Foreword1.The NATO Parliamentary Assembly supported calls for NATO to prepare a new StrategicConcept well before the April 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl when NATO leaders formallydecided to produce one. The previous Strategic Concept was adopted in 1999 and the securityenvironment has altered profoundly since that time. NATO – as a political and military alliance –has remained a vital institution precisely because it has adapted to changing circumstances. Thatprocess of continual adaptation cannot take place in the context of a static Strategic Concept. Asthe strategic environment and NATO evolve and adapt, the Strategic Concept must be revisedperiodically and renewed.2.The new Strategic Concept will be the first one to be adopted after the terror acts of11 September 2001 which transformed our understanding of the new security challenges posed byinternational terrorism. It will also be the first Strategic Concept to incorporate the perspectives ofthe new Allies – many having been formerly under Soviet rule - which have acceded to the Allianceover the last decade. It must therefore, combine more perspectives on how to address bothtraditional and new threats to mutual security.3.The Allies also represent different points of view on a broad range of issues that affect thefuture of the Transatlantic relationship. There are, for instance, competing “visions” of therelationship between NATO and the European Union. There are also concerns among NATOmembers about inequitable divisions of labour and levels of commitment to NATO operations.Such problems further complicate the task of maintaining public support for NATO and itsoperations.4.The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is well placed to make recommendations about a new –or at least, revised - Strategic Concept. Its members are drawn from the national legislatures of allof the member states of the Alliance. It is a product – and a symbol - of the democratic nature ofthe Alliance and represents a direct link to the citizens of the member states. As such it is a two-way channel of communication that affords NATO officials the opportunity to speak directly to therepresentatives of the citizens of the Alliance as well as venue for parliamentarians tocommunicate their constituents’ concerns to NATO’s leadership. As such, the contribution of theAssembly represents many of the concerns of the people this Alliance was created to defend.5.This document is the product of extensive consultation within the Assembly involving all fiveof its Committees. Although Assembly members represent very diverse political perspectives,consensus emerged on certain key themes in debates on the new Strategic Concept, including:the enduring importance of collective defence Article 5;the need to prepare the Alliance to take on a limited range of new tasks;the central role of NATO’s partnerships;the need for NATO to become a forum for discussion and co-ordination on thecomprehensive approach;the critical need to develop the proper capabilities for NATO’s missions and provide thenecessary resources;the importance of NATO’s public communication strategy;the growing significance of Article 2 in the current environment;the need for NATO to remain the main forum for transatlantic dialogue.

A. The commitment to collective defence, as defined in Article 5, must be reaffirmed asthe cornerstone of Alliance security. This reaffirmation should be underlined visibly bymeasures such as planning and exercises.7.A defining characteristic of the Alliance is the commitment of each member to the defence ofthe others. This profound undertaking is the foundation upon which the Alliance is built. Thenature of the threats to Alliance security has, of course, changed profoundly since that foundationwas laid. The Alliance does not face a wholesale, existential threat as it did during the Cold Warbut conversely the challenge of non-traditional threats has grown. Against this background, theAlliance should reconfirm the commitment embodied in Article 5, but it must constantly review howto fulfil that commitment by separately and jointly developing the necessary capabilities asenvisaged in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.8.Deterrence and the concept of extended deterrence also play a fundamental role in ensuringstability and preventing conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region. Much of this is embodied in theconventional capabilities of the Allied militaries, but nuclear weapons feature as part of extendeddeterrence. Members of the Alliance, however, should continue to evaluate the disposition ofthose weapons and the overall number with a focus on reducing the potential dangers posed bynuclear weapons.9.Territorial defence remains a vital, if unlikely, function of the Alliance. NATO should reassessits requirements for territorial defence - including planning, bases, infrastructure and reinforcement- to ensure that the Alliance continues to provide the required reassurance to its members anddeter aggression.B. The Alliance must emphasise its willingness and readiness to respond to threats totheir security that do not fall under the definition of the collective defence commitment ascontained in Article 5.10. In today’s world, threats to the security of the Alliance can originate almost anywhere. Insome cases, the use of military forces may be necessary so the Alliance must be able to countersuch threats wherever they arise.C. In terms of capabilities, there is no need to make a false choice between thecapabilities to perform Article 5 missions and the capabilities to perform operations outsideNATO’s geographical borders.11. Under the terms of Article 5, all Alliance members must be prepared and able to provideassistance to any member that suffers an armed attack. The threat is not against everywhere atthe same time, but it could be against anywhere at any time. Regardless of whether that meanssending military units and assets 300 or 3,000 kilometres from their bases, from one corner of theAlliance to another, or from within the Alliance to beyond its borders, the Alliance members needflexible and deployable armed forces. The imperative is to make NATO militaries more deployable,capable, and integrated. The capabilities needed to deliver military support to an ally in need arecompatible with those needed for stabilization missions that prevent distant security challengesfrom becoming proximate threats.D. Members must make available the capabilities to match their aspirations and improvethe efficient use of scarce resources.12. Although the current economic downturn will pass, longer term demographic trends meanthat increasingly older populations will need to be supported by relatively fewer taxpayers.Additional financial resources for military procurement are not likely to be forthcoming as thisdemographic shift and its financial obligations intensify. This means renewed emphasis on

spending more wisely. The success of efforts to do so will depend in part on improved defencecooperation and the reduction of barriers to defence-related trade in the transatlantic community.i. The Alliance should intensify and increase its common funding of procurement, maintenance,logistics and training that will give more capability for the same level of investment. It iscritical, however, that the savings produced from those efforts be reinvested in our nationalmilitaries and NATO, not returned to the general budget.ii. NATO should press further ahead with “usability” targets for the percentage of members’armed forces which are deployable and sustainable. To this end, members of parliament andnational governments should push ahead on reducing personnel costs in national defencebudgets and shifting more of those scarce resources towards operations, maintenance andprocurement. In addition, the Allies should strive to minimize the use of national caveats toensure that those resources can be deployed in the most effective manner.iii. NATO should maintain an inventory of member capabilities actually available for operations.This should be made available to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Assembly – as aforum for national parliamentarians – can play a key part in ensuring that Alliance membersmake every effort to meet their capabilities commitments and obligations to the Alliance.iv. NATO should streamline its decision-making structure. Consensus must remain at the heartof the Alliance’s decision-making structure, but many of the committees that have evolvedover the years should be consolidated to form a leaner and more effective headquarters.E.An evolving approach to collective defence requires that the Alliance consider broaderthreats to security.13. There are many potential security challenges facing the members of the Alliance, but NATOand its unique military capabilities are not necessarily suited to all of them. In a globalising world,the public perception of security is influenced by a number of non-military factors such as externalpolitical and economic pressure. While many of these areas should not and indeed could not begoverned by a common policy of the Alliance, lack of co-ordination and bilateral approaches toissues that have a multilateral impact risk undermining the Alliance’s credibility among Alliedpopulations. In order to enhance political solidarity among Allies, more emphasis should be put onpossibilities emanating from consultations foreseen in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.14. Article 4 calls for consultation when any member feels a threat to its “territorial integrity,political independence, or security”. An Alliance which attempts to do everything faces thepotential that it will dilute its core strengths and diminish its relevance. Some issues, however,stand out as areas where NATO can and should play a more active role in the context of Article 4:

i.

Cyber-Security.

All of our societies are increasingly dependent on information systems,which generates profound and widespread vulnerability. In addition, an attack on theinformation systems of one NATO member country could have cascading effects on manyother Allies. It is of vital importance to take additional steps to coordinate defences againstcyber attacks, share information and develop contingency strategies. Clearly this is notpurely a NATO function, but NATO has sixty years of experience in co-ordinating anddeveloping plans across the Alliance. NATO has already taken a number of steps to assistmember states in the defence against information systems attacks, but the Alliance shoulddevote more attention to what can only become a growing vulnerability to common securityas reliance on information technology grows. In particular, NATO should consider if, andunder what circumstances, a cyber-attack should prompt an Alliance response and how thatresponse could be coordinated with other international organizations.

Maritime Security.

Sea lanes of communication are a critical component of the globaleconomy, moving the vast majority of the world’s goods from producer to consumer.Disruptions in this communication represent a threat to the overall economic well-being of themembers of the Alliance. No one state has the ability to patrol the world’s oceans, but the

Alliance has considerable experience in co-ordination and standardization that can bebrought to bear on this problem.NATO should bring its collective national expertise on maritime security together in a mannerthat can share information and best practices. It should also coordinate with otherinternational organizations to conduct naval operations and patrols as needed.

iii. Energy Security.

Energy supplies are vital to the functioning of society and interruptions cancause systemic difficulties. Although energy security cannot be seen as a core function ofNATO, the Alliance should consider how the NATO framework and assets could be used tosecure energy supplies. This could include setting up a centre of excellence dedicated topromoting and co-ordinating best practices on critical infrastructure protection including theenergy distribution infrastructure.

iv. Protection against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The Comprehensive PoliticalGuidance of 2006 cites the spread of WMD and their potential use by terrorists as one of theprincipal threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years. The Alliance must do more toprevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against potential attacks using WMD, and beprepared to respond to their use. Missile defence of both deployed forces and populationcentres is an important part of adapting to evolving threat and, if possible, should bedeveloped in coordination with Russia.NATO should increase its programmes to provide technical assistance and training to bettersecure WMD stockpiles. It should also be used as a forum for the exchange of timelyintelligence that can reduce the risks posed by WMD. Finally, the Alliance should use its CivilEmergency Planning assets to train first-responders for WMD contingencies and augmentrapid reaction units that could assist those first responders if requested by a nationalauthority.F.Partnerships and co-operation with nations and other international organizationsshould be broadened and deepened.15. NATO’s partnerships are an increasingly important part of its approach to complexchallenges in regions on the periphery of Europe and beyond. The partners which aspire to NATOmembership should be given all possible encouragement and assistance to pursue their chosencourse of meeting the qualifications for membership. NATO’s “open door” policy regardingenlargement contributes to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.16. Similarly, the broadening and deepening of NATO’s partnerships promotes co-operation,confidence and stability, as well as enlarging the capacities of members and partners to addressnew security challenges. Not all partners aspire to NATO membership, but they often makesignificant contributions to NATO missions. NATO should further develop its mechanisms forconsultation and co-operation with partners who choose to contribute to NATO-led operations.17. NATO’s partnership with Russia merits special emphasis. The relationship is troubled byfundamentally different perspectives on many issues, including the role and nature of NATO in thecurrent international environment. These should not, however, overshadow the fact that NATOand Russia share many common strategic concerns, including the proliferation of WMD, the threatof terrorism, and the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. An area of particularemphasis could be the Arctic region. NATO member countries and Russia compose all but two ofthe countries in the Arctic region and the NATO-Russia Council could be a venue for discussion ofissues affecting this increasingly important region. NATO and Russia should seek to improvetransparency and to forge a cooperative relationship on specific issues where mutual interests canbe identified.18. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s partnership activities complement NATO’s programmesby engaging partners at the parliamentary level, by promoting the values and principles upon which

the Alliance is founded, and, when requested, by providing assistance and training in the field ofparliamentary oversight of defence and security matters. The NATO PA could offer particularassistance to states attempting to reduce the prevalence of corruption in their defence institutions.Corruption in the security sector poses considerable challenges to the efficiency of the defenceestablishment and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces while undermining publicconfidence in democratic institutions. Helping NATO partners to address this problem throughimproved parliamentary oversight could be a significant role for the Assembly.19. Regarding international organizations, the United Nations is an important partner of NATOand NATO should continue to deepen and broaden its relationship with the UN, particularlyregarding the mission in Afghanistan. The European Union (EU) should be a key partner but, fortoo long, the relationship has been hindered by a number of political roadblocks. This has createdan absurd position where two organizations with broadly overlapping memberships and founded onthe same principles and values are effectively blocked from forging the deeper co-operation thatholds such enormous potential. Parliamentarians with responsibility for budgetary oversight aredeeply concerned that scarce resources can be wasted through duplication and lack of co-ordination. It is often noted in discussions about EU-NATO relations that the member states ofboth organizations only have one set of armed forces. They also have one set of taxpayers. Asparliamentarians, it is our obligation to ensure that the resources provided to the EU and NATO areused to the maximum effect. NATO and the EU should find a mechanism that allows closer co-operation, even if that means resorting toad hocprocedures until an institutional arrangement canbe finalized.G. A new Strategic Concept should confirm the geographic limits of the Alliancecontained in Article 10.20. NATO must quell unfounded fears that it aspires to be a “global policeman” or seeksmembers regardless of location. Article 10 makes clear that membership is open to qualifiedEuropean states and this limitation should be reaffirmed.H. NATO should be the forum for transatlantic discussion on a comprehensive approachto security.21. The focus of NATO’s operations continues to be stabilization missions. Such missions aremore than purely military efforts and require close co-ordination between security forces andpolitical and economic development agencies. NATO cannot and should not attempt to “do it all”.Yet, NATO is a long-standing body for political and military co-operation between most of theworld’s industrialized democracies that bear the bulk of the burden of the political and economicaspects of post-conflict stabilization. The Alliance can serve as a unique forum for consultationand co-ordination. With its wealth of experience co-ordinating transatlantic military assets, it couldbecome a natural nexus for co-ordinating some non-military aspects of stabilization missions suchas security sector reform, and training of police and border guards. The Alliance framework shouldbe a forum for consultation and co-ordination on issues which have a direct impact on securitysuch as development efforts in post-conflict stabilization missions. The operative word should be‘collaboration’ and not ‘subordination’. Different organizations bring different skills to the table anda truly comprehensive approach depends on the ability of the agencies and organizations inquestion to organize themselves in a manner that uses their relative strengths to full effect.22. Lasting stability, however, requires that good governance principles and mechanisms beimplemented. Here again the NATO PA plays a role by helping to build integrity, increasetransparency in defence and improve the accountability of defence officials in fragile states.23. Security means far more than “defence”. The comprehensive approach acknowledges thatthe building of security depends upon the use of economic, financial, political, legal, and defenceresources. International organizations each have their own unique competences and comparativeadvantages in bringing these resources to bear in preventing crises and building stability. NATO’s

members must decide what role NATO should play in developing and implementingcomprehensive approaches to international security challenges. In that context, NATO should notsimply be a military “toolkit” to be called upon as necessary by other “players” in the internationalcommunity. It should have an active role in orchestrating a comprehensive approach, and thisagain reinforces the need for mechanisms for closer co-operation among internationalorganizations.24. To that end, members of the Alliance should strive to coordinate their positions on relevantissues in other international organizations in which they participate.25. NATO should also consider how to enhance its own intelligence capability and promotegreater sharing of intelligence among member states. The comprehensive approach relies oncoordination between civil and military authorities, but all activities are informed by intelligenceassessments. A truly comprehensive approach requires an ability to share relevant intelligence ina timely manner. NATO should consider convening conferences of national intelligence directorsin the same way it routinely brings together national armaments directors and chiefs of defence.I.NATO should take a completely fresh look at Article 2 of the Washington Treaty andfully explore the scope for Alliance co-operation that this would allow.26. Article 2 represents among other things, an undertaking by members to promote “conditionsof stability and well-being”, “strengthen their free institutions by bringing about a betterunderstanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded”, “eliminate conflict intheir international economic policies”, and “encourage economic collaboration between any or all ofthem.” The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has always placed great emphasis on Article 2 and ithas long since considered issues beyond the military defence of the Alliance.27. Article 2 underlines the notion of the Alliance as a values-based community and certainlygives scope in the economic sphere for some or all Allies to act in concert. The promotion ofconditions of stability and well-being further implies a mandate to adopt a broader concept ofsecurity in line with the comprehensive approach, and it supports the notion of the Alliance as anactive promoter of security. Allies should explore the opportunities that a fresh examination ofArticle 2 might provide.J.NATO must improve its public communication and build support for its missions.

28. Public support for the Alliance is essential. The problem that NATO faces, however, is thatfor many in the general public in North America and Europe, NATO is a legacy of a previous timerather than an organization that plays an important role in ensuring their security. The benefits ofthat security are often taken for granted while the costs – particularly in terms of NATO troopcasualties as well as local civilian casualties caused by NATO operations – are all too obvious.Public support in Allied countries for NATO operations will also be increasingly difficult to sustain ifburden sharing is perceived as being inequitable. The public has a right to expect clearexplanations of the reason for their nation’s commitment to NATO and its operations. Theirconcerns are easier to address when the wider political aims of an out-of-area engagement areclearly defined and are seen as being consistent with the national security interests of each Alliednation. NATO must also strive to make its values, role and missions understood in nations farbeyond its borders where there are all too many misconceptions and misunderstandings aboutNATO.29. NATO should ensure that its roles and activities are publicised as widely as possible, payingparticular attention to those aspects which have a direct effect on people’s lives such as NATO’simportant but little known role in co-ordinating and delivering disaster relief assets both within theAlliance and beyond.

33. NATO is an Alliance of sovereign nations who subscribe to the principles of democracy,human rights and the rule of law, and who believe that their security is best guaranteed through acommitment to collective defence. The Alliance embodies the indispensable link between thedemocratic nations of North America and Europe. This transatlantic partnership has successfullysafeguarded the liberty and values of its people over six decades and continues to do so. The endof the Cold War removed the ideologically based threat to the security of the member states. But itdid not remove the need for an Alliance based on the defence of values and committed tospreading democracy, peace and freedom. The role of the Alliance has become all the moreimportant in view of the rise of extremism, as shown by the terrorist attacks against Alliancenations. NATO’s raison d’être, preserving the security and liberty of its citizens, remains as vital asever.34. The goal of the Alliance is to protect the peace, liberty and security of its citizens and to do soin a manner that promotes a more secure and stable international order. The political and militarymeans that have underpinned its success for 60 years remain in place. These enduring elementsinclude – the transatlantic solidarity and cohesion of purpose, the indivisibility of security, thesharing of risks and burdens, the spirit of collectivity, the common approach to policy formulationand implementation, the harmonisation of defence planning and operations and the habits of co-operation born of years of working together. They were essential to NATO’s successfultransformation following the end of the Cold War and will provide the basis for its furtheradaptation.35. The transformation of the Alliance has been most visible in the deployment of its forces insupport of peace and stabilisation operations mandated by the United Nations (UN), in the openingof its doors to new members and in the creation of a wide range of relationships fosteringpartnership and co-operation. These developments represent a determination by Alliancemembers to reach beyond the reactive stance of the Cold War, to confront risks at their source andto actively promote the spread of Alliance values. They constitute the foundations on which theAlliance must build its future role and enlarge the zone of stability and security in the Euro-Atlanticregion.36. NATO’s principal field of competence and comparative advantage lies in the realm of defence– harmonisation of national plans and policies for collective defence; effective and timelydeployment and sustainment of armed forces for overseas missions, and provision of assistance topartner countries to organize appropriate and affordable armed forces under democratic control.37. The new strategic environment has meant a focus on the development of capabilities andassets suitable for out-of-area deployments. In view of existing commitments in Afghanistan,Kosovo and potential operations elsewhere, this emphasis will continue. However, the Alliancemust retain the capacity for territorial defence, as defined in Article 5.

38. The international situation is marked by uncertainty and unpredictability. The vulnerability ofour societies to disruptions to computer networks or the flow of energy, the rise of new regionalpowers, or natural disasters and environmental degradation creates new variables that should beaccounted for in a new Strategic Concept. In particular, member states and their societies todayconfront a wide range of challenges stemming from crises and conflicts in weak or failed states,ethnic tensions, religious extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) and competition for resources.39. Instability in distant regions could generate asymmetric threats and terrorism in the Euro-Atlantic area. These are best addressed through a comprehensive approach to security combiningthe military, political and economic tools available through co-operation with other internationalorganizations.40. NATO’s task is to identify and address which of these new risks fall within its scope andcompetence. The Alliance provides a unique framework for transatlantic consultation on all issuespertaining to the security of Alliance members, and there is a range of potential issues, includingWMD proliferation, cyber-security, energy security and maritime security, that could be considered.On each of those issues, the Alliance has to decide upon its own role and upon the appropriatedivisions of labour with other international organizations. The Alliance has already begun to adaptto the new challenges; the question is what further changes are needed. It is also clear that theAlliance cannot be ‘all things to all people’ without losing its focus and unique attributes.Therefore, it is important to define limits and prevent overreach.41. Existing and emerging security challenges demand capabilities and resources. Despite thecurrent emphasis and the planning targets agreed to by member states, alarming shortfalls remainin the capabilities needed by the Alliance to fulfil its commitments. Moreover, some memberscontinue to impose political constraints on the employment of their forces that impact adversely onoperational effectiveness. Pursuing current efforts to mainstream gender issues in NATO activitiescould also contribute to operational effectiveness.42. Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan has represented a steeplearning curve for the Alliance in terms of the requirements of peace support and stabilisationmissions. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan has become the symbol of its willingness to play amore active role beyond its boundaries and the need to implement a comprehensive approach tosecurity. In this case, NATO’s primary responsibilities lie in the provision of the crucial securityumbrella essential to development and reconstruction efforts provided - for the most part - by otherinternational organizations. That said, NATO’s role is not confined to the battlefield. It is providingassistance through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, military training and help with security sectorreform.43. NATO’s various missions all have a unique character but all have highlighted the close linkbetween military, diplomatic and civil efforts. The provision of a security framework which includesarmed forces, police and border guards, and institutions to ensure the rule of law and fundamentalfreedoms is essential for economic and social development. NATO has acquired considerableexperience in helping countries develop effective and affordable armed forces, and appropriatesets of civil-military relations. Member governments should examine the other areas of securitysector reform for which the Alliance could take responsibility. Defence, security and developmentare interdependent.44. In fact, the concept of security itself is broadening and becoming more complex. Forinstance, many citizens might well feel that the most direct threats to their security are neithermilitary nor national in character. Examples include the consequences of climate change such asenvironmental degradation, greater competition for resources, and mass migration; the potential ofcyber attacks; and the threat of ideologically-based terrorism. In that context, it is worth recalling

that the Alliance’s founding fathers did not envisage NATO as being purely military in nature. Thepreamble of the Washington Treaty states that the Parties “are determined to safeguard thefreedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles ofdemocracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being inthe North Atlantic area.” Article 2 also refers to promoting conditions of “stability and well-being”,and goes on to “encourage economic collaboration between any or all of [the Parties]”. Thiscombination of the preamble and Article 2 is the basis for describing the Alliance as a communityof values. During the Cold War, this aspect was understandably overshadowed by other aspectsof the Treaty. However, in today’s strategic environment, it is time to take a fresh look at thepreamble and Article 2 without preconceptions. At the very least, they appear to lend support tothe idea of the Alliance as an active promoter of security rather than just a narrow defender ofterritory.

C. Capabilities and Resources

45. In looking at the future security agenda, NATO must decide how much more it can contribute,both in terms of its geographic scope and the depth of its engagement. The Alliance could beinvolved in more regions and in more security-related areas. However, current commitments meanthat the Alliance is already considerably stretched. The degree, therefore, to which NATO canassume responsibilities in new areas depends on the agreement of the member states and theassets and competences they are prepared to make available to the Alliance.46. The determination by Alliance members that NATO should assume a more global approachand additional responsibilities, must be accompanied by an acceptance of the obligations involvedand a realisation that these must be shared fairly and supported by the necessary resources.47. In the days of the Cold War, NATO’s armed forces were structured to defend Alliance territoryagainst a widespread onslaught. Assets intended for that purpose – heavy and relatively static –contrast sharply with those required to implement stabilization missions outside the territory ofAlliance members. But the choice today is not between yesterday’s forces and those neededtomorrow. The Cold War is over and the Alliance no longer faces a wholesale simultaneousassault. Any conceivable threat to Alliance territory would be much narrower in geographicalscope. Supporting an Ally would inevitably mean moving Alliance forces to the field of operationswhich – even within the Alliance – could be hundreds or even thousands of kilometres distant. Inother words, the capabilities required to support an Article 5 operation overlap considerably withthose needed for expeditionary purposes.48. Deterrence – both conventional and nuclear - will continue to play a central role in Alliancestrategy. Just as conventional capabilities must evolve to changing environment, so must nuclearcapabilities.49. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons played a central role in NATO’s strategy of flexibleresponse. They continue to play a role as NATO member states reduce the number of nuclearweapons they hold to the minimum necessary to support NATO’s strategy of preserving peace andpreventing war.50. Among the new threats facing the Alliance is the proliferation of weapons of mass destructionand their means of delivery.51. While there is an Alliance consensus on the need for the development and deployment ofmissile defence systems to defend NATO forces in the field, there is increased interest in anAlliance-wide system to defend Alliance territory and populations. The precise architecture of thissystem is open to debate but the need for it is not. A missile defence system should be developed,if possible, in co-operation with NATO partners, including Russia.

D. Partnerships and Co-operation with Other International Organizations

52. NATO’s contribution must involve the closest possible co-operation and co-ordination withother international organisations, in particular the United Nations (UN) and the European Union(EU).53. UN relations and co-operation with NATO have steadily improved over the years. NATOderives the legitimacy from its adherence to the principles and purposes of the Charter of theUnited Nations as underlined in the Washington Treaty. Yet, NATO is an independent actor and ithas unique capabilities. As we move forward in the development of a comprehensive approach tosecurity, close co-operation with the UN will be important, as will establishing clear responsibilitiesfor different aspects of security.54. Relations between NATO and the EU represent a mixed picture - limited at the political levelbut constructive on the ground at the practical level of co-operation. However, their co-operationand collaboration falls far short of what is required by the high degree of commonality that existsbetween the two organizations - in terms of membership and resources - and by the demands ofthe international situation.55. The Alliance provides a unique framework for transatlantic consultation on all issuespertaining to the security of Alliance members. Its members are also members of many otherinternational organizations.Recognizing the broad nature of security challenges andcomprehensive approach needed to address them, it is beyond doubt that internationalorganizations must cooperate and have mechanisms in place to enable them to do so. Theabsence of such co-ordination and mechanisms is an affront to the taxpayer. The members of theAlliance should therefore consider using its framework to formulate common positions on relevantissues in other international fora.56. NATO has also begun developing relations with countries contributing forces in Afghanistan,the so-called “contact countries”. Those countries are well outside the bounds of the potentialenlargement of the Alliance as defined in Article 10, and are not involved in NATO’s formalpartnership programmes, but formal mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that their voiceis heard in NATO’s political deliberations on operations involving contact countries’ forces.57. There can be no lasting stability in Europe without a true partnership with Russia. Therelationship should focus upon common interests and concerns, but cannot ignore areas ofdifference. Alliance members have differing views on this matter and they should develop arealistic strategy for engagement to which they can all subscribe.58. NATO enlargement has broadened the range of perspectives brought to bear in Alliancediscussions and consultations. This breadth of experience will continue to grow as the Allianceadmits more European counties that seek to join and satisfy NATO standards and requirements. Atthe NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Alliance leaders extended the promise ofmembership to Georgia and Ukraine. The prospect of NATO - and EU - membership is alsoparticularly significant for promoting stability in Southeast Europe.59. The broad network of relationships developed by NATO and representing different degrees ofpartnership is a sign of the growing political role of the Alliance and its ability to promote stabilityand security through co-operation and the spread of democratic practices. The Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiativeall represent valuable frameworks for the exchange of views and practical co-operation onsecurity-related issues. These still have potential for further development, the benefits of whichwould far outweigh the necessary commitment of extra resources.

E. Public Support for the Alliance

60.Cold War stereotypes and misperceptions are still far too persistent both within Alliancenations and beyond. Furthermore, NATO operations understandably challenge public support notleast because they entail tragic casualties. A new Strategic Concept should help to countermisperceptions by stating clearly the roles and purposes of the Alliance. It should also seek tocontend with certain issues which erode public support such as inequitable sharing of risks andburdens.61. NATO should also be proactive in publicising the many ways in which it is directly relevant tothe security concerns of its citizens. One example is NATO’s role in Civil Emergency Planningwhich should be more effectively publicised. Since its inception in 1998, for instance, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre has been involved in over 30 relief efforts all overthe world but few members of the public are aware of this aspect of NATO’s work. Equally, NATOplays a special role in enhancing capabilities to mitigate the effects of the use of WMD through, forinstance, its Combined Joined CBRN Defence Task Force. Such efforts should receive greateremphasis and public attention.

APPENDIX 2: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, WASHINGTON DC, 4 APRIL 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of theUnited Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples,founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promotestability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace andsecurity. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any internationaldispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that internationalpeace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly internationalrelations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of theprinciples upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability andwell-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and willencourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly,by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop theirindividual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North Americashall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armedattack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defencerecognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties soattacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as itdeems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of theNorth Atlantic area.Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported tothe Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken themeasures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to includean armed attack:on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments ofFrance, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in theNorth Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or anyother area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the datewhen the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of theTropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights andobligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or theprimary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and anyother of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakesnot to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to considermatters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to beable to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may benecessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommendmeasures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to furtherthe principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede tothis Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument ofaccession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the UnitedStates of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument ofaccession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with theirrespective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon aspossible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the othersignatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which haveratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications ofBelgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date ofthe deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any ofthem so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for thefactors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development ofuniversal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for themaintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one yearafter its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America,which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation

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