticipation of Government representatives.The EU Affairs Committee of the EstonianRiigikoguconsidered the future MFF as early on as 9April and 26 November 2010 in meetings attended by the Minister of Finance. Also, the GermanBundestagdiscussed different aspects of the MFF with the federal Government. The GermanBundesratadopted detailed opinions on the Commission Communication "Reforming thebudget, changing Europe"4on 14 March 2008 and on the Communication "The EU BudgetReview"5on 17 December 2010. The Federal Government was required to take these opinionsinto account inestablishing its negotiating position.The Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Budget of the ItalianCamera deiDeputatistarted a jointscrutinyof the Commission proposal on the MFF on 27 July 2011. On28 July 2011, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported on the MFF to a joint meeting of theCommittees on Budget, the Committees on EU Policies and the Committees on Foreign Affairsof the ItalianCamera dei DeputatiandSenato della Repubblica.The ItalianCamera dei Deputatiexpressed some general views on the revision of the EU budgetin its resolution, approved on 13 July 2010, in which it urged the Government to,inter alia,ensure that during the negotiations on the MFF the relationship between the EU policy prioritiesand theirspending is clearly and transparently defined,and reaffirm theprinciple ofsolidarityand parity among Member States, as well as securing an amount of resourcesconsiderably higher than the one envisaged in the MFF for 2007-2013, while maintaining thefunding for cohesion policies at the level envisaged in the current MFF.The Committee on European Affairs of the LatvianSaeimagives a mandate to the Governmenton all Latvia’s official positions on EU matters. In this case, the first position of the committeewas adopted on 28 July 2011. Moreover, theSaeimain its extraordinary plenary sitting of 14July 2011 adopted statements on "the Equitable Common Agricultural Policy of the EU after2013" and on "the EU Budget Financing for Reducing Social and Economic Disparities after2013".The Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on National Economy of the PolishSenatwere briefed by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry ofNational Economy on 27 July 2011 on the subject of "the Real and Potential Sources of Financefor the Europe 2020 Strategy Goals in the Context of Proposals for the MFF 2014-2020". TheCommittee on EU Affairs of the PolishSenatcooperates with competent ministers within theframework of the MFF. The Committee on European Affairs, the Committee on Local Self-Government and the Regional Committee of the PolishSejmheld a joint meeting during whichthey approved the Government's information on the future of the cohesion policy and the newMFF in connection with the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,45

the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions andthe European Investment Bank Conclusions of the fifth report on economic, social and territorialcohesion: the future of cohesion policy6. On 16 February 2011 the Committee on EuropeanAffairs of the DutchTweede Kamerheld a publicvideoconference with the Dutch Members ofthe European Parliamentfrominter aliathe Special Committee on policy challenges andbudgetary resources for a sustainable European Union after 2013 (SURE)7, during which,interalia,the possibility of new EU taxes and the Dutch position on 1 billion euro extra rebate werediscussed.Similarly, on July 7 2011, the Committee on European Affairs of the GreekVouli ton Ellinonheld a meeting on this topic. The alternate minister for Foreign Affairs, competent for EuropeanAffairs gave an account of the Government's first reactions to the Commission’s proposals, itspositions and envisaged steps. The Committee on European Affairs also held a joint meetingwith the Committee for Trade and Production, which focused on the MFF of the commonagricultural policy.On 23 May 2011, the Austrian Parliament held apublic hearingwith Governmentrepresentatives, experts and stakeholders on the future of the common agricultural policy, theresults of which were debated during the plenary session of both theNationalratandBundesratin June 2011. Moreover, the European Affairs Committees of theNationalratandBundesratintend to discuss the Commission’s proposal on the MFF in September 2011, and may decide onthe Austrian position which will be binding on the Government.A few Parliaments/Chambers organizedmeetingson the future MFFwith Members of theCommission.On 3 March 2011 the Committee on EU Affairs of the PolishSejmheld a meetingwith the Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget Mr Janusz LEWANDOWSKI onthe Commission Communication on the EU Budget Review8. In addition, on 1 April 2011, theEU Affairs Committee, the Committee on Economy and the Committee on EnvironmentProtection, Natural Resources and Forestry of the PolishSejmheld a joint meeting with theCommissioner for Climate Action Ms Connie HEDEGAARD. In June 2011, the Committees onEuropean Affairs of the RomanianCamera DeputaţilorandSenatulin a joint meeting with theCommissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development Mr Dacian CIOLOŞ discussed the futureMFF. Also, the ItalianCamera dei Deputatidecided to hold a meeting with Commissioner MrJanusz LEWANDOWSKI.The DanishFolketing,for its part, reports that there is ageneral agreement among politicalpartiesin Denmark concerning the MFF. Although theFolketinghas not been directly involvedin establishing the position of the Government, the latter will have to obtain a mandate from theEuropean Affairs Committee of theFolketingbefore signing up to the MFF in the Council.In total, eight Parliaments/Chambers haveproduced reports dealing with the MFFor will doso in future. On 5 April 2011, the EU Select Committee of the UKHouse of Lordspublished thereport "EU Financial Framework from 2014"9. On 6 June 2011, the FrenchSénatadopted aninformative report by Mr Fran§ois MARC10. Reports on the MFF were also produced as a resultof the joint hearings on 27 and 29 April 2011 in the BelgianChambre des représentantsand67

Sénat.Another report concerning the meeting held by the Federal Committee on EU Affairs ofthe BelgianChambre des représentantsandSénatwith the Belgian Prime Minister on 26 June2011 dedicated to the results of the Euro- zone summit will be published shortly.The European Parliament with a view to establishing the political priorities for the next MFFcreateda Special Committeeon policy challenges and budgetary resources for a sustainableEuropean Union after 2013 (SURE) which ended its work on 8 June 2011 following the adoptionin the plenary of the resolution on "Investing in the future: a new Multiannual FinancialFramework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe" (rapporteur Mr SalvadorGARRIGA POLLEDO)11.The SpanishCortes Generalesadopted their report on 14 June 2011 after a number of hearingswith the participation of Government ministers and high ranking officials of the EU institutions.The LithuanianSeimasis also drafting a report on the MFF, and an associated review of EUhorizontal policies. The report will be submitted for consideration to theSeimasin the autumnsession of 2011.The reports of the LithuanianSeimasand the SpanishCortes Generalesare prepared byworkinggroupsthat were established by their respective Committees on European Affairs. The workinggroup of the LithuanianSeimasis composed of the Members of the Committee on EuropeanAffairs, the Committee on Rural Affairs and the Committee on Budget and Finance, assisted bythe staff of the Office of theSeimasand invited experts.1.1.2 Future involvement of national ParliamentsAlthoughalmost a quarter ofParliaments/Chambers havenot yet discussed the MFFyet,some of them due to the summer recess, they plan to do so in the future12.Due to the parliamentary recess no official consultation has to date taken place between theHungarianOrszággyűlésand the Government. However, it will oversee the Government’sposition via the scrutiny procedure. The MFF will also be on the agenda of the so-calledConsultation Meeting, during which ahead of the European Council meetings, the Prime Ministerwill present the position of the Government to be represented at the European Council. With theaim of raising public awareness and intensifying parliamentary debates, the HungarianOrszággyűlésis considering organising an"open day" dedicated exclusively to the MFFduring the autumn session.The ItalianSenato della Repubblicahas not been actively involved in establishing theGovernment’s position so far, but it intends to debate the MFF in the framework of its oversightof Government action and as a part of its political dialogue with the Commission.The RomanianSenatulforesees regular meetings with representatives of the Government as ofSeptember 2011. Also the Joint Committee on EU Affairs of the IrishHouses of the Oireachtas

intends to fully engage in consideration of the MFF and will consult with the Government andother stakeholders in the autumn 2011.Debates on the MFF are also foreseen in the CzechPoslanecká sněmovna(on 8 September2011), the LithuanianSeimas(during the autumn session of 2011), in the Committee on Financeof the SwedishRiksdag(in September), the Committee on EU Affairs and the plenary of theSlovenianDržavni zbor(in September 2011), in the BulgarianNarodno sabranie(end ofSeptember), the GermanBundesrat.The Committee on EU Affairs of the GreekVouli tonEllinonwill hold another joint meeting with other committees of joint competence at the end ofSeptember, during which competent ministers will report on developments and progress ofdiscussions.Also, the Committee on European Affairs of the SlovakNárodná radawill continuously dealwith the legislative acts issued within the context of preparation of the MFF after year 2013. Bythe end of the year, the Committee on European Affairs of the FrenchAssemblée nationaleshould present its position in a draft resolution, which will then examined by the Committee onBudget.On 20 September 2011, the Committee on Finances and Budget of the LuxembourgChambredes Députésintends to discuss the Commission’s proposal on the MFF, while on 27 September2011, the Committee on European Affairs of the DutchTweede Kamerwill have a debate withthe Government on how the latter will inform theTweede Kamerabout the course of thenegotiations on the MFF.1.2 Proposal to shorten the duration of the MFF from seven to five yearsAs regards the debate on shortening the duration of the MFF from seven to five years,13Parliaments/Chambers13do not support it,underlining thatstability and long-term planningare necessary preconditionsfor success.The BulgarianNarodno sabranieconsiders that such an idea should becarefully approached,warning that thecoincidence between the general and local elections period(every four years)and the proposed five-year MFF period wouldjeopardise the sustainability of the EUplanning processin the long run. Furthermore, theNarodno sabraniebelieves that a seven-yearMFF rather than a five-year one can facilitate the accomplishment of the goals of the seven-yearEurope 2020 Strategy, and ensures thelong-term consistency and predictability.This view isalso shared by the PolishSejm.The EstonianRiigikoguunderscores that the seven-year period ensures the necessaryfinancialand political stabilityfor planning and investing the funds. The GermanBundesratfinds thatthe seven-year timeframe hasproved effectivefor the Structural Funds programmes and forother programmes funded from the EU budget. The GreekVouli ton Ellinonbelieves that theseven year periodensures flexibilityin the mobilisation of resources.

Furthermore, the GermanBundesratwarns that introducing shorter periods for the MFF wouldunnecessarily increase the effort required to reach agreements and for administration, and wouldrender planning more uncertain. Thesedisadvantages outweigh the possible benefitsof thesynchronising of the MFF with the terms in office of the Commission and the EuropeanParliament.The PolishSenatwarns that shortening the duration of the MFFcould provokeserious problems with the implementation of key EU policies,including the cohesion policy.The RomanianCamera Deputaţilordeems the seven year period asappropriateto the interestsof Romania.The FinnishEduskuntahas reservations about the proposal, noting that five years is too short forlong-term policy cohesion, it wouldprefer a ten-year framework with a mid-term review(the"five + five model").There aretwoParliaments/Chamberssupportingthe proposal. The European Parliament, in theresolution14of the Special Committee on policy challenges and budgetary resources for asustainable European Union after 2013 (SURE)15voted on 8 June 2011, is of the opinion that theduration of the MFF should match the tenure of the European Parliament and theCommission(i.e. five years) in order to ensure democratic accountability, legitimacy andresponsibility. Also the UKHouse of Lordswelcomes and supports the proposal because itwould match the European Parliament and Commission terms in office, making the Europeanelections more meaningful. TheHouse of Lordsalso believes that the less the flexibility withinthe MFF, the shorter it should be "as it would be unwise to lock in austerity for seven or tenyears, and would also be likely to prove unacceptable to the European Parliament".There are Parliaments/Chambers that have nottaken a final position yet16, although some ofthem have had intensive debates17on the issue, sometimes in the presence of Members of theEuropean Parliament, as it was the case of the PortugueseAssembleia da República.TheCommittee on European Affairs of the GermanBundestagdebated this issue at a hearing withlegal experts in May 2011. The CzechSenátnotices that there are strong arguments for bothoptions, the seven-year period ensures medium-term security for all participants in terms ofavailable resources and stable conditions for the drawing of finances, while on the other hand,there is an added value in aligning the length of the MFF with the tenure of the Commission andthe European Parliament. The HungarianOrszággyűlésbelieves that this question should bediscussed in a larger inter-institutional context and supports the European Parliament’s idea oforganizing an inter-parliamentary conference with the participation of national Parliaments. TheSlovenianDržavni zborintends to debate the issue in September 2011.As a general comment, the ItalianSenato della Repubblicabelieves that the MFF should be moreflexible and more swiftly adaptable to the changing economic circumstances in the EU.1.3 Proposal to reduce the GNI-based contributions of Member States to the EU budget

A significant number of 19 Parliaments/Chambers have not debated or reached the final positionon the issue yet18.FiveParliaments/Chambers that have replied to the question on the proposal to reduce the GNI-based contributions of the Member States to the EU budget areagainstthe proposal. Thus, theBulgarianNarodno sabraniewarns that any reduction of the GNI-based contribution to the EUbudget wouldlead to a higher risk of a "two-speed Europe",and keeping GNI as one of themain sources of the own resources system would serve as a guarantee that the actual economicdevelopment of each Member State is being taken into account. TheNarodno sabraniebelievesthat "in order to guarantee that the European Union achieves a high level of convergencebetween the new and old Member States, the long-term trend should be aimed at the reduction ofthe Disposable Personal Income (DPI) gap between them".The CzechPoslanecká sněmovnaprefers the GNI-based contributionsof Member Statesrather than adding other types of sources. It is also in favour of maintaining the actual extent ofthe budget. The DanishFolketingsupports the position of its Government which is againstreducing GNI-based contributions, but is willing to look at specific proposals from theCommission on own resources. The PolishSenatnotices that the new MFF is to be the first oneunder the Treaty of Lisbon, offering the EU new opportunities while also imposing newobligations on it. TheSenatunderlines that the EU budget should bepreserved at least at thepresent level of 1.13% of the GNI-based contributionsof the Members States, to make a realimpact on the Member States’ national policies and their economic situation.The IrishHouses of the Oireachtasbelieve that the 1.05% GNI proposal made by theCommission isbroadly acceptable.The ItalianSenato della Repubblicainforms thatno opinionhas been developed on thisproposal, but stresses thatthe Italian Government has welcomed a gradual and carefullyconsidered reduction of the contribution based on the GNP.It underlines that Italy has beena net contributor to the EU budget for several years, without ever receiving any of thecompensation measures envisaged by the MFF for certain States.In the GreekVouli ton Ellinonthere is a broad agreement that that the old system which isprimarily based on state contributions should bemodernised and enriched with additionaltools and resources.Although the LithuanianSeimashas not expressed its opinion yet, thepreliminary positionoftheSeimaswould be tosupport the increaseof Member States contributions to the EU budget.The additional funds should be allocated for the implementation of the strategic European goals.Also the LatvianSaeimais infavour of increasingthe proportion of the GNI-basedcontributions.The CzechSenátbelieves that the GNI-based component of the EU’s own resources should playa major role in the future financing of the EU, andreplace the current resource based on

VAT, which were overly complicated.Also the LatvianSaeimasupports the Commission’sproposal to revoke the value-added-tax-based contributions.The DutchTweede Kamersupports its Government and believes that the contributions from theMember States to the European Union need to be made more fair and transparent. Preference isgiven to using afixed percentage of the GNIas resource to finance the EU budget. Using theGNI as the basis for contributions is simple and transparent and also ensures a fair distribution ofcontributions across the Member States, namely based on the size of the Member States’economies19.As a general remark, the SpanishCortes Generalesbelieve that the structure of the contributionto the EU Budget should be established on the principles of equity in revenues and transparency.It favours a system of resources based both on GNI, as well as on the EU traditional resources.According to the PolishSejm,it is necessary to provide for financial support to the new policiesintroduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. TheSejmtakes the position that the effective achievement ofthe Europe 2020 goals will be impossible without proper funding guaranteed in the EU budget.The RomanianSenatulwould like the EU Budget to contribute to the reduction of expenses atthe national level.In its resolution on "Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for acompetitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe"20the European Parliament is convinced that theintroduction ofone or several genuine own resources replacing the GNI-based systemisindispensable "if the Union is ever to get the budget it needs to significantly contribute tofinancial stability and economic recovery".1.4 New system of EU own resources1.4.1 EU own resourcesAs for the proposal to introduce a new system of EU own resources i.e. a modernised VATsystem and taxes on, for example, carbon dioxide emissions, air transport, corporate profits,financial transactions or sale of energy carriers, 14 Parliaments/Chambers have not considered orreached a final stance on the issue21or do not have an opinion22.1223Parliaments/Chambers areagainstthe measure. The BulgarianNarodno sabraniebelievesthat new EU taxes would additionally burden the economies and citizens of the Member States.The CzechSenátbelieves that the tax policy is an area of sovereign competence of MemberStates, in which the EU should not interfere, while the CzechPoslanecká sněmovnadoes notsupport setting up new EU own resources and is in favour of traditional EU own resources andGNI-based contributions.1920

The FinnishEduskuntahasreservations,as the various proposals for new own resources do notappear to be very realistic and that own resources imply a lesser degree of political insight by theMember States' political bodies, thereby reducing the democratic legitimacy of the EU budget.The GermanBundestagis unlikely to support a European tax, as the governing coalition partieshave stipulated so in their coalition agreement. The GermanBundesrattakes the stance that thetraditional own resources (in particular customs duties) should continue to accrue to the EU, andrejects the alternative of a tax-based revenue source for own resources. The DutchTweedeKameris not convinced that the introduction of a European tax is desirable. This applies to theproposal to introduce a financial transaction tax (hereinafter referred to as "the FTT"), as well asto the proposed transfer of a part of the nationally collected VAT to the EU budget.The PolishSejm,too, isagainstintroducing any new taxes, which may cause excessive financialburden to the economies of the poorer EU Members. The PolishSenatbelieves that some of theproposed options are unacceptable and underlines that a possible "eurotax" should respect theprinciple of equitable burden-sharing proportional to Member States’ levels of wealth. Inparticular itshould not be based on CO2emissionssince such a solution would hit mostseverely the citizens of the "new" Member States where "power sectors are often coal-reliant".Finally, the UKHouse of Lordsin its report "EU Financial Framework from 2014"24agreed withthe UK Government that the new own resources are an "unfortunate distraction".The LithuanianSeimasgives a detailed account of its position underlining that EU MemberStates themselves should be free to choose the most appropriate measures to reduce greenhousegas emissions. It also stresses that excise tariff review is not necessary for pursuingenvironmental targets, as the introduction of the environmental element would result in the lossof simplicity of the excise system and encumber the administration of the excise duties. It alsowarns that the review would result in the increase of minimum excise tariffs on all energyproducts, with the exception of petrol and energy; thus having a negative impact on thecompetitiveness of many sectors of economy, especially transport and agriculture.There arefourParliaments/Chambersfavouringa new system of EU own resources, or some ofits elements. The Austrian Parliament strongly supports the introduction of the FTT. Although afinal position has not yet been adopted in the RomanianSenatul,favourable opinions concerningthe introduction of new taxes were expressed. Similarly, the European Parliament has beenadvocating a reform of the current system of the EU own resources in recent years25. In theresolution on "Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for acompetitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe", the European Parliament26takes note of thepotential new own resources proposed by the Commission in its Communication on the BudgetReview27(e.g. taxation of the financial sector, auctioning under the greenhouse gas EmissionsTrading System, EU charge related to air transport, VAT, energy tax, corporate income tax) andawaits the conclusions of the impact analysis of these options.

The SlovakNárodná radaagrees on the necessity for a new system of EU own resources andbelieves that the efforts should concentrate on the abolition of the own resource based on theVAT. TheNárodná radaopposes, however, the introduction of a new EU VAT own resource asit infringes the national sovereignty in the area of tax policy.The GreekVouli ton Ellinonviews positively the elimination of the traditional own resourcessystem.There is a number of Parliaments/Chambers that areopento discussing new forms of EU ownresources. The EstonianRiigikoguholds the opinion that the new own resources must fulfil thecriteria of stability and sufficiency. The SlovenianDržavni zborremains open for discussion onnew own resources underlining, however, that neither the proposed FTT nor the VAT have beenclarified. Also the RomanianCamera Deputaţilorremains open to consider the introduction ofnew own resources (FTT, European VAT).Although the HungarianOrszággyűléshas not taken a position yet, it believes that division ofcompetences between the EU institutions and the Member States and the present legal baseprovided by the Treaties should be respected when introducing a new system of own resources.Similarly, the Committee on EU Affairs of the FrenchAssemblée nationalehas not taken aposition yet. It is of note, though, that the Committee held several meetings with Mr AlainLAMASSOURE, the Chairman of the Budget Committee of the European Parliament (BUDG)28.Four Parliaments/Chambers underline the need tosimplifythe current system of own resourcesand make itmore transparent.The BulgarianNarodno sabranieconsiders it too complex atpresent, while the EstonianRiigikoguwants it to be more transparent, a view which is shared bythe European Parliament29. The SlovakNárodná radabelieves that the current system of ownresources isexcessively complex, opaque, lacks fairnessand is finallyincomprehensible tothe European citizens.TheNárodná radabelieves that the process of simplification could startfrom 2014 in the form of the abolition of the own resource based on the VAT.Concerning the modernisation of the VAT system the EstonianRiigikoguisin favour of theelimination of the current VAT-based own fundsand correction mechanisms; this view isshared by the SlovakNárodná rada,while the UKHouse of Lordsis concerned that losing theVAT-based resource should not compromise the UK abatement. The GreekVouli ton Ellinonisin favour of reformed VAT.1.4.2 Financial Transaction TaxThere aresixParliaments/Chamberssupporting the introduction of the FTT.The AustrianParliament strongly supports the introduction of the FTT and believes that, if implemented at theEU level or within the Euro area, the FTT wouldgenerate significant fiscal revenueswithoutnegative side effects on the real economy and would complement the necessary re-regulation offinancial markets. Moreover, it would put an end to unjust privileges of financial actors withregard to taxation and also strengthen citizens’ trust into EU institutions.

On 14 June 2011, the FrenchAssemblée nationaleadopted a resolution on introducing the FTTin Europe30favouring the introduction of the FTTin the European Union, or failing that, inthe Euro zone or by a group of Member States. Nevertheless, this resolution does not tackle thequestion of using the FTT as an own resource of the EU.The RomanianCamera Deputaţilorwarns that the issues related to the FTT will have to becarefully assessed"in order to avoid excessive burdens on the financial sector liable to generatedistortion or delocalisation effects that might postpone a sustainable economic recovery". TheCamera Deputaţilorthinks the FTT "should be enforced homogeneously" in the EU or evenmore broadly at G-20 level. The RomanianSenatul,for its part, thinks that the FTT should beintroduced throughout the EU. The European Parliament takes the view that the FTT "couldconstitute a substantial contribution, by the financial sector, to the economic and social cost ofthe crisis, and could also contribute partially to the financing of the EU budget, as well as tolowering Member States' GNI contributions". It adds that "the Union should also act as anexample in relation to the movement of funds towards fiscal havens". The GreekVouli tonEllinon,in turn, believes that the introduction of the FTT may ensure the autonomy of the EUbudget.There arefourParliaments/Chambersopposingthe idea of introducing the FTT. Thus, theBulgarianNarodno sabraniewarns that introducing a new FTT in the EU without an agreementon introducing such a tax on the global level would endanger the competitiveness of the financialinstitutions within the EU. Also, the majority of the Members of the DutchTweede Kamerisopposed to a FTT as EU own resource31feeling that any tax on transactions can best beimplemented worldwide, because, otherwise, this tax would be too easy to evade. Also the ItalianSenato della Repubblicadoubts whether an own resource based on the taxation of financialtransactions will be effective or will merely drive investors towards countries with a more liberaltax regime. The SlovakNárodná radapoints out the scepticism expressed in connection with theproposed FTT.1.5 Support for the Europe 2020 Project Bond initiativeParliaments/Chambers have been asked whether they support the Commission’s proposal on theEurope 2020 Project Bond initiative, the aim of which is to promote individual infrastructureprojects by attracting additional private sector financing.11of the Parliaments/Chambers report that their respective Committees on EU Affairs havenotyet discussedthe Project Bond initiative of the Europe 2020 Strategy (e.g. the FrenchSénat,theSlovenianDržavni zborand the LithuanianSeimas).Out of the16Parliaments/Chambers which haveexamined the Europe 2020 Project Bondinitiative, 1232generally supportthe idea. As expressed by the BulgarianNarodno sabranie,"the project bonds might prove to bea useful toolof realization of multi-regional EU projectswithin strategies, such as the Danube Strategy, the Black Sea Strategy etc." The CzechSenáthas303132

requested the Commission to further elaborate the concept of project bonds and the FinnishEduskuntacalls for "the proposals to be coordinated with the various financing instrumentsresulting from the economic crisis". The European Parliament alsowelcomesthe Europe 2020Project Bond Initiative, "as a risk-sharing mechanism with the European Investment Bank (EIB),providing capped support from the EU budget that should leverage the EU funds and attractadditional interest of private investors for participating in priority EU projects in line withEurope 2020 objectives". Furthermore, the European Parliament calls on the Commission "topresent a fully fledged proposalon EU project bonds, building on the existing experience withjoint EU-EIB instruments, and to include clear and transparent criteria for project eligibility andselection" and reminds "that projects of EU interest which generate little revenue will continue torequire financing through grants"33.Themain concernfor a number of Parliaments/Chambers is, however, that theprivate sectormust bear a fair share of the riskregarding the Project Bond initiative (e.g. the PolishSenatand the GreekVouli ton Ellinon).As underlined by the UKHouse of Lords"it should not beallowed to lead to the EU having to provide additional funds beyond its intended contribution".The European Parliament, on its part, is concerned that "the limited size of the EU budget mighteventually impose limitations to providing additional leverage for new initiatives"34.Out of the Parliaments/Chambers which have replied to this questionfour are not convincedthat private financing instruments should be applied to finance EU projects (i.e. the AustrianNationalratandBundesrat,the DutchTweede Kamerand the SlovakNárodná rada).1.6 Implementation of the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy through the MFF 2014-2020All of the Parliaments/Chambers which have discussed the question generallysupportthe notionthat the MFF should provide for the implementation of the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy35.However, the GermanBundesratexplains that "a policy of EU expenditure cannot andshouldnot constitute the main instrumentfor macro-economic management and for implementationof the Europe 2020 strategy" and that the coordination of the Member States' economic policiesand the completion of the legal framework at EU level is ofgreater importancethan theimplementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy. This point is made even more explicit in the replyof the GreekVouli ton Ellinonwhich writes that because of the reduction in public expenditures,as a result of the financial crisis, it has become almost impossible for "countries like Greece" tosufficiently finance growth and to enhance its participation in the single market.SixParliaments/Chambersexplicitly supportthe inclusion of financing initiatives aimed atstrengthening the Single Market36. The European Parliament, for instance, is convinced that33

"the re-launch of the single market is an essential element of the Europe 2020 Strategy whichincreases the synergy between its various flagship initiatives"37.Furthermore amajorityof the Parliaments/Chambers argue that even though the Europe 2020Strategy should be one of the main objectives of the MFF it should be balanced with the need tofundother prioritiesof the EU. For example, several Parliaments/Chambers mention the needto allocate financial resources to projects focusing on the development of infrastructure withinthe sectors of transport, energy and information and communication technologies (e.g. theBulgarianNarodno sabranie,the HungarianOrszággyűlésand the CzechSenát)but also ondevelopment aid, environmental protection, biodiversity and the area of freedom, security andjustice. The latter areas are highlighted as EU priorities by the UKHouse of Lordsso as torespond clearly to the principal challenges facing the EU today. Finally, more traditional policiessuch as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy are also mentioned as areaswhich should be sufficiently funded (e.g. the RomanianCamera Deputaţilorand the SpanishCortes Generales).As the PolishSejmargues, the way to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy is"to use verified and solid mechanisms of the cohesion policy, the common agricultural policyand other EU budget instruments". Furthermore the European Parliament specifies that "theEurope 2020 Strategy should bethe main policy referencefor the next MFF", maintaining, atthe same time, that "Europe 2020 isnot an all-inclusive strategycovering all Union policyfields" and stressing that "other Treaty-based policies pursuing different objectives need to beduly reflected in the next MFF"38.About halfof the Parliaments/Chambers having replied to this question, report that theirrespective Committees on EU Affairs havenot yet discussedthe MFF (e.g. the CypriotVouliton Antiprosoponand the CzechPoslanecká sněmovna).Some indicate that the proposal isexpected to be discussed during the autumn of 2011 (e.g. the SlovenianDržavni svetand theFrenchSénat).The IrishHouses of the Oireachtassuggest that the questions considering theMFF "might bemore suited to the COSAC in the first half of 2012"as it would allow theCommittees on EU Affairs of national Parliaments "to consult as appropriate and to produce aconsidered view" on the matter.1.7 Structure of EU budgetary expenditure in the MFF 2014-2020More than a halfof the Parliaments/Chambers which have replied to this question report thattheir respective Committees on EU Affairshave not yet discussedthe structure of the EUbudgetary expenditure in the context of the MFF 2014-2020.Out of those Parliaments/Chambers which have examined the structure of EU budgetaryexpenditure in the MFFonlythe BulgarianNarodno sabranieconsiders that the structureproposed by the Commission issuitableas "it gives more visibility to the Europe 2020 and at thesame time is easy to be understood by the stakeholders".

12Parliaments/Chambersdo not believethat the proposed structure issufficiently specific.Asexplained by the CzechSenát"the change in the structure of the EU expenditure headings asoutlined in the EU Budget Review isnot appropriateas it means further aggregation of variousexpenditures under a single general and often unrelated heading". This view is supported by theEstonianRiigikoguwhich states that "it is very important how and under what conditions thefunds are distributed within the headings and under what conditions they can be used".Furthermore, thelack of a heading dedicated solely to the cohesion policyis a recurrentconcern for a number of Parliaments/Chambers (e.g. the FinnishEduskunta,the RomanianCamera Deputaţilor,the RomanianSenatuland the SlovakNárodná rada).The European Parliament, for its part, reiterates its position thatmore flexibility within andacross headingsis an absolute necessity for the functioning capacities of the Union not only toface the new challenges but also to facilitate the decision-making process within the institutions.It also presents aspecific tablein which it proposes a new MFF structure39that groups underone single heading all internal policies under the title "Europe 2020".1.7.1 Transfer of funds from Sub-heading 1b to Sub-heading 1aA majorityof the Parliaments/Chambers that have replied to this questiondo not supportthesuggestion of transferring funds from the Sub-heading 1b (Cohesion for growth andemployment) to the Sub-heading 1a (Competitiveness)40. However, it is a question of achievingthe right balance between efficiency and solidarity when considering the transfer of funds fromcohesion to competitiveness, as the RomanianCamera Deputaţiloremphasises. The FinishEduskuntanotes that "a more coherent approach to cohesion policies should make additionalfunds available for competitiveness projects".A fewParliaments/Chambers find that the transferring of funds from the Sub-heading 1b to theSub-heading 1awould benefitthe economic, social and territorial cohesion of all Member States(e.g. the DanishFolketingand the SwedishRiksdag).In the present situation where the economycould use an "additional boost", the SlovenianDržavni zboris of the opinion that an increase ofresources in the area of competitiveness is "more than welcome".Of those Parliaments/Chambers that have answered the question,11 have yet to discusstheissue in their respective Committees on EU Affairs (e.g. the HungarianOrszággyűlés,the UKHouse of Commonsand the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosopon).A number of these intend todiscuss the question during the autumn of 2011 (e.g. the FrenchSénat,the IrishHouses of theOireachtasand the PolishSejm).1.8 Unspent EU funds

Taking into account the scarcity of EU budgetary funds and the need for their efficient use, theParliaments/Chambers were asked whether they would be in favour of adopting a principle thatunspent EU funds should not be returned to the Member States, as is the case now, but insteadused in future accounting periods as EU own resources.Themajorityof the Parliaments/Chambers having answered the questionhave not yetdiscussedthe issue in their respective Committees on EU Affairs. However, several of themexpect the issue to be debated during the autumn of 2011 (e.g. the SlovenianDržavni zborandthe PolishSejm).Among those Parliaments/Chambers that have discussed this issue,six do not supportthesuggestion (e.g. the DanishFolketingand the ItalianSenato della Repubblica).Three mainexplanationsfor the lack of support are found in the following replies:Instead of carrying unspent funds over to the next fiscal period as EU own resources theeffective useof EU budgetary resources should be improved (i.e. the CzechSenátand theBulgarianNarodno sabranie).Thelimited budgetary fundsin the Member States should take precedence (i.e. theAustrianNationalratandBundesrat).Democratic legitimacy- "both the Union's outlays and its fundraising need to be subjectto advance political approval by the Member States" (i.e. the FinnishEduskunta).Of the Parliaments/Chambers which have discussed the question of unspent EU funds,three arein favourof transferring the funds to future accounting periods (the CzechPoslaneckásněmovna,the LithuanianSeimasand the European Parliament). The PolishSenat,in turn,believes that the suggestion isworth consideringand the PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicathinks the proposal should be subject of a thorough discussion.

CHAPTER 2: TWO YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THETREATY OF LISBON - PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCEIn December 2011 it will be two years since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The aimof the chapter 2 of this report is to evaluate best parliamentary practices and experience of theimplementation of the Treaty of Lisbon (including Protocol 2 on the application of the principlesof subsidiarity and proportionality).Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon national Parliaments have been involved inensuring the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity according to Protocol 2 and haveadopted their internal subsidiarity check mechanisms.National Parliaments send the Commission reasoned opinions on EU draft legislative acts statingwhy they consider that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.Reasoned opinions are also notified to the European Parliament and the Council. NationalParliaments receive responses from the Commission to their reasoned opinions. This chapterevaluates the national Parliaments' opinions on the replies sent to them by the Commission anddescribes how reasoned opinions are dealt with in the European Parliament.According to Article 5 of Protocol 2 draft legislative acts shall contain the justification that theUnion objective can be better achieved at the EU level. This chapter assesses to what extent non-fulfilment of this formal criterion hinders national Parliaments’ examination of the EU draftlegislative act’s compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.Cooperation between national Parliaments and the EU institutions also takes other formsincluding informal political dialogue between the Commission and national Parliaments. Theexperience of national Parliaments in this field is also evaluated in this chapter of the report.Article 290 of the TFEU states that legislative acts may delegate to the Commission the power toadopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essentialelements of the legislative act. According to the Treaty of Lisbon the essential elements of anarea shall be reserved for the EU draft legislative acts and accordingly shall not be the subject ofa delegation of power. However, in the opinion of many national Parliaments essential elementsare introduced to the delegated acts of the Commission which are outside the scope of control ofnational Parliaments. The chapter evaluates Parliaments' current practices and views in thatrespect.2.1 Reasoned opinions2.1.1 Reasoned opinions adopted since the entry into force of the Treaty of LisbonSince the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amajorityof national Parliaments/Chambers,i.e.29,haveadopted at least one reasoned opinion.Out of40national Parliaments/Chambers,11havenot adopteda reasoned opinion yet41.41

Thelargest numberof reasoned opinions, i.e.eight,has been adopted by the PolishSenat.ThePolishSejmhas adoptedsevenreasoned opinions, the SwedishRiksdagand the LuxembourgChambre des Députés- five, the ItalianSenato della Repubblica- four, the DanishFolketing,theFrenchSénat,the LithuanianSeimas,the DutchTweede Kamer,the DutchEerste Kamerand theRomanianSenatul- three each. The remaining18national Parliaments/Chambers have adoptedone or two reasoned opinions. For more information, please see Table 1 below.Table 1: Reasoned opinions (by Parliament/Chamber)Parliament/ChamberNumber of reasonedopinions(in replies)1200201130013120011434Draft legislative acts(in replies)COM (2010) 379COM (2010) 82 *COM (2010) 379--COM(2011) 121COM(2011) 169-COM(2010) 379COM(2010) 379COM(2010) 368COM(2010) 486 *COM(2010) 799--COM(2011) 169 �COM(2010) 76◄COM(2010) 486COM(2010) 471◄COM(2010) 368●COM(2010) 368●PE-CONS 2/10♥--COM(2011)121COM(2011) 215COM(2011) 216COM(2010) 176COM(2011) 126 �Number ofreasoned opinions(on IPEX)421200201130003110011344

The most frequently questioned draft legislative actswith regard to their compliance with theprinciple of subsidiarity were the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common ConsolidatedCorporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)121)and the proposal for a Directive of theEuropean Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-countrynationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM(2010)379). Both of them werecontested bynineParliaments/Chambers.It is worth noting that in case of the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common ConsolidatedCorporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011) 121,nine reasoned opinionsamounted to13 votesin accordance with Article 7 of Protocol 2. As yet,noneof the EU draft legislative acts havebeen contested by the sufficient number of national Parliaments/Chambers to trigger the "yellowcard" or the "orange card" mechanisms of Protocol 2.Table 2: Reasoned opinions (by draft legislative act)Draft legislative actNumber of Parliaments/Chambersthatadoptedreasonedreasoned opinionopinions inreplies9oBulgarianNarodno sabranieoDutchTweede KameroIrishHouses of the OireachtasoMalteseKamra tad-DeputatioPolishSejmoRomanianCamera DeputaţiloroSlovakNárodná radaoSwedishRiksdagoUKHouse of Commons9oAustrianNationalratoAustrianBundesratoCzechPoslanecká sněmovnaoCzechSenátoLithuanianSeimas *oDutchTweede Kamer *oDutchEerste KameroPolishSenatoUKHouse of LordsNumberreasonedopinionsIPEX9ofon

COM(2010) 799Proposal for a Regulation of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncil establishing a commonorganisationofagriculturalmarkets and on specific provisionsfor certain agricultural products(Single CMO Regulation)COM(2010) 486AmendedproposalforaRegulation of the EuropeanParliament and of the Councilamending Council Regulations(EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No1234/2007, as regards distributionof food products to the mostdeprived persons in the UnionCOM(2010) 368Proposal for a Directive of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncil on Deposit GuaranteeSchemes [recast]COM(2011) 127Proposal for a Council Regulationon jurisdiction, applicable law andthe recognition and enforcement ofdecisions regarding the propertyconsequencesofregisteredpartnershipsCOM(2010) 537Proposal for a Regulation of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncilamendingCouncilRegulation (EC) No 1698/2005 onsupport for rural development bythe European Agricultural Fund forRural Development (EAFRD)COM(2010) 539Proposal for a Regulation of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncilamendingCouncilRegulation (EC) No 73/2009establishing common rules fordirect support schemes for farmersunder the common agriculturalpolicy and establishing certainsupport schemes for farmersCOM(2010) 738Proposal for a Regulation of theEuropean Parliament and of theCouncilamendingCouncilRegulation (EC) No 1234/2007 asregards marketing standards

COM(2010) 3712oSwedishRiksdagProposal for a Directive of theoUKHouse of CommonsEuropean Parliament and of theCouncilamendingDirective97/9/ECoftheEuropeanParliament and of the Council oninvestor-compensation schemesCOM(2010) 7482oDutchTweede KamerProposal for a Regulation of theoDutchEerste KamerEuropean Parliament and of theCouncil on jurisdiction and therecognition and enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercialmattersCOM(2011) 2152oItalianCamera dei DeputatiProposal for a Regulation of theoSpanishCortes Generales*European Parliament and of theCouncil implementing enhancedcooperation in the area of thecreationofunitarypatentprotectionCOM(2011) 2162oItalianCamera dei DeputatiProposal for a Council RegulationoSpanishCortes Generales*implementingenhancedcooperation in the area of thecreationofunitarypatentprotection with regard to theapplicable translation arrangementsCOM(2010) 611PolishSenatCOM(2010) 761FrenchSénatCOM(2010) 821AustrianBundesratCOM(2010) 1761ItalianSenato della RepubblicaCOM(2010) 4711FrenchSénatCOM(2010) 4751LuxembourgChambre des DéputésCOM(2010) 7281PolishSejmCOM(2010) 7331RomanianSenatulCOM(2010) 7451PolishSenatCOM(2011) 321RomanianSenatulCOM(2011) 1261ItalianSenato della Repubblica*COM(2011) 3531ItalianSenato della Repubblica*PE-CONS 2/101GermanBundesrat**The reasoned opinion adopted by this Parliament/Chamber is not published on IPEX

Parliaments areroutinely and promptly published on IPEX,a tool for exchanging informationon EU parliamentary activities46.Based on the replies of national Parliaments/Chambers to the questionnaire for this report and thedata published on IPEX, the COSAC Secretariat has performed the aforementioned analysis andhas the followinggeneral observations:Although the vast majority ofreasoned opinionsis published on IPEX,some aremissing;Some reasoned opinions are called by Parliaments/Chambers Opinions, Statements,Conclusions, and thus arenot identified as reasoned opinionson IPEX and, as a result,can not be found;On a number of occasions, reasoned opinionscannot be foundon IPEX by choosingtheheading "reasoned opinions"and the name of the Parliament/Chamber in question, butcan be found under the COM number of the particular draft legislative act; andSome reasoned opinions cannot be found on IPEX, while the Commission's replies tothem arepublished on IPEX under the heading of "informal political dialogue".Bearing in mind the fact that the IPEX website has undergone major developments recently (newplatform since June 2011), the practices concerning the scrutiny of EU draft legislative acts arestillin statu nascendiand having regard to the above findings, it may be advisable for COSAC toencourage national Parliaments/Chambers topublishpromptly andregularly updatetheinformation posted on the IPEX website.2.1.3 Replies from the European Commission on reasoned opinionsParliaments/Chambers have been asked to express their views on the Commission's replies totheir reasoned opinions on EU draft legislative acts. Most national Parliaments/Chambersindicate that the Commissionreplies to all reasoned opinions.The Commission has decided to reply to national Parliaments when they issue a reasonedopinion within three months of the receipt of the opinion. National Parliaments have been askedto indicate whether this self-imposed three month time-limit is met by the Commission.From among the19Parliaments/Chambers which had adopted reasoned opinions at least threemonths before the deadline for the replies to the questionnaire for this report, a large majority(i.e.13)indicate that the three-month deadline was not met in at least one case. In some cases,the self-imposed deadline had not yet expired at the time when Parliaments/Chambers draftedtheir replies to the questionnaire (e.g. in the case of COM(2011) 121).In some cases, national Parliaments/Chambers indicate that they had to wait forfour to sixmonthsfor the Commission's reply (e.g. the AustrianBundesratand the CzechSenát- fourmonths, the GermanBundestag- almost six months, the PolishSenatreceived the replies afterfour-six months).

2.1.4 Quality of the Commission’s replies to reasoned opinionsFourParliaments/Chambers expresssatisfactionwith the Commission's replies, without anyreservations (i.e. the FrenchSénat,the GermanBundestag,the ItalianSenato della Repubblica,the RomanianSenatul).Some Parliaments/Chambers inform that the quality of replies hasnot (yet) been debatedassuch (e.g. the CzechPoslanecká sněmovnaand the UKHouse of Commons).Specific reservationson the quality of Commission's replies expressed byfournationalParliaments/Chambers concern both their form and content as they were deemed to betoogeneral, too shortorgeneric,apparently addressed to all national Parliaments.According to the PolishSejm,the replies werenot satisfactory."The main argument of thePresidium of the EU Affairs Committee, as well as of the Chancellery services, is that theexplanations are limited to one short paragraph,in which Commission maintains its positionand in general way takes an attitude towards theSejm'sdoubts included in the reasoned opinion".The PolishSenat,for its part, notes that the Commission’s replies to the reasoned opinionsregarding COM(2010) 61, COM(2010) 379 and COM(2010) 537 "did include the Commission’sposition on the objections raised by the EU Affair Committee". However, other replies, i.e. thoseto the reasoned opinions which claimed that the Commission had been granted too much powerto regulate by means of delegated acts, were deemedunsatisfactorysince the Commissionofferedonly a brief formal and legal explanation, without dealing with the objections raisedin those opinions".The LithuanianSeimasindicated that even though the recent report on the relations between theCommission and national Parliaments reiterates that all replies are individual, sometimes theCommission uses the practiceto generalise the answersto the questions raised by nationalParliamentsand send the same answers to all submitted reasoned opinions.Thus the reply toa specific question raised by the particular national Parliament "looks watered down".The UKHouse of Lordswas also "disappointedat the qualityof the reply to our reasonedopinion on the Seasonal Workers proposal". TheHouse of Lordsreceived "ageneric reply,apparently addressed to all national Parliaments,rather than a reply specifically addressingthe concerns expressed" in its opinion.In this context, the AustrianNationalratandBundesratpointed out that while at theadministrative level the replies were sometimes perceived as beingtoo general,it was apparentfrom regular contacts with the Commission that "there is anawarenessof this problem and thatquite some effort is invested constantly improving them".2.1.5 Dealing with the Commission's replies in national ParliamentsPractices for dealing with the Commission's replies in national Parliaments/Chambers vary. Outof40national Parliaments/Chambers which sent their replies,17share their experiences andpractices and two describe planned procedure for dealing with the replies when they come in thefuture.

InfourParliaments/Chambers (i.e. the CzechPoslanecká sněmovna,the DanishFolketing,theLithuanianSeimasand the FrenchSénat)the replies are sent only to theCommittees on EUAffairsand/or other relevantspecialised committees.Furthermore, in the PolishSejm,the Commission’s replies are discussed in the meeting of thePresidium of EU Affairs Committeeand then passed on to theMembersof the committee. Inthe DutchTweede Kamerand theEerste Kamer,the replies are put on the agenda of a meeting ofthe relevant committee and subsequently the committee decides on an adequatefollow-up.Onthe other hand, in the SwedishRiksdag,there is no formal procedure for how to deal with thereplies. They are forwarded to the relevant committee and it is up to the committee to decide howto proceed with them.The group of recipients of the Commission's replies is sometimes wider. For instance, in theAustrianNationalratandBundesratthe replies are distributed also to thestaff of the politicalgroupsdealing with EU matters and to the administrative staff in theEU departmentand in theLuxembourgChambre des Députésamong recipients of the replies are Members of the EuropeanParliament from Luxembourg and members of professional chambers47.FourParliaments/Chambers (i.e. the CzechSenát,the PolishSenat,the UKHouse of CommonsandHouse of Lords)indicate that theypublishsuch replies on theirwebsites.The GermanBundesratreprintsthe replies asBundesrat'sofficial documents.Similarly, the IrishHouses ofthe Oireachtasintend to forward the reply to its reasoned opinion on the CCCTB proposal to thejoint Committee on European Union Affairs and the Joint Committee on Finance, PublicExpenditure and Reform for consideration. The reply will also be included in aweekly reportofdocuments received by the Commission and laid in theLibraryof both Houses.Finally, the FinnishEduskunta,which has not yet adopted a reasoned opinion, states that infuture such replies "would be equivalent to any other additions to an existing dossier, i.e. wouldbe discussed by the Grand Committee, which might express an opinion or order the Governmentto take action".2.1.6 Reflection of reasoned opinions in EU draft legislative actsThe issue of the reflection of reasoned opinions in EU draft legislative acts has proved to berather difficult to examine at this stage because of the scarce material available. The Treaty ofLisbon came into force on 1 December 2009 and, therefore, the practice of issuing reasonedopinions is very recent. Moreover, that the contested draft legislative acts originate from 2010 or2011.Nevertheless, twonational Parliaments/Chambers (i.e. the DanishFolketingand the GermanBundesrat)indicatepotential reflectionof their reasoned opinions on one draft legislative act,i.e. on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on DepositGuarantee Schemes (COM(2010) 368). The DanishFolketingpoints out that regardingCOM(2010) 368, thepart of the proposal, which was criticisedby theFolketing,was laterremoved.The GermanBundesrat,in turn, indicates that "during deliberations on the draft47

directive in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Part 2, on 17 June 2011, theCommission ultimately agreed to a compromise proposal from the (German) FederalGovernment; this envisaged,inter alia,that voluntary deposit guarantee schemes providingprotection extending above the 100,000 Euro cut-off point should to a large extent not fall withinthe scope of the directive. This in essence corresponded to a key demand formulated in theBundesrat’sreasoned opinion on the draft directive".The SwedishRiksdagnotes that since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force "none of the(contested) draft legislative acts have been adopted and it is thereforenot clearwhether and howthe reasoned opinions have been taken into consideration in the final legislative act". TheRiksdagfurther notes that "the Commission did not meet the fundamental objections in theanswer regarding COM(2010) 48648, but instead included this proposal as part of the nextproposal COM(2010) 79949". Therefore, theRiksdag'sobjections remain valid. Moreover, thatthe COM(2010) 799 dossier contains "many ambiguities". Therefore, it is not clear whichamendments have been made in relation to the current regulation.2.1.7 Continued dialogue with the Commission after receiving its repliesAll 40national Parliaments/Chambers state that so far theyhave not continuedthe informaldialogue with the Commission on draft legislative acts after they received the Commission'sreply to their reasoned opinion. However, the FrenchAssemblée nationalepoints out that itsCommittee on European Affairs intends to continue the political dialogue with the Commission,which enables it to extend its scrutiny to the principle of proportionality and to initiatediscussions on the substance of the proposals.2.1.8 Sufficiency of the eight-week period for the evaluation of EU draft legislative actsArticle 6 of Protocol 2 stipulates that "any national Parliament or any chamber of a nationalParliament may,within eight weeksfrom the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, inthe official languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, theCouncil and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that a draft in questiondoes not comply with the principle of subsidiarity".39 national Parliaments/Chambers have provided repliesto the question on whether thiseight-week period is sufficient to examine a draft legislative act both on the basis of itscompliance with the principle of subsidiarity and on other aspects. It seems thatParliaments/Chambers are dividedon the issue:ten are satisfiedwith the time-frame ofProtocol 2,14,although generally satisfied, have variousreservations, tenfind itinsufficient orproblematicand the remainingfiveprovidegeneral commentswithout taking a formalposition.

TenParliaments/Chambers50consider the eight-week periodsufficientfor verifying thecompliance of draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity. For instance, theexperience of the PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicaof the implementation of the Treaty ofLisbon has shown that the eight-week period issufficientto check compliance with the principleof subsidiarity and to scrutinise draft legislative acts on other grounds. It is worth noting thatwhile theAssembleia da Repúblicahas not yet issued a reasoned opinion under Article 6 ofProtocol 2, it has expressed its opinion on all draft legislative acts within the eight-week periodwithin the framework of informal political dialogue. Also, the LithuanianSeimasconsiders theeight-week periodsufficientfor subsidiarity checks. Usually, the Committee on EuropeanAffairs of theSeimassets the time limit of up to four weeks for the specialised committees fordeliberation of other aspects of the proposal. The ItalianCamera dei Deputati,too, believes thatthe eight-week period issufficient, but only for subsidiarity checks.An in-depth analysis ofthe substantive aspects of draft legislative acts and other EU documents in theCamera deiDeputatiis usually finalised after the eight-week period.A group of14Parliaments/Chambers, although generally satisfied with the eight-week period,seem tohave various reservationsabout it. For instance, the AustrianNationalratandBundesratare of the opinion that "the period is short, but it can be done". In the view of the IrishHouses of the Oireachtasthe eight week periodcould, potentially, be insufficientto consider aproposal's compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, in particular if other aspects of theproposal are at issue. TheHouses of the Oireachtasnote that this is obviouslycompounded ifthe proposal isvery complexor it is published during the period following general elections.This opinion is shared by the SlovakNárodná radawhich believes that in the majority of casesthe eight-week period is "long enough", but when it comes to more complicated cases,"additionaltime would be helpful".The DutchTweede Kamerannually selects proposals from the Working Programme of theCommission to be "tested against the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality". For thisexercise, theTweede Kamergenerally considers the eight-week period to be sufficient. However,in order to guarantee the smooth functioning of the "yellow card" and the "orange card"mechanisms, theTweede Kamerregards the eight weeks asrather tight,especially in caseswhen it starts examining a specific proposal only after a notification from another Parliament.TheTweede Kameris concerned that the "yellow card" and the "orange card" coalition buildingwill already absorb a substantial part of the eight-week period, potentially resulting in misseddeadlines.Similarly, the PolishSejmso far has not had any problems with adoption of reasoned opinionsduring the eight-week period. However, the procedures of adopting reasoned opinions arelongand time-consuming.Therefore, sometimes the EU Affairs Committee of theSejm,being theinitiator, sometimes needs to work under the pressure of time.In the opinion of the SwedishRiksdag,the eight weeks would normally be a sufficient period oftime for examination. However, clearerand more certain indicationsas to when a draftlegislative act should be expected would facilitate theRiksdag’splanning of subsidiarity checks.

Finally, the UKHouse of Lordsalso indicates that the eight week period istight,but doesusually allow sufficient time for the relevant aspects of a draft legislative act to be examined.The need to secure time in plenary in order for theHouse of Lordsto take a view on a draftreasoned opinioncould prove problematic.For that purpose, the EU Committee "has anundertaking from the business managers to make time available within the eight week deadlinewherever possible".On the other hand,tenParliaments/Chambers considerthe eight-week deadline to be too short.For instance, since in the CzechSenáta proposal has to be deliberated both at the committee(approximately two meetings a month) and at the plenary level (approximately one meeting amonth), theSenátconsiders the eight-week period asgenerally insufficient.On one occasion, inorder to adopt a reasoned opinion on time, the EU Affairs Committee of theSenáthad toconvene anextraordinary meeting.Similarly, in the view of the GermanBundestag,"the eight-week period isnot a sufficientperiodto examine all aspects of a Commission legislative proposal". For the BulgarianNarodnosabranie,too, "the period is achievable, butnot sufficient as a whole".For the FrenchAssemblée nationale"the eight-week periodposes real organisational challenges,while for theUKHouse of Commons,itcauses difficultyin two respects: the time required to receive anExplanatory Memorandum from the UK Government and the time needed to ensure that debateon a Motion can be scheduled in order to secure the endorsement of the European ScrutinyCommittee’s recommendation by theHouse of Commons.Among the ten Parliaments/Chambers,fiveParliaments/Chamberswould definitely welcome alonger period(the CzechPoslanecká sněmovna)as the eight weeks isvery little timetosubstantially check Commission proposals (the DanishFolketing),isa rather narrow timelinefor an effective examination a legislative proposal (the HungarianOrszággyűlés),israther shortand particularly problematicwhen this period falls over parliamentary recesses (the MalteseKamra tad-Deputati)andat times is barely sufficient(the ItalianSenato della Repubblica).Asa result, the DanishFolketing,for instance, resorts to theinformal political dialogue,whenmore than eight weeks are needed for the scrutiny of the content of a draft legislative act.Finally,fiveParliaments/Chambers givegeneral commentsor indicate thatno official positionon the issue has been taken yet. Thus the EstonianRiigikoguis of the opinion that the sufficiencyof the eight-week period should be measured against each individual proposal. The SlovenianDržavni zbor,for its part, considers that, based on earlier experiences, the eight-week periodcould be sufficient, even if since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon it has not adoptedany reasoned opinions. The issue has not yet been raised by the Committee on EU Affairs of theSpanishCortes Generales.The RomanianCamera Deputaţilorhas only recently (i.e. on 19 April2011) adopted a new legal framework on its participation in the European affairs51. This newframework will be assessed in the future, although so far theCamera Deputaţilorhas managed tocomply with the eight-week deadline.2.1.9 Lack of a legal basis and lack of (or insufficient) subsidiarity justificationNational Parliaments/Chambers have been asked whether they have ever considered the lack of alegal basis or lack of (or insufficient) subsidiarity justification in the explanatory memorandum51

of a draft legislative act as grounds for finding a breach of the principle of subsidiarity, and as aconsequence have adopted a reasoned opinion. Out of the33Parliaments/Chambers which havereplied to the question,16indicate that they have indeed found the lack of a legal basis and/orlack of (or insufficient) subsidiarity justification to be aninfringement of the principle ofsubsidiarityand have as a consequence adoptedreasoned opinions.On the other hand,nineParliaments/Chambers have given anegative answer(e.g. the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosopon,the EstonianRiigikogu,the PortugueseAssembleia da República).2.1.9.1 Lack of a legal basisEightParliaments/Chambers give specific examples ofreasoned opinionsissued on the groundsof the absence of a legal basis for a draft legislative act.Thus, the DanishFolketingin itsreasoned opinion52of 7 March 2011 on the proposal for aRegulation establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specificprovisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO) (COM(2010) 799) found that theintended measures had "shifted from having been agricultural policy measures to socialmeasures" and consequently failed to fulfil the objectives of the common agricultural policy. Asa consequence, theFolketingfound that "thelegal basiscited by the Commission in the proposalis incorrect(Article 43(2) of the TFEU)".Similarly, the ItalianSenato della Repubblicadraws attention to the fact that the Commissionhas indicated Article 81(3) of the TFEU as the legal basis for the proposal for a Regulation onjurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding theproperty consequences of registered partnerships (COM(2011) 127) and for the proposal for aRegulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions inmatters of matrimonial property regimes (COM(2011) 126). TheSenato della Repubblicapointsout that Article 81(3) of the TFEU provides that "measures concerning family law with cross-border implications shall be established by the Council, acting in accordance with a speciallegislative procedure". In itsreasoned opinionsof 31 May 2011, theSenato della Repubblicahighlighted problematic aspects relating to the extension of family law provisions to same-sexmarriage and expressly objected to the extension of family law to registered partnerships(COM(2011) 127). In both cases, it concluded that "problemsrelating to the legal basisrequirefurther consideration of the proposal's compliance with the subsidiarity principle".The AustrianNationalratandBundesrathave criticised the lack of legal basis in theirreasonedopinions53on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on theconditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonalemployment (COM(2010) 379). Both Chambers found that the chosen legal basis for theproposal, i.e. Article 79(2a) and (2b) of the TFEU was "inadequate, because these provisions donot provide a basis for decreeing European rules that have impact on the national labour markets,an intention explicitly stated in the proposal".The SpanishCortes Generalesand the ItalianCamera dei Deputatiin their reasoned opinions onthe proposal for a Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of52

unitary patent protection (COM(2011) 215) and on the proposal for a Regulation implementingenhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to theapplicable translation arrangements (COM(2011) 216) found that the breach of the principle ofsubsidiarity was due toan erroneous legal basis.In thereasoned opinion54, the ItalianCameradei Deputatistressed explicitly that "the subsidiarity check implies also the assessment of thecorrectness of the legal basis" and that "the proposals aredevoid of a sound legal basis".Itfurther states that "Article 118 of the TFEU confers on the Union exclusive competence in thearea of the creation of unitary patent protection. Therefore the decision 2011/167/UE of theCouncil authorising enhanced cooperation and its implementation does not comply with article20(1) TEU which provides that Member States may establish enhanced cooperation betweenthemselves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences".Also, the GermanBundesratidentified violations of the subsidiarity principle in respect of theMember State initiative on the European Protection Order (PE-CONS 2/10) and, as a result,adopted areasoned opinionstating that there wereconsiderable doubtsas to whether the draftdirective could be based on the envisaged legal basis.In addition, the SwedishRiksdagindicates that although the lack of a legal basis or subsidiarityjustification has not been "a stand-alone objection in a reasoned opinion", abreach of thelegality principlehas been the main objection in areasoned opinion55on a proposal for aRegulation as regards distribution of food products to the most deprived persons in the Union(COM(2010) 486). TheRiksdaghad serious objections to the proposal, the main one being thatthelegal basison which the proposal rests wasinaccurate.On the other hand,a fewParliaments/Chambers indicated that the absence of a legal basis hasnotbeen considereda ground of an infringementof the principle of subsidiarity. For instance,the European Scrutiny Committee of the UKHouse of Commonsconsiders the lack of a legalbasis to bea question of competencerather than subsidiarity. In the view of theHouse ofCommons,"if there is no competence for the EU to act, subsidiarity cannot arise. Competence toact is, a necessary prerequisite to consideration of subsidiarity". By the same token, thePortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicadoes not consider the lack of a legal basis as a cause for abreach of the subsidiarity principle. Whenever questions of the adequacy of a legal basis havebeen raised in theAssembleia da República,they have always been dealt with in the frameworkof theinformal political dialogue.2.1.9.2 Lack of or insufficient justification with regard to the principle of subsidiarityArticle 5 of Protocol 2provides:"Draft legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity andproportionality. Any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making itpossible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Thisstatement should contain some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and, in thecase of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States,including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons for concluding that aUnion objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative5455

and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. Draft legislative acts shall take account ofthe need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union,national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to beminimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved".The total of17Parliaments/Chamberscomment on the consequencesof the lack of orinsufficient justification of draft legislative acts with regard to the principle of subsidiarity. Forinstance, the DanishFolketingin itsreasoned opinionon the proposal for a Regulationestablishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certainagricultural products (Single CMO) (COM(2010) 799) found that "theCommission has not - asit is obliged – properly justified the proposalwith regard to its compliance with thesubsidiarity principle. The proposal neither contains a detailed statement making it possible toappraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, nor has it beensubstantiated by qualitative or quantitative indicators making it possible to conclude whether theobjectives of the proposal can be better achieved at EU level than at national level."The FrenchSénatrefers to two of itsreasoned opinions56, one on the proposal for a Regulationas regards distribution of food products to the most deprived persons in the Union (COM(2010)486) and the other on the proposal for a Decision establishing the first radio spectrum policyprogramme (COM(2010) 471). The reasoned opinions were intendedto remind theCommissionthat the lack of the justification of the proposals with regard to the principle ofsubsidiarity constitutes a violation of Article 5 of Protocol 2.The PolishSejm,too, has invoked a violation of Article 5 of Protocol 2 in itsreasoned opinion57on the proposal for a Regulation on support for rural development by the European AgriculturalFund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (COM(2010) 537) and on the proposal for a Regulationestablishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agriculturalpolicy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers (COM(2010) 539). TheSejmdrewattention to the fact in line with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the justification of an EUlegal act should make it possible to understand those reasons for its adoption and, subsequently, toexamine its legality. It was the Commission’s responsibility to provide the reasons. Consequently,theSejmfound that in theabsence of an explanationjustifying the compliance of the proposalwith the principle of subsidiarity, it could not evaluate the Commission’s arguments on theproposal’s compliance with this principle.The lack of justificationwith regard to the principle ofsubsidiarity of the same proposal for a Regulation establishing common rules for direct supportschemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain supportschemes for farmers (COM(2010) 539) has been the basis for issuing areasoned opinionby theLuxembourgChambre des Députés.Similarly, the European Scrutiny Committee of the UKHouse of Commonsis of the opinion that"thesufficiency of the subsidiarity justificationshould bea critical partof nationalParliaments’ consideration of whether to issue a reasoned opinion", noting that it is onprocedural grounds that the Court of Justice is likely to find a breach of the principle ofsubsidiarity. The European Scrutiny Committee raised the issue of theabsence of a "detailedstatement"containing the necessary quantitative and qualitative indicatorsas a ground of thebreach of subsidiarityin itsreasoned opinionon the proposal for a Directive on a CommonConsolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011) 121/4):5657

"18. Section 2.4 of the impact assessment (on subsidiarity and proportionality)does notcontain a "detailed statement"to make it possible to appraise compliance with theprinciple of subsidiarity (and proportionality), as required by Article 5 of Protocol 2. Thesummary of the impact assessment states that the impact assessment followed theGuidelines of Secretariat General for Impact Assessments, which do not appear to include aprovision for a detailed statement in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol 2 (see paragraph11 above). Section 2.4falls a long way short of the level of detail requiredtosubstantiate action at EU level [...]"Furthermore, the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs of the SpanishCortes Generalesin itsreasoned opinion58on the proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/96/ECrestructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity(COM(2011) 169) also found a breach of the principle of subsidiarity due to alack ofjustification.The AustrianNationalratandBundesrat,too, have criticised the lack of subsidiarity justificationin theirreasoned opinions59on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and theCouncil on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes ofseasonal employment (COM(2010) 379). With regard to the requirements for the detailedstatement under Article 5 of Protocol 2, both theNationalratandBundesratfound that "all theseaspects are absentfrom the proposed Directive (and in the working document) orare difficultto identifyandwithout substance".In this context, a number of Parliaments/Chambers highlight theimportance of adhering to therequirements of Article 5of Protocol 2. Thus, the BulgarianNarodno sabraniecalls for a"more substantive subsidiarity justification" whichcould lead to a better evaluationof draftlegislative acts. Similarly, the GermanBundestagindicates that many Members of Parliamentcriticisethe subsidiarity justification in most legislative proposals. Sufficient justification underArticle 5 of Protocol 2 is also underscored by the DutchTweede Kamer.The LithuanianSeimas,for its part, details atestit applies when evaluating the compliance ofdraft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiaritybased onthe information contained in theexplanatory memorandumof the proposal. Thus, it takes into account the following:Sufficiency of the consultations with Members States in the drafting process of the act;Explanations allowing to assess the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity;Presence of qualitative and quantitative criteria on which the proposal is based;Assessment of the financial and administrative burden;Potential regulatory impact of the draft legislative act.

have. According to the Commission, "impact assessment is an aid to political decision-making,not a substitute for it"60. The annual roadmaps61, which are also published at the time the CWP isadopted, give an indication of the main areas to be assessed and the planning of impactassessments. The roadmaps and impact assessments (since 2003) are published on theCommission Impact Assessment website62.In November 2005, the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council have agreed onaninter-institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment63, setting out basic rules forimpact assessments throughout the legislative process. The European Parliament and the Councilhave agreed to assess the impact of their own ‘substantive' amendments.In 2006, theImpact Assessment Board64was created as acentral quality controland supportfunction working under the authority of the President of the Commission. It is chaired by theDeputy Secretary General responsible for Better Regulation. The Impact Assessment Boardexamines and issues opinions on all the Commission's impact assessments.2.1.10.2 Quality of impact assessmentsOut of36Parliaments/Chambers which have answered the question on impact assessments,19comment on their quality.A number of Parliaments/ Chambersprovide general commentson theusefulnessof impactassessments for the scrutiny process in national Parliaments. Thus, in the opinion of the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosoponimpact assessments arenecessaryduring the examination of a draftlegislative act. The FrenchSénatfinds the information contained in impact assessments"helpful". In the PolishSenatimpact assessments "serve as auseful tool"for the analysts whoprepare preliminary opinions for its EU Affairs Committee. The PortugueseAssembleia daRepúblicafinds them "veryrelevantto an understanding of the draft legislative act" and of itsscope. The European Parliament believes them to be "asuitable instrumentfor verifying therelevance of Commission proposals, andin particular compliance with the principles ofsubsidiarityand proportionality, and for explaining more clearly to the co-legislators and thepublic at large the reasons behind opting for a given measure".FiveParliaments/Chambers aresatisfiedwith the quality of impact assessments. Thus, theBulgarianNarodno sabranieconsiders the quality of impact assessments to begood.The CzechPoslanecká sněmovnathinks "it isall right".The CzechSenát,too, mostly finds the dataprovided in the impact assessmentssufficient,but draws attention to the need to have adiscussion on "themethodology of the studiesandinterpretation of the data collected".TheFrenchAssemblée nationaleshares the opinion that the quality of impact assessments is"satisfactory", while in the BelgianChambre des représentantstheir quality is "greatlyappreciated".On the other hand, asubstantially higher numberof Parliaments/Chambers, i.e.12, voicecriticismwith regard to the quality of impact assessments. For instance, the FinnishEduskuntaisof the opinion that the quality of impact assessments, like the quality of actual legislative6061

proposals, seems to bevariable."At best, well-drafted proposals come with informative impactassessments.At worst,impact assessments areschematic, only offering lip service to theTreaty's requirements."Similarly, the HungarianOrszággyűléswarns against generalisation asto the quality of impact assessments of EU draft legislative acts, but underlines that in proposalsfalling under the scope of Protocol 2, detailed and conceptual explanations should be providedinstead ofoccasionally formal or general remarks.The PolishSejmshares this opinion as thequality of impact assessments differs. PortugueseAssembleia da República,in general,considers impact assessments to bewell drafted.However, there have been situations, such asthe proposal for a Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)(COM(2011) 121/4), where the impact assessments have not made possible a full understandingof the implications of the proposed measures.The SpanishCortes Generalesalso draws attention to the fact that impact assessments arenotalways up to the required standardsand have in a number of cases been considered asinsufficient.On two occasions the SwedishRiksdaghas voiced criticism on impact assessments.In the case of the amended proposal for a Regulation as regards distribution of food products tothe most deprived persons in the Union (COM(2010) 486), the impact assessment was "notsatisfactory in substance"and in the case of the proposal for a Regulation establishing acommon organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agriculturalproducts (COM(2010) 799), "there werehardly any assessmentsmade at all".As a rule, the European Scrutiny Committee of the UKHouse of Commonsfinds Commissionimpact assessmentsnot to contain the information requiredby the "detailed Statement" underArticle 5 of Protocol 2. In addition, theCommission’s Guidelineson impact assessment "donotappear to have been changed to reflect the new emphasis on subsidiarityafter the entry intoforce of the Treaty of Lisbon". For example, the European Scrutiny Committee has shared theUK Government’s criticisms of the Commission’s impact assessment on the draft Directive onminimum health and safety requirements regarding the exposure of workers to risks arising fromelectromagnetic fields. It was seen to be "basedon too limited a set of datato reflect the fullscale and scope of the impact of the draft Directive and, as a result, it underestimated theprobable costs for industry".In March 2010, the EU Select Committee of the UKHouse of Lordsproduced areport"ImpactAssessments in the EU: Room for Improvement?"65. The report highlights someareas wherethe situation is unclearand further investigation might be warranted, including "the conformityof impact assessments to the Guidelines, the production and use of impact assessments oncomitology proposals, the adequacy of consultation exercises in the preparation of assessments,the evaluation of whether the SME test is working and the use of ex-post evaluation". The reportalso notes that the Council and the European Parliament could make more use of theCommission’s impact assessments.FourParliaments/Chambers66voiceconcernswith regard to theindependent natureof theCommission's impact assessments. Thus, the SwedishRiksdagunderlines that "it is importantthatindependent impact assessmentsare made as they play an important part in taking aposition on a draft legislative act". The GreekVouli ton Ellinonemphasises that "the impactassessments alwaysadvocate the Commission's standpointand therefore they are notconsidered as crucial during our examination process, compared to other documents such asconsultation results or opinions of other institutions". The GermanBundesrat,for its part, has6566

repeatedly expressed concernsthat "the Commission continues to resist the idea of arrangingfor anexternal quality appraisal of impact assessmentsby an objective body outside theCommission". Furthermore, theBundesrathas criticised the fact that the Commission continuesto insist on conductingimpact assessments only on draft legislation with a "significant"impact,stressing thateach new legislative proposal should comprise a clear indication of itsimpact,particularly in respect of administrative burdens at various levels.In view of the fact that Commission's impact assessments are only translated into English or,occasionally, French, it comes as no surprise that themost thorough analysisandstrongestcriticismof the Commission's impact assessments comes from the European Parliament. In itsresolution on guaranteeing independent impact assessments67adopted on 8 June 2011(rapporteur Ms Angelika NIEBLER), the European Parliament lays down a series ofrecommendations on the requirements for impact assessments at the European level with a viewto enhancing their efficiency and independence.As to thequalityof the impact assessments, the European Parliament stresses that "the impactassessments carried out by the Commission areinconsistent in their quality levelandfrequently serve rather to justify a legislative proposalthan to permit an objectiveconsideration of the facts." The European Parliament also calls "for impact assessments to notfocus exclusively on cost/benefit-analysis but to take a large number of criteria into account, inaccordance with the principle of an integrated approach, in order to provide the legislator with ascomprehensive a picture as possible".With regard to theindependent natureof the impact assessments, in the aforementionedresolution the European Parliament emphasises that it "has on a number of occasions expressedsupport for the use ofindependent impact assessmentsin the European Union", that "it isnecessary toinvolve external expertsfrom all policy areas as well as all stakeholder groupsaffected in the impact assessment process in orderto guarantee independence and objectivity".In addition, the resolution draws attention to the fact that "the Impact Assessment Board isconsidered by the Commission to be independent although it is under the authority of thePresident of the Commission and is composed of high-level officials from several Directorates-General and chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General" which "leadsto an information biasandthus to aviolation of necessary neutrality".The resolution calls for the members of the ImpactAssessment Board "to bescrutinized by the European Parliament and the Councilprior toappointment and no longer be subject to the instructions of the Commission President" as well asfor the work of the Impact Assessment Board and experts "to take placein the public remitwiththe highesttransparencyso that their independence can be verified in practice".2.1.10.3 Translation of impact assessments into the official languages of the EUAs a rule, full impact assessments of major draft legislative acts are published in English orFrench. Since 2006, the Commission publishes (Executive) Summaries of impact assessments inall official languages of the EU, except Gaelic.When asked about the need to have the full text of impact assessments translated into all officialEU languages,24Parliaments/Chambersexpressed their viewson the issue. Among those,15

are of the opinion that full impact assessmentsshould be translated into all official languagesof the EU.The BulgarianNarodno sabraniewelcomes the ideaarguing that having the translation into allofficial EU languages of the full impact assessment may lead to abetter understandingof theessence of the proposal. Furthermore, assuming that the eight-week period would not run beforetranslations of a full impact assessment into all official languages are published, it wouldadditionallycontribute to proper subsidiarity check proceduresin national Parliaments.Similarly, the LithuanianSeimason several occasions underlined that the full version of theimpact assessment should be translated into all official languages of the EUbeforethe eight-week period starts.The CypriotVouli ton Antiprosoponis of the opinion that impact assessmentsshould betranslated into all official languages of the EU,the FrenchSénatbelieves that it would be "agood thing",while the BelgianChambre des représentantsandSénatthink it would be "animportant advantage".The SwedishRiksdag,for its part, considers that it would beveryvaluable,while the PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicais convinced that it would beveryimportant for transparency and a better understandingof EU draft legislative acts inMember States. Also, the ItalianCamera dei Deputatiin its opinion on the Annual Report 2010on relations between the European Commission and national Parliaments (COM(2011) 345)68hasurged the Commissionto make impact assessments available in all official languages of theEU as far as possible. The SlovakNárodná rada,too, is of the opinion that "itwould behelpful"to have the impact assessments translated in all official languages of the EU, as this isthe obligation with regard to all legislative proposals.The LatvianSaeimafinds the lack of the translation into the Latvian language as anobstacle forconducting subsidiarity checks.According to theSaeima,the lack of translation "is the reasonwhy theSaeimaconducts subsidiarity checks only on rare occasions". It underscores that it isimpossibleto conduct a comprehensive subsidiarity check without a relevant impact assessment.The PolishSejmreminds that although an impact assessment is a different document than a draftlegislative act, in its substance it is an integral part of the latter. That is why impact assessmentsshould besubject to the same translation requirements as draft legislative acts.Similarly,the HungarianOrszággyűlésrecalls the EU’slinguistic diversityand equal treatment of allnational Parliaments as guiding principles that should be respected by all EU institutions andactors concerned. Also, the ItalianSenato della Repubblicaconsiders that the action of EUinstitutions should be consistent with the language regime envisaged by the Treaties and thattherefore as many documents as possible should be made available in all official languages of theEU. In this context, theSenato della Repubblicabrings up the question of thequality of thetranslation,which "should be carefully ensured, especially for those texts that are bound tobecome legally binding".FiveParliaments/Chambers, however, consider that there isno needto translate full impactassessments into all official languages of the EU. Thus in the opinion of the CzechPoslaneckásněmovna,"there is no desperate need" to translate really everything into all official languages ofthe EU. The same opinion is shared by the LuxembourgChambre des Députés.The CzechSenátdoes not deem translations of full impact assessments necessary either and underlines that theassociated costs would not be proportionate to the added value.The FinnishEduskunta"is68

prepared tobe pragmatic",holding the view that while the substantive proposals must beavailable in all official languages, not all background documents need to be translated into alllanguages. TheEduskuntanotes, however, that the decision would ultimately depend on theimportance of the underlying proposal. The DanishFolketing,for its part, is satisfied with theimpact assessmentsin English.An additionalfourParliaments/Chambers seelimited added valuein the exercise, as summariesof impact assessments are already translated in the official languages of the EU (the AustrianNationalratandBundesrat,the GreekVouli ton Ellinon)or, because of their importance forparliamentary and legislative deliberation, suggest translating impact assessments intoallworking languages( the GermanBundestag).Finally,sevenParliaments/Chambers indicate that theyhave not (yet) formulated a positiononthe matter. Thus, the Joint Committee of the IrishHouses of the Oireachtasdoes not have a viewregarding the translation of impact assessments into the official languages of the EU, stressingthat this would depend on the requirements of colleagues in other national Parliaments. TheMalteseKamra tad-Deputatidoes not have an opinion on this issue either. However, sinceEnglish is also an official language in Malta, the English version will usually do. The issue hasnot been discussedin the PolishSenat,the SlovenianDržavni zbor,theDržavni svetand the UKHouse of Lordseither. The latter, however, draws attention to theassociated costs.2.1.11 Internal subsidiarity control mechanisms of national ParliamentsOut of39Parliaments/Chambers which have replied to the question on their internal subsidiaritycontrol mechanisms,20consider themsatisfactoryso far (e.g. the DanishFolketing,the DutchEerste Kamer,the IrishHouses of the Oireachtas,the FinnishEduskunta,the GermanBundestag,the LatvianSaeima,the FrenchSénat).InfiveParliaments/Chambersno modificationsto the current subsidiarity control procedureshave been introduced at any stage, i.e. the CzechPoslanecká sněmovna,the HungarianOrszággyűlés,the GreekVouli ton Ellinon,the SlovenianDržavni svetand the SwedishRiksdag.AnotherfiveParliaments/Chambersplan to modifytheir internal subsidiarity controlmechanisms, i.e. the AustrianBundesrat,the ItalianSenato della Repubblica,the LithuanianSeimas,the RomanianSenatuland the UKHouse of Commons.20national Parliaments/Chambers reportamendments intheir internalsubsidiarity controlmechanismsintroduced due to the changes in the role of national Parliaments in the EUprovided for in the Treaty of Lisbon. Severalexamplesof such amendments are describedbelow69.InAustria,besides some minor modifications at the administrative level, changes were made tothe Constitutional Law and to theBundesratRules of Procedure. Changes to the Rules ofProcedure of theNationalratare also foreseen. One important change regarding the eight-weekdeadline was that the EU-Subcommittee of theNationalratnow meets more regularly, i.e. once amonth.69

The Rules of Organization and Procedure of theBulgarianNarodno sabraniewere alsoamended after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in order to reflect the new subsidiaritycontrol mechanism. According to the current procedure, the subsidiarity check is conducted onEU draft legislative acts which are included in the Annual Work Programme on European UnionIssues of theNarodno sabranie.A new approach has been introduced while preparing its AnnualWork Programme for 2011, i.e. cooperation and broad discussion with all stakeholders – theCommission, the European Parliament, the Trio Presidency of the Council of the EU, theParliament and the Council of Ministers. As a result the Programme has been transformed into astrategic document, elaborated in accordance with the Commission Work Programme for 2011.This approach ensures the focus of theNarodno sabranieon key issues of the EU agenda.TheCzechSenát'sRules of Procedure have been amended to implement Article 8 of Protocol 2on actions before the Court of Justice on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarityby a legislative act of the European Union. TheEstonianRiigikoguintroduced its internalsubsidiarity control mechanism in 2010. The same year the subsidiarity mechanism of theGermanBundestagwas modified to allow its EU Affairs Committee to issue opinions on everysubsidiarity check.In theIrishHouses of the Oireachtas,too, the Standing Orders of both Houses have beenamended to provide for a mechanism for subsidiarity checks. Following the recent generalelections, specialised committees were specifically delegated the power to consider complianceof draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity. TheHouses of the Oireachtashave alsoput in place a procedure whereby, following general elections and prior to the establishment ofthe committee system, a transitional committee is established within three days of its first sitting,specifically to consider the subsidiarity aspect of EU proposals. This mechanism has been usedfor the first time after the recent general elections and has provided the basis for theDáiltoconsider a draft of a reasoned opinion.InPoland,since entry into force of the Act on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers withtheSejmand theSenatin matters relating to the Republic of Poland’s membership of theEuropean Union came into force on 13 February 2011, the Standing Orders of theSejmhave alsobeen amended to accommodate a new mechanism for adopting reasoned opinions. Under thecurrent procedure, a draft resolution on the breach of the principle of subsidiarity may be tabledby either the EU Affairs Committee or by at least 15 Members of Parliament. A debate and thefirst reading of the draft resolution take place in the EU Affairs Committee, while the secondreading and a vote take place in the plenary. The adopted reasoned opinion and a cover lettersigned by the Marshal of theSejmare subsequently sent via e-mail to the Commission, theEuropean Parliament and the Council.ThePortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicaadopted its scrutiny procedure for EU draft legislativeacts on 20 January 2010, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Under thisprocedure, the European Affairs Committee receives EU draft legislative acts and sends them tocompetent specialised committees for information or for opinion. Whenever it is decided to drawup a report and an opinion on a draft legislative act, the relevant specialised committee has to doso within six weeks. The report and the opinion are then forwarded to the European AffairsCommittee, which has to complete the consideration of the draft legislative act in two weeks,paying particular attention to the legal basis and the act's compliance with the principle ofsubsidiarity. If it is found to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the European AffairsCommittee sends its written opinion, with the report and the opinion of the specialised

committee to the Speaker of theAssembleia da República,who sends it to the EU institutions.On the other hand, if a breach is found, the European Affairs Committee presents a draftresolution to the plenary, which if approved, is sent to the Presidents of the three EU institutionsin the form of a reasoned opinion.In theItalianSenato della Repubblica,the current subsidiarity and proportionality controlmechanism is defined not in the Rules of Procedure, but in a letter of the Speaker signed on theday the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The letter established that the subsidiarity controlmechanism should follow the procedure used for developing guidelines for the Government70.However, recently, a sub-committee of the Committee on Rules was established to revise theRules of Procedure of theSenato della Repubblicain order to accommodate the subsidiaritycontrol mechanism. Recommendations of the sub-committees have been sent to the Speaker andare presently being considered by the Committee on Rules.In theLithuanianSeimas,an inter-institutional working group has proposed amendments to theStatute (i.e. Rules of Procedure) of theSeimasaimed at:Clarifying the subsidiarity control procedure in theSeimas;Establishing the legal basis for examination of the compliance of proposals with theprinciple of proportionality;Defining the competence of the Seimas to bring actions before the Court of Justice ongrounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act;Establishing the procedure for the approval of the EU legal acts (adopted according toArt. 223, 262, 311 of the TFEU and Art. 42 of the TEU).Proposed amendments have been submitted to the plenary of theSeimas.In theRomanianSenatul,the internal subsidiarity control mechanism is currently beingupgraded. It is now more focused on the horizontal cooperation between the Committee onEuropean Affairs and specialised committees. In future, it should provide for a timely scrutiny ofpriority proposals and improved information exchange between theSenatuland the Government.In theUKHouse of Commons,the parliamentary procedure for dealing with the subsidiaritycontrol mechanism has yet to be finalised. At present it is the Government that tables and movesthe Motion to agree a reasoned opinion recommended by the European Scrutiny Committee. Thecommittee regards that as unsatisfactory and is in discussion with the Government on changingthe procedure to one in which the Motion is tabled and moved by the Chairman of the EuropeanScrutiny Committee. The Committee’s view is supported by a recent report of the ProcedureCommittee of the UKHouse of Commons.In addition, theBulgarianNarodno sabranieinforms that if any future amendments to itscurrent scrutiny control mechanism are to be adopted, they would be focused on theimprovement of cooperation and exchange of information between the Government and theNarodno sabranie,including timeframes for observing the eight-week deadline.Finally, inthreeParliaments/Chambers there isno special internal subsidiarity controlmechanism.In the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosopon,the Parliamentary Committee on Foreignand European Affairs is the primary Committee involved in the scrutiny process of EUdocuments. There is no separate procedure with regard to subsidiarity checks. The issue of70

involving specialised committees in future proceedings is still under consideration. In the CzechSénat,the subsidiarity control mechanism is an integral part of the ex-ante scrutiny of EUlegislation. Therefore, there was no need to define a special procedure in this regard. In theMalteseKamra tad-Deputati,for its part, the internal procedure still needs to be approved.2.1.12 Treatment of reasoned opinions and contributions71by the European ParliamentFollowing the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliamentamended itsRules of Procedure72in order to implement the new mechanism under Protocol 2 and set up aninternal procedure for dealing with both reasoned opinions and contributions from nationalParliaments. Pursuant to Rule 38a(4) of the Rules of Procedure, committees must refrain fromadopting reports before the lapse of the period of eight weeks which is provided under Protocol2.73Furthermore the European Parliament notes thatdefinitions of the terms "reasoned opinion"and "contribution"have been established by its Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), which isresponsible for overseeing respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality."Reasoned opinions" are submissions of national Parliaments on the non-compliance of a draftlegislative act with the principle of subsidiarity that are communicated to the EuropeanParliament within the eight week deadline referred to in Article 6 of Protocol 2. "Contributions"are any other submissions of national Parliaments which do not fulfil the criteria for a reasonedopinion.2.1.12.1 Treatment of reasoned opinionsThe European Parliament explains that reasoned opinions from national Parliaments should beaddressed to the President of the European Parliament and be sent to the following e-mailaddress:[email protected].Alternatively, they may be sent to thePresident of the European Parliament74by ordinary mail.Upon reception, and pursuant to Rule 38a(3) of the Rules of Procedure, all reasoned opinions arereferred to the committee(s) responsiblefor the draft legislative act and forwarded forinformation to theCommittee on Legal Affairs(JURI), which examines them and forwardsthem fortranslationinto all official EU languages - except Maltese and Gaelic - in line with thedecision of the Conference of Committee Chairs in December 2010.Reasoned opinions aredistributed to all Membersof the competent committees, areincludedin the filefor the committee meeting andpublished on the"meeting documents" section of thecommitteewebsitepage. Furthermore, the text of draft legislative resolutions must makereferenceto any reasoned opinions received in relation to their subject matter.71

The European Parliament also provides details on theprocedurethat is followed in case therequisite"yellow card" and "orange card" thresholds(i.e. numbers of votes allocated tonational Parliaments) are reached. Where reasoned opinions represent at least one third of all thevotes allocated to the national Parliaments or a quarter in the case of a proposal for a legislativeact submitted on the basis of Article 76 of the TFEU, Rule 38a(5) of the Rules of Procedurestates that the European Parliament shall not take a decision until the author (e.g. theCommission) of the proposal has stated how it intends to proceed. In accordance with Rule38a(6), where, under the ordinary legislative procedure, reasoned opinions represent at least asimple majority of the votes allocated to the national Parliaments, the committee responsible forthe subject-matter, having considered the reasoned opinions submitted by the nationalParliaments and the Commission, and having heard the views of the Committee responsible forrespect of the principle of subsidiarity, may recommend to the European Parliament (plenary)that it reject the proposal on the grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity orsubmit to the European Parliament any other recommendation, which may include suggestionsfor amendments related to respect of the principle of subsidiarity. The opinion given by thecommittee responsible for respect of the principle of subsidiarity must be annexed to any suchrecommendation. The recommendation must then be submitted to the plenary for a debate andvote. If a recommendation to reject the proposal is adopted by a majority of the votes cast, thePresident must declare the procedure closed. Where the European Parliament does not reject theproposal, the procedure must continue, taking into account any recommendations approved bythe European Parliament.2.1.12.2 Treatment of contributionsAccording to the European Parliament's definition, contributions are any submissions of nationalParliaments which do not fulfil the criteria for a reasoned opinion. They may thus refer to theviews of national Parliaments on substantive provisions, the legal basis or policy choices of adraft legislative act, but also to the views of a national Parliament on an EU document whichdoes not necessarily come under the scope of Protocol 2. A submission which positively assessesa given legislative proposal's compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is also treated as acontribution.Contributions should be sent to the dedicated e-mail address[email protected]Following Rule 130(4) of the Rules of Procedure, upon reception contributions arereferred tothe European Parliament's committee(s) responsiblefor the file. The transmission ofcontributions (as well as Commission replies) to the relevant committees of the EuropeanParliament is done by theDirectorate for Relations with National Parliaments(LegislativeDialogue Unit). Subsequently,committee secretariatsare responsible for thetransmissionofcontributionstothe respective committeeChairs and/or rapporteurswho may requesttranslation of contributions respecting the principle of equal treatment (i.e. all contributionsrelating to the particular file must be translated).2.1.12.3 Further actionsThe European Parliament's Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments circulates to allcommittee secretariats, political groups and any other interested European Parliament services amonthly summary tableand an explanatory note outlining the reasoned opinions and

contributions of national Parliaments pertaining to draft legislative acts coming under the scopeof Protocol 2 received during the preceding month. The Conference of Committee Chairsreceives these documents for information.The summary table, which includes links to the full text of all reasoned opinions andcontributions received since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to the LegislativeObservatory of the European Parliament (OEIL)75and to the IPEX website76, is alsoaccessiblevia the European Parliament Intranet(and therefore directly available to the COSACSecretariat and all representatives of national Parliaments accredited to the EuropeanParliament).2.1.13 Reasoned opinions and contributions in documents of the European ParliamentThe European Parliament states that it is particularly keen on ensuring respect of draft legislativeacts with the principle of subsidiarity. To this end, it has adapted its Rules of Procedure77andestablished a procedure for reception and treatment of reasoned opinions and contributions inorder to facilitate the proper implementation of Protocol 2 (see Part 2.1.12) Interestingly, it is theonly EU institution to translateall reasoned opinions (and potentially contributions)in all EUofficial languages,thus allowing its Members to fully take into account the views expressed bynational Parliaments.The European Parliament goes on to say that its legislative reports "systematically make expressreference to reasoned opinions received in the context of Protocol 2". It illustrates this by givingthe following recent examples of reports and resolutions in different legislative areas:COM (2010) 368: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Councilon Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast]. The draft legislative resolution adopted by theCommittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and submitted on 14 June 2011 tothe European Parliament for adoption makes specific reference in thefifth recitalto itsPreamble to thereasoned opinions of four Parliaments/Chambers,i.e. the DanishFolketing,the GermanBundestagandBundesratand the SwedishRiksdag;COM(2010) 379: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council onthe conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonalemployment. The European Parliament's legislative report was adopted on 8 June 2011 bythe Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Thefourth recitaltothe Preamble of the draft legislative resolution makes explicit reference to thereasonedopinions of six Parliaments/Chambers,i.e. the AustrianNationalratandBundesrat,theCzechPoslanecká sněmovn,andSenát,and the DutchEerste KamerandTweede Kamer.COM(2010) 537: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Councilamending Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by theEuropean Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The draft legislative resolutionadopted by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and submittedon 20 April 2011 to Parliament for adoption makes specific reference in itsfourth recital

In its reply to the questionnaire the European Parliament concludes that the impact of Protocol 2on the legislative process is increasing as the procedure matures. It underlines that it is confidentthat the internal procedures that are in place operate efficiently and contribute to achieving theobjectives set by the Treaty of Lisbon and its Protocols and reiterates its commitment to and activesupport for further advancing its cooperation with national Parliaments.2.2 Informal political dialogueTheInformal Political Dialogueinitiative of the Commission (also referred to as "the Barrosoinitiative") waslaunched in 2006with the aim of encouraging national Parliaments to expresstheir opinions on the Commission’s initiatives (e.g. white papers, green papers, communications,draft legislative acts, etc.) not only related to their compliance with the principle of subsidiaritybut also to any other aspect of the initiative. In addition to the official dialogue based on Protocol2, national Parliaments have the possibility to engage in a political dialogue with theCommission throughout the legislative process, too.This tool has been in use for five years andits use is on the increasesince the entry into force ofthe Treaty of Lisbon. As theAnnual Report 2010from the Commission on relations betweenthe European Commission and national Parliaments78shows theclear trendfor 2010 and thefirst months of 2011 is that national Parliaments are more and more engaging in the informalpolitical dialogue.However, not all Parliaments/Chambers use this tool in the same way. Out of theParliaments/Chambers that have replied to the questionnaire,nineParliaments/Chambers79havenot yet usedthe opportunity to convey their opinions to the Commission in the framework of theinformal political dialogue.2.2.1 Number of contributions sent to the CommissionThenumber of contributionssent by individual Parliaments/Chambers to the Commissiondiffers. The largest number of contributions since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on1 December 2009, i.e.220,has been sent by thePortugueseAssembleia da República,followed7879

by the CzechSenát(52), the GermanBundesrat(44), the SwedishRigsdag(38), the AustrianNationalratandBundesrat(31) and the ItalianCamera dei Deputati(31).It is important to note that the contributions sent to the Commission may refer to one or severalCommission documents. For that reason, thenumber of documentsthat Parliaments/Chambersrefer to in their replies mayexceed the number of contributionssent to the Commission.Parliaments/Chambers followdifferent practicesin sending their contributions. Some sendthem not only to theCommissionbut also to theEuropean Parliamentand to theCouncil(e.g.the PortugueseAssembleia da República).Table 3 below refers to the most frequently commented documents of the Commission in 2010and in 2011 (situation as on). Please note that many of these documents have also raisedsubsidiarity concerns of national Parliaments/Chambers.Table 3: Most frequently commented documents80COM(2009)622COM(2010)119COM(2011)0121COM(2011)0015COM(2010)250,COM(2010)367 andCOM(2010)522-527COM(2010)379COM(2010)368COM(2009)647COM(2010)2020Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated CorporateTax Base (CCCTB)Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policyTowards a more efficient European Procurement MarketEconomic governance776Citizens' Initiative (Green Paper and Proposal for a Regulation)8

2.2.3 Quality of the Commission’s replies to the contributionsOut of those Parliaments/Chambers that have replied to this question,the majorityconsider thatthe replies given by the Commission weresatisfactory(e.g. CypriotVouli ton Antiprosopon,CzechPoslanecká sněmovna,the DanishFolketing,the IrishHouses of the Oireachtas,theLithuanianSeimas).However,a groupof Parliaments/Chambers indicate that the Commission'sreplies are sometimestoo vagueortoo general(e.g., the GermanBundestag,the PolishSenat,the PortugueseAssembleia da República).Some examples ofcritical remarksbyParliaments/Chambers are quoted below.The DutchEeerste Kamerpoints out that in one case the reply cametoo late, i.e. after therequested date. Consequently,it could not be used during the plenary debate on the amendmentof "the bill on illegal aliens".The PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicaconsiders that all the Commission's replies followthesame predefined structureand often do not refer to the specific issues raised or relevantcomments made in the submitted opinion. This is especially true in the field of the area offreedom, security and justice, in which the political dialogue is clearly very limited. On the otherhand, theAssembleia da Repúblicaemphasizes that in some cases the Commission has madereference to the complete calendar/roadmap of the European decision-making process, includingthe stages at the Council and the European Parliament, which has provedparticularly useful.TheAssembleia da Repúblicaalso points out that the (formal) way in which the EuropeanCommission has generally replied to national Parliamentsdoes not appear to uphold thedesired "political dialogue"in a wholly satisfactory way (in terms of content). According to thePortugueseAssembleia da República,the replies often predominantly stress the virtues of theCommission's draft acts and do not seek to answer the critical observations made by theParliament, thus failing to encourage discussion on the ideas, content and substance of the draftacts and opinions in question and fall short of leading to the intended "dialogue".However, there is stillroom for improvementin many aspects. Thus, the AustrianNationalratandBundesratand the ItalianCamera dei Deputatiemphasize that on the basis of the regularcommunication between national Parliaments and the Commission they know that theCommissionis aware of this problem and makes "quite some effort" to improve the qualityof its replies and that it has improved over the last year.The CzechSenátconsiders that thequality of replies differs(depending on the Directorate-General of the Commission responsible and the type of document). On the other hand, itacknowledges that the replies to resolutions on draft legislative acts are generally moreelaborated. TheSenátemphasizes that it wouldin particular welcome information on theresults of public consultationslaunched on green papers, even if this would mean that the self-imposed time-limit of three months to reply would be exceeded.2.2.4 Dealing with the Commission's replies in national ParliamentsIn most cases the Commission's replies to the contributions in the framework of the informalpolitical dialogue aredealt with in the same manner as the replies to reasoned opinionsunder Protocol 2.54

In the majority of cases the replies are distributed in the Committee on EU Affairs, but also inother relevant specialised committees81.Exceptionally, for instance in the LuxembourgChambre des Députés,replies are also sent to theLuxembourg Members of the European Parliament, while the GreekVouli ton Ellinonand theLithuanianSeimasalso occasionally send the replies to their Governments.Many Parliaments/Chambers publish the replies on their websites, thus increasing transparencyand enabling all interested parties to follow the political dialogue.2.2.5 Further informal political dialogue after receiving Commission's repliesIn the vastmajorityof cases there has beenno continuationof the informal political dialogueafter receiving a Commission's reply to the contribution.In some cases, though, for instance in case of the debate on the EU-China report in the UKHouse of Lords,further written dialogue has continued. In other reported cases, there were nowritten answers or comments to the replies, but a discussion on the Commission’s replies in therelevant committees (mostly Committees on EU Affairs).In the LithuanianSeimas,there has been a more concrete follow-up of the replies, in that theinformal dialogue has continued in meetings between Lithuanian Members of Parliament andCommission officials responsible for the Internal Market issues. The CzechSenát,for its part,indicates that it often invites a Member of the European Commission, usually Mr MarošŠEFČOVIČ, Vice-President of the Commission responsible for inter-institutional relations, todiscuss in person with the relevant bodies of theSenátany pending issues that might not havebeen dealt with in the replies in a satisfactory manner.2.3 Parliamentary scrutiny and delegated acts under Article 290 of the TFEU2.3.1 Opinions on proposals that provide for delegated actsOut of the 36 Parliaments/Chambers that have replied to the question of whether they have hadany concerns regarding proposals which provide for delegated acts, some indicate that they havenot discussedthe issue (i.e. the EstonianRiigikogu,the BelgianChambre des ReprésentantsandSénatand the SpanishCortes Generales)or havenot yetdone so (i.e. the MalteseKamra tad-Deputati,the RomanianCamera Deputaţilorand the SlovakNárodna rada).The CypriotVouliton Antiprosoponinforms that the issue isunder consideration.The FrenchSénat,theSlovenianDržavni zborand the SwedishRiksdagmention that they havenot adopted an officialposition.The latter refers to a statement of the Swedish Government when ratifying the Treatyof Lisbon indicating,inter alia,that delegated acts may make the legislative process moreefficient and adds that theRiksdaghas not voiced a different opinion. The SlovenianDržavnisvetstates that it hasnot yet raised concernson delegated acts. The ItalianCamera deiDeputati,for its part, informs that up to now "no general position or concern has been expressed"81

by its EU Affairs Committee and specialised committees. The DanishFolketingexplains its(written)procedureon delegated acts whereby the Government has to present its position ondelegated acts of considerable importance to the European Affairs Committee, after which theFolketinghas at least eight days to adjust the Government's position, and if it does so theGovernment must inform the other members of the Council of the change. The European AffairsCommittee of the LatvianSaeimatakes the view thatnational Parliaments can have anindirect influenceon the application of a "non-legislative act of general application" by givingtheir Governments the mandate to object in the Council to the application of Article 290 oftheTFEU and goes on to explain that in order for non-legislative acts to be applicable animportant condition must be met, i.e. a delegated act can come into force only if the EuropeanParliament or Council has not objected. Hence the European Affairs Committee of theSaeimaconsiders non-legislative acts of the EU on an individual basis.The remaining Parliaments/Chambers take a more or less articulatedcritical stance.TheAustrianNationalratandBundesratare of the opinion that delegated actsshould be usedcarefullyas they might endanger the institutional balance struck by the Treaties and underminedemocratic legitimacy of decisions taken at the European level. In the same vein the PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicaexpresses reservations about the excessive useof this "legislativetechnique". The EU Select Committee of the UKHouse of Lordswarns that practicalscrutinyproblemsarise when proposals involve many provisions for delegated legislation in highlytechnical contexts. The Joint Committee on European Union Affairs of theIrish Houses of theOireachtas,for its part, holds the view that more focus should be put on consideration of thedelegation of powers as part of the usual scrutiny process and informs that it will liaise with thespecialised committees to that effect. The EU Affairs Committee of the PolishSejmunderlinesthat it tries to monitor and control the Commission's power to adopt delegated acts through theconsideration of its proposals, while its counterpart of the PolishSenathighlights thatdefiningand assessing non-essential elementsto be regulated by delegated acts has proven adifficultand controversial exercise,as many national Parliaments consider these elements essential, forwhich reason they should be regulated by a legislative act.For the DutchTweede Kamerthe democratic control of practices in the so-calledcomitologycommitteesremains an issue. It says it is open to suggestions to increase transparency in thisfield. In the GreekVouli ton Ellinona majority of the Members of the EU Affairs Committeebelieve that delegated actsenhance the powers of democratically elected bodies,such as theEuropean Parliament and the Council,against comitology.The GermanBundestagis concernedthat the delegation of powermay weaken national Parliamentsand indicates that it should beinvolved through national law. The FinnishEduskunta,in turn, signals that it is regularlyconfronted with theimproper application of Article 290and links this to "the old question ofthe technical quality of European legislation". Similarly, the HungarianOrszággyűléspleads fortransparent and explicit references in legislative acts authorising the Commission to adoptdelegated acts. The European Scrutiny Committee of the UKHouse of Commons,too, refers toArticle 290 and calls forclose monitoring of delegated acts by the EU legislator,welcomingin this context theCommon Understandingbetween the Commission, the European Parliamentand the Council82. The ItalianSenato della Repubblica,too, mentions the CommonUnderstanding and in particular its paragraph 8 on the duration of delegated acts.

The FrenchAssemblée nationalestates that the general issue of delegated (and implementing)acts wasaddressed on two occasionsby the Chairman of its Committee on EU Affairs, MrPierre LEQUILLER, i.e. on 22 September 2009 and on 6 July 2010. It goes on to say that theCommittee chose (a) to extend the mandate of the rapporteurs on major legislative texts to thescrutiny of the most important delegated acts and implementing acts that emanate from them, (b)toorganise hearings- on the most important texts -with the leading French expertswhowould sit on the various committees that work on delegated acts and implementing acts and (c)to identify the sectors that could be monitored more closely.Finally, four Parliaments/Chambers refer toresolutionsin which they have voiced theirconcerns.The Committee for European Affairs of the CzechPoslanecká sněmovnahas stated insome of its resolutions that too much competence is being passed to the Commission. Likewise,the CzechSenátexpressed its opinion in its resolution of 20 May 2010 on the Communicationfrom the Commission on the implementation of Article 290 of the TFEU. The GermanBundesrat,quoting three examples, highlights that it has repeatedly criticised the fact that theCommission's proposals envisaged powers to enact delegated acts even in cases where theBundesratbelieves that harmonised provisions for the implementation of EU legislation arerequired or in cases addressing certain provisions of essential importance for Member States. TheBundesratgoes on to say that for that reason on 18 March 2011 it resumed deliberations on theaforementioned Communication on the implementation of Article 290 of the TFEU and adoptedan additional resolution which was also sent directly to the Commission83. The ItalianSenatodella Repubblica,referringinter aliato resolution 875/09 of the GermanBundesrat,insists thatthe Treaty on the functioning of the European Union should be strictly complied with when itcomes to defining the various aspects of the delegation of power. The ItalianSenato dellaRepubblicalists 27 resolutions in which it raises objections related to the delegation of powerand quotes from the Commission's Annual Report 2010 on relations between the EuropeanCommission and national Parliaments, in which the Commission acknowledges that "onechamber systematically questions the fact that the delegated powers are conferred on theCommission for an undetermined period".2.3.1.1 Concerns related to the subject of delegated acts31 Parliaments/Chambers have replied to this question. Some do not go into further details forvarious reasons: the SlovakNárodná radahas not discussed the issue in any extensive way yet,the RomanianCamera Deputaţilorwill explore the issue later, the SlovenianDržavni zborhasnot adopted an opinion and the UKHouse of Commonshas not formed a view yet. In the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosoponthe issue is still under consideration.FourParliaments/Chambers (the DanishFolketing,the IrishHouses of the Oireachtas,theSlovenianDržavni svetand the SwedishRiksdag)inform thatno concernshave been raised onthis issueso far.The European Affairs Committee of the LatvianSaeimaclarifies that it hasnoconcerns since its opinion is binding on the Governmentand its views are thereforerepresented in the Council. The BulgarianNarodno sabraniestates thatconcernshave arisen onseveral occasions, but that the issue has subsequently beensolved.The EstonianRiigikoguclarifies that its EU Affairs Committee has discussed this issue under the existing scrutinyframework and that "comitology" questions have been raised and dealt with in cooperation withthe Government.83

NumerousParliaments/Chambers voicespecific concerns,often referring to documents. TheGermanBundesratrefers to the aforementioned additionalresolutionon the implementation ofArticle 290 of the TFEU of 18 March 2011, in which it notesinter aliathat the provisions of theTreaty of Lisbon were not sufficiently taken into account and that there was a lack of consistencyin the decisions to opt for a delegated act or an implementing act. The LithuanianSeimashasexpressed its concern in tworeasoned opinions.So has the PolishSenat,which has adopted fivereasoned opinions stating that the Commission had been granted excessive delegated powers onissues of vital importance to the agricultural market. The LuxembourgChambre des Députés,too, mentions five reasoned opinions that are critical of certain aspects of legislative proposalswhich deal with essential elements and are not compatible with Article 290 of the TFEU. ThePolishSejmrefers toopinionsof its European Union Affairs Committee in which it expresses itsdoubts in relation to delegated acts, giving the example of the directive on the interconnection ofcentral, commercial and companies registers. The UKHouse of Lordsprovides threeexamplesof cases (interalia,in respect of agricultural funding) that have caused concern about the powerto adopt delegated legislation possibly affecting essential elements of the legislative act. Inaddition, it highlights "a significant element of political judgment" in determining what areessential or non-essential elements of legislative acts. The PolishSenatmakes a similar comment(see 2.3.1) The ItalianSenato della Repubblica,too, gives six specific examples of scrutinizeddocuments that include delegated powers concerning essential elements of the act. One suchexample is the delegated act in the framework of theCitizens' Initiativeregulation empoweringthe Commission to amend Annex I establishing the minimum number of signatories per MemberState. The same example is given by the CzechSenát.It draws attention to the "unfortunate trendof basic legislative acts containing only a framework regulation" which leads to more delegatedacts and less transparency.According to the FinnishEduskunta,the general problem seems to be that delegated actsexceedthe powers grantedin the underlying legislation or are evenin contradictionwith it. TheItalianCamera dei Deputatirefers to one case in which a specialised committee considered thata draft legislative act conferred atoo broad delegation of powerto the Commission. TheAustrianNationalratandBundesrathold the view that delegated acts should be limited totechnical aspects and/or emergency situations and that the transfer of law-making powershouldnot exceed the absolute minimum.This view is echoed by the PortugueseAssembleia daRepública,which considers that the delegation of power to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts should be "keptto a strict minimum".The HungarianOrszággyűlésinsists thatall relevant EU institutions shouldrespect the limitationsof Article 290 of the TFEU and theDutchEerste Kamerconsiders that the incorrect application of Article 290 of the TFEU "wouldindeed be a matter of concern" insofar as it "would impede effective parliamentary scrutiny".2.3.1.2 Adequate description of essential features of delegated acts in proposals28 Parliaments/Chambers have replied to the question on the adequacy of the description ofessential features of delegated acts in proposals. The RomanianCamera Deputaţilorindicatesthat the issue will be dealt with later. The SlovenianDržavni zborhas not adopted an opinion onthis and the UKHouse of Commonshas not formed a view yet. In the CypriotVouli tonAntiprosoponthe issue is still under consideration.The Joint Committee of the IrishHouses ofthe Oireachtasis considering whether the Commission should be required to address the issue intheexplanatory memorandumof relevant proposals. The ItalianSenato della Repubblica,too,is of the opinion that the Commission should include in the explanatory memorandum of every

act the elements necessaryto assess compliance with Article 290.The DutchTweede Kamerstates that no information is available and the CzechPoslanecká sněmovnaadmits that it cannotreally assess this issue.The DanishFolketinginforms that only the general use of delegated acts has been debated. TheBulgarianNarodno sabranie,for its part, clearly states that so far essential features of delegatedacts have beenproperly described.The SlovenianDržavni svet,the SwedishRiksdag,theItalianCamera dei Deputatiand the European Affairs Committee of the LatvianSaeimahavenot identified any concerns yet.According to the FinnishEduskuntathe real problem with delegated acts - apart from theirvarying drafting quality - is thetendency not to respect the inherent limits.The LithuanianSeimasrefers to its criticism of the Commission in a reasoned opinion on the grounds that it didnot provide sufficient evidence toprove the needfor delegated acts. The GreekVouli tonEllinon,for its part, explains that in the light of the vast number of recent proposals based onArticle 290 of the TFEU only a few have been selected for scrutiny and goes on to say that thescrutiny process has revealedmany differences in the justificationof delegated acts, rangingfrom very detailed to inexistent.On the description of theobjectiveof delegated acts, the PolishSejmhas come to the conclusionthat it isoften vague(as is the description of the scope). The UKHouse of Lords,too, states thatthere have been instances where the legislative actdoes not clearly and specifically definetheobjectives of the delegated power, for instance in the context of agricultural funding.Regarding thecontentof delegated acts, the PolishSejmhighlights that delegated acts docontain essential elements which should be dealt within the legislative act itself. According to thePortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicathe lack of an explicit description of the content (andscope) of delegated acts raises justifiable doubts. The LuxembourgChambre des Députésnotesthat the wording frequentlylacks precision,allows for thearbitrary interpretationofdelegated powers andalters essential elementsof the legislative act.In its additional resolution of 18 March 2011 on the implementation of Article 290 of the TFEUthe GermanBundesratnotesinter aliathat the requirement to limit thescopeand/or duration ofdelegated acts has often not been complied with. The AustrianNationalratandBundesratholdthe view that there is aneed for an ex-ante clear definitionof the scope of future delegated actsand that the scope should berestricted to technical aspects and/or emergency situations.TheItalianSenato della Repubblicaurges that the scope be defined in compliance with the limitsexplicitly set byArticle 290 of the TFEU.Both the PolishSejmand the PortugueseAssembleiada Repúblicacriticise theinsufficiently explicit definitionof the scope of many delegated acts.The GreekVouli ton Ellinoninforms that Members of its EU Affairs Committee take the viewthat in some cases the scope of competence conferred on the Commission is"of significantnature",which may lead to breaches of the proportionality principle. The CzechSenátsignalsthat it supported the efforts of the Czech Government to better define the scope of theCommission's powers in the context of the recast of the railway package.Thedurationof delegated acts is another point of concern to the CzechSenát,which is indisagreement with, for instance; theindefinite natureof the delegation of power to theCommission to amend Annex I of the regulation on theCitizens' Initiative.In itsaforementioned resolution of 18 March 2011 the GermanBundesratnotesinter aliathat therequirement to limit the scope and/or duration of delegated acts hasoften not been complied

with.The HungarianOrszággyűlésfears that the indeterminate period of delegation of power tothe Commission and the narrow time frame for EU legislators to reactmay reducetransparency,especiallyvis-à-visnational Parliaments. This view is shared by the ItalianSenatodella Repubblica,which argues that "the practice of indefinite delegation is held to adverselyaffect the authority of national Parliaments"and advocates clear start and end dates for thedelegation of power, "which should leave no space for the increasing practice of indefinitedelegation". It goes on to describe delegated powers for an indefinite period of time as an"anomaly"made possible by the aforementionedCommon Understandingbetween theCommission, the European Parliament and the Council. The European Scrutiny Committee ofthe UKHouse of Commons,too, thinks that delegated acts "should be granted for a fixed, ratherthan indefinite, period of time, which should not be automatically renewed."2.3.2 Possible cooperation with the EU institutions for monitoring delegated acts33 Parliaments/Chambers have replied to the question on possible cooperation with the EUinstitutions in the process of themonitoring of delegated acts.The MalteseKamra tad-Deputatiinforms that the issue has not yet been discussed. In the LuxembourgChambre des Députéstheissue is not under discussion. Similarly, the RomanianCamera Deputaţilorindicates that theissue will be dealt with later, while the CypriotVouli ton Antiprosoponreiterates that the issue isstill under consideration. The SlovenianDržavni zborstates that no opinion has been adoptedand the SwedishRiksdagis not in a position to answer the question.According to the CzechPoslanecká sněmovnathere is "hardly" any room for cooperation withthe EU institutions on monitoring delegated acts, while the Lithuanian Seimas does "notyet"seesuch a possibility. The SlovakNárodná radadoes not primarily focus on this issue,but doesnot exclude its future participation in such an exercise either. The FinnishEduskunta,for its part,prefers to rely on its existing constitutional powers, considering dialogue with the EU institutionsnot a first optionand legal action the ultimate remedy if delegated powers are exceeded.Similarly, the AustrianNationalratandBundesrattake the view that an increased control ofdelegated acts by national Parliaments will not remedy shortcomings and that it isup to the EUlegislators and finally the Court of Justiceto secure uniform application of criteria. TheHungarianOrszággyűlésfavours primarilycloser cooperation between governments andnational Parliaments.The DanishFolketing,for its part, has been focusing on the scrutiny ofdelegated acts via its Government in the Council. The GermanBundestagmentions that for nowcooperation takes place "in the given framework". For the PolishSenatreasoned opinionsandthepolitical dialogueare useful tools to address the concerns, while the LatvianSaeimatakesthe view that "dedicating a section on the European Commission's website to delegated actswould be a sufficient measure to ensure additional clarity".The Joint Committee on European Union Affairs of the IrishHouses of the Oireachtasstates thatit "would be happy to consider anappropriate mechanism".The DutchTweede Kamerconveysthe message that it is "open to suggestions that could improve the transparency and democraticcontrol of the practices of the comitology committees". The DutchEerste Kamer,for its part, is"open to work with other EU Parliaments to exchange information and best practices". TheSlovenianDržavni svetdeclares itself alwaysopen to cooperation,without formulating specificsuggestions. According to the BulgarianNarodno sabraniecooperation with the EU institutionson this issue is "agood idea".The Committee on EU Policies of the ItalianCamera dei Deputatifinds such a cooperation "veryusefulin order to support the general scrutiny of nationalParliaments on draft legislative acts", indicating that the latter are "currently not transmitted by

the Government to the Italian Parliament". The GermanBundesratinforms that so far it has notcommented on this issue, but also draws attention to its first opinion of 12 February 2010 on theCommunication of the Commission on the implementation of Article 290 of the TFEU, in whichit welcomed the intention of the Commission to continue the systematicconsultation of expertsfrom national authorities of all Member Statesand the practice of working with expertgroups. In the same opinion, theBundesratemphasised that "theEU legislatormust continue toassumeresponsibility for democratic oversightof delegated acts", and called on the FederalGovernment to ensure in the Council that this scope for oversight is used to the full. The GreekVouli ton Ellinoninsists that any involvement in the process "requires specialised knowledge andexpertise" and is convinced that "there will be aconstant need for supportby experts andgovernmental units in undertaking such an initiative".Cooperation with the European Parliamentin particular is a possibility foreseen by the PolishSejm,which announces that the issue will be discussed when the Presidium of its EU AffairsCommittee meets in September 2011. The FrenchAssemblée nationale,for its part, is quiteexplicit in stating that close cooperation, in particular with the European Parliament, is "one ofthe most promising ways to guarantee efficient parliamentary control". The UKHouse of Lords,too,favours increased cooperationwith the European Parliament by identifying in good timedelegated acts to which the European Parliament or the Council may object as well as instanceswhere either of them contemplates revoking the delegation in the legislative act. Pointing tocapacity problems in most national Parliaments to monitor "the plethora of delegated actsadopted" the CzechSenátwelcomesthe idea of the UKHouse of Lordsregarding cooperationwith the European Parliament on this issue.The European Parliament refers to the aforementionedCommon Understandingwith theCommission and the Council and goes on to say that it will carry out anassessmentof the waythe Common Understanding functions one year after it became operational and decide whetheror not to initiate a revision of it with the Commission and the Council.The ItalianSenato della Repubblicadraws attention to theletter on(the duration of)delegatedactsthat the Chairwoman of its Committee on EU Policies, Ms Rossana BOLDI, sent on theoccasion of theXLV COSAC,inviting all national Parliaments to have an in-depth look into thematter84. Whilst criticising the Commission for constantly reiterating its position in its numerousreplies to its standing committees, theSenato della Repubblicastates that it is willing tocooperate with all EU institutionson effective monitoring of delegated acts. The PortugueseAssembleia da Repúblicaunderscores theneed for a model- even if only informal - ofcooperation with the EU institutions on the scrutiny of delegated acts.