MPU, Alm.del - 2010-11 (1. samling) - Bilag 544: Henvendelse af 27/4-11 fra Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (CCNR) om Transport of 16 Radioactive Steam Generators from Canada

ExecutiveSummaryThe Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River are a precious resource providingdrinkingwaterforover40millionpeople.BecauseofthevitalresourcesthattheLakes contribute to our economy, health and lives, we need to ensure theprotectionandrestorationoftheLakesandRiver.TheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeappreciatestheopportunitytocommentontherevisedCNSCstaffreport.This document consists of supplementary comments from the Great Lakes andSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiative(CitiesInitiative)onBrucePower’sapplicationtotheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionforpermissiontoshipsixteenradioactivesteam generators on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence. These commentsprovide additional information to the Cities Initiative’s initial submission,submittedonSeptember13,2010,andtheCitiesInitiative’stestimonybeforetheCNSCduringitshearingsinOttawaonSeptember28,2010.GreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeispleasedthattheCommissionersof the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) recognised the significantinformation gaps in the original proposal. Many of these information gaps wereidentifiedbytheCommissionersandintervenors,includingtheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeattheCNSChearing.ItisencouragingthattheCNSCCommissionersrespondedtotheseinformationgaps by requesting additional information from CNSC staff, and then invitingintervenors to submit supplementary comments on the revised CNSC staffreport. It is also encouraging that the significant difficulty experienced by theCities Initiative and other intervenors in obtaining additional information on theproposalhasalsobeenrecognized.However, whiletheCommission’srequestforadditionalinformationfromCNSCstaffistobecommended,intheopinionoftheCitiesInitiative,thecontentoftherevisedCNSCstaffreportremainsinadequate.

BasedonCitiesInitiativeanalysisofthesupplementalreportofCNSCstafftotheCommissioners,theCitiesInitiativehasreachedthefollowingkeyconclusions:1. An accident with this proposed shipment has the potential to exceedfederalstandardsforradioactivityindrinkingwater.¶Ifallthetotalradioactiveinventoryofonesteamgeneratorisreleased,thiswouldexceedtheHealthCanadaActionLevelforinterventionintheeventofanuclearemergencybytwotimes(2.52mSvvs.1mSvactionlevel).If all the total inventory of all 16 generators was released this wouldexceed the Health Canada Action Level by40 times (40 mSv vs. 1 mSvactionlevel).Even if retaining the original assumption of partial inventory, an accidentwith4generatorswouldbesufficienttoexceedtheHealthCanadaActionLevelfordrinkingwater.An accident with only one generator in Owen Sound Harbour has thepotential to exceed the Health Canada Drinking Water Action Levels (ifreleaserateis100%).An accident with only one generator in a ship lock exceeds the HealthCanadaDrinkingWaterActionLevelsunderallaccidentscenarios.

2. The proposed shipment exceeds the international allowable safetylimitsfortotalamountofradioactivityonasingleship.¶We are in agreement with the CNSC that this proposed shipment doesexceed the international allowable safety limits on the total amount ofradioactivityonasingleship.However, we continue to disagree on the magnitude of the exceedance.TherevisedCNSCstaffreportprovidesnonewrationaleforthemarginofexceedence of the international safety limit. The revised estimatedconveyance value for the shipment of 16 generators is 622 A2, anincreasefromtheBrucePoweroriginalestimateof545A23

3.Theenvironmentalreviewisflawed¶The environmental review of the proposed shipment continues to bebased on best case assumptions, and fails to consider other plausibleassumptions. There is insufficient evidence given for many of the criticalassumptions. As a result, the environmental review consistentlyunderestimatesenvironmentalrisk.The accident scenarios all rely on dilution as the solutionto anaccident.As environmental management has evolved, using the Great Lakes todilute radiological contamination is growing less acceptable. In addition,the calculation of dilution factors is a simplistic methodology fordeterminingenvironmentalimpact.The environmental review still lacks several components: an analysis oftheSt.LawrenceRiver,ananalysisofanaccidentscenarioalongtheroadroute,includingdowntownOwenSound,andananalysisofoptimumtimeof transport. The definition of environment is too narrowly scoped toincludeonlydrinkingwaterimpacts,andsothereisalsostillnoanalysisoftheecologicalimpactsofanaccident,suchasimpactsonfish,wildlifeandfood chains. Often radioactivity will be taken up by phytoplankton andzooplanktonandsothenbepassedupthefoodchainandbiomagnified.The presentation of public health information is limited and relies onassumptionsofexposuremeasuredinseconds.Otherplausiblescenariosarenotpresented.

Intervenors and the public have experienced difficulties in accessinginformationTherearedifficultiesinthepresentationoftheinformationwhichdoesnotalways fairly summarise the information or outline the underlyingassumptions,ortheeffectoftheseassumptionsThe CNSC revised report clearly indicates that the process has beenrushed, with significant questions in play in August and September, andseveral unanswered issues right up to the hearing and following thehearing.At the CNSC hearing, a number of intervenors noted that they had notbeen consulted or informed sufficiently to feel comfortable with theproposal.Itisnotclearfromtherevisedreportwhatadditionalmeasurestheproponenthasundertakentoconsultwithinterestedstakeholders.The Cities Initiative would respectfully suggest to CNSCthat they reviewtheirexistingprocedurestoensurethatinthefuture,alldocumentationonan application is posted on the CNSC web site, and to create amechanism to better accommodate intervenor questions, to providerequestedinformationandanswerquestionsinadvanceandfollowingthehearing,thatisfairtoallparties.

This shipment is requesting three special exemptions from internationalsafetyrules:i. theuseof``specialarrangement``toviolatetheinternationalsafetylimitsontotalallowableradioactivityonasingleship,toviolatetherulewhichrequiresdemonstrationthatthelevelof radioactivity in the generators does meet the correctclassification, and to allow the generators to be shippedwithoutusinganapprovedpackage,ii. the``exclusiveuse``provisiontoexceedinternationalsafetytransportindexlimitsiii. and it appears, the ``special use vessel`` to exempt fromvesselandotherradioactivitylimitsTherefore this proposed shipment is notroutine. It stillappears to bethefirst Canadian request for approval to transport large, used radioactivematerialsthatdo not meet international safety limits on theGreat LakesandSt.Lawrence.6

IntroductionThese are supplementary comments from the Great Lakes and St.Lawrence Cities Initiative on Bruce Power’s application to the CanadianNuclear Safety Commission for permission to ship sixteen radioactivesteamgeneratorsontheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrence.TheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeMayors of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative are a prominentvoice in efforts to protect and restore the vitality of the Great Lakes and St.LawrenceRiverandimprovethequalityoflifefortheresidentsoftheregion.TheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiative(GLSLCI)isabinationalcoalitionof mayors and other local officials that works actively with federal, state, andprovincial governments to advance the protection and restoration of the GreatLakesandtheSt.LawrenceRiver.CurrentlyGLSLCIincludesover70mayorsfromaroundtheLakes,representingover13millionpeople.NatureofGLSLCIinvolvementThe GLSLCI has been actively engaged in gathering information about thisapplication over the past six months. Staff attended the summer Owen SoundCouncil meeting, reviewed the August CNSC staff report and multipleapplications from Bruce Power, submitted a number of emails and letters toCNSC requesting additional information in August and September, submitteddetailed written comments to the CNSC on September 13, intervened in theSeptember 28 and 29 CNSC hearing, reviewed the revised CNSC staff reportsand with this document, submitted supplementary comments to the CNSC onNovember22.The Mayors of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative focused onansweringthefollowingquestionsabouttheproposedshipmentincluding:Whatarethepotentialenvironmentalandhealthimpactsofshipmentofthegeneratorsand an accident involving the generators? What safeguards have been appliedand arethese sufficient? Isthere a sound emergency response plan in case ofaccident and adequate resources on hand in case of accident and clean up?Have all communities been informed? Does this proposed shipment meet allrequirementsanddoesitrepresentaprecedent?177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

The Board of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has discussedthisproposalatlengthwithintheorganization.WebelieveitisaverysignificantissuethatdeservestheclosestpossibleattentionandscrutinyoftheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrencecommunity.CurrentstatusFollowing the September CNSC hearing, the Commissioners requestedadditional information in three areas: Environmental Impact Assessment, theemergency plan, including accident scenarios and the IAEA regulations for theSafeTransportofRadioactiveMaterialandtheamountofradioactivityallowedinshipments.TheCitiesInitiativeispleasedthattheCommissionersrecognisedthesignificantinformationgapsinthisproposal. ManyoftheseinformationgapswereidentifiedbyintervenorsincludingGLSLCI.TheCommissionersarealsotobecommendedforaskingthattheseinformationgapsbefilled,andsodirectingstafftoprovideadditional information. Taking the additional step of asking for supplementarycomments from intervenors is also very welcome. The Great Lakes and St.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeispleasedto havetheopportunitytocommentontherevisedCNSCstaffreport.However, while the actions of the Commissioners to increase the amount ofinformation and sharing with intervenors are to be commended, the content ofthe revised CNSC staff report remains inadequate. Much of the report simplyreiterates previous assumptions and opinions that upon analysis are notadequatelysubstantiated.BasedonCitiesInitiativeanalysisofthesupplementalreportofCNSCstafftotheCommissioners,theCitiesInitiativehasreachedthefollowingkeyconclusions:1.Anaccidentwiththisproposedshipmenthasthepotentialtoexceedfederalstandardsforradioactivityindrinkingwater2. The proposed shipment exceeds the international allowable safetylimitsfortotalamountofradioactivityonasingleship3.Theenvironmentalreviewisflawed

4.Continueddifficultyinestimatingtheradioactivityoftheshipmentiscauseforre·evaluationandcaution5.Flawedpublicprocess6. Emergency measures need several additions to better respond tolocalconditions7. The apparent reversal of burden of proof on environmental safetycontinues8.Thetestofequivalentsafetydoesnotseemtohavebeenmet9. This proposed shipment is not routine, it appears to be setting theCanadian precedent for the transport, export and processing of usedradioactiveequipmentontheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrence10. Taken together, the above conclusions suggest that theenvironmentalimpactscontinuetobeunderestimated,theprocesshasbeen flawed, the shipment presents a precedent and that the originalandrevisedreportsfailtoprovideandpresentadequateinformationtoenable the CNSC to render an informed decision on whether or not toallowtheBrucePowershipmenttoproceed.Thefollowingsectionsofthisreportdiscusseachoftheseconclusions.

Conclusion1:AnaccidentwiththisproposedshipmenthasthepotentialtoexceedHealthCanada’sdrinkingwateractionlevels1.1AccidentintheNearshoreoftheGreatLakesItishighlysignificantthatintheCNSCrevisedreport,fortheaccidentscenariointhe nearshore Great Lakes, the environmental impact is revealed to be higherthan previously anticipated. This supports the previous comments by GreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiative.The revised accident scenario for an accident in nearshore Great Lakes, usingmore realistic assumptions, clearly illustrates the potential for environmentalimpact:¶Ifallthetotalradioactiveinventoryofonesteamgeneratorisreleased,thiswouldexceedtheHealthCanadaActionlevelforinterventionintheeventofanuclearemergencybytwotimes(2.52mSvvs.1mSvactionlevel).Ifthetotalinventoryofall16generatorswasreleasedthiswouldexceedtheHealthCanadaguidelinesby40times(40mSvvs1mSvactionlevel).Evenifretainoriginalassumptionofonlypartialinventoryisreleased,anaccident with 4 generators would be sufficient to exceed Health Canadaactionlevelsfordrinkingwater.

ItisalsoimportanttonotethattheHealthCanada’sActionLevelsof1mSvareten times higher than the dose limit used to set provincial and federal drinkingwaterlevels(0.1mSv).Sotheenvironmentalimpactsintheseaccidentscenariosarebeingcomparedagainstthelessstringentnumber.Ifcomparisonsaremadeagainst the more stringent drinking water guidelines, all environmental impactsincrease by a factor of 10. This further illustrates the potential for significantdrinkingwaterimpactsinageneratoraccidentscenario.The revised CNSC staff report clearly shows that if more than onegenerator is involved in an accident in the nearshore Great Lakes, ordifferent assumptions are used, then would exceed Health Canada’sdrinking water action levels. So there is a significant potential for anenvironmental and public health impact on drinking water of an accidentwiththisshipment.177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

ThepresentationoftheenvironmentalimpactsintheCNSCrevisedreportisnotclear. The report does not clearly present the range of the assumptions used,theiralternativesandtheimpactofdrinkingwater.Thereforeitisdifficultforthereader to understand the importance of the assumptions used. The reader isoftenlefttodothemaththemselves.In addition, in the revised report, section 2 on environmental impact does notfairly or accurately reflect the conclusions of the environmental review. Most ofthecriticalinformationisinAppendixA,andaseriesofmemos.WewouldhaveexpectedtheCNSCrevisedreporttopresenttheenvironmentalinformation in a similar way to Table 1. The table below clearly illustrates theenvironmentalinformationrelatedtotheimpactondrinkingwater.

Conclusion 1.2: An accident with only one generator in Owen SoundHarbourhasthepotentialtoexceedHealthCanada’sDrinkingWaterActionLevels(ifreleaserateis100%)The revised report demonstrates that the loading dock in Owen Sound is veryclose to the intakes for drinking water for Owen Sound (less than 2 km). Anaccident in Owen Sound Harbour with only 1 generator and assuming a 100%release rate would result in radioactivity levels that exceed Health CanadaDrinkingWaterActionlevelsby6times(Table2).Thisisofconcern.The accident with 1 generator in Owen Sound has already been considered a“credibleaccidentattheloadingdock”(AppendixA,page11).Onlyalteringthereleaserate,thengivesasignificantfindingofenvironmentalriskforthedrinkingwaterforthepeopleofOwenSound.Ifanaccidentinvolved4generators,thenthedrinkingwateractionlevelisexceededby24times.Thereforeweconcludethat a credible accident in Owen Sound harbour can lead to Health CanadaDrinkingWaterActionLevelbeingexceeded.The new material submitted in the revised report describes the difficultyexperiencedinhandlingasteamgeneratorinGermany.Itisnotedthatintesting,“package integrity could not be demonstrated in certain drop positions.” (page233).ThisisofconcerntotheBrucePowershipment,asthesteamgeneratorsarenotrequiredtobetestedinthesameway(requirementsonlyapplytoSCO·II).SoBrucePower maynothaveidentifiedcritical droppositionstoavoid,andsomayhavedifficultywithloadingthesteamgenerators. ItisrecommendedthatBruce Power be required to demonstrate that it is prepared to anticipate andavoidthesecriticaldroppositions.Ontario’s source water protection program is designed to protect drinking watersupplies.AnaccidentwiththeradioactivesteamgeneratorsintheOwenSoundHarbour area would be within the Source Water Protection Program’s IntakeProtectionZone2andwithinthe2hourTimeofTravelCaptureZone(Appendix1,page11).Thismeansthatwithin2hoursofanaccidentwiththegeneratorsatthe dock, it could be expected that radioactivity could enter the Owen Sounddrinkingwaterplant. Thisisofconcern.The revised report also does not clearly present the full range of impacts ofdrinkingwaterinOwenSound(onlythesameconservative1generator,1%and13 % assumptions). To fully understand the potential impacts on Owen SoundwehavepreparedTable2,whichillustratestheimpactoftheseassumptionson177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

theconclusions.Itclearlyshowsthatthereispotentialforanaccidentinloadingthe generators in Owen Sound that would exceed the Health Canada drinkingwaterlevels.TherevisedCNSCstaffreportusesabackoftheenvelopemethodtoestimatethe dilution potential in Owen Sound harbour at 2.5 billion litres. This is twentytimes less water than the dilution used for the nearshore Great Lakes accidentscenario,andsothepotentialfordrinkingwaterimpactsinOwenSoundishigh.TherevisedCNSCstaffreportunderplaysthissignificantfinding.“Moreextremebut improbable scenarios could nevertheless result in short or long termcontamination of the drinking water supply of the municipality. The exactoutcomeofanyaccidentinthesoundwouldbehighlydependentonthenatureofthespillandtheweather/currentsbeforesalvageoccurred.”(Appendix1page11).ThissignificantfindingisalsonothighlightedintheSection2,summaryofthe environmental impact. The emergency plan also does not provide anydetailedspecificsalvageplansforanaccidentinOwenSoundharbour.We conclude that the close proximity of the drinking water intakes to theOwen Sound loading dock, the smaller water dilution available and therisks involved in loading, all illustrate the plausible potential for anaccident withthe generators to impact the drinking waterofthe peopleofOwenSound.

Table 2: The impact of assumptions used in the CNSC staff report to estimateeffects on drinking water of an accident with the steam generators in OwenSoundHarbour.AmountofAmountofResultsImpactonradioactiveradioactive(inmSv DrinkingWatermaterialinmaterialinmillisieverts) (HealthCanadageneratorgeneratorActionLevelof1assumedto assumedtobemSv)bereleasedavailablefor`Releaserate``release``Partialortotalinventory``1generator1%13.2%0.06 mSv DoesnotexceedlimitExceedslimit1generator17%13.2%1mSvExceedslimit1generator100%13.2%6mSvExceedslimit1generator100%100%45mSv4generators1%13.2%0.24 mSv DoesnotexceedlimitExceedslimit4generators100%13.2%24 mSvExceedslimit4generators100%100%181mSv16generators1%13.2%0.96 mSv Doesnotexceedlimit·closetolimitExceedslimit16generators100%13.2%96mSvExceedslimit16generators100%100%727mSvNote:allbasedonCNSCassumptionofwaterdilutionfactorof2.5billionlitresOnlythefirstaccidentscenarioispresentedintheCNSCrevisedreport.Numberofgeneratorsassumedtobeinvolvedinaccident

Conclusion1.3:AnaccidentwithonlyonegeneratorinashiplockexceedsHealthCanada’sDrinkingWaterActionLevelsTheCNSCreportdidpresentnewinformationontheenvironmentalimpactofanaccidentinalock.Theproposedshipmentwouldneedtopassthroughaseriesof19locks,alongtheWellandCanalandintheSt.LawrenceRiver.ThisisoneoftheareasraisedbyGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeascauseforconcern.The amount of water availablein alock fordilution was estimated at 91 millionlitres, much smaller than nearshore Great Lakes (45 billion litres) and OwenSound harbour (2.5 billion litres), so it is expected that the concentrations ofradioactivityfromanaccidentwouldbeveryhighinalock.Andtheresultsbearthis out: an accident in a lock with only one generator (and using mostconservative assumptions 1% release rate and partial inventory) results in thehighest amount of radioactivity of all accident scenarios, 1.64 mSv, well abovethe Health Canada drinking water Action Level of 1 mSv (CNSC staff report,AppendixA,page9·10).It is also worth noting that some municipal drinking water intakes, agriculturalintakes and private industrial water intakes are near locks. For example, St.Catharines and surrounding towns, takes its drinking water from the WellandCanal (providing a water supply forabout 165,000 people). Other communitiesalongtheSt.LawrencetaketheirdrinkingwaterfromtheSt.Lawrence.Thereisnoinformationpresentedontheproximityofwaterintakestolocksintherevisedreport.Unfortunately the lock analysis in the CNSC report applies the sameconservative ‘best case’ assumptions of 1 generator, a 1% release rate andpartialinventory.Table3presentstheresultsofthisscenarioandotherplausiblescenarios.All accident scenarios in a lock result in exceedance of theHealthCanadaActionLevels,oftenbyalargemargin.Despite this significant result of only one generator significantly exceedingdrinkingwaterguidelines,theCNSCreportdoesnotpresentthisfindingclearly,or evaluate the significance of this finding fully. This contributes to theCommissioners not having sufficient information of sufficient quality to evaluatethisproposal.

Thereportalsogoesontodiscusswhatmighthappentothecontaminatedwaternow contained in the lock. “If an accident of this type did occur, the lock watercould be recovered, and if warranted, disposed of in a licensed wastemanagement facility. If lock water was not recovered, further dilution in lake orcanal water would occur.” However there is no mention of this scenario in theemergencyplanandnocontingencyplaninplaceforthisscenario.Thiswouldalso appear to be a reportable spill. If this accident did occur and the ship andcontaminatedwaterwasstuckinthelockforaperiodofdaysorweeks,thiscancause a backup of loaded ships in the entire seaway, causing considerableeconomicimpact.Table 3: The impact of assumptions used in the CNSC staff report to estimateeffectsondrinkingwaterofanaccidentwiththesteamgeneratorsinalockintheWellandCanalandSt.LawrenceSeaway.AmountofAmountofResultsImpactonradioactiveradioactive(inmSvDrinkingWatermaterialinmaterialinmillisieverts)(HealthgeneratorgeneratorCanadaActionassumedto assumedtobeLevelof1bereleasedavailableformSv)`Releaserate``release``Partialortotalinventory``1generator1%13.2%1.64mSvExceedslimit1generator100%13.2%164mSvExceedslimit1generator100%100%1,242mSvExceedslimit4generators1%13.2%6.56mSvExceeds limit4generators100%13.2%656mSvExceedslimit4generators100%100%4,970mSvExceedslimit16generators1%13.2%26.24mSvExceedslimit16generators100%13.2%2,624mSvExceedslimit16generators100%100%19,879mSvExceedslimitNote:allbasedonCNSCassumptionofwaterdilutionfactorof91millionlitresOnlyfirstaccidentscenariopresentedintheCNSCrevisedreport.Numberofgeneratorsassumedtobeinvolvedinaccident

Conclusion2:TheproposedshipmentexceedstheinternationalallowablesafetylimitsfortotalamountofradioactivityonasingleshipWe are in agreement with the CNSC that this proposed shipment doesexceed the international allowable safety limits on the total amount ofradioactivityonasingleship.Wethereforefeelthatthisissufficientreasonwhythisshipmentshouldnotproceed.Thisexceedanceoftheinternationalsafetylimitsisoneofthethreereasonswhythisshipmentrequiresaspecialapproval,calledaspecialarrangement.Atthehearing,itwassuggestedmanytimesthattheonlyreasonaspecialarrangementapproval was required was due to thesizeof the generators. This is incorrect.Oneofthethreereasonsthataspecialagreementisrequiredisbecauseofthecontentof the steam generators.The radioactive content of the steamgenerators exceeds the international safety limits for the total amount ofradioactivityallowedonasingleship.Thereisnodisputeordisagreementaboutthisfact.Thisexceedenceofaninternationalsafetylimitsissignificant.Much of the revised CNSC staff report describes the CNSC’s opinion on theamountofthemarginofexceedenceoftheinternationalsafetylimit.Whilethisisimportant, it tends to overshadow the more important fact, that this shipmentexceeds the international safety limits for the total amount of radioactivityallowedonaship.Notenoughinformationoremphasishasbeenplacedonthismostimportantfinding.We would have expected the revised report to provide to the Commissionersdetailed information about this most important fact, the exceedence of aninternational safety limit. The type of information that we expected to seeprovided to the Commissioners and the intervenors includes: how manyrequests for special arrangements are reviewed each year, a break down oftheserequestsbymodeoftransportandtypeofmaterial,whetherthisisthefirstapplication that exceeds the international safety limit for a ship on the GreatLakes and Atlantic Ocean, what type of controls are common on other specialarrangementshipments,andwhatareothercountriespractisesforthissituationetc.In particular, the CNSC report has not included any description of the draftguidelinebeingdevelopedbyInternationalAtomicEnergyAssociation(IAEA)forexactly this type of situation, the transport of large components under specialarrangement. This guidelineis now out for comment until December.We wouldhave thought that the revised report would have described this IAEA draft177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

guideline in detail, and assessed whether the current proposal is consistent ornotwiththisIAEAdraftguideline.ThefactthatIAEAisdevelopingthisguidelineis highly significant and merits discussion: it illustrates that there is a growingglobalneedforregulationsandguidanceinthisarea,thatthereisexpectedtobeincrease in global trade in steam generators and other used radioactiveequipment, that the process and decisions being made by the CNSCCommissioner are being watched by many, the type of conditions and controlsplaced on this shipment may have implications for other countries and that thisshipmentisthereforeprecedentsettinginCanada.The Commissioners did ask about this verypoint at the September hearing, onwhethertherewasaneedforCNSCtodevelopguidanceforthetransportationoflarge components. The reply was that something was being developed in thenext year or two. This was the point when it would have been expected fortheexistenceofthisIAEAdraftguidelinetoberaised,discussedanddebated.TheCommissionerscouldconsideraskingforadditionalinformationandassessmentofthisapplicationunderthisdraftguideline.NonewevidencetojustifyCNSCstaffopiniononmarginofexceedenceofinternationalsafetylimit(conveyancelimits)The revised CNSC staff report provides no new rationale for the margin ofexceedence of the international safety limit on conveyance limits. The revisedestimated conveyance value for the shipment of 16 generators is 622 A2, anincreasefromtheBrucePower’soriginalestimateof545A2(April1application).We can agree to disagree with the CNSC on the margin of exceedence of theinternational safety level. The CNSC revised staff report states that thisproposed shipment exceeds theinternational allowable safetylimits on the totalamountofradioactivityonasingleshipby6times,andCitiesInitiativeanalysisconcludesthatthisshipmentexceedstheinternationalsafetylimitby50times(ornow 60 times with revised and increased estimates of radioactivity). Thisdifference of opinion comes down to whether the International Atomic EnergyAgency guidelines are interpreted as applying to an inlandwater wayor to aninlandwatercraftandthedefinitionofaninlandwatercraft.OnecolumnofTable5 of the guidelines states that the limit applies to an inland waterway and theothercolumnstatesthatitappliestoaninlandwatercraft.

A fairinterpretation of the IAEA guidelines wouldbe that the guidelines are notclear on whether the 10 A2limit applies to an inland waterway or an inlandwatercraft,andwhattypeofvesselisconsideredaninlandwatercraft.Wenotethat the IAEA guidelines do not define “an inland watercraft”, and hence nomention of an inland watercraft being abarge. Aninland water craft could be aseagoingvesseltravellingonaninlandwaterway.Inaddition,ontheGreatLakesthere are a number of vessels known as “lakers” which travel only the GreatLakes,anddonottraveltotheseaduetothewiderberth.Theselakersarenotbarges,butsturdyvessels,andcouldalsobeconsideredinlandwatercraft.We note that CNSC staff promised at the September hearing to providecomments from the IAEA on the interpretation of IAEA guidelines to clarify thismatter. These IAEA written comments were not provided in the revised staffreport.ThismakesitverydifficulttoaccuratelydeterminewhichinterpretationofTable 5 of the IAEA guidelinesis correct. Itwould have been helpful for CNSCstaff to follow through and to provide an IAEA letter or memo clarifying thisinterpretation of the IAEA guidelines. The revised report reiterates CNSC staffassertions,ratherthanprovidingnewinformationorarulingfromIAEA.Withoutthis letter from IAEA we feel that this matter on which IAEA conveyancelimits applies, and what type of vessel is considered an inland watercrafthas not been sufficiently clarified.Nevertheless, there is agreement on thefactthatallpartiesagreethatthisshipmentdoesexceedtheinternationalsafetylimitsfortotalamountofradioactivityofasingleship.

Conclusion3:TheenvironmentalreviewisflawedConclusion 3.1: The environmental review of the proposed shipmentcontinues to be based on best case assumptions, and fails to considerother plausible assumptions. As a result, the environmental reviewconsistentlyunderestimatesenvironmentalrisk.Conclusion 3.2: The environmental review is flawed because of a poorchoiceof “bounding scenario” used in the environmental review.There islittle or insufficient evidence given to support many of these criticalassumptions.Inourpreviouscommentsandatthehearing,GLSLCIpointedoutthatoneofthemainproblemswiththeCNSCenvironmentalanalysiswasthatitrestedonbestcase assumptions instead of other plausible assumptions. There is little orinsufficient evidence given to support many of these critical assumptions. Theconsequence of these assumptions is that it leads to consistentlyunderestimatingtheenvironmentalrisks.TheAugustCNSCenvironmentalanalysisrestedonfourbestcaseassumptionsincluding:1)onlyoneofthe16generatorsisinvolvedinanaccident,2) only a very small amount (1%) of the radioactive materialsis released in anaccident,3) not allof theradioactive materialsin the generators are available for release(only13%oftotalinventoryisavailable),4)theuseoflargewaterdilutionfactors.TheCNSCreportcallsthefirstthreeofthesebestcaseassumptions“aboundingscenario”. It then uses these critical assumptions in the “bounding scenario” toassess environmental impact. This poor choice of bounding scenario, andunwillingness to consider other scenarios is one of the critical flaws of theenvironmentalreview.Therevisedreportdoeslittletocorrectthiscriticalflaw.WhenalltheseassumptionsarecombinedintheCNSCstaffreport,itresultsinunderestimates of the environmental risk of the shipment. The effect of theassumptionsismathematicallytotakealargenumericalriskandthenmultiplyitby 0.00132 to get an answer. So in other words, mathematically the effect ofthese assumptions is to take a big number and make it into a small number.However, the assumptions used in the environmental review are not always177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

valid. Nor are there always adequate reasons given to support these criticalassumptions. Therefore the entire environmental review is flawed because it isbasedontheseinvalidandofteninadequatelysupportedassumptions.TheCommissioners,andtheGLSLCI,requestedthatthesecriticalassumptionsusedintheboundingscenariobealtered.IntherevisedCNSCstaffreport,thishas only been partially done and only for one accident scenario. For the otheraccident scenarios, such as accident in a lock, or accident in Owen Sound,unfortunately, the same faulty best case assumptions are carried through.Therefore, the revised report seems to repeat the original error of using faultybest case assumptions in most accident scenarios. It does not present otherplausiblescenarios.Therefore,therevisedreportcontinuestounderestimatetheenvironmentalriskoftheproposedshipment.Because these assumptions are so critical to the conclusions aboutenvironmentalimpact,wecommentoneachofthem.NoevidenceprovidedtojustifyassumptionofonlyonegeneratorinvolvedinaccidentThefirstassumptionthatonlyonegeneratorisinvolvedinanaccident,doesnotseem to make sense when all 16 generators are the same hold of one ship.Indeed all 16 generators are fairly closely packed together in the ship hold, somuchso,thattwoofthegeneratorshavetobeplacedinoppositeorientation.Anaccident which only involved one of these generators is hard to imagine whentheyareallpackagedsotightlytogether.The CNSC staff revised report still refuses to see any scenario in which morethan 1 generatoris involvedin an accident as “probable”. Yet thereis no solidevidencegivenforthisassumption. Thereisnoaccidentreportsreferenced,nodata provided. There is a complete lack of evidence provided by the CNSC tojustifytheassumptionofonly1generatorbeinginvolvedinanaccident.Becauseofthislackofevidencetosupportacriticalassumption,theCommissionersstilldonothavesufficientinformationtoevaluatetheproposal.Alternativeaccidentscenariosarelabeledas“extreme”,whereasstaffscenariosarelabeledas“credible”.IntheaccidentscenarioinalockandinOwenSound,therearenoanalysispresentedusingotherthanthisassumptionthanonlyonegeneratorisinvolvedinanaccident.Thisisofconcern.

Assumption that only 1% of material is released not based on actualaccidentsbutoutdatedconceptsThe second assumption in the environmental review is that only 1% of theradioactive material would be releasedin case ofan accident. Thisis a criticalassumption, and plays a major factor in determining the analysis ofenvironmentalrisk.TherevisedCNSCdocumentstatesthatthis1%assumptionisdrawnfromIAEAadvisorymaterials(TS·G·1.1Appendix1paragraphs1.32to1.35).TheseguidancedocumentsaretoassistintheinterpretationoftheIAEAguideline and are not considered legally binding. This 1% release rate isquestionable.ItisbasedontheQsystem,anoldsystem,fullofassumptions.Asthe same IAEA guidance document states “Many of the assumptions made aresimilar to those stated, or implied, in the 1973 Edition of the Transportregulations…. In particular, pragmatic assumptions are made regarding theextent of the package damage and the release of contents…” (TS·G·1.1Appendix1paragraph1.7).This 1% release rate is not based on actual performance of packages inaccidents.Infact,IAEAdescriptionsononeactualaccidentdocuments30%ofthematerialwasreleased.The1%releaserateisusedtodeterminetheamountofradioactivitythatcanbeallowedincertaintypesofpackages.Itisatheoreticalcalculationdesignedtoderivepackagelimits.Itisnotdesignedtobeappliedinthistypeofsituation,todeterminetheenvironmentalimpactsofarelease.Therefore,in previous written comments and at the hearing, GLSLCI urged theCNSC to examine the environmental impacts if this critical 1% release rate isaltered.Inanyanalysiswhereonefactorisidentifiedasdrivingtheanalysis,itiscommontodosensitivityanalysistodeterminetheimpactsofalternativevalues.WewouldhaveexpectedtherevisedCNSCreporttopresentarangeofreleasefactorsandthecorrespondingimpactsondrinkingwaterquality.However,intherevised CNSC staff report,onlyin one scenario(nearshore Great Lakes)is thiscritical assumption altered. This is not sufficient. This critical 1% release rateassumption should also have been altered for all accident scenarios, and theinformation clearly presented. Instead the reader cannot gather this informationfromthesummaryandhastogototheAppendicesandcalculatetheimpactsforthemselves for most accident scenarios. Because of this omission, theCommissionersdonothavesufficientinformationtoevaluatethisproposal.

Whenthereleaserateisassumedtobe100%,insteadof1%thenanaccidentwith four generators (assuming still 13% available inventory only), then thisnearshore accident scenario will result in exceedance of the Health CanadaDrinkingWaterActionLevelsinnearbydrinkingwaterplants(Table1).Weconcludethatthereisstillanexcessiverelianceonthe1%releasefractioninthe revised report, which is a critical assumption, and based on dated scientificconceptsandlimitedknowledgeofactualaccidents.LowconfidenceintheestimateofnonfixedinventoryThe third assumption states that not all the radioactive materials in thegeneratorsareavailabletobereleasedinanaccident.Thisisbecausesomeofthematerialiscontainedwithinthemetaltubes(calledfixed)andsomeisintheformofadustonthetubes(callednon·fixed).Whatbecomescriticalthenistheaccuracyoftheestimateofhowmuchofthetotalinventoryisinthenonfixedordust form. Here there are only very preliminary estimates provided by BrucePower on the amount of non fixed form of 4·13%. It does not appear to beverifiedbyanyactualtestingorobservationsofthegenerators.Itisabackoftheenvelopetheoreticaltypeofcalculation. Itthereforeappearstobereasonabletoassumethatthereisalowconfidenceinthisestimate.ItisthereforereasonabletoexpecttherevisedCNSCreporttorepresentarangeofvaluesfortheamountofavailableinventory.

Conclusion3.3:TheaccidentscenariosallrelyondilutionasthesolutiontoanaccidentThe fourth assumption in the environmental review rests on the amount ofdilution provided by the Great Lakes and Owen Sound Harbour. However, asenvironmental management has evolved, using the Great Lakes to diluteradiologicalcontaminationisgrowinglessacceptable.Itisnotreallyacceptableto take advantage of the size of the Great Lakes as a way to justify theenvironmentalsafetyoftheshipment.The revised staff report contains several of GLSLCI requested pieces ofinformationaboutthedilutionfactorsusedintheenvironmentalanalysis.

This new information reveals that there is a huge reliance on assuming largeamounts of dilution as the solution to an accident with this proposed shipment.The dilution factors used in the environmental analysis are very high, over 45billionlitresforthenearshoreGreatLakesscenarioand2.5billionlitresforOwenSound.Thereisnoevidencepresentedonhowthesedilutionfactorscomparetootherstudiesandfindings.Thereisonly a dilutionfactor calculatedinthe report for one Great Lake (LakeOntario) and then this dilution factor is assumed to be representative of allnearshoreGreatLakes.Thisisinadequate.EachGreatLakeandespeciallytheconnecting channels are unique. Each Lake and river has very differentvolumes, currents and ecology, so one size does not fit all. An accident couldoccur on the smaller Lake Erie (with about one quarter the volume of LakeOntario)orthesmallerstillLakeSt.Clair(withonehundredththevolumeofLakeOntario), or the connecting channels such as St.Clair river. There are manydrinkingwaterintakesalongtheconnectingchannelssuchasLakeSt.ClairandtheSt.Clairriver.Thesesmallervolumelakesandriverswouldhavetheeffectofhaving less water available for dilution and so increasing the concentration ofradioactivity.Wewouldhaveexpectedthereporttopresentananalysisofthehowthedilutionfactorcomparestootherstudiesandfindings,howadilutionfactorcalculatedforLake Ontario can be legitimately applied to all the Great Lakes, and especiallythe smaller Lakes like Erie, St.Clair and the connecting channels. It does notseemappropriatetocalculateadilutionfactorforoneLakeandthenassumeitisvalidforalltheGreatLakes.Wealsoexpectthewindandwavestoeffecttheconcentrationofradioactivityatthenearshoreintakepipes.Thesearenotconsideredinthecurrentanalysis.Wewould appreciate receiving a copy of the document in the revised report thatdiscussesseasonalityasafactor(Reference5,AppendixApage12).However, even using these mammoth dilution factors, still results in significantenvironmentalimpacts. Even assuming dilution with 45 billion litres of water inLake Ontario, an accident with 4 generators will still exceed Health CanadadrinkingwaterActionLevel.

It is also curious why the environmental analysis is not based on a differentmethodologyentirely.Wewouldhaveexpectedtheenvironmentalreviewtousea sophisticated environmental modelling approach, instead of the simplisticcalculation of a dilution factor. There are a number of good sophisticatedenvironmentalmodelsusedtopredictconcentrationsintheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrence.CNSC staff review guidance documents anticipates and encourages the use ofthese modeling methods by applicants in other situations (including SRG·2.01·EISEnvironmentalImpactStatement Modelling).Thesemodelsuseavarietyofinputstopredictconcentrationsatdifferentlocationsandpointsintime,andhavebeenusedtoassesscriticalfactors,concentrationsovertimeandconcentrationsinecologicalfoodwebsetc.Theyareoftencomputermodelsimulationsrunwithchanginginputs.The computer models have several advantages over the dilution factor methodpresented in this environmental review: they allow for multiple scenarios to berun,theyidentifythecriticalfactorsdrivingconcentrations,theycanbeappliedtodifferent Great Lakes to get customized results for each Great Lake, they cangive a time sequence, they can identify critical seasons or weather conditionsthat would increase impacts and they can identify expected concentrations inalgae,fishandotherfoodchain.WhydidCNSCnotrequireBrucePowertodoamore sophisticated assessment of environmental impacts using one of theenvironmental modelling approaches? Why CNSC did not seek the advice ofotherfederalexpertsontheGreatLakesandSt.LawrencesuchasEnvironmentCanadafortheirassistanceandreviewoftheenvironmentalimpacts?Instead of using one of these environmental models, the report estimates thedilution factor from a spill in Lake Ontario, and then uses this dilution factor asthe basis for the environmental review. It is not clear why this method waschosen over other methods to predict environmental impacts of the proposedshipment.

Conclusion 3.4: The revised report still lacks severalcomponents:1)ananalysisoftheSt.LawrenceRiver,2)anecologicalanalysis,3) an assessment of the transport index and if this shipmentexceedsthenormaltransportindexlimit,4) an analysis of an accident scenario along the road route,includingindowntownOwenSound,5)analysisoftheoptimumtimeofshipment.Thismissinginformationmakesitdifficultfortheproposaltobeproperlyevaluated.NoanalysisofaccidentontheSt.LawrenceThe GLSLCI has serious concerns with the failure to comprehensively evaluatethe potential environmental impacts of an accident in the St. Lawrence in therevised staff report. The report suggests that this accident scenario “was notcarriedforwardforquantitativeanalysisastheNearshoreLakeOntarioscenariowasdeemedtobeaboundingscenario.”(AppendixA,page10).However,thereisnoevidencepresentedtosupportthisconclusion.TheamountofwaterintheSt. Lawrence and the dilution factor are not presented. There is only anunreferenced statement of the large (not quantified) amount of water in the St.Lawrence. This is not sufficiently precise an analysis to rule out quantitativeanalysisontheSt.Lawrence.Thisisasignificantomission.In addition, the analysis does not consider the narrowness of the river in someparts with the close proximity between ships and drinking water intakes, thelargenumberofpeoplelivinginmajorcitiesalongtheroute,andthenearshorecurrents which often cause contaminants to hug along the shorelines, or theeffectoffreshwaterandsalinitymixingzones.NoanalysisofecologicalimpactIn the revised CNSC staff report, there is still no analysis of the ecologicalimpacts of an accident, such asimpacts on fish, wildlife and food chains.Often177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

radioactivity will be taken up by phytoplankton and zooplankton and so thenbepassed up the food chain and biomagnifies. In the revised report,theenvironmental impacts have been overly narrowly scopedto include onlyimpacts on drinking water. The definition of the environment in various nuclearsafety regulations is broad, and so would seem to require a broaderenvironmental analysis. The CNSC staff guidance documents do provide aframework for ecological risk assessment. The full range of environmentalimpacts are not considered, including the lack of consideration of ecologicalimpacts,whichisanomissionintherevisedreport.No Transportation Index given for the proposed shipment, or anydiscussionorevaluationifthisshipment’stransportationindexexceedsasecond international allowable safety limit. Bruce Power invokes“exclusive use” provision to exempt from regulatory safety limits.Exclusiveusethereforeprovidesmorethan“administrativerelief”.In our earlier submitted questions to the CNSC we had requested the transportindex for each generator and for the shipment. The revised report stilldoes notanswer this question or provide discussion or analysis on the transport index.Thetransportindex mattersfortworeasons:thereisaninternationalregulatorylimit on transport index for shipments, and the transport index is often used byemergencypersonneltoevaluatewhattypeofresponseisrequiredintheeventof an accident or emergency. The revised report does provide a July 16, 2010memo from WMG which carefully avoids saying what the transport index is. Italso states that ``Declaring these shipments exclusive use excepts the steamgenerators from the regulatory limit for individual package or conveyance TI ``(transportindex). Exclusiveusemeansthatnoothercargoiscarriedontheroadtrailerortheshipatthesametime. Thismemodoesindicatethatincalculatingthe transport index for each steam generator and for the entire shipment, theoriginal estimate calculated has to be multiplied by 10 to get the final transportindexvalues(fromTableVI).In a followup GLSLCI question to the CNSC, staff noted that while eachTransport Index would be assigned prior to shipment, the transport index wasexpectedtobeabout8foreachgenerator.Ifthisnumberisthenmultipliedbytheagreeduponfactorof10,thiswouldmeanthetransportindexforonegeneratorcouldbeabout80andfortheentireshipmentcouldbeabout1,280(sumofallTI`s). These are very high transport indices. This would seem to exceed theinternational regulatory limit for a package transport index of 50. It would alsoseemtoexceedtheinternationalsafetylimitsetforatotalvesselof200.177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

Thereforethisshipmentappearstoexceedtheinternationalallowablesafetylimiton another matter, the transport index. This time, to exempt from thisinternational safety limit, another, different mechanism is used, the “exclusiveuse” provision. Bruce Power proposes to ship these generators under the“exclusive use” provision, so argues that this exempts the proposed shipmentfromtheseinternationalsafetylimits.We would encourage the CNSC to follow through on its good original line ofquestioningaboutthetransportindex,andtoprovidetheindividualandshipmenttransport index, and assessment of whether this exceeds the international limitandthenanevaluationofwhythisshipmentisbeingconsideredifitexceedsasecondinternationalsafetylimit.Thisismissingfromtherevisedreport.Atthehearing,duringadiscussionofthispointraisedbyGLSLCIthatexclusiveuse provision loosens regulatory requirements, the CNSC staff replied that theexclusiveuseprovisionprovided“administrativereliefonly”.Thisdoesnotseemtobethecasehere.Itseemsthattheuseofexclusiveuseprovisionisawaytoallowthisshipmenttoexceedtheinternationalsafetyrulesforsafeshipmentonbothroadsandships.Thisproposedshipmentwouldnotbeallowedifitwerenotforthedeclarationofexclusiveuseprovision.Therefore, itseemsthatexclusiveuse provision provides more than administrative relief. We conclude that theinformation around the transport index has not been clearly presented orassessedandthattheexceedenceofthetransportindexlimitisanotherreasonforthisshipmentnottobeapproved.NoanalysisoftheoptimumtimeofshipmentorloweredlakelevelsInourpreviouscommentswenotedthatthelackofanalysisontheoptimumtimeofshipment.Therevisedreportalsodoesnotanalysetheshipmenttodeterminetheoptimumtimeofshipment.Astimehasprogressed,thepotentialdatesofshipment(originallylistedasJune30toSept7)havebecomelaterthisyearorpotentially2011.Duringwinterandspring,theroadsfromBrucePowertoOwenSound,includingthelargehilldownto the harbour can become slippery, windy and icy. At the hearing, it wassuggestedthatitwouldtake16·21daystotransportthegeneratorsthe80kmtoOwenSound.IfapprovalisgiveninDecember,thiscouldmaketheshipmentinlateDecember.Latefallandwinterarestormy,coldtimesonthelakes,pronetohigh winds and waves on some of the Lakes and the Atlantic. For example,December has the highest possible storm induced rises of all months (examplegivenforBuffalo,USArmyCorpsofEngineers).BrucePower’sapplicationcould177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

have taken advantage of the wealth of information on the shipping conditionsduringdifferentmonthstodeterminetheoptimumtimeofshipment.In addition, parts of the shipping route and Seaway close in Decemberdepending on conditions. These dates are also often very busy times on theWellandCanalandSeaway.Withthechangesintheworldgrainmarket,averybusy fall shipping season is currently underway on the Lakes and Seaway. St.Lawrence Seaway 2010 year to date shipments have increased by 17% from2009. Has the changed potential shipment date been considered and analysedforlikelihoodofaccident?Hastheoptimumtimeofshipmentbeenconsidered?ThelakelevelsinmanyoftheGreatLakesarelow.LakeHuroniscurrently16·17inchesbelowitslongtermaverage,Superior11·13inches,Erie4to7inches,Ontario 4 to 8 inches and Lake St. Clair 7 to 9 inches (US Army Corps ofEngineers Great Lakes Water Summary). Has the lowered levels in the LakesandtheportofOwenSoundbeenconsideredinthisshipment?RadiationProtection

Conclusion3.5:Thereislittleinformationpresentedinthereporton the radiation dose to the public in different situations.Thedose is stated to be low, but this is based on exposures measured inseconds. Other plausible scenarios, involving longer times or more thanone generator are not presented. In particular, there is no informationavailableonpublicdoseratesduringanaccidentalongtheroadrouteandduringloadinginOwenSoundorforpeopleexposedforlongertimes.Thedosetotheshipworkersalsoappearstobehigh.In general, both the original and the revised report do not present muchinformation on estimating the public dose in a variety of situations. In a similarsituation to the environmental review, only a few scenarios are presented, andalso make best case assumptions. Other plausible scenarios involving longertimes,accidentsalongtherouteorexposuretomorethanonegeneratorarenotpresented.

Therevisedreportcouldhavealsopresented:¶Theestimateddosetothepublicintheeventofaroadaccidentalongtheroute, in both rural and within the several towns the shipment passesthrough¶The estimated dose to the public of the cumulative effect of the 16generatorsduringtheestimated20daysofloadingintheharbourofOwenSound¶A map of the Owen Sound harbour, indicating the loading dock and theproximity to the nearest houses and businesses, and the estimatednumberofpeopleandexpecteddosesinvariouszones¶Anestimateddosetopeoplewatchingtheloadingofthesteamgenerators¶Theestimateddosetoworkershandlingthesteamgeneratorswithknownhotspots¶TheestimateddosetothepublicandworkersintheeventofanaccidentduringloadingattheOwenSoundharbour¶Doseratesat1,2and3metersfromonegeneratorandtheaccumulated16generators¶The requirements for checking the boat before loading to ensureradioactivitylevelsarewithinlimitsNo public health information using plausible longer exposures and allgeneratorsThepublicdoseinformationisverylimitedandalsonotclearlypresentedintheoriginalorrevisedreport.Theactualdoseestimatesarecontainedinaseriesofquestion and answers buried in the technical materials of the report. Thesetables state that the public dose is low (0.1% of annual dose), mainly becausetheexposureisassumedtobemeasuredinseconds.Exposureiscalculatedforsomeone driving by the shipments and for someone walking by quickly andslowly. Using these same rates and assuming a longer exposure does givesignificantpublicdoserates.Areasonablequestiontoaskis:howlongwouldamemberofthepublichavetobeexposedtothesesteamgeneratorstoreceivethe maximum recommended annual public dose limit of 1 millisievert? Thisquestionisnotaskedoransweredinthereports.Thisisasignificantomission.

In our attempt to understand the public dose, we did some preliminarycalculationsbasedonBrucePower’sinformation.Itappearsthatifapersonisstanding watching the generators go by (so has no speed), then it wouldtake only 37 minutes for this person to receive the total recommendedmaximum public dose for one year (1 millisivert).We would welcome theCNSC and Bruce Power’s thoughts on this, and would encourage them topresent additional information on the public dose. Without this information, andwiththeinformationpresentlygivenandinthe manneritispresented,doesnotallow the Commissioner or the public the opportunity to fully understand theimpactofthisshipmentonthepublicandworkers.We would have expected the report to present the information on public doseratesinwaythatallowstheCommissionersandreaderstoeasilyunderstandtheinformation, and the effect of the assumptions behind the information. Someplacesalongtheroutearewelltravelledfairlybusyroadswithlotsofpedestrians(i.e. Highway 6 and 10 in Owen Sound), where more people could be exposedand for longer than the assumed 30 seconds. We would have expectedsomethinglikeTable4,withtheotherscenarioscalculated.Table 4: Estimated public dose from exposure to the steam generators as theytravelalongtheroadroutefromBrucePowertoOwenSoundScenarioDrivingpastWalkingpastquicklyWalkingpastSlowlyWatchingthegeneratorspassbyWatchingtheloadingofthegeneratorsExposuretothepublicifan accident occursduringroadtransportExposuretotheworkers if an accidentoccurs during roadtransportSpeedExposuretime15km/hour 4seconds4km/hour 15seconds2km/hour 30seconds0km/hour??37minutes??Exposure(millisieverts)0.0008910.0030.006681??Exposure(microsieverts)0.893.346.681000??

Based on Bruce Power July 22, 2010 memo to CNSC which estimates a doserate of 8mR/hour, and a distance of 16.7 metres. The first three scenarios arepresentedinthequestionandanswersfromBrucePower.NopublichealthinformationforanaccidentalongtheroadrouteItisalsocuriousthattherevisedreportdoesnotprovideanaccidentscenarioorpublic dose estimates for a truck accident and release of radioactivity near thecentre ofOwen Sound and the several other towns that this shipment will passthrough.InBrucePower’sSummaryreportofAugust20,2010,thisscenarioisdescribed. “hypothetical highway transportation could occur on highways,rural/county secondary roads or City/ municipality urban roads. Althoughconsidered an unlikely scenario, for planning purposes it could be consideredthat the vehicle overturns, and thepackageclosureisbreached during a snow,rain and/or wind event, resulting in the release of some radioactivecontamination” (page A4). We would have expected the revised report todescribethisaccidentscenario,andestimatethepublicandworkerdoseofthisscenario, using the revised radioactivity estimates. This lack of public doseestimates, and lack of updating existing public dose estimates is a seriousomissionintherevisedreport.Therefore the report does not seem to provide adequate information to theCommission on the public dose expected from this shipment under a variety ofplausibletransportsituations,andalsoinanaccidentsituationalongtheroadorduringloadingatOwenSound.Because of these omissions, vague evidence presented to rule out an accidentscenario on the St. Lawrence, lack of ecological impacts, and lack of accidentscenarios along the road route,including Owen Sound,lack of consideration ofoptimum transportation time, the Commission does not have sufficientinformationofsufficientqualitytoevaluatethisproposal.

Conclusion4:Continueddifficultyinestimatingtheradioactivityoftheshipmentiscauseforre·evaluationandcautionThere is a continuing tendency to underestimate the radioactivity of thegenerators,andsoalsotounderestimatetheriskpresentedbythegenerators.ItappearsthatCNSCstaffhasbeenaskingBrucePowergoodquestionsabouttheestimatesofradioactivityofthegenerators,andthishasresultedinasignificantincreaseof50%intheestimatesofradioactivityofthegenerators.Therecontinuestobedifficultyinaccuratelyestimatingandreportingtheamountof radioactivity in the shipment. Just prior to the September hearing, CNSCissued revised values for the estimates of radioactivity of the shipment. Theestimateofthetotalactivitycontainedinthe16steamgeneratorswentfrom3.67to5.46terabequerels(atrillionbequerelsorE12).Thisisanincreaseof50%inthetotalradioactivityofthegenerators.Revision in radioactivity requires new application from Bruce Power, withrevisedestimatesofpublicandworkerdoseThis revision in radioactivity is significant, as much of the original public andworkerdoseestimatesandenvironmentalworkwasdoneonthelowerestimate.In the revised CNSC report, there are not revised estimates available for thepublic dose based on the revised, increased radioactivity levels. Perhaps theradioactivity hasincreased withoutincreasing the effective dose. This seems tobe an omission in the information provided to the Commission. The CNSCrevisedstaffreportdoesusethecorrectedhigherestimatesintheenvironmentalreview.It seems curious that it was the CNSC staff, not Bruce Power who issued therevised radioactivity estimates, and that this material change in the informationdid not seem to trigger a revised application from Bruce Power. The memosbetween CNSC and Bruce Power explaining the reason for the omission of themissing plutonium and other isotopes have not been included in the revisedCNSCstaffreport.The revised report adds another level of estimation to the radioactivity of thegenerators,withnewerrorvaluesofplusorminus30%.TherevisedCNSCstaffreport also gives an example of a shipment in Germany, noting that they alsoexperienceddifficultiesinaccuratelyestimatingradioactivityoftheshipment.177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

QuestionablerationaleinmovingfromfullKinetricslistof50radioisotopesto abbreviated list of about 23 radioisotopes used in the Bruce PowerapplicationTherevisedCNSCreportnotesthatBrucePowerdoesnotincludeuraniuminitsestimates of radioactivity of the generators. It is not clear why these uraniumisotopesarenotincludedintheinventoryofthesteamgenerators.Itisclearthatthereis uranium in the generators: U·234 (approximately 8,000,000 Bq), U·235(130,000 Bq) U·236 (1,500,000 Bq) and U·238 (9,900,000 Bq) (Table C.7Kinetrics Isotopic Inventory). This would increase the estimate of radioactivityandalsoincreasetheestimateofA2.Therearealsoanumberofotherisotopes intheKinetricsreport(thetotallistofradionuclide’s in the steam generators is over 50) that are not on the final listprovided by Bruce Power. Some of these were discussed at the hearing, andothersseemtobedifferent.WewouldrecommendthatCNSCclarifythereasoningusedinmovingfromtheKinetricslistof50radioisotopes(TableC.7)inthegeneratorstotheabbreviatedsummarylistofthe23isotopesinthegenerators.Therearemanyassumptionsand screening criteria used to move from the full Kinetrics list to the finalabbreviated list of radioisotopes used in the Bruce Power application. Some ofthese screening criteria may have been appropriate for the original purpose ofthe list, to determine classification, but they do not seem to be appropriate forother uses, including determination of the A2value of the shipment and as abasisfordeterminingenvironmentalandpublichealthimpacts.WewouldencourageCNSCtocarefullyconsidertheassumptionsandscreeningcriteriaasthesemeritcarefulreview,andmaynotbevalid.AsnotedinthenewIAEAdraftguideline,“Careshouldbetakenabouttheradioisotopiccompositionof inventory.” Bruce Power and OPG have a number of useful surveys on thegenerators, butit is thetranslationof these survey resultsinto the finallist thatrequiresre·assessment.This difficulty in accurately estimating and reporting the radioactivity of theshipmentiscauseforcautioninallaspectsoftheproposedshipment.

Not all generators are the same, some are more radioactive than others,andsomehave“hotspots”.Noconsiderationofimportanceofhotspotsinclassifying handling, transportation, storage and processing of thesegeneratorsThe CNSC and Bruce Power documents recognize that not allgeneratorshavethe same amount of radioactivity. However, it appears that the range inradioactivity among generators may be greater than previously thought. Itappears that some generators have“hotspots”, areas on a generator whereradioactivity levels are much higher.This has important implications for theclassifying,handling,transportation,storageandprocessingofthesegenerators.InSeptember2010,CNSCissuedrevisedestimateofthemaximumcontactdoserateononespotononegenerator,increasingthemaximumcontactdoseratefrom 270 microsieverts to 740 microsieverts, an increase of 174 %(CNSCSupplemental document with corrections CMD 10·H19C). This is furtherconfirmationthatthegeneratorsarenotallalike,andsomegeneratorsandsomespotsongeneratorsaremuchmoreradioactivethanothers.Theexistenceofhotspotsonthegeneratorsisanimportantwarningsignthatneeds to be taken into account in all aspects of this proposed shipment,particularly when classifying, handling, transporting, storing and processing thegenerators. It would seem prudent for Bruce Power to investigate the possiblereasons for this hotspot, as it may indicate internal breakage, leakage or otherconditions. It would also seem prudent to investigate if other generators havesimilar hotspots. It would seem prudent to knowand visibly mark which spotsarethemostradioactive,andthenavoidcontactwiththeseasmuchaspossible.It would also seem advisable for Bruce Power to tell this information to WMG,Studskvik,shipworkersandotherssothatitcanbetakenthisintoaccountifthegeneratorsarehandledandprocessed.Thisinformationalsoneedstobepartoftheemergencyplanandtheradiologicalprotectionplans.Knowledge of the revised maximum contact dose of this one generator wouldalsohave beenhighlyimportant for the painters and welders who havealreadypreparedthegenerators,andforthepeoplewhomayyethandlethisgenerator.It would be highly important for the workers who are proposed to weld thesegeneratorsaddlesintotheship.YettheserevisedestimatesandtheexistenceofhotspotsdonotappearintheBrucePower’sestimatesofdosefortheworkersortheradiologicalprotectionplan.177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

Surveysconfirmradioactivityisnotuniformlydistributedinthegenerators,therefore need to assess whether the more radioactive parts of thegeneratorareactuallySCO·IITheexistenceofhotspotsisalsoastrongconfirmationthattheradioactivityisnot uniformly distributedwithin the generators. From the Kinetrics Surveys,radioactivity appears to be lower at the top of the generators, highest in thebottomsidesandhigh,insome,butnotallbowls.Thishighlyvariabledistributionofradioactivity,mayalsobeastrongindicationthattheSCO·Ilimitsarenotmetforallpartsofthegenerator.CNSCmaywishtoconfirmtheextentofhotspotsand variability on all generators, and whether these hotspots and variabilitymeans that part of the generators do not meet the SCO·I definition, and someparts of the generator,are actually SCO·II.It needs to be evaluated whethersomepartsofthegeneratorsareSCO·IIandsomepartsareSCO·I.In fact, if the original radiation surveys of the steam generators are reviewed(Appendix B, Steam Generator Radiation Surveys, Kinetrics Isotopic Inventory,2009), it clearly demonstrates large variations in the amount of radioactivity atdifferent spots forallthe steam generators. The hot spots seem to be at themiddlesidesofthegeneratorclosesttotheground(samplepoint3,4,5)andalsoin the bottom bowl. The original radiation surveys clearly show tremendousdifferences between generators and in different spots on the generators. Forexample,thebottomofthebowlonUnit1steamgenerator1hasacontactdoserate of 27 mrem per hour compared to 0.5 mrem per hour for Unit 1 steamgenerator7bottombowl.Forthesidesofthegenerator,Unit1steamgenerator7 has a contact dose rate of 18 mrem per hour (sample point 3D) whichdecreases to 1 mrem on the same generator closer to the top of the generator(sample point 7a). While some of the variation might be expected given thenature of the deposition,it does appear that the each generator is highlyunique,andthattherearehotspotsoneachgenerator.We would suggest that the Commissioners and the public need additionalinformationontheextentofthehotspotsonthesteamgenerators,whetherthisrequiresareconsiderationofthegeneratorsclassificationfromSCO·ItoSCO·II,and how the existence of hotspots has been accounted forinthe classification,handling, transportation, storage and processing of the generators. It may beprudentforBrucePowertoconsidernotshippingthegenerators,especiallytheoneswithveryhighhotspots,untilthereasonsforhotspotsandtheappropriateclassificationarefullyunderstood.177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

Conclusion5:FlawedpublicprocessIntervenors and the public have experienced difficulties in accessinginformationThereisabroadquestionaboutadequacyofaccesstoinformation. Itisdifficultfor interveners to access all relevant documents on this application for a fewreasons:¶the documents, including the CNSC staff summaries (CMDs), BrucePower’s multiple applications, supporting documentation etc. are notcurrentlypostedontheCNSCwebsite,sothereisnoeasy,quickwayforthepublicandintervenorstogetallinformationonthisapplication,oralistofalldocumentation¶thepublicandanintervenorhastorequestinwritingorbyemailtobeonthelisttoreceivealldocumentation¶if a member of the public orintervenordoes not know or does not makethis request in writing for all documents, they do not then receive anysubsequentdocumentation¶theimportanttechnicalinformationoftenappearsinmemosandtechnicaldocuments which are not includedin the CMD, and have to be speciallyrequested¶there is no clear procedure for the public or intervenors to follow whentheyhavequestionsaboutthedocuments¶in this case, GLSLCI was refused access to CNSC technical staff todiscuss the environmental review, which made it more difficult to assesstheenvironmentalreview¶significantpiecesofinformationwerenotincludedintheoriginalCMD¶GLSLCI did submit a detailed list of 36 questions to the CNSC, CNSCcommitted at the hearing to answer these questions, GLSLCI has notreceived an answer, has to guess that the intent was for the revisedCNSC report to answer these questions, and upon review, some of theoriginallistofquestionsstillremainunanswered¶GLSCLI did submit additional questions following the hearing, and hasreceivedatimelyanswer¶itis not clear if CNSC has a policy or guidance governing intervenors orpublic access to information from CNSC, to supplement the broaderfederalgovernmentalpolicies.

CNSC should consider an improved process to answer intervener questionsonceastaffreporthasbeenpublished.Itisfrustratinganddifficultforallpartiesnot to be able to get questions answered. Other forums have these processes.We would respectfully suggest to CNSC to review their existing procedures tobetter accommodate intervenor questions, including creating a mechanism toprovide requested information, answer questions in advance and following thehearing,thatisfairtoallparties.We would also recommend that the CNSC review its current practise of notposting CMD and other key documents on the CNSC website, and move toposting all documents, including CMDs and the proponent’s application on theCNSCwebsite.Thiswouldgreatlyincreasethepublic’saccesstoinformation.The revised report doesnot adequatelypresentthe information to allow adecisiontobemadeThere is also a question about the adequacy of the presentation of theinformation:¶¶¶¶¶the report summaries do not always clearly and accurately present theunderlyinginformationthereportsummariesdonotalwaysexplainthesignificanceofthefindingsthereportsummariesdonotpresenttheinformationinawaythatallowstheunderlyingassumptionstobeunderstoodthereportsummariesdonotpresenttherangeofscenariosit also seems inappropriate for the CNSCto promote the web site of theapplicant,BrucePoweratanytime,butespeciallyduringthetimeandonthe issue that the Commissioners are considering an application fromBrucePowerthepublicnoticeforthisapplicationwaslimitedtocertainlocalpapersinOntario, and in the future should include notices in additional locationsalongtheshippingroute,includingQuebecpapers

Needtoimprovecommunicationofasignificantchangeintheproposal,a50%increaseinradioactivityThe 50% increase in the total amount of radioactivity of the generatorsannouncedabouttwoweeksbeforethehearing,wasasignificantdevelopment,yet many intervenors at the hearing were unaware of the revision and so theimportance of this revision. This is partly because of the way the material was177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

presented· the revised CNSC report just changed the figures, without providingthe original figures. In the future it would seem that CNSC could considerproviding the revised figures and the original figures to allow for easiercomparison.Thedifficultyincommunicationwasalsopartlythewaythematerialwas distributed, for, like all CNSC CMD documents, it did not appear on theCNSCwebsite.TheprocesshasbeenrushedThe CNSC revised report clearly indicates that the process has been rushed,with significant questions in play in August and September, and severalunanswered issues right up to the hearing and following the hearing. TheenvironmentalreviewappearstohavebeenrequestedonAugust13,2010.Therevisedestimatesofradioactivityofthegeneratorswhichincreasedtheestimateof radioactivity by 50% were noted in memo dated September 7, 2010. Therequest for additional environmental review is dated October 6, 2010. Thedocumentation clearly shows the impact of the initial error to consider thisshipment as routine, has been staff scrambling to fill information gaps and littletimeforadditionalaccidentscenariosorthoughtfulreview.TheinitiallackofconsultationincreaseddifficultiesThe hearing also clearlyillustrated theimpact of lack of early consultation, withmany parties noting that they found out about the project through the mediareports.Atthehearing,intervenorafterintervenornotedthattheyhadnotbeenconsulted orinformed sufficiently to feel comfortable with the proposal. It is notclear from the revised report what additional measures the proponent hasundertaken to consult with interested stakeholders. If the project is approved,itis also not clear what process of consultation Bruce Power would followimmediatelybeforethegeneratorsareshipped.Many municipalities along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence passed Councilresolutions expressing concerns andopposing this shipment. In addition, sevenUS Senators have written to the CNSC and US departments expressing theirconcernswiththisshipment.NoinformationprovidedonthecurrentstateofotherrequiredapprovalsTherevisedreportalsodoesnotindicatethecurrentstateoftheotherrequiredmultilateral approvals. Approval ofthis proposed shipment is also required fromU.S Department of Transport and Swedish regulatory agency (two permits·177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

permissiontoprocessinadditiontopermittoimport).ItisourunderstandingthattheneithertheUSpermitnortheSwedishapprovaltoprocesshavebeengiven.InadditionthetwofederalexportpermitspreviouslygiventoBrucePowerforthisproposedshipmentexpireattheendofJanuary2011.ItwouldseemthatBrucePower may need to reapply for these federal export permits. It would seemprudent for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to have a new reviewprocessforthesenewpermits,giventhenewinformationavailableandthelevelofpublicinterestandtorequestadvicefromEnvironmentCanadaandothers.NeedtoconsiderallproposalsforspecialarrangementsascandidatesforpublichearingWe would also suggest that proponent’s requests for special arrangement andexclusive use be automatically considered as candidates for CNSC publichearing.

Conclusion 6: Emergency measures need several additions tobetterrespondtolocalconditionsTheCommissionersalsoaskedforadditionalanalysisontheemergencyplan.ItdoesnotappearthatanynewinformationoranalysisontheemergencyplanhasbeenincludedintherevisedCNSCstaffreport.However, there are some areas in the emergency plan that we would haveexpected to be revised based on the hearing and also the need for additionalinformation. For example, the initial cordon area for safety in the event of anaccident is 300 feet. This safety area is the same as that proposed when thegeneratorswere50%lowerinradioactivity.Itwouldseemprudenttoreviewthiscordonareawiththerevisedradioactivityestimatestodetermineifinfactthisisanadequatesafetyzone.Emergency plan needs to be amended to include local Owen Sound andother community’s factors and permit to transport large objectrequirementsAlong the 80 km transport route, there are a number of sensitive land uses,includingthecentreofseveraltowns,schools,farms,houses,retirementhomes,severalrivers,hotels,stores,achurchandconservationareas.ThegeographyofOwen Sound harbour also means that the generators have alimited number ofroutes to get to the harbour. Many of these routes are very close to the177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

downtown core with its clusters of stores, businesses and people. Other routesarelinedwithhouses.Evena300footsafetyzoneinOwenSoundcouldinvolveshops,housesandbusinessesandsignificantnumberofpeople.AstheMayorinOwen Sound testified at the hearing, there is also a steep hill going down intoOwen Sound from most directions, which becomes icy in winter and springconditions.SeveralbridgesarebeingrebuiltinOwenSoundandsotrafficflowishigher and patterns are different. Owen Sound also has a number of festivalsthroughouttheyear,whichattractsignificantnumbersofpeople.ThereisnomentionoftheseimportantlocalfactorsintheWMGTransportationandEmergencyplan.Theselocalmeasuresneedtobeaddedasacheckoffinthe WMG Transportation and Emergency plan. Suggested check off to beadded, “A month before and two weeks before shipment, consult with OwenSound municipal staff and municipal staff along the transportroute to check onlocal conditions including traffic flow, bridge repair, occurrence of festivals andotherrouteandtimingconsiderations.”Inadditionatthehearing,BrucePowercommittedtotheMayorofOwenSoundthat they would meet all the requirements of the Owen Sound bylaw on thepermit to transport a large object. These requirements need to be written in asconditions of the transport permit and added to the WMG Transport andEmergency Plan. Suggested check off to be added “A month before shipment,obtain letter from Owen Sound verifying that all conditions of the permit totransportalargeobjecthavebeenmet.”If other municipalities along the route also have specific permit requirements,then these alsoneed to be writteninto the transport conditions andemergencyplan.In our previous comments, we noted that the emergency shipping plan is ageneric document created by the shipping company. It is not specific to thisshipment. There is only one page (section 7.3) that deals with an emergencycausingareleaseofradioactivematerial.Onthispage(section7.3.5j)itstates“all aspects to be planned and agreed on with the relevant parties prior tocommencement of the intended cargo operations and voyage.” There is notevidence that the specific emergency aspects for a release have been plannedandagreedoninadvance.The emergency plan also needs to better respond to the two scenarios wereexceedence of drinking water is highly likely, by providing specific, detailed177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

measuresforsalvageatOwenSoundHarbourandspecificdetailedmeasurestodealwithcontaminatedwaterinalock.Emergency plan to specifically require immediate notice to drinking waterplantsintheeventofanaccidentWewouldsuggestthattheemergencyplantoberevisedtocontainamapoftheshippingrouteandtheproximityofthedrinkingwaterplantsintheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrence,andthephonenumberoftheSpillsActionCenter.WewouldalsorequestthattheemergencyplanberevisedtoincludetherequirementforBrucePowertoimmediatelynotifyalldrinkingwaterplantoperatorsintheeventofanaccidentwiththisshipment.Thisinformationwouldbegiventotheshippingcompanytoaugmenttheiremergencyplan.ThereisanexistingprovincialprotocolinOntario“CoordinationoftheResponseto a Liquid Emission at OPG and Bruce Power” which specifies roles andresponsibilities in the event of “liquid discharges with abnormal levels ofradioactivity from OPG and Bruce Power which could impact Ontario drinkingwatersupplies.”Itrequiresthecreationofaliquidemissionresponseteam.Whiledesigned for spills from nuclear power plants, this protocol could provide animportantframeworkforrolesandresponsibilitiesthatarerelevantintheeventofan accident with this proposed shipment. Therefore we recommend that thisprotocolbereviewedbyCNSCstaffandtheelementsoftheprotocolthatapplybereferencedintheemergencytransportationandshippingplan.

Conclusion 8: CNSC Commissioners do not have sufficientinformation of sufficient quality to conclude that the test ofequivalentsafetyhasbeenmetCNSCstaffargumentsfortheshipmentmeetingthetestofequivalentsafetyarealso incomplete, and in some places, contorted and contradictory. The IAEAguidelinesspecifythatifashipmentexceedstheinternationalsafetylimits(asinthis case) then the applicant must provide justification and compensatorymeasures.ThetestforapprovalfromCNSC,isthattheoveralllevelofsafetyoftheshipmentintransportmustbedemonstratedtobeatleastequivalenttothatwhichwouldhavebeenprovidedifallapplicablerequirementshadbeenmet(i.e.theconveyancelimitwasmet).This test for equivalent safety would seem to require CNSC staff to create twotransport scenarios, one that met the applicable requirements and one that didnotmeettheapplicablerequirements.Thenasystematicanalysisofthesafetyofthesetwoscenarioswouldbeperformedtodetermineiftheoveralllevelofsafetybetweenthetwoscenariosisinfactatleastequivalent.Thereisnosuchanalysisof equivalent safety in the revised staff report. Is there CNSC staff reviewguidance on how to perform a test of equivalent safety? The current approachdoes not seem to be a systematic comparison of two options, rather a list ofideas. In many instances is not clear what is being compared. There are inadditionanumberofconceptsnotmadeclear:Whodoesthetestforequivalentsafety apply to? workers, public and the environment? If the safety level isactually10A2andnot100A2doesthismeanthatadditionalmeasureswouldberequired for the lower conveyance limit? How can an agency objectivelydetermine that sufficient measures are in place? What is the relationshipbetween the compensatory measures proposed and the test of equivalentsafety?We have reviewed the arguments for determining the test of equivalent safetyandconcludethattheyarenotadequate,sufficientlywellpresentedorsufficientin detail for the Commissioners to evaluate if the test of equivalent safety hasbeenmet(Table4).Thisisofconcern.Table 4: Arguments used by CNSC Staff in the revised report to justifyconclusionthatlevelofsafetyoftheproposedshipmentisatleastequivalentasmeetingthe100A2limit177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

Exceeding the IAEA safety limit does not meansplitting shipment into more trips· it is a reasonnottoshipthegenerators.There is no proven need to ship the generators·theyareinapprovedstoragefacility.Alsonoconsiderationisgiventofactthatifhavefewer generators on a ship, this decreases thelikelihood of exceeding drinking water guidelines.Havingfewergeneratorsonashipdecreasestheamount of radioactivity available in case ofaccident.If arguing that increasing the number ofshipments increases the risk of an accidentproportionately, then this would also apply to thefuture shipment of the remaining 16 steamgeneratorsfromthesite·So this would mean that Bruce Power’s secondgenerator shipment of the remaining 16generators would have twice the risk of accidentofthisfirstshipment.Isthisreallyvalid?We are not arguing to split this proposedshipment up, rather that this splitting argumentcannot be used a legitimate justification for theexisting proposal or for meeting the equivalentlevelofsafety.Itisaspuriousargument.Using this argument, all shipments that met the100 A2limit would also have release rates lowerthan 100 A2, so this reason is not an apples· to·applescomparison.Itcomparesareleaseratetoaconveyancelimit.Avalidcomparisonisashipmentreleaseamountto a release rate limit or a shipment conveyanceamount to an international conveyance limit. It isnotvalidtomixthesetwoconceptsandcomparea shipment release rate to an international46

conveyancelimit.Also it is not a valid interpretation of IAEAguidelineswhicharesetasconveyancelimitsnotasreleasebasedlimit.This estimate of 82 A2is based on assumptionsincluding only 1% release rate, rather than arangeofplausiblescenarios.Cannot be used as reason to justify shipment ormeetingequivalentlevelofsafety.Shellprovides This seems to be irrelevant. IAEA Table 5equivalent safety to conveyancelimitsapplytoSCO,regardlessifitisIndustrialPackage·1packaged as IP·1 or unpackaged. It is unclearwhatisbeingcomparedhere.Shiphasextrafeatures It is positive that the ship has additional safetyfeatures, however the exact protection measuresprovided by these safety features and how theyare relevant for this particular shipment is neverdiscussed.Only a promotional brochure and vagueassurancesaregiven.To be a valid argument, increased precision inanalysisisneeded.Inthehearing,CNSCstaffstatedthatfirewasnota consideration with this shipment, so was fireaccident was not considered for an accidentscenario, yet the additional fire protectionmeasures provided for in an INF2 ship areconsideredoneoftheadditionalsafetymeasures.Thisseemscontradictory.Italsoappearstobearbitrarytoassignasafetyfactorof10tothistypeofship–whynotasafetyfactor2or5or100?Also seems incorrect and/or questionable tointerpret IAEA conveyance guidelines as beingabletobemultipliedbyarbitrarysafetyfactorstoderive new conveyance limits. It seems incorrectto use this arbitrary safety factor of 10, assignedwithout any evidence to an INF 2 ship, and tothenarguethatconveyancelimitisactually1000A2(arbitrarily safety factor of 10* limit of 100A2).177 North State Street, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois 60601 ~ (312) 201-4516 phone ~ (312) 553-4355 faxwww.glslcities.orgDenis Lapointe, Mayor of Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, ChairRichard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, Founding United States ChairDavid Miller, Mayor of Toronto, Founding Canadian Chair

This argument cannot be allowed to stand as itwouldsetanewmethodofinterpretationofTable5whichisnotconsistentwithitspurpose.Itisgoodthatthisisaspecialpurposevessel,yetit is not clear how this provides the equivalentsafetyifthe100A2limithadbeenmet.Not sufficientinformation ofsufficient precision isprovided for the Commissioners to conclude thatthis INF2 ship provides an equivalent level ofsafetyif100A2limithasbeenmet.ItalsoappearsthatBrucePowermayneedtousea special use vessel anyway in order to beexempted from some of the radiological limits intheIAEAguideline.Insomeinstances,thereportarguesthatthe100A2limit applies, in other placesit argues that thelimitis1000A2,inothersinarguesthatadifferentmeasure,anestimateoftheradioactivityreleasedisthewaytoevaluateequivalentsafety.Thereisno consistent logic or systematic comparativeanalysis here. Therefore it is not possible toconclude that the test for equivalent safety hasbeenmet.GLSLCI Concludes: there is not sufficient evidence, sufficiently clearly presentedand/or of sufficient quality for the Commissioners to conclude that the test ofequivalentsafetyhasbeenmetWe conclude that there is not sufficient evidence, sufficiently clearlypresented and/or of sufficient quality for the CNSC Commissions toconclude that the required test of equivalent safety has been met.Therefore we urge the Commissioners to consider that this shipmentcannotbeapprovedatthistime.

Conclusion9:Thisproposedshipmentisnotroutine,itappearsto be setting the Canadian precedent for the transport, exportand processing of used radioactive equipment on the GreatLakesandSt.LawrenceThisproposedshipmentisrequestingthreespecialexemptionsfrominternationalsafetyrules:¶the use of ``special arrangement`` to violate the international safetylimitsontotalallowableradioactivityonasingleship,toviolatetherulewhich requires demonstration that the level of radioactivity in thegenerators does meet the correct classification, and to allow thegeneratorstobeshippedwithoutusinganapprovedpackage,¶the``exclusiveuse``provisiontoexceedinternationalsafetytransportindexlimits,¶and it appears, the ``special use vessel`` to exempt from vessel andotherradioactivitylimits.Therefore this proposed shipment is not routine. It still appears to be the firstCanadianrequestforapprovaltotransportlarge,usedradioactivematerialsthatdonotmeetinternationalsafetylimitsontheGreatLakesandSt.Lawrence.MakingnewpolicythroughpracticeTheproposedshipmenthasbeenscopedtobeatransportpermitrequest,wheninfact,theprojectposesbroaderpolicyquestions,whichhavenotbeenaskedoranswered. This proposed shipment seems to moving ahead without acomprehensivenationalframeworkinplace.Itispartofagrowing,globaltrend,andapprovalofthisproposedshipmentwillsetthebarforCanada.Approvalofthis proposed shipment would in fact, make a new Canadian policy throughpractice.The revised staff material does provide another example of shipment ofradioactivesteamgeneratorsinGermany.Thisprovidesanexampleofhowthistrade in large components from nuclear industry is already increasing. Theexistence of the draft IAEA guideline on the transport of large components isfurther evidence. This application could set the Canadian precedent for thisgrowingglobaltrend.

Conclusion 10.The original and revised CNSC reportsfail toprovideandpresentadequateinformationtoenabletheCNSCtorenderaninformeddecisiononwhetherornottoallowtheBrucePowershipmenttoproceed.Throughout this document we have noted difficulties with the type ofinformationpresentedandthemannerofpresentation.Takentogether,theredoesnotseemtobeadequateinformationofsufficientqualityandsufficientlyclearly presented to render an informed decision on whether or not to allowtheBrucePowerShipmenttoproceed.RecommendationThe Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative would respectfully suggestthattheCNSCCommissionersnotapprovethisproposedshipmentbecause:1.Anaccidentwiththisproposedshipmenthasthepotentialtoexceedfederalstandardsforradioactivityindrinkingwater2. The proposed shipment exceeds the international allowable safetylimitsfortotalamountofradioactivityonasingleship3.Theenvironmentalreviewisflawed4.Continueddifficultyinestimatingtheradioactivityoftheshipmentiscauseforre·evaluationandcaution5.Thepublicprocesshasbeenflawed6. Emergency measures need several additions to better respond tolocalconditions7. The apparent reversal of burden of proof on environmental safetycontinues8.Thetestofequivalentsafetydoesnotseemtohavebeenmet

ConclusionThe Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River are a precious resource providingdrinkingwaterforover40millionpeople.BecauseofthevitalresourcesthattheLakes contribute to our economy, health and lives, we need to ensure theprotectionandrestorationoftheLakesandRiver.TheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeappreciatestheopportunitytocommentontherevisedCNSCstaffreport.This document consists of supplementary comments from the Great Lakes andSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiative(CitiesInitiative)onBrucePower’sapplicationtotheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionforpermissiontoshipsixteenradioactivesteam generators on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence. These commentsprovide additional information to the Cities Initiative’s initial submission,submittedonSeptember13,2010,andtheCitiesInitiative’stestimonybeforetheCNSCduringitshearingsinOttawaonSeptember28,2010.GreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeispleasedthattheCommissionersof the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) recognised the significantinformation gaps in the original proposal. Many of these information gaps wereidentifiedbytheCommissionersandintervenors,includingtheGreatLakesandSt.LawrenceCitiesInitiativeattheCNSChearing.ItisencouragingthattheCNSCCommissionersrespondedtotheseinformationgaps by requesting additional information from CNSC staff, and then invitingintervenors to submit supplementary comments on the revised CNSC staffreport. It is also encouraging that the significant difficulty experienced by theCities Initiative and other intervenors in obtaining additional information on theproposalhasalsobeenrecognized.

However, whiletheCommission’srequestforadditionalinformationfromCNSCstaffistobecommended,intheopinionoftheCitiesInitiative,thecontentoftherevisedCNSCstaffreportremainsinadequate.BasedonCitiesInitiativeanalysisofthesupplementalreportofCNSCstafftotheCommissioners,theCitiesInitiativehasreachedthefollowingkeyconclusions:1. An accident with this proposed shipment has the potential to exceedfederalstandardsforradioactivityindrinkingwater.¶Ifallthetotalradioactiveinventoryofonesteamgeneratorisreleased,thiswouldexceedtheHealthCanadaActionLevelforinterventionintheeventofanuclearemergencybytwotimes(2.52mSvvs.1mSvactionlevel).If all the total inventory of all 16 generators was released this wouldexceed the Health Canada Action Level by 40 times (40 mSv vs1 mSvactionlevel).Even if retaining the original assumption of partial inventory, an accidentwith4generatorswouldbesufficienttoexceedtheHealthCanadaActionLevelfordrinkingwater.An accident with only one generator in Owen Sound Harbour has thepotential to exceed the Health Canada Drinking Water Action Levels (ifreleaserateis100%).An accident with only one generator in a ship lock exceeds the HealthCanadaDrinkingWaterActionLevelsunderallaccidentscenarios.

conveyance value for the shipment of 16 generators is 622 A2, anincreasefromtheBrucePoweroriginalestimateof545A23.Theenvironmentalreviewisflawed¶The environmental review of the proposed shipment continues to bebased on best case assumptions, and fails to consider other plausibleassumptions. There is insufficient evidence given for many of the criticalassumptions. As a result, the environmental review consistentlyunderestimatesenvironmentalrisk.The accident scenarios all rely on dilution as the solutionto anaccident.As environmental management has evolved, using the Great Lakes todilute radiological contamination is growing less acceptable. In addition,the calculation of dilution factors is a simplistic methodology fordeterminingenvironmentalimpact.The environmental review still lacks several components: an analysis oftheSt.LawrenceRiver,ananalysisofanaccidentscenarioalongtheroadroute,includingdowntownOwenSound,andananalysisofoptimumtimeof transport. The definition of environment is too narrowly scoped toincludeonlydrinkingwaterimpacts,andsothereisalsostillnoanalysisoftheecologicalimpactsofanaccident,suchasimpactsonfish,wildlifeandfood chains. Often radioactivity will be taken up by phytoplankton andzooplanktonandsothenbepassedupthefoodchainandbiomagnified.The presentation of public health information is limited and relies onassumptionsofexposuremeasuredinseconds.Otherplausiblescenariosarenotpresented.