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Europaudvalget 2009-10
EUU Alm.del Bilag 316
Offentligt

Meals per gallon

the impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Contents

Executive summary

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Industrial biofuels – the context

What’s driving the EU industrial biofuel boom?

Chapter 3: What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

Industrial biofuels increase food prices, driving more people into hunger

Industrial biofuels are failing local communities where they are grown

Industrial biofuels are not a solution to climate change

conclusion – the EU response

Chapter 4: Industrial biofuels to 2020

Governments are increasing biofuel demand

the alarming scale of industrial biofuel land expansion

conclusion

Chapter 5: Biofuel use – a suggested way forward

Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations

“I don’t have a

farm, I don’t

have a garden,

because the

only land that

I have has been

destroyed.”

Elisa Alimone Mongue,

mother and farmer,

Mozambique. Her land

was taken by a biofuel

company.

PHOtO: JAMES OAtWAy/PANOS/

ActIONAID

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Acronyms And AbbreviAtions

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

Carbon dioxide

Common Property Resources

European Commission

Economic Partnership Agreements

European Union

Food and Agriculture Organization

The G5 group of developing countries

(India, Brazil, China, Mexico and

South Africa)

The G8 group of developed countries

(UK, Russia, US, Italy, France, Germany, Japan and Canada)

GHG Greenhouse gases

IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute

ILUC Indirect land use change

IMF

International Monetary Fund

JRC

Joint Research Centre of the European Commission

NAP

National Action Plans

(shortened version of NREAP)

NREAP National Renewable Energy Action Plans

Nitrous oxides

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation

and Development

ODI

Overseas Development Institute

RED

Renewable Energy Directive

United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

ACP

CPRs

EPA

FAO

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2 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Executive summary

Industrial biofuels – fuels made on an industrial scale from agricultural crops –

have been put forward as an answer to energy security, climate change and

rural development. ActionAid believes they are unlikely to be the solution to

any of these challenges.

In fact they have been a major cause of the food and hunger crisis, which is

set to get worse.

Industrial biofuels are currently made from maize, wheat, sugar cane and

oil seeds such as palm oil, soy and rapeseed. The rapidly rising demand

for crops for fuel has put them into competition with those grown for food,

driving food prices higher and affecting what and how much people eat in

developing countries. This is a significant issue in a world where a billion

people are already going hungry.

Despite this, in 2008 European Union (EU) member states committed

themselves to obtaining 10% of transport fuels from renewable sources

by 2020. Member states will fill almost all of this commitment through

industrial biofuels, meaning the 10% target is, in effect, a biofuels target.

Consumption of industrial biofuels in the EU will jump four-fold. As much as

two-thirds are likely to be imported, the majority from developing countries.

The 10% target is not the only driver of increased consumption in the EU.

In 2006, it was conservatively estimated that the EU biofuel industry was

supported by financial incentives to the sum of

€4.4

billion. Assuming the

same level of subsidies continues, the industry would be subsidised to the

tune of about

€13.7

billion per annum to meet the 2020 target.

The case against industrial biofuels has been mounting for a number of years.

This is borne out by evidence in this report, collected from the countries in

which ActionAid works. This report focuses on three main broad impacts.

1. implications for food prices and hunger

Biofuels are conservatively estimated to have been responsible for at least

30% of the global food price spike in 2008. It was estimated in 2008 that the

food crisis had already pushed a further 100 million people into poverty and

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3 executive summary

“While many worry about filling their gas tanks, many others

around the world are struggling to fill their stomachs. And it’s

getting more and more difficult every day.”

robert Zoellick, President of the World bank, 2008

driven about 30 million more people into hunger. If all global biofuel targets

are met, it is predicted that food prices could rise by up to an additional 76%

by 2020. An estimated 600 million extra people may be hungry because of

industrial biofuels by this date.

2. Local impacts and hunger

Industrial biofuels are having disastrous local impacts on food security and

land rights in many of the communities where they are grown.

The scale of the current land grab is astonishing. In just five African countries,

1.1 million hectares have been given over to industrial biofuels – an area the

size of Belgium. All of the biofuel produced on this land is for export. EU

companies have already acquired or requested at least five million hectares of

land for industrial biofuels in developing countries – an area greater than the

size of Denmark.

The local impacts range from the displacement of people, rising local food

prices and food scarcity, broken promises by the companies about job

opportunities and lack of consultation and compensation. Some have

described this land grab as the next era of colonialism in poor nations.

3. making climate change and hunger worse

Many industrial biofuels do not have lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions

compared to fossil fuels. This is because:

•

converting forests, peatlands or permanent grasslands to grow biofuel

crops is an important cause of GHGs (direct land use change);

•

converting existing food crop land to biofuel crops often has a displacement

effect; the original land use is pushed onto land in new areas, such as

forests (indirect land use change). The new land use may have a GHG

emission impact, much the same as with direct land use change;

•

nitrous oxides (N

0) are released by the fertilisers required to grow

industrial biofuels. N

0 is 300 times more powerful as a GHG compared

to carbon dioxide.

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4 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

“They actually took the land when it was already tilled… They

haven’t paid us anything... What we want is to get our farms back,

because that is what our livelihood is dependent on... we are dying of

hunger and there is nothing that we have that is actually our own.”

matilde ngoene, mother and farmer, mozambique, november 2009

Industrial biofuels are also not good value for money. In fact, they are the least

cost-effective way of saving GHG emissions compared to other uses of the

feedstock (the crops that go to make biofuel). Industrial biofuels are therefore

a red herring in the fight against climate change, and will compound hunger

and poverty for the poor in the future.

the future – the ALArming scALe of the LAnd grAb

Global biofuel consumption is estimated to jump from about 70 billion litres

in 2008 to 250 billion litres in 2020. For the EU, the increase will be steeper –

from 13 billion litres to about 55 billion litres.

To meet the EU 10% target alone, the total land area directly required to grow

industrial biofuels in developing countries could reach 17.5 million hectares,

well over half the size of Italy. Additional land will also be required in developed

nations, displacing food and animal feed crops onto land in new areas, often

in developing countries.

We are at a turning point. Renewed commercial interest in industrial biofuels

is beginning to emerge now that the price of oil has reached about US$80/

barrel. Either we recognise the problems inherent in industrial biofuels now,

or we open the door to a future for the world’s poor where the hunger and

climate crises continue to grow. To stop this trend, the EU and member

states must:

•

place a moratorium on the further expansion of industrial biofuel

production and investment;

•

ensure that member states do not lock-in industrial biofuels

to their 2010 national action plans;

•

reduce transport and energy consumption;

•

end targets and financial incentives for industrial biofuels;

•

support small-scale sustainable biofuels in the EU and abroad.

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5 executive summary

Florence Minj,

Director

of People’s Action for

Development, an ActionAid

partner working with

poor communities in

northeast India.

PHOTO: ATOL LOKE/PANOS/ACTIONAID

A cALL to Action: fLorence minj

Florence Minj is Director of People’s Action for Development, an ActionAid partner working

with poor communities in northeast India. He is part of a growing movement of people and

organisations campaigning against industrial biofuels.

“In the UK they want to go for more biofuels. But they should not. They should

campaign against biofuels. We have seen the reality. The impact will be worst

among the

adavasi

[indigenous] community and marginal farmers.

“Only a global campaign can stop this – by ourselves it is difficult. In

collaboration with other countries we can reduce the impact of

jatropha

biofuel crop] – then more food production can happen. Ultimately, if you

promote biodiesel, it is all for the rich people, not the poor.”

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6 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

1. Introduction

The energy crisis of the 1970s provided the initial

impetus for the search for new energy sources.

Countries had become increasingly dependent

on oil at a time of rising and volatile oil prices. More

recently, oil production is said to have peaked,

and the fight against climate change has become

the environmental and developmental issue of our

time. The scramble for a cleaner and more secure

energy source is on.

Close to the top of the list of alternatives are

industrial biofuels, which, in small quantities,

can be easily and quickly integrated into the

existing transport infrastructure. Only a few

years ago, they were seen by many as an

innovative, environmentally friendly and relatively

simple step in the right direction; a new, ‘green’

fuel simultaneously solving the energy and

climate crises by replacing the ‘dirty’ fossil fuels

of the past.

Others, particularly in developing countries,

saw industrial biofuels as a means of promoting

development, securing an energy supply and

alleviating poverty in rural areas. In Europe, the

EU has pushed a similar argument; that biofuels

would give a much-needed boost to farmers

and rural communities in terms of livelihoods

and new markets after years of low prices for

agricultural crops.

Rich nations jumped on the bandwagon,

setting ambitious targets for increased biofuel

consumption and supporting their industries

with generous financial hand-outs.

After this first flush of enthusiasm, the reality

of industrial biofuels is starting to sink in. The

evidence now shows that industrial biofuels are

having negative impacts on people, farmers

and workers, as well as on hunger, the climate,

biodiversity and on habitats such as forests.

Across the developing world, local communities

are realising that industrial biofuels are not living

up to their promises.

If produced sustainably and for local markets,

biofuels grown on a small scale can help create

energy security, increase local incomes and

even reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But

this isn’t happening. Biofuels, like many cash

crops before them, are following the traditional

large-scale, industrial, monoculture and export

model. In the rush to get industrial biofuels

onto the market, the full impact has not been

recognised. Some have even described the

biofuel land grab as a new era of colonialism for

poorer countries.

If they are so bad, why are so many

governments continuing to endorse them?

Industrial biofuels allow rich countries to avoid

some urgent and difficult decisions, such as

reducing consumption of transport fuels and

energy more generally, and forcing companies

to invest in cleaner and alternative technology.

All in all, liquid industrial biofuels let us continue

our love affair with the internal combustion

engine while providing the illusion of action from

the car and oil industries.

the focus of this report –

industrial biofuels and hunger

ActionAid works with people, communities

and partner organisations across the developing

world to realise their right to food and to

address any factors that undermine or deny it.

Farmers themselves want to build on existing

knowledge and resources to develop sustainable

approaches to local production as a means

towards self reliance and combating hunger.

Today hunger is increasing sharply, especially

in the world’s poorest countries. According to

recent figures from the Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO), the number of chronically

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7 introduction

“I and the community expected to increase our cash income and

revenues by working on the plantation. Our food is insufficient

because we gave away our land. We have to fight for our rights and

find alternatives to fill the gap in food and livelihoods.”

mamadou bah (alias), male farmer, senegal, october 2009

hungry people has reached just over a billion

compared to 913 million in 2008. One in six

people in the world are now hungry.

Yet, only ten

years ago, governments committed themselves

to halve world hunger by 2015 as part of the

Millennium Development Goals (Goal 1).

The scientific evidence is steadily moving

against industrial biofuels and the link between

biofuels and hunger is strong. This report

examines the connections between the two,

particularly from a women’s rights perspective,

and the extent to which the right to food is

being undermined by industrial biofuels. It

will explore whether hunger is increasing as

a result of this additional demand for fuel and

whether this is pushing up food prices. It looks

at whether land grabs by industrial biofuel

companies are having localised impacts, for

example on food security and the displacement

of people. It also examines the link between

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from

industrial biofuels and the impact on hunger

from climate change.

rising food Prices: bAn vAn tuAn’s story

“We take a small portion of boiled rice

and seasonal vegetables we collect from

the hills. Now we have learned to live

without meat, oil and other necessary

food as my family believes that they

can never come out of poverty.

“I feel that the price hike has now really

shattered all our hopes and put us in a

difficult situation. We have to borrow,

borrow and borrow…. but, for how long?

Even my brothers will refuse one day

as we have no means to repay loans.”

Ban Van Tuan lives with his wife and two

daughters. The family has been trapped by

global food price rises. Everyone has to skip at

least one meal a day to cut costs. He worries

that his daughters will have to stop going to

school because the family can no longer afford it.

“My family

believes that

they can never

come out

of poverty.”

Ban Van Tuan,

farmer, Vietnam.

PHOTO: ACTIONAID

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8 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

2. Industrial biofuels

– the context

Biofuel is fuel obtained from biological material.

But the term ‘bio’ also implies some sort of

environmental benefit (for example the French

word for organic is

biologique)

and the term has

been hijacked by the biofuels industry to portray

a green image.

The term biofuel, by itself, should only refer to

fuel produced from waste processes such as

landfill off-gassing, recycled vegetable oil or

small scale sustainable production for local use.

Agrofuels are also biofuels but refer to the fact

that the biological material is an agricultural

crop, produced intensively by agribusiness, in

large-scale monoculture plantations and which

compete, directly or indirectly, with food (see

Box 1). These are agrofuels produced on an

industrial scale. The term ‘industrial biofuel’

rather than agrofuel is used in this report.

The main agricultural crops used for industrial

biofuels (ie agrofuels) are:

– vegetable oil seeds – such as palm, soy,

sunflower, rapeseed and jatropha which can be

used to produce biodiesel;

– starches – maize (corn) and wheat – and

sugars are used to make ethanol (ethyl alcohol)

which can be used in petrol.

In small quantities, they are fairly easily blended

with existing fuels with little if any modifications

to existing vehicle engines or transport

infrastructure (currently about 3.3% of EU road

fuel comes from biofuels

). Thus they are well

suited for use in transport. They are also used in

box 1: comPetition betWeen food And industriAL biofueLs

Maize and wheat are important food staples

in the developing world. Vegetable oils such

as palm oil are also important food ingredients

and can be used to cook other food.

Many rich-country producers, and particularly

those manufacturing ethanol from maize (corn)

and wheat, argue that their feedstocks (ie the

crops used to make biofuels) do not compete

with food because they are different varieties.

Take maize as an example: some proponents

argue that US ethanol is produced from field

corn (yellow maize) which is used to feed

animals. It is sweetcorn that is consumed by

people. However, about 10% of field corn is

still used in the US food chain and some

exports of field corn are consumed by people,

particularly in exports to the developing world.

It is currently the same in the EU: the wheat

varieties that are likely to be turned into ethanol

are also consumed by people. So contrary to

their arguments, there is a direct and strong

link between crops that are used both for fuel

and food.

There are other ‘competing’ links that are

perhaps more important. Greater demand

for maize or wheat – as a fuel – drives maize

and wheat prices higher, as described in

Chapter 3. This in turn has a direct bearing on

the quantity and quality of food consumed in

developing countries.

The argument is also flawed because of the

issue of land. Much of the land used for wheat

and maize for animal feed and/or ethanol could

also be used to grow food. And turning millions

of hectares of agricultural land over to fuel (for

example in the EU) will often shift the crops

they’ve displaced onto land somewhere else

(for example outside the EU).

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9 chapter 2

Industrial biofuels – the context

“It is a crime against humanity to divert arable land to

the production of crops which are then burned for fuel.”

jean Zeigler, (speaking in 2007) united nations special rapporteur on the right to food 2000-2008

Busiswe Mpulo,

maize farmer in Kwa-Zulu

Natal, South Africa.

PHOTO: JAMES OATWAY/PANOS/ACTIONAID

power/heat units, such as power plants, boilers

and cooking stoves. If industrial biofuels are

produced unsustainably, the same issues will

occur regardless of whether the fuel is used in

transport or in a power station.

as to whether they will ever be commercially

viable.

Even if they do get onto the market, this

is unlikely before 2018.

The benefits of second generation biofuels are

still disputed. But concerns have been raised

that land to grow them would displace food

crops and drive deforestation to create more

farmland,

making climate change worse

(see Chapter 3).

Even more advanced biofuels from algae are

being researched (commonly called third

generation). However, commercial viability

and production of third generation biofuels is

a long way off.

first, second and third generation

industrial biofuels

First generation refers to industrial biofuels that

are produced using conventional technology,

that are currently in commercial production

and compete with food such as maize, palm oil

and rapeseed oil. Jatropha also falls within this

category because although it cannot be eaten,

it uses current technology, is in the early stages

of development and competes with agricultural

– ie food – land.

Second generation industrial biofuels are made

using new technological processes and non-

food crops, and are currently being investigated

for their commercial viability. These include

biofuels from forestry and agricultural by-

products such as stalks from wheat/maize, from

wood waste or specifically grown crops such as

poplars and micanthus. There remain doubts

WhAt’s driving the eu

industriAL biofueL boom?

The EU and member states have already sent

out signals that companies should go out and

invest in industrial biofuels, for example in

new refineries and land acquisitions. Billions

of euros have already been spent – privately

and publicly – on supporting the EU industrial

biofuels industry.

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10 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

In 2006, EU farmers

received

€1.4

billion to

produce biofuels. At

this rate, biofuels

could cost EU

taxpayers up to

€4.2

billion annually

by 2020

The inter-relationship between industrial biofuels

and different sectors and issues – agriculture,

energy, transport, the environment and trade –

means a wide variety of policy instruments are

being used to promote them.

to produce industrial biofuels. Although subsidy

rates are likely to change, given current support

levels and predicted EU production levels, the

10% target could end up costing taxpayers

as much as

€4.2

billion a year by 2020 in

agricultural support (see Table 1).

the eu’s 10% target

By far the most important development is

the recently adopted EU Renewable Energy

Directive (RED).

ActionAid wholeheartedly

supports the general thrust of this directive –

that by 2020, 20% of all EU energy must come

from renewable sources. However, there is

a sub-element to this directive that will have

the effect of increasing hunger while failing to

meet the EU’s stated aims of reducing GHG

emissions. It covers the transport sector and

says that by the same date, 10% of transport

fuels must also be from renewable sources.

Member states will meet almost all of the 10%

obligation through industrial biofuels, meaning

that it is, in effect, an industrial biofuels target.

tax exemptions

By far the largest element of support to the

EU biofuel industry is exemption from excise

duties. For example, the duty on UK biofuels at

the pump is 20 pence less per litre compared

to conventional fuels although this is due to

end in 2010. From 2009, the duty on low-

sulphur petrol and diesel in the UK was 54.19

pence per litre; for biodiesel and ethanol it was

34.19 pence per litre.

In Sweden there are no

energy taxes on biofuels.

ActionAid calculates

that in 2006, EU tax exemptions were worth

about

€3

billion. Although excise duties are

likely to change, given current support levels

and predicted EU consumption levels, the 10%

target could end up costing taxpayers as much

€9.5

billion in tax exemptions a year by

2020 (see Table 1).

European subsidies are very important (as in

the US) because biofuels in developed nations

are, in the main, uneconomic without subsidies.

This is particularly true when the price of oil

falls below US$60-100/barrel depending on

the biofuel and the price of the feedstock

in question.

domestic agricultural subsidies

EU farmers receive subsidies for all crops

they produce, including those that can be

processed into industrial biofuels – sugar beet,

maize, rapeseed oil, soy, sunflowers and wheat.

The farmer will sell to an ethanol or biodiesel

processor so long as the price is better than

could be obtained from a food processor or

grain animal-feed operator. In 2006, ActionAid

calculated that EU farmers received

€1.4

billion

table 1: main eu industrial biofuel subsidies in 2006 and 2020

€

millions

Tax exemptions for producers

Agricultural support

Total subsidy

2006 costs to the eu taxpayer

2,960

1,448

4,408

2020 projected costs to the

eu tax payer

9,506

4,216

13,722

This assumes that payments and exemptions continue at the same level from 2006 to 2020. While the rate of tax exemptions is already

falling in some countries, this is countered in part by increased volumes.

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11 chapter 2

Industrial biofuels – the context

“I don’t have a farm, I don’t have a garden, because the only land that

I have has been destroyed. We are just suffering with hunger, because

even if I go to look for another farm, they will just destroy it again.”

elisa Alimone mongue, mother and farmer, mozambique, november 2009

Elisa Alimone Mongue,

mother and farmer,

Mozambique. Her land

was taken by a biofuel

company.

PHOTO: JAMES OATWAY/PANOS/

ACTIONAID

trade and investment incentives

It is no coincidence that industrial biofuel

companies are focusing overseas investment

opportunities in Africa, parts of Asia and south

and central America. Many of these countries

benefit from preferential trading access back

into the EU. This means biofuel and feedstock

traded into the EU either have lower tariffs

or are exempt from tariffs. These include

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries under

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),

least developed nations under the ‘everything

but arms’ initiative; and 13 developing countries

(Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mongolia,

Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka and

Venezuela) under the General System of

Preference+ scheme.

12, 13

There are additional

benefits for companies as well; some of these

trade deals – for example EPAs – also often

cover inward investment whereby companies’

access to developing countries is made easier;

for example previous restrictions on foreign

land ownerships or leases may be eased or

lifted all together.

This preferential access has also stimulated

a new series of south-south co-operation

agreements. Companies in Brazil for example

have restricted access to the EU for Brazilian

ethanol because of higher tariffs. But since

2007, the Brazilian government and Brazilian

company Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa

Agricola (Embrapa) have signed a number of

agreements with other developing countries as

a means of facilitating Brazilian co-operation

and investment. Embrapa is the main agent for

investment in Africa; and projects have been

established in Libya, Morocco, Mozambique,

Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Benin, Togo and Angola

under its leadership, many of which have

preferential access to the EU.

The EU will meet

almost all of the

10% target for

transport fuels from

‘renewables’ through

industrial biofuels

– in effect, making it

a biofuels target

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12 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

3. What’s wrong with

industrial biofuels?

The sheer scale of industrial biofuels – from large-

scale intensive agricultural plantations to the export

of the raw material – is not sustainable. Yet the allure

of apparently easy solutions has led politicians and

corporations to push ahead with industrial biofuels

without heeding the many warnings about their

negative impact, including the following.

Global food prices

•

Industrial biofuels have contributed to

the food and hunger crisis. Diverting land

and food crops into fuel production has

contributed to rising international food prices.

Local issues such as land, food security and

labour conditions

•

Local food prices are also increasing.

•

Industrial biofuel production is encouraging

a land grab and the (sometimes violent)

displacement of people.

•

Income levels for biofuel plantation workers

are low and labour conditions are poor.

•

Local environmental impacts are becoming

increasingly evident, from a reduction in soil

quality to the depletion of water resources.

Climate change, habitats and biodiversity

•

Industrial biofuels are no longer seen as

a solution to climate change; in fact most

biofuels release more GHG emissions

compared to fossil fuels.

•

There are massive impacts on habitats and

biodiversity. Some biofuels – such as sugar

cane, soy and palm oil – are either directly

grown in tropical forest areas and other

high biodiversity hotspots, or are displacing

other activities such as cattle ranching into

these areas.

Energy security

•

Industrial biofuels will do little for energy

security – indeed crops have their own

insecurity through droughts and disease.

industriAL biofueLs

increAse food Prices,

driving more PeoPLe

into hunger

Many talk of the food crisis as something that

happened in 2008. While global food prices fell

back in the latter part of 2008, domestic prices

have proved ‘stickier’ and remained resolutely

high. Riots over food shortages no longer hit

the headlines, but for millions of people the food

crisis is still with them.

The food crisis, and skyrocketing demand for

industrial biofuels, are exacerbating the situation

table 2: causes of the 2008 global food price increase

causes of the 2008 global food

price increase

Shifting commodity consumption patterns

Rising oil prices

Climatic events

Decline of the US dollar

Speculation

Biofuels

study by don mitchell

(see footnote)

Little impact

10%

Little impact

15%

Little impact

75%

Purdue university study

An impact but mainly due to oil demand

from China

Significant impact because linked with biofuels

and costs of food production

No in the short-term

Significant impact

Inconclusive

Significant impact and strong links with

rising oil prices

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13 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“No one will buy jatropha. People said if you have a plantation then

surely you have a good market, but we didn’t see such good market.

When I got the message that there was no market, I got discouraged.

I was very upset. I felt very bad. I expected profit. I threw it [the

seeds] away.”

raju sona, farmer, india, november 2009

In 2008 the food

crisis pushed 100

million people newly

into poverty.

Biofuels alone

pushed 30 million

people into hunger

for poor people and undermining their right to

food. The World Bank estimated in 2008 that

the crisis had already pushed a further 100

million people into poverty. ActionAid estimated

at the time that 30 million more people were

now hungry as a result of biofuels.

The causes of the rise in food prices are clearly

complex, but a number of authoritative sources

have confirmed that industrial biofuels were one

of the main causes of the food price hike.

The study by Purdue University for Farm

Foundation is in fact an evaluation of 25 different

surveys. It essentially supports Donald Mitchell’s

(and other institutions’) analysis without

attributing statistical importance – that biofuels,

linked to rising oil prices, are a major contributor

to rising food prices. Oil prices are predicted to

be higher in the medium to longer term as we

come out of the global recession. So we will see

a dramatic increase in food prices and hunger.

And it is the poor and poor countries that will

suffer most. Many low income developing

countries are net food (and fuel) importers; most

households in developing countries are net food

buyers; and the poorer you are, the greater the

percentage of your income spent on food (in

some households it is as much as 80%).

The interaction between industrial biofuels,

higher food prices and hunger arises because:

•

fuel, energy and food prices are now

increasingly linked;

•

at a global level, a relatively small change in

agricultural supply or demand has a large

and disproportionate effect on food prices,

and so the increased demand for biofuels

has driven food prices higher;

•

higher global food prices have been

transmitted through to the national level;

•

higher national food prices have filtered

through to the local level where the majority

of households are net buyers;

•

this has been compounded by food growers

changing over to biofuels in anticipation of

higher returns, and farmers leaving their own

land uncultivated in order to work on biofuel

plantations.

The FAO estimates that in 2008/9, 125 million

tonnes of cereals were diverted into biofuel

production. In this year, as shown in Table 3,

at a time when hunger was escalating and

riots over food shortages were common, more

cereal production was diverted into animal feed

and industrial uses (1,107 million tonnes) than

feeding people (1,013 million tonnes). 2008/9

was a record global grain harvest, up 7.3 %

from the previous year (which was also at a

record level).

The cereal market is geared more

towards feeding animals and industrial uses

than feeding people (see Box 1, page 8).

Around 30% of maize production in the US is

Raju Sona,

farmer,

northeast India. He gave up

food production to grow

jatropha which failed to give

him an income. His family is

much happier now that he

is growing food again.

PHOTO: ATOL LOKE/PANOS/ACTIONAID

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14 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Around 30% of

maize production

in the US is now

being converted

into ethanol

table 3: World cereals production and ‘end use’

million tonnes

2007/08

2008/09

% change

change

07/08–08/09

Total production

Total utilisation of which*

To food

To animal feed

To other uses

2,132

2,120

1,013

748

359

2,287

2,202

1,029

773

401

+1.3%

+1.5%

+3.3%

+11.7%

155 million tonnes

+16 million tonnes

+25 million tonnes

+42 million tonnes

*Utilisation is a combination of production and the use of stocks from the previous year (stocks of cereals went up from 2007/08 to 2008/09

by about 80 million tonnes)

now being converted into ethanol.

Putting

the energy markets into competition with

food markets will inevitably result in higher

food prices.

Industrial biofuels are placing a

massive and additional demand on agricultural

production. Not only will extra agricultural supply

simply not respond quickly enough, but there are

well grounded fears that there will not be enough

land or resources such as water to meet future

demand for food, let alone biofuels, as shown in

Chapter 4. All this is driving prices up.

The increase in prices is not just confined to

prices of maize, wheat, vegetable oils and

sugar – ie biofuel feedstocks themselves.

Close food substitutes are also affected. For

example, as prices of maize rise, consumers

will look to purchase cheaper substitutes.

This extra demand in turn increases the price

of substitutes. It also has knock on effects

on animal feed prices which in turn will affect

the livestock and poultry industries. The link

between food and fuel prices is also evident in

that energy is required to make fertilisers and

for use in machinery and transport, thereby

increasing costs of farming.

rising prices and hunger at a

global level

From 2006 to the middle of 2008, the global

prices of nearly all major food and feed

commodities skyrocketed. Overall, world food

prices increased by 75%, yet the price for staple

food grains (such as wheat, rice and maize)

increased by a staggering 126% over the same

period.

For the 82 low income food deficit

countries, import bills (in comparison to export

revenues) went up. Each 10% increase in the

prices of cereals (including rice) adds nearly

US$4.5 billion to the aggregate cereals import

table 4: 2008 food price rises due to industrial biofuels

22, 23, 24

Agency/institution

IMF

IFPRI

FAO

OECD

Donald Mitchell

date

April 2008

May 2008

June 2008

May 2008

April 2008

% rise in food prices due to

biofuels

20-30%

30%

56-59%

Almost 60%

75%

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15 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“Rapidly growing demand for biofuel feedstocks has contributed to

higher food prices, which pose an immediate threat to the food

security of poor net food buyers in both urban and rural areas.”

food and Agriculture organization, 2008

Between 2006-08,

global food prices

rose by 75%. The

costs of staple

grains that poor

people rely on

rose even higher,

by 126%

cost of those developing nations that are

net importers.

There has been some controversy regarding the

extent that industrial biofuels were responsible

for the rise in global prices in 2008 (see Table

4). Those with a vested interest, such as the US

and the EU, have tended to play down the role of

biofuels. Independent observers have concluded

that industrial biofuels have played a more

significant role, probably in the range 30-75%.

The exact figure probably lies somewhere within

this range. Assuming the lower figure of 30%,

ActionAid conservatively calculated in 2008

that 30 million more people are now hungry

as a result of industrial biofuels and a further

260 million are at risk of hunger. ActionAid’s

figure was vindicated last year when the FAO

confirmed that between 2008 and 2009, a

staggering 100 million more people were

pushed into hunger within a year.

According to the Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD), a third

of the rise in agriculture prices foreseen for

the next ten years (2008-2017) will be caused

by increased demand for industrial biofuels.

box 2: the eu 10% target and hunger

The European Commission has forecast that

its own target would increase world cereal

prices by 3 to 6%.

Following the same

argument as outlined below – that the number

of hungry people could increase by 16 million

for every 1% price rise – the EU could be

responsible for an extra 50-100 million people

going hungry by 2020.

Many other studies have attempted to project

future price rises due to biofuels if consumption

targets are met. The Overseas Development

Institute (ODI) has summarised 11 of these

studies and for almost every product studied,

the impact on food prices was up, sometimes

significantly.

The ODI describes the International Food

Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) model as

‘typical’ of these studies; that by 2020 prices

would rise between 21 and 30% for wheat,

29-41% for maize and 45-76% for oilseeds

(see Figure 1).

This is in keeping with other

estimates. But the lower end of the IFPRI

estimates is based on the assumption that

second generation will be available. ActionAid

figure 1: changes in commodity prices in response to global biofuel

expansion in 2020

100

% difference from baseline

First generation

Second generation

Wheat

Maize

Wheat

Maize

Oilseeds

Sugar

cane

Oilseeds

Sugar

cane

Maize

Oilseeds

Sugar cane

Wheat

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16 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

By November 2009,

maize prices in

Zambia, Kenya,

Malawi and

Mozambique were

still around 60%

higher than at

the start of 2007;

in Tanzania it

was 150%

0.6

believes that this is unlikely to be the case; and

that IFPRI’s price rises for first generation are

likely to be more realistic.

The IFPRI model shows that the impact on food

supply and malnutrition, particularly in Africa,

could be alarming. It is also estimated that

the number of hungry may rise by 16 million

for every 1% rise in food prices.

Assuming

a conservative rise of 35-40% by 2020, this

suggests that some 600 million more people

may be hungry within 10 years because of

industrial biofuel expansion. This is similar to

another finding – that a 20% increase in food

prices in 2025 would increase the number of

undernourished people by 440 million.

figure 2: maize prices in east and southern Africa between

2007 and 2009

0.5

0.4

US$ per kilogramme

0.3

0.2

0.1

01/07

02/07

03/07

04/07

05/07

06/07

07/07

08/07

09/07

10/07

11/07

12/07

01/08

02/08

03/08

04/08

05/08

06/08

07/08

08/08

09/08

10/08

11/08

12/08

01/09

02/09

03/09

04/09

05/09

06/09

07/09

08/09

09/09

10/09

11/09

1. Kenya, Nairobi, maize, wholesale, US$ per kg

2. Malawi, Lilongwe, maize, retail, US$ per kg

3. Mozambique, Maputo, maize (white), retail, US$ per kg

4. South Africa, Randfontein, maize (white), wholesale, US$ per kg

5. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, maize, wholesale, US$ per kg

6. Zambia, National Average, white roller maize meal, retail, US$ per kg

7. International prices, USA: Gulf, maize (US No. 2, yellow), export, US$ per kg

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17 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“We deeply regret we agreed on letting [the biofuel company]

operate on our land.”

rashidi omary goboreni, farmer, tanzania, september 2009

rising prices and hunger at a

national level

Whether poorer nations and poorer people suffer

from price rises depends not just on whether

countries are net food importers but also

whether households are net buyers or sellers.

Figure 2 shows that global maize prices peaked

in the summer of 2008 and fell back to levels

experienced at the start of 2007 as the world

went into recession and oil prices fell. Yet for

east and southern Africa, the global increases

in maize prices from mid 2007 onwards was

transmitted almost immediately into higher

domestic prices, both wholesale and retail.

However, while global prices fell, domestic

prices have proved ‘stickier’. Prices in much

of east and southern Africa continued to rise.

By November 2009, maize prices in Zambia,

Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique were still

around 60% higher than at the start of 2007; in

Tanzania the figure was 150%. The magnitude

of the price rises, and subsequent volatility, is

also alarming although sharp price movements

are to be expected pre and post harvest time.

The only country in the survey that appears to

buck this trend is South Africa.

Domestic prices have remained higher in part

due to more localised issues such as climatic

events (droughts), currency fluctuations and

civil strife. But high prices have another effect. In

developing countries, farmers are increasingly

switching away from food crops into other

cash crops as the price for the latter rises. For

example, by mid 2009, global sugar prices

had reached a 28-year-high on the back of

crop failures in India and increased demand for

ethanol. Farmers in Swaziland are cultivating

sugar cane at the expense of staple food.

But at the same time, the country is suffering

massive food insecurity because of exceptional

shortfalls in food production and supplies.

The massive rise in maize prices from late

2006 had an immediate effect on farmers and

consumers in central America. The region

is closely linked with the US market. In 2007

tortilla prices almost doubled and there was a

public outcry – resulting in protests and riots

– among the tens of millions of poor Mexicans

who rely on tortilla as their main food.

The

maize crisis spilled over into other countries

in central America. Again, maize prices hit the

poorest hardest as tortilla prices rose. Costs in

the livestock industries, where maize is used as

feed, rose by 15-20% in 2007 alone.

Small wonder that the food crisis sparked

riots across the globe from the Philippines,

Bangladesh and India; to Egypt and Senegal;

and to Mexico, Haiti and El Salvador. In 2008,

food price inflation in Latin America and the

Caribbean was running at 20%

while in parts

of Africa – Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia – it

ranged from 16 to 47%.

impacts on households, women

and the poor

The majority of households in urban and rural

areas are net buyers of food and consequently

they are the most vulnerable to rises in food

prices. In a World Bank survey of seven

countries (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh,

Zambia, Madagascar, Vietnam and Cambodia),

only in Asia are there a greater number of net

selling households; but even here it was only

just over 50%. In both Bolivia and Bangladesh,

about 85% of households are net buyers; in

Zambia it is 65%; and in Madagascar and

Ethiopia it is about 52%.

Another study found

“empirical evidence from a number of sub-

Saharan countries…[that] in no case finds a

majority of farmers or rural households to be net

food sellers”.

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18 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Purchasing of food with

5,000 Kwacha (US$1) in

Lusaka, Zambia in

February 2008 (left) and

February 2009 (right).

PHOTO: MWILA MULUMBI

Not only are most households in developing

countries net buyers but poor families spend

a greater percentage of their income on food,

as much as 80% in some cases.

Of the

households that are net sellers in developing

countries – which we have established are the

minority – most tend to be farmers that are better

off, and on farms with larger areas of land. Poorer,

small-scale farmers are invariably net buyers and

are most likely to be negatively affected.

In a survey of seven different countries, the

FAO estimated the welfare gains or losses

from a 10% increase in the price of the main

food staple. In urban areas, every household

will experience a net welfare loss (ie they will

be worse off). In rural areas, it is the poorest

quintiles that are the biggest losers (with the

exception of Ghana and Mozambique which

experienced small welfare gains).

And the impacts fall heavily on women who are

responsible for 60-80% of food production in

developing countries yet own less than 10% of

the land.

Land being turned over to industrial

biofuels is also particularly important to women.

They may not own the land but it has often been

‘allocated’ to women by their husbands so they

can grow crops, collect nuts, graze animals or

collect firewood. This has knock-on impacts for

food security and hunger. As food prices rise,

women reduce their nutritional intake sharply

so as to feed the rest of the family.

As UNICEF

says:

“A growing body of evidence... suggests

that when resources are scarce women generally

prioritise the nutrition of family members above

other personal and household issues.”

This is well illustrated in Indonesia. When

prices rose, mothers in poor families invariably

responded by reducing their food intake in

order to feed their children. In the same FAO

study, even though female-headed households

were not over-represented among the poor in

the seven countries, they invariably suffered

either greater welfare losses or smaller welfare

gains. The FAO concluded that female-headed

households fare worse when the price of staple

crops rise because they spend a far greater

share of their income on food. In rural contexts,

women have less access to land and participate

far less in agricultural income-generating

activities, and therefore do not benefit from crop

price rises.

What many of these studies do not consider

is whether farmers in developing countries

produce more when crop prices rise. However,

ActionAid’s own surveys and analysis confirm

that smallholder farmers in many countries,

who produce the bulk of food, have not been

able to respond to higher prices by bringing

more food into production. Much of west

and east Africa, as well as south and central

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19 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“Filling the 25-gallon tank of an SUV with pure ethanol requires over

450 pounds of corn – which contains enough calories to feed one

person for a year.”

Professors ford runge and benjamin senauer, 2007

EU companies have

already acquired or

requested at least

five million hectares

of land for

industrial biofuels

in developing

countries

America, are forecast to experience cereal

production declines in 2009.

But there are

clearly many factors behind this production

shortfall.

industriAL biofueLs Are

fAiLing LocAL communities

Where they Are groWn

To meet the demand for biofuels in developed

nations, significant land area is already being

acquired in developing countries. That puts land

and land rights at the centre of the industrial

biofuels debate:

•

Land is being taken out of food production

and replaced with fuel production.

•

Less land for food will have a direct impact

on local food prices and hunger.

•

Land rights are being violated as investors

seek new areas for production.

•

Land use issues will also have a major

impact on whether industrial biofuels

contribute to fighting climate change

(see next section).

•

Labour conditions and incomes for

plantation workers are often poor.

rural hunger and poverty. But access and

tenure to land is often poorly protected,

particularly for women who produce 60-80%

of food in developing countries. Compared to

men, they own very little land. Instead, women

often use communal land to grow crops, collect

nuts, graze animals or collect firewood. But

this very same land is being targeted for biofuel

expansion.

scale of the current land grab

ActionAid is campaigning against industrial

biofuels in a number of countries – from

Guatemala and Ghana to India. What we are

witnessing is a land grab – the displacement of

vulnerable communities, often without any prior

community consultation or decision making.

The scale of the land grab is astonishing. In a

study of just five countries – Ethiopia, Ghana,

Madagascar, Mali and Sudan – some 2.5 million

hectares have been given over to food and fuel

with 90% of it under private (mainly foreign)

investment. Of the 2.5 million hectares, 1.1

million is for industrial biofuels (an area the size

of Belgium). Incredibly, all the biofuel production

would be exported.

At a global level, ActionAid has surveyed

existing and potential EU company biofuel

land investments in developing countries.

ActionAid calculates that EU companies have

already secured or requested at least five

million hectares of land for industrial biofuels

in developing countries. This is equivalent to

an area greater than the size of Denmark. It

will be mainly for growing jatropha, but also

sugar cane and palm oil where it is known

that these are being used as a biofuel source.

Because crops like sugar cane and palm oil

can be used in a variety of ways, it is difficult

to get an exact figure. There is also a scarcity

of data on some projects. So, though five

grabbing land – the ‘new gold’

Land grabs for commodities have gone on for

centuries. Rich nations have a long history of

plundering the resource base of developing

nations – from precious metals, minerals, oil

and other fossil fuels to forest products and

cash crops. But the recent rise in both food

and fuel prices has turned land itself – a finite

and increasingly pressured resource – into

a valuable commodity which investors and

speculators are keen to exploit. Some have

described the industrial biofuel scramble as the

latest chapter in the long-running colonial land

grab in poorer countries.

Access to land and other resources is a

fundamental precondition in the fight against

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20 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

“Our livelihood was dependent on the farms – and they’ve taken

the farms.”

julio ngoene, village chief and farmer, mozambique, november 2009

Julio Ngoene,

village chief

and farmer, Mozambique.

PHOTO JAMES OATWAY/PANOS/ACTIONAID

LAnd grAb – juLio ngoene’s story

Julio Ngoene is fighting to save not only his

community’s farmland, but also its way of life.

Julio is the village chief for approximately 100

households, totalling over 1,000 people. Their

agricultural livelihood is critical to them.

However, a biofuel company is setting up a

project near his village and has taken over

– without permission – 85% of the village

farmland and destroyed its crops.

At the onset of the project, the company

promised to resettle the village but, two

years later, Julio and the villagers have

heard nothing more. Despite the lack of

permission for the farmland that was taken,

no-one in the community has received any

compensation.

million hectares is a crude estimate, it is also

likely to be a conservative one.

Over the past 18 months, ActionAid has been

looking into the local impacts of this land grab in

the countries where we work (and this research

is continuing). The following sections reveal

some of our findings. Almost without exception,

the respondents had negative experiences of

biofuels in their areas.

the displacement of people and

local communities

Even where consent to use land for biofuels

has been sought and given (after often cursory

consultation), it is little more than a subtle form

of land dispossession, particularly of women.

Communities are invariably fed the positives

of industrial biofuels (high yields, prices and

prompt returns), and offered compensation

and promises by the company in the form of

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21 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

60 million

indigenous people

are globally at risk

of displacement

because of

industrial biofuels

jobs, incomes, schools etc. But some of these

may never materialise. At the same time, local

authorities often allocate land to companies

without any consultation with affected

communities at all.

In Colombia, NGOs have documented land

rights’ violations due to the massive expansion

of palm oil and sugar cane plantations.

Indonesia, in the village of Aruk, villages and

people have come into direct confrontation

with palm oil plantations. Twenty-five plots were

cleared without their permission. One villager

lost his 10-acre plot.

“I went to my land one

morning, and found it had been cleared. All my

rubber trees, my plants had been destroyed…

Now I have to work as a builder in Malaysia, so

I can feed my three children.”

His cousin said:

“This

is our ancestors’ land which we have had

for years, and now we have lost it.”

The Chair

of the UN Forum on Indigenous Issues has

estimated that 60 million indigenous people are

globally at risk of displacement because

of industrial biofuels.

The situation is similar in Tanzania. In one case

where ActionAid has conducted interviews, 175

villagers have been displaced. Clearly, there

is anger about what is happening, not just in

Tanzania but throughout Africa.

“We deeply regret we agreed on letting

[the biofuel company] operate on our

land. Now we think the employment and

the possibility to use their tractors was

only their strategy to get the agreement

… We realised we did not know if we had

agreed on selling our land or leasing it

for 50 or 99 years. A neighbour told us

he had leased his land for 99 years and

we got worried. What is hiding behind

the 6,000 schilling [about

€3

as an

initial payment], we wondered? If we

do not get employed then how will we

make our living? Without land we will

not be able to farm and our children will

have nowhere to settle down when they

grow up. I’ve heard stories about other

villages who have leased their land and

the villagers there are now not even

allowed to pass their land. If they pick

up firewood, someone from the company

will tell them to put it back.”

Rashidi

Omary Goboreni, farmer, Tanzania,

September 2009

“Land is generally given to wealthy

people at the expense of local people

whose ancestors have used the land

for generations. There will never be

development if they give land to the rich

and ignore poor people. If this trend

continues, there will be no more small-

scale farmers in this area. I believe it

is my land and I do not want to lose it. I

want my children to stay and inherit the

land and not move away.”

Gora Thiam,

farmer and village chief, Senegal,

October 2009

food security is being compromised

because land for food is being used

for fuel

In parts of Africa, some companies have

secured land that was used for growing crops

for the production of jatropha (see Box 3) and

sugar cane.

“I and the community expected to

increase our cash income and revenues

by working on the plantation. Our food

is insufficient because we gave away our

land. We have to fight for our rights and

find alternatives to fill the gap in food

and livelihoods.”

Mamadou Bah (alias),

farmer, Senegal, October 2009

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22 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

box 3: mArginAL LAnds And jAtroPhA

Jatropha has been sold as a miracle biofuel. Native

to central America, jatropha produces seeds that

contain oil, which can be used as biofuel.

One of its supposed advantages is that it can

be grown on ‘so called’ marginal land, and not

compete with food. Jatropha, it is claimed, can

also be grown in semi-arid areas, on poor soils

with limited water use. It will therefore provide

livelihoods and promote rural development.

1.8-2 tons per hectare per year, and even

this has yet to be achieved.

These are some of the other reactions to

jatropha from ActionAid’s field visits:

“Until now I haven’t got any seeds

from this jatropha. I feel bad. Now it is

almost four years and I am not getting

any income. There is no improvement.”

Wanjang Agitok Sangma, India

“I don’t think the jatropha will be

profitable.”

Matilda Sangma, India

“I don’t have any interest in jatropha.

It’s a loss to us, there are no benefits.”

Mamadou Bah (alias) Senegal

“We

do not want jatropha here.”

Sophie Mbodj, Senegal

Most of the evidence to date suggests that this

is too good to be true. For a start, companies

would like the crop to be grown on fertile land

with the requisite amounts of water to bring

higher yields and returns. But this would put

it into direct competition with land that could,

and often is, used to grow food. In Tanzania,

jatropha is being targeted at areas with good

rainfall and fertile soils. In Sahel areas of Senegal, The concept of marginal lands has now become

jatropha will only survive with irrigation; it’s a

synonymous with other terms – for example

similar story in Swaziland, which is suffering

land that is idle, exhausted and/or degraded.

from persistent drought.

The whole idea that jatropha (or any industrial

biofuel crop) should be targeted at these lands

is an insult to those that ActionAid works with

Jatropha is also being sold on the basis that

in developing countries. Communities would

the crop will offer employment and livelihoods.

dispute whether most, if any land would fall into

But the ODI concludes that “as the mainstay of

these categories, even if definitions could be

people’s livelihoods, [jatropha] looks distinctly

agreed. Communities use this land and massive

marginal.” This is because:

numbers would be displaced.

• employment is often sporadic – it is labour

intensive during planting (year 1) and then

A jatropha seed

very little until harvesting (years 4+);

• in India, where jatropha is becoming well

established, the promise of high yields has

never been proven regardless of whether

they are gown on fertile or poor soils. The

initial forecast was that it would only be

cost-competitive if yields reached 3-5 tons

of seeds per hectare per year. Private firms

have now had to scale down projections to

PHOTO: ACTIONAID

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23 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“What we want is to get our farms back, because that is what our

livelihood is dependent on... we are dying of hunger and there is

nothing that we have that is actually our own.”

matilde ngoene, mother and farmer, mozambique, november 2009

“I don’t have a farm, I don’t have a

garden, because the only land that I

have has been destroyed … We grew

maize, groundnuts, beans, pumpkins,

watermelons… I have given up: I

am staying helplessly, because we

don’t have anything to eat. We are

just suffering with hunger, because

even if I go to look for another farm,

they will just destroy it again.”

Elisa

Alimone Mongue, mother and farmer,

Mozambique, November 2009

“I clearly refused all the initial

propositions that I received for starting

to grow jatropha because I do not want

us to become farm workers at the

mercy of a few companies. I prefer to

continue to increase my production

of rice and corn. Imagine what would

happen if the world demand falls and

the price of agro-fuels collapses, after

we have concentrated all our efforts

on it? Our situation would be even

worse than now, and there would be

famine. We can’t eat jatropha, but

we can eat rice.”Abdou

Tall, farmer,

Senegal, 2008

“Farmers that now work on the

plantations have neglected their

own land and crops. It was hard last

year because most farmers went to

the plantation to work. However, the

company could not employ them. It

was the middle of the rainy season,

so too late to go back and plant crops.

Food prices are generally the same in

the market. But there are shortages of

millet and less income. Even this year,

there are farmers who haven’t grown

crops.”

Khady Diop (alias), mother,

Senegal, October 2009

One of the supposed advantages of jatropha is

that it doesn’t compete with food and can be

grown in semi-arid areas. ActionAid’s findings

on the ground reveal a very different picture.

In Tanzania, jatropha is being targeted by

companies, not at the semi-arid parts of the

country, but at areas with adequate and reliable

rainfall, fertile soils, and relatively well developed

infrastructure such as roads, railways and port

facilities that favour exports. This is land that

could be used to grow food.

In northeast India, local farmers and

communities were being enticed to experiment

with jatropha. Raju Sona grew jatropha for

one year on land he otherwise uses to grow

vegetables for his family.

“If we plant jatropha we will have a

problem because [it means] we have

to buy food from outside. If there is

no market [for jatropha] then there

will be a big problem. This will cause

great loss to me. Vegetables are very

expensive [so] we can save money

with all the things we grow – we are

cultivating potatoes and cabbages. If

the land is planted professionally, it

could grow 4,000 to 6,000 cabbages in

six months to sell in the market. This

is good land for growing ginger, onions

and garlic.”

Raju Sona, farmer, India,

November 2009

food security is compromised because

local food prices are rising

ActionAid is beginning to see evidence that food

prices in local markets are beginning to increase

because of the industrial biofuel companies in

their locality.

“Instead of farming their land, people

go to work for the [biofuel] company.

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24 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

So then they are not involved in their

activities at the farm. There are now

fewer farmers involved in farming their

own land. Food is becoming a problem…

The price of food has been increasing

every now and then. The increasing

food prices have to do with food

shortages within the village due to

lower production on the farms.”

Aailyah Nyondo (alias), farmer,

Tanzania, February 2009

When asked whether less food is produced

since the biofuel company arrived, Fatuma

Omari responded:

“Yes that is true… there is little activity

on the farms and then the consequence

is low production. I am alone and have

to go to the farm daily. I never used this

[jatropha] area for firewood collection. I

buy it. I use charcoal. It was 100 shilling

but now it is 200 shilling. That’s because

of the company – the company is using

charcoal. [Food] prices are increasing

because of low production in the village

and we are depending on food from

neighboring villages.”

Fatuma Omari,

farmer, Tanzania, February 2009

broken promises

In parts of west Africa, ActionAid has witnessed

what is little more than a subtle form of land

dispossession, where communities are offered

promises from companies that are not being met.

One company has secured land from farmers,

in local currency, at about

€30

per hectare – a

very small amount of money. But some farmers

have agreed to sell the land on the condition

that they were employed by the company on the

‘plantation’ at a rate of

€130/month.

However,

having acquired the land, the company said that

it would only pay about half the amount,

€2.30/

day or

€70/month.

While this is at the minimum

wage for the country, the ActionAid office

confirmed that this is simply not a living wage.

For those that have given away all their land,

€70/month

is not sufficient for everyday needs,

including the purchase of food.

“When the company came, they made

a promise; if you want to work with

us, you have to give up your land and

you can work on the plantation. They

reneged on their promises; we had

already given up our land and now they

reduced the hours on the plantation.

In the beginning they gave us [€30/

hectare]. If you work on the plantation,

the company would pay us [€130/

month]. I worked 2-3 months and then

the company started to reduce the

salary. Finally, it came down to [€70/

month] and that is when the problems

started. I lost my land. They did not

respect me. They betrayed me. They

reduced the people on the plantation

and I lost my job. Almost all the people

in the village have lost their jobs. The

company brought their own staff from

elsewhere [in the country] but not from

the village.”

Kwame Sarpong (alias),

farmer, west Africa, 2009

Loss of income, livelihoods and

community resources

More often than not, those affected are

women, because they are the ones most

frequently ‘displaced’. So-called marginal

land is often used by women, and is critical

to their livelihood as a place to grow food and

subsistence crops, gather fuel, use for grazing

or even as a source of medicinal herbs. As

local land is taken over for industrial biofuel

production, women are forced to spend more

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25 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

time walking further afield to do other chores

such as collecting firewood.

“It is the woman who is affected most

because she is the main producer of food

for the household. The woman is feeding

the household. We normally used to go

there [to the former community land

on which the biofuel company is now

growing jatropha] for farming and

collecting firewood. Now we cannot go

there anymore. They are prohibiting

it. Now I have to go to another forest

[to collect firewood]. This is a little bit

far away. I would have to leave here

now at ten o’clock and would be back

at two o’clock. It is heavy. It is now

harder work for me to go as compared

to the other area. Because of this I can

spend less time on my farm because the

work time has been reduced.”

Aailyah

Nyondo (alias), farmer, Tanzania,

February 2009

“It would have major impacts for the

village [if the company cut down the

forest]. Now we depend as much on the

forest as we do on the farm land. We

use it for charcoal making, collecting

firewood, mushrooms, timber of which

we build houses, benches and other

things. We also collect materials of

which we make mats that we sell in the

market.”

Mwanahawa Abdala, farmer,

Tanzania, September 2009

In Ghana there are similar stories. Women have

traditionally harvested nuts from shea trees to

make shea butter – an important commodity

in cosmetics and soaps, and used locally in

cooking. Shea nuts have therefore been an

important source of supplementary income

for poor rural women, particularly during the

rainy season. But in some areas, the shea

trees have been destroyed to make way for

jatropha plantations.

“The shea nuts I am able to pick during

the year help me to have my children

in school, to buy cloth and also to

supplement the household’s food needs

when the harvest from my husband’s

farm runs out. But this year I could not

get much because of the trees that have

been cut. Now they have destroyed the

trees so we have lost a good source of

income forever, yet we have not been

paid anything in compensation. That is

why I confronted the white man at the

meeting.”

Sanatu Yaw, Ghana, 2008

Those planting jatropha in northeast India are

not getting a decent income. Most of them are

getting no income at all. The main problems are

low yields and a lack of market for seeds.

“No one will buy jatropha. People said

if you have a plantation then surely

you have a good market, but we didn’t

see such good market. When I got the

message that there was no market, I got

discouraged. I was very upset. I felt very

bad. I expected profit. I threw it [the

seeds] away. They were no use to me. I

destroyed the plants because of lack of

market. The thing is that we have land,

but if I use it for jatropha and I don’t get

good production after spending money, it

will be a great loss for me.”

Raju Sona,

farmer, India, November 2009

“Until now we have had no income from

the jatropha plantation. They told me

it would be two years before we would

have income, but it is already three

years. People are a little down now

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26 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Matilde Ngoene,

Mozambique. Her land was

taken by a biofuel company.

PHOTO JAMES OATWAY/PANOS/ACTIONAID

because the whole project is already four

years running and there is no income. I

still hope that I will get profit otherwise I

will pull up the plants.”

Parindra Gohain

(alias), farmer, India, November 2009

In the sahel region of Senegal, ie the driest

part of the country, much of the land

earmarked for industrial biofuel production is

also used for grazing animals. Each animal

requires about 12 hectares of grazing which

will be completely impossible if land is given

over to biofuels.

Lack of consultation and compensation

The issue of compensation – or the lack of

it – runs through many of the testimonies

collected. In Tanzania, companies have been

offering compensation to people where they

had been displaced from their land. In one

location, 60% rejected the compensation

as inadequate.

In parts of west Africa, the scale and speed of

the land handout has meant that those most

directly affected by the biofuel boom have not

even been consulted.

“They actually took the land when it

was already tilled…They haven’t paid us

anything, they haven’t told us anything.

Some of the people in the town have

received money, but in our case they

haven’t given us anything... They haven’t

offered any job, they haven’t employed

us. They haven’t given us any alternative

farms. What we want is to get our farms

back, because that is what our livelihood

is dependent on... we are dying of hunger

and there is nothing that we have that

is actually our own.”

Matilde Ngoene,

mother and farmer, Mozambique

“Many things will be affected – health

clinics, wells, roads, villages, people.

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27 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

“The balance of evidence shows a significant risk that current

[biofuel] policies will lead to net greenhouse gas emissions.”

ed gallagher, renewable fuels Agency, 2008

In Africa, yields

from rain-fed

agriculture are

predicted to drop by

as much as 50% by

2020 because of

climate change

This needs a lot of consultation. But

there wasn’t any consultation and there

hasn’t been any compensation.”

Mustafa

Lo, farmer, Senegal, October 2009

Africa by more than 30% by 2030.

56, 57

intense droughts and floods are recurrent in

many areas. Of the 31 countries currently facing

food and agriculture crises, 11 have suffered

recent adverse weather conditions.

Scientists working on the

Stern Review on the

Economics of Climate Change

have predicted

that, given current trends, up to an additional

600 million people may be hungry by 2080, as

a result of climate change.

Obviously action to limit climate change is

imperative for development. The problem

with industrial biofuels in this context is that

they present a false solution. Some politicians

and companies claim they emit fewer GHGs

compared to fossil fuels – because they are

carbon neutral (ie, as the fuel is burned it

re-releases the carbon dioxide that the plant

absorbed when it was growing, making a

closed circuit). In truth, other resources –

land, fertiliser and energy for example – are

needed to grow the plants, and manufacture

and transport the fuels, meaning industrial

biofuels can have a large and negative

climate impact.

Labour conditions

Brazil is the largest industrial biofuel producer

in the developing world, where the sugar cane

(ethanol) plantation industry is well established.

However, working conditions are often poor.

Of one million cane workers, about half are

employed as cutters – most of which they

do by hand. Because of the heat and long

hours to meet quotas, it is not surprising that

a number of deaths have been reported. The

government’s own investigations have found

virtual slave labour conditions, exploitative sub-

contracting systems, poor sanitation and quality

of food, unfit drinking water and overcrowded

living conditions. In one investigation, the

team rescued 11,000 labourers working in

unacceptable conditions.

industriAL biofueLs Are

not A soLution to cLimAte

chAnge

Climate change is not just an environmental

and developmental issue; it’s also about

injustice. The impact of climate change will be

felt unevenly between and within countries,

reinforcing existing inequalities, between

women and men, rich and poor, and between

the north and south.

Climate change is also a hunger issue. In

some countries in Africa, yields from rain-fed

agriculture are predicted to drop by as much

as 50% by 2020 because of climate change,

and India could lose 18% of its rain-fed cereal

production in the same period. A Stanford

University study forecasts that climate change

could reduce maize production in southern

how policy has got ahead of

the science

The science surrounding the impact of

industrial biofuels on climate change is

evolving fast; and many scientists – some

using life cycle analysis – are providing

evidence that most biofuels currently being

used actually release more GHGs compared

to fossil fuels. Unfortunately, all of the figures

currently used in EU legislation (ie in the

recently agreed Renewable Energy Directive –

RED) are over-optimistic about the potential for

industrial biofuels to help reduce emissions.

The backdrop to this is that the RED stipulates

that member states’ biofuels must achieve

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28 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Up to an additional

600 million people

may be hungry as

a result of climate

change by 2080

35% GHG savings when compared to fossil

fuel, and this rises to 50% by 2017.

The main policy areas where the EU is over-

optimistic or currently has no policies in place

are as follows.

direct land use change

The increasing use of industrial biofuels is

resulting in changes in land use. Direct land

use change happens when forests, peatlands,

grasslands or other non-agricultural lands are

converted, cut down, or dug up for industrial

biofuel production. When carbon-rich habitats

are involved, this has massive implications

for the carbon stored in the soil and in the

vegetation. As biofuel production increases,

so new land will be converted.

A recent study estimated the emissions from

change in land use and compared them to

potential emissions savings through the use of

industrial biofuels. This gives a carbon debt and

the study estimated how many years it would

take to pay back this debt:

•

Indonesian/Malaysian peatland rainforest to

palm oil biodiesel: 423 years

•

Brazilian Amazon to soy biodiesel: 319 years

•

US central grassland to corn ethanol: 93 years

•

Indonesian/Malaysian tropical rainforest to

palm oil biodiesel: 86 years

•

US abandoned cropland to corn ethanol:

48 years

•

Brazilian

cerrado

grassland to soy biodiesel:

37 years

•

Brazilian

cerrado

woodland to cane ethanol:

17 years

This suggests that it will take many decades,

even centuries, to turn any climate change

benefits into a positive GHG balance profit –

time we simply do not have if we are to limit

dangerous climate change.

Another study by the Institute for Applied

Ecology and the Institute for Energy and

Environment in Germany shows that if you

include direct land use change for the main EU

biofuel feedstocks, none of them would achieve

the required 35% GHG reduction as required by

the RED.

This means that most EU industrial

biofuel production must come from land already

under agricultural production, displacing

existing food and other production elsewhere –

an indirect land use change (see below).

Under the sustainability criteria, the RED

makes some provisions that would restrict

biofuels that originate from carbon rich areas

such as forests and peatlands. However, there

are so many loopholes that little protection is

actually afforded to high carbon stock areas.

Furthermore, unless the verification of sources

and supply chains is robust and credible, claims

that industrial biofuels are not sourced from

these areas must be treated with caution.

Furthermore, in terms of GHG emissions, the

criteria in the RED do not prohibit the use of

grasslands, on which much of the expansion

is expected to take place.

Much grassland is

also carbon rich. The use of only a small area of

permanent grasslands would emit more GHGs

than the annual emissions savings as predicted

by the European Commission.

indirect land use change (iLuc)

This occurs when land previously used to grow

food or animal feed is turned over to growing

industrial biofuels. This displaces the original

agricultural land use onto land in new areas.

Thus, while the biofuel crop itself may not

cause new land clearance directly, it can still be

held responsible because of its displacement

impact. The new land use will have a GHG

emission impact, much the same as with direct

land use change.

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29 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

For example:

•

EU rapeseed oil is traditionally used as

a vegetable oil in food products but is

increasingly being used as an industrial

biofuel feedstock. This displacement effect

means the EU has to import vegetable oil

to replace rapeseed oil from elsewhere,

invariably extra palm oil from Indonesia and

Malaysia, much of which will have been

grown on converted forest and peatlands.

•

Increased EU and US demand for Brazilian

cane and soy as industrial biofuels is

displacing other activities – such as

cattle ranching – further into the Amazon,

triggering indirect emissions.

•

More corn is now being grown for ethanol

in the US at the expense of soy. This in

turn pushes up the price of soy, providing

an incentive to south American farmers

to expand soy production, often into

forest areas.

This is why indirect land use change, as it

relates to climate change, is such an important

cLimAte chAnge: cheLimo’s story

“My name is Chelimo and I live in

northern Kenya. When there was rain

the land was green and our goats had

grass to eat. We used to eat our goats

when we were hungry. Sometimes we

would sell them for food.

Now the land everywhere is very

dry. My father and my uncle spend

a long time looking for green land

with grass for our goats. Each time

my father goes looking we don’t know

when he will come back. My family

have not been able to grow any food

this year.”

For poor people worldwide, the impact of

climate change is already being felt. In the

last few years, Kenya has suffered recurring

droughts, rainfall has become more

sporadic and sometimes it never arrives

at all.

In the northern part of Kenya, a prolonged

drought has led to 10 million people searching

for food. For families like Chelimo’s, hunger is

a daily problem.

There is an urgent need to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions to limit climate change. The

scientific evidence is growing every day that

most biofuels will actually make climate change

worse, compared to fossil fuels they are

replacing. Biofuels are not the answer to climate

change and will drive more people into hunger.

Chelimo, aged nine,

and her aunt Margaret,

northern Kenya.

PHOTO: ACTIONAID

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30 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

issue. The indirect displacement effect is

substantial; and if additional rainforest or

peatland is being destroyed, this will release

vast quantities of GHGs into the atmosphere.

Measuring the impact of indirect land use

change is critical if the GHG emissions of

industrial biofuels are to be correctly assessed.

The EU Commission, parliamentarians and

member states must ensure that scientifically

robust calculations on indirect land use change

are included in calculating the GHG balance

for biofuels. The precautionary principle must

be used when addressing indirect land use

change, particularly where data deficiencies

or uncertainties persist.

Will second generation be any

better?

Policy makers believe the climate change

benefits of second generation biofuels are much

greater than those of the first, but some have

cast doubts on this claim:

“An expanded global

cellulosic bioenergy [ie second generation

biofuels] program… predicts that indirect

land use will be responsible for substantially

more carbon loss (up to twice as much)

than direct land use; however, because of

predicted increases in fertilizer use, nitrous

oxide emissions will be more important than

carbon losses themselves in terms of warming

potential.”

Second generation biofuels could

lead to higher GHG emissions when compared

to their fossil fuel equivalent.

cultivation

Almost all industrial biofuel feedstocks require

nitrogen fertilisers. These release nitrous oxides

0) to the atmosphere that are 300 times

more damaging as greenhouse gases than

. Scientists now estimate that previous

analyses have underestimated the importance

of N

0 as a GHG by a factor of between 3

and 5.

Even sceptics of this work, who are

few, acknowledge that

“in some instances,

O emissions] will result in the feedstock not

achieving GHG savings compared to fossil

fuels”.

Some even argue that

“increased

fertiliser use for biofuels production will cause

nitrous oxide emissions (N

O) to become more

important than carbon losses, in terms of

warming potential, by the end of the century”.

Given that the weight of scientific evidence is

compelling, that there are no emissions savings

at all for many industrial biofuels, the carbon

debt will never be paid back.

The EU must urgently include revised

calculations on nitrous oxide emissions in the

GHG balance for biofuels.

good value for money?

Even if it were possible for liquid transport

biofuels to achieve GHG emissions savings, two

other very important issues arise:

•

What are the net global welfare gains and

losses from adopting this policy – in short,

are industrial biofuels a cost-effective way of

reducing GHG emissions?

•

Is the energy pathway of growing crops and

converting them into liquid transport biofuels

the best approach of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions?

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the

European Commission analysed the first

question. It placed a net benefit value on energy

security, GHG benefits and employment gains.

The benefits reached

€18.4

billion. However,

the costs – in terms of industrial biofuels being

more expensive to produce when compared

to an equivalent quantity of conventional fuel –

heavily outweighs the benefits, reaching some

€56.7

billion. This net cost of some US$40

billion by 2020 would have to be met by the EU

taxpayer.

This cost might be worthwhile if it

were actually contributing to a reduction in GHG

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31 chapter 3

What’s wrong with industrial biofuels?

emissions, but the truth is that taxpayers will get

little if any climate benefit for their money.

In answer to the second question, there is also

a growing body of evidence to support the

conclusion:

“Biofuels can be used far more

efficiently in stationary facilities [eg power

plants] to generate heat or to co-generate

heat and electricity than they can as liquid

transportation fuels

[eg, for cars].”

Electric

vehicles are also more efficient in turning energy

into movement.

As part of a wider strategy, the then UK

Department of Trade and Industry concluded

that first generation transport biofuels are

the least cost-effective way to lower GHG

emissions.

The Environmental Audit

Committee in the UK came to a similar

conclusion: that current EU and UK policy fails

to ensure the most efficient use of biofuel in

terms of greenhouse gas emission potential. It

does not deliver good value for the taxpayer.

While there may be some benefits of using

crops for heat and power generation, we need

to approach this with extreme caution. If crops

for heat and power are grown on large-scale,

monoculture crop plantations, the problems

with emissions from land use change and

large releases of nitrous oxide, as well as other

environmental and developmental impacts, will

be the same as for transport biofuels.

fuels. But first generation biofuels are well

established and as the next section shows, their

production will expand massively. This argument

is also misleading because second generation

industrial biofuels would require new technology

and an entirely different infrastructure.

Thus

there is no stepping stone effect from the first

to the second generation. More importantly,

second generation biofuels may never become

commercially viable. As the OECD concludes:

““As

second-generation technologies are still in

the demonstration phase, it remains to be seen

whether they will become economically viable

over the next decade, if ever. Even with positive

technological developments there are serious

doubts about the feasibility of using residue

material as…[a] feedstock on a large scale.”

The EU’s second main argument is that all

EU biofuels would have to meet sustainability

criteria and standards to fill the 10% target. The

criteria have already been criticised as being far

too weak, particularly on developmental and

social grounds. But as with all criteria that deal

with commodities, verification, compliance and

certification will prove very difficult, particularly

given the sheer scale of production and the

difficulties presented by complex supply chains.

In addition, the European Commission alone will

decide, through an advisory committee, exactly

what information EU member states will require

operators to report on, and it must make its

decision with a view to avoiding an ‘excessive

administrative burden’.

ActionAid fears that the criteria and verification

will fail to provide anything like the burden

of proof on sustainability required to ensure

that industrial biofuels are actually produced

sustainably. In short, criteria and standards can

provide a cloak of acceptability that enables

unsustainable biofuels to be produced.

concLusion – the eu resPonse

The impacts are significant, wide ranging and

will only get worse. To answer the critics, and

in support of the 10% target, the EU falls back

on two main but flawed arguments. Firstly, that

we can find a technological solution: ie that first

generation industrial biofuels are a short-term

solution and are merely a stepping stone to

more ‘sustainable’ second and third generation

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32 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

4. Industrial biofuels

to 2020

governments Are increAsing

biofueL demAnd

future global biofuel demand

Industrial biofuels are not new. Brazil and the US

have been producing ethanol for decades. What

is new is the sheer scale of the biofuel boom.

Most G8 and G5 countries (see acronyms

for a list of countries) have now established

mandatory biofuel blend targets – by a certain

date, transport fuels must include a certain

percentage of biofuels (see Table 5).

By 2020, global consumption will more than

triple, increasing from about 70 billion litres

in 2008 to an estimated 250 billion litres in

2020, assuming current targets are met. Of

this, the EU would consume about 55 billion

litres in 2020, Brazil approximately 45 billion

litres, both behind the US at about 110 billion

litres. Predictions are that other countries will

consume relatively small amounts of biofuels

by 2020 – about 20% of the total consumption.

Thereafter, the amount they consume will grow

much faster.

Clearly this could be just the start of it.

Assuming that all countries blend 10% of their

transport fuel by 2030, consumption could

reach around 400 billion litres (about 340 million

metric tonnes).

the ALArming scALe of

industriAL biofueL LAnd

exPAnsion

In an era of climate change, water stress and

competing land uses (particularly for food),

where is all this biofuel land going to come

from?

global land requirements and

availability

It is difficult to predict how much land will be

needed by 2020 to produce this quantity of

industrial biofuels, and the following figures

should be treated as indicative only. One

authoritative study estimates that the additional

agricultural land required would range between

118 and 508 million hectares by 2030. This is

dependent on the crop type and productivity

level and assumes that all countries would

substitute 10% of transport fuel with biofuels

by this date.

Other scientists have concluded

that because of critical constraints on the

table 5: biofuel targets in the g8 and g5 countries

(mandatory unless specified otherwise)

country

Canada

Russia

Japan

Brazil

China

India

South Africa

Mexico

biofuel target (ie % blend in transport fuels)

10% ‘renewable content’ by 2020 but most, if not all of this, will come from industrial biofuels

36 billion gallons by 2022

5% renewable content in petrol by 2010 and 2% in diesel by 2012

No targets

500,000 kilolitres by 2010 (voluntary)

5% biodiesel by 2010; 25% ethanol blend in petrol

10 and 2 million tonnes of ethanol and biodiesel respectively by 2020

20% biofuels by 2017 (national policy)

4.5% biofuels by 2013 (national strategy)

Targets under consideration

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33 chapter 4

Industrial biofuels to 2020

“Current mandates and targets for liquid biofuels should be

reconsidered in light of the potential adverse environmental

consequences, potential displacement or competition with food

crops, and difficulty of meeting these goals without large scale

land conversion.”

Proceedings of the scientific committee on Problems of the environment (scoPe), 2008

figure 3. eu and global biofuel consumption in 2008 and 2020

250

200

Billions litres

150

100

Global

2000

2008

Years

Indicative only: Quantities in 2020 will vary according to a host of factors, for example whether targets are met or new ones introduced,

GHG saving targets to be achieved from biofuels, the availability of second generation and so on.

2020

productivity of biofuel crops, such as water

availability, the higher end of estimates for the

amount of agricultural land that has to be given

over may be more realistic.

Another study gives a lower range of between

56 and 166 million hectares by 2020. The range

takes into consideration yields, ‘co-products’

and the uptake of second generation biofuels

within the next 10 years

which, as explained

earlier, remains very unlikely.

This compares with the estimated amount of

land under industrial biofuels in 2007 of about

27 million hectares.

Assuming 100 million

hectares for industrial biofuels by 2020 – which

is roughly twice the size of France – this is four

times the current land use. But this has to be

taken together with other projected increases

in demand for land and land availability,

particularly for food.

competing global land use requirements

The expansion of biofuels is happening at

a time of massive competing land uses –

including forestry, agriculture for food, animal

feed, fibres and fuels, and the expansion of

urban areas. One of the largest competing

uses will be food for a growing population.

In 2007, the United Nations Environment

Programme (UNEP) calculated that by 2020

an extra 200 to 700 million hectares of

additional land will be required to grow food,

animal feed and provide pasture for animals.

These figures are backed by similar findings

from other studies.

The Gallagher report looked at three different

land requirement scenarios for food, feed and

fuel by 2020:

•

an optimistic scenario where only 60 million

hectares of land are required for industrial

biofuels, and 200 million hectares for food

and feed;

•

a mid-range scenario where 100 and 400

million hectares are required respectively;

•

a pessimistic scenario where 200 and 500

million hectares are required respectively.

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34 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Carlotta Machaule

lost her land with a farming

association to a biofuel

company in Mozambique,

and is now fighting to

reclaim her rights.

PHOTO: JAMES OATWAY/PANOS/ACTIONAID

The mid-range scenario assumes that,

by around 2020, some 500 million more

hectares of crops may have to be brought

into agricultural use to meet global demand.

This is an area roughly half the size of Europe.

The current area of arable land in the world

is about 1.5 billion hectares. This means that

500 million hectares – 33% more land than is

currently under cultivation – would have to be

found.

global land use availability

The Gallagher report also summarised various

studies in an attempt to estimate land suitable

for global agricultural expansion. This ranged

from 50 million to 1.2 billion hectares.

With

such a large range, any analysis of requirements

versus availability becomes hypothetical. But

even towards the lower end of these estimates,

grassland and so-called marginal land (see Box

3) are likely to be brought into production. Even

woodlands, forests and other natural habitats

are likely to be lost.

This is unsustainable because:

•

forests and other natural habitats – such as

wetlands – are important carbon sinks and

biodiversity hotspots;

•

grassland will be a primary target for

industrial biofuel expansion

because they

are considered low carbon stock areas.

But even here, grasslands – particularly

permanent grasslands – are important

carbon stores;

•

even if land were available, there are other

factors that make expanding intensive

agriculture, including biofuels, unrealistic;

– water accessibility will impose constraints

on land use. This is likely to be made

worse by climate change. The scarcity

of resources, particularly land and water,

will be a key issue in many parts of the

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35 chapter 4

Industrial biofuels to 2020

developing world earmarked for industrial

biofuel expansion, where the fight against

hunger must take precedence.

– by 2020, because of climate change, there

are likely to be strenuous attempts to place

agriculture on a sustainable basis, both to

mitigate the effects of climate change, and

to help people adapt to them. Intensive

agriculture and associated land use is

already responsible for 30% of global

GHGs.

All the major industrial biofuel

feed stocks, with the exception of soy,

require significant amounts of nitrogen

oxide fertilisers; nitrous oxides released into

the atmosphere are one the most potent

GHGs.

The idea that we can increasingly

intensify agriculture – ie to get greater

biofuel yields from a hectare of land – is

continually untenable.

In conclusion, land is becoming an ever-more

pressured resource, particularly in an era of

water stress and climate change. Massive

competing land use raises doubts as to whether

we have enough land to feed the world in the

future. Land for food must be prioritised over

land for fuel.

eu land requirement

Buoyed by the fact that the mandatory 10%

target has provided the assurance and

confidence it needs, and backed by generous

subsidies, EU agribusiness is scouring the

world for future industrial biofuel investment

opportunities. Four crops dominate the new EU

biofuel colonial frontier in developing countries

– sugar cane to make ethanol and jatropha, and

palm oil and soy for biodiesel.

direct land use issues

Where will the 55 billion litres of biofuel required

by the EU by 2020 to meet its 2020 target

originate from? And how much land to grow it

would be required from developing countries?

By way of illustration, the Dutch Environment

Assessment Agency estimates that globally,

some 20-30 million hectares will be required if

biofuels are used to meet the EU 10% target.

figure 4: eu biodiesel and ethanol consumption by source in 2020

Other (including

jatropha) 5%

Brazilian soy 7%

US soy 8%

Argentinian soy 10%

EU oil seed rape 22%

Indonesian palm oil 25%

Malaysian palm oil 23%

Other 8%

EU sugar beet 5%

EU coarse grains

(ie maize) 8%

EU wheat 35%

Brazilian sugar cane 44%

EU biodiesel consumption by source in 2020

(Total = 27.5bn litres)

EU ethanol consumption by source in 2020

(Total = 27.5bn litres)

Sources: UK government/ author’s own calculations. These graphs should be used as indicative only. They are based almost exclusively on

economic assumptions (costs, prices, tax incentives etc) as well as production and consumption targets. They do not consider other

assumptions such GHG savings/losses, trade restrictions, blend characteristics, technical specifications etc.

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36 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

Jatropha plantation,

northern Senegal.

PHOTO: TIM RICE/ACTIONAID

For reasons explained below, ActionAid believes

that the higher end of this estimate is likely to be

more realistic, if not higher.

It is impossible to gauge with any certainty as

to ‘what’ will be grown ‘where’ to meet this

increased EU biofuel use. Much will depend,

for example, on the profitability of different

types of biofuels (the major factors being the

price of oil and the feedstock price), their blend

characteristics and technical specifications,

yield changes and the level of climate change

savings or losses for biofuels compared to

fossil fuels.

That said, some modelling has been done to

ascertain what feedstocks could be grown where.

The UK Renewable Energy Association predicts

that the EU could produce up to 80% of its own

biofuel needs by 2020.

However, the majority

of estimates, for example that conducted by the

JRC, conclude that the EU will have to import

between a half and two-thirds of its consumption

by 2020 assuming that second generation

biofuels are not available by this date.

Despite the uncertainties, some member

states are also attempting to map out this

information. Most of these models assume that

EU consumption in 2020 (by volume) will be

fairly evenly split between biodiesel and ethanol.

Again, imports would comprise about 60% of

EU consumption. These figures should be used

as indicative only (Figure 4).

Using the graphs in Figure 4, the following is a

crude estimate of what land may be required

from developing countries to meet the EU 10%

industrial biofuels target in 2020:

•

Some 2.5-3 million hectares in Indonesia

and Malaysia may be required to supply

palm oil.

•

Some 2-2.5 million hectares in Brazil may be

required to supply ethanol from sugar cane

(to reach this level would require changes to

the level of import tariffs on Brazilian ethanol

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37 chapter 4

Industrial biofuels to 2020

Both directly and

indirectly, the total

land required to met

the EU 10% target in

developing and

developed countries

will run into the

tens of millions

of hectares

which are currently high to protect the

ethanol industry in the EU).

•

Assuming that jatropha makes up 5% of EU

biodiesel consumption in 2020, this may also

require between 1-2 million hectares of land

depending on final yields. A key location for

production is in Africa and south Asia where

it is deemed that so-called idle and marginal

land is available (see Box 3).

•

Other sources – such as soy from Argentina

and Brazil – may require 8-10 million hectares.

This all adds up to some 13.5-17.5 million

hectares of developing country land. The top

end of this figure is well over half the size of

Italy. Millions of hectares will also be required in

developed nations, principally the EU and US.

indirect land use issues

A significant amount of land in the EU formerly

used for food is also being diverted into biofuel

production. For example, EU rapeseed oil has

traditionally been used in the food industry as

a vegetable oil, but increasingly large amounts

are now being used as a feedstock for industrial

biofuels. The food industry has had to turn to a

different source, and invariably this is oil palm

from southeast Asia. If 22% of biodiesel in 2020

comes from domestically produced edible oils,

this suggests a shortfall – which will be filled by

palm oil – of about six billion litres of edible oil

requiring another 1-2 million hectares of land

in developing countries.

But this is a conservative estimate. For

example, it is very difficult to quantify the

impact of higher maize production and prices,

say in the US. Here farmers are switching

to maize at the expense of soy, which in

turn drives up the price of soy; this gives an

incentive for an increase in land grabbing for

soy production in south America, which is

associated with tropical deforestation.

conclusion

Both directly and indirectly, the total land

required to met the EU 10% target in developing

and developed countries will run into the tens

of millions of hectares. As shown in Chapter 3,

this will have disastrous impacts on food prices,

hunger, climate change and land rights for many

of the communities where they are grown.

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38 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

5. Biofuel use –

a suggested way forward

The way forward for biofuels should be built

around three core principles. Firstly, that

there is a role for biofuels so long as they are

produced sustainably, do not compete with

food and genuinely contribute to reducing

GHGs (see Box 4). These biofuels could

potentially be used in a number of ways

– heating, power, cooking, transport etc.

Secondly, that a more sustainable society must

reduce energy consumption so that many of

the impacts identified in this report can be

minimised, or even avoided. Thirdly, alternative

and more sustainable transport modes must

be prioritised such as public transport, electric

vehicles (assuming that the electricity source

is decarbonised) and cycling.

Alongside this, the rush to industrial biofuels

must be reined in, and ultimately stopped.

production before sustainable local

biofuel needs;

– protect access to resources, particularly

land rights, for both men and women

(this would include the principles of free,

prior and informed consent and greater

transparency where contracts with

companies are involved);

– ensure that all workers enjoy decent

standards of work as defined by the

International Labour Organisation;

– ensure that overseas companies are held

legally accountable for their impacts on

human rights and the environment.

2: nAtionAL Action PLAns

must not Lock in biofueLs

The Renewable Energy Directive requires that

EU member states must each produce, by June

2010, a National Renewable Energy Action Plan

(NREAP or NAP for short) which will set out

the targets for the share of renewable energy

in transport, electricity, heating and cooling

sectors by 2020. The directive also includes a

review of the 10% transport target in 2014.

Because of the growing evidence against

industrial biofuels, ActionAid believes that,

when drawing up NREAPs in 2010, EU member

states must not introduce or increase targets

for the proportion of energy that comes from

industrial biofuels – a stream that is likely to be

deemed economically, environmentally and

developmentally unviable in the future. In the run

up to the 2014 review, we believe the evidence

will confirm, even to sceptics, that industrial

biofuels are not a sustainable way to reach even

the current 10% transport target (by volume),

and that EU members states should abolish all

volume targets, certainly no later than 2014.

ActionAid believes that it is currently

impossible to meet the EU target sustainably.

1: there shouLd be A

morAtorium on the further

exPAnsion of industriAL

biofueL Production

And investment

The moratorium would have the effect of

reducing impacts by limiting further expansion.

All governments, both north and south, are

culpable in allowing and even encouraging

harmful biofuel investments to go ahead. Much

of the expansion taking place in developing

countries is happening with little regulatory

control over company operations and

unsustainable land use.

The moratorium should remain in place until:

•

the UN reports on a full and global

assessment of the impacts of industrial

biofuels;

•

national legislation and regulatory

frameworks are in place and enforced that:

– implement a sustainable land use plan

that prioritises sustainable local food

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39 chapter 5

Biofuel use – a suggested way forward

“A more effective way to reduce greenhouse gases and secure

energy supply is to reduce demand, improve efficiency and

develop sustainable transport and energy systems.”

friends of the earth, 2008

The current 10% target for transport should

be replaced by a renewables target based on

GHG reductions.

This would include:

•

that all GHG emissions are calculated

robustly and credibly, using a precautionary

approach. In particular, direct and indirect

land use change and nitrous oxide emissions

must be properly included.

•

that sustainability criteria are strengthened

and include developmental issues. The

verification and certification of the criteria

must be transparent, credible and robust.

3: trAnsPort And energy

consumPtion must be

reduced

The simplest and cheapest way for EU member

states to reduce the impact of their transport

and energy sectors – whether in relation to

GHG emissions, hunger or other issues – is to

embark on a drive to reduce transport fuel and

energy demand.

For this to happen there needs to be much

more EU support given to:

•

investment in public transport and other

more sustainable forms of transport such

box 4: sustAinAbLe AgricuLture And sustAinAbLe biofueLs

Sustainable agriculture integrates three

main goals – environmental stewardship,

farm profitability and prosperous farming

communities. It refers to the ability of farms to

produce food indefinitely, without damaging

soils and ecosystems, or people, their

communities and livelihoods. It would aim to

maintain healthy soils while reducing reliance

on external ‘inputs’ – such as fertilisers,

pesticides and herbicides.

Sustainable production of biofuels from land

should follow similar principles. However, in

addition:

• biofuels should not compete with food;

• they should prioritise the greatest GHG

savings;

• they should be controlled by and for the

benefit of local communities;

• they should prioritise small-scale

production targeted at local energy needs;

• where companies and investors are

involved, they should have obtained the

free, prior and informed consent of local

communities and people.

ActionAid Brazil has been looking into the

potential of small-scale sugar cane production

in the south of the country. One example

shows how smallholder farmers are taking

into account social and environmental

considerations, for example energy self-

sufficiency, non-competition with food crop

production as well as adding value to their

products. Each small sugar mill is managed

by 10-15 smallholder farming families, each

having two to six hectares of sugar cane. They

work collectively and divide the work, such

as cutting and crushing the sugar cane, and

the production of brown sugar, ethanol and

cachaça

– a strong and traditional Brazilian

alcoholic drink. According to demand and

prices, each mill can decide what product

they are going to produce. They also use the

crushed sugar cane

(bagasse)

to produce

animal feed.

However, other forms of sustainable biofuels

are also available – ie those fuels produced

from waste processes such as landfill off-

gassing and recycled vegetable oil.

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40 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

as electric vehicles and cycling;

•

more ambitious vehicle efficiency standards;

•

more ‘efficient’ driving such as reducing

speed limits;

•

investment in energy efficiency.

4: finAnciAL incentives

for industriAL biofueLs

must end

As well as the 10% target, other policy drivers

within the EU are stimulating the unsustainable

boom in industrial biofuels. The EU and

members states must end all subsidies and

other financial incentives to these fuels.

To that end, the EU should support small-scale,

sustainable biofuel projects controlled by and

for the benefit of local communities. This should

prioritise local energy needs, the preservation

of natural resources and the greatest GHG

savings. Such projects should not displace

food production, or impact on biodiversity

and habitats. Where companies and investors

are involved, they should have obtained the

free, prior and informed consent of local

communities and people.

Support should also be given to fuels produced

from waste processes such as landfill off-gassing

and recycled vegetable oil.

5: smALL-scALe sustAinAbLe

biofueL Projects shouLd

be suPPorted in the eu And

AbroAd

ActionAid believes sustainable smallholder

agriculture offers a key solution to tackling

hunger, as well as addressing poverty and

tackling GHG emissions from agriculture.

Mounting evidence shows sustainable agriculture

is highly productive in poor countries and has

other social and environmental benefits.

While ActionAid would argue that sustainable

agriculture must prioritise food before other

uses, there are situations where farming for

food, animal feed, fibres and fuel (ie sustainable

biofuels), could exist side-by-side. Where

produced and consumed locally, this would

have additional benefits in terms of fighting

hunger and energy poverty, and promoting

climate mitigation and adaptation, employment

and incomes.

But the scale will be nothing like that proposed

by rich nations. Most, if not all, sustainable

production of biofuels would be consumed

locally in developing countries and would not be

for export.

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41 chapter 6

Conclusion and recommendations

6. Conclusion and

recommendations

Industrial biofuels do not offer a solution to the

two main aims of EU biofuel policy – to combat

climate change and increase fuel security.

Rather, industrial biofuels are fuelling poverty

and hunger because they are now competing

with food crops, dramatically increasing the

prices that poor people pay for food worldwide.

At the same time, biofuels are having disastrous

local impacts on food security and land rights

for many of the communities where they are

grown.

Industrial biofuels are the main cause of the

food crisis and recent rises in hunger. Despite

this, political action on hunger and biofuels has

been minimal. Industrial biofuels provide a false

solution that allows rich nations to continue their

love affair with the internal combustion engine,

and industry to continue its business-as-usual

approach. It has allowed developed countries

to avoid the urgent and difficult realisation that

our current levels of transport fuel consumption

(and energy more generally) are unsustainable

and need to be reduced. Meanwhile, the costs

of these policies – in terms of hunger, poverty,

climate change, environmental degradation

and on people – are being felt mainly in the

developing world.

Oil prices are once again increasing, and unless

the industrial biofuel boom is reined in (and

targets for the proportion of our energy that

comes from them dropped), hunger is in danger

of spiralling out of control and climate change

will worsen. The hunger and climate crises

require immediate and sustainable responses –

and industrial biofuels are not the answer.

The easiest and best way to reduce the impact

of the transport sector on hunger and GHG

emissions, as well as improve our energy

security, is to reduce the overall consumption of

energy by transport. In terms of climate change,

this will yield immediate and guaranteed

reductions in GHGs. Once land-use changes,

fertiliser use and other factors are taken into

consideration, it is clear that many industrial

biofuels do not have a role to play in the fight

against climate change.

recommendations

ActionAid is in favour of sustainable biofuels.

But industrial biofuels – large-scale, intensive

monocultures – are clearly unsustainable and

in ActionAid’s view, their expansion should be

stopped. The EU and member states must:

•

place a moratorium on the further expansion

of industrial biofuel production and

investment;

•

ensure that member states do not lock

industrial biofuels into their 2010 national

action plans;

•

reduce transport and energy consumption;

•

end targets and financial incentives for

industrial biofuels;

•

support small-scale sustainable biofuels in

the EU and abroad.

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42 meals per gallon

The impact of industrial biofuels on people and global hunger

endnotes

FAO, 2009a.

The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2009.

Food and Agriculture Organization , Rome.

GAIN. EU27

Biofuels Annual Report 2009.

Doornbosch, R. and Steenblich, R.

Biofuels: Is the Cure

Worse than the Disease?

OECD, 2007. www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/15/46/39348696.pdf

OECD/FAO.

Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017.

Food and

Agriculture Organization , Rome, 2008.

See Wynn, G.

Advanced Biofuels Will Stoke Global Warming:

Study.

Reuters, 22nd October2009. www.reuters.com/article/

idUSTRE59L4V920091022

Official Journal of the EU, 2009.

Directive 2009/28/EC on the

Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources.

5 June

2009. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:

L:2009:140:0016:0062:EN:PDF

Bertholet, J.

The EU’s Main Agrofuels Subsidies in 2006 and

2020.

Solidarite, 2008.

HM Revenue and Customs, 2007. BN53 –

Hydrocarbon Oils

Duty: Rates.

www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2007/bn53.htm

GAIN, 2009.

Op cit.

Berthelot, 2008.

Op cit.

Berthelot, 2008.

Op cit.

Stevens, C.

EU Biofuel Policy and Development.

Overseas

Development Institute, 2008. www.icea.co.uk/archive/EU%20

biofuel%20policy%20development.ppt#256,1,EU Biofuel Policy

and Development

Official Journal of the European Communities, 2008.

Commission Decision of 9th December 2008.

http://eur-lex.

europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:334:0090:0

091:EN:PDF

Bizzarri, K.

Cornering the Market in Agrofuels: Brazil’s Bid to

Dominate the EU.

Corporate Europe Observatory, 2008. http://

archive.corporateeurope.org/docs/Cornering_the_market_in_

agrofuels.pdf

Mitchell, D.

A Note on Rising Food Prices,

April 2008. Don

Mitchell is a lead economist for the World Bank but the views do not

necessarily reflect the views of the Bank.

Abbott, P. C. et al.

What’s Driving Food Prices?

Purdue

University, 2008.

FAO, 2009b.

Crop Prospects and Food Situation.

http://www.

fao.org/docrep/011/ai481e/ai481e04.htm and FAO, 2009c. Food

Outlook. http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/ai482e/ai482e02.htm

USDA.

Agricultural Baseline Projections: U.S. Crops, 2009-

2018.

US Department for Agriculture, 2009. www.ers.usda.gov/

Briefing/Baseline/crops.htm

See Brown, L. R.

Biofuels Blunder Massive Diversion of US

Grain to Fuel Cars is raising World Food Prices.

Earth Policy

Institute, 2007. www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/press_room/

C68/SenateEPW07

FAO, 2009d.

Food Price Indexes.

www.fao.org/

worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/

Collins, K., 2008.

The Role of Biofuels and Other Factors

in Increasing Farm and Food Prices. A Review of Recent

Developments with a Focus on Feed Grain Markets and Market

Prospects.

Report for Kraft Foods Global Inc, June.

See Bailey, R. 2008a.

Another Inconvenient Truth.

Oxfam pages

19-20.

Borger, J. 2008a.

US Attacked at Food Summit over Biofuels.

Guardian, 4 June. www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/04/

biofuels.food

Mitchell, 2008.

Op cit.

Anderson, J. W. Food

Prices Predicted to Ease Before Entering

Steady Climb.

Washington Post, 2008. www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/29/AR2008052901023.

html?wpisrc=newsletter

Wiggins S. et al.

Review of the Indirect Effects of Biofuels:

Economic Benefits and Food Insecurity.

Overseas Development

Institute, June 2008. p7.

See Runge C. F. and B. Senauer, 2007.

How Biofuels Could

Starve the Poor.

Foreign Affairs, Volume 86, No 3

Senauer, B. and M. Sur,.

Ending Global Hunger in the 21st

Century: Projections of the Number of Food Insecure People.

Review of Agricultural Economics, 23 (1) 2001, pp68-81.

Boel, F.

Biofuels: not a Magic Wand but a Valuable Policy Tool.

Speech to the 2008 World Biofuels Market Congress, 13 March

2008.

Bailey, R. 2008b.

Response of Oxfam GB to the Gallagher

Review.

Oxfam.

FAO, 2009f.

National Basic Food Prices: Data and Analysis Tool.

http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/ accessed 3rd December

2009

IRIN.

Swaziland: Sugar Prices Tempt Small Farmers Away from

Food Production,

4th August 2009 http://www.irinnews.org/report.

aspx?ReportID=85749

FAO, 2009e.

Crop Prospects and Food Situation.

November.

http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak340e/ak340e02.htm

Runge C. F. and B. Senauer, 2007.

How Biofuels Could Starve

the Poor.

Foreign Affairs, Volume 86, No 3

Wittington, E.

Growing Pains: The Possibilities and Problems

with Biofuels.

Christian Aid, 2009.

FAO, 2008a.

Food Situation in Latin America and the

Caribbean.

September/October http://www.rlc.fao.org/iniciativa/

pdf/bolobs3_en.pdf

FAO, 2008b.

Crop Prospects and Food Situation.

October. See

for example http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/ai473e/ai473e03.htm

FAO, 2008c.

The State of Food and Agriculture. Biofuels:

Prospects, Risk and Opportunities.

pp75-76.

Barrett quoted in FAO, 2008c.

Op cit,

p75.

DFID.

Growth and Poverty Reduction: the role of Agriculture.

London, 2005.

FAO, 2008c. p76.

UNICEF.

Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender

Equality,

2007. www.unicef.org/sowc07/docs/sowc07.pdf

Wiggins S. et al, 2008.

Op cit.

p88.

UNICEF, 2007.

Op cit.

p26.

FAO, 2008c.

Op cit.

p76-77.

FAO, 2009g.

Crop Prospects and Food Situation.

www.fao.org/

docrep/012/ak340e/ak340e04.htm

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43 endnotes

IIED, 2009.

Land Grab or Development Opportunity: Agricultural

Investment and International Land Deals in Africa.

ftp://ftp.fao.org/

docrep/fao/011/ak241e/ak241e.pdf pp41-51.

Whittington, E.

Growing Pains: the Possibilities and Problems

with Biofuels.

Christian Aid, 2009.

Painter, J.

Losing Land to Palm Oil in Kalimantan.

August, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolpda/ukfs_news/hi/

newsid_6927000/6927890.stm

MWC News.

Biofuel Threat to Indigenous People,

2007. http://

mwcnews.net/content/view/14507/235/

Friends of the Earth.

Jatropha: Wonder Crop? Experience from

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