TABLE OF CONTENTSI.II.INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN .................................................................. 2A.CONTINUED INSECURITY.......................................................................................... 2B.GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES ................................................................................... 4C.NARCOTICS: PROGRESS, IN PART THROUGH ISAF EFFORTS ............................. 5D.DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES AND CO-ORDINATION ............................................. 6E.PUBLIC SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN AND AT HOME .............................................. 7F.SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN: A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE CONFLICT ............. 8ELEMENTS OF A TURNING POINT? ................................................................................... 9A.A NEW APPROACH BY THE UNITED STATES .......................................................... 9B.NATO RENEWS ITS COMMITMENT ......................................................................... 10C.ELECTIONS IN AUGUST 2009: CAN MOMENTUM BE RE-ESTABLISHED? ........... 12D.ISAF COMMANDER MCCHRYSTAL’S INITIAL ASSESSMENT ................................ 13THE WAY FORWARD......................................................................................................... 14

1.A unique confluence of events makes 2009 a seminal year for the international community’songoing efforts in partnership with the Afghan people to achieve meaningful progress inAfghanistan.2.Members of the Assembly are well aware that after the initial dislocation of the Taliban andAl-Qaeda, Afghanistan made hopeful and promising steps towards a more secure future.However, the subsequent collective failure to implement a clear and sustained strategy has led toa dangerous return of violent extremists to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has also resulted inthe emergence of an ungoverned space in the frontier tribal lands in which attacks are planned onour citizens and their communities. Allowing chaos to re-emerge in the Afghanistan-Pakistanregion would be a clear and constant danger to all of our nations.3.The initial hope offered by a number of elements unique to the first part of this year has tosome extent been disturbed by developments on the ground. Your Rapporteur’s initial draft of thisreport, prepared in the first months of 2009, anticipated that our combined efforts in Afghanistanwere being offered a second chance by several milestone events. The elections in Afghanistan forthe office of the President scheduled for 20 August and the coinciding provincial elections, theinitial comprehensive policy review by the United States, the attendant increases in military andcivilian resources and the high-level attention devoted to the Afghan conflict by the US were allpromising developments. In addition, the renewed impulses generated throughout the internationalcommunity by the 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl and the International Conferenceon Afghanistan in The Hague also represented key developments.4.Unfortunately, undeniable trends including continued insecurity, exacerbated by theuncertain outcome of the elections, suggest that momentum has not yet swung decisively in favourof a brighter future for the Afghan people and success for the international community’s efforts.This judgement has been borne out by a fundamental and extremely persuasive reassessment ofthe mission by ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal, described to your Rapporteur inKabul in October 2009.5.Your Rapporteur firmly believes that, although faced with an extraordinary challenge, theAfghan authorities, NATO and its international partners can complete this mission successfully.The international community has rightly adopted a strategy that is “regional,” addressing theimportance of Afghanistan’s neighbours in its future; “comprehensive,” combining securityprovision with increased emphasis on governance and development; and increasingly“Afghanised,” demonstrating increasing leadership and stakeholding by Afghans themselves.These elements make up a strategy for success, if they are properly resourced. This Assembly aswell as our national parliaments have a crucial role in ensuring that a positive outcome prevails,through our collective oversight and resource-allocation functions, as well as our interactions withour constituents.6.The Afghan authorities, NATO and its international partners will continue to confront acomplex web of challenges, including dangers posed by eroding security, increasing corruption,the corrosive narcotics economy, and the unresolved problem of Pakistani safe havens. Theperceived lack of legitimacy that threatens to taint the results of the August 20 elections furthercomplicates the picture.7.Even in the face of these challenges, however, we dare not shirk our responsibilities to theAfghans or to our own populations. We are all aware of the suffering caused by the Taliban withinAfghanistan’s borders during its period of harsh rule. We equally cannot forget that ourindifference allowed Afghanistan to become a safe haven for the generation of murderous attacksagainst many of our countries. We simply cannot allow the re-emergence of such a situation.

8.In this report, your Rapporteur will seek to lay out some of the principal elements of thechallenges facing Afghanistan at this time, as a starting point for an informed debate amongst ourmembers. It will, to a large extent, avoid recounting the contents of the Committee’s previousreports on Afghanistan and NATO operations, focusing instead on current developments andareas where real change is occurring.9.Already our membership is well aware that in Afghanistan, nearly 100,000 men and womenfrom 42 NATO and non-NATO partner nations assigned to the International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) and US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) are assisting the Government of the IslamicRepublic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secureenvironment, facilitating reconstruction and development, and extending GIRoA control.10. While it is therefore natural for this inquiry to focus to some extent on NATO’s role inAfghanistan, it is fundamental to recall that the formal responsibilities of the Alliance itself havealways centred almost exclusively on one area: the provision of a safe and secure environment.NATO does not have the lead in providing for democratic development, agricultural reform, orliteracy programmes and the like, but far too frequently NATO is criticized for shortcomings inthese areas, which more appropriately fall under the responsibility of other organizations andagencies.11. This report is informed by your Rapporteur’s repeated travels to Afghanistan with the NATOParliamentary Assembly, most recently from 29 September to 2 October 2009, for meetings withsenior Afghan and international officials. On the most recent visit, the delegation discussedmilitary strategy with General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of ISAF, as well as reviewingthe current political situation in the wake of the inconclusive elections with the Speaker of theLower House of Parliament, the Ministers of Defence and Interior, and senior UN and diplomaticrepresentatives. The delegation also visited the Afghan National Military Academy, observingtraining manoeuvres and interacting with cadets. Members also received very encouragingbriefings from the ISAF Special Operations Fusion Cell, established on February 1 to collate andcorrelate intelligence gleaned throughout the country.12. After three days of discussions in Kabul, the delegation travelled to Mazar-e Sharif, wheremembers heard the ISAF Regional Commander’s situational assessment had exchanges withregional UN staff, and visited a regional co-ordination centre for Afghan security forces as well asa Provincial Reconstruction Team led by Sweden.13. Given the information gathered in the visit, as well as unfolding events and feedback fromfellow Assembly members, this version of the report differs significantly from the draft presented inthe spring of this year. The political fluidity surrounding Afghanistan at the time of writing alsoensures that elements of this report are unfortunately likely to rapidly be surpassed by events.

many areas as well as a general lack of government capacity and competency. ISAF CommanderGeneral Stanley McChrystal’s leaked Initial Assessment bore this out, as have numerous publicstatements by, among others, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General forAfghanistan Kai Eide. Afghan Parliamentarians have also echoed these realities in statements toour Assembly, both in Kabul and at our Sessions.16. More specifically, the security situation has deteriorated in all areas, with the level of violencereaching new heights throughout the country. The insurgency has, over time, demonstratedgreater aggressiveness and more lethal tactics. Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups haveexpanded operations into previously peaceful areas of the north and west and around Kabul. TheTaliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope, despite ISAF and Operation EnduringFreedom (OEF) military operations targeting insurgent command and control networks.17. General John Craddock, formerly Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), attributedthis increase in violence to three factors. First, ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA) haveincreased operational tempo and extended their reach into areas which were once safe havens forthe insurgents. Second, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan remain a sanctuaryfor the arming, training, and planning of operations against ISAF in Afghanistan. Third, insurgentshave taken to attacking reconstruction and development through attacks on convoys and aidfacilities, as well as the intimidation, abduction, and killing of aid workers. This insurgent tactic isclearly intended to convince Afghans that their government cannot provide for their individualsecurity, or the security of the international community’s efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan.18. The insurgency itself is not a homogenous movement. The political motivations rooted in thefundamentalist attitudes of the Taliban have been joined by a conglomerate of dissatisfied tribalgroups as well as criminal and drug gangs. General David McKiernan, then Commander of ISAF,described the insurgency to a visiting Assembly delegation in October 2008 as a “syndicate” thatbrought together numerous groups with diverse and overlapping interests, including but not limitedto the Taliban.19. In battling this insurgency, ISAF itself continues even today to face serious shortfalls incritical assets as the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) remained unfilled.While the end of 2008 saw some increase in national troop commitments and a reduction innational force caveats, the shortfalls remaining continued to hamper NATO operations in certainareas.20. General McKiernan also told the Assembly delegation that national caveats forfeited NATO’sinherent advantage over any adversary in Afghanistan through ISAF’s intelligence, speed,firepower, logistics and other attributes, and therefore put NATO soldiers at higher risk. Inaddition, insurgents are fully aware of national caveats and plan their own activities accordingly inorder to exploit the chinks they unwittingly create.21. Several NATO and Afghan sources have told Assembly members repeatedly about thedifficulties posed by the relatively rapid rotations of ISAF personnel. Tours of as little as fourmonths often limit ISAF personnel’s ability to learn lessons and maintain in-depth knowledge ofAfghan society. In such a complex operating environment, it is essential to put a premium onexperience and relationships with local populations and officials, which can only be developed overtime.22. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) must be the central element in combating theinsurgency.According to information obtained by your Rapporteur in Afghanistan inSeptember 2009, the Afghan National Army (ANA) is planned to expand from its current strengthof 93,980 to 134,000; it grew by 26,000 in 2008 and should grow by 28,000 this year. The ANA isleading more than 61% of deliberate operations in 2009. The ANA participates in more than

90% of all ISAF operations. The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) continues to grow insize and capability thanks to contributions of aircraft and training teams. In the past year theANAAC has provided 90% of the airlift required by the ANSF.23. On the other hand, the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo,attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make ANA units capable of independent action. TheAfghan National Police (ANP), for its part, remains a largely untrained force with high rates ofcorruption and absenteeism. The key ANP training program – Focussed District Development(FDD) – takes local police “off-site” for several weeks of training while local security is maintainedby a temporary force from the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP). This approach has producedat least temporary improvements in ANP performance where FDD has been applied, but the re-training effort is proving to take much longer than expected, with a drop-out rate of nearly a third.24. Insecurity has also had an impact on NATO’s supply routes into Afghanistan and forcedepisodic closures, straining logistical pipelines. These concerns have only been heightened as theUS has increased its troop numbers dramatically, requiring by some estimations a threefoldincrease in supplies. ISAF daily fuel consumption, for example, has increased in 2009 from2m litres/day to 4.1m litres/day.25. Approximately three-quarters of the food, fuel and other provisions that supply NATO forcespass through Pakistan. As a result of the mounting violence targeting Pakistan-based supplyroutes, NATO and US forces sought alternative transport routes, eventually leading to theestablishment of the Northern Distribution Network through the Baltic States, Russia, and CentralAsia. Increased insurgent activity in northern Afghanistan has put pressure on this supply route aswell. The Taliban has also sought to deter co-operation by Central Asian states in the Network,including through direct threats directed at their governments. Russia has largely co-operated inestablishing the NDN but insists its use exclude shipment of military hardware and ammunition.26. Fundamentally, the continued support of the Afghan people for the government and theinternational community will be dependent on the ability of the Afghan government, NATO, and theUnited States to push back the Taliban and deliver security, basic governance, and economicdevelopment. And without security, nothing else – especially development and reconstruction -- ispossible.

27. High hopes in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of the Taliban regarding the delivery ofservices and good governance have unfortunately proven too optimistic. Indeed, recent yearshave seen negative trends in these areas, as demonstrated by the fact that Afghanistan wasconsidered more at risk of state failure than it was in 2005 (rising on the “failed states” index fromthth11 in 2005 to 7 in 2008). Afghanistan was also rated as increasingly corrupt over the sameththperiod (dropping from 117 to 176 onTransparency International’scorruption index).28. President Karzai told a visiting Assembly delegation in October 2008 that combatingcorruption was an exceptionally difficult challenge due to the poverty of most Afghans and thecorrosive effect of the narcotics trade, coupled with the country’s weak governance structures andadministrative capacity. This would be a years-long effort by any account. President Karzaifurther lamented the fact that the contracts structured by donors often resulted in fundingchannelling back to western contractors rather than Afghans.29. The cabinet re-shuffle by President Hamid Karzai in the fall of 2008 was widely seen as anencouraging step. In particular, the new Ministers of the Interior and of Agriculture were seen asespecially competent and wise choices given the challenges to the previous incumbents. The

future of these Ministers in the aftermath of the 2009 elections will be crucial and remained, at thetime of writing, uncertain.30. The absence of effective governing structures also presented an opening that the Talibanhasexploited.AccordingtoJelaniPopal,DirectoroftheIndependentDirectorate of Local Governance (IDLG) in Kabul, the international community’s initial focus onsupporting the central government allowed a void to emerge at the local level, which had beenfilled in some areas by the Taliban. For example, in the absence of a reliable justice system,Taliban courts had emerged in Helmand province and were actively and rapidly resolving propertydisputes. Contrary to official institutions, these courts made decisions quickly and were in aposition to enforce them.31. The IDLG was therefore created to supervise provincial and district governors, provincialcouncils and municipalities outside of Kabul. Among its most visible achievements as of late 2008was the replacement of 13 provincial governors; it has also prompted progress of legislation thatwould mandate the delegation of authority and funding to provinces.

32. The scourge of opium continues to pose significant challenges to Afghan development,although the September 2009 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report offers somepositive news on opium production in Afghanistan. Opium cultivation is down, at least whenmeasured in physical terms (hectares and tonnes). Following the 19% reduction in opiumcultivation in 2008, a further decrease in opium cultivation of 22% occurred in 2009, including amajor drop in Helmand province. The volume of production was reduced by 10%. The number ofpoppy-free provinces has increased from 18 in 2008 to 20 in 2009. Four other provinces have‘marginal’ cultivation and three others could become drug free in the next farming season.Effectively, opium production is now largely confined to a few southern provinces, althoughtrafficking continues through “poppy-free” provinces along traditional smuggling routes.33. The UN attributes much of this progress to a collapse of the Afghan opium market, in whichover-supply at the source and lower market penetration in Europe are pushing opium prices down.It estimates that 800,000 fewer Afghans are involved in opium production compared to 2008.34. Market forces have been reinforced by pressure put on the link between drugs andinsurgency by Afghan and NATO forces, according to the UN, leading to a shifting risk/rewardbalance tilting against drugs. In October 2008, based on the request of the Afghan Government,NATO Defence Ministers agreed that ISAF could act in concert with Afghan police and armyagainst narcotics facilities and facilitators who support the insurgency. As a result, in the first halfof 2009, military operations destroyed over 90 tons of precursor chemicals, 450t of seeds,50t of opium, 7t of morphine, 1.5t of heroin, 19t of cannabis resin and 27 labs. This has increasedthe risks of drug trafficking and created a deterrent for the future.35. However, despite the reductions in cultivation in 2008 and 2009, the Afghan drug traderemains a major source of revenue for corrupt officials, the Taliban and other insurgent groupsoperating in the country. It is one of the greatest long-term challenges facing Afghanistan.Afghanistan still accounts for 90% of the world’s opium supply and the UN estimates that the totalexport value of the country’s 2008 opium crop was nearly US$ 3.5 billion. The reduction in size ofthe 2009 crop is viewed as a window of opportunity through which the opium industry inAfghanistan may be dealt a significant blow.

In order to consolidate these gains, the Executive Director of the UNODC has called for:Vigilance against the emergence of Afghan narco-cartels, increasingly motivated bydrug money rather than ideology;Avoiding a relapse by focusing international assistance programs on ruraldevelopment, and particularly avoiding individual foreign-sponsored projects aroundeach Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) rather than coherent assistance programsacross Afghanistan;Focusing oninterdictionrather thaneradication,and continuing to target drug kingpins;Targeting massive missing stocks of opium produced in recent years;Emphasizing a regional approach including both Pakistan (through which 25% ofAfghan narcotics is smuggled) and Iran (through which perhaps 50% of Afghan opiumis exported), as well as Central Asia.

37. Without a doubt, progress has been made in a number of crucial development areas. Oneexample is the Afghan health sector, in which the number of functioning primary health carefacilities increased from 498 in 2002 to 1,443 in 2008; 85% of Afghans now have access to basichealth services. The per capita GDP has also steadily risen since 2002. Since 2001, more than3,500 schools have been built.38. NATO Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Fernando Gentilini told Assemblymembers in October 2008 that a number of promising reconstruction-related events had occurredin that year. First, the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) wasstrengthened and Ambassador Kai Eide, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary Generalfor Afghanistan, arrived in Kabul. Second, significant funding (US$ 21 billion pledged by morethan 80 donors) was generated at the June 2008 donors’ conference in Paris, in support of theAfghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which itself provided an overall frameworkfor the international community’s coordinated efforts under the three pillars of security,development, and governance.39. Several interlocutors in Afghanistan underlined to your Rapporteur in September 2009 thatthe ANDS remains the most effective comprehensive development plan and represents a plan notonly endorsed by the Afghans but in large part authored by them. Thus, they argued, nationalagendas by donor countries should be aligned with the ANDS rather than on purely bilateralassistance programs.40. NATO nations also operate a system of 26 PRTs, led by 14 different nations. A total of30 countries contribute to the PRTs, which have provided more than US$ 545 million in projectsthroughout the country.41. Despite these advances, perceived inefficiencies in the delivery of international assistancehave undermined the confidence of the Afghan population in its Government and in theinternational community. UN personnel and NGOs continue to struggle to provide assistance inareas “cleared” of insurgents after counter-insurgency operations, as these areas often cannot be“held” by Afghan or international forces and are devoid of enough personnel and equipment to“backfill”.42. Kai Eide is cited in a recent UN report as concerned that, despite his efforts to increaseUNAMA’s co-ordination capacity, any impact remained limited by the lack of a comprehensivepicture of the aid being provided to Afghanistan as well as by the continued unwillingness of somedonors to fully back existing co-ordination mechanisms. UNAMA itself continues to be hampered

by personnel and funding shortages, inexperience of some of its staff members, internaluncertainties over the appropriate degree of co-operation with ISAF forces, and its inability tocreate and man field offices in critical provinces.43. Ambassador Eide has also stated his concern about the concentration of aid in conflictareas, to the detriment of more stable regions (particularly the north of Afghanistan) where thereturns on aid could be much higher. While progress in implementing the Afghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy was accelerating, further gains would take time and sustained effort, aswell as increased Afghan government capacity.44. Senior Afghan officials, including President Karzai, have regularly called for increasedchannelling of aid through Afghan institutions. He argues that funding needs to go through localactors rather than contractors who create new bureaucracies and are relatively expensive.45. Jelani Popal, the Director of IDLG, has made it a priority to co-operate with PRTs toimplement government priorities through Provincial Development Plans, which were based onprojects suggested by locals. Popal sought the PRTs’ assistance in developing Afghan capacity atthe provincial level for planning and budgeting, in an effort to strengthen the skill set andindependence of local officials. He also called for the civilian elements of PRTs to bestrengthened and to remain in the country for longer than 6 month tours in order to ensurecontinuity. Finally, he suggested PRTs focus more on long-term projects rather than exclusivelyon quick-impact ones. Popal affirmed that one kilometre of road financed through Afghanchannels would cost US$ 500,000, while the same kilometre, built using direct bilateral assistance,would cost no less than US$ 1,000,000.46. UNAMA regional officials have repeatedly told Assembly members that donor funds shouldincreasingly be channelled through Afghan authorities rather than bilaterally, and called inparticular for greater use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund by donors in order toincrease Afghan ownership of development projects. UNAMA regional officials also called forprioritized funding of long-term projects over quick-impact proposals, and for increased investmentin the extraction of the region’s mineral resources, which could be exploited for Afghanistan’s long-term gain. Very little aid was reaching Afghans at the district level, and their lives had notimproved appreciably since the fall of the Taliban.

47. The continued support of the public – both in Afghanistan itself as well as in the nationsproviding troops, funding and other assistance – is absolutely critical to achieving success. Unmetexpectations on all sides are beginning to erode confidence that the mission is achievable.48. The principal complaints and accusations against international forces by Afghans centre ontactics such as forced entry of houses and the arrest of Afghans by international forces.Of course, the tragic problem of civilian casualties, which by some estimates rose 40% last year, isalso a core grievance. According to NATO, these are still caused principally by the insurgency,which systematically targets civilians as part of its strategy. Indeed, NATO officials point out thatinsurgents accounted for 80% of civilian casualties in 2008. NATO further points out thatinsurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the largest single causeof civilian casualties. The importance of this issue has been repeatedly emphasized by ISAFcommanders in successive “tactical directives”. However, translating that policy into actions at thesoldier level has proven difficult.49. Even so, some positive indicators exist, including the fact that Afghan institutions maintainsome public support and that the Afghan public continues to reject the Taliban. Most polls showAfghans rating the performance of the Afghan Army positively (particularly high relative to the

perceived performance of the United States and NATO/ISAF). One possible conclusion of suchsurveys is that, given these results, it could prove more popular to put the relatively more trustedand popular Afghan institutions – rather than a Western face – on anti-insurgent efforts.50. Uncertain public opinion on the war in Afghanistan in troop contributing nations is onlyexacerbated by instances such as the proposed Afghan family law that the United Nations hascompared to legalizing rape within marriage. The so-called Shia Personal Status Law, covering theShia minority (roughly 10-20 % of the population), was first reported in late March 2009.51. According to Human Rights Watch, after its submission to a consultation process with civilsociety groups, the final version was published in the official Gazette on July 27, 2009. Thatversion of the law still contained many regressive articles that deny women rights guaranteed tothem by the Afghan constitution, for example allowing a husband to withdraw basic maintenancefrom his wife, including food, if she refuses his sexual demands.52. Speaker of the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga) H.E. Younus Qanooni expressed disappointmentthat the Parliament, which he said had demonstrated more achievements than any other Afghaninstitution, had come under criticism regarding this law. He assured Assembly members inOctober 2009 that Parliament had “improved” the law significantly, fundamentally altering theoriginal version of the law. After the August 20 elections, President Karzai had proposed newamendments to the law, according to Qanooni, and the Parliament was reviewing it carefully withan eye to further improving its provisions.53. The ongoing Personal Status Law controversy continued to demonstrate the challenges ofthe interactions between domestic and international politics in Afghanistan. It also posed afundamental challenge to members of the international community regarding the balance betweenrespecting sovereign political processes and defending their shared values.

54. The security of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to that of Pakistan. General McChrystal’sleaked assessment could not be clearer: “Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported fromPakistan.” This message was emphasised to your Rapporteur in September 2009 by numerousmembers of the Afghan parliament.55. It is critical to engage Pakistan fully if there is any hope of denying safe havens to theAfghan insurgency. A promising development in this regard is the improved communication andco-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past year. Increased contacts at alllevels have resulted in multiple channels of dialogue across the border, although particularly in thecommunity of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek former Mujahidin, there remains deep suspicion ofPakistan’s strategic motives toward Afghanistan – suspicion that is mirrored by some on thePakistani side.56. In support of a regional approach and to facilitate a mutually reinforcing co-operationbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan, Turkey initiated the Trilateral Summit process with theparticipation of the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic ofPakistan in 2007. The three Summits held since then focused on the issues of dialogue,development and security, respectively. The last trilateral Summit, held in Ankara last April,focused on regional security. Together with Presidents, the top military and intelligence officials ofthe three countries attended the Summit in order to institutionalize the process among military andintelligence chiefs to focus on security issues.57. Recent proactive engagement by the Pakistani government and Army (with support from theUS) to address the presence of Pakistani Taliban in the North-West Frontier Province and

Federally Administered Tribal Areas has also been encouraging. These efforts have begun toprovide the Pakistani government space to reassert control in the areas.58. India’s increasing role in Afghanistan through reconstruction projects and diplomatic effortsis also of concern to Pakistan. Some Pakistani analysts suggest that India’s influence could leadto a strategic encirclement of Pakistan, and seek the assistance of the US in reducing anyperceived gains by India.59. Without seeking to imply that Pakistan is anything other than a central element of this overallpicture, your Rapporteur will not dwell further on Pakistan’s own challenges; this issue is treated insome detail in the 2009 report by Political Committee member Congressman Mike Ross of theUnited States.60. Of course, other external actors also have major levers to affect the future of Afghanistan.Iran is undeniably one such actor, and in General McChrystal’s report, it is named as playing anambiguous role in Afghanistan. On the one hand, it has supported the Afghan government by,among other steps, pledging US$ 560 million at the Tokyo Conference on the Reconstruction ofAfghanistan in 2002, and an additional US$ 100 million at the 2006 London Conference. At theInternational Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague in March 2009, the Iranian Deputy ForeignMinister suggested that while Iran objected to foreign forces being present in Afghanistan, hiscountry was “fully prepared to participate in the projects aimed at combating drug trafficking andthe plans in line with developing and reconstructing Afghanistan".61. On the other hand, ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal’s Initial Assessmentpoints to reports of a more malign influence:“… the Iranian Qods Force is reportedly training fighters for certain Taliban groups andproviding other forms of military assistance to insurgents. Iran’s current policies and actionsdo not pose a short-term threat to the mission, but Iran has the capability to threaten themission in the future. Pakistan may see Iranian economic and political initiatives as threatsto their strategic interests, and may continue to address these issues in ways that arecounterproductive to the ISAF effort.” (McChrystal Report, page 2-11)

64. The strategy focused more intensively on Pakistan than in the past, calling for a regionalapproach. The Obama Administration sought, and received, from Congress an additional packageof assistance to Pakistan that is planned to disburse US$ 1.5 billion a year over five years (for atotal of US$ 7.5 billion).65. As outlined by Secretary of State Clinton at the International Conference on Afghanistan inThe Hague on 31 March 2009, the new US strategy rested on three prongs: that the challenge iscomprised of both Afghanistan and Pakistan; that military and civilian activities are equallynecessary and must be supported by diplomatic efforts; and that Afghanistan’s own people andinstitutions bear ultimate responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.66. The new strategy recognized that “Security is the essential first step; without it, all else fails”.In order to assist the Afghan National Security Forces’ efforts in this regard, the ObamaAdministration announced an additional 17,000 soldiers and 4,000 additional military trainers tobuild up the Afghan security forces, bringing the total number of US forces to more than 68,000.67. However, even this number of additional troops in combination with the NATO forces intheatre cannot hold territory across Afghanistan in a sustained manner. Thus the new US plancalls for the training and equipping of much larger ANSF. It aimed for a target size of 134,000 forthe ANA and 82,000 for the ANP by 2011, to accelerate Afghan ownership of security provisionthroughout the country.68. On issues other than physical security, the new US strategy foresaw a doubling of Americancivilian officials in Afghanistan, to over 900. US Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan FrankRicciardone told a visiting Assembly delegation in October 2009 that the rapid increase of civiliansincluding five Ambassador-rank officials in the US Embassy was evidence of this approach, whileadmitting that numerous challenges have slowed progress in this area. The new strategyemphasizes support to the Afghan National Development Strategy and identifies agriculture as akey for development. Underlining the problems of corruption, it sees Afghan institutions such asthe Independent Directorate of Local Governance as key to ensuring that the government isresponsible, transparent, and effective at all levels.69. The Presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan both welcomed the new US strategy. AfghanPresident Hamid Karzai praised the regional emphasis as well as the potential reconciliationefforts, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari commended the renewed focus on economicdevelopment and assistance to Pakistan.

70. NATO’s Heads of State and Government at the Alliance’s 60 Anniversary Summit meetingin Strasbourg-Kehl declared that security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan’ssecurity and stability, and underlined that the 42-nation UN-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistanis NATO’s key priority.71. According to the NATO Secretary General, more than 10 countries announced newcontributions. NATO leaders also pledged to build closer political and practical ties with Pakistan.Several thousand additional troops were pledged to bolster security for the August 20 elections,and an additional 2,000 personnel were pledged to train Afghan Security Forces.72. NATO nations also pledged to expand the NATO-ANA Trust Fund for the army to coverrunning costs and to encourage international contributions to the fund. The NATO-ANA TrustFund provides a mechanism for ISAF nations to support the transportation and installation costsfor equipment donations by ISAF nations to the ANA; the purchase of ANA equipment andservices for engineering infrastructure projects; and in-and out-of-country training

73. The sustainment part of the ANA Trust Fund is estimated to require annual financial supportof US$ 1.8 billion (on the basis of a 134,000-strong ANA ceiling). The Fund will help pay forsalaries and other costs, complementing separate support from the United States, whichconcentrates on initial build-up of the force (ammunition, uniforms, training, as well as theconstruction and maintenance of security infrastructures).74. European Allies and partners pledged in 2009 some US$ 350 million to the trust fund, andthe United States is spending US$ 5 billion this year and over US$ 7 billion next year to train,equip, and sustain the army and police. The US-led efforts totalled 7 billion in 2009.75. A French initiative, calling for a 300-member European Gendarmerie Force to train andmentor Afghan National Police, was also approved. The force would conduct its training forperiods of up to 11 months in areas “cleared” of insurgents and “held” by Afghan forces –increasing efficiency of programmes in which police forces were sent to Kabul for training. It wasalso announced that 70 additional military training teams would be sent by European governmentsto assist with the growth of the ANA to its authorized level of 134,000.76. In addition, the assembled Heads of State and government decided to establish aNATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee training for the Afghan army and policeand pledged to provide more trainers.77. NTM-A will comprise senior-level mentoring of the ANA and an expanded role in developingprofessional ANP. The mission will operate under a dual-hatted command, with a singlecommander for both the US-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. The mission will provide higher-level training for theANA, including defence colleges and academies, and will be responsible for doctrine development,as well as training and mentoring for the ANP. This will reflect the Afghan Government’s policingpriorities and will complement existing training and capacity development programmes, includingthe European Union Police Mission and the work of the International Police Co-ordination Board(IPCB). In a briefing to Assembly members in Kabul in October 2009 by CSTC-A Commander,MGEN Formica and his key staff, he emphasized the critical need for additional trainers,equipment donations and funding to maintain the momentum of the ANSF training effort.78. In practical terms, the new mission means bringing most current army and police trainingprogrammes under a single umbrella, drawing on and better utilising resources that are already intheatre. NTM-A is intended to help reduce duplication of effort, whilst creating more integrated,coherent and robust ANA and ANP training structures and capabilities.79. The establishment of the NTM-A is part of a significant restructuring and clarification ofresponsibilities that has been taking place over the past year but which has accelerated sinceGeneral McChrystal assumed command. The restructuring essentially comprises the alignment ofUS commands with ISAF, the establishment of an Intermediate Joint Command (IJC) on12 October, which is focused on operations, and the establishment of the NTM-A. Thisrestructuring in itself is a reflection of a continued and renewed commitment fromISAF contributors but it has also enabled a more coherent and dynamic ISAF command.80. The new NATO commitments can be seen in conjunction with the results of the InternationalConference on Afghanistan in The Hague on 31 March 2009. Over 70 countries met to discussthe overall picture in Afghanistan and the region, and generally endorsed the ObamaAdministration’s shift in emphasis.

81. The Presidential and provincial council elections held in August 2009 were intended to be akey step in the democratic construction of the Afghan state, as laid out at the Bonn Conference in2001. A state’s capacity to conduct free and fair elections in a relatively safe and secureenvironment is a test of its functioning as a government. Successful elections in Afghanistan weresaid to have the potential to re-energize the political process both domestically and internationally.The international community therefore sought to ensure that the elections were conducted in asafe and legitimate manner.82. The run-up to the elections themselves was in many respects promising. The voterregistration process was completed successfully, and perhaps surprisingly, faced no concertedefforts by the insurgency to disrupt it. Approximately 4.5 million new voters were registered(of which almost 1.7 million were women), in addition to the more than 10 million registered in2004, which far exceeded expectations. Several on-the-ground observers told your Rapporteurthat the process leading to the elections engaged the population in open and serious debatebetween alternatives and demonstrated an appetite amongst the Afghan people for furthercontinued democratic development.83. According to Afghan authorities, only 10 districts out of 398 across Afghanistan could notparticipate in the registration process for security reasons. This success has received littleattention in western media, for whom the lack of significant violent attacks against the registrationprocess meant that the process itself was a ‘non-event’.84. In addition, the international community made significant pledges towards supporting theelections, allowing President Obama to announce at NATO’s Strasbourg Summit that the electionsupport requirements laid out by NATO authorities had been “fully resourced”.85. The extraordinary security challenge requiring the security of more than 7,000 pollingstations was met principally by Afghan forces, with the national police providing the first line ofsecurity, the Army providing the second, and ISAF providing the third. The fact that the securityeffort was Afghan-led was itself a significant indicator of the growing maturity of the ANSF and theimproved ability of the ANA and ANP to work together.86. On the day itself, 41 presidential candidates, including two women, and over 3,000candidates for provincial council seats presented themselves. According to the UN, more pollingstations opened than during previous elections. Voter turnout was much lower than the 2004election, with an estimated 38% of the eligible population casting ballots, compared to 70% in2004. One explanation for the low voter turnout could be a result of the spike in violent attacksleading up to the election: the Taliban issued threats warning voters to stay away from the polls; acar bomb exploded before the election outside ISAF headquarters; August marked the deadliestmonth since the inception of the war; and on election day, ISAF reported more than 400 insurgentattacks – a one-day record.87. ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal’s Initial Assessment included the following evaluationof the election:"From a security standpoint, they (the elections) were generally executed smoothly andwithout major physical disruption, although the credibility of the election results remains anopen question. The country-wide spike in violence against ISAF and ANSF, with three tofour times the average number of attacks, underscores the widespread reach of insurgentinfluence, particularly in the south and the east and in select areas of the north and west.However, the relatively low number of effective attacks against polling centers offers someevidence that insurgents were targeting ISAF and ANSF, not the voters."

(McChrystal, Stanley, 30 August 2009. “Commander’s Initial Assessment.”)88. On September 16, the Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC), a group of Afghanofficials appointed by President Karzai, published the final uncertified voting tallies: of the twoleading candidates, incumbent President Hamid Karzai received 54.6% of the vote and principalchallenger Abdullah Abdullah received 27.8%. At the time of writing, these totals remained inquestion pending the results of investigation by the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission(ECC).89. Local observers told visiting members of the Assembly that the population was hoping simplyto have the process finalized. Indeed, it seemed clear that uncertainty regarding the electoralresults has the potential to further erode the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes ofthe Afghan population and could represent an opportunity for the insurgency to grow. Theextended process of determining a winner had tried the patience of the population.90. Unfortunately, the international community’s response was, in some respects, fragmented; apossible lack of consensus on issues surrounding the election outcome emerged through publicreports of high-level disagreements within the UNAMA mission leading to the departure of theDeputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for Afghanistan.

91. At the time of writing, public debate on the future of the international military approach inAfghanistan was focused on the Initial Assessment of the operation by ISAF Commander GeneralStanley McChrystal, which became public in September 2009, and the anticipated resourcerequirements entailed by his proposed approach. Indeed, the plan’s stark assessment andproposed way forward were widely endorsed by officials (Afghan and international) who met withan Assembly delegation in Kabul shortly after its dissemination.92. McChrystal’s strategy, as he described it to Assembly members, is based on gaining thesupport of the Afghan people and providing them with a secure environment, as compared toseizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces. The main lines of his strategy are improving theeffectiveness and size of the Afghan National Security Forces through closer partnering withinternational forces; elevating the importance of governance; prioritizing major population centreswhere vulnerable populations are most threatened; and gaining the initiative to reverse theinsurgency’s momentum.93. The resource implications of McChrystal’s strategy were being widely debated at the time ofwriting, but the overall approach was already in evidence in a number of areas. For instance, theAssembly delegation learned that the development of the Afghan National Army had already beenfurther accelerated under General McChrystal’s leadership; current plans at the time of writingcalled for an ANA of 134,000 by October 2010, rather than the previous target date of 2011. TheAmerican command responsible for training activities expected ANA growth of 28,000 soldiers in2009 (by comparison, it grew by only 9,700 in 2006-2007).94. There is no doubt that the rapid consolidation of the Afghan National Security Forces is acentral element of any strategy for success in Afghanistan. Training teams are the key to standingup these forces. As of late September, of the 169 training teams estimated to be necessary toachieve the 134,000 end strength of the ANA , 137 training teams have been made available oroffered (66 US Embedded Training Teams and 71 NATO Operational Mentoring and LiaisonTeams/OMLTs). This leaves a shortfall of 32 training teams.95. It is anticipated that a decision will be made this year to increase the number of AfghanNational Police to around 140,000 as well. In addition to the increased number of new police

97. Your Rapporteur had the opportunity to visit Afghanistan for discussions with leading Afghanand international officials in early October of this year. In the run-up to the mission, there was averitable sense of unease regarding the challenges facing the Afghan population and those whoseek to assist them. However, several areas of progress, and clear expositions on the wayforward, have convinced your Rapporteur that it remains possible to move beyond the politicalchallenges so evident at the time of writing. Even so, several major elements will have to beresolved in order to ensure that our efforts over the past eight years have not been in vain.98. First, the political process engaged by the elections must be brought to a clear and credibleconclusion; the judges of the validity of the process must ultimately be the Afghan people. Theresulting Afghan leadership must then make it a priority to renew the bonds that link it with theAfghan people, bonds that have been frayed through the disputed electoral process but also theperception of slow progress and uneven delivery of services to the Afghan population.99. In addition, the Afghan leadership will have to make a credible case to the internationalcommunity that it remains a reliable partner for the furtherance of the common vision forAfghanistan spelled out in agreements made since 2001.100. The evidence of this would first and foremost emerge in the nature of the new cabinetappointed by the Afghan leadership; clearly, the re-appointment of key Ministers who have earneda reputation for delivering results is critical. Of course, the appointment of counterproductiveindividuals to key posts would also send a signal to international institutions and the publics ofdonor and troop contributing nations.101. The Afghan leadership should also propose a positive agenda, to include better governance,significant efforts against corruption – to include high-profile prosecutions – and strengthened ruleof law. There should also be an increased emphasis, as pledged in the presidential campaign, onthe reconciliation and reintegration process. One element of this approach must be thedevelopment of clear and tangible incentives for low-level fighters to rejoin their communities.102. The international community, for its part, should demonstrate its continued commitment tothe future of Afghanistan by agreeing to hold a Ministerial-level conference in Kabul in early 2010to signal its determination and steadfast dedication, as well as to witness the establishment of anew compact between the Afghan leadership and the Afghan people.103. In the context of this process, the international community will certainly have to back up itsrenewed commitments with renewed dedication to providing the resources commensurate to thetask.104. On the security side, the international community’s efforts must focus especially on thedevelopment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The growing size of the AfghanNational Army and the Afghan National Police will require more effort from all contributing nationsto provide training teams and equipment.

105. Full support of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan will be a key element to theeventual ability of the ANSF to stand between the Afghan population and violent extremists. Thisincludes the Trust Fund for the ANA launched by NATO, which seeks a total of US$ 8.6 billion forthe first five years of a long term sustainment programme.106. The international community must also strengthen its efforts to provide development resultsfor the Afghan people. It will be particularly important to do this in a manner that does not simplyfocus on quick-impact projects at the expense of longer term, more comprehensive strategies. Allefforts should also be made to ensure that provision of assistance flows to the greatest extentpossible through Afghan authorities rather than bilaterally; the Afghan government must be seenby its people to be delivering. Of course, rigorous measures should be taken to ensure the properlevel of oversight for funding streams.107. The influx of American resources – personnel, funding, training teams and others – hasmade some observers concerned about an excessive ‘Americanization’ of the effort. It isparticularly in the area of the consolidation of the ANSF that other nations could and should makegreater efforts to ensure that the mission does not become unbalanced.108. Your Rapporteur views the overall trajectory of Afghanistan with cautious optimism. Reportsby this committee over the last several years have called for additional resources andco-ordination in Afghanistan, and it appears that the international community as a whole may beready to move in that direction, albeit at painfully slow pace.109. The Assembly and our national parliaments will have a crucial role to play in ensuring thatour combined efforts come to fruition. We

must

ensure that the resources pledged are actuallydelivered. Indeed, one of the principal obstacles to ISAF’s success since its launch has been thesubstantial gap between the political will expressed by member states and the resources that havebeen subsequently committed. Assembly members can and must play a crucial role in ensuringthat the pledges made, with our support, are fulfilled completely and in a timely manner.110. ISAF will likely face significant challenges in the next two years as the Netherlands isplanning to withdraw its 1,700 combat troops next year and Canada has announced its intent towithdraw its 2,800 troops in 2011. The possibility that more nations will begin to announce theirown exit strategies in an unco-ordinated and potentially dangerous fashion must be avoided. AllNATO nations agreed at the recent Summit that the collective commitment to Afghanistan is by itsvery nature a long-term endeavour; we cannot sacrifice the gains we have fought so long and hardto achieve.111. This is a fight that ultimately the Afghans must win. We cannot do it for them. However, inthe short and medium term, the Afghan people will continue to require the assistance of NATO, itsmember states, and all contributing nations.112. We must not forget the dangers of allowing this mission to go unfulfilled. Islamic militantextremists would be inspired and energized by the apparent victory of the Taliban and Al-Qaedaover the civilized world. The destabilization of the region, including a nuclear-armed Pakistan,cannot be excluded. And of course, the Afghan population would itself be subjected to a return tothe darkest days of Taliban rule.113. We are engaged in this effort because it is the right thing to do for the Afghan people as wellas for our own populations. As your Rapporteur recently heard the Deputy Commander of ISAFstate in Mazar-e Sharif:

“…I must admit I am confused by the doubts about our mission, our commitment and ourchances of success that are circulating in Western capitals. There can be no doubt about it:the challenges posed by three decades of conflict in this country – and the insurgents wouldnow extend that violence indefinitely – are extraordinarily difficult to solve. But it is our dutyto dare to do what is difficult. No nation has cornered the market on military excellence …courage recognizes no national borders… determination to persevere and succeed is a markof excellence among people of all races and creeds. The 42 nations of ISAF… together withour Afghan partners… are not a hopeless jumble of languages, cultures and militarytraditions, but a united alliance who have sent their best men and women to Afghanistan.Here, we take our stand against those who would turn this country back into a nest ofignorance, hatred and fear.”

disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda and its safe havens.”

must