OSCEs parlamentariske Forsamling 2009-10
OSCE Alm.del Bilag 21
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NATO Parliamentary AssemblyAssemblée parlementaire de l’OTAN
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONUkraine — Presidential Election, 17 January 2010
STATEMENT OFPRELIMINARYFINDINGS ANDCONCLUSIONSPRELIMINARYCONCLUSIONSThe first round of the 17 January presidential election in Ukraine was of high quality and showedsignificant progress over previous elections. This election met most OSCE and Council of Europecommitments. Civil and political rights were respected, including freedom of assembly, associationand expression. Election day was conducted in an efficient and orderly manner.This election saw a diverse field of candidates representing alternative political views, offering agenuine choice to the electorate. Candidates were able to campaign freely across the countrywithout impediment. The campaign period was generally calm and orderly. Unsubstantiatedallegations of large-scale electoral fraud negatively affected the pre-election atmosphere and voters’confidence. In contradiction with the law, administrative resources were misused by candidates inofficial positions. More transparent campaign financing is necessary during the pre-election period.By voting in large numbers and freely expressing their will, Ukrainians have shown the desire todecide on the course of the country. The intertwining of political and economic interests had anegative influence and undermined public confidence in the political process, posing a challenge forUkraine’s leadership.Election rules have to be set clearly and should not be a permanent subject of discussion.Regrettably, a unified election code has not yet been adopted in Ukraine. The existing election lawas amended in August 2009 was a step backward compared to previous legislation. As a result, thelegal framework remains unclear and incomplete. Last minute court decisions contributed to a lackof clarity in the procedures. However, if implemented in good faith and in a non-restrictive manner,the legislation could provide a basis for holding democratic elections.Freedom of expression significantly improved since 2004. Overall, the pluralistic mediaenvironment offered voters a variety of information about leading presidential candidates and theirplatforms. The media was subject to heavy financial pressures and economic interests. Thecoverage by the electronic media was often not determined on the basis of newsworthiness, butrather as a result of candidates paying to appear in the news or current-affairs programmes.Despite a delay in funding, the election commissions were generally efficient in meeting tightdeadlines while coping with a heavy workload. The Central Election Commission (CEC) mostlyoperated in a non-partisan and collegial manner, although in a highly polarized politicalenvironment. The CEC did not fully address the shortcomings of the law, at times leaving theDistrict Election Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs) without properguidance. Some actions of the CEC lacked the required transparency.
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In a positive development, for the first time a State Voter Register was established and the electionand state administration made considerable efforts to decrease the number of multiple registrationsof voters and to improve the overall quality of voter lists.Throughout the campaign, candidates rarely used the legal means available to them in the electorallegislation to address their complaints. The administrative courts adjudicated election-related casesin a timely and transparent manner, meeting tight deadlines and providing plaintiffs effectiveremedies. The CEC did not address complaints in a transparent manner and answered most of themwithout a formal decision, thus denying access to effective remedies.The presence of domestic observers significantly increased transparency. Non-governmentalorganizations monitored the elections despite the fact that they were not permitted by the electionlaw to register their members as observers.Women were well-represented in the leadership positions of the election administration.The election day was orderly and calm. Voting and counting was assessed as overwhelminglypositive by observers.
PRELIMINARYFINDINGSBackgroundThe political landscape in Ukraine is characterized by confrontation between the legislative andexecutive branches as well as tensions between the president and the prime minister, former“orange coalition” allies. Both the president and the prime minister have publicly blamed each otherfor causing the political and economic crisis.A lack of quorum or the opposition hindering parliamentary sessions paralyzed the work ofparliament. As a result, important laws were not adopted, including the 2010 state budget. Theconstitutionality of the date of this election set by the parliament was contested by the president.Following the ruling by the Constitutional Court, the parliament eventually established the date for17 January 2010.Election System and Legal FrameworkThe President of Ukraine is elected for a five-year term. In case no candidate wins more than 50 percent of votes cast in the first round, a second round takes place three weeks later between the twocandidates with the most votes.The Constitution and the Law on the Election of the President of Ukraine (hereinafter election law)provide for universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.1Regrettably, a unified electioncode has not yet been adopted in Ukraine. The election law, adopted in 2004, as amended in August2009 represented a step backward. The Council of Europe and OSCE/ODIHR reviewed the law andconcluded that although the amendments incorporated a number of previous recommendations,many remained unaddressed. They also noted that some amendments raised serious concern and did
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Other relevant legislation include the Law on the CEC, the Law on the State Voter Register, the Law onPolitical Parties, and some provisions of the Code of Administrative Proceedings and the Criminal Code.
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not comply with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments.2Some of the concerns includeelectoral dispute mechanisms, the possibility to make changes in the voter lists up to one hourbefore the close of the poll, the mechanism for appointing members of electoral commissions, andcampaign finance provisions.The Constitutional Court ruled several of the amended provisions unconstitutional, therebyaddressing some of the concerns raised in the joint opinion related to limitations on the right tochallenge result protocols in courts. The Court also nullified provisionsinter aliarequiring allmembers of District Election Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) tolive within their respective district or precinct and provisions that required citizens residing abroadto be listed in the consular registry in order to exercise their right to vote.In general, the election legislation included significant shortcomings. Incomplete, inconsistent andambiguous provisions frequently led to confusion. Nonetheless, if implemented in good faith and ina non-restrictive manner, the legislation could provide an adequate basis for holding democraticelections.Election AdministrationThe election administration is comprised of the Central Election Commission (CEC), 225 DECs,and 33,695 PECs. Despite the late disbursement of funds, the election commissions generallyworked efficiently and met the deadlines required by the law.The CEC operated in a non-partisan manner despite the complex political environment. Althoughthe CEC was responsible for clarifying how to apply election-related laws, most CEC clarificationssimply repeated the provisions of the law and did not further clarify the inconsistent or incompleteaspects of the law.3These shortcomings left the DECs and PECs without proper guidance.The CEC performed its work in a relatively open manner by holding regular sessions open to themedia, candidate representatives and observers. However, the CEC members also held closedmeetings at which the agenda and draft decisions were discussed so that a coordinated positioncould be reached and presented. The official sessions therefore became the forum where manydecisions were just voted upon, but not debated. These actions were not in conformity with the lawand decreased transparency.4Overall, the CEC members worked collegially but the commission became polarized as election dayapproached. This first surfaced during discussions on numbering candidates on the ballot andcontinued over the issue of homebound voting and the procedure for amending the voter lists onelection day. These controversies were further highlighted by the opposing press statements madeby the chair and other members of the CEC.Despite legal requirements, the CEC did not produce any voter education programs on the rightsand obligations of voters, voting procedures, and the complaints and appeals procedures.2
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The Council of Europe Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Joint Opinion on the Law on Amending SomeLegislative Acts on the Election of the President of Ukraine (CDL-AD (2009)040)http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2009/10/40858_en.pdf.Such issues include homebound and out of country voting, complaint procedures, making changes to the voterlists on election day and the conduct of mass media.Article 28.1 of the election law; articles 2.2, 4.1, 4.3 of the law on the CEC; articles 1.4, 10.1 and 13 of therules of procedure of the CEC. All concern the requirements that CEC sessions, deliberations and activities beconducted openly.
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The DECs and PECs were appointed based on candidate nominations with each candidate havingthe right to two representatives per commission. Based on the number of nominations, candidateshad a right to proportional representation in leadership positions (chairperson, deputy chair andsecretary). The proportionality principle at the DEC level was initially respected. However, in thecase of subsequent replacements of commissioners, the CEC decided that the proportionalityprinciple did not need to be respected. Upon a court’s request, the CEC reconsidered three suchreplacements, but did not change their initial decision.The DECs appointed the PECs by the legal deadline using different methods to allocate PECleadership positions. The CEC data indicated that four candidates were overrepresented nationwidein the PEC leadership positions.5The appointment of PECs was difficult and characterized by ahigh number of PEC members who resigned and who were moved from one PEC to another.Reasons for resignations included insufficient remuneration and perceived workload, especially forleadership positions. The process was also affected by some candidates nominating the same personto multiple PECs or both as a PEC member and observer.6Due to the late transfer of the 2009 DEC budget funds, the DECs were forced to function based oncredit and members’ own contributions.7This negatively impacted a few commissions, as they weredelayed in delivering provisional voter lists to PECs, in purchasing the PEC stamps, or in printingand publicizing their documents.8Some DEC chairs expressed discontent with the level ofoperational support and cooperation from the local administration.9Despite difficulties, the DECs were generally efficient in meeting deadlines within a tighttimeframe while coping with a heavy workload. The candidates did not always take into accountknowledge and experience during the nomination of lower level commissioners, specifically toleadership positions. This combined with the large number of members and the fact thatcommissions were not regulated by uniform rules of procedures at times led to chaotic sessions.Some PECs were not fully operational by the deadline, due to a lack of quorum or a resignation ofthe chairperson.10Others were hampered by poor working conditions.11This was of concern, asthese PECs were late in providing public access to the provisional voter lists.The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine together with the CEC trained DEC and PECmembers.12In addition some candidates organized trainings for their own PEC members.
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For 222 out of 225 DECs, as of 16 January; Mr. Yanukovych was over-represented by 13 per cent, Ms.Tymoshenko by 12 per cent, Mr. Yatsenyuk by 9 per cent and Mr. Yushchenko by 5 per cent. With similarnumber of nominations, Ms. Suprun was under-represented by 9 per centAs observed in DECs 4, 37, 39, 69 and 158. In DEC 95 and 169 the same person was nominated by differentcandidates.For example, DECs 24 to 29, 36, 38, 39, 146, 147, 152, 172, 175 and 176.For instance problems delivering preliminary voter lists at DEC 96, 149, 150, 160, purchasing PEC stamps atDEC 9, 91, 163 and 164 and document production at DEC 4.DECs 1, 4, 29, 57, 59, 91, 149, 180, 206 and 225.Lack of quorum affected 44 PECs of 176 in DEC 125; 10 PECs of 83 in DEC 176; 4 PECs of 78 in DEC 106.No chairperson in function at 13 PECs of 229 in DEC 86.A lack of heating or electricity affected PECs in DECs 4, 120, 197 and 210.Approximately 2,600 DEC and 80,000 PEC chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and secretaries were trained and5,000 DEC and 100,000 PEC official manuals were distributed.
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Voter RegistrationPreviously, voter lists were created anew for every election. For the first time a State Voter Register(SVR) was established and voter lists were extracted from the SVR. The SVR was compiled on thebasis of voter lists used in the 2006 and 2007 elections. In September 2009, initial verification tookplace and voters were sent a personal notification with a request to report back on any inaccuracies.The SVR contains 36,302,473 voters.13Since the SVR was created, over eight million inclusions,exclusions and corrections were made, of which one million directly addressed citizens’ requests. Atotal of 651,975 duplicates have been removed, while 103,254 entries remain unresolved. From 27December, the preliminary voter lists were made accessible for public scrutiny.14The final voterlists were delivered to the PECs by 14 January as required by law.The procedures to add voters on the voter lists on election day and the documents required to applyfor homebound voting created controversy. The Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals (KACA)decision clarified these two issues in conformity with the law and the High Administrative Court ofAppeals (HAC) confirmed the decisions. On the eve of the election, the KACA reversed their initialdecisions. They reintroduced the requirement that only voters with a medical certificate could belisted as homebound. They also upheld the decision of one DEC that instructed PECs not to makechanges to the voter lists on election day but to refer these citizens to the court. Both decisionscannot be appealed.15On election day, the CEC communicated to the PECs that its decisions wouldgovern the process on election day, because new court decisions were not in conformity with theelection law.Candidate RegistrationCandidate registration was inclusive and resulted in a diverse field of candidates representingalternative political views and offering a genuine choice to voters. In order to be registered eachpresidential candidate had to submit a comprehensive list of documents and forms to the CEC,along with a financial deposit of 2.5 million UAH (approximately 208,000 EUR).16The CECregistered 18 candidates who were nominated by parties, electoral blocs and through self-nomination (independent).17The CEC rejected 40 applications based on various grounds. Eighteennominees challenged their denial of registration. The appeals were rejected by the KACA.Campaign EnvironmentThe campaign was low-key and took place in a generally calm environment. It was visible acrossthe country with billboards and posters, public rallies, leafleting, concerts, campaign tents and door-1314
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Data as of 10 January.One or two day delays delivering the preliminary voter lists to PECs occurred in DECs 37, 102, 151 and 160due to logistical or financial problems.According to Article 177.4 of the administrative procedure code, decisions taken between midnight and 6 amon election day cannot be appealed.The deposit will only be refunded to the two candidates who qualify for the second round of voting.The CEC registered: Inna Bohoslovska, independent; Mykhailo Brodskyi, independent; Anatoliy Hrytsenko,independent; Yuriy Kostenko, Ukraine People’s Party; Volodymyr Lytvyn, People’s Party; OleksandrMoroz, Socialist Party of Ukraine; Oleksandr Pabat, independent; Vasyl Protyvsikh, independent; SerhiyRatushniak, independent; Oleh Riabokon, independent; Lyudmila Suprun, People’s Democratic Party; PetroSymonenko, Bloc of Leftist Parties; Oleh Tiahnybok, All-Ukrainian Union - Freedom; Serhiy Tihipko,independent; Yulia Tymoshenko, All-Ukrainian Union - Motherland; Viktor Yanukovych, Party of Regions;Arseniy Yatsenyuk, independent; Viktor Yushchenko, independent.
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to-door canvassing. All presidential candidates were able to campaign freely and withoutimpediment. Levels and types of campaign activities of candidates differed considerably.Unsubstantiated allegations of large-scale electoral fraud negatively affected the pre-electionatmosphere and voters’ confidence.The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) noted that some presidential candidatesabused their official positions and misused administrative resources for campaign purposes, whichcontradicts the election law. This offered them an undue advantage over their opponents. Both Ms.Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko were warned by the CEC for campaigning during officialworking visits.18In a clear case of violation of the campaign regulations, the governmental Pension Fund of Ukrainesent official letters to all pensioners, explaining that the law sponsored by the opposition Party ofRegions would not raise pensions to the extent they claimed. The letter then explained that thecurrent government was able to preserve the increase even during the economic crisis and promisesfurther increases in 2010. There was also a letter sent to depositors of Rodovid Bank, recentlynationalized, which contained campaigning on behalf of Ms. Tymoshenko. This blurs thedistinction between state and political party that is prescribed by paragraph 5.4 of OSCECopenhagen Document.The cabinet of ministers, under the direction of the prime minister, ordered that the PECs whoaccept homebound voting applications without a medical certificate19would not be paid andthreatened them with criminal liability. She has also ordered the Ministry of Interior to verify allapplications concerning homebound voting. This directly involved the government in the electionprocess which is against the law. On the eve of election day these actions were declared illegal.Other isolated incidents occurred, including arson and burglary of campaign premises, destructionof billboards or dissemination of anonymous inflammatory campaign material.20A few incidentsresulted in complaints or criminal investigations. Candidate Mr. Ratushniak frequently usednationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric in his election campaign.21Participation of WomenThe Constitution provides for equality between women and men in public and political life. Inaddition, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men specifically provides for equal rightsand opportunities in the election process. There were three women among the 18 registeredpresidential candidates, including the incumbent prime minister. Within the CEC, 4 out of 15members are women, including one of the two deputy chairpersons and the secretary. Womenchaired 98 of the 225 DECs (43.6 per cent) and two thirds of the polling stations visited.
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Ms. Tymoshenko’s warning was cancelled by the court, however the court did not address the substance of theCEC decision and the warning was cancelled on technical grounds. The KACA cancelled the warning againstMr.Yushchenko on the grounds that he was not personally informed of the session at which the warning wasissued and that the CEC produced no evidence of which administrative resources the president allegedly usedfor campaigning.It is not required by the law.Cases of arson targeting local Yanukovych campaign premises have been reported in Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk and Poltava. A burglary of a Tymoshenko campaign office took place in Dnipropetrovsk. TheOSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs reported on alleged inflammatory campaign material from Chernihiv,Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytsky, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Odesa and Poltava.For instance the distribution of materials against candidate Mr. Yatsenyuk.
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Participation of MinoritiesThe majority of citizens are ethnic Ukrainians (77.8 per cent), while Russians form the mostsizeable minority (17.3 per cent). The remaining five per cent of the population are Belarusians,Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, Jews and Roma.22Ukraineratified the Council of Europe “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”(1998) as well as the “European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” (2006). Official voterinformation and election material was available only in Ukrainian.23Some candidates, however,produced campaign materials in minority languages in a direct attempt to reach out to thesecommunities.The MediaMedia coverage of the election campaign is mainly regulated by the election law that providescandidates with direct access to media through paid and free air time. Only a few articles refer tothe editorial coverage of the campaign, not providing journalists with rules requiring fair, balancedand impartial coverage in news and current affairs programs on television.24The election lawprohibits only state and municipal media from showing preference to any candidates. Some aspectsof the law remain unclear and there is no requirement for relevant guidelines to be issued. Thisallowed candidates to interpret the law to their benefit.Freedom of expression significantly improved since 2004. Overall, the pluralistic mediaenvironment offered voters a variety of information about leading presidential candidates and theirplatforms. The media was subject to heavy financial pressures and economic interests. Most privatemedia broadcasters, however, showed editorial bias reflecting political views of their ownership.The coverage by the electronic media was often not determined on the basis of newsworthiness, butrather as a result of candidates paying to appear in the news or current-affairs programmes.25Journalists informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers that as a result of this they were not alwaysable to work according to the highest professional standards.Media monitoring results of campaign coverage within newscasts have revealed differentapproaches in how TV stations determined when a candidate was acting in an official capacity or asa candidate. This had a significant impact on the total amount of air time devoted to campaigncoverage in newscasts for candidates with official positions on different TV channels.26All five nationwide TV stations monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM clearly favoured variousmain candidates in their newscasts. This can be seen both in terms of the amount of airtime devotedto covering their campaign and the tone of coverage.27The state-owned TV stationUT1,that haslow viewership, provided free air time and debates to all presidential candidates, as required by22
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2001 census; Information of the State Committee of Statistics of Ukrainehttp://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality.See General Comment No. 25 adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee (1996) on para. 25 of the UNInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “Information and materials about voting should beavailable in minority languages.”As stipulated by the Council of Europe’s Recommendation no. R (99) 15 on Measures Concerning MediaCoverage of Election Campaigns.Editors in chief reported this practice as widespread which applies to other formats such as current affairsprograms and political debates as well.Article 58.3 states that official notices during the election process (which are not of a campaign nature) aboutthe activities of candidates carrying out their official duties shall not be considered part of the pre-electioncampaign. The law does not define “campaign nature”.The monitored TV stations areChannel5,ICTV, Inter, Ukraina TVandUT1.
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law.28This channel also broadcast ample information about the candidates through political talk-shows. However, its news coverage was biased in favour of the incumbent prime minister andpresident.29Presidential debates would have enhanced a voters’ ability to compare platforms.WhileChannel 5displayed a bias in favour of Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko,30otherprivate TV stationsUkraina TV, ICTV and Interfavoured Mr. Yanukovych in tone and timedevoted to his campaign coverage.31Out of 18 candidates, 11 received less than 1 per cent coveragein newscasts on the monitored TV stations. Regional media monitoring results also showed a biasfor particular candidates.32The National Broadcasting Council (NBC), the supervisory body vested with the resources andmandate to oversee the electronic media, is not empowered to provide effective remedies or imposesanctions when media-related violations occur during the electoral period. The CEC, the bodyresolving issues related to media issues, instead of considering media-related complaints as requiredby the law, referred them to the courts. Furthermore, the NBC which monitors the broadcast mediadoes not report to the CEC on a regular basis, which would enable the CEC to act when the NBCrecords a violation, regardless of whether the CEC has received any complaints.Complaints and AppealsThe majority of the decisions on election-related complaints were made by the administrativecourts. They adjudicated cases in a timely, efficient and transparent manner. Courts were able toadhere to the two-day timeframe for deciding cases even facing a lack of resources and the holidayperiod. Most of these complaints were challenges to CEC decisions on procedural or administrativematters. Very few dealt with alleged campaign violations by the candidates. The KACA and HACwere transparent and provided access to all required documents.The CEC made formal decisions only on a small number of the complaints filed. They did not dealwith the substance of most complaints, rejecting them either because the complainant did notcomply with the technical requirements in filing them or because they were submitted late.The CEC’s strict interpretation of the requirements for filing complaints was problematic and led tomany complainants not being heard. In general, the CEC did not address complaints in a transparentmanner and answered most of them without a formal decision, thus denying access to effective
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The election law does not set limitations on the amount of paid political advertising; it is only constrained bythe candidate’s financial resources. During the monitored period from 4 December – 15 January, 10 of 18candidates purchased air time for political advertising on monitored TV stations with nation-wide coverage.The state-ownedUT1devoted30 per cent of the total campaign coverage in newscasts to Ms. Tymoshenko and28 per cent to Mr. Yushchenko respectively. Mr. Yanukovich received 8 per cent of the campaign coverage innewscasts onUT1.These figures exclude coverage of a candidate’s institutional role.Channel 5devoted 25 per cent to Ms. Tymoshenko and 25 per cent to Mr. Yushchenko respectively, while Mr.Yanukovych received 12 per cent of the total air time devoted to campaign coverage within newscasts.OnUkraina TV37 per cent of the campaign coverage was devoted to Mr. Yanukovych, whileICTVdevoted35 per cent to this candidate.Interfavoured Mr. Yanukovych to a lesser extent with 29 per cent of campaigncoverage devoted. Other candidates received less than 21 per cent of the campaign coverage on the mentionedTV stations. These figures exclude coverage of a candidate’s institutional role.The monitored state and privately owned regional TV stations are DonetskODTRKand Channel 27 inDonetsk, OdesaODTRK,LvivODTRKandUT3Zakhid in Lviv, andDTRKKrym andTRKChernomorskayain Crimea.
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remedies.33There also appeared to be a practice by the CEC and some DECs to place administrativehurdles in the way of complaints being heard.34Domestic and International ObserversThe presence of domestic observers significantly increased transparency. Candidates were active innominating observers to follow the electoral process. In addition, non-governmental organizationsmonitored the election despite the fact that the law does not allow them to register as observers,contrary to paragraph 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document. As in past presidential elections, suchobservers applied for accreditation as journalists, who have fewer rights to access the electoralprocess than observers. They for example cannot obtain copies of result protocols. Domesticobservers stated that they were unhindered in their work.Election DayElection day was calm and voting was conducted in an orderly and transparent manner. IEOMobservers assessed the voting process as good or very good in 97 per cent of polling stations visited.The CEC reported voter turnout at some 67 per cent based on preliminary data.Most polling stations opened on time or with minor delays due to protracted opening procedures.35Significant delays of four or five hours were noted in Sumy oblast where polling stations waited fora new supply of ballots following the unauthorized use of “withdrawn” stamps, as well as a lack ofquorum in some polling stations in Kyiv oblast.36A last minute court decision rejected by the CEC led to different procedures being applied forvoters who were not in the voter lists. In most cases, the PECs referred such voters to the court, theDECs or the Register Maintenance Bodies for inclusion into the voter list. In contrast, the IEOMreceived significantly fewer reports of PECs which decided to include such voters on the list basedon their own decision, as instructed by the CEC.The secrecy of the vote was largely respected, though group voting was observed in 4 per cent ofthe polling stations visited. IEOM observers noted three cases of voters taking a photo of theirballot inside the voting booth, which could potentially indicate a vote buying scheme.37Circumstances in and around polling stations were rated very positively.IEOM observers noted a number of crowded polling stations (7 per cent), mainly due to smallpremises and the presence of a large number of PEC members and domestic observers. Thetransparency of the process was assessed as good or very good in 96 per cent of the cases. Civilsociety representatives were present in 18 per cent of the polling stations observed, while observersrepresenting candidates were present in nearly all polling stations visited (98 per cent).The counting process was assessed as good or very good in 95 per cent of reports, without regionalvariations. Although some procedural errors were observed during the count, these did not appear to
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See Paragraph 5.10 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document “everyone will have an effective means of redressagainst administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal integrity.”For example delaying the publication of decisions, the provision of documents necessary for filing complaints,and delaying the response to the complainant until the last day of the deadline.IEOM observers noted 20 delays in opening and 4 early openings out of 203 polling stations visited.IEOM reports from DEC 91. According to press reports, 22 polling stations in DEC 91 opened after 12:00 hrs.Kyiv DEC 221# PEC #24 and DEC 217 PEC # 16 and Dnipropetrovsk DEC 36 PEC #13.
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have an impact on the process. Contrary to the law, the results protocols were not displayed in about10 per cent of polling stations visited.Reconciliation and tabulation procedures at DECs were rated positively in 98 per cent of reports.However, in 48 DECs observers were not given access to the room where preliminary results wereentered into a computer for transmission to the CEC. Transparency was noted as a problem in everysixth DEC. The reconciliation of PEC protocols was generally correct and only resulted in a fewrecounts.This statement is also available in Ukrainian.However, the English version remains the only official document.MISSIONINFORMATION& ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSKyiv, 18 January 2010 –Theassessment was made to determine whether the election complied with the OSCE andCouncil of Europe commitments for democratic elections, as well as with Ukrainian legislation. This statement ofpreliminary findings and conclusions is delivered prior to the completion of the election process. The final assessmentof the election will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including thetabulation and announcement of results and the handling of possible post-election day complaints or appeals. TheOSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendations for potential improvements, someeight weeks after the completion of the election process. The delegation of the PACE will present its report at the nextplenary session of the Assembly in Strasbourg from 25-29 January.The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Kyiv on 24 November 2009 with 16 experts in the capitaland 60 long-term observers deployed throughout Ukraine. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) conducted apre-election visit on 1-4 November, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) conducted a pre-election visit on 24-27 November 2009. On election day, over 800 short-term observers were deployed in anInternational Election Observation Mission (IEOM), including a 117-member delegation from the OSCE PA, a 45-member delegation from the PACE, a 30-member delegation from the EP and a 10-member delegation from the NATOPA. In total, there were observers from 47 OSCE participating States. The IEOM observed voting in over 2,100 pollingstations out of a total of 33,695, counting in 134 polling stations and tabulation in 157 DECs.Mr. Joao Soares (Portugal), President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Head of the OSCE PA delegation, wasappointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Coordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission.Mr. Mátyás Eorsi (Hungary) headed the delegation of the PACE, Mr. Pawel Kowal (Poland) headed the EP delegation,and Mr. Assen Agov (Bulgaria) headed the delegation of the NATO PA. Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) isthe Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.The IEOM wishes to thank the authorities of Ukraine for the invitations to observe the elections, the Central ElectionCommission for its co-operation and for providing accreditation documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs andother authorities for their assistance and co-operation. The IEOM also wishes to express appreciation to the OSCEProject Co-ordinator in Ukraine and other international institutions for their co-operation and support.For further information, please contact:Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, in Kyiv;Mr. Jens Eschenbächer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson (+48-603-683 122); orMs. Lusine Badalyan, OSCE/ODIHR Election Adviser, in Warsaw (+48-22-520 0600);Klas Bergman, Director of Communications, OSCE PA, +380958703700 or +4560108380,[email protected];Angus Macdonald, Press Officer, PACE, +380938581019 or +33 630496820,[email protected];Ruxandra Popa, Director of the Committee of Civil Dimension of Security, NATO PA, +32 473931961,[email protected]
OSCE/ODIHR EOM Address:Bogdana Khmelnitskogo 52 aKyiv, UkraineTel: + 38 (0) 44 2071040; Fax: + 38 (0) 44 2071045Email: [email protected]