REPORT FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS

Rapporteur: Mr. Matteo Mecacci (Italy)

Since 1975, with the Helsinki Final Act1, the Organization for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE) has regarded human rights and fundamental freedoms as central andlegitimate interests in international relations among States as well as an important element inguaranteeing security in the Eurasian region. In particular, the OSCE has developed over theyears a series of instruments for monitoring the implementation of the commitments assumedby the participating States in the sphere of human rights and democracy.During the 1990s, developments in the political situation in Europe led to fundamentalchanges within the OSCE and the strengthening of its role in the area of human rights anddemocracy through the establishment of new procedures and mechanisms. These include theso-called “human dimension mechanism”.The central role that the OSCE has conferred on the so-called “human dimension” stems fromthe realization that in most cases crises or emerging conflicts spring from phenomena thatoften involve gross violations of fundamental rights. The elimination or preventivecontainment of such violations can in specific cases make possible effective efforts to findsolutions to these conflicts.As part of the mechanisms for prevention and intervention that the OSCE has put into placewithin the human dimension there are various institutions that together and through theOSCE missions on the ground are seeking to carry out their assigned role.The OSCE field missions represent in fact another basic instrument for the performance ofthe Organization’s activities. The missions are able to provide the parties concerned withimportant technical assistance support (in the form of information, opinions and expertise)with respect to the safeguarding of human rights, the defence of the rights of nationalminorities, freedom of the media and democratic elections. What is more, the missions haveat their disposal an array of instruments for overseeing the maintenance and development ofdemocratization processes, e.g., the monitoring of trials and of judicial institutions (so-calledcourt monitoring) or the examination of claims regarding human rights violations presentedby individuals or associations (so-called human rights complaints) as well as, naturally,election monitoring activities.The human dimension mechanism, known also as the Vienna Mechanism, established in theVienna Concluding Document of 1989, aims at ensuring compliance with the commitmentsundertaken by States in the area of human rights and involves four phases: the filing of acomplaint against one participating State by another, the written response by the first State to1The Act sets out the “Helsinki Decalogue”, i.e., the following principles: (1) sovereign equality, respectfor the rights inherent in sovereignty; (2) refraining from the threat or use of force; (3) inviolability offrontiers; (4) territorial integrity of States; (5) peaceful settlement of disputes; (6) non-intervention ininternal affairs; (7) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom ofthought, conscience, religion or belief; (8) equal rights and self-determination of peoples;(9) co-operation among States; (10) fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.1

the second State and a possible bilateral meeting, transmission of the complaint to the otherOSCE participating States, and discussions of the matter at meetings of the Conference on theHuman Dimension.The Vienna Mechanism was later revised in 1990 with the Document of the CopenhagenMeeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE2and in 1991 with theDocument of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,which established the so-called Moscow Mechanism.The Moscow Mechanism3is therefore regarded as a further extension of the ViennaMechanism and provides specifically for the possibility on the part of the participating Statesto establish ad hoc missions of independent experts for the purpose of assisting in theresolution of a problem involving serious and persistent violations of human rights.In addition to these mechanisms, there is a further instrument to be considered, namely theso-called Berlin Mechanism4, which was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin Meeting of the2In the Copenhagen Final Document three clauses are added to the Vienna Mechanism: States are calledupon to respond in writing to a request for information under the Vienna Mechanism within four weeksfrom the receipt of the request; bilateral meetings between the two States in question must be arrangedas soon as possible, not later than three weeks following the request; the bilateral meetings shouldfocus on the subject agreed upon in advance.The Moscow Mechanism has been used by:1.Twelve States of the European Community and the United States of America in response toreports of atrocities and attacks against unarmed civilians that were perpetrated in Croatia andBosnia and Herzegovina (1992);2.Estonia for the purpose of studying its own legislation and comparing it with the universallyaccepted norms in the area of human rights (1992);3.Moldova for the purpose of analysing the legislation in force, inter-ethnic relations and theimplementation of minority rights on the territory of Moldova (1993); later, in June 1993, theOSCE Committee of Senior Officials applied the mechanism in the case ofSerbia-Montenegro for the purpose of investigating claims of human rights violations;4.Ten OSCE participating States (Germany, the United States of America, Austria, Canada, theUnited Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden), with respect to Turkmenistanfor the purpose of looking into the concerns raised by the investigations into the alleged attackon the life of President Niyazov on 25 November 2002 and to evaluate all the issuesconcerning the conduct of the inquiries (December 2002–March 2003).The Berlin Mechanism has been used on the following occasions:1.On 28 June 1991 Luxembourg requested clarifications from the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia following the conflict in that country;2.On 4 May 1992 Austria requested the convening of an emergency meeting to deal with thesituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;3.On 6 April 1993 Azerbaijan requested an emergency meeting of the Committee of SeniorOfficials regarding the situation in the Caucasus region of Nagorno-Karabakh;4.On 25 November 1994, during the Budapest Review Meeting, Bosnia and Herzegovinarequested the convening of an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials inconnection with the situation in the Bihać zone;5.On 21 April 1999 the Russian Federation invoked the Berlin Mechanism for the purpose ofobtaining clarifications from Germany, the United States of America, Belgium, Canada,Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, theNetherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Iceland and Luxembourgregarding the NATO military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Two dayslater, the countries called upon provided responses.

OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and which defines the measures that are applicable incases of serious emergency situations that may be the result of the violation of one of theprinciples laid down in the Helsinki Final Act or of serious disturbances capable ofthreatening peace, security or stability5.During the 1990s, thanks also to the establishment of these procedures and mechanisms, theOSCE played a decisive role in advancing and strengthening the process of democratization,particularly in the countries of Eastern Europe. Over the course of the years the OSCE hasmaintained and expanded this role throughout the Eurasian area, particularly in recent yearswhen it has been called upon to perform a more active role in the Asiatic area, i.e., in thecountries of the Caucasus and in the five Central Asian republics. In this zone, which for along time lay outside the geostrategic agenda of the world’s major political players, theOSCE can lay claim to valuable experience in promoting security and the development of thedemocratization process.Still, it must be admitted that the unfolding of the political situation in the OSCE area has hadthe effect that in recent years there has been an increased fear that the Organization mayhave, once and for all, lost its ability to intervene in a decisive and specific manner inresponse to the most serious political crises, which have continued to emerge, not least of allin the area of the human dimension.At the first OSCE Summit that was held in Astana from 1 to 2 December 2010, after so manyyears of meetings at a lower political level6, attention was therefore focused on the need torevive the Organization’s political role, even if, despite the presence of more than 30 Headsof State or Government of the participating States, it must be said that the political responsewas unsatisfactory and at best half-hearted.In point of fact, the adoption of the Astana Commemorative Declaration did not represent apolitical turning point since it was not possible to put forward a proposal for the reform of theOrganization, despite the great need for such a measure if respect for the commitmentsundertaken by the participating States is to be guaranteed.It is therefore necessary to seize the opportunity presented both by the Astana Summit and bythe political crises that are emerging throughout the entire region along the southern border ofthe OSCE area to formulate certain proposals aimed at increasing the political relevance ofthis Organization in international affairs and, in particular, in the field of the humandimension. The fact that hundreds of thousands of persons have poured on to the streets in theArab world to call for respect for democratic values and to denounce the corruption of theirown governments should not be underestimated by an organization such as the OSCE, whichhas placed respect for these values at the centre of its mandate.

The events taking place in North Africa and the Middle East are in fact part of a worldwidemovement that has developed in recent decades and that has been characterized bysociologists and politicians as “waves of democratization”. This process – whose positiveoutcome cannot be taken for granted – has in recent decades affected, in part or in whole, allthe continents, from South America to Asia and from Africa to Eastern Europe, and is nowbeing seen in North Africa and the Middle East as well. Specifically, in recent months,popular movements calling for the democratization of these countries have made themselvesfelt in Egypt and Tunisia and also in Libya, in whose territory, following authorization by theUnited Nations Security Council, NATO has intervened in an effort to protect the Libyanpopulation from Gaddafi’s efforts to suppress the uprising.Here it should be stressed that at the Copenhagen meeting of the Ministerial Council in 1997the OSCE formulated for the first time a proposal to develop closer ties among theorganizations operating in the field of security, such as for example NATO, and that it wasfollowing the adoption of the Charter for European Security at Istanbul in November 1999that attention was given to the absolute need to develop co-operation among internationalorganizations in line with their respective areas of competence and under the terms ofChapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OSCE MIK), officially established by the Permanent Councilon 1 July 1999, provides an example of a mission in which the OSCE has not only for thefirst time been an integral part of a mission conducted under the aegis of the United Nations(UNMIK) but also in which the Organization has co-operated with NATO (provision, forexample, having been made that the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) CommunicationZone West based in Durrës should provide the OSCE with helicopter facilities to permitmedical/casualty evacuations as necessary and also to make possible occasional visits toremote parts of the country)7.The OSCE and NATO have also co-operated effectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania,Macedonia and Moldova, all countries that as of today have become associate members ofthe Atlantic Alliance. These examples show that it is possible, and in my opinion useful, toimagine that co-operation between the OSCE and NATO might be expanded.The situation in Libya, and in the entire Middle East, can therefore be viewed as an area inwhich the OSCE, in collaboration also with other regional organizations, should be calledupon to perform a role in the processes of transition towards democracy.Turning to the present-day realities within the OSCE area, we have also seen how recently inBelarus the citizens have taken to the streets of Minsk to call for the revision of the results ofthe recent elections and for respect for democracy and the rule of law by the governmentauthorities.As regards the conduct of the Belarusian presidential elections on 18 December 2010, theOSCE has expressed an extremely critical assessment, noting serious flaws in the democraticprocess both during the election campaign and on election day itself8. Nevertheless, followingthe criticisms of the electoral process levelled by the OSCE observers, the Belarusian78Cf.http://www.osce.org/secretariat/14524Cf.http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/746564

Government ordered the immediate closure of the OSCE Office in Minsk, declaring that itsmandate had expired.Regarding the situation in Belarus, which saw the arrest of many opposition activistsfollowing the demonstrations of 19 December 2010, on 6 April 2011 in Vienna 14 OSCEparticipating States – the Czech Republic, Germany, the United States of America, Canada,Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania,Slovakia and Sweden – called for the application (after many years in which this had nolonger happened) of the Moscow Mechanism, requesting specifically an investigation of thestate of affairs with regard to respect for freedom of association and expression and the ruleof law within that country. The negative response received on 8 April 20119from theBelarusian Government confirmed once again the serious difficulties confronting the OSCEin its efforts to operate effectively in places where there are crises with regard to respect forhuman rights.There is in my opinion an important conclusion to be drawn from the various situations towhich I have referred: There can be no stability or security where there is no respect fordemocracy and the rule of law and where an independent judicial system and free press areunable to develop.With a view to guaranteeing that these values are protected within the OSCE area, there isalso a need to ensure the effective operation of the field missions. In this connection, one ofthe challenges that the OSCE will have to deal with in the immediate future surely flows fromthe fact that no field mission can be authorized without the consent of all 56 participatingStates. The consequence of the constant application of that principle can therefore be seen inthe gradual marginalization of the role that the OSCE can play precisely in those cases whereits presence and actions would in fact be most important and crucial in helping to resolve apolitical crisis.For all these reasons it should be remembered that the OSCE can act by calling, wherenecessary, on the so-called “consensus minus one” procedure, which was introduced at thePrague meeting of the Ministerial Council held on 30 and 31 January 1992. This is aprocedure that provides for the possibility, on the part of the Council or the Committee ofSenior Officials, to take a political initiative, even where there is no consent on the part of thecountry concerned, in the case of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCEcommitments10.

Conclusions

If it is to be able to deal with the new political challenges emerging within and outside itsarea, it is essential that the OSCE, on the basis of its own experience and the developmentsthat have taken place over the years, know how to reactivate and use all the procedures andmechanisms that it has put into place since 1975 until the present day, particularly as regardsthe human dimension.

It is therefore necessary that there be a proper response to the new demands that are emergingand that require open and concrete support by the OSCE for the processes of democratizationas an essential adjunct in guaranteeing security throughout the entire region, beginning withthe countries located along the southern border of the OSCE area, so that they may developthe rule of law.It would be a serious error were the OSCE to fail to take the initiative at the highest politicallevel and to extend a helping hand to our Mediterranean Partners by offering them high-levelpolitical co-operation so as to ensure that the process of transition away from authoritarianregimes may truly lead to the democratization of a region that is after all of strategicimportance to our Organization.For the purpose of promoting and strengthening these processes for the democratization ofthe Mediterranean area and its integration with the OSCE, as well as of advancing all thosevalues that are at the heart of the mandate of our Organization, it is also essential toencourage and develop constantly co-operation between the OSCE and internationalorganizations, in line with their respective areas of competence, so as to be able to intervenewhere necessary. I believe in fact that the promotion, in a manner consistent with thefounding principles of the United Nations, of political co-operation in regions where thefounding principles of the OSCE are not yet a reality – despite the existence of some forms ofco-operation as in the case of the Mediterranean Partners – represents the best way and bestguarantee of rediscovering the importance of the full implementation of those principleswithin our Organization as well.