Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalget 2009-10
MPU Alm.del Bilag 501
Offentligt
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Globe International Commission on Land Use Change and Ecosystems
Draft Report of the GLOBE European Fisheries Policy Workshop
Tuesday 23rdMarch 2010European Parliament, Brussels
Report compiled by Alex Rogers, Simon Harding and Elizabeth Clark
1.
Executive SummaryI. Poor management has led to the overexploitation of many European marine fisheries with 88%of stocks fished above their Maximum Sustainable Yield. Overfishing not only affects individualstocks but also the overall health and resilience of marine ecosystems. Although the potentialbenefits of appropriate fisheries management are huge, a range of factors including short-termpolitical pressure and a lack of policy coherence have prevented these benefits from beingrealised.
II. A meeting was held at the European Parliament in Brussels on 23 March 2010 betweenEuropean legislators, DG MARE representatives and expert advisors to comment on and furtherdevelop recommendations for improved fisheries management proposed by the GLOBE MarineTechnical Advisory Group (MTAG) and the UK fishing community. Discussions focused on theforthcoming reform of the European Community‟s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).III. Improving the role of science in decision-making was regarded to be a crucial issue for CFPreform. Scientific recommendations for catch limits must be respected, with precautionary limitstaken where data is lacking. Meeting participants agreed on the need to increase financialsupport for fisheries research and to address the distrust and lack of communication betweenindustry, scientists and managers.IV. Lack of coherence between environmental and fisheries policy frameworks was considered afailing of European policy. European fisheries policy is currently not subject to the MarineStrategy Directive, under which Marine Protected Areas are implemented. Policy integration isvital for the success of both fisheries and marine environment policy.V. The benefits and drawbacks of various rights-based management systems were discussed, withparticular emphasis on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and community-based rights.Because of the diversity of European fisheries, these systems should be implemented with clearpolicy objectives based on local and regional contexts. It was agreed that regionalizedmanagement should be a policy priority for CFP reform.VI. With general agreement that capacity reduction should occur where overcapacity threatensecological or economic sustainability, discussions in this area focused on ways to mitigate theshort-term impacts of such reductions.VII. There was general agreement that public financial support should be directed at programmesthat increase overall sustainability and removed from those that encourage unsustainable fishingpractises and promote overfishing. Financial incentives for the adoption of sustainable fishingpractices were proposed.VIII. Developing a culture of compliance in EU waters, for fisheries importing to the EU, and on thehigh seas was discussed. In EU fisheries, incentives were regarded as critical to achievingcompliance. Global cooperation and building capacity in developing countries is needed toeffectively combat IUU fishing, an important part of implementing the EU IUU Regulation aimedat eliminating illegally-caught EU fish imports. Compliance in Regional Fisheries ManagementOrganisations (RFMOs) was discussed, with meeting participants supporting the MTAGproposal to mandate the United Nations (UN) to review RFMO performance and useinternational law to hold non-compliant countries accountable.IX. Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) were debated by legislators, experts andrepresentatives from the European Commission with particular regard to their governance andsustainability in third party waters. Issues surrounding financing and licensing of FPAs werediscussed, with general support for increasing ship-owner contribution to access payments andstrengthening coherence with development policy, but with some disagreement over theCommission‟s role in licensing. Meeting participants strongly agreed that FPA reform must besteered by clear policy objectives.X. As within the EU, the role of science in RFMO decision-making was considered by all to be akey area for reform, with a focus on scientific recommendations for catch limits. Importantchanges to high seas fisheries legislation will be made in 2010, and meeting participantsdiscussed the role of the EU in the development and implementation of these changes.
rd
2.
Introduction
BackgroundMarine ecosystems are extremely important in terms of global food security and provide criticalecosystem services for humankind. The oceans regulate the Earth‟s temperature, provide nearly halfthe oxygen in the atmosphere and play a critical role in the major planetary nutrient cycles. However,the oceans are in crisis. Overfishing, driven by poor systems of ocean and coastal governance, open-access to fisheries and inappropriate subsidies, poses a significant threat to fish populations and canjeopardise food security. Destructive fishing methods damage the habitats that many fish dependupon for reproduction and survival. Coastal pollution, mainly arising from the use of agrochemicalsand poor waste management, is causing extensive habitat degradation through eutrophication andharmful algal blooms leading to the spread of dead zones and contributing to the loss of coral reefs,one of the most species diverse ecosystems on Earth. The overriding threat of climate change ischanging patterns of productivity in the oceans, altering the timing of natural marine cycles andcausing coral bleaching and ocean acidification which will have knock-on effects on marine resourcesupply and fisheries.Many of the management problems faced by the oceans today can be resolved but they requireharnessing the intellectual, political and economic resources of the international community to developa comprehensive plan of action and to successfully implement it. The level of threat and both thecurrent and predicted costs to humankind demand a response on a scale not previously considered bygovernments. The GLOBE International Commission on Land Use Change and Ecosystems(ICLUCE), a unique forum bringing together legislators from the G20 and major fishing nations, plusleading international scientists and economists, is an ideal mechanism to deliver such a plan.The Commission aims to develop a specific political narrative that is consistent with the latesteconomic and scientific understanding which can be shaped into a set of politically-tested policymeasures for international leaders to implement. It provides a platform for constructive dialoguebetween scientists, economists and legislators in order to develop policy frameworks that strive toprevent the continued destruction of the world‟s critical ecosystems. The Zoological Society of London(ZSL) is working closely with the GLOBE International Secretariat to produce robust and practicalpolicy briefing papers on critical global conservation issues for both marine and terrestrial ecosystems.The Commission is currently addressing the major issues facing the oceans and developingrecommendations to legislators that will operate synergistically to tackle and help resolve these issuesGLOBE‟s work on the marine environment began in June 2009 at the GLOBE Legislators Forum inRome. In July 2009, when the ICLUCE met at the UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi, ZSL drafted a policybriefing paper on marine fisheries that was presented to Globe legislators in both written and oralformat as a series of presentations by scientific experts. Since this meeting, the Commission‟s marinescientific advisors from ZSL have focussed on the topic of marine fisheries and revised the draft policypaper that outlines a series of key policy recommendations for specific topics contained within sixbroad subject areas. The fisheries policy paper currently contains preliminary recommendations forfisheries regulations, Illegal, Unregulated and Unrestricted (IUU) fishing, rights-based fisheriesmanagement, overcapacity and subsidies, bycatch and discards, and the role of MPAs as a fisheriesmanagement tool (Annex 1).A Series of Fisheries Policy WorkshopsThe crucial next step is to determine practical and effective ways to implement policyrecommendations as working legislation or recognised codes of practise at a range of levels(international, national, regional and local). It is for this reason that GLOBE and ZSL set up a MarineTechnical Advisory Group (MTAG) in August 2009 to provide expertise on marine fisheries to theGLOBE ICLUCE.The GLOBE MTAG met for a one day workshop on 29recommendations within four key areas:th
October 2009 to develop preliminary
Fisheries Regulation and Management I: Overcapacity and SubsidiesFisheries Regulation and Management II: High Seas and RFMO ReformFisheries Regulation and Management III: IUU Fishing and TraceabilityMarine Protected Areas – Implementation of a Global Network (with a focus on High SeasMPAs)
A draft set of implementation recommendations were formulated for each subject during thediscussions on the day that were finalized shortly afterwards and sent to GLOBE Internationallegislators and civil servants as a Summary of Recommendations in November 2009 (Annex 2). A full1report of the meeting was finalized in January 2010.On 2 March 2010, GLOBE held a UK-based workshop in collaboration with the All PartyParliamentary Fisheries Group to comment on and further develop the ZSL/MTAG recommendations.Legislators and key representatives from the UK fishing and processing sectors, governmentalfisheries managers, non-governmental organizations and expert scientific advisors developed policyrecommendations within three key areas:Overcapacity, Rights-based Management and SubsidiesIUU, Traceability and ComplianceMarine Protected Areas and Marine Spatial Planningnd
A fourth topic of Global Fisheries Management with particular reference to Regional FisheriesManagement Organizations was also briefly discussed. Stakeholder contributions throughpresentations and discussion were used to formulate a set of policy recommendations which were1finalised by participants shortly after the meeting and are summarized in Annex 3. This report alongwith ZSL and MTAG recommendations formed the basis for the EU Fisheries Policy Workshop.A Marine Ecosystems Recovery StrategyOn June 8 2010 GLOBE legislators will be launching the first part of aMarine Ecosystems RecoveryStrategyonto the international political agenda through a plenary meeting of GLOBE‟s InternationalCommission on Land Use Change and Ecosystems (ICLUCE) to be held in London. By collectivelyincreasing the knowledge of a leading group of legislators and facilitating an informed discussionwithin the world‟s key legislatures, GLOBE aims to catalyse a step-change in the way politicianslegislate for the marine environment. Part one of theMarine Ecosystems Recovery Strategywill bedeveloped through contributions from the ZSL policy paper, the Marine Technical Advisory Group, theUK Fisheries Policy Workshop, the EU Fisheries Policy Workshop and a similar meeting held byGLOBE in Japan.The EU Fisheries Policy WorkshopOn 23 March 2010, GLOBE EU and GLOBE Europe hosted a workshop in the European Parliamentto comment on and further develop the ZSL/MTAG and UK Workshop recommendations with aspecific focus on reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The workshop provided anopportunity for discussion between a panel of experts and European legislators consisting of MEPs,members of the European Parliament‟s fisheries committee and from Europe‟s main fleet nations. Theprimary aim of the meeting was to reach consensus on the following key principles for CFP reform:Panel 1: Addressing Fleet OvercapacityPanel 2: Developing a Culture of CompliancePanel 3: The External Dimensionrdth
Subjects which addressed the CFP Green Paper topic “Focusing the Decision-making Framework”were discussed by Panel 1. Contributions from experts, European legislators and representatives fromthe European Commission were summarized in this report shortly following the meeting. Subjectheadings are based on Sections 4 and 5 of the CFP Green Paper.1
Full reports of all GLOBE fisheries workshops available upon request from Elizabeth Clark([email protected]) and Beth Gardiner-Smith ([email protected])
3.3.1
European Fisheries Policy DevelopmentThe Need for Reform
European legislators and expert advisors discussed the main shortcomings of European fisheriesmanagement and envisioned the potential beneficial outcomes of successful reform. Although thediscussions in this workshop are focused on CFP reform, most of these principles also apply tofisheries management around the world, with similar needs for reform in the Exclusive EconomicZones (EEZs) of many other countries and on the high seas.Europe‟s fisheries management has on the whole been poor since the start of the CFP in 1983, with88% of fish stocks currently fished beyond their Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), compared with a2global average of 25%.The CFP and its implementation have not succeeded in achievingeconomically or ecologically sustainable fisheries.European legislators and expert advisorshighlighted the following reasons for failure at the meeting:In Europe, fisheries and agriculture are dealt with under the Agriculture and Fisheries Title ofthe TFEU so that fisheries are subject to the same regime as that established for theagricultural sector. While fisheries policy takes account of many environmental concerns, itmay be determined without due regard to clear scientific advice. A precautionary ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management has not been widely adopted and many of thesomedamaging impacts of fishing (such as by-catch and discards, food web impacts and habitatdestruction) have not been adequately addressed.Intergovernmental fisheries management exemplifies the “tragedy of the commons” as nationscompete for larger shares (quotas) of a shrinking pie (TACs) at the political level.Decision-making mechanisms for fisheries management are properly constituted but haveoften been unintentionally weakened by the good governance strategy of stakeholderparticipation which has given too great a voice to industrial interests. Government bodiesresponsible for making management decisions are pressured by fishing industry lobbyists, andoften prioritize short term socioeconomic gains over long term economic and ecological3sustainability. Scientific advice is, in many cases, ignored or only partly accepted.The EU still provides subsidies that increase fleet catching power. These subsidies contributeto fleet overcapacity and overfishing, undermining sustainable fisheries management4objectives.
Legislators also highlighted the role of aquaculture in fish production, warning that it will not be afeasible substitute for marine capture fisheries, mainly because of its environmental impacts and highreliance on wild caught fish as feed. Depletion of marine fish populations that make up the highertrophic levels in an ecosystem can have serious ecological and environmental consequences. Oneexample is the increased size and frequency of algal blooms in the Baltic Sea, mainly caused byoverfishing of cod and the subsequent effects of this on lower trophic levels. Healthy fish stocks are akey component of healthy marine ecosystems.The potential benefits of ecosystem-based sustainable management of marine fisheries resources arehuge. Greater food security for consumers, higher and more stable incomes for fishers, and healthiermarine ecosystems are all realistic outcomes if fisheries are well managed. Achieving these potentialbenefits requires drastic and enduring reform of current management practices.2
European Commission,Fishing Opportunities for 2009: Policy Statement from the European Commission,COM(2008) 331final (Brussels, 30.5.2008).3Daw & Gray, 2005.Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a study of failure in the European Union’sCommon Fisheries Policy.Marine Policy. 29: 189-1974Cappell, R., T. Huntington and G. Macfadyen (2010). „FIFG2000-2006 Shadow Evaluation’.Report to the Pew EnvironmentGroup.
Expert advisors contended that Europe faces a serious marine fisheries crisis that requires radicalsolutions. Minor, incremental reform will not be sufficient to achieve truly sustainable and profitablefisheries. It is time for decision-makers to break away from short-term political pressures and invest inthe future through long-term measures.
3.2
Focusing the Decision-making Framework
Decentralized management and co-managementA common theme reiterated throughout the workshop was the complexity of European fisheries andthe need to develop a management structure that can tailor management decisions to local or regionalsituations. For many of the issues concerning fishing in EU waters, legislators agreed thatregionalized management should be a policy priority for CFP reform.The issue of industry co-management was also briefly discussed, with general agreement thatincreasing stakeholder involvement in management would have a number of benefits includingincreased compliance. However, experts highlighted the need for checks on industry responsibility toensure that long term sustainability goals are met both for both target and by-catch species and alsofor the marine environment.The knowledge base for fisheries policyThe European Council regularly ignores scientific recommendations on catch limits, setting Total5Allowable Catches (TACs) significantly higher than recommended limits . Both legislators and expertadvisors agreed that scientific recommendations, including adjustments for uncertainty, should beconsidered the maximum possible catch limit to be adopted by the Council. The CFP includes acommitment to the precautionary principle and ecosystem-based management. Furthermore, theEuropean Union have ratified the UNCLOS and UNFSA with provisions for ecosystem-basedmanagement. These commitments make it unacceptable for the Council to adopt catch limits abovescientific recommendations. It was also agreed that greater transparency in the TAC decision-makingprocess was necessary. There should be no mechanisms available for decision makers to collectivelyexceed the scientific recommendations on TACs during quota negotiationsLegislators agreed on the need to increase financial support for fisheries research that forms the basisof scientific recommendations. Scientific uncertainty and lack of data for many commercially fishedspecies is still a serious problem in need of attention. Legislators proposed the creation of a central,non-governmental research institute to collect fisheries data from around Europe. Expert advisorsreiterated the need to apply the Precautionary Principle, as laid out in the proposed CFP reform, tofished stocks where assessment data were lacking (e.g. deep-sea fisheries and many inshorespecies). Given that only 17 out of a total of 96 fished stocks within Europe are subject to6management or recovery plans there is a clear requirement for increased investment in research forthose fisheries where management is lacking or undertaken with a high degree of uncertainty. Asimilar situation of poor availability of data exists with respect to assessment of the environmentalimpacts of fishing activities by EU vessels both within and outside of EU waters. Furthermore,increased economic analysis of fisheries should be supported to improve economic performancewithin the fishing industry. Legislators supported the MTAG recommendation to perform economic“stress tests” on severely depleted fisheries that have been closed to allow stock recovery in order toensure optimum economic performance upon the reopening of the fishery.Both legislators and expert advisors expressed concern over the distrust and lack of communicationbetween industry, scientists and managers. There was general consensus that increasing5
Daw & Gray, 2005.Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a study of failure in the European Union’sCommon Fisheries Policy.Marine Policy. 29: 189-1976MRAG, 2009.A vision for European fisheries – 2012 reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy.WWF, Brussels.
communication between the three groups and facilitating collaboration in fisheries research should bea policy priority.Integrating the CFP into the broader maritime policy contextLegislators considered the separation of fisheries and environmental policy frameworks to be a majorfailing of European policy. The European Union is committed to an integrated marine programmethrough the European Marine Strategy Directive, and under present EU law Marine Protected Areas(MPAs) are to be established and administered by Member States under this Directive. However, EUfisheries policy is not subject to the Directive and there is currently no wording in the CFP requiringthat fisheries policy comply with the Integrated Maritime Policy. Expert advisors suggested success isdependent upon integration of fisheries and environmental (including MPAs) law and policy.
3.3
Addressing Fleet Overcapacity
Developing rights-based managementIt is critical that rights-based fisheries management is steered by clear policy objectives. Legislatorsexpressed optimism regarding the potential of rights-based management schemes such as IndividualTransferable Quotas (ITQs), but also concern for the risk of economic consolidation and loss of fishingcommunities under some ITQ systems (e.g. Iceland). Expert advisors agreed that the diversity offisheries across Europe will require a range of rights-based management systems (including ITQs andcommunity-based schemes) driven by clear policy objectives. These objectives may be, for example,the maintenance of sustainable small-scale fishing communities, economic efficiency, or capacityreduction.Addressing the impacts of fleet capacity reductionThere was general agreement that capacity reduction should occur where overcapacity poses a threatto ecological or economic sustainability. Discussions on capacity reduction focused on the need tomitigate negative social impacts of any reductions, making it important to work in conjunction withother agencies providing regional and rural development funding rather than trying to rectify theadverse effects of capacity reduction solely through fisheries policy. GLOBE MTAG members outlinedtheir „Cap and Restore‟ proposal for severely depleted fisheries, which includes measures both toassist fishers wishing to leave the industry and to employ fishers in scientific stock assessment orenforcement roles during fishing moratoria. Both expert advisors and legislators agreed upon theimportance of mitigating the social impacts of capacity reduction.Public Financial SupportThe role of subsidies in promoting and protecting small-scale fishing fleets in Europe was discussed.One the one hand, it was argued that small-scale fisheries require special treatment to protect themfrom competition from industrial fisheries. Conversely, it was contended that subsidies to help small-scale fleets modernize can result in their transformation into industrial or semi-industrial fleets withincreased fishing power. Legislators agreed that poorly managed small-scale fisheries can contributeto overfishing. Small-scale fishers can target a range of species that have little or no stock assessmentand are often not subject to fishing quotas.Recent expenditure under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) aimed at reducingfleet capacity may have resulted in an overall increase in fishing power of the European fleet. Takinginto account Member State allocation this amounted to a subsidy of€4.9billion between 2000 and2006. Whilst the scheme resulted in the scrapping of 6000 vessels, most of these were small inshorevessels from Italy and Greece. Under the scheme 3000 new vessels were built and 8000 modernised.83% of the measures under FIFG were regarded as having an unclear or negative impact on capacity
reduction whilst only 17% resulted in capacity reduction or other beneficial measures to reduce7pressure on fish stocks.Legislators and expert advisors generally agreed that public financial support should be directed atprogrammes that increase sustainability, and removed from programmes that increase capacity andpromote overfishing. Financial incentives for the adoption of sustainable fishing practices wereproposed by legislators and expert advisors as a way to use public financial support to promotesustainability.
3.4
Developing a Culture of Compliance
Traceability starts at seaExpert advisors presented information on illegal fish imports into the EU, with a focus on West Africancase studies. Market measures in the EU to limit the importation of illegally-caught fish are weakenedby both poor traceability at sea (outside the EU) and inadequate inspection and control in EU ports.Cooperation between coastal states and port states is needed to improve at-sea surveillance and thusstrengthen the efficacy of market-based measures in the EU. Illegal fishing is also pervasive on thehigh seas, and reform of the flag state system may be necessary to improve control of high seasfishing.Compliance IncentivesExpert advisors described a number of incentives for compliance which may be implemented withinthe fishing industry or through the seafood retail sector.A „critical mass‟ of agreement from the industry was regarded as necessary for a culture of complianceamong fishing operators. Fishermen would be more likely to accept and comply with regulations ifthey perceived that they would receive the benefits of any stock recovery that resulted. Incentives,such as additional days at sea for vessels using types of low impact fishing gears, could be moreeffective than regulations imposing technical conservation measures that were not supported by theindustry. Furthermore, robust systems of certification for sustainable or legal fish provide a strongfinancial incentive to fishers through the higher prices they can receive for certified products. Becauseit can be costly to enter certification schemes (both legal and sustainability certification), assistance tosmall-scale fishers in the EU and in developing countries will be necessary to enable theirparticipation.Market legislation that imposes penalties on fish buyers for trading illegal fish or uses financialinstruments to penalise fishers and traders that deal in illegally landed fish can effectively reduceillegal fish landings (blackfish) as buyers demand legally-caught fish from fishing operators. This„buyers and sellers‟ legislation has worked well in the UK; fishers have benefited through an increasein market-price for fish and the legislation has both discouraged illegal landings and encouragedcompliance with fisheries regulations.Global CooperationIllegal fishing is a global problem requiring broad-scale and far-reaching solutions. A number ofmeasures to eliminate or reduce illegal fishing were proposed by expert advisors and supported bylegislators.Expert advisors highlighted the need to improve international coordination and cooperation and furthersupport the work of the International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Network. Support is7
Cappell, R., T. Huntington and G. Macfadyen (2010). „FIFG2000-2006 Shadow Evaluation’.Report to the Pew EnvironmentGroup.
particularly needed to build human and financial capacity to combat illegal fishing in developingcountries. Legislators generally supported the recommendations of GLOBE‟s MTAG to create a“global marine Interpol”, a world-wide intelligence-gathering and enforcement agency for fishingactivities. Also proposed was a global record of vessels, involving unique registration codes forindividual vessels (for example the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number) to combat theproblem of renaming vessels to avoid traceability.
3.5
The External Dimension: Bilateral Fisheries Partnership Agreements
Representatives from the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) joinedthe workshop for the afternoon sessions focusing on “The External Dimension”. Mr. Andrea M.Fontana, Deputy Head of Unit B3 dealing with Bilateral Agreements, gave a short presentation onpotential reforms of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) that are currently being discussedwithin the Commission.Financing Fisheries Partnership AgreementsDG MARE is considering increasing ship owner contribution to access payments, and asked theparticipants for their position on the issue. Legislators felt that public financing of access agreementsconstituted a subsidy for the fishing industry, and suggested ship owners should contribute a higherproportion of access payments. Expert advisors agreed, supporting the goal of increasing ship ownercontribution from current rates (~25%) to the total cost of access payments. Both legislators andexpert advisors felt this form of subsidy led to unfair competition between EU ships and local fleets forfishery resources in third country waters.Fisheries sector support to third countries through FPAsDG MARE outlined plans to change the structure of FPAs by de-linking structural support for thefisheries sector from unrestricted access payments. Under the proposed plans, the amount ofstructural support for each third country would not be determined as a proportion of the accesspayment, but would instead be adapted to country need. Legislators expressed concern that currentsector support is often not spent within the sector due to corruption in the third country or a lack ofadequate governance and infrastructure for disbursement of such funds. Legislators also proposedthat sector support be offered to all third countries in need, not just those involved in fisheries accessagreements with the EU, suggesting this would be more consistent with sustainable developmentobjectives.DG MARE also intends to complement bilateral agreements by supporting regional cooperationprogrammes to improve regional fisheries management through Monitoring, Control and Surveillance(MCS) and scientific research and assessment. Legislators proposed that the EU play an active rolein MCS of the EU fleet fishing in third country waters. This also ties in with the EU IUU Regulation forseafood imports and the need for capacity building in third countries to enable compliance with theseregulations and export to the EU.The Role of the EU in FPA LicensingDG MARE is considering reducing or ending its license management role for FPAs, in which it seesitself to be an unnecessary intermediary between member states and third countries. Under thisproposal, DG MARE would continue to monitor licensing but would allow member states to dealdirectly with third countries regarding licensing of member state vessels fishing in third country coastalwaters under FPAs. Legislators were generally not in favour of this proposal, suggesting that itcontradicted a recent regulation to set up the licensing system and that it would conflict with goals toimprove governance in FPAs. Expert advisors concurred with legislators and added that theCommission has had problems in the past with the data provided by member states regardinglicensing, and recommended that the Commission should play a stronger rather than a weaker role in
the licensing process. It was suggested that licenses provide an opportunity to incentivise sustainablefishing practices by the EU distant water fleet through preferential licensing to those ships proven touse responsible fishing practices and maintain a good record of reporting catches.Policy Coherence for FPAsLegislators and expert advisors strongly supported an improvement in policy coherence in the matterof bilateral FPAs. Development of clear policy objectives for FPAs and cooperation with otherDirectorate-Generals to ensure EU policy coherence were two priority areas for improvement of theCFP raised by legislators and expert advisors.Legislators also asked whether DG MARE was the most appropriate agency to implement sectorsupport and governance agreements with developing third countries, suggesting the Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) as an alternative. Legislators suggested that DG DEV may notsupport some aspects of FPAs, such as the negative impact that they can have on local fishing fleetsand livelihoods. Therefore, legislators would like to see stronger collaboration between DG MARE andDG DEV. Expert advisors concurred, pointing to the EU‟s legal obligation under the Treaty of Lisbonto support third country development. Mr. Fontana agreed that collaboration between DG MARE andother Directorates-General was an important part of current discussions on the reform of bilateralfisheries agreements.Legislators stressed the importance of defining clear and specific policy objectives for FPAs to steerreforms and improve fisheries management. While DG MARE‟s general policy objectives include thepromotion of responsible and sustainable fishing by the EU distant water fleet, specific objectives(including, for example, a clear definition of responsible and sustainable fishing) have not yet beendeveloped. Legislators strongly supported the development of these more specific policy objectives.Expert advisors agreed on the importance of clear policy objectives, and suggested that anecosystem-based approach to fisheries management as required under the UN Fish StocksAgreement be included.
3.6
The External Dimension: High Seas Fisheries Management
.For the second part of the External Dimension session Mr. Roberto Cesari, Head of Sector RegionalFisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) at DG MARE, gave a short presentation on EU workto improve performance of sector RFMOs.The Role of Science in RFMOsDG MARE considers the role of science in RFMO decision-making to be a key area for reform. It seesa need to invest in scientific research and to improve decision-making to ensure scientific advice ismore closely followed. Legislators agreed that a lack of respect for scientific advice by decision-makers in RFMOs is an issue of serious concern, and supported increasing funding and support forscientific research and assessment on the high seas. Legislators and expert advisors highlightedexamples of RFMO decision-makers setting TACs significantly higher than the scientificrecommendations. Legislators supported the recommendation of MTAG to expand RFMO mandatesto include ecosystem-based management rather than management based primarily on target fisheriesor fish stocks. It was suggested that involving RFMO member state Environment Ministries orDepartments in RFMO operations would help to promote better environmental performance.Improving Compliance in RFMOsDG MARE considers compliance to be a key area for improvement. In his presentation, Mr. Cesarihighlighted problems with developing country compliance and the need to build human and financialcapacity in-country to enable compliance. He also reiterated the challenges of implementing the newEU IUU Regulation, but considered it to be a good opportunity to use market-based measures to
reduce high seas illegal fishing. Legislators agreed that compliance was a serious issue, and raisedthe possibility of establishing an agency to oversee, appraise and sanction RFMOs. Mr. Cesarisuggested individual countries should be held accountable, rather than RFMOs. Legislators generallysupported the proposal of MTAG to mandate the UN to review RFMO performance and useinternational law (UNFSA and ITLOS) to hold countries accountable. Expert advisors called attentionto further compliance issues such as non-contracting parties and unregulated deep sea fishing inviolation of the UNFSA. It was pointed out that not only developing countries, but also developedcountries (including the EU) contribute to high seas noncompliance.The Role of the EU in High Seas Fisheries ManagementImplementation of international high seas fisheries legislation has not been successful. The EU playsa significant role in high seas fisheries, both as fishing nations and as political negotiators at the UN.Legislators support EU efforts to improve implementation at UN negotiations in 2010, especially withregard to the deep sea fisheries access regime. It will be critical for the EU to promote mechanisms toimprove the role of science in decision-making and improve compliance in high seas fisheriesmanagement.
4.
The Next Steps: Priorities for Action
A number of key recommendations for CFP reform were made during the meeting. It is extremelyimportant that these points are followed up and pursued by legislators in the ongoing process withinthe European Parliament to significantly change the CFP so that fisheries decline is halted and thepotential substantial benefits of well-managed sustainable fisheries can be realised both within Europeand in the waters of it trading partners.An overarching point that was made repeatedly is the need for clear policy objectives that arefocussed on achieving both economic and environmental sustainability for European fisheries. Clarityof purpose will help to dictate the objectives and requirements for a range of subjects within the CFPsuch as compliance, the use of subsidies, management approaches and fisheries research.Scientific research for fisheries monitoring and stock assessment is still a priority that needs significantlong-term investment if we are to reach a stage where the vast majority of marine species harvested inEuropean waters have been adequately assessed and allocated quotas. Moreover, scientificrecommendations for TACs of well monitored stocks must be respected by all members of the EC.Where research is lacking and accurate recommendations are not possible the precautionaryapproach should be followed in setting of catch limits. The current practise of setting catch limitsabove recommended levels must cease and steps should be taken so that it is not an option duringthe final decision making process.The existing divide and distrust between scientists and industry is a major issue that needs to beaddressed in Europe if sustainable management is to be achieved. Increased collaboration betweenfishers, managers and research scientists in many aspects of fisheries management will help to buildup trust and understanding. Further investment in fisheries partnership schemes and increased use offishers‟ knowledge in management is recommended.The increased use of rights-based management where appropriate and devolution of fisheriesmanagement to the more regional level are two approaches that the reform should incorporate.However, both approaches need to be tailored to the type of fishery and the local or regional contextto ensure they are practical and workable in that location.The use of incentives to enable transition to more sustainable fishing practises and managementapproaches or to comply with existing regulations is a key factor that should be fully utilised to enableEuropean fisheries reform. In addition there should be a move away from using publicly fundedsubsidies that promote overfishing and other unsustainable practises and a switch those thatencourage best practise and sustainable fisheries.A culture of compliance is not only important within European waters but also in the EEZs of thirdparty countries and on the high seas. Achieving compliance in external waters requires a concertedeffort to significantly improve collaboration and coordination between nations to enforce existingfisheries regulations and eliminate IUU fishing. Supporting existing international MCS initiatives andproviding both technical and logistical capacity for third party countries to effectively manage their ownfisheries are key priorities for CFP reform. The EU should take a strong managerial and supportiverole in bilateral FPAs to help build third party capacity and reduce unsustainable fishing. Buildingfisheries sustainability externally will secure trade and address a number of environmental, fisheriesand development issues in third party nations.It is also important that the EU continues to take an active role in RFMO reform and high seas fisherymanagement, promoting the use of ecosystem-based management and the adherence to scientificrecommendations in decision making for RFMO catch limits.
Annex 1:
ZSL and GLOBE ICLUCE Working Paper on Marine Fisheries1
Marine ecosystems provide a wide range of services to human society . Among these, marine capturefisheries are of enormous economic and social importance. However, marine fish catches have2stagnated or are declining, with 80% of stocks either fully or overexploited . Developing andimplementing management systems for the sustainable extraction of marine fishery resources requirespolicy reform at global, regional, national, and also local levels.Marine capture fisheries have exceptional value as a source of food, livelihoods and income formillions of people across the globe. Fish provide more than 2.9 billion people with at least 15% of their2average per capita animal protein intake . Nearly 44 million people are engaged in the primary2production of fish worldwide . Most marine fishers work in small-scale fisheries, mainly in developing3countries . These countries have contributed more than half of total capture fish production since 19904and more than two-thirds in 2005 . Approximately 170 million people are involved in the fishing2industry and 520 million are potentially dependent on the sector . Annual global fish trade is worth $922billion , while the entire seafood industry is valued at $200 billion.Depletion of fishery resources is primarily driven by the open-access nature of fisheries, which results5in excess capacity, economic waste and the widespread use of unsustainable fishing practices .Growing global demand for seafood, globalization of fish trade and rising fish prices are also powerful6drivers of overfishing . Both chronic overfishing and associated habitat loss have a highly negativeeffect on the availability of remaining marine resources, threatening both the livelihoods of producersand the food security of consumers worldwide.Sustainable management of fisheries has failed in many parts of the worldas a result of ill-functioning institutions and a lack of political will amongst states to implement fisheries regulations at2,7national or international levels . Poor management of marine fisheries means that the difference4between the potential and actual economic benefit is roughly $50 billion per annum .Marine capture fisheries support a global industry that we cannot afford to lose. Some fishing8communities have already suffered due to collapse of fish stocks such as Newfoundland cod , whileothers have thrived due to the sustainable yields and high economic values of catches resulting from9successful fisheries management .The long-term survival and success of the global marinefishing sector depends on a sustainable ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management.In contrast, aquaculture production continues to increase globally, contributing 51.7 million tonnes in2006 with a value of $78.8 billion. However, intensive aquaculture systems that require the use of fish-based feed inputs increase demand on other fish species and may reduce overall protein available for10human consumption . Policy recommendations for sustainable aquaculture as a viable alternative tocapture fisheries will be provided in a subsequent document and included in a broader marinerecovery package.Overfishing is already causing severe economic hardship and ecological damage, and the problemswill only increase unless sustainable fisheries management programmes are implemented.The rootcauses of overfishing must be addressed at all levels of governance.At the international level,urgent reform of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) is required so they cover alloceans and function effectively. At the national and provincial levels, a range of tools to manageoffshore and inshore fisheries must be applied to protect the livelihoods of millions of people in thecoastal zone. Fisheries management must be both biologically and economically sustainable whilealso integrating ecological, economic and social issues and their drivers.This paper outlines a series of high-level policy recommendations to improve the biological andeconomic sustainability of marine capture fisheries. These recommendations focus on six aspects offisheries reform and management: Overcapacity and Subsidies, Regulation of Fisheries, MarineProtected Areas, IUU Fishing, Rights-based Management and Bycatch and Discards.References: (1)UNEP (2006).Marine and coastal ecosystems and human wellbeing.UNEP.(2)FAO (2009)State of World Fisheriesand Aquaculture 2008.FAO, Rome.(3)Berkes, F. et al (2001)Managing small-scale fisheries: alternative directions and methods.IDRCpublication, Ottawa.(4)World Bank and FAO (2009)The Sunken Billions.The World Bank, Washington DC.(5)FAO (2008)TechnicalGuidelines for Responsible Fisheries: Managing fishing capacity.FAO, Rome(6)Pauly, D. and J. Alder (2005).Marine FisheriesSystems.InEcosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends.Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.(7)Allsopp, M. et al.(2009)State of the World’s Oceans.Springer, Dordrecht.(8)Hutchings, J.A. and R.A. Myers. (1994)Canadian Journal of Fisheries andAquatic Sciences.51(9):2126–2146.(9)Hilborn, R. et al. (2005)Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B360:47-57.(10)Naylor, R.L et al. (2000)Nature405: 1017-1024.
Overcapacity in Marine FisheriesCurrent fishing capacity is currently more than twice the level required to capture marine fish . Thisovercapacity causes “overfishing, the degradation of marine fisheries resources, the decline of food4production potential, and significant economic waste” .Overcapacity is a result of competition between fishers in open-access fisheries and is exacerbated by5,6subsidies that artificially increase the profitability of fishing . Each year, governments spend about7$20 billion on these harmful subsidies .Conventional fisheries management methods aimed at stock conservation do not solve the problem of5overcapacity because they do not change the economic incentives faced by fishers . For example, inTotal Allowable Catch (TAC) systems fishers still compete for their share of the total catch, resulting in7a “race for the fish” . Vessel buyback programs aimed at reducing overcapacity are only a temporary8fix, because they fail to address the root causes of overcapacity .When properly enforced and scientifically monitored, rights-based management systems can eliminateunhealthy competition between fishers, halting the growth of overcapacity and enabling fishers andsociety to maximize profits and benefits from their fishery. Catch rights in fisheries can furthercontribute to sustainable management by creating the economic incentive to conserve fish stocks.When catch rights are transferable, market forces promote economic efficiency, eliminating redundant5capacity .1,2,3
Key Policy Recommendations:The following measures aim to provide economic security for fishers while reducing overfishing,thereby encouraging economic and environmental sustainability.Where feasible, establish a rights-based management systemto create incentives foreconomically efficient fishing. Rights-based management in industrial fisheries may take the form ofindividual catch rights, while in artisanal fisheries it may include territorial or community-based rights.National governments should provide the policy framework to enable rights-based management forboth industrial and small-scale fisheries.Where feasible, make catch rights tradable.A good example of tradable catch rights is theIndividual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. Tradable catch rights for industrial fisheries should beimplemented in coastal waters by states and on the high seas by RFMOs.Eliminate subsidies that promote overcapacity and overfishing,such as boat construction andmodernization programs, port construction and renovation programs, fishery support services, taxexemptions and fuel subsidies.Continue subsidies that promote sustainability,such as monitoring, control and surveillanceprogrammes, stock assessment and other fisheries research, and management of Marine ProtectedAreas. Government purchase of excess capacity may be included with caution, as their success1depends heavily on implementation methods .Address subsidy reform through multilateral, enforceable agreements.This could be achievedthrough international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or RFMOs.Use the resources saved by eliminating harmful subsidies to implement transitional measuresto mitigate impacts of capacity reduction such as employment losses. Transitional measures mayinclude occupational retraining or financial compensation.Implement specific measures to protect the rights of small-scale and artisanal fishersbecauseof their importance to global food security and livelihoods.References: (1)Asche, F. et al. (2008)Marine Policy32: 920-927.(2)Sumaila, U.R. and D. Pauly (2007)Nature450: 945.(3)WorldBank and FAO (2009)The Sunken Billions. The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform.The World Bank, Washington DC.(4)FAO(1999)International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.FAO, Rome.(5)FAO (2008)Technical Guidelines forResponsible Fisheries. Managing Fishing Capacity.FAO, Rome.(6)Yagi, N. et al. (2008)Fisheries Science74: 1229-1234.(7)Khan,A.S. et al (2006).The Nature and Magnitude of Global Non-Fuel Fisheries Subsidies.InCatching More Bait: a Bottom-up Re-estimationof Global Fisheries Subsidies.Eds U.R. Sumaila and D. Pauly. The Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia.(8)Beddington, J.R.et al. (2007)Science316: 1713.
International Regulation of FisheriesThe United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement2(UNFSA) establish the fundamental principles and obligations for the management of fisheries underinternational law. In addition, the 1995 UN FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries andassociated FAO instruments further elaborate on the principles and obligations in UNCLOS and theUNFSA, particularly regarding the application of the precautionary approach and sustainable3ecosystem-based management of fisheries . Key to international cooperation and the multilateralimplementation of these agreements are regional and sub-regional fisheries managementorganisations (RFMOs). These bodies are responsible for the management of fisheries on the highseas, and in the cases of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, in national waters as well.States are required by UNCLOS and the UNFSA to join and cooperate with these bodies and toestablish and abide by regulations to sustainably manage harvested fish stocks and protect their3,4associated ecosystems .There is clear evidence that the increasing numbers of overexploited or collapsed fish stocks is aresult of the failure of States to comply with their obligations under international law and the failure ofthe RFMOs to sustainably manage fisheries. In national waters these problems have often resultedfrom an emphasis on short-term socio-economic considerations rather than long-term sustainabilitywhen setting catch limits for harvested fish stocks. Problems with certain RFMOs have beendocumented in a recent independent review which identified the following issues, including: (i) manyRFMO conventions need updating to incorporate the provisions of the UN FSA and otherinternationally agreed standards and modern principles of fisheries management (ii) a failure of Statesto provide timely and accurate catch and bycatch data (iii) lack of compliance by States with the rulesand recommendations of RFMOs (iv) a lack of transparency in decision making (v) failure to establishmanagement measures consistent with scientific information and advice (vi) decision makingstructures which allow one or more States to block or „opt out‟ of compliance with needed regulations4(vii) IUU fishing (viii) inadequate funding .1
Key Policy RecommendationsReview and reform of existing RFMOsthrough:Requiring RFMOs to be periodically reviewed and where necessary reformed consistent withStates‟ obligations under international law;Identifying fleet overcapacity where it exists and reducing it accordingly;Ensuring the application of ecosystem based management of fisheries and the precautionaryapproach as outlined in international law or else prohibit fishing;Ensuring RFMO management measures are based on the best scientific information available.Immediately establish RFMOsfor species and/or areas of the high seas where they are absent.Further develop the international legal frameworkto allow for the equitable access, allocation andapplication of management and enforcement measures for fisheries for straddling, highly migratoryand high seas fish stocks.Improve enforcement of international fisheries lawthrough:Use of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to ensure the effectiveimplementation of international fisheries law, particularly the UNFSA;Allowing access to ITLOS by non-state entities in cases relating to the mis-management offisheries on the high seas.Establish international measures on traceability of caught fishby effective port and market Statemeasures and strengthening the international legal regime for flag State responsibility in fisheries.Ensure effective implementation of internationally agreed measures for the management ofhigh seas deep water fisheries,in particular UN GA resolution 61/105.Establish environment impact assessmentsas a prerequisite for permitting large-scale fisheries onthe high seas.Fund researchto “assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors ontarget stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the4target stocks” .References: (1)United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)(2)United Nations General Assembly (1995). Agreement for theimplementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.(3)FAO (1995). Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. FAO, Rome.(4)Hurry, G.D. et al. (2008)Report of the Independent Review.International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
The Role of MPAs as a Fisheries Management ToolMarine Protected Areas (MPAs) are increasingly being considered as an important tool for achievingan ecosystem approach to fisheries management and as a rational and practical way of managing1marine resources to facilitate the achievement of ecosystem-based fishery objectives . Community-based MPA management or co-management initiatives are also an important and often highlysuccessful approach for small-scale artisanal and subsistence fisheries as part of integrated coastalzone management.In terms of fish and fisheries it has been shown that MPAs:Can lead to an increase in the density, biomass, individual size and diversity of nearly all fish2functional groups and export both biomass and eggs/larvae to neighbouring fisheries and habitats3respectively .Have great potential to complement and underpin other commonly used fishery management4practises, helping to increase the overall success of management .By protecting areas from fishing, enable habitats to recover from fishing disturbance, increasingspecies diversity, habitat complexity and productivity, as well as restoring ecological processes5such as water filtration and carbon sequestration in sediments and reef structures . In particular,MPAs can play a key role in the protection of slow-growth habitats such as deepwater coral andsponge communities.Reduce mortality of non-targeted species due to bycatch, discards, collateral mortality from fishing6gears and ghost fishing .Provide protection for breeding and nursery areas of important fishery species, including mobile7and migratory species, and particular spawning aggregation sites for heavily exploited species .Create more natural, extended population age structures and larger population sizes that willincrease resilience to environmental fluctuations and directional climate change, as well asoffering a buffer against management failures, and reducing risks of fisheries collapses and8extinctions .
Key Policy Recommendations:Implement a Global Network of Marine Protected Areasthat afford a high level of protection fromfishing to enable the protection of 20-30% of marine habitats including offshore pelagic habitats. The9cost of such a network was estimated at $5-19 billion in 2004 , but is still considerably less than global10expenditure on subsidies to industrial fisheries, at $30-34 billion per year . This network has been9estimated to create 1 million new jobs , helping to offset any restructuring costs for local fishingcommunities.Provide adequate support for the setting up of a Global MPA Networkin terms of infrastructure,capacity, management and enforcement.Integrate the use of MPAs as a management tool into regional fisheries managementprogrammes at the ecosystem levelto complement other approaches such as IndividualTransferable Quotas.Support both small-scale co-management initiatives and traditional management practisesinvolving MPAsto promote best practise community-based management for artisanal andsubsistence fisheries.Provide funding for further MPA researchfor subjects such as MPA Success Indicators, FisheriesBenefits of MPAs for a range of target species and fisheries worldwide particularly for the pelagiczone, Fisheries Models incorporating MPAs and assessing the suitability of MPAs for differentfisheries.References: (1)Martin et al. (2006). Background paper 1:Experiences in the use of Marine Protected Areas with fisheries managementobjectives – a review of case studies.FAO Workshop on Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries Management: Review of Issues andConsiderations.(2)Halpern, B.S. and R.R. Warner (2003)Ecology Letters5:361-366.(3)Sobel, J. and C. Dahlgren (2004)MarineReserves: A Guide to Science, Design and Use.Island Press, Washington, D.C.(4)Sainsbury, K. and Sumaila, U.R. (2003)Incorporating ecosystem objectives into management of sustainable marine fisheries, including “best practice” reference points and use
of marine protected areas.In M. Sinclair and G. Valdimarsson (eds)Responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem.FAO, Rome. 343-361.(5)Roberts, C.M. and J.P. Hawkins (2000).Fully Protected Marine Reserves: A Guide.Washington, DC: Endangered SeasCampaign.(6)Murray et al. (1999).Fisheries24(11): 11-25.(7)Sadovy, Y.J. and M.L. Domeier (2005)Coral Reefs24: 254-262.(8)Roberts, C.M. et al (2005)Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B,360:123-132(9)Balmford, et al. (2004)PNAS101(26):9694-9697.(10)Sumaila, U.R. and D. Pauly (2007).Catching More Bait: a Bottom-up Re-estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies.TheFisheries Centre, University of British Columbia.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated FishingIllegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a symptom of poor ocean management andrepresents a significant threat to the sustainability of fishing, recovery of overexploited fish stocks andmarine ecosystems.ImpactsIllegal fishing harms fish stocks and the wider ocean ecosystem. It contributes directly to overfishingand depletion of fish stocks, and also increases uncertainty in stock assessments used to make1management decisions . Fishing in protected areas or using banned gear increases by-catch and1destroys marine habitat . IUU fishing deprives coastal states of landing fees, license fees, taxes and2export earnings . Legal fishers suffer increased costs, decreased incomes and lost employment3opportunities as a result of resource depletion by IUU fishing . In developing countries, illegal fishingthreatens food security and livelihoods in coastal communities with few alternative sources of food or3income . IUU operations also often do not meet international standards of vessel safety and may4involve human rights abuses of the crew .Status and TrendsBecause of its clandestine nature, IUU fishing is extremely difficult to measure. Recent studies haveproduced global estimates of illegal fish catches between 11 and 26 million tonnes, worth $10-231billion . IUU fishing became prevalent in the 1970s and 80s, and reached its peak in the 1990s. Overthe last decade, there has been some progress in curtailing IUU fishing, with levels dropping in 111ocean regions but rising in another five . IUU fishing levels are connected to both maritime control and1overall strength of governance in coastal states . East and West Africa have been especially hard hit,where internal political instability and lack of resources in many coastal countries results inuncontrolled coastal waters. Currently, the eastern Atlantic (West African coast) experiences the1highest amount of IUU fishing, with total estimated catches 40% higher than reported catch figures .IUU fishing is often carried out by large industrial vessels, which may be registered with so-called Flagof Convenience countries, but are usually owned by companies in developed countries, particularlyEast Asia and Europe. However, the increasing power and range of small coastal vessels indeveloping countries, particularly SE Asia and Africa, is generating new opportunities for IUU activity.Policy OptionsIllegal fishing is driven byeconomic incentives and poor ocean governance.Overcapacity and5market demand make illegal fishing profitable , while the benefits from engaging in illegal fishing far6outweigh the cost if apprehended . Failures to govern both the oceans and the seafood markets havefacilitated the proliferation of IUU fishing. Inadequate surveillance and intelligence-sharing betweenstates and regions makes IUU fishers unlikely to be detected, while lack of enforcement by flag,5coastal and port states makes even detected IUU fishers unlikely to be sanctioned . Effective policiesto combat IUU fishing must begin by improving detection of IUU through regional cooperation insurveillance and control, in particular gathering and sharing vessel information. This information mustthen be used to strengthen enforcement capacity and prevent illegally-caught fish from entering the8seafood market .Currently,detection of IUU fishingis impeded by poor capacity for surveillance and poorcommunication of intelligence information. Surveillance of coastal waters requires financial and humanresources that many countries lack. On the high seas, RFMOs may lack the funds, means and legalmandate to undertake effective surveillance and act against vessels undermining their regulations.Funding and training to improve ocean monitoring in developing countries is critical to reducing thehigh levels of IUU in these areas. Transparency and communication of information about fishingactivity are necessary for not only detecting IUU fishing when it occurs but also identifying illegally5caught fish when it is landed and traded .Satellite-based monitoring and tracking systemscan be useful, and include the GPS-basedVessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and Synthetic Aperture Radar-based Vessel Detection Systems
(VDS). VMS units, in which on-board GPS units automatically transmit information about vessellocation and speed, are becoming widespread. However, there are limits to the effectiveness of VMS.Some varieties of on-board transmission units are vulnerable to data-falsification. Furthermore, evenaccurate VMS data are transmitted to the vessel‟s flag state but not to coastal states, port states, orRFMOs. Vessel Monitoring Systems are a powerful tool that could contribute to the detection of illegal5fishing, but to be effective, transmitters must be tamper-proof and data must be shared among states .VDS can be effective in identifying the presence of vessels in low and mid-latitudes (where ice bergsdo not produce a confounding signal), but cannot identify individual vessels and so rely on surface-based support to complete the surveillance picture.Flag state non-compliancerepresents a serious failure of ocean governance and remains a5significant barrier to the elimination of IUU fishing . Flag states with open registers have no citizenshipor nationality requirement for vessels to fly their flags and many of these states cannot or will not take5enforcement action against these vessels . Persistent IUU activity by vessels registered with thesecountries should be met with a coordinated and coherent international response, leading viadiplomatic engagement eventually to sanctions against countries or prohibitions on the import offishery product from vessels registered to them.Historically,IUU control measureshave focused on apprehending vessels and prosecuting illegalfishing operators. These measures must continue to be strengthened, particularly in coastaldeveloping states. However, there has been a recent trend toward a diverse range of port and market8measures to prevent illegally-caught fish from entering the market . The UNFAO has recentlyconcluded negotiations on an International Agreement on Port State Measures based on its Model9Scheme to deny port access to vessels engaged in or supporting IUU fishing. Domestic legislation inmarket states banning the import of illegally-caught fish, such as the Lacey Act in the United States,5has also been effective in blocking trade in IUU fish products . Public sector traceability measures4such as Catch Documentation Schemes have been successfully applied to some fisheries , while a10European Community Catch Certification Scheme will take effect in 2010 . Private sector traceabilityprogrammes such as the Marine Stewardship Council‟s certification scheme that promotes sustainablesourcing policies through eco-labelling may also contribute to improved traceability. Port and marketstate control measures should be used in conjunction with more traditional control measures at sea toensure illegal fishing is deterred at every stage of the supply chain.
Key Policy RecommendationsReduce overcapacitythrough measures outlined in page 3 of the Fisheries Document.Gather and share informationon fishing vessels and catchExpand and strengthen monitoring and surveillance to enhance IUU fishing detection. Thesecan include Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), aerial and satellite surveillance, observers,and maritime surveillance by government agencies, NGOs, and fishers.Provide technical capacity building for developing countries to set up and operate effectivemonitoring and surveillance techniques, including regional collaboration for cost-effectivemonitoringInvest in development of improved technology such as satellite based VDS and tamper-proofVMS systems, and harmonise the technology to facilitate timely and accurate sharing of dataPromote the use of the International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Network for511sharing IUU vessel intelligence and create a global database of fishing vesselsImplement control measuresthroughout the fish supply chainFlag state measuresDevelop framework for legal and coordinated international diplomatic and economic action5against non-compliant flag states , for example, through the International Tribunal for the Law7of the SeaCoastal state and RFMO measuresImprove high seas governance through measures outlined in page 2 of the FisheriesDocumentStrengthen the abilities of coastal states and RFMOs to locate, apprehend and prosecute IUUfishersImprove legislation and enforcement of regulations relating to maritime safety of vesselsIncrease penalty levels for IUU offendersPort state measures
Ratify, and encourage others to ratify rapidly, the UNFAO Port State Agreement; developmechanisms for practically implementing it; and provide funds for capacity building to allow itsearly and effective implementation in developing countriesImplement domestic port state policies to refuse port entry and landing of fish by IUU vesselsMarket state measuresImplement domestic legislation and policies making it illegal to import or sell IUU fish, such asthe Lacey Act (USA), and increase penalty levels for offenders.Implement harmonised, fraud-resistant catch documentation or certification schemes ensuringtraceability of seafood productsPromote private traceability schemes through eco-labelling and sustainable sourcing policiesReferences: (1)Agnew, D.J., et al. (2009)PloS ONE4 (2).(2)MRAG (2005)Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and UnregulatedFishing on Developing Countries.(3)High Seas Task Force (2006)Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas.(4)FAO(2002)Implementation of the international plan of action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.FAO,Rome.(5)FAO (2009)State of the Worlds Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008.FAO, Rome.(6)Sumaila et al. (2006)Marine Policy30(6):696-703.(7)Gianni, M. & Simpson, W. (2005)The changing nature of high seas fishing: How flags of convenience provide cover forillegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.(8)OECD (2004)Regulating IUU fishing or combating IUU operations?(9)FAO (2007).Model Scheme on Port State Measures to combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.FAO, Rome.(10)EC Regulation1005/2008 to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing.(11)FAO (2009)Combating Illegal,Unreported and Unregulated fishing, including through a legally binding instrument on port state measures and the establishment of aglobal record of fishing vessels.FAO, Rome.
Fisheries Bycatch and DiscardsBycatch can be defined as „that part of the capture that is discarded at sea, dead (or injured to an1extent that death is the result) . The problem of bycatch has been recognised ever since peoplethstarted to catch fish. In the 20 Century fishing technology and capacity rapidly increased, with acorresponding lack of effective regulation to control overfishing and bycatch levels. The managementand mitigation of bycatch is one of the most pressing issues facing the global commercial fishing2industry , and is regarded as fundamental to fish stock sustainability and a conservation/food security3imperative .Status and TrendsGlobal estimates of bycatch are difficult to quantify as data is incomplete for many areas and2fisheries . In the 1980‟s commercial fisheries annual bycatch was estimated at 27 million tonnes or425% of the total global catch . A more recent estimate using a different method to derive bycatch led5to a total of 7.3 million tonnes . A new definition of bycatch itself which includes all unmanaged andwasted fisheries‟ catch produced a total of 38.5 million tonnes, accounting for 40% of global marine31catches . However, using the more widely accepted definition , it is generally agreed that the totalbycatch in commercial fisheries has decreased since the 1980‟s, which was mainly attributed to acombination of bycatch mitigation measures and an increased utilisation of bycatch for food and5livestock feeds Increased utilisation of bycatch for human consumption and aquaculture is especially6high in Asia and parts of Africa and is considered to be part of a global trend . However, the concept ofbycatch in terms of defining target/non target catches is weak for many fishing communities in2,3developing countries where most of the catch is usually retained for food .ImpactsThe main types of bycatch that are still major issues for fisheries management include sharks onlonglines, cetaceans in gill nets and trawls, discards from shrimp trawls, seabirds on longlines,2,7,8,9pinnipeds in trawls, seabirds in coastal gill nets and juvenile fish in trawls. As well as causing themortality of large, long-lived and often rare or endangered species such as turtles, sharks, cetaceans,seabirds and some invertebrates there are considerable ecological impacts on marine ecosystems.These include effects on benthic fauna and habitats, scavenging species, predator-prey interactions,diversity (genetic, species and community), nutrient recycling and ecosystem resilience and7,10,11function. Bycatch and discards can therefore be a serious conservation issue as well as a12substantial waste of potential food resources . Both target and non-target stocks can be furtherreduced through bycatch mortality, contributing to ecosystem degradation. Damaged ecosystems willbe less commercially viable in terms of fish stocks than ones managed sustainably.Policy OptionsSolutions to reduce bycatch need to be tailored to specific fisheries and can differ between regions of213the world . The overall process of bycatch mitigation implementation can be split into three stages :1. Selecting and prioritising species and fisheries that require bycatch reduction action;
2. Bycatch mitigation: selecting the methodology and measures for a particular fishery;3. Implementation, compliance and monitoring, with feedback to enable adaptive management.Furthermore, three main approaches to bycatch reduction (technical,regulatory and social)have2been suggested. These approaches should be adopted in an integrated way . Examples of successfulbycatch mitigation are presented below.Technicalapproaches can be split into three types;selectivity, deterrence and avoidance.Selectivity and deterrence both involve making changes to fishing gear. Examples ofselective gearare bycatch reduction devices (BRDs) and turtle exclusion devices (TEDs) for shrimp and prawn trawlfisheries, which are now mandatory for a large number of these „bycatch heavy‟ fisheries around theworld.Deterrenceinvolves measures to prevent bycatch mainly for passive fishing gear such as longlinesand gillnets. An example of successful deterrence is the reduction in seabird mortality in CCAMLRwaters. A number of deterrence methods were made mandatory including the use of streamer lines,14weighted longlines and night setting of gear . These methods along with effective monitoring usingobservers and compliance by the fishers enabled a drastic and consistent reduction of bycatch levels.15Deterrence can also be very effective for coastal gillnet fisheries but is not widely used, resulting in9,16,17,18high mortality of seabirds, cetaceans, sharks, and turtlesAvoidancemeasures include the use of time and area closures to protect species at certain stages oftheir life history such as the closure of juvenile nursery areas or adult spawning grounds. Permanentarea closures are also used to protect vulnerable species from incidental capture. Examples are areaclosures for the Hawaiian monk seal and the vaquita porpoise in the Gulf of California. However suchclosures often just displace fishing effort, and although protecting one species, can lead to unintended19consequences for others .Regulatoryapproaches can be effective but may inadvertently cause increased discards of other2target species that fishery managers are also trying to protect . Therefore any regulatory legislationmust be carefully evaluated beforehand.Reducing fishing effort in commercial fisheries is oneobvious way to reduce bycatch.For overexploited fisheries a reduction in fishing effort cansignificantly reduce bycatch without greatly affecting target catches. Examples of legislation thataddress bycatch directly are the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in theUnited States, and the 1996 New Zealand Fisheries Act. Bycatch quotas for vulnerable species arealso used where fishing ceases when the quota is reached, for instance for Hooker‟s sea lion in NewZealand or dolphins in the IATTC-managed Eastern Pacific Ocean, both examples of environmentallegislation that has been effective in changing fishing practises. Discard bans operate in Norway,Iceland and New Zealand, where bycatch of commercial species is landed for a guaranteed value.Total bycatch bans in Namibia require that all bycatch is landed for processing into fishmeal andfishers pay a surcharge towards the processing cost.Socialmeasures to reduce bycatch are critical if both technical and regulatory measures are to bemost effective. Fishers need to be made aware of the ecological and economic costs of bycatch anddiscards, particularly the loss of revenue and time. In the north-west Atlantic groundfish fishery therewas an estimated loss of potential income of $50 million when the 1987 year class of yellowtail20flounder was harvested prematurely and then discarded . Awareness initiatives to explain the use of14technical measures can improve compliance and reduce bycatch considerably . However, in somecases even when deterrent measures are mandatory fishers tend to ignore them or do not implementthem effectively.Economic incentives to fish sustainably are becoming more common through certification schemes,where bycatch mitigation can be a condition for operating a certified fishery. Public opinion, linked tomedia attention and peer pressure within fishing communities or fisheries can also play a large part inchanging fishers‟ attitudes and fishing behaviour. Making a change happen often requires a„champion‟ within the fishing community who can perceive the problem, is receptive to new information21and is able to positively influence fellow fishers .
Key Policy RecommendationsReview current bycatch mitigation measuresin RFMOs and inshore fisheries including those indeveloping countriesConduct research into new technical bycatch mitigation techniquesfor fisheries lacking suchmeasuresImplement appropriate existing mitigation measuresfor fisheries where bycatch reduction is poor(e.g. inshore gillnets).
Implement regulatory measuresthat provide economic incentives (or disincentives for non-compliance) for fishers to reduce bycatch to an ecologically acceptable level through sustainablefisheries certification schemes, the issuing of fishery licences and control of licence fees.Focus on social measuresin combination with technical and regulatory ones in order to drivechange in fisher‟s attitudes and fishing behaviour. Examples include improved awareness coupledwith persuading key fishers in a community to actively support change and influence fellow fishers.Ensure that all regulated fisheries are monitored effectivelyusing on-board observers or remotecameras to record bycatch, including discard estimates. Expand the remit and extent of observerprogrammes where necessary and conduct research into new or improved remote monitoringtechniques.References: (1)Hall, M.A. (1996)Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries6(3):319-352(2)Hall, S.J. & Mainprize, B.M. (2005)Fish andFisheries6:134-155(3)Davies, R.W.D., et al. (2009)Marine Policy33(4):661-672(4)Alverson, D.L. et al. (1994)A global assessmentof bycatch and discards.FAO, Rome(5)Kelleher, K. (2005).Discards in the world’s marine fisheries.FAO, Rome(6)Nunoo, F.K.E. etal. (2009)Fisheries Research96:167-172(7)Hall, M.A. et al (2000)Marine Pollution Bulletin41:204-219(8)Lewinson, R.L. et al. (2004)Trends in Ecology and Evolution19(11):598-604(9)Zydelis, R. et al. (2009)Biological Conservation142:1269-1281(10)Andrew, N.L. &Pepperell, J.G. (1992)Oceanography and Marine Biology: An Annual Review30:537-565(11)Sinclair, M. & Valdimarsson, G. (eds)(2003)Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem.CABI Publishing, Rome.(12)Harrington, J.M. et al. (2005)Fish and Fisheries6:350-361(13)Bache, S.J. (2003)Ocean & Coastal Management46:103-125(14)Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources (2007).CCAMLR’s work on the elimination of seabird mortality associated with fishing.CCAMLR Secretariat(15)Melvin, E.F. et al. (1999)Conservation Biology13:1386-1397(16)Read, A.J. et al (2006)Conservation Biology20(1):163-169.(17)Peckham, S.H. et al (2007)PLoS ONE10.(18)Thorpe, T. & Frierson, D. (2009)Fisheries Research98:102-112(19)Baum, J.K. et al.(2003)Science299:398-392(20)Clucas, I. (1997)A study of the options for utilization of bycatch and discards from marine capturefisheries.FAO, Rome(21)Kennelley, S.J. (2007)Bycatch reduction in the world’s fisheries.Springer, Dordrecht.
Rights-based Fisheries ManagementIn open access fisheries, fishers compete for their share of the total catch, resulting in a damaging1,2“race to fish” which often leads to overcapacity, overfishing and reduced catches . Eliminatingharmful competition between fishers is critical to improving the sustainability of fisheries worldwide.Secure harvest rights can create incentives for economic efficiency and ecological sustainability. Inthis paper we tackle rights-based management approaches for both large-scale and small-scale3,4fisheries, but separately, because of the largely different nature of these two types of fisheries .
Large–Scale Fisheries and Rights-based ManagementIn the large-scale commercial fishing sector, group or individual catch shares can eliminate the “race5,6to fish” by granting fishers a set proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC) . Catch shares, alsoknown as fishing quotas, may be transferable or non-transferable, and may be allocated to individualsor groups of fishers. Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems are the most commonly used form ofrights-based management in large-scale fisheries, and will be the focus of this section.The adoption of individual fishing rights in large-scale fisheries has accelerated since the 1970s. By72008, 20-25% of the global marine catch was harvested using ITQ or similar systems . At least 157nations use ITQs as a major management tool , including New Zealand, Iceland, Canada, Namibia,8the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and the United States . On the high seas, individual fishingrights have proven more difficult to implement. To date, none of the Regional Fisheries Management6Organizations (RFMOs) have implemented individual fishing rights .ITQ systems can generate a number of economic and ecological benefits. Transferability of fishing1,6quotas enables a reduction of excess capacity, improving economic efficiency . Use of quotas allows1fishing to be more cost-effective, increasing profits and reducing the need for subsidies. Secureharvesting rights confer a stewardship incentive to fishers as catch share values are directly linked tofish stock health. This incentive has led fishers to lobby for reduced TACs to rebuild stocks, invest inscientific research to improve stock assessment, and fund monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS)98to reduce illegal fishing . Large-scale fisheries with ITQ systems are less likely to collapse , often haveimproved TAC compliance, greater fisher involvement in the decision-making process and improved5cooperation between fishers, managers and scientists . Through improved efficiency and stewardship,8ITQs can “halt and even reverse the global trend toward fisheries collapse” .However, catch shares alone are not a guarantee of sustainable fishing. Their success depends onthe setting of suitable ecosystem-based TACs, which in turn relies on robust stock assessment and10political will . ITQs can provide an incentive to fishers to fill their quota with high-value fish, leading to“high-grading”, or the discarding of lower value fish. This issue has been countered in many ITQfisheries through the combined use of on-board observers and discard quotas, which promotes more2,9selective fishing and has led to investment in by-catch reduction techniques . ITQs can address most
fisher incentive issues but not all by-catch and habitat conservation issues, and should be used inconjunction with other fishery management tools such as by-catch mitigation, gear restrictions, spatialand temporal closures, input controls, and certification. Tradable quotas or „quota leasing‟ have lead insome cases to economic concentration but can be resolved through individual quota limitations and9,10robust leasing regulations . Employment losses from capacity reductions may occur, but can bemitigated through measures such as occupational retraining and financial compensation.
Small-scale Fisheries and Rights-based ManagementSmall-scale fisheries (SSF) are defined as „fisheries that work from the shore or from small boats in11coastal or inland waters . SSF are made up of both artisanal and subsistence fisheries, mainly in thedeveloping world, and are an important component of global fisheries. They provide directemployment to more than 90% of the 27 million capture fishers worldwide whilst also supporting a12further 84 million in fish processing, distribution and marketing roles . SSF catches make up half ofthe global fish catch for human consumption and many operate at a fraction of the cost of large-scale13fisheries .. Small-scale fisheries are highly important both in terms of supporting livelihoods andproviding future food security for developed and developing countries. Many countries in Asia depend12on coastal fisheries for up to 50% of their animal protein, compared to a global average of 15% . Indeveloped countries, where there is sufficient capacity to provide effective governance and scientificassessment, SSF can be successfully managed using ITQ systems. However, ITQs are less practicalin countries where such capacity is lacking and here community based management or co-management approaches are more suitable.As for large-scale fisheries many small-scale fisheries are facing a crisis. Anthropogenicenvironmental degradation of the coastal zone and intensification of fishing effort in inshore watershas led to overfishing, depletion of marine resources and habitat loss. The main drivers of overfishingin SSF have been:open access to inshore fishing grounds and human migration into the coastal zone;increased demand in local or foreign markets for marine resources;lack of alternative food supply or income for coastal populations coupled with economicsubsistence pressure driving people to keep fishing overexploited stocks;competition between small-scale and large-scale fisheries as industrial fishing‟s rangeexpanded.
Previous neglect of SSF in national development and fisheries plans has led to a lack of regulation14and management of these fisheries in many developing countries . Furthermore, the societal andeconomic value of SSF at the local and national level is often greatly underestimated or poorly14,15understood.Rights-based management in small-scale fisheries has existed for centuries in traditional fisheries of16,17the Western Pacific using a system of territorial use rights or customary marine tenure. Successfulmanagement within these systems is closely linked to the level of cultural and social cohesion within a18particular community . Successful small-scale rights-based management approaches have beenadopted in many parts of the world. Examples are territorial user rights fishery systems (TURFs)operating within a co-management approach in Latin America for sea urchins (Chile) and lobsters3(Mexico) . In these cases, and in South-east Asia (Philippines and Indonesia), fisheries managementforms part of an integrated approach to coastal zone planning addressing multiple issues (social,4,19economic and ecological) that is embedded in local or regional government mandates . Within theseand other management strategies it is critical that fishers, along with other stakeholders, are fully20integrated into a participatory decision-making process .
Key Policy RecommendationsImplement rights-based management systems in both large-scale and small-scale open-accessfisheries.Implement the form of fishing rights most suitable to the fishery, fishing community and the marineenvironment.Rights-based management should be knowledge-based and follow the precautionary principle as partof an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries.In large-scale fisheries:Ensure ultimate control lies with the regulatory authority, with clear lines of authority,transparency, and stakeholder involvement.
Use rights-based management as part of a diverse fisheries management programme,alongside other tools such as marine protected areas, input controls (e.g. effort restrictions),strong monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), and market measures such as catchcertification and eco-labelling.
In small-scale fisheries:Apply a knowledge-based approach incorporating multiple issues (economic, social andecological) as part of a mandated integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) process.Implement forms of co-management that can strengthen the social consensus, participation,self-regulation and compliance of fishers. Fishing communities need to be fully involved in aparticipatory process to incorporate ownership and stewardship of the fishery. Examples existin the Philippines, Chile and Mexico.Implement a rights-based co-management approach combined with other fisheriesmanagement tools where applicable, including territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs),community fish catches, and temporary closures and reserves (MPAs).Ensure management is adaptive and tailored to respond to the changing local socio-ecological21situation. An example is the Integrated Assessment and Advisory (IAA) Framework .References: (1)Asche, F. et al. (2008)Marine Policy32: 920-927(2)Hilborn, R. et al (2005)Philosophical Transactions of the RoyalSociety B360:47-57(3)Defeo, O. & Castilla, J.C. (2005)Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries15:265-283(4)McClanahan, T.R. et al(2009)Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries19:33-47(5)Griffith, D.R. (2008)Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment6(4):191-198(6)Beddington, J.R. et al (2007)Science316:1713-1716(7)Arnason, R. 2008. Fisheries Self-management under ITQs. In Advances inRights Based Fishing (eds. R. Arnason & B. Runolfsson). RSE Centre for Social and Economic Research. Reykjavik(8)Costello, C. etal (2008)Science321:1678-1681(9)Grafton, R.Q. et al (2006)Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science63:699-710(10)Sumaila, U.R. (2009) (Pers.Comm.)(11)Allison, E.H. & Ellis, F. (2001)Marine Policy25:5377-388(12)FAO (2009)State of WorldFisheries and Aquaculture 2008.FAO, Rome(13)Pauly, D. (2006)Maritime Studies4(2):7-22(14)Garcia, S.M. et al (2008).Towardsintegrated assessment and advice in small-scale fisheries: principles and processes.FAO, Rome(15)Zeller, D. et al (2007)MarineResource Economics21:355-374(16)Ruddle, K. (1996) Traditional management of reef fishing.In:Polunin, N.V.C. & Roberts, C.M.(eds),Reef Fisheries.Chapman and Hall, London.(17)Johannes, R.E. (2002)Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics33:317-340(18)Aswani, S. (2005)Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries15:285-307(19)White, A.T. et al (2005)Ocean and Coastal Management48:271-296(20)McClanahan, T. & Castilla, J.C.Fisheries Management: Progress towards sustainability.Blackwell, Oxford.(21)FAO(2008)Report of the Global Conference on Small-Scale Fisheries: Bringing together responsible fisheries and social development.FAO,Rome.
Annex 2:
First Meeting of the GLOBE Marine Technical Advisory Group:Summary of Recommendations
Cross-cutting measures:Redirect inappropriate subsidieswhich artificially increase the profitability of fishing, leading toovercapacity and overfishing. Unsustainable fishing will continue to be perpetuated by the use ofharmful subsidies unless they are removed.Ensure all relevant countries ratify existing UN oceans and fishery agreements,such as theUN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) andthe Port State Agreement on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, and adopt robustimplementing legislation.Ensure that fisheries are subject to environmental legislationby creating integrated oceanspolicy that strongly links fisheries and other commercial marine activities with the environment.Reduce unregulated activities by promoting governance systems for all oceans andfisheriesby expanding the coverage and number of Regional Fisheries Management1Organisations (RFMOs )Significantly reduce unreported fishing activitiesby encouraging the reporting of all fishingactivities, including subsistence, artisanal, bycatch and discards, in all fishing countries.Promote governance reformto improve accountability, transparency and inclusiveness ofdecision-making at global, regional and national levels in accordance with the requirements ofUNCLOS and the UNFSA.
Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) Reform:Mandate the United Nations to review and monitor RFMO performanceby providingcomprehensive global oversight and ensuring effective science-based decision-making, referringto existing benchmark standards for RFMOs in the UNFSA .Hold states accountableby using the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) tobetter enforce the international legal responsibilities of states, specifically compliance andperformance, when operating in the high seas.Revise RFMO mandates to specifically include a precautionary, ecosystem-based approachto management, protection of biodiversity in the marine environment and long term-sustainabilityof fish stocks (as already required by the UNFSA).Apply environmental, economic and social assessments to all fisheriesto determine theoptimal way to operate the fishery and achieve maximum economic value or specific social goals,within the framework of sustainable ecosystem-based fisheries and environmental management.Investigate a “Cap and Restore” approach for severely depleted fisheriesthat would imposea temporary moratorium or drastic reduction in catches and effort to allow fish stocks to recover.During the stock recovery period fishers will either be paid compensation to leave the industry orbe employed for scientific assessments or enforcement activities. Once re-opened, the fishery willbe operated with stronger links to the market, greater economic efficiency, and compulsoryenvironmental and economic impact assessments to set precautionary catch levels.
Tackling Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing and Traceability:Work with every link in the fishery supply chain,by implementing measures for RFMOs, flagstates, coastal states, ports and market states, to strengthen action against IUU practices.Encourage comprehensive membership of RFMOs for all the states involved in the fishery,by investigating the nature of existing barriers to participation.Restrict market access for non-compliant flag statesand provide economic incentives forstates to join RFMOs and enforce regulations.Improve monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) at the regional levelthrough capacitybuilding that increases and harmonizes the level and effectiveness of the MCS system. In
addition, flag, coastal and port states should increase and harmonise sanctions against IUUperpetrators.Support and expand the capacity of the International MCS Networkto coordinate professionalenforcement efforts to fight IUU fishing. RFMOs or other regional bodies should be used as a hubto provide funding and training to developing countries.Share technical and logistical resources with other marine agenciesto effectively managefisheries alongside other issues including immigration, smuggling, drug and human trafficking at aregional level.Create a global record of fishing vesselslinked to authorised vessel lists which include safetycertificate information plus blacklists for vessels, fisheries, management organisations or statesthat are involved in or allow IUU fishing.
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs):Promote fully protected marine reservesthat build resilience in marine ecosystems, protectbiodiversity and provide reference points for research studies. When combined withcomplementary measures (specifically effort reduction), MPAs can help to successfully deliversustainability targets, enhance food security in the future and help adapt to climate change.Adopt modern MPA network targetsto propel the creation of marine reserves and MPAnetworks beyond 2012. This should be based on the latest scientific advice and the 2003 WorldParks Congress target of 20-30% of each marine habitat to be protected, noting that in somecases the percentage required for protection may be higher.Ensure that MPAs are enforced and effectively managed following their designationbycreating a well coordinated MCS network at all levels of governance from local communities tonational and global legislation. Penalties for breaking MPA regulations need to be severe enoughto deter future violation and be fully enforced by all legal systems.Protect ecologically or biologically significant marine areas beyond national jurisdictionthrough the use of MPAs and other measures, by ensuring that states cooperate using therelevant global and regional organizations and the 2008 CBD scientific criteria for protection.Investigate the establishment of a new Global Framework Treaty for Marine SpatialPlanning in areas beyond national jurisdictionthat would provide a framework for MPAnetwork designation, management and enforcement, and mandate the integration of marineconservation into sectoral and regional management.Increase requirements for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and ensure theireffective implementation and scrutinyat both the national level and for all marine activities witha potential impact in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Governments can endorse efforts withinthe CBD to develop guidance for such EIAs and promote a mechanism for global consultation.GlossaryCBDEIAFAOITLOSIUUMCSMPARFMOUNCLOSUNFSAUNGAConvention on Biological DiversityEnvironmental Impact AssessmentFood and Agriculture Organisation of the United NationsInternational Tribunal on the Law of the SeaIllegal, Unreported and Unregulated FishingMonitoring, Control and SurveillanceMarine Protected AreaRegional Fisheries Management OrganisationUN Convention on the Law of the SeaUnited Nations Fish Stocks AgreementUnited Nations General Assembly
1: Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) are affiliations of nations which co-ordinate efforts tomanage fisheries in a particular region.RFMOs may focus on certain species of fish (e.g. the Commission for theConservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna) or have a wider remit related to living marine resources in general withina region (e.g. the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources).
Annex 3
GLOBE UK Fisheries Policy Workshop Summary
Overcapacity, Subsidies and Rights-based ManagementAddress the root cause of overfishing: the management systemThe UK industry sees some evidence of excess capacity in the UK fishing fleet.Givenfavourable conditions, there are members who would leave the fishing industry. In the UK, the levelof potential fishing capacity is greater than available fishing opportunity. However, the UK industryhas experienced a number of decommissioning schemes over the years which have greatly reducedthe total number of vessels operating in the UK fleet. As a result of this, there are some industrymembers who do not feel overcapacity currently exists or is a major problem in the UK. Theindustry would like to see further research into defining capacity, better understanding of the currentlevels of capacity, and developing ways to enable a transition to a fleet size that is suited toavailable fisheries resources based on sustainable fishing practises.This excess fishing capacity can have negative economic and ecological consequences.Some UK fishing fleets have much greater fishing capacity than actual fishing effort deployed orallowed. To some extent this overcapacity is required to give the fleet flexibility in terms of the stocksit exploits and the geographic area in which it operates (vessels may not be restricted to EU waters).However, unused fishing capacity is not benign; it results in less than optimal economic performanceof the UK fishing industry, reducing profitability and creating incentives for overfishing. Theseimpacts should be addressed through economic, market-based and ecosystem-based managementmeasures.The term „Overcapacity‟ was regarded as misleading.A number of industry representativesthought that „overcapacity‟ was not a clear term to use for fisheries and that controlling „fishing effort‟or „fishing mortality‟ would be more useful approaches. Capacity was regarded as the potential tocatch fish and did not necessarily mean that fishing was occurring at the maximum capacity of eachvessel or fleet. This raises an issue with the current Green Paper on the reformation of the CommonFisheries Policy that places large emphasis on reduction of overcapacity.As overcapacity is a symptom of poor management the target of policy reform should not beonly capacity reduction.Currently, overcapacity is a legacy of over-capitalisation of the Europeanfishing fleet stimulated by indirect subsidies such as open access to fisheries and direct Europeanand national subsidies such as economic assistance with fleet construction or modernisation and taxexemptions on fuel costs. The current management system continues to provide economicincentives to over-invest, allowing overcapacity to persist. However, there are many other areas ofpoor management including an emphasis on short term socioeconomic gain over long-termsustainability in fisheries, poor monitoring, control and surveillance, and a lack of effective sanctionsagainst fishers who are found to fish beyond quota or engage in illegal fishing practices. A fisheriesmanagement system that promotes sustainable fishing practices and sets incentives accordingly isrequired.Policy reform should focus on improving management systems,thereby addressing the rootcauses of overcapacity. Strengthening fisheries management overall (for example, throughstakeholder involvement, increasing the role of science in decision-making, strengthening controland compliance, and providing the right economic incentives) is critical. The CFP Green Paperoverstates the importance of overcapacity; rather than constituting a central failing, it is a symptomof failed management and inappropriate incentives.Decommissioning schemes do not address the root causes of overcapacity.Additionally,while decommissioning can greatly reduce the number of fishing vessels, technological innovationand investment in the remaining fleet increases fleet catching power (a phenomenon known as“technical creep”). The industry proposes investing public funds in other areas of management thatwould be more effective in reducing fishing pressure, such as stock assessments and monitoring,control and surveillance (MCS). Promoting the development and use of sustainable fishing practises
is also suggested, by non-industry groups. Decommissioning may, however, have a role to play forfisheries or fleets where there is a large difference between potential capacity and permitted fishingeffort.Develop integrated, flexible rights-based management at the national levelFishing quota management through Producer Organizations has been successful in the UK.Regional and sectoral Producer Organizations have been involved in quota management since1985. The process has been dynamic and adaptive, introducing and modifying tradability of quotasthrough time and allowing for both individual and pool or group quotas. The fishing industry hasseen benefits of the system including reducing the incidence of discarding, elimination of thecompetitive race to fish, establishing a collective self policing dynamic over quota use and fleetrestructuring through consolidation of quota into fewer licenses. However, non-industryorganizations do not view UK quota system to have been successful at eliminating overcapacity,overfishing or economic inefficiencies. To improve, non-industry groups suggest fishing quotas needto be formalized with quota distributed on the basis of sustainability criteria and compliance.Utilize a dynamic, highly adaptable approach to rights-based management in Europe.Fisheries across Europe are highly diverse, making no one rights-based management strategyappropriate for all. Adaptability is critical in all management systems and has been an importantcomponent of the success of rights-based management in the UK.In the UK, expand the system of Producer Organizations to include all fishing vesselstargeting quota stocks.Quota for vessels less than 10 metres in length in England and Wales arecurrently centrally managed by Fisheries administrations.Producer Organizations offer afundamental industry organisational unit to foster self-management in the industry and also thepossibility to protect more vulnerable fishing communities without the need for a separatedifferentiated system as proposed in the CFP Reform Green Paper. Many stocks, such as scallops,are also not currently regulated by quotas (non-quota species) and scientific stock assessments formany of these resources have not been completed. However, some non-industry organizationsquestioned the potential for improvement by expanding Producer Organization membership toinclude all vessels less than 10 metres in length as these vessels are currently included in pool orgroup quotas managed by the national fisheries authorities.Target subsidies to improve sustainabilitySubsidies should be linked to sustainable fishing and compliance.Some of the subsidies listedas “bad” by the MTAG may not necessarily be bad, such as modernization (improved gear and fuelefficiency), local food and fish processing, port construction and maximizing added value throughprocessing. Agreement was not reached on fuel subsidies; some participants felt they made fishingartificially profitable, while others felt there could be a case for fuel subsidies when accounting forother socioeconomic values of the fishing industry e.g. tourism.Subsidies should be used to invest in improved fisheries management.Some aspects of thisinclude improved stock assessments and scientific advice, monitoring control and surveillance(MCS), and assistance for developing countries where UK and European fleets fish. Fishing rightsand the allocation of subsidies could also be directly linked to sustainable fishing practise.Transition to self-sustaining fisheries that are profitable without public supportInvest now in a better fisheries management system with incentives for an economicallyefficient and profitable fleet.The industry aims to be self-sustaining without the need for publicsupport. This can be achieved through improved management.
IUU Fishing and TraceabilityRecognize and support industry initiative to source legal and sustainable fishThe seafood trade industry in the UK is committed to developing a fully traceable supplychainand importing only legally-caught fish. The UK fish processing industry relies on imports,which make up the majority (roughly 65%) of seafood consumed in the UK. Industry members haveinitiated cooperative efforts to tackle problems with illegally-caught fish in the supply chain. Becausesourcing legally-caught fish is important for seafood trade companies‟ reputations, they fully supportthe new EU IUU Regulations and the industry has engaged with a wide range of IntergovernmentalOrganizations (e.g. World Bank) and Non-governmental Organizations (e.g. Chatham House) todevelop fully traceable, legal fish supply chains.Build capacity overseasSupport third parties, particularly developing countries, to enable their compliance with theEU IUU Regulation.The industry strongly supports the use of electronic data submission androbust auditing of catch certificates to make implementation of the EU IUU Regulation efficient andeffective. This will require support to developing country trade partners to enable their compliancewith the new regulation. While there have been concerns over the European Commission‟s level ofengagement with third parties, now more than 80 countries have been approved for trade with theEU. The industry supports the change in EU policy from simply securing fishing rights overseastowards capacity-building for sustainable fishing and a secure supply chain. UK governmentinitiatives are also helping to increase capacity overseas such as DEFRA‟s input into DFID‟s AfricaFisheries Programme for tackling IUU fishing.Continue developing EU measures to eliminate IUU fishing worldwideBuild on successes with the new EU IUU Regulation.Although it has only just taken effect, thenew EU IUU Regulation has been successfully implemented and UK compliance levels are good.The Regulation is seen as a positive measure by the industry and is generally considered to besuccessfully reducing illegally-caught fish imports.Resolve problems with the new EU IUU Regulation.There have been concerns overengagement with third parties, but these will diminish over time as more countries are approved fortrade with the EU. The European Commission should provide funding and support to help thirdparties comply with technical measures such as electronic data submission. There is also a risk thatillegal fish will enter the supply chain as inputs (fishmeal or fish oil) for imported aquacultureproducts as some of these products are not currently subject to the new regulation. This potential“laundering” of illegally caught fish should be monitored and IUU Regulations modified if necessary.The EU IUU Regulations could form the basis for certification of sustainable fisheries.Thefeasibility of extending regulations aimed at certification of legally caught fish to include fish sourcedfrom sustainably managed fisheries should be investigated. Such a certification scheme could beused to reduce or eliminate the supply of fish from fisheries that are legal but unmanaged or notmanaged in a sustainable manner (e.g. many high seas fisheries for deep-water species). Such ameasure across the European Union, including the European fleet fishing abroad, could dramaticallyinfluence the levels of implementation of international agreements, codes and guidelines on fisheriesmanagement which have been signed up to by many nations but are not enforced in many areas ofthe ocean (e.g. UN Convention on Law of the Sea, FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing,various UN General Assembly Resolutions). Such measures would require a strict definition of a“sustainable fishery” (see below) and would have to be implemented in a way that did notcontravene free trade. They would also require significant support for fisheries management in thedeveloping world but could be critical as a part of a wider strategy to improve food security globally.Wild caught fish are one of the ultimate self-sustaining food sources if managed correctly.
Harmonize guidelines and standards for sustainable sourcingIn the long term, both public and private measures should aim for both legal and sustainablesourcing.Sourcing legally-caught fish guarantees it is caught according to national andinternational fisheries regulations but does not guarantee that the stocks are being fishedsustainably. There are private certification schemes as well as public standards-setting bodies whichhave begun to develop sustainability guidelines. It is important to maintain the distinction betweenthese different types of organizations and processes and utilize them where appropriate.Develop commonly-agreed sustainability guidelines.There has been a great deal of difficultyamong stakeholder groups (such as NGOs) in agreeing upon a common set of sustainability criteria.However, for the seafood trade industry to enact effective sustainable sourcing policies, suchguidelines must be developed.Use all available methods and sectors to tackle illegal fishingPromote both public and private sector measures throughout the entire seafood supplychain to eliminate illegal fishing.The EU IUU Regulation aims to prevent illegally-caught fishfrom being imported or landed into the EU, while the EU Control Regulation aims to reduce illegalfishing in EU waters. These public sector measures provide increased monitoring, control andsurveillance of fishing activities at sea, fish landings in ports and fish traded through processors andretailers. It is critical that these measures be adequately implemented throughout the EU, and thatpolicymakers recognize and support additional private sector measures. Furthermore, incentives forcompliance should be built into the fisheries management system, for example by increasingindustry involvement in decision-making. The legality and sustainability of aquaculture productsshould also be investigated as a matter of priority.
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Marine Spatial PlanningApproach Marine Spatial Planning holisticallyEnsure fishing sector involvement in marine spatial planning,particularly in the development ofa Marine Protected Area network. There is a strong feeling within the fishing industry and amongstpoliticians that fishers are not adequately involved in the marine spatial planning process or in thedevelopment of a Marine Protected Area network. Implementing decision-making protocols thatensure fisher involvement is critical to achieving credibility and compliance.Address potentially negative impacts of displaced fishing effort and other marine activitiesresulting from the implementation of Marine Protected Areas.There is serious concern aboutthe unintended effects of Marine Protected Areas, such as displaced fishing effort causingoverfishing in other areas. Addressing these ecological impacts as well as potential socio-economiceffects is an important part of holistic marine spatial planning. The MTAG recommendation to installMPA networks in combination with fisheries management measures such as reduced fishing effortwas not discussed in detail by participants.Ensure the marine spatial planning process is dynamic and focused on long-term objectives.Fisheries legislation must allow for flexibility and adaptation into the future, with adequate support forresearch to assess the success or failure of management measures and for adaptive management.Clarify the purpose of a Marine Protected Area networkThe primary purpose of the currently proposed network of Marine Protected Areas in the UKis the conservation of species and habitats.While permanent Marine Protected Areas can havemany benefits to fisheries, in the UK and internationally they have been considered to be primarily atool for the conservation of biodiversity and less as a fisheries management tool. However there isgrowing evidence that MPAs, including in temperate offshore waters, can be used as one of a rangeof tools to improve fisheries, particularly for benthic species such as shellfish but also for demersalfinfish as shown on George‟s Banks. It is important to clearly define the objectives of an MPAnetwork when enacting policy for marine conservation, fisheries or marine spatial planning. MPAs
are a very important tool but have to be used appropriately and as part of a wider strategy ofmanagement of activities in the marine environment.„Real-time‟ closed areas are different from Marine Protected Areas and are an importantfisheries management tool.A primary difference between areas closed to fishing and MarineProtected Areas is in their permanence. Areas closed to fishing are less permanent than MarineProtected Areas, and are implemented when and where needed for fish stock recovery. Anotherdifference is in the activities allowed in each area. Marine planning and fisheries managementbodies should consider the objectives of „real-time‟ closed areas and Marine Protected Areas whendetermining which marine activities to permit.The current CFP is seen as a barrier to the implementation of MPAs in European waters andto the participation of the fishing industry in the designation process.The reformation of theCFP must allow the implementation of ecosystem-based fisheries management measures, includingthe designation of MPAs as fisheries management tools, or for other purposes, such asconservation of habitats or species, beyond territorial waters.It is critical that fisheriesmanagement, marine conservation and marine spatial planning are contiguous between watersunder national jurisdiction and those that are accessible as a result of the CFP. The CFP shouldallow full and transparent participation of the fishing industry and fisheries managers in the marinespatial planning process as stakeholders on an equal footing to other industries.Promote scientific research and communicationAddress the disagreement between industry and scientists on the potential impacts ofMarine Protected Areas in Europe.Although Marine Protected Areas are now a legal requirementin the UK, many associated with the fishing industry and government remain unconvinced of thebenefits. A lack of appreciation of, or agreement with, current research relating to the fisheriesbenefits of MPAs is a part of this issue. However, there is undoubtedly a lack of research in theconservation and fisheries benefits of MPAs in European waters. This should be addressed throughpolicies and legislation promoting further research into the impacts of current European MPAs andimproved communication between marine industries and scientists. Specific thematic calls forresearch into MPAs would be appropriate under the European Framework for research funding andcould be implemented immediately.
Global Fisheries ManagementThere was wide support for the expansion of intergovernmental fisheries managementframeworks.The network of RFMOs across the high seas is fragmented and incomplete; whilstmany fisheries are covered by RFMOs with little authoritative power, still more are left completelyunregulated. New RFMOs must be established to cover those fisheries currently unregulated, andthe powers and competency of existing RFMOs should be standardised.There should be a „Blueprint‟ for standardising RFMO good practice.Benchmark standards forRFMO responsibilities have been posited by the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, and theFood and Agriculture Organisation‟s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in 1995. Howeverthese standards are basic and generalised to suit the wide range of differing powers andresponsibilities of RFMOs. Agreement must be reached on an enforceable „Blueprint‟ for goodpractice, framing a code of conduct that all RFMOs should meet and be assessed against. RFMOsshould be sufficiently funded and resourced to be able to meet the agreed standards.RFMOs should be subject to independent international monitoring and review.RFMOperformance should be monitored and assessed against international „Blueprint‟ for good practicethat covers environmental, social and economic standards. There should be an international„blacklist‟ for those RFMOs who consistently and severely fail in their management duties. Under-performing RFMOs will need to improve their management to meet the agreed standards or facepenalties.
Cross-cutting IssuesDevolve and delegate management responsibilityThe industry strongly favours the devolution of management responsibility to regional,national and local levels combined with industry co-management.A great deal of fisheriesmanagement implemented at the European level could be more effective if implemented at theregional, national or local level. Furthermore, delegation of rights-based management to ProducerOrganizations in the UK has improved industry responsibility, self-policing and compliance. Nationalproducer organizations could have delegated responsibilities under a regional managementapproach which includes ecosystem-based management, greater transparency, and widestakeholder participation. It is important to ensure fishers are involved in both fisheries managementand marine spatial planning. However, non-industry representatives argued that delegatedresponsibility must also include accountability, transparency and financial responsibility formanagement costs.Improve the role of scientific and industry advice in decision-makingScience must play a greater role in fisheries management in Europe.Industry representativespointed out that there is limited scientific data to support the management of many fish stocks fishedin European and adjacent waters. Additionally the consistent setting of total allowable catches(TACs) above scientific recommendations in Europe for short-term economic gain has been a majorcause of failure of management of European fisheries. More resources should be directed atscientific assessment of fish stocks and scientific evaluation of management strategies. Scientificrecommendations of TACs should not be exceeded and fisheries management should be evidencebased. Where scientific data are lacking or are uncertain, the precautionary principal should beapplied in accordance with international fisheries agreements. There is a need for much moretransparency and wider participation in fisheries negotiations and management in the EuropeanUnion.Address the Industry-Science divide.There is currently a major gulf in communication andunderstanding between members of the fishing industry and scientists. It is important to integrateboth scientists and the industry into the fisheries management process to enhance communicationand cooperation between the two groups. One part of this may be through co-managementarrangements and rights-based management, which give more management responsibility to theindustry while creating incentives to invest in scientific assessments of the resource.Increase participation of fishermen in the collection of scientific fisheries data.There waswide agreement that fishing industry participation in data collection would not only increase theaccuracy of stock assessments but also stimulate better communication and trust between fishersand scientists.Make scientific advice interdisciplinary.Fisheries face many social, economic and ecologicalchallenges. These challenges are dynamically integrated and will require an interdisciplinaryapproach to meeting them. The lack of such integration in the past has negatively contributed to thepolitical dimension in fisheries management. The Common Fisheries Policy aims for three pillars ofsustainability: social, economic and ecological. To achieve these aims, fisheries managementshould more strongly integrate natural and social sciences.
Comments from the UK All-Party Parliamentary Fisheries GroupAddress the Science-Industry divide at a global levelMembers of the UK APPFG are concerned about the lack of trust and communicationbetween scientists and the fishing industry.Members sought to recognize the progress industryhad made recently towards sustainable fishing and develop policy mechanisms to enable the twogroups to work together to develop socially, economically and ecologically sustainable solutions tofisheries management problems. This will require greater transparency, interdisciplinary dialogueand the creation of multi-stakeholder groups at the management level.Address the problems with intergovernmental fisheries managementMembers of the UK APPFG see many of the problems with the Common Fisheries Policy tobe rooted in the intergovernmental framework.Failures of the CFP mirror failures of RegionalFisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the sustainable management of fish stocks due toissues of national control and collective decision-making. It is important to create a decision-makingframework for fisheries management that is fully based on science and is protected from nationalinterest and politics.Members of the UK APPFG support industry-government co-management of fisheries.Thereis weakness in the current management structure in which industry involvement is minimal.Devolution of management to the national or local level is important but improved inclusion ofindustry in decision-making must be a part of this.Marine Protected Areas are necessary but not sufficientMembers of the UK APPFG pointed out that while Marine Protected Areas are an importanttool in marine ecosystem conservation, they alone are not sufficient to ensure sustainableresource use.Significant reform of the Common Fisheries Policy is critical to achieving sustainablefisheries and the designation of temporary fisheries closures and permanent Marine Protected Areasare just one aspect of that reform.The socio-economic side of fisheries managementMembers of the UK APPG were concerned that the socio-economic effects of changing fisheriesmanagement were not addressed in detail during the discussions and stated that this aspect offisheries must be adequately assessed and factored in to any proposals and plans for fisheries inthe future.
Annex 4
European Fisheries Policy Workshop Meeting Agenda
DRAFT AGENDAInternational Commission on Land Use Change & EcosystemsEuropean Fisheries Policy WorkshopTuesday 23rdMarchEuropean Parliament, BrusselsMeeting Rooms A5G-1 & A1E-3
11h00 to 16h00 = Open to all MEPs16h45 to 18h = GLOBE group onlyRoom A5G-11100Introduction: AMarine Fisheries Recovery PlanHon Barry Gardiner MP (UK), Vice-President, GLOBE International, and Co-Chair,International Commission on Land Use Change and EcosystemsEurope’s Common Fisheries Policy: The Need for ReformIsabella Lövin MEP (Sweden), EP Fisheries CommitteeOverview: What GLOBE Policy Recommendations for Marine FisheriesMean for Common Fisheries Policy ReformPresentation by Dr Alex Rogers, ZSL / Chair, GLOBE Marine Technical AdvisoryGroup (MTAG)Respondant: Isabella Lövin MEP (Sweden)Panel 1: Addressing Fleet OvercapacityChair : Maria do Céu Patrâo Neves MEP (Portugal)Dr. Alex Rogers, ZSL/MTAG; Dr. Jill Wakefield, University of Warwick/MTAG;Professor Antonio Garcia Allut, Co-Founder of Lonxanet Foundation for SustainableFishing; Professor Michel Kaiser, University of Bangor/MTAG.Subsidy reform, rights-based management, transitional measures, alternativelivelihoods and Cap & Restore approach, Marine Protected Areas1300Panel 2: Developing a Culture of ComplianceChair : Raül Romeva i Rueda MEP (Spain)Andrew Read, Isle of Man /MTAG; Hélène Bours, Coalition for Fair FisheriesArrangements - CFFAResponsibility/Accountability, IUU Fishing, Control and Enforcement Reform (MCS),Certification of Sustainable Fisheries
1110
1120
11401200
Room A1E-314001400LunchPanel 3: The External DimensionChair: Barry Gardiner MP (UK)Matthew Gianni, DSCC/MTAG; Béatrice Gorez, Coalition for Fair FisheriesArrangements - CFFARFMOs, Third Country Agreements and UNCLOS1500MARE)Comments by Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG-Representative TBC1515Questions & Discussion
Room A5G-11600Coffee
GLOBE ONLY
1620
A European Response to GLOBE Fisheries Policy RecommendationsPresentation by Dr Alex Rogers ZSL / Chair, GLOBE MTAG and Isabella LövinMEPFinalisation of GLOBE European Recommendations
1640
1730
Workshop Ends
Annex 5
European Fisheries Policy Workshop List of Participants23 March 2010

Chairs

Ms Isabella Lövin MEP(SE)Mr Raül Romeva iRueda MEP (ES)Hon Barry Gardiner MP(UK)Rapporteur on the Commission's vision on the CFP reformEuropean Parliament Committee on Fisheries, European ParliamentCommittee on Fisheries
Vice President, GLOBE InternationalCo-Chair, GLOBE International Commission on Land Use Change and EcosystemsUK House of Commons

Legislators

European ParliamentHon Satu Hassi MEP (FIN)Chair of the Environment CommitteeMs Ulrike Rodust MEP (DE)Committee on FisheriesMaria do Céu Patrão Neves MEP (PT)Rapporteur on the Commission's vision on the CFP reform, Committee on FisheriesRaül Romeva i Rueda MEP (PT)Committee on FisheriesKriton Arsenis MEPCommittee on FisheriesHon. Ricardo Cortés Lastra MEPHon Steen Gade MPPresident of GLOBE Europe, Danish FolketingHon Sophia Rossen MPDanish FolketingFrédéric CuvillierNational Assembly of FranceHon Kostas KartalisPresident of the Standing Committee on Environment, Hellenic ParliamentHon Georgios KasapidisSenator Roberto Della SetaStanding Committee on Land, Environment and Environmental Resources, ItalianSenateHon Ulisses Manuel Brandão Pereira MPRapporteur on the EC Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP, Assembly of theRepublic of PortugalHon Barry Gardiner MPCo-Chair of GLOBE International Commission on Land Use Change andEcosystems, UK House of Commons
European Parliament
European Parliament
European Parliament
European Parliament
European ParliamentDenmark
Denmark
France
Greece
GreeceItaly
Portugal
UK
International Commission on Land Use Change & Ecosystems23 March 2010

Expert Advisors

Ms Hélène BoursProfessor Antonio García AllutMr Matthew GianniMs Béatrice GorezDr Simon Harding
Coalition for Fair Fisheries ArrangementsLonxanet Foundation for Sustainable Fisheries, University of CoruñaPolitical and Policy Advisor, Deep Sea Conservation CoalitionCoalition for Fair Fisheries ArrangementsMarine Scientific Advisor, Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society ofLondonBangor UniversityFisheries Director, Isle of MannReader, Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of LondonChief Marine Scientific Advisor to GLOBESchool of Law, University of Warwick
Professor Michel KaiserDr Andy ReadDr. Alex David Rogers
Dr. Jill Wakefield

Ex Officio

Mr Adam C.T. MatthewsMr Chris StephensMs Beth Gardiner-SmithMs Elizabeth ClarkSecretary General, GLOBE InternationalDirector, GLOBE InternationalPolicy Advisor, GLOBE InternationalPostgraduate Research Assistant, Zoological Society of London
Annex 6
Acronyms and Abbreviations
CFP, Common Fisheries Policy; DEFRA, Department for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs;DFID, Department for International Development; EU, European Union; FAO, Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations; G20, The Group of Twenty; GLOBE, Global LegislatorsOrganization; ICLUCE, International Commission on Land Use Change and Ecosystems; ITQ,Individual Transferable Quota; IUU, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing; MEP, Member of theEuropean Parliament; MP, Member of Parliament; MPA, Marine Protected Area; MTAG, MarineTechnical Advisory Group; NGO, Non-Governmental Organization; RFMO, Regional FisheriesManagement Organization; TAC, Total Allowable Catch; UK, United Kingdom; UN, United Nations;UNCLOS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; UNEP, United Nations EnvironmentProgramme; UNFSA, United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement; ZSL, Zoological Society of London.