MandateThe Mid Year Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan,prepared by the Human Rights Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission inAfghanistan (UNAMA Human Rights), covers the period 01 January to 30 June 2010. Itis compiled in pursuance of UNAMA’s mandate under United Nations Security CouncilResolution 1917 (2010) to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts toensure their protection, to promote accountability and to assist in full implementation ofthe fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution andinternational treaties to which Afghanistan is State party, in particular those regardingthe full enjoyment by women of their human rights.UNAMA Human Rights undertakes a range of activities aimed at minimizing the impactof the conflict on civilians; this includes independent and impartial monitoring ofincidents involving loss of life or injury to civilians; advocacy activities to strengthenprotection of civilians affected by the armed conflict; and, initiatives to promote respectfor international humanitarian and human rights law and the Afghan Constitutionamong all parties to the conflict.

MethodologyUNAMA Human Rights investigates reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broadrange of sources and types of information that are evaluated for their credibility andreliability. In undertaking investigation and analysis of each incident, UNAMA HumanRights endeavours to corroborate and cross-check information inputs from as wide arange of sources as possible including, accounts of eyewitnesses and directly affectedpersons, military actors (including Afghan Government and international militaryforces), local village/district and provincial authorities, religious and community leaders,as well as information obtained through direct site visits, visits to hospitals and medicalfacilities, still and video images, reports of UN Department of Safety and Security andother UN agencies, secondary source accounts, media reports, and informationcollected by NGOs and other third parties.Wherever possible, investigations are based on the primary testimony of victims and/orwitnesses of the incident and on-site investigations. On some occasions, primarily dueto security-related constraints affecting access, this form of investigation is notpossible. In such instances, UNAMA Human Rights relies on a range of techniques togain information through reliable networks, again through as wide a range of sourcesas possible that are evaluated for credibility and reliability.Where UNAMA Human Rights is not satisfied with the information concerning aparticular incident, it will not be reported. In some instances, investigations may takeseveral weeks before conclusions can be drawn. This may mean that conclusions oncivilian casualties arising from a particular incident may be revised as more informationbecomes available and is incorporated in the analysis. However, where information isunclear, conclusions will not be drawn until more satisfactory evidence is obtained, orthe case will be closed without conclusion and will not be included in the statisticalreporting.In some incidents the non-combatant status of the reported victims of an incidentcannot be conclusively established or is disputed. In such cases, UNAMA HumanRights is guided by the applicable standards of international humanitarian law and doesnot presume fighting-age males are civilians. Rather, such claims are assessed on thefacts available on the incident in question. If the non-combatant status of one or morevictim(s) remains uncertain, such deaths are not included in the overall number ofcivilian casualties.An electronic database was established in January 2009 to support UNAMA HR’sreporting on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan. The databaseis designed to facilitate the systematic, uniform and effective collection and analysis ofinformation, including disaggregation by age and gender. Due to limitations associatedwith the operating environment, such as the joint nature of some operations and theinability of primary sources in most instances to precisely identify or distinguishbetween diverse military actors/insurgents, UNAMA HR does not break downresponsibility for particular incidents other than attributing them to “Pro-GovernmentForces” (PGF) or “Anti-Government Elements” (AGEs) UNAMA HR does not claim thatthe statistics presented in this report are complete; it may be the case that, given thelimitations associated with the operating environment, UNAMA HR is under-reportingcivilian casualties.

Legal Responsibilities of the Parties to the ConflictUNAMA HR takes the position that the armed conflict in Afghanistan is an internal (noninternational) armed conflict involving the Government of Afghanistan and its partners,including international military forces, engaged in hostilities with Anti-GovernmentElements. The Anti-Government Elements encompass individuals and armed groups ofdiverse backgrounds, motivations and command structures, including thosecharacterized as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hezb-e-Islami and others.All parties to the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan have responsibilitiesunder international law to protect civilians or non-combatants and to minimize theimpact of their actions on the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. Article 3,common to the fourGeneva Conventions of 1949,establishes minimum standards thatparties to an armed conflict should observe in non-international armed conflict.Common Article 3 extends humanitarian law into situations occurring in the territory ofa sovereign State and binds not only State actors but also non-State actors involved inthe conflict.Customary rules of international humanitarian law also apply to the warring parties.International judicial bodies have stated that several rules in the Geneva Conventionsand the Additional Protocols are part of customary international law. This has beenaffirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has concludedthat several rules of the fourGeneva Conventions and Additional Protocol Ihaveacquired the force of customary international law and that most of these rules apply inboth international and non-international armed conflicts (ICRC,Customary InternationalHumanitarian Law,ed. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (CUP/ICRC,Cambridge 2005) {ICRC Study}. These rules include:Distinction: “Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time asthey take a direct part in hostilities,” and “[a]ttacks must not be directed againstcivilian objects.” ICRC Study, Rules 6, 7.Proportionality: “Launching an attack which may be expected to causeincidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or acombination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete anddirect military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” ICRC Study, Rule 14.Precautions in attack: “In the conduct of military operations, constant care mustbe taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. Allfeasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize,incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”ICRC Study, Rule 15.In addition to international humanitarian law, other bodies of law apply in Afghanistan.Insurgents, once they arehors de combat(“outside of combat”), are subject toprosecution under the criminal laws of the country concerned. International humanrights standards to which the State is a party or which form part of customaryinternational law continue to apply in situations of armed conflict. Members of the Pro-Government military forces are also accountable for violations of internationalhumanitarian and human rights law and the national laws of their home states.

All nations contributing to the international forces present in Afghanistan, includingcontingents of ISAF, US Forces Afghanistan, members of the Operation EnduringFreedom coalition, or forces which fall outside these chains of command aresignatories to the fourGeneva Conventions of 1949.While not all troop contributingcountries are signatories toAdditional Protocol I of 1977,they are still bound by thoserules of international humanitarian law that are part of customary international law.The primary responsibility for the protection of the civilian population during armedconflict rests with the Afghan Government. All parties to the armed conflict, however,have responsibilities under international law to protect civilians as noted above.Afghanistan is a signatory to the fourGeneva Conventions of 1949and is also boundby those rules of international humanitarian law which form part of customaryinternational law. Afghanistan is a signatory to theInternational Convention on Civil andPolitical Rights(ICCPR), which obligates the Afghan government to provide basicprotections to all persons within the territory or jurisdiction of the State.The Government of Afghanistan has an obligation and a responsibility to ensure lawand order throughout the territory of Afghanistan. It has the right and duty to enforcethe laws of the country subject to the international laws it has accepted or which arebinding on it.

GLOSSARYAGEs:Anti-Government Elements. These encompass all individuals and groupscurrently involved in armed conflict against the Government of Afghanistan and/orInternational Military Forces. They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well asindividuals and groups motivated by a range of objectives and assuming a variety oflabels.Air Attack:Firing ordinance from aircraft or air assets, including close air support(support to units and troops in contact under immediate threat), and from fixed wing airassets.ANA:Afghan National Army.ANP:Afghan National Police.ANSF:Afghan National Security Forces; a blanket term that includes Afghan BorderPolice, ANA, ANP and the National Directorate of Security.BBIED:Body-Borne Improvised Explosive Device; see IED.Casualties:May be of two classifications:•Direct:casualties resulting directly from armed conflict – including those arisingfrom military operations conducted by pro-Government forces (AfghanGovernment Forces and/or International Military Forces) such as forceprotection incidents; air raids, search and arrest operations, counter insurgencyor “Global War on Terror” operations. It also includes casualties arising from theactivities of AGEs, such as targeted killings, IEDs or direct engagement withPro-Government Forces, etc.•Other:casualties resulting indirectly from the conflict, including casualtiescaused by explosive remnants of war deaths in prison, deaths from probableunderlying medical conditions that occurred during military operations, or whereaccess to medical care was denied or was not forthcoming. It also includesdeaths arising from incidents where responsibility cannot be determined withany degree of certainty, such as deaths or injuries arising from cross-fire.Finally, it includes casualties caused by inter/intra-tribal or ethnic conflict.CID:Criminal Investigations Department.Children:According to theConvention on the Rights of the Child,a “child” is definedas any person under the age of 18 (0-17 inclusive). Injury figures for children are likelyto be under-reported due to the fact that age information for injured individuals is oftennot readily available or reported.Civilian/Non-Combatant:Any person who is not taking a direct part in hostilities. Itincludes all civilians as well as public servants who are not used for a military purposein terms of fighting the conflict, and encompasses teachers, health clinic workers andothers involved in public service delivery, as well as political figures or office holders. Italso includes soldiers or any person who arehors de combat,whether from injury orbecause they have surrendered or because they have ceased to take a direct part in

hostilities for any reason. It includes persons who may be civilian police personnel ormembers of the military who are not being used in counter insurgency operations andnot taking a direct part in hostilities including when they are off-duty.COIN:Counter-Insurgency.COM-ISAF:The Commander of ISAF; see ISAF.EOF Incidents: Escalation of Force Incidents also referred to as “forceprotection” incidents:Situations where civilians fail to pay attention to warnings frommilitary personnel when approaching or overtaking military convoys or fail to followinstructions at check points. Escalation of force incidents also occur when individualsare perceived as too close to military bases or installations and fail to observewarnings from military personnel.GoA:Government (of the Islamic Republic) of Afghanistan.IDP:Internally Displaced Person.ICRC:International Committee of the Red Cross.IED:Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed in ways otherthan in conventional military action. IEDs can also take the form of suicide bombs, suchas Body-Borne IEDs (BBIEDs), Remote-Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), Vehicle-BorneIEDs (VBIEDs).Incidents:Events where civilian casualties resulted from armed conflict. Reports ofcasualties arising from criminal activities are not included in UNAMA Human Right’scivilian casualty reports.IM Forces:“International Military Forces” includes all foreign soldiers forming part ofISAF and US Forces Afghanistan (including Operation Enduring Freedom) who areunder the command of the Commander of ISAF (COM-ISAF). The term alsoencompasses those forces not operating under the Commander of ISAF, includingcertain Special Forces.Injuries:Include physical injuries of differing severity. The degree of severity of injuryis not recorded in UNAMA Human Rights’ Database. Injuries do not include cases ofshock or psychological trauma.ISAF:International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is deployed under theauthority of the UN Security Council. In August 2003, upon the request of the UN andthe Government of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. The ISAF forcecurrently comprises at least 119,745 troops from 46 Troop Contributing countries,organized in six regional commands. Since November 2008, the Commander of ISAFserves also as the Commander of US Forces Afghanistan, although the chains ofcommand remain separate.KSF:Kandahar Strike Force.

LDI:Local Defence Initiative.NATO:North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Members of NATO are the main troopcontributing countries to ISAF; see ISAF.NDS:National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s State intelligence service.OHCHR:United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.OEF:“Operation Enduring Freedom” is the official name used by the US Governmentfor its contribution to the War in Afghanistan under the umbrella of its Global War onTerror (GWOT). It should be noted that Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan,which is a joint US and Afghan operation, is distinct from ISAF, which is an operation ofNATO nations including the US and other troop contributing nations. Most US forcesoperating under OEF since October 2008 have been incorporated into “US ForcesAfghanistan” (see below) under the command of General David Petraeus, who is alsoNATO/ISAF Commander.OGAs:Other Government Agencies. This term is used to refer to certain securityoperatives, such as the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) that do not operate underregular military chains of command. Frequently, it is unclear who has commandresponsibility for such agencies.Pro-Government Forces (PGF):•Afghan Government Forces.All forces that act in all military or paramilitarycounter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control ofthe Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited to, theANA, ANP, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the NDS.•International Military Forces (IM Forces)and OGA.

Executive SummaryThe human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan is escalating in 2010. In the first sixmonths of the year civilian casualties – including deaths and injuries of civilians -increased by 31 per cent over the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civiliancasualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase of 53 per centfrom 2009. At the same time, civilian casualties attributed to Pro-Government Forces(PGF) decreased by 30 per cent compared to the first half of 2009.UNAMA Human Rights (HR) highlights two critical developments that increased harm tocivilians in 2010. First, the number of civilians assassinated and executed by AGEs rosedramatically and second, AGEs used a greater number of larger and more sophisticatedimprovised explosive devices (IEDs) throughout the country. The devastating humanimpact of these tactics underscores that nine years into the conflict, measures to protectAfghan civilians effectively and to minimize the impact of the conflict on basic humanrights are more urgent than ever.Between 01 January and 30 June 2010, UNAMA HR documented 3,268 civiliancasualties including 1,271 deaths and 1,997 injuries.1AGEs were responsible for thedeaths and injuries of 2,477 civilians or 76 per cent of the total number of civiliancasualties for this period. Suicide and IED attacks caused the most civilian casualtiesattributed to AGEs including 557 deaths (61 per cent of civilian deaths attributed toAGEs) and 1,137 injuries (73 per cent of civilian injuries attributed to AGEs).In the same period, UNAMA HR recorded 386 civilian casualties (12 per cent of totalcivilian casualties) linked to PGF, down 30 per cent from the first six months of 2009.Aerial attacks caused the largest number of civilian casualties attributed to PGFincluding 69 deaths (31 per cent of civilian deaths attributed to PGF) and 45 injuries (20per cent of civilian injuries attributed to PGF).As civilian casualties rose in the first half of 2010, women and children made up agreater proportion of those killed and injured than in 2009. Women and childrenexperienced an extreme lack of protection in conflict-affected areas along withwidespread violation of their basic human rights. From January to June 2010, womencasualties increased by six per cent and child casualties leapt by 55 per cent from 2009.UNAMA HR found that 120 women were killed and 151 injured while 176 children werekilled and 389 injured as result of the armed conflict. IEDs and suicide attacks by AGEscaused the most women and children casualties in the first half of 2010.The 1,271 total civilian deaths in the first half of 2010 was a 21 per cent increase overthe number documented in the first half of 2009. In total, 920 (72 per cent of total civiliandeaths) were attributed to AGEs, up 48 per cent from the first half of 2009. PGF were1

UNAMA Human Rights (HR) documented and included in its analysis and reporting on civilian casualtiesfor the period 1 January to June 30, 2010 only those incidents of civilian death and injury that its field officesreported, cross checked with a diverse range of sources and verified. UNAMA HR does not claim that thestatistics presented in this and its previous reports are complete; given the limitations in methodology andthe operating environment UNAMA HR may be under-reporting civilian casualties, see the methodologysection of this report. Information regarding civilian casualties in Afghanistan posted on the Wikileakswebsite covers the period 2004-2010 and is comprised of thousands of documents from a variety ofsources. UNAMA HR is examining this material for new information on previously reported cases and alsoreviewing all cases of civilian casualties referred to in the documents.

linked to 223 deaths or 18 per cent of total civilian deaths down 29 per from 2009.UNAMA HR could not attribute the remaining 128 deaths (10 per cent) to either party tothe conflict.IEDs were the deadliest tactic used by AGEs in the first half of 2010 and caused 29 percent of all civilian deaths while suicide attacks, assassinations and executions took thelives of 14 per cent of civilians. UNAMA HR recorded 183 civilians killed by suicideattacks and a further 183 civilians killed by assassinations and executions. 39 womenand 74 children died from IED explosions and suicide attacks in the first half of 2010 - a44 per cent increase in female deaths and 155 per cent increase in child deaths from2009 attributed to AGEs.Compared with the same period in 2009, the number of civilians assassinated andexecuted by AGEs surged by more than 95 per cent in 2010. More than half of thecivilian assassinations and executions occurred in southern Afghanistan, where morethan one hundred such incidents were noted.UNAMA HR found a 64 per cent decrease in civilian deaths caused by aerial attacks byPGF compared to the same period in 2009. ISAF’s July 2009 Tactical Directiveregulating the use of air strikes appears to have contributed to this decrease. The use ofaerial attacks in civilian areas, however, continued to claim the largest percentage ofcivilian deaths attributed to PGF, causing 69 civilian deaths or 31 per cent of the totalnumber of 223 civilian deaths by PGF in the first half of 2010. Search and seizureoperations, mainly night searches, resulted in 41 deaths (18 per cent of civilian deathsby PGF) and numerous detentions. Escalation of Force incidents (PGF shooting atsuspected AGE attackers) accounted for 16 per cent of civilian deaths by PGF in the firsthalf of 2010.Civilian deaths in the south increased by 43 per cent and in the southeast by 24 percent. The previously more stable northeastern region2saw a sharp rise in AGE activitiesthat intensified the conflict causing an increase of 136 per cent in civilian deathscompared to the same period in 2009. In the south, the surge of International MilitaryForces (IM Forces);3the launch ofOperation Moshtarak,a joint operation of AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) and IM Forces to re-take the Marja and Nad Ali areasof Helmand province from the Taliban; the start ofOperation Hamkari,an AfghanGovernment led and ISAF supported operation to enhance stability and securityconditions in Kandahar city and surrounding areas; and the Taliban’s response allcontributed to intensified conflict and the resultant increase in civilian deaths.In the south, AGEs, in particular the Taliban expanded and strengthened their campaignof intimidation against a wider and larger group of civilians working for, or perceived bythe Taliban to be supportive of the Afghan Government and IM Forces. This campaignincluded assassinations, executions, abductions, night letters and threats. The Taliban’suse of assassinations increased from an average 3.6 per week and 15.6 per month inthe first part of 2009 to on average 7.0 per week and 30.5 per month in the first fourmonths 2010. In May and June, the number of assassinations skyrocketed to on23

average 18.0 per week according to the UN Department of Safety and Security-Afghanistan. Civilians targeted included teachers, nurses, doctors, tribal elders,community leaders, provincial and district officials, other civilians and civilians workingfor IM Forces and international organizations. The intensified pattern of assassinationsreinforced the widespread perception of Afghan civilians that the Taliban can strikeanywhere at anytime with impunity and that the Afghan Government and IM Forces arefailing to protect them.Tactical directives and standard operating procedures implemented in 2010 by IMForces regulating night searches and rules of engagement on escalation of force,together with the July 2009 Tactical Directive restricting air strikes, contributed to asignificant reduction in civilian casualties by PGF.4UNAMA HR welcomes the efforts ofIM Forces to minimize civilian deaths and injuries. At the same time, we highlightconcerns about inadequate implementation of directives and procedures on the ground,and the continuing lack of transparency on investigations and accountability for civiliancasualties. While UNAMA HR acknowledges the military’s need to balance protection ofits forces with protection of civilians, we urge the new leadership at ISAF to fullyimplement measures designed to reduce civilian casualties and to further strengthencivilian protection.The first six months of 2010 painted a grim and bleak picture for civilians affected by thearmed conflict. As the conflict intensified in the traditional fighting areas of the south, andmoved to specific districts in the north, west and northeast, civilians experienced anerosion of Government presence and a further decrease in protection. At the same time,AGEs increasingly undertook unlawful means of warfare through increased use of IEDs,suicide attacks and assassinations that violate Afghans’ basic right to life and theinternational humanitarian law principles of distinction,5proportionality6and precaution7that apply to all parties to an armed conflict –both State (PGF) and non-State actors(AGEs) - requiring them to minimize civilian loss of life and injury.UNAMA HR highlights the UN Secretary-General’s 7 July 2010 statement on protectionof civilians in armed conflict in which he stressed that ensuring greater compliance withinternational law by non-State armed groups was still a “huge common challenge.” In thesame debate, the Representative of Afghanistan emphasized that both the AfghanOn 04 August 2010, the Commander of ISAF issued an updated Tactical Directive that provides guidanceand intent for the “disciplined use of force” in support of ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan operations. Theupdated Directive replaces the July 2009 Directive. The ISAF press release announcing the issuance of thenew Directive states, “While stressing the importance of our efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian lifeon our operation, it also stresses the right and obligation of our troops to defend themselves and thecoalition and Afghan forces with whom we serve shoulder to shoulder.” An unclassified portion of theDirective notes, “We {ISAF} must continue-indeed, redouble-our efforts to reduce the loss of innocent civilianlife to an absolute minimum. Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force oroperate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.”“ISAF Commander Issues Updated Tactical Directive”, News Release by ISAF, 4 August, 2010.5Distinction: “Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part inhostilities,” and “[a]ttacks must not be directed against civilian objects.” ICRC Study, Rules 6 and 7.6Proportionality: “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injuryto civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to theconcrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” ICRC Study, Rule 14.7Precautions in attack: “In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare thecivilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in anyevent to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” ICRCStudy, Rule 15.4

RECOMMENDATIONSTo all Anti-Government Elements (Taliban and other Anti-Government ArmedGroups)•The Taliban should withdraw all orders and statements calling for the killing ofcivilians, including civilian Government officials; adopt and enforce codes of conductor other directives that prohibit any and all attacks on civilians; accept that civilians’cooperating with the Afghan Government and International Military Forces areprotected against any attack and immediately cease targeting those civilians.The Taliban should prevent civilian casualties by complying with internationalhumanitarian law, rules and principles including those rules publicly committed to inthe 2009 Taliban Code of Conduct and other documents on preventing civiliancasualties when planning suicide attacks and acts of perfidy.Comply with international humanitarian law, rules and principles that prohibit attacksagainst civilians and civilian objects and cease attacking civilians. Take all feasibleprecautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life,injury to civilians and damage to civilian property.End the use of all improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks.Immediately cease all acts of killing and intimidation prohibited under the Constitutionand national laws of Afghanistan, and international humanitarian and internationalhuman rights law including assassination, execution, abduction, intimidation andbeheading of civilians.Fully respect civilians’ freedom of movement.Cease using civilians as human shields to protect fighters from attack.

To the International Military Forces•Institute immediate, credible, impartial and transparent investigations into allincidents involving civilian casualties; publicly and promptly report on the progressand results of investigations and take appropriate disciplinary or criminal actionagainst any individuals found responsible for violations of military or domesticcriminal law.Strengthen and fully implement restrictions on the use of aerial and indirect fires onresidential compounds and civilian situations set out in the August 2010 TacticalDirective.Seek alternate viable options to night raids required by the January 2010 TacticalDirective. Ensure all search and seizure operations are led by Afghan NationalSecurity Forces, fully respect traditional, cultural and religious practices and complywith the forces’ international legal obligations of proportionality, distinction andprecaution when conducting raids. Establish standard, transparent monitoring andevaluating mechanisms to assess effective implementation of Tactical Directives.Establish a body in ISAF that monitors, investigates and publicly reports on allincidents of civilian casualties and works directly with the Afghan Government andother protection actors to strengthen civilian protection, transparency andaccountability.Provide timely, adequate and transparent compensation to civilians/victims of allmilitary operations that result in death or injury of civilians or damage to civilianv

To the Government of Afghanistan•Create and provide adequate resources for an appropriate governmental body toserve as the lead on the Government’s response to major incidents of civiliancasualties and to interact with International Military Forces, Afghan citizens, theUnited Nations, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, NGOs and othercivil society groups. Ensure that any Government investigation into incidents withcivilian casualties includes a forensic component and implements compensatoryprocedures in a transparent and timely manner.Ensure Afghan National Security Forces fully respect their obligations underinternational humanitarian law to protect civilians and to take all feasible precautionsto avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civiliansand damage to civilian property.Take prompt and transparent steps to improve accountability for any member of theAfghan National Security Forces who unlawfully causes death or injury to civilians orotherwise violates the rights of Afghan citizens including disciplinary measures orprosecution, as appropriate.Refrain from locating military bases and check points in locations that place civiliansat risk of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.

OverviewBetween 01 January and 30 June 2010, 920 civilian deaths were attributed to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), representing 72 per cent of the total number of civiliandeaths during this period. UNAMA Human Rights (HR) observed that AGE attacks oftentargeted legitimate military objectives that resulted in a disproportionate number ofcivilian casualties. AGEs also undertook deliberate actions designed to control thecivilian population that often involved the intentional targeting of individual civilians.AGEs predominantly targeted military objectives using Improvised Explosive Devices(IEDs), suicide attacks, rockets, mortars and direct fire. However, AGEs often usedthese tactics in civilian areas where a military target or objective was not clear. Certaintactics and weapons, in particular IEDs and suicide attacks, also appeared in somecases to target specific civilian individuals. AGEs controlled the civilian populationthrough a range of measures often involving violence, assassinations and abductions.

In addition, AGEs began a systematic and sustained campaign of targeting tribal elders,community leaders and others working for, or perceived to be supportive of theGovernment and International Military Forces (IM Forces), which has includedabductions and assassinations. This campaign was reinforced in an 8 May statement ofthe Taliban announcing the start ofAl-Faath(Victory/Conquest) Operations on 10 May,that would target the “Americans, the NATO military personnel, foreign advisers, spieswho pose as foreign diplomats, members of the Karzai… administration…contractors offoreign and domestic private security companies, contractors and personnel of militarylogistics and military constructions [sic] companies and all supporters of foreign invaderswho are working for the strengthening of foreign domination.”In some areas, the Taliban have been able to effectively disrupt Government activitiesthrough attacks on civilian buildings, such as district administrative centers andeducational facilities, often using IEDs, direct and stand off attacks. These attacksresulted in damage to property, loss of life and injury to civilians working in thesebuildings or the surrounding area and discouraged civilians from regularly visitingprovincial authorities and seeking the advice and support of the Government. AGEshave also killed, injured and intimidated civilians working for the Government, includingteachers, doctors, nurses and security guards. As a result, basic services, Governmentoutreach and protection for the population have been destabilized and further eroded.Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Suicide Attacks

Improvised Explosive Devices

IEDs kill and injure more civilians than any other tactic used in the conflict. Although theGovernment prohibited the use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in January 2010, the keyingredient in making IEDs, their use has increased and with it civilian casualties. IEDsaccounted for 374 (29 per cent) of the total number of civilian deaths in the first sixmonths of 2010, with incidents in the south accounting for 65 per cent of civilians killedby IEDs. The number of civilians killed country-wide by IEDs increased by 44 per centfrom the same period in 2009.AGEs primarily used IEDs against military objectives but their increased and widespreaduse has caused increased civilian casualties. IEDs have been placed on roadsides, inbazaar and commercial areas, outside the homes and offices of Government officials, inbicycles and rickshaws. IEDs are detonated in a variety of ways – they can be triggeredby remote-controlled IEDs (RCIED), wire-triggered, or by victims (pressure or sensitive-plated IEDs). When detonated, an IED explosion is indiscriminate and affects everyonein the vicinity of the explosion.UNAMA HR has received reports of IED explosions, often remote-controlled, in busymarket areas. On 31 March, an IED, reportedly concealed in a wheelbarrow, exploded inthe midst of the weekly Wednesday market in Baba Ji, Lakshar Gah district in Helmandprovince. A Government delegation that investigated the incident concluded that 24civilians were killed and 46 injured.In some instances, IEDs were deliberately placed outside of shops selling music, DVDsand sweets. In Khost city, two separate explosions, reportedly IEDs, occurred againstice-cream shops on 12 and 29 May respectively, injuring 12 civilians, including children.2

RCIED incidents documented by UNAMA HR have targeted international militaryconvoys, Afghan National Security Force’s (ANSF) personnel and buildings, such asAfghan National Police (ANP) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) headquarters,but have also detonated in crowded civilian places, resulting in more civilians harmedthan the intended target. In April, two major incidents involving RCIEDs in Jalalabad cityagainst an international military convoy (placed in a bicycle) and against the head of theinvestigations unit of NDS (placed in a rickshaw) on 7 and 17 April respectively, resultedin a total of three civilians killed and 21 injured, including six children.RCIEDs were also used to target high-profile civilians. Two incidents in June illustratethis. On 22 June, the Head of the Public Health Department in Kunduz was killed andthree civilians injured when an RCIED detonated at his private clinic. Preliminaryinvestigations suggested that AGEs were behind this attack as the deceased hadreportedly refused, on several occasions, to send medical supplies and personnel totreat insurgents injured in clashes with Pro-Government Forces (PGF). On 23 June, anRCIED detonation left the former Deputy Provincial Council member of Behsud district inNangahar province, and two other civilians, injured. The well-known cleric is also anominee for the September 2010 parliamentary elections.AGEs’ use of pressure-plated IEDs is of grave concern since these explosives werefrequently placed along roadsides used by civilian traffic and vehicles and in commercialareas. Their detonations resulted in indiscriminate explosions that affected civiliansthrough loss of life and injury. The nature of these weapons means they can be triggeredby anyone, often civilians, and indiscriminately hit any target.IEDs were often used effectively to spread fear and to intimidate local populations,restricting their movement and impacting adversely on their livelihoods. While in somecases Taliban warned local communities that IEDs had been planted on a particular roador not to use a certain road, such measures were often inadequate. In Shindand districtin Herat province and Pusht Rod district in Farah province, five people were killed and17 others were injured by an IED in spite of warnings from local Taliban.On 28 April, six civilians were killed when their mini bus struck an IED in Daragiaarea, close to Tani district centre in Khost province. Four other civilians wereinjured. On 3 May, an IED detonated against a mini bus in Taraki village, Zurmatdistrict in Paktya province, resulting in nine people killed, including two childrenand 12 others injured, including four children.

civilians. On 18 May, a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED)2detonated close to DarulaAnman area in Kabul city targeting an international military convoy. As a result of theexplosion, seven civilians were killed and 49 others were injured, including women andchildren. Six international military personnel were also killed.Suicide attacks occurred outside hotels, on bridges and in market places – all areas witha heavy civilian presence. Two suicide attacks in the south: one in Dehrawud district inUruzgan province and one in Kandahar city on 14 January and 4 February respectivelytook place in crowded areas outside of hotels. As a result of both explosions, at least 23civilians were killed and 34 injured; the 14 January attack could have been a prematureexplosion.Such attacks carried out by Taliban members appear to be in violation of their rules onavoiding civilian casualties set out in the Taliban’s 2009 “Code of Conduct.” Article 41states, “..while launching a suicide attack, [we] should try to prevent civilian casualties.”Article 46 includes a general order that “[M]ujaheddin must do their best to avoid civiliancasualties.”3UNAMA HR documented several suicide attacks that targeted Government officials andtribal elders. On 22 February, a young boy detonated his suicide vest targeting aprominent Government tribal leader returning from a meeting with district officials andtribal elders in Nangahar province. As a result, 14 civilians were killed, including thehead of Chamtala Disabled Council and the head of Sherzad IDP Council. Twelve otherswere injured, including the Director of the provincial Returnees and RefugeesDepartment.The first ever reported suicide attack in Afghanistan that involved a female occurred inKunar province on 21 June. A female with a body-borne IED (BBIED)4detonated againsta joint ANP/IM Forces check post on Shultan Bridge in the Shigal wa Shultan district. Atleast one civilian was killed and 13 civilians were reportedly injured, including ninechildren. The provincial authorities condemned the attack and distributed compensationto the victims. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.Although Government and IM Forces were often the targets of attacks, two suicideattacks against private organizations in Kandahar city marked the latest in a series ofattacks in and around the city in which civilians and civilian facilities – particularly thoselinked to the Afghan Government, international organizations and international military –have been deliberately targeted. On 15 April, an SVBIED exploded in a compoundhosting several international organizations. As a result, six people were killed and atleast 27 were injured. Less than two weeks later, on 27 April, an attack on a compoundof a private security company resulted in the deaths of four civilians and injury to 30.

On 9 June, a body-borne IED attack occurred in Masha Kor area of Nagahanvillage, Arghandab district in Kandahar province at a party in the men’s sectionfollowing a wedding. Reportedly, the attacker was a young man of approximately18 years. At least 49 people died, including six children, and 106 people wereinjured, including 14 children. This incident killed more civilians than any other inthe southern region in 2010. According to eyewitnesses at the wedding party, theprincipal target was a commander of the US-supported Local Defense Initiative(LDI) viewed as the most successful LDI program in the south. Approximatelythree quarters of the casualties were civilians who were not members of anysecurity force or armed group. The Taliban denied responsibility and claimedinstead that the incident was caused by an air strike. Such claims from the Talibanare not new and are used to deflect attention and responsibility away from attacksthat cause large numbers of civilian casualties.

Complex and Multiple Suicide Attacks

AGEs carried out complex and multiple attacks on a much more frequent basis than atany other time since 2001. In the first two months of 2010, AGEs carried out twocomplex attacks per month. The number of such attacks has declined since then.Complex attacks included body-borne and vehicle-borne suicide bombers with the use ofsmall arms and grenades. Although the majority of these complex attacks targetedGovernment buildings (not all of which were legitimate military targets) and internationalmilitary bases, often with fewer civilian casualties, the attacks nevertheless causedwidespread terror and fear among the civilian population. Complex attacks took place inthe southern, central and northern regions of Afghanistan.On 26 February a complex attack comprised of a series of suicide attacks,targeted foreign residences and guesthouses in Kabul city that resulted in thedeaths of at least 17 people, including 13 civilians; many of them foreigners. Forty-four civilians were reportedly injured, the majority of whom were Afghans. On 13March, five attacks took place in Kandahar city: a suicide vehicle-borne improvisedexplosive device at Sarpoza Prison and the ANP HQ; two body-borne improvisedexplosive device detonations occurred in the areas of the Red Mosque, Al Jadidand Seman Dorahi. Reportedly, 35 people were killed and 70 injured; a smallnumber of these were ANSF. The Taliban claimed responsibility for both attacksand in a statement issued after the second attack warned International SecurityAssistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) against planning operations in the city.

Legal Analysis:The use of IEDs in many cases violates the internationalhumanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. A suicideattack that directly targets civilians or one that may be expected to result incasualties beyond the strict requirements of military necessity violates internationalhumanitarian law. Suicide attacks, as a method of attack during an armed conflict,are not prohibitedper se.However, a suicide attack violates internationalhumanitarian law when it targets civilians, or it may be expected to result in civiliancasualties in violation of the principle of proportionality, or is carried out in aperfidious manner. In addition, many suicide attacks on legitimate militaryobjectives disregard the principle of proportionality by taking place in public areaswith large numbers of civilians indicating a failure to take all feasible precautions tominimize incidental loss of civilian life and injury.

Intimidation Tactics: Abductions, Assassinations, Executions, Illegal Checkpointsand Night LettersIn the first half of 2010, AGEs greatly intensified their intimidation campaign againstsupporters, or those perceived to be supportive of the Government and the internationalcommunity. The campaign included abductions,5assassinations and executions ofcivilians and Government officials. UNAMA HR recorded 183 executions andassassinations and 165 incidents of abductions by AGEs6in the first six months of 2010.Executions and assassinations increased by more than 95 per cent from the first half of2009 (14 per cent of all civilians killed by AGEs). Civilians were also harassed andintimidated through the setting up of road blocks, distribution of “night letters” and theuse of other intimidation tactics.AGEs targeted community and tribal elders, Government officials, civilians working forthe international military as interpreters, construction workers, and those civiliansperceived to be supporting or associated with the Government. They also targetedteachers, health care workers, shop keepers and staff of Afghan and internationalNGOs. These acts of intimidation and killing are an extremely effective means ofspreading fear among communities and exerting control over the civilian population. Thetactics also undermine support for the Afghan Government and are facilitated by theGovernment’s frequent inability to protect civilians from such activities and abuses byAGEs.

Abductions

AGEs abducted aid workers, medical and educational employees, labourers, truckdrivers, and tribal elders, among others. It is difficult to obtain accurate figures and thenumber of incidents is often under-reported. Abduction is a sensitive issue and in manycases those involved in negotiations are reluctant to speak out, or are unwilling to talkafter release or where abductees were killed.

UNAMA HR recorded numerous incidents of abduction across the country, especially inthe south and the southeast which experienced extremely high rates of abduction in thefirst half of 2010. In May, in the southeast alone, UNAMA HR recorded 45 cases ofabductions by alleged AGEs. Out of this, 14 people were killed, 10 were released, whilethe fate of the remaining 21 hostages remains unknown, including that of a 12 year oldboy. The majority of victims were abducted on the suspicion of spying for the AfghanGovernment and IM Forces.Abducted civilians were frequently killed, used to demand a ransom or used as abargaining tool before release. For example, AGEs demanded the withdrawal of localsupport for the Afghan Government and the provision of weapons in return for therelease of two family members of a pro-Government elder abducted on 14 February inBilichiragh district in Faryab province. Civilians abducted in Kunar and Laghmanprovinces in the east in May were often only released after providing assurances theywould stop supporting the Government or following the payment of a fine imposed by theTaliban’s parallel court. AGEs also abducted civilians at illegal check points they set up.On 23 May, 11 pro-Government Zadran tribal elders, who were also members ofthe Community Development Council, were fired upon by AGEs after being calledfor a meeting in Sayed Khel Village of Shamal district in Khost province. Fiveelders were instantly killed, and the remaining six were abducted. One elder wassubsequently killed. As of 29 May, the whereabouts of the remaining five elderswere unknown according to provincial authorities. Possible motives for the attackincluded retaliation for the establishment of ‘arbaki’, a traditional tribal force toprotect local communities used to protect labourers working on the Gardez-Khostroad, or the elders’ refusal to give AGEs some of the project funds.

Assassinations and Executions

Assassinations and executions by AGEs targeted a greater number and range ofcivilians in the southeastern and central regions and in particular dramatically rose in thesouthern region. During the first six months of 2010, AGEs killed at least 183 civiliansthrough these tactics. UNAMA HR also documented several incidents where publicexecutions were held, including of children.On average there were 7.0 assassinations per week in the first four months of 2010, upfrom 3.6 per week in the same period in 2009. In May and June alone, AGEs’assassinated on average 18.0 people per week according to the UN Department ofSafety and Security-Afghanistan. This included the Barmal District Mayor and theDeputy Mayor of Kandahar. The highest number of assassinations was recorded in thesouthern region where more than one hundred people were assassinated betweenJanuary and June 2010.Although the ANSF remained the predominant target for assassination in the south, itappears more people were abducted and executed on suspicion of spying thanpreviously recorded, includingshuramembers, students, mullahs, teachers and tribal

elders.7The Taliban frequently attached notes to the bodies of civilians theyassassinated warning others of the same fate.The different versions of the Taliban Code of Conduct have addressed the issue of‘spying.’ The 2009 Code of Conduct appears to give more detailed information on howTaliban members should treat suspected spies. It prescribes the death penalty andrequires the testimony of two witnesses or a confession when deciding on the sentence.8Targeted assassinations of civilians included district governors,shuramembers,religious elders, members, teachers, off-duty ANSF personnel, tribal elders as well asstudents, truck drivers, doctors, construction workers and those working for theprovincial authorities, international military and international organizations.At least four civilians were killed during prayers in a Mosque. When entering places ofworship, people must leave their weapons at the door, and are therefore unarmed andunable to protect themselves.On 18 February, a tribal leader from Dand district in Kandahar province was killed whilepraying in a mosque. On 9 April, a districtshuramember was killed in a mosque in Zharidistrict in Kandahar province. On 19 April, the Kandahar city deputy mayor was killed ina mosque. On 21 May, a mullah from Tere Zayi district in Khost province was killed whilepraying in a mosque.

UNAMA HR documented 12 civilians assassinated by AGEs in Kandahar provincein the first six months of 2010. The victims ranged from civilians in high-profilepublic positions to civil servants,shuramembers and others. On 2 February, aprominent pro-Government Shi’ite leader and a close associate of Ahmed WaliKarzai were killed in Kandahar city. On 24 February, the Director of the Informationand Culture Department of the province, the Head of the Literature Faculty atKandahar University, and the brother of the Arghistan district chief of police werekilled in the city. On 19 April, the deputy mayor of Kandahar was killed whilepraying in a mosque. The Taliban claimed responsibility for this killing. On 21 April,the Head of the Agricultural Cooperative was killed in District Three of Kandaharcity. On 12 May, the deputy prison administrator of Sarpoza prison was killed afterhe left his house for work. On 15 June, a member of the Shah Wali Kotshurawasassassinated in the city.

Illegal Checkpoints

In some cases, AGEs dressed in ANSF uniforms, established illegal checkpoints andstopped civilian vehicles. They harassed passengers and in some cases killed them ifthey were found to be working for the Afghan Government or IM Forces. In thesoutheastern region during May, AGEs, dressed in ANSF uniforms, stopped vehiclesand accused passengers of being ‘AGE sympathizers’ and killed those who showedidentity cards from the Government or IM Forces.On 15 May, the Taliban stopped six passengers at an illegal checkpoint in SpinaPayela village, Terezai district in Khost province. The passengers were part of awedding party traveling back from Pakistan. To determine whether the passengerswere working for the Afghan Government or IM Forces, the Taliban, withoutidentifying themselves, accused the passengers of being AGE sympathizers. Torefute these allegations the passengers produced their work identity cards. Twopassengers were released, and the remaining four, including the groom, werekilled. Reportedly, the groom was a translator for the IM Forces and the othervictims had been working with the Afghan Government and/or private securitycompanies. The Taliban accused the victims of spying and claimed responsibilityfor the incident.

civilians working for the Afghan Government and the IM forces. Civilians stopped atillegal checkpoints were harassed, intimidated, and in some cases abducted or killed.These checkpoints also severely restricted civilians’ freedom of movement.

Night letters

Night letters, distributed countrywide by AGEs were often placed in public areas,including at mosques and Government buildings, warning communities to stay awayfrom the Afghan Government and IM Forces. Night letters warned entire communitiesnot to send their daughters to school, not to let their sons join the ANSF, and called onteachers and Government employees to stop working. In May, AGEs distributed nightletters in Logar, Kunar, Badakshan and Balk provinces warning people not to collaboratewith provincial authorities or the international community and to leave the ANSF. Theletters also disseminated anti-female education messages and warned people thatfailure to comply with the warning would lead to retribution.Attacks on Women and Children9IEDs and suicide attacks by AGEs caused the most women and children casualties inthe first half of 2010.UNAMA HR recorded 39 women and 74 child deaths as a result of both IED explosionsand suicide attacks in the first half of 2010. This is a 44 per cent increase in deaths ofwomen and 155 per cent increase in child deaths compared to the same period in2009.10On 6 January, an explosive device detonated in a crowd where children hadsurrounded an international military/ANP convoy in the Hisarak Mazina area of Rodatdistrict in Nangahar province, killing four children and injuring 68 others. Fifty-six of thoseinjured were school children. The home-made explosive device was reportedly filled withshrapnel and other sharp objects (nails, glass, screws).Civilian vehicles hit by IEDs placed on roadsides frequently caused women and childcasualties. Of great concern were IEDs placed in busy market or bazaar areas, in somecases attached to bicycles, or placed next to organizations and facilities, such as parks,frequented by women and children.

An alarming issue was the extrajudicial killing of children by AGEs on the suspicion ofspying for the Government. UNAMA HR documented four separate cases where AGEsreportedly executed children soon after they were abducted on allegations of spying. On8 March, a 17 year old student was taken at night allegedly by the Taliban from his homein Shekhyasin village, Chack district in Wardak province. His body was found thefollowing morning. The Taliban had reportedly accused him of being part of the AfghanGovernment. On 29 June, a 12 year old boy was publicly executed allegedly by AGEs inthe district centre of Waghaz in Ghazni province. The motive for killing the boy isunknown. On 10 June, a seven year old boy was publicly hanged in Sanjin district inHelmand province reportedly by the Taliban. Although tribal tensions may have been afactor, the Taliban had accused the boy of spying for the Government.The impact of the conflict continued to have more serious consequences for women andchildren; access to basic services, such as health and education were adverselyaffected. Doctors and medical practitioners, including vaccinators, were killed andabducted by AGEs. These attacks affected not only the quality of services available toAfghans in need, but also affected access to medical care. AGEs attacked educationalfacilities, and harassed and intimidated teachers and students. As a result, schools weredestroyed or closed either on a semi-permanent or temporary basis, denying educationalopportunities for thousands of children, particularly in the southern, southeastern,northern and central regions. The United Nations Human Rights Council adopted aresolution11in July 2010 that condemned attacks against schools and students,especially against girl students in Afghanistan.Night letters, disseminated by AGEs warning teachers and pupils not to attend schoolswere distributed in the southern, southeastern, central and northern regions ofAfghanistan. On 29 February, the head of a girl’s school in Pul-i-Khumri, the provincialcapital of Baghlan, received threat letters, allegedly from the Taliban, warning her toclose the school otherwise her children would be killed. UNAMA HR has documentedcases where IEDs were placed on routes used, particularly by female students, to walkto school, resulting in casualties.

AccountabilityAGEs operate with impunity in Afghanistan. UNAMA HR observes that while the Talibanhave made public commitments to avoid civilian casualties, including those found inseveral provisions of the 2009 Taliban Code of Conduct, no information exists onwhether and how Taliban commanders have ensured effective implementation of theseprovisions on the ground. Based on UNAMA HR’s documentation regarding increasedcivilian casualties attributed to the Taliban, it appears that the Taliban’s publiccommitments to avoid civilian death and injury have not been respected.The Afghan Government often fails in its duty to investigate, arrest and punishperpetrators, including any member of an AGE, for violations under domestic criminallaws, international humanitarian law or applicable human rights law. The weak andunder-resourced judicial system in Afghanistan often cannot ensure fair trial standardsfor accused persons or justice for victims. With the current focus on reconciliation andreintegration between the Government and those Taliban who renounce violence and11

PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANSOverviewBetween January and June 2010, 386 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) wereattributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF). UNAMA Human Rights (HR) recorded 223civilian deaths and 163 civilian injuries. These figures represent a decrease of 29 percent in civilian deaths caused by PGF from the same period in 2009. For the first half of2010, UNAMA HR recorded 69 civilian deaths as a result of air strikes (31 per cent of the223 civilian deaths by PGF), 41 deaths occurred during search and seizure operations,mainly night raids (18 per cent of total civilian deaths from PGF) and 36 deaths wereattributed to escalation of force incidents (16 per cent of total deaths caused by PGF).UNAMA HR recorded 42 female civilian deaths and 25 injuries, and 51 child deaths and26 injuries by PGF for the first six months of 2010. This is a decrease of 42 per cent indeaths of women and a 50 per cent decrease in child deaths by PGF compared to thesame period in 2009.

from air strikes (the tactic that results in the largest number of civilian casualties byinternational forces) suggests that decisions by international military troops prevented anincrease in civilian casualties even as large numbers of additional troops enteredAfghanistan in 2010. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took furthermeasures in 2010 to minimize the impact of international military operations on civiliansby introducing two directives that apply to ISAF and US forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A):the 23 January 2010 Tactical Directive on night raids and a review of StandardOperating Procedures on Escalation of Force incidents first published on 19 February2010 and updated on 19 April 2010.UNAMA HR has observed that from at least mid-July 2009 through to June 2010incidents in which air attacks on residential compounds have caused mass civiliancasualties were rare. This suggests that adherence by international forces to restrictionson targeting residential compounds likely prevented mass casualty incidents.According to media reports, COMISAF brought the majority of US Special Forces underits command in March 2010 reportedly to ensure greater integration and coordination ofmilitary operations. UNAMA HR often finds it difficult to verify whether Special Forceswere involved in particular operations, as many witnesses and victims do not know thedifference between regular international military and Special Forces. In addition, mostoperations involving Special Forces are not publicized and no, or limited, information ismade available to civilians in response to requests for information on their operations.Excessive force, ill-treatment and deaths and injury to civilians have occurred in somecases involving Special Forces that UNAMA HR has investigated. A 12 February nightraid in Gardez city, in which five civilians were killed, and a 21 February air strike inUruzgan province, where at least 21 civilians were killed were illustrative of incidentsinvolving Special Forces (see boxes below). UNAMA HR welcomes the move to betterintegrate certain elements of US Special Forces into ISAF’s chain of command.However, more information on how many forces and which units from the SpecialForces, including forces that are part of Operation Enduring Freedom, have beenbrought under COMISAF could provide greater transparency and accountability forcivilian casualties that occur as a result of Special Forces’ operations.

Location of Military FacilitiesAs raised in its previous reports, UNAMA HR remains concerned about the proximity ofmilitary bases and checkpoints to civilian areas. UNAMA HR has documented numerousincidents where AGEs have attacked ANSF/IM forces observation posts, bases andoutposts in towns and residential areas, including through the use of groundengagement, mortar and rocket attacks. Often mortars do not hit their intended targetand have killed and injured civilians and damaged civilian property. Retaliatory actionsupdated Directive replaces the July 2009 Directive. The ISAF press release announcing the issuance of thenew Directive states, “While stressing the importance of our efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian lifeon our operation, it also stresses the right and obligation of our troops to defend themselves andthecoalition and Afghan forces with whom we serve shoulder to shoulder.” An unclassified portion of theDirective notes, “We {ISAF} must continue-indeed, redouble-our efforts to reduce the loss of innocent civilianlife to an absolute minimum. Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force oroperate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.”“ISAF Commander Issues Updated Tactical Directive”, News Release by ISAF, 04 August, 2010.

by ANSF/IM forces, through the use of artillery on suspected AGE locations, often havethe same consequences.UNAMA HR documented numerous incidents duringOperation Moshtarakin Marja andNad Ali districts in Helmand province where checkpoints established by IM Forceshindered the movement of people, particularly those who were injured and seekingmedical assistance. After combat operations had finished, Government and IM Forcescontinued to locate in residential areas putting civilians at increasing risk from Talibanattacks. COMISAF’s Guidance for Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations incorporates apopulation-centric approach predicated on support from the Afghan people by ensuring asafe and secure environment to enable development. By locating military bases in ornear residential areas particularly in conflict affected areas, IM Forces may be puttingcivilians at heightened risk. In such areas Afghan civilians face not only the risk of oftendisproportionate and indiscriminate attacks by AGEs, but also death and injury frommortar and rocket attacks fired by IM Forces that mistakenly fall short of their target andhit residential compounds.

Large- Scale Military Operations

Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province

Conflict-affected communities have reported to UNAMA HR that large-scale militaryoperations remain deeply unpopular as they are believed to result in further insecurityand less protection for the area and its inhabitants. For example,Operation MoshtarakinNad Ali and Marja districts in Helmand province, launched in February 2010 by PGF,has not resulted in increased protection for the local population. As of June 23, UNAMAHR recorded at least 74 civilians killed in Marja. 29 civilian deaths were linked to PGF,32 civilians were attributed to AGEs with 13 civilian deaths caused by unknown actors.Civilians were killed and injured through the use of IEDs, air strikes, raids and forceprotection incidents during the 13-24 February operation in Marja. According to UNHCR,as of 13 June, 3,719 families were displaced by the conflict.Since the completion of major combat operations in Marja, the Taliban’s violentintimidation of civilians has become the defining protection concern in the area. TheTaliban have carried out abductions, assassinations and executions against civilians.Those targeted have included local residents, teachers, civilians attempting to play apolitical role in the area, persons accused of spying for the IM Forces, Afghanconstructors and civilians accepting assistance from the Government and internationalcommunity. Provincial authorities have failed to achieve an effective presence in thearea due to the violence and the continuing Taliban intimidation campaign.Numerous civilians were killed in intimidation incidents since the end of combatoperations in late February to the end of June. As a result, many persons displaced fromthe area were reluctant to return and the pace of return has been very slow. Thecontinued violence carried out by the Taliban in Marja, coupled with their repeated andincreased use of IEDs and mines, has seriously affected civilians’ daily lives. Civilians inthe area have limited ability to freely move, children have been denied access to

education13as the majority of schools were closed, and participation in developmentprojects has been very difficult.

Operation Hamkari in Kandahar

Operation Hamkari14in Kandahar province is according to a May 2010 article by theNATO Secretary-General,15a campaign “to change the political situation, to graduallyenhance security, to strengthen governance and to expand the Government’s authorityin key areas of insurgent influence” in Kandahar province. The objective of the firstphase is to create a security ring protection force (“Ring of Steel”) of ANSF checkpointsto control all access points to Kandahar city. ANSF activities would also focus on theoutlying districts, such as Zhari, Arghandab, and Panjwai, supported by IM Forces withthe reported intent to avoid combat operations as much as possible.Afghan and IMForces launched the second phase ofOperation Hamkarion 21 July with low-leveloperations in Arghandab district.Many local elders from the surrounding districts of Kandahar city, whom UNAMA HR metwith expressed strong opposition to the impending military activity by PGF. The eldersclaimed that such operations would not protect their communities from the Taliban orimprove the security environment for civilians, but rather exacerbate the alreadyinsecure conditions in their districts. Local elders reported that in their view anyimpending military activities would fail to stop Taliban activity in the area, result ingreater civilian casualties and destroy their homes and crops. They were especiallyconcerned about what they believe is the inability of IM Forces to distinguish betweenTaliban and civilians (even with the IM Forces’ use of biometrics) and the Taliban’spersistent use of civilians as human shields, its “guerilla warfare” and increased use ofIEDs and mines. Elders also expressed concerns about IM Forces’ lack of culturalawareness when conducting operations, the destruction of property and loss oflivelihoods, in particular of their harvest that would result from military operations. Eldersstressed that ISAF‘s publication of its plans to launch the military operation caused theTaliban to plant more IEDs and intensify their campaign of intimidation against pro-Government figures.Elders also reported that although numerousshuraswere held between the provincialauthorities, IM Forces and affected communities to discuss impending operations inKandahar these meetings were “photo opportunities” at which the elders’ concerns andsuggestions were not taken seriously. As one elder from Panjwayi district told UNAMAHR,“.. there are far too many ‘meetings in name.’ ISAF and the Government ignore whatwe say, because we are from the districts..[T]his is not true, and it is insulting…[t]hereare too often photographers and television cameras at these meetings. In Pakistan, ofcourse, the Taliban can watch television, see me sitting with the governor and decide tokill me. So, when there is a ‘meeting in name,’ first I risk my life, and then I am insulted.”

Search and Seizure Operations/Night Raids“Isympathize even with my enemies when this happens to them.”UNAMA HR interview with a local elder from Arghandab district in Kandahar provincewho was involved in a night raid, April 2010.

Concerns of Civilians

UNAMA HR has spoken to many Afghan civilians about the impact that search andseizure operations, most particularly night raids, have on their communities and howthese incidents cause extreme anger, mistrust and resentment towards the internationalcommunity. Concerns around night raids are not new, and debate has not often focusedon the need or reason for night searches, but rather on how night raids are conducted,and the frequency of civilian casualties as a result. According to the January 2010Tactical Directive, the ANSF should take the lead on all raids whenever possible. SpecialForces also carry out night raids with other armed pro-Government groups. UNAMA HRnotes that the number of night raids that result in civilian casualties is likely higher thanUNAMA HR has been able to document given the overall lack of information andtransparency around night raids.UNAMA HR documented 13 night raids in the first six months of 2010, resulting in 41civilians killed and eight injured, as compared to 26 night raids in the same period of2009 that resulted in 75 civilians killed and 29 injured. This figure represents a decreaseof 45 per cent of civilian deaths by PGF in night raids. Civilians were often arbitrarilydetained and property damaged or destroyed as a consequence of these raids.Many affected communities reported to UNAMA HR that the lack of transparency andaccountability of those conducting night raids is a huge concern for them. Communities’concerns included the inability to distinguish and determine which forces conducted theraid, lack of effective investigation and prosecution for abuses that occurred during araid, lack of information regarding the location of detainees, lack of access to medicaltreatment for persons injured during a raid and the inability to receive compensation forloss of life, injury and destruction to property. Many communities informed UNAMA HRthat they are often turned away from bases, ignored or repeatedly told information isforthcoming with no further follow up when seeking redress from IM Forces.Communities also reported a continuing lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity on thepart of certain troops involved in raids regarding invasion of people’s homes, especiallyat night, particularly the searching of women’s quarters by men and violating the honourof women and the reputation and future of the entire family. Communities’ alsoexpressed concerns that inaccurate intelligence was often used as a basis to searchpremises contributing to increased and unwarranted civilian casualties.17

January 2010 Tactical Directive

COMISAF has recognized that night raids have galvanized communities to express theirgrievances against IM forces more than other tactic used by PFG. The Tactical Directiveissued in January 2010 attempts to address some of these concerns and applies to allISAF and USFOR-A troops. UNAMA HR notes that the number of night raids it hasdocumented that resulted in civilian casualties has decreased which could be attributedto implementation of the Tactical Directive. The Directive states “the first and mostpreferable course of action is to explore all other feasible options before effecting a nightraid that targets compounds and residences”, to have Afghans in the lead wherepossible and coordinate the operations “with Afghan [G]overnment officials, ANSF andlocal elders whenever possible.”16ANSF are required to be included in all night raids andin the planning process at the earliest possible time with notice to Afghan Governmentrepresentatives prior to the start of any night operation.In the first half of 2010, in spite of the issuance of the Tactical Directive and asubsequent reduction in civilian casualties during night raids, UNAMA HR documentedsimilar patterns of abuse during some raids: excessive and often indiscriminate use offorce against occupants of a house, including women and children; destruction ofproperty and theft of goods. In some cases, UNAMA HR documented allegations ofmistreatment and abusive conduct towards women and children. Abuses havereportedly continued to occur, even with ANSF presence, and in some instances as adirect result of their activity.In addition, due to the lack of transparency around night raids, communities and othersoften did not know whether local elders were consulted and whether viable alternateoptions, such as cordoning off the target until daybreak, were considered. There was nofollow-up on whether the raid produced results (such as yielding usefulinformation/intelligence, or capture of insurgents and weapons).This lack oftransparency continued to fuel anger and resentment toward PGF among affectedcommunities and the Afghan public.The Tactical Directive also contains a procedure for tracking persons detained during anight raid through a form that gives contact details on how the family can follow up withIM Forces on detention and return or compensation for any property seized or damaged.The form includes a section on the reason for detention. UNAMA HR has obtainedcopies of two completed forms from two separate night raids that do not provide contactdetails of IM Forces for follow up. One of the forms specified the property damaged andseized but failed to provide contact information for follow up. The second form detailedinformation about one person detained but did not give any contact details for the familyto find out the detainee’s location.On 12 February, IM Forces, reportedly US Special Forces, jointly with Afghanarmed groups conducted a night raid against a private house in Khataba village ofGardez centre in Paktya province. At the time a large group of people werepresent to participate in a family celebration. As a result of the operation, fivecivilians belonging to the same family were killed, including two brothers, one anANP Intelligence Officer in Zurmat district and the other a prosecutor in AhmadAbad district. Three women were killed, two of whom were pregnant. Four wereinjured, including a 15 year old boy and eight others were detained.16

UNAMA HR’s investigations of this incident revealed that US and Afghan forcesphysically assaulted and injured, restrained and forced those who were in the house tostand in the cold with bare feet for several hours. According to witnesses, two peoplelater died from injuries sustained during the raid caused by the US and Afghan forces’failure to provide adequate and timely medical support. On the same day, hours later,the bodies of the five persons killed were carried through Gardez town in protest, withthe demonstrators calling on the provincial authorities to resign as they were unable toprevent the deaths of civilians. A Ministry of Interior and ISAF press release on 12February stated that a joint investigation was underway. To date, since the family insistson the perpetrators being brought to trial, they have rejected compensation from ISAFbut accepted compensation from the Afghan Government for injuries sustained byvictims. UNAMA HR is aware that ISAF conducted a further investigation into theallegations of abuse however the findings and results of the investigation have not beenmade public.While night raids are conducted mainly to detain those actively involved in the conflict,UNAMA HR has documented that PGF also detained many other Afghan males duringsome of these operations. These detentions can result from misinformation, poorsourcing or a desire for revenge on the part of other families. UNAMA HR documented anumber of incidents where ANSF and IM Forces had detained men ranging from severaldays to years, without the detainees knowing the evidence against them and beingunable to effectively challenge their detention.

Demonstrations against Night Raids

Night searches have hit such a discord with Afghan communities that demonstrationswere often held following such operations even when those killed or detained wereAGEs. Demonstrations occurred in the southern, southeastern, central and easternregions of Afghanistan. Reportedly, AGEs have manipulated some of thesedemonstrations, particularly in the south. Some demonstrations have resulted in civilianskilled and injured due to excessive use of force by the ANSF. A joint search operation,led by the ANSF, in Garmsir district in Helmand province sparked a series ofdemonstrations in the area due to an allegation that a copy of the holy Quran wasdesecrated and an allegation that a girl was sexually abused (later reported to beunfounded). Reportedly, the demonstrations, instigated by AGEs, turned violent and inthe first demonstration on 12 January, ANSF killed eight civilians and injured16 others.In the second demonstration on 13 January, international military and Afghan forcesinjured five civilians. Many other demonstrations held across the country have called forthe Government to end night raids and bring perpetrators of abuses to justice.In Asmar district in Kunar province, the community held demonstrations following anight raid reportedly by US Special Forces on 13 March in which three civilianswere killed. A night raid on 25 April that resulted in three people killed and twoarrested in Nasir village in Logar province prompted demonstrations the followingday. In both raids suspected AGEs were killed. On 28 April, a relative of a femaleMember of Parliament was killed during a night raid at her house in Nangarharprovince, resulting in demonstrations the following morning where protestorschanted anti-American slogans. The raid was condemned in the Wolesi Jirga.

Escalation of ForceAn Escalation of Force (EoF) incident occurs when the driver of a vehicle fails to stopafter PGF give a series of signals to stop, resulting in the death and injury of civilians.UNAMA HR recorded 36 civilians killed and 36 injured during the first six months of 2010from EoF incidents. This is 16 per cent of the total number of civilian deaths caused byPGF and represents an increase of 125 per cent in the number of civilian deaths duringEoF incidents compared to the first half of 2009.Civilian casualties and concern from communities on force protection incidents promptedIM Forces in February 2010 to review their procedures on EoF (Standard OperatingProcedure 373) that are part of a campaign to end civilian casualties caused by EoFincidents. The updated SoPs were first published on 19 February and later updated on19 April. The SoPs provide guidance on EoF incidents and how ISAF should respond tosituations in a proportionate manner. The SoP provides a framework for the use of forcewithin the authorized rules of engagement. The guidelines instruct troops to ensureefforts are made to control a situation without force; to ‘tailor’ procedures to the localenvironment by consulting local Afghan leaders; whenever possible to remain at thescene of any convoy shootings; to find ways to de-escalate the situation; and to takeresponsibility for their actions.Many EoF incidents occured because drivers did not seem to understand, or ignoredsignals or were not aware of the signals or because IM Forces gave ambiguous signals.Although ISAF has embarked on numerous public awareness campaigns to publicizeEoF signals across the country, civilians continued to be killed and injured.UNAMA HR notes that many EoF incidents adversely affected families, children andpassengers in civilian vehicles. UNAMA HR documented five children killed and oneinjured as a result of EoF incidents. On 10 May, IM Forces, traveling in a convoy, killed atwo-year old child in Zardad Ghund area in Logar province, while the family wastraveling to Kabul. On 19 April one child and four civilians were killed when their vehiclereportedly got too close to an IM Forces’ convoy in Gurbuz district in Khost province.

On 12 April, IM Forces, engaged in a routine clearance patrol, fired at a bus killingfour civilians, including one female teenager, and injuring 18 others in the Senzeraiarea in Zhari district in Kandahar province. Conflicting reports were releasedregarding the precise position of the bus at the time of the shooting and whetherwarning signals were given. ISAF immediately accepted responsibility for theincident on 12 April and according to an ISAF Joint Command statement on thesame date, a joint ANSF and ISAF incident assessment team were sent to reviewthe events. According to ISAF a report was published but it has not been madeavailable to UNAMA HR. ISAF reported that measures taken to prevent futureincidents included re-emphasis on the 2 July 2009 Tactical Directive to minimizethe impact of the conflict on civilians, a broader public information campaign tomake the public aware of and understand EoF signals and increased use of non-lethal measures.

Legal Analysis:The use of deadly (or lethal) force by military forces againstcivilians is prohibited under international humanitarian law and international humanrights law. When combat operations are being carried out, the warring parties arerequired to distinguish between civilians as protected persons and those who aredirectly participating in hostilities, and not attack civilians. Outside the combatzone, the rules of international human rights law apply. Such rules limit the use ofdeadly force to the following situations:(i)self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death orserious injury,(ii)to prevent a particularly a serious crime involving grave threat to life,(iii)to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting authority, or(iv)to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means areinsufficient to achieve these objectives.In any event, intentional deadly use of firearms should only occur when strictlynecessary to protect life.

a smaller increase in June as numerous aerial attacks were carried out in the south andeast against suspected AGEs. The southern region recorded the largest number ofcivilian deaths (39) by aerial attacks, with the eastern region recording the secondhighest total of 22 civilian deaths. While the number of air strikes that resulted in civiliandeaths and injuries was low compared to the overall number of aerial attacks, whencasualties do occur they result in a larger number of civilian deaths than any other tacticused by PGF.On 18 June, air strikes were launched against suspected AGE hideouts in Piraiand Kohsin areas of Paktya province, close to Musa Khel district in Khost province.On hearing the air strike a family, based in Musa Khel, evacuated their house andsheltered under a tree. The air strike hit them and killed the mother and fivechildren, all under 12 years, and injured one 13 year old boy. In a statement, ISAFsaid they were reviewing the “operational details of the engagement.” In spite ofrequests to ISAF, UNAMA HR has been unable to obtain information about theoutcome of this review.In its earlier reports on protection of civilians, UNAMA HR raised numerous concernsabout civilian casualties from air strikes and aerial bombardment by PGF. COMISAFattempted to address these concerns through the July 2009 Tactical Directive, thatstipulated when and how aerial attacks should be conducted and the criteria used tobase decisions. Since then, UNAMA HR has documented a noticeable reduction in thenumber of civilian deaths and injuries from air strikes and urges COMISAF to fullyimplement the updated Tactical Directive of 4 August 2010 on restriction of air strikes.Increased transparency on investigations and accountability for any civilian casualtiescaused by air strikes would also strengthen civilian protection.UNAMA HR documented three air strikes by IM Forces against suspected AGElocations in Kunar province that resulted in 18 women and child casualties. On 11February, an air strike by IM Forces against suspected AGE locations in Korangelarea, Manogay district reportedly killed four women while they were collectingwood in the early morning. In spite of UNAMA HR’s queries to the ISAF regionalcommand, it is unclear whether ISAF investigated the incident.On 16 February, an air strike by IM Forces against suspected AGE bases in theShultan Valley, Shigal district reportedly killed a family of seven, including fivechildren, who were crossing into Afghanistan as refugees from Pakistan. Inresponse to UNAMA HR’s queries, ISAF stated that guided bombs were droppedon a group of 10 insurgents in a known infiltration route from Pakistan inaccordance with ISAF’s rules of engagement, that all 10 were killed and that therewere no civilian casualties. It is unclear whether ISAF’s statement was the result ofan investigation into the incident.Between 27 and 28 June, during a joint ANSF and IM Forces operation againstAGEs in Murwara district in Kunar province, IM Forces conducted an air strikeagainst suspected AGEs firing from the vicinity of, or in, a residential compound.The air strike reportedly killed five civilians, including three children and injured twowomen and three children. An ISAF statement released on 27 June stated “thecombined force has taken precautions to prevent collateral damage, and ISAF hasno reports of injuries to civilians.” ISAF told UNAMA HR that a lead investigatingofficer had traveled to the region but had not completed the investigation report.22

Legal Analysis:Aerial attacks are governed by general rules of internationalhumanitarian law which require parties to a conflict to, at all times, distinguishbetween the civilian population and combatants and to spare the civilianpopulation and property. Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian personsshall be the object of attack. Attacks are required to be directed solely againstmilitary objectives. In addition, parties to a conflict and members of their armedforces do not have an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. It isprohibited to use weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to causeunnecessary losses or excessive suffering.In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare thecivilian population and civilian objects. Armed forces must take all feasibleprecautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life,injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.They must also take all feasibleprecautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view toavoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury tocivilians and damage to civilian objects.Under international humanitarian law, parties must do everything feasible toassess whether any attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which wouldbe excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.Finally, the warring parties must give effective advance warning of attacks whichmay affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

Compensation for Deaths, Injuries and Property DamageSince 2008, protection actors, including the former UN High Commissioner for HumanRights Louise Arbour during her visit to Afghanistan in 2007, have called on ISAF andNATO to put in place a uniform compensation system for civilians who have sufferedpersonal and property loss during combat operations. On 26 February 2010, NATOmissions and additional missions participating in ISAF carried out a policy review of non-binding guidelines describing appropriate compensation practices. The objective was tostreamline compensation practices among ISAF troop contributing nations (TCNs),which have beenad hocand inadequate as different countries had different processesand methods of payment.On 11 June, the North Atlantic Council adopted these guidelines.18The focus of theguidelines is on TCNs’ prompt acknowledgment of civilian casualties or damage toproperty during combat. The guidelines require troops to investigate possible cases ofcivilian casualties or damage to property and provide information to the ISAF CivilianCasualty Tracking Cell;19and to proactively offer assistance for individual or communityharm, ensuring transparency and accountability in the process. The timely and effectiveimplementation of the guidelines should remain high on the agenda of both COMISAFand troop contributing countries.

Response of the Government of Afghanistan to Civilian CasualtiesCivilian casualties and the impact on civilians of military operations by PGF and AGEsremain a critical issue for Afghan civilians and the Afghan Government. President Karzaihas continuously called on IM Forces to end night raids, aerial bombardments and fortransfer of control of detention facilities to the Afghan Government. During the opening ofParliament in February 2010, President Karzai stated that NATO must do more toprevent civilian casualties, but acknowledged that progress had been made in reducingcivilian casualties, particularly those caused by aerial bombardment. In his visit to the USin May 2010, President Karzai again called for ending night raids. The final communiquéfrom the July 20 Kabul International Conference stated “.. civilian casualties andprotection of civilians are of great concern and noted that most civilian casualties arecaused by insurgent attacks. Participants regretted the death of every Afghan andinternational civilian, and Afghan and international military forces remain committed tothe objective of a steady reduction in the rate of civilian casualties.”20Both the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirgas (the lower and upper houses of the AfghanParliament) have repeatedly discussed civilian casualties, the operations of AGEs andPGF and condemned the loss of civilian life, the inability of the Government and IMforces to protect civilians and the need for thorough investigations into incidents ofcivilian casualties.The Government often undertakesad hocinvestigations into major incidents of civiliancasualties. These investigations are often instigated at the provincial level and are widelyreported in the media. Government investigations usually involve a mix of the civil andsecurity arms of the Government and serve as fact-finding missions. After aninvestigation has been completed, usually in a very short time, the investigationcommittee releases a report (often not public) outlining its findings and sends it to thePresident. It is unclear what procedures or criteria are followed during theseinvestigations and what occurs afterwards. In some incidents that UNAMA HR hasmonitored, President Karzai has given compensation to affected families through thepresidential discretionary fund. To enhance civilian protection, UNAMA HR suggests thatthe Government regularly investigate, where possible, all major incidents of civiliancasualties rather than on anad hocbasis using standard procedures. In addition, theGovernment should determine and make public the procedures and criteria forinvestigations, mandate, persons involved in these investigations, final report, ensureany investigations are carried out in a detailed and thorough manner with forensicexpertise and grant families access to the investigation report and committee for followup.

Although ISAF has taken concrete measures, through its guidance and directives, tominimize the impact of the conflict on civilians, UNAMA HR observes that greatertransparency and accountability for any civilian casualties caused would further advancecivilian protection and could lead to greater decreases in civilian deaths and injuries.UNAMA HR noted that when investigations by IM Forces have been announced andundertaken, minimal information was made available on the details of the investigationand the results. The outcome of investigations was often not made public. UNAMA HRdocumented only a few cases in which the results of investigations have been partlypublished. Victims and affected communities were often not informed whetherdisciplinary or other action had been taken against those who may have beenresponsible for civilian casualties including commanders. To improve protection ofcivilians, any investigation and accountability process should ensure that credibleinvestigations are conducted in an open and transparent manner and explanations andapologies, when appropriate, are issued where harm has occurred. Appropriate punitivemeasures should also be taken against those found guilty of a breach of domestic ormilitary law.UNAMA HR also notes that IM Forces often do not publicly report on activities of SpecialForces and other Pro-Government armed groups that result in civilian casualties.Protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas would improve if all Special Forces weresubject to greater transparency and accountability. UNAMA HR has been informed thatsome night raids have yielded useful information and prevented other attacks; howevercommunities were not informed of such results causing continuing resentment. Based onthe number of deaths and injuries that still occur during night raids, UNAMA HR remainsconcerned that possible failure to use alternative measures which show greater respectfor civilians continues to cost too many lives.A US investigation into an aerial attack on 21 February against a three–vehicleconvoy in the Sourki area of northern Charchine district in Uruzgan province thatkilled at least 21 civilians and injured 14 others revealed a number of errors andomissions by those involved. The convoy was carrying civilians displaced byprevious fighting back to their village in the Sourki area. General McChrystalapologized for the civilian casualties on 23 February and on 29 May, USFOR-Areleased the redacted findings of a US investigation into the incident. Among theinvestigation findings were that “inaccurate and unprofessional reporting of thePredator crew” meant the ground force commander was not provided with allavailable “evidence and analysis that the vehicles were not a hostile threat” andthat “[i]nformation that the convoy was anything other than an attacking force wasignored or downplayed by the Predator crew.” According to a USFOR-A pressstatement, General McChrystal issued “memoranda of reprimand” to four officersand “memoranda of admonishment” to two officers (these memoranda are forms ofnon-judicial punishment in the US military justice system). The AfghanGovernment and USFOR-A provided compensation to the victims’ relatives.USFOR-A “launched a criminal investigation into allegations that US soldiers wereresponsible for the unlawful deaths of as many as three Afghan civilians” accordingto a 20 May 2010 statement. Reportedly, the soldiers were from the 2ndinfantry ofthe 5thStryker Brigade, which had been operating in Kandahar province. Accordingto media reports, five soldiers were charged with premeditated murder includingtwo who were also charged with assault in three separate incidents.25

Accountability of ANSF and other Pro-Government Armed Groups

According to media reports, in mid-May, an Afghan military prosecutor issued a warrantfor the arrest of an American Special Forces officer accused of being in command of agroup of Afghan men, reportedly called the Kandahar Strike Force (KSF). The KSF areallegedly part of a US-trained and financed armed group. Members of this group shotand killed Kandahar’s provincial chief of police and the provincial head of the ANPCriminal Investigation Department (CID) on 29 June 2009 during a reported attempt tofree one of its members who had been detained. The provincial security authoritiesarrested 41 Afghans in Kandahar in connection with this incident. The Primary CriminalCourt in charge of cases related to the members of the police sentenced four to deathand the remaining 37 to lengthy prison sentences. According to the Director of theInvestigations Department of Prosecution a letter was sent to the Afghan Ministry ofForeign Affairs to request the prosecution of the American Special Forces officer. TheDirector of the Investigations Department of Prosecution informed UNAMA HR that todate he has not received a reply to his request from the Afghan Ministry of ForeignAffairs.Based on its documentation, UNAMA HR has found that accountability for abuses byANSF is quite rare. For example, following an RCIED detonation against a vehiclecarrying private security guards in Tirin Kot district in Uruzgan province on 13 March,which killed five and injured one, the surviving guards established a road block andsearched vehicles. At this roadblock, they killed a driver during an argument. UNAMAHR repeatedly raised the incident with the provincial chief of police but no investigationwas initiated.On 4 April, a police truck was struck by an IED, killing one officer in Tirin Kot district inUruzgan province. According to credible reports, armed men employed by a localpowerbroker, affiliated with the police, came to the suspected perpetrator’s home, killedhim, threw grenades into the home, and dragged his dead body behind a truck. Thedead man’s family was reportedly warned to leave the area. While UNAMA HR hasraised the incident with both the provincial chief of police and the implicatedpowerbroker, as of 25 May, no investigation had begun.Public accountability for civilian casualties is critical as victims and their families have theright to know why operations were conducted, why killing and injury occurred, andwhether those who killed and injured civilians have been held responsible.Demonstrations occur because Afghans are angry that military operations causedcivilian deaths and injury and seek to express their frustration about the lack ofinformation about operations including on night raids. More transparency could lead toless anger and resentment from local communities and advance civilian protection. InUNAMA HR’s conversations with elders in Logar and Wardak provinces, they said theirpriority was to end the culture of impunity for civilian deaths and injury from militaryoperations and for those who committed abuses to be held accountable.