Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 (1. samling)
URU Alm.del Bilag 36
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THE G20 SEOUL SUMMITLEADERS’ DECLARATIONNOVEMBER 11 – 12, 20101. We, the Leaders of the G20, are united in our conviction that by working together we cansecure a more prosperous future for the citizens of all countries.2. When we first gathered in November 2008 to address the most severe world recession ourgeneration has ever confronted, we pledged to support and stabilize the global economy,and at the same time, to lay the foundation for reform, to ensure the world would neverface such upheaval again.3. Over the past four Summits, we have worked with unprecedented cooperation to breakthe dramatic fall in the global economy to establish the basis for recovery and renewedgrowth.4. The concrete steps we have taken will help ensure we are better prepared to prevent and,if necessary, to withstand future crises. We pledge to continue our coordinated efforts andact together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced growth.5. We recognize the importance of addressing the concerns of the most vulnerable. To thisend, we are determined to put jobs at the heart of the recovery, to provide socialprotection, decent work and also to ensure accelerated growth in low income countries(LICs).6. Our relentless and cooperative efforts over the last two years have delivered strong results.However, we must stay vigilant.7. Risks remain. Some of us are experiencing strong growth, while others face high levels ofunemployment and sluggish recovery. Uneven growth and widening imbalances arefueling the temptation to diverge from global solutions into uncoordinated actions.However, uncoordinated policy actions will only lead to worse outcomes for all.8. Since 2008, a common view of the challenges of the world economy, the necessaryresponses and our determination to resist protectionism has enabled us to both address theroot causes of the crisis and safeguard the recovery. We are agreed today to develop ourcommon view to meet these new challenges and a path to strong, sustainable andbalanced growth beyond the crisis.9. Today, the Seoul Summit delivers:the Seoul Action Plan composed of comprehensive, cooperative and country-specificpolicy actions to move closer to our shared objective. The Plan includes ourcommitment to:-undertake macroeconomic policies, including fiscal consolidation wherenecessary, to ensure ongoing recovery and sustainable growth and enhance thestability of financial markets, in particular moving toward more market-determined exchange rate systems, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to reflectunderlying economic fundamentals, and refraining from competitive devaluation1
of currencies. Advanced economies, including those with reserve currencies,will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchangerates. These actions will help mitigate the risk of excessive volatility in capitalflows facing some emerging countries;-implement a range of structural reforms that boost and sustain global demand,foster job creation, and increase the potential for growth; andenhance the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) to promote externalsustainability. We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote externalsustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducingexcessive imbalances and maintaining current account imbalances at sustainablelevels. Persistently large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to beagreed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, warrant anassessment of their nature and the root causes of impediments to adjustment aspart of the MAP, recognizing the need to take into account national or regionalcircumstances, including large commodity producers. These indicativeguidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as a mechanism tofacilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventive andcorrective actions to be taken. To support our efforts toward meeting thesecommitments, we call on our Framework Working Group, with technicalsupport from the IMF and other international organizations, to develop theseindicative guidelines, with progress to be discussed by our Finance Ministersand Central Bank Governors in the first half of 2011; and, in Gyeongju, ourFinance Ministers and Central Bank Governors called on the IMF to provide anassessment as part of the MAP on the progress toward external sustainabilityand the consistency of fiscal, monetary, financial sector, structural, exchangerate and other policies. In light of this, the first such assessment, to be based onthe above mentioned indicative guidelines, will be initiated and undertaken indue course under the French Presidency.
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a modernized IMF that better reflects the changes in the world economy throughgreater representation of dynamic emerging markets and developing countries. Thesecomprehensive quota and governance reforms, as outlined in the Seoul SummitDocument, will enhance the IMF’s legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness, makingit an even stronger institution for promoting global financial stability and growth.instruments to strengthen global financial safety nets, which help countries cope withfinancial volatility by providing them with practical tools to overcome suddenreversals of international capital flows.core elements of a new financial regulatory framework, including bank capital andliquidity standards, as well as measures to better regulate and effectively resolvesystemically important financial institutions, complemented by more effectiveoversight and supervision. This new framework, complemented by otherachievements as outlined in the Seoul Summit Document, will ensure a moreresilient financial system by reining in the past excesses of the financial sector andbetter serving the needs of our economies.the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth that sets out our commitment2
to work in partnership with other developing countries, and LICs in particular, tohelp them build the capacity to achieve and maximize their growth potential, therebycontributing to global rebalancing. The Seoul Consensus complements ourcommitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and focuses onconcrete measures as summarized in our Multi-Year Action Plan on Development tomake a tangible and significant difference in people’s lives, including in particularthrough the development of infrastructure in developing countries.the Financial Inclusion Action Plan, the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusionand a flexible SME Finance Framework, all of which will significantly contribute toimproving access to financial services and expanding opportunities for poorhouseholds and small and medium enterprises.our strong commitment to direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-boardnegotiations to promptly bring the Doha Development Round to a successful,ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced conclusion consistent with the mandate ofthe Doha Development Round and built on the progress already achieved. Werecognize that 2011 is a critical window of opportunity, albeit narrow, and thatengagement among our representatives must intensify and expand. We now need tocomplete the end game. Once such an outcome is reached, we commit to seekratification, where necessary, in our respective systems. We are also committed toresisting all forms of protectionist measures.
10. We will continue to monitor and assess ongoing implementation of the commitmentsmade today and in the past in a transparent and objective way. We hold ourselvesaccountable. What we promise, we will deliver.11. Building on our achievements to date, we have agreed to work further on macro-prudential policy frameworks; better reflect the perspective of emerging marketeconomies in financial regulatory reforms; strengthen regulation and oversight of shadowbanking; further work on regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets;improve market integrity and efficiency; enhance consumer protection; pursue alloutstanding governance reform issues at the IMF and World Bank; and build a morestable and resilient international monetary system, including by further strengtheningglobal financial safety nets. We will also expand our MAP based on the indicativeguidelines to be agreed.12. To promote resilience, job creation and mitigate risks for development, we will prioritizeaction under the Seoul Consensus on addressing critical bottlenecks, includinginfrastructure deficits, food market volatility, and exclusion from financial services.13. To provide broader, forward-looking leadership in the post-crisis economy, we will alsocontinue our work to prevent and tackle corruption through our Anti-Corruption ActionPlan; rationalize and phase-out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies;mitigate excessive fossil fuel price volatility; safeguard the global marine environment;and combat the challenges of global climate change.14. We reaffirm our resolute commitment to fight climate change, as reflected in the Leaders'Seoul Summit Document. We appreciate President Felipe Calderón’s briefing on thestatus of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, as well as3
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s briefing on the report of the High-Level Advisory Groupon Climate Change Financing submitted to the UN Secretary-General. We will spare noeffort to reach a balanced and successful outcome in Cancun.15. We welcome the Fourth UN LDC Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-Level Forumon Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011.16. Recognizing the importance of private sector-led growth and job creation, we welcomethe Seoul G20 Business Summit and look forward to continuing the G20 BusinessSummit in upcoming Summits.17. The actions agreed today will help to further strengthen the global economy, acceleratejob creation, ensure more stable financial markets, narrow the development gap andpromote broadly shared growth beyond crisis.18. We look forward to our next meeting in 2011 in France, and subsequent meeting in 2012in Mexico.19. We thank Korea for its G20 Presidency and for hosting the successful Seoul Summit.20. TheSeoul Summit Document,which we have agreed, follows.
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THE SEOUL SUMMIT DOCUMENT
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth1. Our unprecedented and highly coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus worked to bringback the global economy from the edge of a depression. This has highlighted that theworld would benefit from more effective international cooperation. In Pittsburgh, welaunched the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and committed towork together to assess the collective implications of our national policies on globalgrowth and development, identify potential risks to the global economy, and takeadditional actions to achieve our shared objectives.2. Since then, we have made important progress through our country-led, consultativeMutual Assessment Process (MAP) of the Framework:ŸŸŸŸŸSupportive economic policies have been put in place to promote ongoing recoveryand job creation;Explicit commitments have been made to put public finances on a sustainable track;Strong measures have been adopted and are being implemented to safeguard thestability of our financial system;Important structural reforms have been launched and/or planned to boost globaldemand and potential growth; andSignificant steps have been taken to strengthen the capacity of international financialinstitutions (IFIs) in support of development.
3. Since we last met, the global recovery continues to advance, but downside risks remain.We are resolved to do more. Our strengthened collaborative and collective policy actionscan further safeguard the recovery and lay a solid foundation for our shared objectives ofstrong, sustainable and balanced growth.The Seoul Action Plan4. Today we are launching the Seoul Action Plan. We shaped the Plan with unity of purposeto:ŸŸŸensure an unwavering commitment to cooperation;outline an action-oriented plan with each member’s concrete policy commitments;anddeliver on all three objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growth.
5. Specifically, we commit to actions in five policy areas with details of specificcommitments by G20 members set out in the Supporting Document.6.Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies:We reaffirm the importance of central banks’commitment to price stability, thereby contributing to the recovery and sustainablegrowth. We will move toward more market-determined exchange rate systems andenhance exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying economic fundamentals andrefrain from competitive devaluation of currencies. Advanced economies, including thosewith reserve currencies, will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly1
movements in exchange rates. Together these actions will help mitigate the risk ofexcessive volatility in capital flows facing some emerging market economies.Nonetheless, in circumstances where countries are facing undue burden of adjustment,policy responses in emerging market economies with adequate reserves and increasinglyovervalued flexible exchange rates may also include carefully designed macro-prudentialmeasures. We will reinvigorate our efforts to promote a stable and well functioninginternational monetary system and call on the IMF to deepen its work in these areas.7.Trade and Development Policies:We reaffirm our commitment to free trade andinvestment recognizing its central importance for the global recovery. We will refrainfrom introducing, and oppose protectionist trade actions in all forms and recognize theimportance of a prompt conclusion of the Doha negotiations. We reaffirm ourcommitment to avoid financial protectionism and are mindful of the risks of proliferationof measures that would damage investment and harm prospects for the global recovery.With developing countries’ rising share in world output and trade, the goals of globalgrowth, rebalancing and development are increasingly interlinked. We will focus effortsto resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growthin developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular: infrastructure, humanresources development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growthwith resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and knowledgesharing. In addition, we will take concrete actions to increase our financial and technicalsupport, including fulfilling the Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitmentsby advanced countries.8.Fiscal Policies:Advanced economies will formulate and implement clear, credible,ambitious and growth-friendly medium-term fiscal consolidation plans in line with theToronto commitment, differentiated according to national circumstances. We are mindfulof the risk of synchronized adjustment on the global recovery and of the risk that failureto implement consolidation, where immediately necessary, would undermine confidenceand growth.9.Financial Reforms:We are committed to take action at the national and internationallevel to raise standards, and ensure that our national authorities implement globalstandards developed to date, consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, arace to the top and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatoryarbitrage. In particular, we will implement fully the new bank capital and liquiditystandards and address too-big-to-fail problems. We agreed to further work on financialregulatory reforms.10.Structural Reforms:We will implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustainglobal demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase ourgrowth potential, and where needed undertake:ŸŸProduct market reforms to simplify regulation and reduce regulatory barriers in orderto promote competition and enhance productivity in key sectors.Labor market and human resource development reforms, including better targetedbenefits schemes to increase participation; education and training to increaseemployment in quality jobs, boost productivity and thereby enhance potential growth.
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Tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving theincentives to work, invest and innovate.Green growth and innovation oriented policy measures to find new sources of growthand promote sustainable development.Reforms to reduce the reliance on external demand and focus more on domesticsources of growth in surplus countries while promoting higher national savings andenhancing export competitiveness in deficit countries.Reforms to strengthen social safety nets such as public health care and pension plans,corporate governance and financial market development to help reduce precautionarysavings in emerging surplus countries.Investment in infrastructure to address bottlenecks and enhance growth potential.
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In pursuing these reforms, we will draw on the expertise of the OECD, IMF, World Bank,ILO and other international organizations.11.MAP beyond the Seoul Summit:In addition, we will enhance the MAP to promoteexternal sustainability. We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote externalsustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducing excessiveimbalances and maintaining current account imbalances at sustainable levels. Persistentlylarge imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be agreed by our FinanceMinisters and Central Bank Governors, warrant an assessment of their nature and theroot causes of impediments to adjustment as part of the MAP, recognizing the need totake into account national or regional circumstances, including large commodityproducers. These indicative guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve asa mechanism to facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventiveand corrective actions to be taken. To support our efforts toward meeting thesecommitments, we call on our Framework Working Group, with technical support fromthe IMF and other international organizations, to develop these indicative guidelines,with progress to be discussed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors inthe first half of 2011; and, in Gyeongju, our Finance Ministers and Central BankGovernors called on the IMF to provide an assessment as part of the MAP on theprogress toward external sustainability and the consistency of fiscal, monetary, financialsector, structural, exchange rate and other policies. In light of this, the first suchassessment, to be based on the above mentioned indicative guidelines, will be initiatedand undertaken in due course under the French Presidency.12. We have a shared responsibility. Members with sustained, significant external deficitspledge to undertake policies to support private savings and where appropriate undertakefiscal consolidation while maintaining open markets and strengthening export sectors.Members with sustained, significant external surpluses pledge to strengthen domesticsources of growth.13. Recognizing the benefits of the Framework, we agreed to expand and refine the country-led, consultative MAP by including monitoring of the implementation of ourcommitments and assessment of our progress toward achieving our shared objectives.This process will be adopted in 2011 under the French Presidency.3
International Financial Institution Reforms14. When the world was in the middle of the global financial crisis, we met and agreed toprovide the IFIs with the resources they needed to support the global economy. With ouragreements to increase their resources substantially and endorse new lending instruments,the IFIs mobilized critical financing, including more than $750 billion by the IMF and$235 billion by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Financial marketsstabilized and the global economy started to recover. Even in the midst of the crisis, weknew that further reforms of the IFIs were required.15. We committed to modernize the institutions fundamentally so that they better reflectchanges in the world economy and can more effectively play their roles in promotingglobal financial stability, fostering development and improving the lives of the poorest.In June 2010, we welcomed the reforms to increase the voting power of developing andtransition countries at the World Bank. We also remained committed to strengthening thelegitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IMF through quota and governancereforms.Modernized IMF governance16. Today, we welcomed the ambitious achievements by the Finance Ministers and CentralBank Governors at the Gyeongju meeting, and subsequent decision by the IMF, on acomprehensive package of IMF quota and governance reforms. The reforms are animportant step toward a more legitimate, credible and effective IMF, by ensuring thatquotas and Executive Board composition are more reflective of new global economicrealities, and securing the IMF’s status as a quota-based institution, with sufficientresources to support members’ needs. Consistent with our commitments at the Pittsburghand Toronto Summits, and going even further in a number of areas, the reforms include:ŸShifts in quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and tounder-represented countries of over 6%, while protecting the voting share of thepoorest, which we commit to work to complete by the Annual Meetings in 2012.A doubling of quotas, with a corresponding rollback of the New Arrangements toBorrow (NAB) preserving relative shares, when the quota increase becomeseffective.Continuing the dynamic process aimed at enhancing the voice and representation ofemerging market and developing countries, including the poorest, through acomprehensive review of the quota formula by January 2013 to better reflect theeconomic weights; and through completion of the next general review of quotas byJanuary 2014.Greater representation for emerging market and developing countries at theExecutive Board through two fewer advanced European chairs, and the possibilityof a second alternate for all multi-country constituencies.
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Moving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the IMF’s membershipto maintain the Board size at 24 chairs, and following the completion of the 14thGeneral Review, a review of the Board’s composition every eight years.
17. We reiterate the urgency of promptly concluding the 2008 IMF Quota and Voice Reforms.We urge all G20 members participating in the expanded NAB to accelerate theirprocedures in completing the acceptance process. We ask the IMF to report on theprogress, in accordance with agreed timelines, toward effective implementation of the2010 quota and governance reforms to our Finance Ministers and Central BankGovernors at their periodic G20 meetings.18. When combined with the already agreed voice reform of the World Bank, these representsignificant achievements in modernizing our key IFIs. They will be even stronger playersin promoting global financial stability and growth. We asked our Finance Ministers andCentral Bank Governors to continue to pursue all outstanding governance reform issuesat the World Bank and the IMF.Surveillance19. We recognize the importance of continuing the work on reforming the IMF’s mission andmandate, including strengthening surveillance.20. IMF surveillance should be enhanced to focus on systemic risks and vulnerabilitieswherever they may lie. To this extent, we welcome the decision made by the IMF tomake financial stability assessments under the Financial Sector Assessment Program(FSAP) a regular and mandatory part of Article IV consultation for members withsystemically important financial sectors. We call on the IMF to make further progress inmodernizing the IMF’s surveillance mandate and modalities. These should involve, inparticular: strengthening bilateral and multilateral work on surveillance coveringfinancial stability, macroeconomic, structural and exchange rate policies, with increasedfocus on systemic issues; enhancing synergies between surveillance tools; helpingmembers to strengthen their surveillance capacity; and ensuring even-handedness, candor,and independence of surveillance. We welcome the IMF’s work to conduct spilloverassessments of the wider impact of systemic economies’ policies.Multilateral Development Banks21. We reiterate our commitment to completing an ambitious replenishment for theconcessional lending facilities of the MDBs, especially the International DevelopmentAssociation, to help ensure that LICs have access to sufficient concessional resources.Strengthened global financial safety nets22. As the global economy became more interconnected and integrated, the size andvolatility of capital flows increased significantly. The increased volatility was a source ofinstability during the financial crisis. It even adversely affected countries with solidfundamentals and the effects were greater on those with more open economies. Theseproblems persist. Current volatility of capital flows is reflecting the differing speed ofrecovery between advanced and emerging market economies. National, regional andmultilateral responses are required. Strengthened global financial safety nets can help5
countries to cope with financial volatility, reducing the economic disruption from suddenswings in capital flows and the perceived need for excessive reserve accumulation.23. Therefore, we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to prepare policyoptions to strengthen global financial safety nets for our consideration at this Summit.24. We welcome the following achievements from our mandate:ŸThe enhancement of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) including the extension of itsduration and removal of the access cap. Countries with strong fundamentals andpolicies will have access to a refined FCL with enhanced predictability andeffectiveness.The creation of the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) as a new preventative tool. ThePCL allows countries with sound fundamentals and policies, but moderatevulnerabilities, to benefit from the IMF’s precautionary liquidity provision.The recent decision by the IMF to continue its work to further improve the globalcapacity to cope with shocks of a systemic nature, as well as the recent clarificationof the procedures for synchronized approval of the FCLs for multiple countries, bywhich a number of countries affected by a common shock could concurrently seekaccess to FCL.The dialogue to enhance collaboration between Regional Financing Arrangements(RFAs) and the IMF, acknowledging the potential synergies from such collaboration.
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25. Building on the achievements made to date on strengthening global financial safety nets,we need to do further work to improve our capacity to cope with future crises. Therefore,we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore, with input fromthe IMF:ŸŸA structured approach to cope with shocks of a systemic nature.Ways to improve collaboration between RFAs and the IMF across all possible areasand enhance the capability of RFAs for crisis prevention, while recognizing region-specific circumstances and characteristics of each RFA.
26. Our goal is to build a more stable and resilient international monetary system. While theinternational monetary system has proved resilient, tensions and vulnerabilities areclearly apparent. We agreed to explore ways to further improve the internationalmonetary system to ensure systemic stability in the global economy. We asked the IMF todeepen its work on all aspects of the international monetary system, including capitalflow volatility. We look forward to reviewing further analysis and proposals over thenext year.Financial Sector Reforms27. The global financial system came to a sudden halt in 2008 as a result of reckless andirresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, combined with majorfailures of regulation and supervision. While our initial priority was to move quickly to6
stabilize financial markets and restore the global flow of capital, we never lost sight ofthe need to address the root causes of the crisis. We took our first step at the WashingtonSummit, where we developed the Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform. Sincethen, we built on the progress made in London, Pittsburgh, and Toronto, and together,took major strides toward fixing the financial system with the support from theinternational organizations, particularly the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the BaselCommittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).Transformed financial system to address the root causes of the crisis28. Today, we have delivered core elements of the new financial regulatory framework totransform the global financial system.29. We endorsed the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS on the new bank capital andliquidity framework, which increases the resilience of the global banking system byraising the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity,constrains the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capitalbuffers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. Theframework includes an internationally harmonized leverage ratio to serve as a backstop tothe risk-based capital measures. With this, we have achieved far-reaching reform of theglobal banking system. The new standards will markedly reduce banks’ incentive to takeexcessive risks, lower the likelihood and severity of future crises, and enable banks towithstand – without extraordinary government support – stresses of a magnitudeassociated with the recent financial crisis. This will result in a banking system that canbetter support stable economic growth. We are committed to adopt and implement fullythese standards within the agreed timeframe that is consistent with economic recoveryand financial stability. The new framework will be translated into our national laws andregulations, and will be implemented starting on January 1, 2013 and fully phased in byJanuary 1, 2019.30. We reaffirmed our view that no firm should be too big or too complicated to fail and thattaxpayers should not bear the costs of resolution. We endorsed the policy framework,work processes, and timelines proposed by the FSB to reduce the moral hazard risksposed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and address the too-big-to-fail problem. This requires a multi-pronged framework combining: a resolutionframework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolvedsafely, quickly and without destabilizing the financial system and exposing the taxpayersto the risk of loss; a requirement that SIFIs and initially in particular financial institutionsthat are globally systemic (G-SIFIs) should have higher loss absorbency capacity toreflect the greater risk that the failure of these firms poses to the global financial system;more intensive supervisory oversight; robust core financial market infrastructure toreduce contagion risk from individual failures; and other supplementary prudential andother requirements as determined by the national authorities which may include, in somecircumstances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large exposure restrictions, levies andstructural measures. In the context of loss absorbency, we encourage further progress onthe feasibility of contingent capital and other instruments. We encouraged the FSB,BCBS and other relevant bodies to complete their remaining work in accordance with theendorsed work processes and timelines in 2011 and 2012.31. In addition, we agreed that G-SIFIs should be subject to a sustained process of mandatory7
international recovery and resolution planning. We agreed to conduct rigorous riskassessment on these firms through international supervisory colleges and negotiateinstitution-specific crisis cooperation agreements within crisis management groups.Regular peer reviews will be conducted by the FSB on the effectiveness and consistencyof national policy measures for these firms.32. We reaffirmed our Toronto commitment to national-level implementation of the BCBS’scross-border resolution recommendations. To support implementation at the nationallevel, we welcomed the BCBS’s planned stock taking exercise of these recommendations.We called on the FSB to build on this work and develop attributes of effective resolutionregimes by 2011.33. Delivering on our commitment in Toronto, we endorsed the policy recommendationsprepared by the FSB in consultation with the IMF, on increasing supervisory intensityand effectiveness. We reaffirmed that the new financial regulatory framework must becomplemented with more effective oversight and supervision. We agreed that supervisorsshould have strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act,appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify andaddress risks, including regular stress testing and early intervention.Implementation and international assessment, including peer review34. But our reform efforts are an ongoing process. It is essential that we fully implement thenew standards and principles, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the topand avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage. Werecognized different national starting points.35. We reaffirmed today our full commitment to action and implementation.36. At the national level, we will incorporate the new standards and principles into relevantlegislation and policies. At the global level, international assessment and peer reviewprocesses should be substantially enhanced in order to ensure consistency inimplementation across countries and identify areas for further improvement in standardsand principles. In this regard, we recognized the value of the FSAP jointly undertaken bythe IMF and the World Bank, and the FSB’s peer review as means of fostering consistentcross-country implementation of international standards.37. We also firmly recommitted to work in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge funds, OTCderivatives and credit rating agencies. We reaffirmed the importance of fullyimplementing the FSB’s standards for sound compensation. We endorsed the FSB’srecommendations for implementing OTC derivatives market reforms, designed to fullyimplement our previous commitments in an internationally consistent manner,recognizing the importance of a level playing field. We asked the FSB to monitor theprogress regularly. We welcomed ongoing work by the Committee on Payment andSettlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO) on central counterparty standards. We also endorsed the FSB’s principles onreducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants,supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings.
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38. We re-emphasized the importance we place on achieving a single set of improved highquality global accounting standards and called on the International Accounting StandardsBoard and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to complete their convergenceproject by the end of 2011. We also encouraged the International Accounting StandardsBoard to further improve the involvement of stakeholders, including outreach to, andmembership of, emerging market economies, in the process of setting the globalstandards, within the framework of independent accounting standard setting process.39. In addition, we reiterated our commitment to preventing non-cooperative jurisdictionsfrom posing risks to the global financial system and welcomed the ongoing efforts by theFSB, Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information (Global Forum),and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based on comprehensive, consistent andtransparent assessment. We reached agreement on:ŸThe FSB to determine by spring 2011 those jurisdictions that are not cooperatingfully with the evaluation process or that show insufficient progress to address weakcompliance with internationally agreed information exchange and cooperationstandards, based on the recommended actions by the agreed timetable.The Global Forum to swiftly progress its Phase 1 and 2 reviews to achieve theobjective agreed by Leaders in Toronto and report progress by November 2011.Reviewed jurisdictions identified as not having the elements in place to achieve aneffective exchange of information should promptly address the weaknesses. We urgeall jurisdictions to stand ready to conclude Tax Information Exchange Agreementswhere requested by a relevant partner.The FATF to pursue its successful work in identifying non-cooperative jurisdictionsas well as regularly updating a public list on jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies,with next update being in February 2011.
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40. We reaffirmed the FSB’s role in coordinating at the international level the work ofnational financial authorities and international standard setting bodies in developing andpromoting the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financialsector policies in the interest of global financial stability. We asked the FSB to bringforward for review by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors well before ournext meeting in 2011 proposals to strengthen its capacity, resources and governance tokeep pace with growing demands. We welcomed the FSB’s outreach. We endorsed theestablishment of regional consultative groups. We welcomed the FSB report on progressin the implementation of G20 recommendations for strengthening financial stability andlook forward to another progress report at our next meeting.Future work: Issues that warrant more attention41. While we have made significant progress in a number of areas, there still remain someissues that warrant more attention:ŸFurther work on macro-prudential policy frameworks:In order to deal with systemicrisks in the financial sector in a comprehensive manner and on an ongoing basis, wecalled on the FSB, IMF and BIS to do further work on macro-prudential policyframeworks, including tools to mitigate the impact of excessive capital flows, and9
update our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their next meeting.These frameworks should take into account national and regional arrangements. Welook forward to a joint report which should elaborate on the progress achieved inidentification of best practices, which will be the basis for establishing in the futureinternational principles or guidelines on the design and implementation of theframeworks.ŸAddressing regulatory reform issues pertaining specifically to emerging market anddeveloping economies:We agreed to work on financial stability issues that are ofparticular interest to emerging market and developing economies, and called on theFSB, IMF and World Bank to develop and report before the next Summit. Theseissues could include: the management of foreign exchange risks by financialinstitutions, corporations and households; emerging market and developingeconomies’ regulatory and supervisory capacity where necessary, including withregard to local branches of foreign financial institutions which are systemic in theirhost country and development of deposit insurance schemes; financial inclusion;information sharing between home and host supervisory authorities on cross borderfinancial institutions; and trade finance.Strengthening regulation and supervision of shadow banking:With the completion ofthe new standards for banks, there is a potential that regulatory gaps may emerge inthe shadow banking system. Therefore, we called on the FSB to work incollaboration with other international standard setting bodies to developrecommendations to strengthen the regulation and oversight of the shadow bankingsystem by mid-2011.Further work on regulation and supervision of commodity derivative markets:Wecalled especially on IOSCO’s taskforce on commodity futures markets to report tothe FSB for consideration of next steps in April 2011 on its important work.Improving market integrity and efficiency:We called on IOSCO to develop by June2011 and report to the FSB recommendations to promote markets’ integrity andefficiency to mitigate the risks posed to the financial system by the latesttechnological developments.Enhancing consumer protection:We asked the FSB to work in collaboration with theOECD and other international organizations to explore, and report back by the nextsummit, on options to advance consumer finance protection through informed choicethat includes disclosure, transparency and education; protection from fraud, abuseand errors; and recourse and advocacy.
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Fighting Protectionism and Promoting Trade and Investment42. Recognizing the importance of free trade and investment for global recovery, we arecommitted to keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and investment as a means topromote economic progress for all and narrow the development gap. The importance offree trade and open markets is illustrated by the joint report of the OECD, ILO, WorldBank and WTO on the benefits of trade liberalization for employment and growth. Thesetrade and investment liberalization measures will help achieve the G20 Frameworkobjectives for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and must be complemented by10
our unwavering commitment to resist protectionism in all its forms. We thereforereaffirm the extension of our standstill commitments until the end of 2013 as agreed inToronto, commit to rollback any new protectionist measures that may have risen,including export restrictions and WTO-inconsistent measures to stimulate exports, andask the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD to continue monitoring the situation and to reportpublicly on a semi-annual basis.43. With respect to the WTO Doha Development Round, we welcome the broader and moresubstantive engagement of the past four months among our representatives in Geneva.Bearing in mind that 2011 is a critical window of opportunity, albeit narrow, thisengagement must intensify and expand. We now need to complete the end game. Wedirect our negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations to promptly bring theDoha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and balancedconclusion consistent with the mandate of the Doha Development Round and built on theprogress achieved. Once such an outcome is reached, we commit to seek ratification,where necessary, in our respective systems.44. We strongly believe that trade can be an effective tool for reducing poverty andenhancing economic growth in developing countries, LICs in particular. To support LICcapacity to trade, we welcome the adoption of the Multi-Year Action Plan onDevelopment. We note our commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, Aid for Tradelevels that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008); to make progresstoward duty-free quota-free market access for least developed country (LDC) products inline with our Hong Kong commitments, without prejudice to other negotiations,including as regards preferential rules of origin; to call on relevant international agenciesto coordinate a collective multilateral response to support trade facilitation; and tosupport measures to increase the availability of trade finance in developing countries,particularly LICs. In this respect, we also agree to monitor and assess trade financeprograms in support of developing countries, in particular their coverage and impact onLICs, and to evaluate the impact of regulatory regimes on trade finance.45. We recognize the potential for faster growth in Africa, which could be unlocked byAfrican plans for deeper regional economic integration. We therefore commit to supportthe regional integration efforts of African leaders, including by helping to realize theirvision of a free trade area through the promotion of trade facilitation and regionalinfrastructure. We call on the MDBs and WTO to collaborate with us in supporting thisendeavor.Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth46. The crisis disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in the poorest countries andslowed progress toward achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).As the premier economic forum, we recognize the need to strengthen and leverage ourdevelopment efforts to address such challenges.47. At the same time, narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral toachieving our broader Framework objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growthby generating new poles of growth and contributing to global rebalancing. We aretherefore using our best efforts for a rapid increase in the share of global growth andprosperity for developing countries, LICs in particular.11
48. We commit to work in partnership with other developing countries, LICs in particular, tohelp them build the capacity to achieve and maintain their maximum economic growthpotential. We have thus developed a consensus for the G20’s contribution to globaldevelopment efforts in line with our Toronto mandate.49. We endorse today theSeoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth(AnnexI)anditsMulti-Year Action Plan on Development(AnnexII).50. The Seoul Consensus and the Multi-Year Action Plan are based on six core principles:First, an enduring and meaningful reduction in poverty cannot be achieved withoutinclusive, sustainable and resilient growth, while the provision of ODA, as well asthe mobilization of all other sources of financing, remain essential to thedevelopment of most LICs.Second, we recognize that while there are common factors, there is no singleformula for development success. We must therefore engage other developingcountries as partners, respecting national ownership of a country’s policies as themost important determinant of its successful development, thereby helping to ensurestrong, responsible, accountable and transparent development partnerships betweenthe G20 and LICs.Third, our actions must prioritize global or regional systemic issues that call forcollective action and have the potential for transformative impact.Fourth, we recognize the critical role of the private sector to create jobs and wealth,and the need for a policy environment that supports sustainable private sector-ledinvestment and growth.Fifth, we will maximize our value-added and complement the development efforts ofother key players by focusing on areas where the G20 has a comparative advantageor could add momentum.And finally, we will focus on tangible outcomes of significant impact that removeblockages to improving growth prospects in developing countries, especially LICs.
51. The Seoul Consensus also identifies nine key pillars where we believe actions arenecessary to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable andresilient growth in developing countries, LICs in particular: infrastructure, humanresource development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growthwith resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and knowledgesharing. The Multi-Year Action Plan then outlines the specific, detailed actions to whichwe commit in order to address these bottlenecks, including to:a) Facilitate increased investment from public, semi-public and private sources andimprove the implementation and maintenance of national and regional infrastructureprojects in sectors where there are bottlenecks. We agree to establish a High-LevelPanel (HLP) to recommend measures to mobilize infrastructure financing and reviewMDBs’ policy frameworks. We will announce the Chair of the HLP by December12
2010;b) Improve the development of employable skills matched to employer and labor marketneeds in order to enhance the ability to attract investment, create decent jobs andincrease productivity. We will support the development of internationally comparableskills indicators and the enhancement of national strategies for skills development,building on the G20 Training Strategy;c) Improve the access and availability to trade with advanced economies and betweendeveloping and LICs. Our action plans on trade are discussed in paragraphs 42 to 45above;d) Identify, enhance and promote responsible private investment in value chains anddevelop key indicators for measuring and maximizing the economic and employmentimpact of private sector investment;e) Enhance food security policy coherence and coordination and increase agriculturalproductivity and food availability, including by advancing innovative results-basedmechanisms, promoting responsible agriculture investment, fostering smallholderagriculture, and inviting relevant international organizations to develop, for our 2011Summit in France, proposals to better manage and mitigate risks of food pricevolatility without distorting market behavior. We also welcome the progress of theGlobal Agriculture and Food Security Program, as well as that of other bilateral andmultilateral channels, including the UN Committee on World Food Security, andinvite further contributions;f) Improve income security and resilience to adverse shocks by assisting developingcountries enhance social protection programs, including through furtherimplementation of the UN Global Pulse Initiative, and by facilitating implementationof initiatives aimed at a quantified reduction of the average cost of transferringremittances;g) Increase access to finance for the poor and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).Our action plans for financial inclusion and associated implementation mechanismsare discussed in paragraphs 55 to 57 below;h) Build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improvingdeveloping country tax administration systems and policies and highlighting therelationship between non-cooperative jurisdictions and development; andi) Scale up and mainstream sharing of knowledge and experience, especially betweendeveloping countries, in order to improve their capacity and ensure that the broadestrange of experiences are used to help tailor national policies.52. We commit to and prioritize full, timely and effective implementation of the Multi-YearAction Plan, understanding its high potential to have a positive transformative impact onpeople’s lives, both through our individual and collective actions and in partnership withother global development stakeholders. We will continue to work closely with relevantinternational organizations to push these actions forward.
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53. We reaffirm our commitment to achievement of the MDGs and will align our work inaccordance with globally agreed development principles for sustainable economic, socialand environmental development, to complement the outcomes of the UN High-LevelPlenary Meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 in New York, as well as withprocesses such as the Fourth UN LDC Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-LevelForum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011. We also reaffirm ourrespective ODA pledges and commitments to assist the poorest countries and mobilizedomestic resources made following on from the Monterrey Consensus and other fora.54. We further mandate the Development Working Group to monitor implementation of theMulti-Year Action Plan, so that we may review progress and consider the need for anyfurther steps at the 2011 Summit in France. Development based on the Seoul Consensuswill therefore be an enduring part of future G20 Summits. What we promise, we willdeliver.Financial Inclusion55. We reiterate our strong commitment to financial inclusion and recognize the benefits ofimproved access to finance to lift the lives of the poor and to support the contribution ofSMEs to economic development. We welcome the stock taking report on successful andscalable models of SME financing in developing economies. We have developed theFinancial Inclusion Action Plan based on our Principles for Innovative FinancialInclusion as the work program for the coming year.56. Working with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, the Consultative Group to Assist thePoor and the International Finance Corporation, we commit to launch the GlobalPartnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) as an inclusive platform for all G20 countries,interested non-G20 countries and relevant stakeholders to carry forward our work onfinancial inclusion, including implementation of the Financial Inclusion Action Plan. TheGPFI’s efforts over the next year will include helping countries put into practice thePrinciples for Innovative Financial Inclusion, strengthening data for measuring financialinclusion, and developing methodologies for countries wishing to set targets. We agreethat the GPFI should report to us on its progress at our 2011 Summit in France.57. Recognizing the vital role of SMEs in employment and income generation, we welcomethe strong response to the G20 SME Finance Challenge and the innovative models forscaling up private SME finance that have emerged from the competition and congratulatethe winners. We have constructed a flexible SME Finance Framework to mobilize grant,risk capital and private financing by using existing funding mechanisms and the newSME Finance Innovation Fund to finance the winning proposals and other successfulSME financing models. We welcome the commitment of Canada, Korea, the UnitedStates and the Inter-American Development Bank of $528 million to the Frameworkthrough grants and co-financing.EnergyFossil Fuel Subsidies58. We reaffirm our commitment to rationalize and phase-out over the medium terminefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, with timing based14
on national circumstances, while providing targeted support for the poorest. We direct ourFinance and Energy Ministers to report back on the progress made in implementingcountry-specific strategies and in achieving the goals to which we agreed in Pittsburghand Toronto at the 2011 Summit in France.59. We note the preliminary report of the IEA, World Bank and OECD and ask theseorganizations, together with OPEC, to further assess and review the progress made inimplementing the Pittsburgh and Toronto commitments and report back to the 2011Summit in France.60. We recognize the value of the sharing of knowledge, expertise and capacity with respectto programs and policies that phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.Fossil Fuel Price Volatility61. We recognize the importance of a well-functioning and transparent market in oil forworld economic growth. We strongly support the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) and askthe IEF, IEA and OPEC for a report suggesting specific steps in order to improve thequality, timeliness and reliability of the JODI Database. The report should include aproposed timeframe and implementation strategy, which will explore the ways toimprove data availability on oil production, consumption, refining and stock levels, asappropriate. An intermediate report should be submitted to the February 2011 FinanceMinisters’ meeting, with the final report submitted to the April 2011 Finance Ministers’meeting. We also request the IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO to produce a joint report, bythe April 2011 Finance Ministers’ meeting, on how the oil spot market prices are assessedby oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning ofoil markets.62. We support the establishment of the IEF charter to strengthen the producer-consumerdialogue, and welcome the IEF plan, developed in cooperation with the IEA and OPEC,to hold an annual symposium with major relevant institutions on energy market outlooks.We call on the IEF, IEA and OPEC to produce a joint report and common communiqué,highlighting their respective outlooks and their short, medium and long-term forecasts foroil market supply and demand. We welcome their ongoing work on the linkages betweenoil physical and financial markets.63. Welcoming the June and November 2010 IOSCO reports, we ask IOSCO to furthermonitor developments in the oil OTC markets and report to the FSB for consideration ofnext steps, for improved regulation and enhanced transparency of the oil financial marketin April 2011 by Finance Ministers and other relevant Ministers, informed by the work ofthe Energy Experts Group. We ask the Energy Experts Group to extend its work onvolatility to other fossil fuels as a second step.Global Marine Environment Protection64. We welcome the progress achieved by the Global Marine Environment Protection(GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best practices to protect the marineenvironment, to prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, aswell as marine transportation, and to deal with their consequences. We recognize thework done by the GMEP Experts Sub-Group and take note of the progress made on15
reviewing international regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration, production andtransport with respect to marine environmental protection as a first step to implement theToronto mandate.65. Future work on the GMEP initiative should benefit from relevant findings, as theybecome available, from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spillin the United States and the Montara Commission of Inquiry in Australia. We ask theGMEP Experts Sub-Group to provide a further report, with the support of the IMO,OECD, IEA, OPEC, International Regulators Forum, and International Association ofDrilling Contractors and, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to continue work onthe effective sharing of best practices at the 2011 Summit in France.Climate Change and Green Growth66. Addressing the threat of global climate change is an urgent priority for all nations. Wereiterate our commitment to take strong and action-oriented measures and remain fullydedicated to UN climate change negotiations. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, andthe principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Wethank Mexico for hosting the UNFCCC negotiations to be held in Cancun beginning atthe end of November 2010. Those of us who have associated with the CopenhagenAccord reaffirm our support for it and its implementation. We all are committed toachieving a successful, balanced result that includes the core issues of mitigation,transparency, finance, technology, adaptation, and forest preservation. In this regard, wewelcome the work of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financingestablished by the UN Secretary-General and ask our Finance Ministers to consider itsreport. We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments.67. The ongoing loss of biodiversity is a global environmental and economic challenge.Both climate change and loss of biodiversity are inextricably linked. We acknowledgethe outcomes of the global study on the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity. Wewelcome the successful conclusion of COP10 in Nagoya.68. We are committed to support country-led green growth policies that promoteenvironmentally sustainable global growth along with employment creation whileensuring energy access for the poor. We recognize that sustainable green growth, as it isinherently a part of sustainable development, is a strategy of quality development,enabling countries to leapfrog old technologies in many sectors, including through theuse of energy efficiency and clean technology. To that end, we will take steps to create, asappropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the development anddeployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including policies andpractices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity building.We support the ongoing initiatives under the Clean Energy Ministerial and encouragefurther discussion on cooperation in R&D and regulatory measures, together withbusiness leaders, and ask our Energy Experts Group to monitor and report back to us onprogress at the 2011 Summit in France. We also commit to stimulate investment in cleanenergy technology, energy and resource efficiency, green transportation, and green citiesby mobilizing finance, establishing clear and consistent standards, developing long-termenergy policies, supporting education, enterprise and R&D, and continuing to promotecross-border collaboration and coordination of national legislative approaches.16
Anti-Corruption69. Recognizing that corruption is a severe impediment to economic growth anddevelopment, we endorse the G20Anti-Corruption Action Plan(AnnexIII).Buildingon previous declarations, and cognizant of our role as leaders of major trading nations,we recognize a special responsibility to prevent and tackle corruption and commit tosupporting a common approach to building an effective global anti-corruption regime.70. In this regard, we will lead by example in key areas as detailed in the Anti-CorruptionAction Plan, including: to accede or ratify and effectively implement the UNConvention against Corruption and promote a transparent and inclusive review process;adopt and enforce laws against the bribery of foreign public officials; prevent access ofcorrupt officials to the global financial system; consider a cooperative framework forthe denial of entry to corrupt officials, extradition, and asset recovery; protectwhistleblowers; safeguard anticorruption bodies. We are also committed to undertake adedicated effort to encourage public-private partnerships to tackle corruption and toengage the private sector in the fight against corruption, with a view to promotingpropriety, integrity and transparency in the conduct of business affairs, as well as in thepublic sector.71. The G20 will hold itself accountable for its commitments. Beyond our participation inexisting mechanisms of peer review for international anti-corruption standards, wemandate the Anti-Corruption Working Group to submit annual reports on theimplementation of our commitments to future Summits for the duration of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan.Business Summit72. Recognizing the importance of private sector-led growth and job creation, we welcomethe Seoul G20 Business Summit held on November 10 and 11 that convened globalbusiness leaders under the theme “The Role of Business for Sustainable and BalancedGrowth”. We look forward to continuing the G20 Business Summit in upcomingSummits.Consultation73. We recognize, given the broad impact of our decisions, the necessity to consult with thewider international community. We will increase our efforts to conduct G20consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnershipswith international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society,trade unions and academia.74. Bearing in mind the importance of the G20 being both representative and effective asthe premier forum for our international economic cooperation, we reached a broadconsensus on a set of principles for non-member invitations to Summits, including thatwe will invite no more than five non-member invitees, of which at least two will becountries in Africa.
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ANNEXES(http://www.seoulsummit.kr/outcomes/)I.II.III.Seoul Development Consensus for Shared GrowthMulti-Year Action Plan on DevelopmentAnti-Corruption Action Plan
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT(http://www.seoulsummit.kr/outcomes/)I.Policy Commitments by G20 Members
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