URU, Alm.del - 2007-08 (2. samling) - Bilag 80: Rapport fra House of Commons: Reconstructing Afghanistan vol. II

PowersThe Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers ofwhich are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.PublicationsThe Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The StationeryOffice by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including pressnotices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/indcomCommittee staffThe staff of the Committee are: Carol Oxborough (Clerk), Matthew Hedges(Second Clerk), Anna Dickson (Committee Specialist), Chlöe Challender(Committee Specialist), Ian Hook (Committee Assistant), Jennifer Steele(Secretary), Alex Paterson (Media Officer) and James Bowman (Senior OfficeClerk).ContactsAll correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the InternationalDevelopment Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA.The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 1223; the Committee’semail address is [email protected]FootnotesIn the footnotes for this Report, references to oral evidence are indicated by ‘Q’followed by the question number. References to written evidence are indicatedby the page number as in ‘Ev 12’

Witnesses:Mr Jim Drummond,Director, South Asia Division,Ms Lindy Cameron,former Head ofDepartment for International Development (DFID) Afghanistan, andMr Peter Holland,Head, AfghanDrugs Inter-Departmental Unit (joint DFID-FCO unit), DFID, gave evidence.Q1 Chairman:Good morning and thank you forcoming to give evidence in our ﬁrst session ondevelopment assistance in insecure environmentswith the emphasis on Afghanistan for which youhave particular DFID responsibilities. MrDrummond, perhaps for the record you would ﬁrstintroduce the members of your team and theirparticular areas of expertise and responsibility.Mr Drummond:My name is Jim Drummond and Iam the director for South Asia in DFID. I startedthis job at the beginning of the month and so I am arelative new-comer. On my right is Lindy Cameronwho in September ﬁnished a period of 18 months orso as head of the DFID oYce in Afghanistan basedin Kabul. On my left is Peter Holland who is head ofthe Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit,generally known as ADIDU. Mr Holland has beenin his job for a while and therefore also hasconsiderable expertise on the subject. ADIDU isresponsible for the counter-narcotics eVort but isalso the lead on policing and justice issues and so MrHolland will help with questions that you may haveon those subjects.extremity of poverty in Afghanistan is being takeninto account in setting the level of aid that thecountry receives?Mr Drummond:Perhaps I may start with a littlebackground to that question. The developmentchallenge in Afghanistan is still huge. We startedfrom an extremely low base in development terms in2001 when the Taliban regime fell. From thestatistics we have, in 2004 life expectancy inAfghanistan was 46 years and adult literacy was 28%compared with the average in Least DevelopedCountries of 52.4 years and 63%. One in ﬁve Afghanchildren dies before its ﬁfth birthday. That is animprovement from one in four dying at the end ofthe Taliban regime, but it is still a very serious stateof aVairs. Half the population lives on less than $1 aday and about one third of the population eats lessthan the minimum daily calorie requirement.Afghanistan will miss the Millennium DevelopmentGoals but it has a target for meeting them by 2020.Set against that, there have been some prettyremarkable achievements in the past ﬁve years. Wenow have 5.4 million children in school, one third ofthem girls. As you know, the Taliban excluded girlsfrom school. Nearly ﬁve million refugees havereturned to Afghanistan. There have beenimprovements in infant mortality rates and theimmunisation of children. It is estimated thatimmunisation against measles has saved about35,000 lives annually. Attendance at school andaccess to basic healthcare have improved. There is amixed picture of achievements from a very low basebut which often go unreported. It varies around thecountry as you will know. In terms of the resourcesthat DFID puts into Afghanistan, Ministers made a�commitment to provide 330 million over a three-year period. The last year of that is the next ﬁnancialyear. We expect to meet that commitment. If youlook at the resource allocation model from whichDFID starts its process—obviously, resourceallocations are political decisions but they are basedon evidence of poverty—Afghanistan would getabout one third of what it gets now. We have madeextra provision for Afghanistan.Q3 Chairman:I completely accept the statistics youhave given us and the scale of improvement, whichis welcome. I also accept your answer in terms of

DFID’s particular commitment, but, to put that incontext, the International Crisis Group—I acceptthis is historical—says that in the ﬁrst two years afterthe removal of the Taliban the international aidcommitment was $52 per Afghan compared with$1,400 per person in Bosnia. I do not query whatDFID does—it is probably one of the big donors—but what is the context? What is everybody elsedoing, and what is the level per head now and howdoes it compare with others?Mr Drummond:We may need to write to you withprecise ﬁgures because we do not have them in ourheads.1We acknowledge that there is aninternational issue about how we balance theresponse to conﬂicts. You will be familiar with theﬁgures for the DRC2because you have been thererecently. In that country the response per capita ismuch lower than for Sudan and many other postconﬂict countries. Afghanistan is clearly muchbetter placed than DRC in terms of the response tothe crisis it faces and the amounts of aid available toit, but it is less well aided than certain parts of theBalkans.Ms Cameron:We believe that aid is being disbursedalong the lines pledged at the London conferencetwo years ago to which you referred. Therefore, theissue you are describing is a known one: Afghanistanhas consistently received lower levels of per capitaaid than some other countries. One must alsorecognise that Afghanistan in 2001 did not have thecapacity to absorb very high levels of aid because ithad such a limited government capacity. Every yearwe have seen a dramatic increase in the ability of theGovernment to spend money—in most years it hasrisen between 50 and 100%—so from our perspectivewe are probably less worried about the level of aid itis receiving. There is a longer term issue aboutensuring it receives sustained aid to enable it tocontinue to make the dramatic progress we haveseen so far. Afghanistan started from a dramaticallylower base than either Bosnia or Kosovo inparticular in terms of both much higher levels ofpoverty but also much lower levels of state capacityto do something with the aid. It had a programmethat was much more focused on humanitarianassistance to start with, transitioning todevelopment. It is less focused on reconstruction perse because there has been less to reconstruct. Theinfrastructure in Afghanistan was much moredevastated but also there was much less of it in theﬁrst place. Most Afghans have seen very little of theAfghan state historically and therefore there is anawful lot more to do. We have not seen a dramaticchange in levels of aid since the London conferencebut certain countries, particularly the US andCanada, have made increased commitments. TheCanadians have raised their level of commitmentsince then partly because of the perception ofincreased need in the south. The internationaldevelopment banks are also clear that the need theypreviously identiﬁed—to maintain levels of post-conﬂict assistance –is still there. We have a dialoguewith both the World Bank and the Asian12

Development Bank about the need to maintain thehigher levels of post-conﬂict assistance that theyhave been delivering to Afghanistan.Q4 Chairman:Do you reject some of the evidence wehave received which suggests that the levels of aid areinadequate for the need? Do you also accept that thelimited capacity to absorb aid has been a problemthat has been overcome? In that context is DFIDtrying to encourage other donors to contributemore? Is that part of the department’s broaderobjective?Mr Drummond:I do not think we would say theproblem about capacity has been overcome. At thestarting point, there was a Taliban regime whichreally did not run a government budget that wewould recognise as such, disbursing maybe $100million as a central government budget. There isnow a government budget of $2.6 billion which theevidence shows is being disbursed pretty well. Thereis a little lag on the investment budget side, but therecurrent budget is almost all spent. Five years intoa post-conﬂict situation that is not bad, but there isstill a major issue about the capacity of someministries to spend. Some quite innovative things arebeing done in particular ministries. For example, theMinistry of Health does not try to be a deliverer ofhealth services; it subcontracts to NGOs and othersto deliver those services around the country. Ibelieve that has been relatively successful.Q5 Chairman:In parallel we are running a separateinquiry on maternal health in developing countries.Is that improving? The information we have is thataccess to antenatal care stands at 30% of the eligiblepopulation. The worst ﬁgure is in Balochistan where6,500 women die for every 100,000 babies born. Ismaternal health a priority, and does DFID have aparticular engagement with that?Mr Drummond:DFID is not directly funding thehealth sector. When Ashraf Ghani was Minister ofFinance in Afghanistan he was very clear as to whathe wanted donors to do. He did not want them towork in any more than three sectors. In terms ofdonor eVectiveness that was pretty good leadershipfrom the government of a country that had emergedfrom a conﬂict only two years before. DFID madechoices for its three sectors. It did not include directinvolvement in health, but the money we put into theAfghan Reconstruction Trust Fund goes to pay thesalaries of health workers, so we are makingcontributions indirectly. You are absolutely rightthat maternal and child health is a very serious issuein Afghanistan. There have been signiﬁcantimprovements in the past ﬁve years, but it still putsAfghanistan way down the league table.Ms Cameron:The ﬁgures have improveddramatically speciﬁcally for antenatal care. Accesshas gone up from 5% in 2003 to 30% in 2006, so thatis a six-fold increase. That is a very good example ofthe extraordinarily low base that we are talkingabout. Similarly, one in ﬁve children used to diebefore the age of ﬁve; now it is one in four. They arestill appalling ﬁgures, but there have been dramaticimprovements over the past few years.

Chairman:That is a problem with which theCommittee will be wrestling. We are trying to gaininformation both here and when we visit the countryin due course. Clearly, a very mixed picture emerges.In terms of sustaining international commitmentone needs to have identiﬁable and measurableresults, but obviously there are many anecdotesabout areas where nothing is happening, or nothingis being reached, which raise the whole question ofthe capacity to absorb aid and the role ofgovernment. Sir Robert Smith will explore a littlefurther the status of budget support.Q6 Sir Robert Smith:When we looked at the annualreport of the department in July we heard somethingabout the Afghanistan Reconstruction TrustFund—I believe that 66% of DFID’s spend goesthrough that mechanism—as a means of coping withthe fact that the Afghan Government was not readyto receive direct budget support. What sort ofassessment have you made of its eVectiveness? Iknow that the Afghan Government has found it awelcome means.Mr Drummond:In the ﬁrst couple of years when weprovided assistance to Afghanistan it was based verymuch on the direct funding of humanitarianagencies. After two or three years we got to a pointwhen we wanted to make a decision about whatshould be the role of the Afghanistan Governmentand how we could strengthen its capacity to deliverservices. At that point a conscious decision wastaken to switch funding into Afghanistan’s ownbudget systems in order to start giving it someauthority over the way in which donors worked.Obviously, if one has donors doing just directfunding of individual agencies in particular parts ofthe country then that is not very visible to theGovernment. Compared with the problems we havehad in trying to help governments set up budgetsthat work in other post-conﬂict countries I believethat the ARTF3has been very eVective. It is notdirect budget support in the sense that we have aconversation with the Government and we aresatisﬁed with its procedures and allocation process;it is a stage removed from that. The ARTF haswithin it accountability mechanisms. It is a trustfund that is managed by the World Bank andaudited by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. We reimburseand do not pay upfront. It is divided into two mainsegments with a recurrent cost element that pays thesalaries of teachers, nurses and so on. There is alsoan investment budget which runs four or ﬁvediVerent national programmes, some of which haveworked better than others, but there is goodevidence of money getting down from the centre intothe community certainly through the NationalSolidarity Programme. Studies that have been madeof Afghan systems—the World Bank has done thework—demonstrate that the ARTF process hasmade them stronger. In a sense it is building upsystems from absolutely nothing.Ms Cameron:An external review was made a coupleof years ago and a second one is now taking place.3

Q7 Sir Robert Smith:By whom?Ms Cameron:I believe it is being made byindependent consultants hired by the World Bank.As a contributor we input into the terms of referenceand the World Bank essentially sets up the review.Obviously, we all contribute to that and I am surethey will also be interested to hear your views. Thereview is expected to be in two parts. One isbackward-looking and assesses the eVectiveness ofthe ARTF so far; the second part is forward-lookingand assesses how the ARTF can respond to thechanging needs of a post-conﬂict country ﬁve yearslater. The expectation is that they will look at boththe recurrent and investment parts of the ARTF toconsider the diVerent kinds of results ﬂowing fromit. As to recurrent spending, it has been a veryeVective way to mobilise a range of diVerentcountries’ funds to contribute to what is essentiallya gap between Afghan tax revenue and the costs ofrunning even the most basic level of government.The results in areas like health and education arepretty good. For example, in healthcare the basicﬁgures show that access has grown from 9% to 82%.We were so shocked by those ﬁgures when we lookedinto them. In some areas the diVerences in the verybasic levels of service are very impressive. Similarly,in education the number of kids in school has gonefrom something like one million to over ﬁve million.Nearly two million of those are girls. The basicservices that the Government delivers, funded bythat recurrent investment, have clearly deliveredsome very good results. The investment programmesfunded by the ARTF need to be looked atindividually. Recurrent reviews of thoseprogrammes, that is, the micro-credit programme,the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), theNational Rural Access Programme (NRAP), and soon, take place and we engage as they happen.Q8 Sir Robert Smith:Approximately whatproportion of development aid to Afghanistan willgo through the trust fund from around the world?Ms Cameron:That is a very good question. This yearabout $474 million is disbursed by it. The totalcommitment of the London conference over a ﬁveyear period was $10 billion. I do not have the ﬁguresto hand for the precise percentage this year; they willprobably not be available until next year, but we canwrite to you with that information or provide itduring the inquiry.Mr Drummond:The total Afghan budget is about$2.6 billion for the current year. Of that, about $500million will be delivered through the ARTF. It isprobably also worth noting that DFID has about80% of its expenditure in Afghanistan on budget, sothe Government clearly knows what is happening toit and has some power to direct that, but two-thirdsof the aid money going into Afghanistan are still oV-budget, so there is quite a serious issue about howmuch control the Afghan Government has over thewhole piece.Q9 Chairman:Does that mean there is about $5billion of bilateral aid of one sort or another thatdoes not go to the Government?

Mr Drummond:On budget the Government itselfraises about $500 or $600 million. That is tinycompared with what most governments raise, but ithas risen from $100 million ﬁve years ago. Theamount of money on budget on top of that is $2billion from other sources, largely donors, and thereis also money oV budget. I will have to check theﬁgure but you are about right in terms of orders ofmagnitude.4Q10 Sir Robert Smith: The permanent secretary saidthat the department was looking to see whether thiscould be replicated in other post-conﬂict states. Howfar progressed is that assessment? How much is thedepartment itself assessing that as a model for useelsewhere?Mr Drummond:We have struggled in a lot of post-conﬂict environments to ﬁnd the mechanism whichbridges the gap between the humanitarian phase andgovernment taking control. I do not know of otherexamples where the exact Afghan model has beenreplicated, but I know that in DRC which you havevisited and in Sudan it has been quite a struggle toget trust funds moving.Ms Cameron:And also in Iraq. The idea is that thetrust fund model is an eVective way for theinternational community to pool resources ratherthan set up a series of parallel bilateral interventions.Q11 Sir Robert Smith:Who controls the priorities ofthe trust fund?Ms Cameron:It is a negotiation between theGovernment and steering committee. Essentially,there are two committees: one comprises theGovernment, the World Bank and key donors to theARTF. Essentially, that discusses the way the trustfund is managed. In terms of the actualdisbursements, there is a smaller committeecomprising the World Bank and a number of otherkey partners such as the ADB,5UN and governmentwhich decides exactly how the money should beallocated. That is precisely to try to ensure there issome separation and to lower the level ofpreferencing so that, rather than donors using itsimply as a bank account to transfer money tospeciﬁc projects they want to implement, theGovernment has a certain discretion over thosefunds and can prioritise them.Q12 Sir Robert Smith:What other action is DFIDtaking to try to assist the Government ofAfghanistan to develop its own accountability andability to deliver services?Ms Cameron:Two key parts of our programme arethe state building component and the economicmanagement component. We work with theMinistry of Finance both to raise more tax revenuebut also to manage the tax revenue that it collectseVectively. We work closely with both the revenuedepartment and also the budget department to try toensure that the Afghan Government has the bestpossible control and oversight of its own budget andas much visibility as possible of donor funds within45

that budget. We are also a very strong advocate inthe donor community for transparency so thatgovernment can see what donors are doing. We chairthe External Advisory Group which is thecommittee of donors that interacts with theGovernment on the Afghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy (ANDS). I believe that we arethe primary advocate for the use of the strategy as avehicle for donors to co-ordinate what they aredoing. That strategy is now in development and willbe produced by next spring. We would like to seedonors producing a collective response which says,“If this is the Government’s strategy this is how weas donors will prioritise the assistance available fromus to respond to it.” In our own programme we helpto build accountability mechanisms for governmentto disburse the budget but we also act as a lobbyistand advocate within the donor community for waysto help make donors easier to manage bygovernment. Within our state building programmewe also look particularly at the public sector and therole of the civil service. In the past we have done anumber of pieces of work with the Government oncivil service reform, looking at how the whole publicsector can become more eVective to make sure thatpay is at the right level, that the size of governmentis appropriate and that, for example, a departmenthas the civil servants it needs rather than people inplace who perhaps are not appropriately qualiﬁed.Q13 Sir Robert Smith:Some NGOs have expressedconcern that since 2003 the support channelledthrough them has been reduced quite dramatically.Does that leave a gap in delivery of services on theground?Mr Drummond:We are very conscious of NGOconcerns about this. We made a conscious decisionto try to shift the way we did business to give theGovernment authority over it, but when we look atthe way government does business a lot of the moneyput through it is then delivered by NGOprogrammes. The health sector is a good example.The Ministry of Health subcontracts NGOs todeliver programmes. So they still have a big role toplay. Obviously, there are things that NGOs dowhich are beyond service delivery, and we need toensure the capacity of advocacy NGOs is still beingbuilt up to hold government to account. A numberof NGOs get resources from DFID pots of moneyheld either centrally or, in one or two cases, atcountry level for advocacy work on gender, forexample the Womankind programme. As thesecurity situation improves in some places but notothers there is a constant question in our mind as tohow to deliver services in the less secure areas. Onemust also take account of where the NGOs are ableto deliver. If NGOs are to help to deliver services inthe more diYcult places where the Government’snational programmes ﬁnd it hard to operate weshould think hard about helping them.. If the NGOproposals for delivering services are in places wherethe Government’s programmes can start to reach,then there is much more of a case for the delivery ofthose services to be provided or subcontracted bygovernment.

Q14 Chairman:In its evidence to us BAAG6madeone or two comments that slightly concerned us.One understands that the NGOs have their ownagenda and naturally they will lobby for it, but, ﬁrst,BAAG makes the speciﬁc complaint that BritishNGOs remain particularly challenged due to littledirect support from their national government.Second, it says that since NGOs have become soclosely associated predominantly with governmentprogrammes—you say that the Government is usingNGOs—they are now considered to berepresentatives of the Afghan Government and soare targeted by the insurgency. Do you think there isany substance to those concerns?Ms Cameron:British NGOs have the option toapply for funds that DFID has centrally. It is truethat we made a signiﬁcant shift in the way we run ourbilateral programme, but we are the biggestcontributor to the ARTF and NGOs received $450million of funding from the Afghan Government in2005-06. Therefore, there is very signiﬁcant DFIDfunding available via the Government to NGOs forservice delivery. In a sense, the method of fundsbeing channelled through NGOs for service deliveryfrom the UK Government is indirect rather thandirect. That means British NGOs have to competewith the full range of other international and AfghanNGOs for those funds from the AfghanGovernment. I believe that that helps to ensure thatthey are accountable to the Afghan Government forthe services they provide. In terms of security,obviously that is a huge concern in terms of ensuringthat NGOs have as good security as possible. I havenot seen any speciﬁc evidence to support thatparticular view, but obviously perception is key.Ensuring that NGOs’ security is managed as well aspossible is a key concern, particularly for some ofthem working in extremely diYcult areas. Forexample, Afghanaid has done some excellent workin challenging areas in the east of the country.Q15 James Duddridge:When the Select Committeeon Defence returned from Afghanistan it assertedthat failure to address corruption was holding backthe Afghan Government. Speciﬁcally, it came backwith a request from the Afghan Attorney Generalfor support in relation to corruption. What supporthas DFID been able to provide?Mr Drummond:Perhaps I may provide some contextfor the way we view corruption. Corruption inAfghanistan is undoubtedly a serious problem andwe do not deny it. If one looks at the perceptionsurveys that have been done, the InternationalCorruption Perception index rates Afghanistan as117thout of 159. Perhaps given its circumstances onemay think that is not too terrible. If one asks theAfghan population, they report concerns aboutrising corruption particularly in municipalities,customs, and the justice and security sectors. TheAfghan Government has done some good things oncorruption. It has signed up to the UN Conventionon Corruption, established a task force that we havesupported on corruption and implemented a6

number of new laws. A civil service law has led tomerit-based recruitment for 1,500 seniorappointments. It has also passed a publicexpenditure and ﬁnancial management law and aprocurement law and has introduced an internalaudit function. DFID has been providing advice tothe Government throughout this process. TheGovernment has started to restructure state-ownedenterprises. A lot has been done. Clearly, this doesnot match the perceptions of ordinary Afghans thatthere is an increasing problem. It is said quite oftenthat what is required is leadership from theGovernment in dealing with the tougher cases. Dowe have hard evidence? The answer is: not veryoften.Q16 James Duddridge:My question was veryspeciﬁc. Has DFID provided any support to theAttorney General following the passing on of arequest by the Defence Committee?Ms Cameron:As far as I am aware, DFID has notprovided speciﬁc support to the Attorney General.The drugs team does, however, work with theAttorney General.Mr Holland:We work speciﬁcally with the US toestablish an anti-corruption unit and that will belinked to the Criminal Justice Task Force oncounter-narcotics, so it will look speciﬁcally atcorruption cases relating to counter-narcotics. Thatwill work with the Attorney General. It is not exactlyclear what he wants; he wants a unit speciﬁcally inhis own department, but the Criminal Justice TaskForce is an already established justice mechanismand we feel it is more appropriate to set up an anti-corruption unit under that structure rather than anew one.Q17 James Duddridge:What gives us the right todecide that is more appropriate? It is their country,not ours.Mr Holland:That has been the subject of discussionwith the Afghan judicial authorities about where itwould be best to site it.Q18 James Duddridge:EVectively, the AttorneyGeneral has been gazumped by other Afghans, notexternal agencies?Ms Cameron:The Attorney General’s view is onlyone view of what the institutional arrangementsshould be. There are a number of diVerent AfghanGovernment views on what the arrangementsshould be for anti-corruption, which I do not believehave been fully resolved yet. It is perhaps worthadding that in terms of DFID’s role we are one of theﬁve key donors who helped to draft a proposed anti-corruption roadmap to give the Government someideas on the ﬁrst steps it could take to tacklecorruption. We are one of the key partners whowork closely with the Government. In addition, thework on public ﬁnancial management to which Ireferred earlier is a key part of improving theGovernment’s own systems to ensure that both weand the Afghan Government have conﬁdence in itssystems for spending its own money. In particular,the ARTF not only provides a good deal of

reassurance about our funds but also gives theGovernment a very good role model in terms of howto provide that level of transparency andaccountability. The Government has adopted someof the techniques that the ARTF uses to scrutiniseexpenditure for the entire government budgetbecause it sets a good example and this hasdemonstrably improved the ﬁnancial performanceof the Government over time. The level of what iscalled ineligible expenditure, which is not capable ofbeing reimbursed by the ARTF, has gone down overtime because of better compliance with things likeprocurement rules but there are also incentives: oneis not reimbursed unless the transaction is seen to bevalid and fair. Therefore, it provides betterincentives for the Government to improve its ownﬁnancial management performance. That hasspread not just within the ARTF funds but to thewhole government budget.Q19 James Duddridge:Is there any estimate as to thecost of corruption? For every 1 that goes in how�many pence are lost through corruption orineYcient spending because of corruption?Ms Cameron:I have not seen a good estimate ofthat ﬁgure.Chairman:Obviously, the UK Government isheavily involved in Helmand province on which Iwill ask Mr Burden to ask some questions.�Q20 Richard Burden:About 16 million of DFID’s�100 million budget goes to Helmand and about onequarter is devoted to quick impact projects. Can youtell us a bit about how it is possible to do quickimpact projects there? What is the interface betweenthat and the security situation? In that situation howdo you monitor the eVectiveness of those projects,and who does the monitoring?Mr Drummond:The system for quick impactprojects in Helmand has developed over the pastyear or two. What is now in place is quite a good co-ordination mechanism between the three or four UKgovernment departments involved but also the othergovernments involved in Helmand. The HelmandExecutive Group is at the pinnacle of this and meetsweekly to consider proposals for quick impactprojects the ideas for which usually come fromAfghan people, local government; or they may comethrough our own development advisers, or thePCRU7staV based in Helmand. There is quite agood supply of local Afghan contractors inHelmand whom we can use to deliver programmes.In the area round Lashkar Gah it is relatively easyto get out and see what is going on; in other parts ofHelmand the security situation has been morediYcult. I guess that it is more dependent there onthe military to do some monitoring of what has beenachieved. My colleague Ms Cameron has lived withthis for longer than I have.Ms Cameron:There are over 180 quick impactprojects completed, ongoing or planned. They arevery diverse and include improvement of ﬂooddefences along Helmand River, humanitarian7

assistance to drought victims, improving children’splaygrounds, working with Lashkar Gah prison,improving two local markets and trainingprogrammes for drug addicts and securityinfrastructure. Much depends on how they areidentiﬁed, implemented and then monitored. DFIDstaV have been out to see some of the projects thatare more easily accessible and we have used others tomonitor them. The military has been very helpful inbeing part of that. In that respect it has been a veryjoined-up operation. But that is not where themajority of our funding in Helmand goes. Themajority goes through the national programmeswhich have well established implementation andmonitoring methodologies: the National SolidarityProgramme; the National Rural Access Programmewhich builds local feeder roads; and the Water andSanitation Programme that has been responsible forproviding wells. More than 225 wells have now beencompleted. There is also the micro-creditsprogramme. All of these programmes have theirown diVerent methodologies for implementationand monitoring. In part we have used them to extendour inﬂuence in Helmand province because they aretried and tested methodologies. For eachprogramme it is challenging to operate in a morediYcult environment than in the past and it has toﬁnd diVerent ways. For example, the micro-creditprogramme focuses on slightly larger-scale lendingbased in Lashkar Gah because it is harder to get outto villages. Programmes that are dependent on NGOfacilitation ﬁnd it a more challenging environment,whereas for those that can use local contractors, likethe water and sanitation programme, the responseby local contractors has been very impressive. Quitea lot of construction companies are keen to bid forthese projects, which is good. The Ministry of RuralDevelopment has changed its methodologies toallow it to contract more eVectively locally.Q21 James Duddridge:I understand what you sayabout the quick impact projects being a minority ofthe spend, but from the amalgam of ways that youmonitor them—I understand what you say—thatmust be a matter of horses for courses. Is the purposeof those to make a long-term impact on people’slives and, if so, how far do they contribute to that?How far are they about achieving a greater level oftrust in the military which in itself is a legitimate butdiVerent objective?Mr Drummond:To be perfectly honest, they try toachieve both. A quick impact project is somethingthat will deliver a rapid beneﬁt. Typically, it is prettysmall scale. If one builds a new classroom on aschool one expects it to last, so it will usually have along-term beneﬁt as well, but one does it quickly toestablish in the eyes of the community that one isproviding real help in real time. Obviously, that hasa spin-oV beneﬁt for the troops who are there whoworry about the security situation.Q22 James Duddridge:To pursue the same line,obviously it is quite important to ensure that thework of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is not

seen simply as an extension of the NATO8securityagenda. How do they engage local communities andensure that they are committed to the projects inwhich they are involved? Do they have the capacityto do more?Ms Cameron:I think the answer is hard to generalisewith PRTs9because they look very diVerent indiVerent parts of Afghanistan. The Swedish PRT inMazar-e-Sharif looks quite diVerent from theAmerican PRTs in the east, and in turn these lookdiVerent from the UK PRT in Helmand. That islargely a reﬂection of the very diVerent kinds ofsecurity environments in which they work and alsothe very diVerent capacity of government each PRTfaces. For example, the UK ran a PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif for a couple of years before handing it over toSweden so that we could take over the PRT inHelmand. It has been quite a diVerent challengebecause the security situation is more severe. It isvery hard to generalise and that is partly why onyour visit, as I understand it, you will see twodiVerent provinces to give you a sense of the diVerentmodels that exist. PRTs are usually quite dependenton funding from their own national troop-contributing nation or supporter, so how muchfunding the PRT gets depends on the policy of thecountry that is running it. There are some fundswhich can then be used across diVerent PRTs—NATO has some funds available—but there is nosingle model. Increasingly, there is an attempt byISAF10and various partners to try to provide a betterframework in which PRTs operate. Again, you areto see Major General Garry Robison who is theUK’s Deputy Commander (stability) for ISAF. Hewill be able to give you a sense of the governanceframework he is trying to set up to institute a bettersense of purpose for PRTs and, for example, to shiftthem so they focus more generically on things likesecurity sector reform. It is diVerent in diVerent partsof the country. There are a number of similaritiesbetween the PRTs run by diVerent countries in thesame area. For example, the Canadian PRT inKandahar, the Dutch PRT in Oruzgan and theBritish PRT in Helmand all share experience andwork quite closely together to understand what hasworked in quite similar security situations in thesouth.Q23 James Duddridge:Earlier you spoke about non-quick impact projects and the range of communityand other projects. From the brieﬁng we have had,there are 482 community projects run through theHelmand Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentProgramme. Are those the ones you are talkingabout?Ms Cameron:That is right. The HelmandAgriculture and Rural Development Programme isthe title we use for the funding for the ﬁve nationalprogrammes we are running in Helmand, so in asense it is the way that we describe the basket offunding that is available to Helmand speciﬁcally asa province for those national programmes.89

Mr Drummond:Essentially, we are saying thatnational programme funds will reach the southernprovinces, but security makes access for themdiYcult. Because we have a particular interest inHelmand we have provided some extra targetedfunds through the national programmes to makesure that Helmand does get at least its fair share.Ms Cameron:That is an approach very similar tothat taken by the Canadians and the Dutch inKandahar and Oruzgan..Q24 Mr Singh:I should like to focus on the AfghanNational Police. The Defence Committeecommented that it found the police service to bequite inadequate. I understand that about 70,000people now serve in the police and that training isquite limited and poor. What role does DFID playin terms of recruitment, training and support for thepolice service? What are the strengths andweaknesses of the Afghan national police? Has itcontributed anything to the security situation and tolaw, order and justice in Afghanistan?Mr Holland:We would very much share thatassessment of the police. The internationalcommunity would recognise that the police areweak. In terms of numbers the total ﬁgure that ismeant to be established is 82,000, but the bestestimates we have seen are that probably 50,000 arecurrently available across all the arms of the AfghanNational Police. The quality varies but there areconsistent problems in terms of both levels oftraining received and capability. That is particularlytrue in the most insecure areas in the south. Theinternational community’s eVort has been led byGermany which has focused particularly on highlevel training of oYcers. The US is the major donor;it has put in about $2 billion this year to train thepolice. The US focuses much more at local level totrain police oYcers. The US has recently carried outa review of its training programme. It recognises thatmore needs to be done. Essentially, it is looking at iton a district-by-district basis, taking the police out ofthe districts for some intensive training over a two-month period to sort out the problems and thenputting them back into the community andmentoring them intensively over the next fewmonths to ensure much better quality. Dependingon where one is, the nature of the policing problemfaced in Afghanistan is not the same. In the south itis much more about backing up the other securityforces; in the north and the centre where the securitysituation is much better one has a more typicalapproach to policing. Again, the district-basedapproach is meant to address that problem so onehas a rather more speciﬁc approach to training thanhas been carried out so far. In terms of UK support,we are not a major player on the policing side. Wesupport in a number of ways. First, we support theEU mission which has now taken over from theGermans. There is an EU police mission based inKabul which is just getting going. That will workvery closely with the US. We are providing a numberof speciﬁc posts at the centre to work on the policyand training programmes; in particular, we providethe deputy head of the EU mission. We also provide

support speciﬁcally in Helmand and are looking toincrease that support so we can work particularly onsupporting the district training programmes inHelmand. We have a number of mentors andtrainers down there. The other area where we havespeciﬁcally provided assistance has been counter-narcotics policing. That has been the main focus ofour eVort because of our role in counter-narcotics.That is designed to develop both the generic counter-narcotics police and the speciﬁc interdiction forces.Q25 Mr Singh:Have the 50,000 made any diVerencein terms of law and order in Afghanistan?Mr Holland:It depends on where you are. Someplaces are better than others. No one disputes that inthe south it is weak. In the area we know best—which is counter-narcotics—they are beginning tohave an impact and make arrests of fairly signiﬁcantﬁgures. For example, in the past year and a half therehave been over 500 convictions for drug traYcking.Similarly, in the centre and north one sees betterquality policing on the ground. It is varied acrossthe country.Q26 Mr Singh:What is the public perception of thepolice force? Do people fear the police? Do theybelieve that the police commit crimes, as has beensaid somewhere? Is the police accepted andrespected?Mr Holland:The public perceptions are very similarto those relating to corruption. Particularly in thesouth one sees real anxieties about the way the policebehave. The police are perceived to be part of theproblem as well as the solution, and that is reallywhat the district training programme seeks tochange. Until people have conﬁdence in the policethey will not be able to fulﬁl their role.Q27 Mr Singh:I understand that accusations ofserious corruption have been pointed at the Ministryof the Interior which is a crucial body in any state-building exercise. Are there any plans to reform theMinistry of the Interior? I understand that druglords and warlords are part of the ministry. What isbeing done about that?Mr Holland:We hear exactly the same allegations.There are some examples where we know thoseallegations go beyond that. President Karzai hasrecently recognised that himself and is committed toa process of political change within the Ministry ofthe Interior. One aspect of it is that the functions ofthe ministry have recently been split. The Ministry ofthe Interior now focuses purely on internal securityissues and the wider responsibilities for localgovernment have been removed from it. The nextstage in that process is a change in personnel. TheUS leads on the reform programme and has a fairlyextensive mentoring and training programme withinthe Ministry of the Interior.Q28 Mr Singh:Do we and other international bodieshave any mechanism to monitor police abuse, policecorruption and involvement by the police in thenarcotics trade?

Mr Holland:There is no systematic assessment of it.In the area of narcotics, investigations are donerather more on an ad hoc basis. In that area weprovide support in terms of investigation andevidence gathering around the trade. As those casesemerge one begins to get a broader picture.Q29 Mr Singh:Although DFID is not the leadagency, is there anything positive that it can do toimprove the police force?Mr Holland:We do believe that policing is a priorityand is important, so we are deliberately devotingmore resources to that area. We work at the centrethrough the EU mission and at a policy level to tryto ensure that that mission and that of the US jointogether and have the same approach to training thepolice force. As to where we believe we can have thegreatest impact, we are concentrating on Helmandin terms of training and on the counter-narcoticsside.Mr Drummond:Obviously, DFID is a partner in thisexercise through the funding that goes into theconﬂict pool. I think that the bits of the DFIDprogramme that would have an impact acrossgovernment are the work we do on budgetmanagement, which will aVect the way that theMinistry of the Interior ought to be managing itsown budget, and public service reform which oughtto impact on the way recruitment processes in theMinistry of the Interior work. We believe thatthrough the central things we are doing there will bespin-oV beneﬁts to the Ministry of the Interior, butit is not a place where DFID is leading.Chairman:You mentioned earlier some of theimprovements in education. I will ask AnnMcKechin to pursue that in a little more detail.Q30 Ann McKechin:You indicated in your writtensubmission that between 50 and 55% of school agechildren in Afghanistan are currently in school. Canyou advise us what percentage of those who areenrolled and regularly attend school are girls? Whatis the diVerence as between Kabul, outlying areasand places such as Helmand in the south?Mr Drummond:About one third of pupils are girlsand 28% of the teachers are women. DFID is notdirectly funding the education sector. In the choiceof three sectors, we did not choose education; othersare doing that. It is not a sector where we have a lotof direct expertise. Remarkable progress has beenmade in this area. As you know, Afghanistan is avery conservative society. The number of femaleteachers is a constraint particularly on older girlsstaying in school. The level of literacy amongstwomen is still very low; it is 13%, which is shocking.Q31 Ann McKechin:Given that the British and Irishaid agencies in Afghanistan report that 80% of theteachers are untrained, do you believe that theAfghan Government gives enough priority totraining and the building of schools? It is estimatedthat 72,000 classrooms would have to beconstructed. If DFID is not one of the primarydonors who are they?

Mr Drummond:Let me give the Committee one ortwo numbers and then Ms Cameron can talk aboutthe donors. The ﬁgure I have, which comes fromUNICEF,11is that since 2001 nearly 2,000 schoolshave been built or rehabilitated. According toUNICEF, since 2001 the number of teachers hasincreased from about 21,000 to 128,000. There areteacher training programmes. You are absolutelyright that this is an area where there is a hugeamount more to do. As to donors, this is an areawhere the Bank, the UN and EU are active.Ms Cameron:The World Bank is a key player in thissector, as are some of the Scandinavian donorsparticularly the Danes. They are working inpartnership with the US. I believe that US fundingof textbooks is being spent through the Danishassistance programme. There are a number of quitelarge donors in this sector. Essentially, theGovernment prioritised education much moreheavily about 18 months ago when Hanif Atmar wasappointed the new Minister of Education. Formerly,he was a very successful Minister of RuralDevelopment who did a transformative job with thatministry. He was appointed Minister of Educationto get a grip and push it forward. He has introduceda new strategy, of which we can provide you with acopy in country.12There will also be an opportunityin country to talk to some of the other donors,particularly the World Bank, who are more active inthis sector. It is a sector in which we have seen asigniﬁcant improvement in government leadership,dynamism and planning in the past 18 months to twoyears. As a result, there is now pressure becausethere are bigger spending plans. The ministry is keento see its funding go up.

Q33 Ann McKechin:Given that about 70% of the aidis oV budget, is that being focused on education oron other areas of policy? Obviously, that is still avery important part of the total pot.Ms Cameron:I do not have with me ﬁgures to showwhat the US is doing in the ﬁeld of education, but wecan provide them in country. It is however a largepart of the oV budget aid. Quite a large part is relatedto the security sector and that is not so readilyavailable for education. We can try to provide abetter breakdown in country of the precise ﬁguresfor education.13Mr Drummond:As a footnote, the ARTF which wedo fund provides the salaries of almost all theteachers in the country. British Government moneyﬂowing through the ARTF is ﬁnding its way into theeducation sector.Q34 Chairman:The Afghanistan Compactrequested more co-ordination amongst donors butdid not require it. The evidence suggests that notonly is that not very strong but quite speciﬁcally asfar as concerns the United States it is entirelydivergent. In the January/February issue ofForeignAVairsBarnett Rubin was very critical. He summedit up by saying: “Contemptuous of nation buildingand wary of mission creep, the Bush administrationentered Afghanistan determined to strike Al Qaeda,unseat the Taliban, and then move on, providingonly basic humanitarian aid and support for a newAfghan army.”14He goes on to say that that wasclearly short-sighted and asks to what extent theyhave changed that. We understand that the USGovernment does not usually give money to othergovernments directly. It does not trust the AfghanGovernment and would ﬁnd it politicallyunacceptable to put money into a collective pot suchas the Afghan reconstruction trust fund becausesuch funds cannot be directly traced. That is a prettyfundamental divergence between the approach ofthe US Government and the approach of the BritishGovernment. To what extent does that make yourlife that much more diYcult, or how do youpractically engage with the United States and otherdonors to get the money where it delivers eVectiveresults?Mr Drummond:The US Government is a hugedonor to Afghanistan and provides throughUSAID15$1.4 billion per year. That is to becompared with British Government money throughDFID of about $200 million a year. You areabsolutely right that it is by far the biggest player.We have a regular dialogue with them and say thatit would be much better for more of their money tobe on budget than is done at the moment. There aresome signs that they are taking interest in thatargument now because they recognise the need tobuild up the Afghan Government’s capacity anddecision-making about its own country. There is astrong feeling in the US that it needs to be involved1314

in direct delivery and account even more stronglythan we account to you for the direct delivery of eachdollar. We think that the ARTF establishes amechanism which provides adequate audit and thereis suYcient evidence on the ground of aid beingdelivered and therefore that the ARTF is a goodmechanism to use. We hope that the newAfghanistan National Development Strategy willprovide a framework for the Afghan Government tohave discussions with the donors about where theyfocus their priorities. In a sense, that will recalibratethe decisions made three or four years ago. The USGovernment is very closely involved in that process.Q35 Chairman:Even allowing for the diVerence inapproach, does the United States at least ask theAfghan Government to give a steer as to what itwants so it can do it, because clearly if there is thatdegree of co-ordination the divergence is not as greatas it would be if the US Government simply decidedits own priorities and told the Afghan Governmentwhat it wanted to do?Mr Drummond:There is a constant dialogue withthe Afghan Government about the priorities for itsresources, so that is happening. We say to the USvery openly that it would be better if its funding waswithin the overall budget framework and thereforemore visible to the Ministry of Finance than perhapsit is now.Q36 Chairman:Given that the military activity isbeing led by NATO and predominantly non-USforces on the ground, in terms of aid anddevelopment, allowing for Mr Rubin’s somewhatacerbic comments, do you detect a fundamentalchange of attitude at least where the US sees co-ordination as relevant and long term capacity-building, if not nation- building, as a clear objectivecompared with what he describes as its originalthinking?Mr Drummond:The US Government is investing ahuge amount of money in capacity-building in thepolice and other areas of Afghanistan. Where it isdelivering infrastructure, for example road-buildingin Helmand, it will tend to do that with a more directrelationship with contractors than going through anAfghan process.Ms Cameron:I think that the key challenge for theAfghan Government is to ensure that it has fulltransparency about aid money so it can make trade-oVs between donors as well as prioritise what anyone donor does itself, because there is an issue ofcomplementarity. Clearly, the US is the largestsingle bilateral donor and has a particular eVect onhow the overall balance of aid money is spent. As wesay to them openly, it is particularly important thatthey are as transparent as possible not just with theGovernment but also with donors about their plansbecause that also aVects what it makes most sensefor the rest of us to do. We have been very impressedby the dialogue we had with them in the run-up tothe full Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy and we have seen a real willingness toengage in trying to get a better collective donorresponse to a good government plan. The US has

been responsible for providing quite a lot oftechnical assistance to the Government to try toimprove its own strategic capacity to plan andprioritise and have something to which we canrespond.Q37 Chairman:But it is not helpful to those of uswho are supporting the British aid programmeinternationally as well as in Afghanistan if we aretold by American commentators that the USGovernment does not trust the AfghanGovernment. Clearly, the British Government isinvesting in the Afghan Government. Are you being�naıve or are they being unreasonable?Mr Drummond:We have a slightly diVerentapproach and they have diVerent requirementsplaced upon them by Congress. There areaccountability levels for each dollar and for what isexpected. We believe that we have the balance right;otherwise, we would not be doing it our way. Weaccept that there are lots of issues in building up thecapacity of the Afghan Government. We have talkedabout problems of corruption but also about thesafeguards that we have put in place to make surethat our money is spent in a way that meets thepriorities of the Afghan Government but hassuYcient safeguards to ensure it is spent in the wayintended. We have a good relationship with diVerentparts of the US eVort in Kabul and this debate willcarry on.Ms Cameron:It is also worth saying that the USdoes contribute to the ARTF, so this is not a black-and-white debate; it is a question of proportions andpercentages. The US contributes to it and sits on thecommittee, so it is prepared to put money throughgovernment systems. It is also a major intervener inthe health programme where there is a structuredesigned to ensure that diVerent donors can help todeliver the same package of health outcomes to suitthe diVerent mechanisms that they are able toimplement. There are a number of diVerent ways totry to improve the outcome. The key challenge is toensure that the Afghan Government has maximumvisibility for whatever it is doing and is able to feelthat it can prioritise the resources for the outcomesit wants to achieve.Chairman:If we are in Afghanistan for the long haul,as we are consistently being told, it seems to me thatfor the purposes of both national and internationalpublic good will there should be a clear strategy andco-ordination of activity amongst the key players sopeople understand there is a long-term commitment.I understand that Ann McKechin would like to askhow that may be taken forward.Q38 Ann McKechin:Earlier this month I attendedthe NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Reykjavik.That body was addressed by NATO’s SecretaryGeneral, Mr Jaap de Hoop. He indicated that hewould prefer to appoint a special UN envoy forAfghanistan with the speciﬁc task of co-ordinatingthe development and security structure, because hefelt that the diVerent tracks, donors and prioritieswere muddying the water and causing severediYculties. Given the fact that such a senior

international ﬁgure should call for that, has the UKGovernment had any dialogue with NATO or otherdonors about that possibility?Ms Cameron:There is already a UN SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General forAfghanistan, Tom Koenigs. He chairs the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) which isthe forum set up to monitor the implementation ofthe Afghan Compact and the Afghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy. In a sense, there is already aUN special representative who chairs a co-ordinating body that is designed to be a forum fordevelopment, political and security matters. TheJCMB meets up to four times a year and has asigniﬁcant membership of key players both on theAfghan Government side and the donor and securityside. There is already a signiﬁcant UN co-ordinatingrole in place. That UN envoy has two deputies, oneof whom focuses on the political issues and the otherof whom focuses speciﬁcally on development issuesand is also joint-hatted as head of the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP) in country.Q39 Ann McKechin:It would appear that NATO isnot yet reassured that there is suYcient co-ordination and, given that it has its troops on theground, surely that should be given proper weight?Mr Drummond:We have been saying to the UN fora little while that we would like it to play a strongerrole in co-ordination on this matter. It has beenstrengthened with the arrival of Bo Asplund who isnow the Deputy Special Representative responsiblefor the development side. Tom Koenigs will bemoving on at the beginning of next year, so there willbe a new appointment to that post. Compared withwhat you have seen in DRC where there is anintegrated mission and the UN is very clearly at theapex of all of this, in Afghanistan we have a morecomplex relationship because of ISAF as well as theUN. To bring these two bodies together is morechallenging, and we would like to see the UN playingan even more determined role in this.Q40 Richard Burden:Ms Cameron, you spoke aboutthe US and the ARTF. Did you say that the US putmoney into that?Ms Cameron:It is a contributor. We do not have thenumber to hand but we can provide it.16Q41 Chairman:In passing, we note that PresidentKarzai is in town today. I know that he is meetingsome parliamentarians, but he is not going to meetany members of the Select Committee. Are thesequestions that can usefully be explored with himeither here or in Afghanistan? We are to meet anumber of Afghan Ministers who are directlyresponsible.Mr Drummond:Yes.Chairman:It is a slightly tangential point. ThisCommittee is very focused on the development ofAfghanistan, as is the President, so perhaps someexchange may be desirable. We have not discussed indetail the longer-term strategy to deal with poppies,16

livelihood development and so forth which is clearlyvery important for the longer-term establishment ofa functioning economy, particularly in rural areas. Iask Ann McKechin to ask questions.Q42 Ann McKechin:Mr Holland, can you indicatehow the alternative livelihoods approach which ispromoted by DFID seeks to address the structuraland institutional causes of poppy cultivation inAfghanistan?Mr Holland:Perhaps I may set some of the contextand then ask my colleagues to pick up the speciﬁc“livelihoods” question. The Afghan Governmenthas a National Drug Control Strategy which is basedon that which was successful in Pakistan andThailand. Essentially, it recognises that there willnot be one approach to tackling poppy cultivation.That strategy has eight pillars which I will notdiscuss but can be given to the Committee.17Essentially, they cover the law enforcement andjustice side; livelihoods; the institutionaldevelopment that is needed to build Afghancapacity; and the eradication of poppies targeted onthose areas where farmers have the option to havealternative livelihoods. The deliberate aim of thestrategy is that it should be a balanced, targetedapproach.Q43 Ann McKechin:In a recent article on alternativelivelihoods David Mansﬁeld criticised theprogramme as being a mismatch between thegeographical focus of the NSP programme and thelocation of the areas of highest poppy cultivation.He suggested that the programme appeared to bebased more on where there was a possibility ofgreater alternative production rather than on wherethe greatest problem existed.Ms Cameron:The National Solidarity Programme isnot only intended to address poppy cultivation; it isa key vehicle for the Afghan Government to extendits reach to the people of Afghanistan and to becomevisible to them and it is a source of funding forcommunity level development projects not just inpoppy growing areas but across Afghanistan as awhole. It has been incredibly successful. More than17,000 communities have been reached; more than30,000 projects have been undertaken. It has beenthe most visible sign of the Afghan Government tomost communities in Afghanistan. A number of therural livelihood programmes that we support areintended not only to tackle poppy production butalso to ensure that incomes in rural areas ofAfghanistan rise in general, because clearlyAfghanistan is an overwhelmingly poor ruralsociety. The approach to legal livelihoods is reallyabout replicating the kind of opportunities that thedrug trade oVers, that is, improving access tomarkets, security and credit and ensuring thatfarmers have better technology, seeds and inputs.Basically, it is a matter of making sure that farmershave all the things they need to do something elseand raise their incomes. On average, farmers in17

Afghanistan do 17 diVerent things in a year as partof their income; it is not a choice between all poppyand all something else.Q44 Ann McKechin:There is a mixture ofalternatives?Ms Cameron:Yes. For example, DFID’s Researchinto Alternative Livelihoods Programme isinvestigating mint and saVron as high valuealternatives to poppy and trying to look at ways thatthose can become alternatives. The horticultureprogramme is looking at horticulture more broadlyas an option. That requires looking at orchards�which are quite long-term investments. We put 20million into a credit programme because credit is akey constraint. Essentially, what we are looking atare binding constraints that prevent people fromhaving a real choice. Those are quite similar to thekinds of constraints that poor farmers face inAfghanistan generally.Q45 Ann McKechin:There are multiple schemes. Isthere a uniform system by which they are monitoredso we can review the most eVective interventions?Ms Cameron:That is a really challenging issue andis something that we are trying to work on with theMinistry of Counter Narcotics. One of the keychallenges that we would like the Government totackle more eVectively is to review the kinds ofthingsthatministries—agriculture,ruraldevelopment and the other rural departments—across the board are doing to make a betterassessment of what can have an impact on poppycultivation speciﬁcally. As David Mansﬁeldhighlights in his article, trying to make sure that therural development programmes are as focused asthey possibly can be to make maximum impact onpoppy cultivation is a key challenge. We are now ata stage where we have enough results and can beginto do that, but for a while and until some of theseprogrammes had been implemented it was hard tosee how the target could be achieved.Q46 Ann McKechin:Realistically, they are morelikely to work in the north of the country than themore insecure areas in the south such as Helmand?Ms Cameron:Given that security is a key constraintfor farmers in terms of what, how and when they canget their produce to market, almost any ruraldevelopment programme is easier and cheaper toimplement in more secure areas.Q47 Ann McKechin:Is that where the donor prioritywould be?Mr Drummond:Poppy is a high value and lowvolume crop which tends to be collected from farmsrather than farmers having to take the stuV tomarket. Therefore, in insecure areas it is an easiercrop to grow.Q48 Ann McKechin:Can we anticipate that poppycultivation in the south of Afghanistan will continueto be at very high levels for the short term at least?

Mr Holland:It is very hard to predict what the levelswill be because they ﬂuctuate pretty dramaticallyyear on year depending on local economiccircumstances as well, but now the trend is thatpoppy cultivation decreases in those areas that havebetter security and stability and the converse is truein areas which are more insecure. I believe that thattrend will continue. One will see more provinceswhich have low poppy cultivation or are poppy free,but cultivation will be concentrated in thoseprovinces where it is now high. Whether it will be ashigh next year is diYcult to say. There is someevidence that prices at the farm gate are droppingwhich may persuade farmers not to cultivate asmuch next year.Q49 Chairman:To raise a broader topic, theGovernment has announced the scaling down of ourtroop involvement in Iraq. Leaving aside thequestion whether we are moving towards exit orminimal retention and increasing the troop levels inAfghanistan to provide for security, from your pointof view as a development agency what would be yourmessage to the British people about the need formore troops on the ground to create space fordevelopment and to start making a material impactto demonstrate that what is happening inAfghanistan, albeit a long haul, is achievable andmeasurable in this situation? Is not the danger thatpeople may start to say that we are pulling out ofIraq? You well know that there is a campaign thatmaybe we should pull out of Afghanistan. The ﬁrstquestion is: could you cope with development inAfghanistan with fewer troops? Second, if theargument is about maintaining or increasing troopinvolvement, can you give people conﬁdence thatthat will create space for signiﬁcant developmentopportunities in Afghanistan?Mr Drummond:You are beginning to take me intoareas where Ministers would probably want tocomment.Q50 Chairman:It has just been pointed out to methat Des Browne is giving evidence to the DefenceCommittee on exactly this issue now. I am askingyou as the Department for InternationalDevelopment what can be achieved and what thesecurity situation and troop level must be to createthat space. I do not ask for speciﬁc numbers but canyou respond in general terms?Mr Drummond:What we have seen in Afghanistanis in many ways quite remarkable progress on thedevelopment numbers in the past ﬁve yearsconsidering where we started from. Despite our besteVorts, I do not think that is tremendously wellpublicised in the UK because the press tends toconcentrate on other things. The Taliban problem inthe south is obviously serious. It is localised and ithas been contained, and at a tactical level we aremaking good progress. Clearly, if it spread thatwould have a major impact on development inAfghanistan overall and so it is extremely importantthat our forces do what they are doing. They aredoing a tremendous job. I do not think I cancomment on whether or not it is sensible to have

Witness:Mr David Mansﬁeld,Independent Consultant, gave evidence.Q52 Chairman:Mr Mansﬁeld, good morning andthank you very much for coming to give evidence toour inquiry on Afghanistan. For the record, I shouldsay that recently the Committee spent a week inAfghanistan. We were based in and around Kabulbut Members of the Committee split up and somevisited Helmand and some visited Mazar-e Sharif inBalkh in the north. Therefore, we have someperspective. I do not suggest that a week gives ustotal knowledge and understanding of a hugelycomplicated situation, but at least we feel we havesome exposure to a variety of the issues. Obviously,you do not spend much time in Afghanistan beforethe issue of poppy production and narcotics—opium, heroin and so forth—comes up. By way ofstarting the discussion, perhaps you could commenton the eVectiveness of the control of poppy. Whatseems to happen is that you hear sweepingstatements that poppy production has beeneliminated or cut back here or there, but when youlook across the piece it goes up and clearly it isconcentrated in some parts of the country anddiminishes in others. We heard some explanationsfor that while we were there. Perhaps it would behelpful to know how you see the wide variation inpoppy production which increases in some parts ofthe country and decreases in others. I half-expectwhat the answer would be, but it would be helpful tohave your take on why that happens.Mr Mansﬁeld:Thank you for the invitation tospeak. I do not want to give the usual explanation ofhow complex this is in some ways, but regionalcontext is very important within Afghanistan. In thepast 10 years I have spent a lot of time doing ﬁeldwork in Afghanistan and looking at why there arechanges in poppy cultivation in diVerent areas. Inthe past three years I have looked particularly atNangarhar in the east, Ghowr province just north ofHelmand and I have also gone into Badakhshan. Ihave spent a lot of time looking at the very speciﬁccircumstances of those areas. A colleague of minefor AREU1has also been looking at Balkh. Forinstance, in an area like Nangarhar in 2005 there wasa very strong eVort to reduce poppy cultivation.They had 28,000 hectares in Nangarhar in 2004; by2005 it had reduced to 1,200 hectares. There was abig political push to reduce poppy cultivation but itwas on top of economic changes against poppy. Forinstance, wheat prices had increased quitesigniﬁcantly in Nangarhar during the winter of 2004/05. Regardless of the returns on wheat, it does not1

have to compete with poppy. People becomeconcerned about food security and so they have tobalance their livelihood strategies. If there is concernabout accessing wheat because prices are rising orbecause there are controls in Pakistan about wheatsmuggling into Afghanistan people will start tothink. It is not a question of whether it iscompetitive; they need to grow some wheat to feedthemselves and their livestock. Therefore, theyexpand wheat cultivation and reduce poppy. Thatprocess was already in place. In 2004 because ofdisease there was also a poor poppy yield inNangarhar and prices fell. Wheat prices rose andthere was concern over access. Poppy prices fell andthere were problems over yield. On top of that therewas a big political push to say “You will not growpoppy”. There was a concerted eVort to go out intothe districts, learn from the way the Taliban ban wasimplemented, press people not to grow poppy andpromise development assistance. I have beenlooking at the consequence of this over a two orthree-year period. The consequence was to create aquite signiﬁcant income deﬁcit not just amongstpoppy farmers but others. If you reduce poppycultivation by 96%, as happened in Nangarhar thatyear—it is happening in Balkh at the moment—youend up impacting not only on the poppy farmerhimself but there is a multiplier eVect across theeconomy. Businesses systematically reduced theirwholesale and proﬁt, the numbers they employedand the wage labour rates they paid. There weresimilar falls in wage labour rates in the constructionindustry. That created economic pressure whichsubsequently meant a shift in the political dynamic.We predicted that in Nangarhar in December 2006.It went from 28,000 hectares to 1,200 hectares andthen to 4,800 hectares. It is now back to 18,500hectares because of the sheer economic pressure onhouseholds which faced an income deﬁcit. InBadakhshan in the north east we have seen anothershift in the dynamics in relation to the balancedlivelihood strategy that people pursue. They balancetheir cash needs with food security and issues aroundtheir livestock which needs fodder and wheat straw.We saw the price of poppy fall again and wagelabour rates increased signiﬁcantly. Poppy is anincredibly labour-intensive crop. The net returns onpoppy were decidedly unattractive even comparedwith wheat to some extent but particularly inrelation to things like improved onion or potato.Again, the Government came in and pushed downon poppy cultivation. People are already producingless. The authorities pressed harder, essentially

expending a degree of political capital to makethemselves look a bit better; they can attribute thereduction to government eVort rather than shifts inthe economy in the way that livelihoods are working.In Balkh there is a big push by Governor Atta. I cancommend the work of Adam Pain of AREU who hasdone a lot of work on this and looked at the dealsstruck between Governor Atta and variousstakeholders in the drugs and non-drugs business topress down on poppy cultivation. There is a bigquestion over whether that reduction will besustained. You will have seen and heard a number oftimes how there appears to be an increase incannabis cultivation. That is in the nature ofsubstitution to reduce the winter opium crop andincreasing the summer cannabis crop. There is aquestion of how that will be sustained and how it isperceived by some. If we look at poppies as a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment, I do not thinkwe have seen Helmand as being as high risk as it istoday. In the late 1990s I used to wander roundKajaki and Musa Qala in Helmand province talkingto opium traders to understand more about the farmgate opium trade. Today in Helmand whilst there isenormous agricultural potential in some areas,particularly the canal-irrigated lands, you couldgrow onions and a whole range of diVerent legalcrops that potentially could bring in more money,especially through inter-cropping, than poppybecause they are less labour-intensive crops. Youwould not have to hire labour. But insecurity is suchthat poppy is essentially your best option. If I growonions I have to take them to the market and indoing so I may have to go through a number ofcheckpoints. In doing so I will have to pay a bribeknown as a ‘backsheesh’ to the ANP,2militia orwhoever it might be. By the time I get to the marketI am uncompetitive at best; at worst I can suVerphysical injury. It is far better to grow a crop wherethe trade comes to you; it arrives at your farm gateand buys from you. The traders inherit thetransaction and transportation costs. If there is adegree of insecurity and you have to leave the houseyou can take with you a few kilograms of opium; youcannot carry a bag of onions. This is a liquid asset.Therefore, in the context of Helmand for me it is arational choice in a highly insecure environment. Ido not hold with the idea that farmers in Helmandopt to grow poppy only because it can provide a highincome. There is some element of that but they havean economic potential in Helmand but cannotrealise it due to the insecurity.Q53 Chairman:Referring to Balkh, we had ameeting with Governor Atta who said that he hadmade the province poppy-free. The chairman of hisdistrict council said that poppy production had goneup until that council got stuck in, so there was a littleargument about who had made Balkh poppy-free.You do not sound very optimistic that it will remainpoppy-free even under the auspices of a “strong”governor like Governor Atta.2

Mr Mansﬁeld:We have seen it before, if I can put itlike that. In 1995 we saw Haji Oadeer reduce poppycultivation in Nangarhar by 50%; we even saw SherMohammad Akhondzada reduce poppy inHelmand in 2003 by 50%. We saw Haji DinMohammad, the governor, do it in Nangarhar in2005. Some of us talk of Balkh as being the ‘newblack’ or new fashion. Nangarhar illustrates how theeconomic consequences shift the political dynamic.Once you have a critical mass of the populationsuVering a degree of economic crisis, which is exactlywhat we saw in Nangarhar, the governors becomeunderstandably a bit more reluctant to enforce a banthat makes them unpopular with the people. Thepolitical context shifts. If the price increases we alsosee a similar phenomenon. These kinds of sustainedreductions even with ‘strong’ leadership are quitediYcult. No matter how strong the leadership we aretalking about armed populations. There are rivalswho are more than happy to marginalise theleadership. In Nangarhar we saw a reduction, but insome areas around the provincial centre there was avery interesting process in which people made thetransition from an ‘illegal’ to a legal livelihood. Theyexpanded their horticultural crops; they sent theirsons to the bazaar or into Pakistan to ﬁnd work.Those areas did quite well around the provincialcentre of Jalalabad, but beyond that area, peoplereplaced their poppy crop purely with wheat whichis an ‘inshallah’ crop. You put it in and walk away;it is not labour-intensive and you hope to get a crop.Essentially, they relied on oV-farm and non-farmincome. A lot of Nangarharis went to Balkh andplayed a role in the increasing cultivation in Balkh in2005 because they were perceived to have particularskills. They get a premium rate as itinerantharvesters. Therefore, a process of change tookplace in those areas which was not sustainable.Essentially, they could not grow enough wheat as asurplus to sell; they needed non-farm and oV-farmincome. They did that for a while but it had its limitsand wage labour rates were going down. Therefore,where you see poppy replaced by wheat beconcerned that it is not a sustainable shift; where yousee poppy replaced by high value horticultural cropsand non-farm income opportunities you see agenuine process of transition taking place. You haveto look at the qualitative nature of the change, notjust the reduction in cultivation. Too often we focuspurely on hectareage or eradication rather than whatis ﬁlling the gap.Q54 Sir Robert Smith:You have dealt with all theeconomic factors. I picked up a lot of local addictionto the poppy, especially among children, inprocessing it and handling it. Is any element of thecultivation of poppy dictated just by the growingproblem of addiction amongst the local population?Mr Mansﬁeld:There seems to be a growing problemof drug use within Afghanistan. You see manysurveys but how accurate they are I do not know.Certainly, when you do ﬁeld work people willdiscuss the issue of opium use and pharmaceuticaluse. There is a whole range of diVerent products. Inmany ways we should not only focus on opium when

it comes to demand issues. Some very good work isdone in Afghanistan on this. You can buy a month’sworth of Valium for $1 in Kabul. People use a wholerange of diVerent products of which opium might beone. In some communities particularly in theWakhan in Badakhshan there are drug useproblems. I am sure that colleagues who knowBadakhshan better than I, in terms of those kinds ofareas, can comment. There is also a deﬁnite elementof local demand that fuels this trend, butfundamentally it is about addressing youreconomic needs.Q55 Ann McKechin:What are your views on theAfghan National Drugs Control Strategy and whereyou think it is placed or viewed by the major donors?Why is there currently such a diVerence of opinionbetween, say, the European donors on the one handand the US on the other who still seem to be marriedto the idea that crop eradication is the ﬁrst priority?What is your view on the Strategy? Is the UKGovernment right in trying to align its policies withthat strategy?Mr Mansﬁeld:I suppose one of the questions iswhether the National Drug Control Strategy is astrategy, but it contains a lot of the right policyelements for me in terms of international experience.I have been involved in various aspects of it over thepast ﬁve or six years. It contains elements to do witheradication only where viable alternatives exist, noconditionality, ie making development assistancecontingent on reductions in poppy cultivation,which has proven not to work. As to howeradication might be done, typically it is manualwith no use of spraying et cetera. I think it containsmany of the important ingredients in relation tointernational experience on drugs policy in terms ofsupply reduction. As to whether its sequences andprioritises the assistance required, clearly that is notwithin the programme. There are issues around themechanisms by which line ministries will implementit. It is all very vague on that kind of thing and thatis why there has been an attempt to do CN3implementation plans with which I am a bitunfamiliar these days. The strategy itself containsthe right policy elements. There is constantdiscussion about those. The more the ﬁgures go upthe more eradication comes to the fore. At a certainlevel you can see the arguments on eradication thatare presented. You look at the experience inColombia. I have had these discussions time andtime again. If people grow more opium poppy youjust destroy more. I do not understand the logic of it.To some degree this is a faith-based issue. If peoplegrow poppy it is perceived as illegal. The farmers areperceived to be making more money than non-poppy farmers. If you look at the latest UNODC4survey and the kind of analysis it presents that isexactly the argument that is made. Therefore, if theyare wealthy and grow poppy and it is illegal and youdestroy it because of their wealth they should be ableto pick up an alternative; they can become second-hand car dealers or who knows what. Reality is very34

diVerent from this. Often the ﬁgures that arepresented on the drugs issue are quite problematic.The idea that poppy farmers in Helmand are richrather than potentially wealthy fuels this discussion.The whole understanding of why people grow opiumpoppy in the context of Afghanistan today informsyour policy response and view on that strategy.There are diVering views about the understanding ofthe causal factors and drivers of poppy cultivation inAfghanistan today and those are fuelled by a lot ofthe numbers and some quite problematicmethodologies that generate them.Q56 Ann McKechin:I take it from what you havesaid that you do not think crop eradication shouldbe used as a technique unless there are alternativelivelihoods, but there are some suggestions thatfocusing on alternative livelihoods only in the areaof opium production could act as an incentive topeople who are currently producing legal crops tomove into illegal production so they beneﬁt fromalternative livelihood schemes. Do you think there isthere any validity in that criticism?Mr Mansﬁeld:In many ways I think they are twoseparate arguments. In relation to eradication, wehave seen that experience not only in Afghanistanbut other countries where you destroy the crop andthere is no alternative, you create an economic andpolitical crisis. In Thailand in the 1970s there washeavy emphasis on eradication and it ended uppushing people into the Thai communist party. Wehave Colombia, Afghanistan et cetera. But I do notthink that means that you do development only inpoppy-growing areas; not at all. You need the rightbalance. You can see some of the arguments. I haveheard Afghan ministers say—I have to agree—thereis a danger that if you do work only in Helmand,Nangarhar et cetera and not in Ghowr and othermarginal players in poppy cultivation you create thewrong motives. Some of these areas have fewersecurity problems, less criminality and few problemsof poppy cultivation. Neglect them at your peril.There is an argument for containment, making surethese areas do not feel neglected. I confess that I havenot come across many farmers in the ﬁeld who saythey are growing poppy to attract developmentassistance because, quite frankly, they do not believeit will come anyway. Therefore, it is not realistic thatthey would waste valuable resources—land, labour,water et cetera—purely to attract developmentassistance in which often they have little conﬁdence.I tend to hear that argument from the malik or headof a village or a governor with a bit more politicalsavvy. You go back to the issue of what is happeningin Balkh and Nangarhar. We already see statementsfrom Governor Atta, as we did from Haji DinMohammad and Sher Mohammad Akhondzada,saying that they have “not received a dime”. Theyhave reduced poppy but where is the developmentassistance? Potentially, this opens the door to themsaying they have done their bit but we have not doneours. They cannot control it and people will have toreturn to poppy. In many ways the governor doesvery well because he is seen to be a good citizen forreducing poppy. Therefore, he gains from the

national and international community for doingthat and if development assistance comes he arguesthat he provided that assistance; he negotiated withthe international community and the governmentand he is therefore seen as a benevolent leader. Ifdevelopment assistance does not come he can saythat people should feel free; if they have to growpoppy, so be it.Q57 Chairman:There is a slight problem in thatthere is a diVerence of view as to what developmentassistance is. We had exactly that discussion withGovernor Atta. I believe that the week before thehead of DFID5who had been reconnoitring our visitgot the rough end of Governor Atta’s tongue beforehe understood that the department was putting 80%of its money into the Government of Afghanistanwhich was spending money in Balkh province andtherefore aid money was arriving but it was notperceived as such. He was looking at things that hecontrolled as opposed to things that theGovernment of Afghanistan controlled.Mr Mansﬁeld:If you will forgive me, there is also anissue about the label “alternative livelihoods” whichI ﬁnd singularly unhelpful.Chairman:We shall come to that.Q58 Hugh Bayley:I want to turn to the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund. Why has it been so slowdisbursing funds? If you were running it what wouldyou do to get some wind in its sails?Mr Mansﬁeld:I feel a little outside my comfort zoneon the CNTF;6I have not poured over it in greatdetail. I have seen a version of a very interestingreview that has been made of it. One of thefundamental issues has been vision and ownership ofit. Some people, particularly the former minister ofthe Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, saw it as almosta competitor of ARTF7and that it would have $1billion in it in due course. I believe that to someextent UNDP8also viewed it in that sense, whilstothers saw it as catalytic funding. Why would youneed to compete with ARTF? This is the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund and the “CN” is the value-added aspect of it. Therefore, what would you befunding from that in relation to delivering on thevision of drugs as a cost-cutting issue across thewhole of the Afghan national development strategy?The former minister saw it as a way of having moneywhere he could almost become a proxy implementerof development programmes. That was never howothers saw it, particularly on the UK side. You donot want to set up parallel systems where MRRD9and the Ministry of Agriculture are doinglivelihoods programmes in non-poppy-growingareas and MCN10through the trust fund isimplementing them in poppy-growing areas. Thatwas not the idea here. This is about national56

programming. I thought that these were meant to beelements that would make, say, a national priorityprogramme more CN-focused. National priorityprogrammes can contribute to reductions in poppycultivation, but there are things that you might beable to do to increase the CN outcome in terms ofwhere the assistance is going, how it is targeted andwho gains from that assistance, be it irrigation,roads or whatever it might be, also bringing togetherthe national priority programmes so you createdevelopment synergies. The CNTF should havebeen part of the process of assisting NPPs11to bemore CN-focused; maybe it could ﬁll in strategicgaps, or maybe you had an area where you hadirrigation, ag-extension12but no micro-ﬁnance.Therefore, plug in sectoral gaps through NGOs13andothers who are ﬂexible and can work in the ﬁeld. Dothat diagnostic and say, “Look, we are seeing areduction in poppy but there is a gap. People arebeing marginalised and there is a danger that poppymay increase over time if we do not address thatgap.” You could be constantly doing a diagnostic onthe ground as to what is missing in relation to sectorsand technical assistance to make developmentprogrammes more CN-focused. I think that shouldhave been its vision, but it became $80 million, orwhatever it is—I do not even know—to fundgreenhouses in Nangarhar at $2,000 a shot, ormushrooms. All of these have validity, but where isthe CN value-added? If you can justify that andground it in terms of how the programme will assistthe transition from poppy cultivation dependency toa reduction in poppy then it is ﬁne, but I think a lotof that context was lost. I see the CNTF as havinga problem of vision more than anything. The issuesaround how it reviewed the projects and subsequentissues of disbursement and institutional capacity Ileave to others.Q59 James Duddridge:In the paper that you co-authored with Adam Pain you challenged the use ofthe term ‘alternative livelihood’. What are yourreservations about that terminology with respect toAfghanistan?Mr Mansﬁeld:The point at which you have analternative livelihood as an end state; it is not aprogramme or set of speciﬁc interventions. Thecausal factors that have led me to the point where Ihave a viable alternative to poppy cultivation are aprocess of economic growth, security, governanceand to some degree the threat of eradication. It isthere at the end; it is not a series of discreteinterventions that we can call ‘alternativelivelihoods’. Road building and irrigation cancontribute to a reduction in poppy. There is a dangerthat national priority programmes and developmentare here and alternative livelihoods are there and sowhen Governor Atta says he is not receiving anyassistance he is not looking at the national priorityprogrammes and the role they can play in reducingpoppy cultivation; he is thinking of his “alternativelivelihoods programme”. It serves the purpose of111213

compartmentalising the drugs issue in a way that iscounter-intuitive and makes no sense. To deliver adrugs outcome we need governance, security,development and economic growth, not a certain setof interventions. They do not exist outside thoseelements. I just ﬁnd it an unhelpful term and a wayof saying that insuYcient alternative livelihoodsassistance has been received. There are nationalpriority programmes and other assistance. It is a wayof negotiating for more money.Q60 James Duddridge:Christian Aid uses the termyou do not like but argues that there is considerablescope for improving DFID’s existing alternative-livelihood programmes. What is your assessment ofthat assertion?Mr Mansﬁeld:Again, what is it classifying under“alternative livelihoods”? I see the national priorityprogrammes as contributing to a CN outcome. Ihave been helping with NRAP (the National RuralAccess Programme) which looks at how that mightbetter maximise CN outcomes. There is a range ofdiVerent interventions in the portfolio that cancontribute. I just ﬁnd the ‘AL’14label an abstraction.I believe that people are talking about diVerentthings at diVerent times and it does not help. Weshould be talking essentially about ruraldevelopment and economic growth, not using a termwhich you might use in a diVerent way from me. Weconstantly hear people say that they do not haveenough money in AL. Yet AL is the national priorityprogramme. We are constantly talking at cross-purposes. I ﬁnd that an unhelpful term. As toDFID’s work, fundamentally I support the idea ofnational priority programmes and the developmentof synergies between them. I think it has also donevarious things in relation to the AALP15in Balkh andHerat and the work that it used to do in Badakhshanthrough its development forum. There arecentralised national programmes to be broughttogether so they work in a more synergistic way, butyou must also come up from the bottom with BDF16and others to try to get communities empowered tomake demands of those programmes so they are notso top down centralised and are more demand-ledand responsive to communities’ needs. That is thechallenge.

Q63 James Duddridge:Lord Malloch-Brown saidthat we were muddling along in relation to counter-�narcotics. Is it a somewhat naıve view to assert thatthere is a single solution and that whilst politicianswould like that from what you are saying it is notthat simple; it is highly complex with a whole rangeof solutions and we should not really typify what ishappening as “muddling along” rather than using arange of solutions and experimenting with them andthat will be much more eVective than a single newpolicy.Mr Mansﬁeld:It is an incredibly complexenvironment. Where we have some successes youwill see a response in relation to the drugs businessand wider livelihoods. You constantly must evolvewith the drugs business and the economy ofAfghanistan and the changing security situation.Whether or not it is muddling along? After 10 yearsof doing this kind of work I have sympathy for thephrase but I think we have a far better understandingQ61 James Duddridge:What are your views on the of the problem and what is required. There are issuesDFID programme to encourage the production of around what can be done in the currentmint and saVron and melon further north, for environment, particularly in relation to the levels ofinsecurity. I am sure you will hear from colleaguesexample?Mr Mansﬁeld:They are all essential elements. There later that this is not just in the south but in otheris a range of diVerent interventions going on across areas. In 1994 a friend of mine who worked forAfghanistan, looking at high-value horticulture. DFID did a one-month review in Afghanistan.The Dutch have GSE17in Oruzgan buying up When he came back his political analysis was thatsaVron. There are various interventions by USAID.18the Taliban would remain a small organisationDFID is doing its own project with mint and saVron restricted possibly to Helmand and Kandahar in thewith Mercy Corps and others. All of these are south. By 1996 they had Kabul; by 1998 they were inmuch of the country. I am wary of predictions about14Alternative Livelihood (AL)Afghanistan and any idea that there is a unique15Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods Program (AALP)solution. As soon as you come up with a solution the16Bakhtar Development Foundation (BDF)situation has already adjusted. You must constantly17Growing Sales Exchange (GSE)18United States Agency for International Developmentevolve, move and understand the context so you can(USAID)shift your responses.

Q64 Sir Robert Smith:Historically, obviouslyagriculture has been a major part of the Afghaneconomy and yet the NGOs are concerned thatsupport for agriculture is considerably under-funded. DFID does put money through the Ministryfor Rural Rehabilitation and Development whichhas related impacts on agriculture, and 3% of thefunding of the US goes towards agriculture. Hasagriculture been neglected by donors?Mr Mansﬁeld:The Ministry of Agriculture hasprobably been somewhat neglected by the donors.There has been a lot of investment in ruraldevelopment. There are more investments in relationto horticulture. USAID debates how it is operatedbut has put a lot of money into RAMP19—I cannotremember what the acronym stands for—which is anagricultural marketing programme and then it is putinto ASAP20. It puts a lot of money through itsalternative livelihoods programmes. A lot of itfocuses on value chain work in the agriculturalsector. The emergency horticulture and livestockprogrammes of the World Bank are quite signiﬁcant.There have been whole issues about working withthe Ministry of Agriculture; it has been problematicin terms of working with NGOs. It had a range ofadvisers who were stuck in the old days of thecollectives and wanted to provide all kinds of pricesubsidies and have large tractor plants that theycould rent out. There has been a whole range ofissues in terms of working with the Ministry ofAgriculture. From what people are saying theyappear to be working their way through. Theagricultural base of Afghanistan is fundamental, butif you consider what has been successful in othercountries you must also look at the non-farm incomeside of it. If you look at Pakistan, Thailand and areaswhere poppy cultivation occurred you see a processof movement away from the land. In many areas ofAfghanistan where opium is most concentrated theycannot sustain the population with poppy. There aresuch small land holdings and such high populationdensities. People must move down from the hills.There is a natural process of development wherepeople move down to non-farm incomeopportunities in urban areas. Agriculture isfundamental but that side also must be considered.Q65 Sir Robert Smith:Colleagues who went northsaid that farmers had diversiﬁed into melons andthen the crop failed because of a melon ﬂea. Wheatcould be much more productive with more inputs interms of managing the crop. Are skills and advicenot being provided in that sense?Mr Mansﬁeld:What the Ministry of Agriculture isdoing out in the ﬁeld is debatable. If you go aroundlooking at the ag-extension and provision of adviceand support clearly it is wanting. Much of thatsupport comes from the NGO community andthrough some of the large programmes. A lot morecan be done in those areas to pump-prime the legaleconomy. I am a great fan of the Peace DividendTrust. I do not know whether you met them. Thereis an issue about local procurement and the fact that1920

we have PRTs,21the military et cetera who ﬂy in allthis food when that money could be put into the legaleconomy or used to pump-prime horticulturalproduction. Some people estimate that there couldbe $1 billion worth of investment in the ruraleconomy if the various military and civilian forcesbought locally. EVorts are being made there by thePeace Dividend Trust. The US military used tospend $38 million on importing bottled water; it nowbuys locally. These kinds of eVorts could be helpful.Q66 Chairman:In one village that we visited a cleanwater supply had been installed for the villagers andthey had switched from poppy—they did not say sobut we got that impression—and were growingmelons. They said that the melons were failing andthere was nobody who could advise them how todeal with the problem, or whether they should growalternative crops. Their animals were suVering froma shortage of drinking water. Again, they wanted anirrigation scheme and there was nothing there. Thereseemed to be a clear gap. They knew what theywanted but there was nobody to provide it.Mr Mansﬁeld:Yes.Q67 Richard Burden:You have emphasised theimportance of constructing a functioning state inorder to get the integrated strategy that you thinkwill be important. That requires all sorts of thingsbut certainly co-ordination between diVerentdepartments and so on. Where do you think in all ofthat the 22,000 community development councilssit? How eVective do you think they are or could bein developing the kind of strategy you are talkingabout?Mr Mansﬁeld:Again, that probably takes me a bitoutside my comfort zone. Given the nature of theway I do my ﬁeld work I tend not to engage toomuch with the CDCs,22but I am very much aware ofsome of the discussions that are taking place aroundsub-national governance. I think they can beenormously helpful as a development platform interms of engagement with them in understandingcommunity needs and clustering CDCs. That is verymuch what AKDN23and others have been doing;they have been clustering them so they can make thenational priority programmes more demand-led. Isee them having a very important role, but the nextwitnesses will probably be able to give you a farbetter idea.Q68 Sir Robert Smith:We were told in Helmand thatsome of the reduction in poppy in the past had beento do with just shortages of water and given that therains had come back and the forecast was more rainwe should not expect any reduction in poppycultivation in the province for the foreseeable future.From your earlier answer you suggested that all thedrivers are for continued poppy cultivation.Mr Mansﬁeld:I go back to my earlier commentabout making predictions about Afghanistan. If youlook at poppy cultivation in Helmand today,212223

economically it is not very attractive. If you considerthat people were paying up to $20 a day for hiredlabour—most households have to hire labour duringthe harvest period—it is an incredibly labour-intensive crop. During the harvest season therequirement is two hundred person days per hectare;it is 350 to 360 person days for the crop as a wholefrom the point of preparation of land to ﬁnalclearing of the ﬁeld. For harvesting you have to getthe right amount of labour at the right time andlabour must have the right skills. You do not wantidiots doing it; they will reduce your yields. When Iwas in Nangarhar I met people who were going toHelmand because the wage labour rates were $20 aday and they were getting a premium for working inan insecure environment. If you calculate the netreturn on opium poppy, not the gross returns that weare often presented with—for example that poppyprovides 10 or 20 times more return than wheat—itis unattractive. Why do they continue to do it? Theydo it because the trader goes to them. It is low riskand so it is a better option for the farmer. Somehouseholds bring in share-croppers who do the bulkof the work. Eighty per cent of the total cost ofopium poppy cultivation is labour. You need to ﬁndways to access cheap labour, and share-cropping isone way to do it. At the current rates as an ownercultivator I am not making much money from poppybut it is a nice low-risk crop in a high-riskenvironment. If I am a landlord and I have share-croppers with the provision of credit I can buy thecrop early as a distress sale at a low price. I amaccessing their labour cheap because of the nature ofthe share-cropping arrangement under which theyget 50% of the crop and I get the other 50% but theyare doing all the work, and I can sell the opium laterin the season. I can make money essentially from thesurplus value of labour. Some farmers can stillmaintain a degree of proﬁt; others are just managingrisk. Too often we talk of these farmers as if they areall proﬁt-maximising. Farmers the world over lookat what kind of risk they can aVord to take andmanage it and within that risk they try to maximiseproﬁt. Farmers in Helmand are no diVerent fromfarmers anywhere else in the world. Is it going to goup or down? I will be able to tell you in about amonth’s time because at the moment I have peoplethere in various districts at their own risk doing ﬁeldwork; they are looking at the process of decision-making, so you will have to wait for that.Q69 Richard Burden:Can you give your impressionsof the narcotics/insurgency link? I know that it isdiYcult to deﬁne “Taliban”, “insurgents”, “drug-traYckers” and “foreigners”. That is a complexarea. When we were there we were told in very broadterms that the Taliban, however deﬁned, gotbetween 20% and 40% of its income from poppy andthat ﬁgure has been bandied around elsewhere.What is your assessment of that?Mr Mansﬁeld:I would be fascinated to know themethodology. There are some clear links, but howstrong they are is under some debate. I see asigniﬁcant shift. I used to do ﬁeld work during thedays of the Taliban in Helmand, Kandahar and

various places where I would not even think to gonow. I saw an environment in which poppycultivation thrived for a number of reasons. Firstand foremost, I did an ‘apprenticeship’ with opiumtraders in the south; I spent three weeks looking atthe farm gate trade in Kajaki, Musa Qala and placeslike that. I would meet traders who had beeninvolved for many years. I asked what had been thebig change in the opium trade in the past 25 years.They said that in the old days when the Mujahideenwere in charge there were checkpoints everywhere.They had camel bags on the back of motorcycles—the sort of thing you can buy in Camden market—and half would be ﬁlled with money and the otherwith a gun. They would travel through thecheckpoints and pay money, so it was very diYcultto operate. With the Taliban all those checkpointswent so basically they could travel from districtxtothe border and obtain a better return on the opiumthey sold. In terms of trade it could expand. Theargument was that it was easier for them becausethere were a lot more new entrants into the opiumtrade as a consequence because the securityenvironment allowed them to trade more easily. Onthe farming side there was very little developmentassistance. There was an ongoing drought and all theright ingredients for poppy cultivation to increase. Idid not see the Taliban encourage poppy cultivation;I just saw a vacuum of governance essentially. NowI pick up from ﬁeld work, especially last year, thatthe “Taliban”, whoever they are, to a certain extentencourage poppy cultivation. Is this about funding?Will the Taliban and insurgency go away if the drugsgo away? I do not believe that will happen, but Ithink there is a play for hearts and minds. TheTaliban are now encouraging poppy cultivation tosome extent to provoke a reaction. What betterpropaganda coup than to provoke an aggressiveeradication campaign, particularly with spraying?You hear Afghan farmers say that the foreignercares about drugs but the priority for them issecurity, employment and corruption. Theargument that you hear sometimes from farmers isthat those issues are not addressed. This is right orwrong; it is the perception of truth that counts. Theperception is that foreigners care about drugs andthe Government of Afghanistan is trying to get ridof them to help foreigners deal with their drugsproblem at home. If that is the perception in ruralareas and you come in with an aggressive eradicationcampaign, what better way is there to win the heartsand minds of rural population? I think the fundingside is there but I am sure they get their funding fromall the usual sources with which we were so familiarin the late 1990s. Is that the primary motive? I tendto think not. I think it is about the hearts and mindsof the rural population. Sometimes weunderestimate the “Taliban” vision in some of this.They are more than able to look at the strategicpicture about how the drugs issue can be foughtover.Q70 Sir Robert Smith:Dealing with what seems tome to be the madness of aerial spraying, presumablyin the nature of the cultivation it is not just serried

Witnesses:Ms Elizabeth Winter,Special Adviser, Policy and Advocacy, British and Irish AgenciesAfghanistan Group (BAAG),Mr Mudasser Hussein Siddiqui,Policy, Research and Advocacy Co-ordinator, ActionAid Afghanistan, andMr David Page,Chair of Trustees, Afghanaid, gave evidence.Q71 Chairman:While we wait for other colleagues toreturn it may be helpful if you brieﬂy introduceyourselves and your background to get it on therecord.Mr Page:I am the current chair of Afghanaid andhave been a trustee for about 10 years. I came into itwith a background in the media in that I worked atthe BBC World Service for some 20 years and wasinvolved in broadcasting to Afghanistan, Pakistanand other countries. I have been working withAfghanaid for 10 years and I have made annualvisits for the past three or four years to some of theprojects we are doing. We work as an organisationin four provinces. We have been working inBadakhshan for 10 or 12 years and in Ghowr andSamangan since 2000. We are also working inNuristan in the east. That is probably the mostdiYcult area in terms of the security situation. Wehave been ﬁnding it very diYcult to work thererecently because of the growing insurgency, but inthe other three provinces we are still able to do ourwork. There are shortages in funding for the kind ofwork that we have done traditionally. Previously, wedid integrated rural development work with fundingfrom DFID in Badakhshan and from the EU inGhowr. We have found it very diYcult to replacethat funding since DFID and the EU decided two orthree years ago to change their priorities and fundthe Afghan Government. In terms of DFID, 80% ofits funding now goes to the Afghan Government.and I am doing quite a bit on civil societydevelopment in Afghanistan at the moment. I amalso a trustee of Afghanaid, having helped set it up.Mr Siddiqui:I am the policy and advocacy co-ordinator for ActionAid in Afghanistan. I have beenthere since February 2005. ActionAid has beenworking in Afghanistan since 2002. Most of ourprior operations have been in the provinces ofJowzjan and Balkh and also in Kabul. We also havesmall operations in Kandahar, Kunduz and Ghazni.We are a facilitating partner for the NationalSolidarity Programme. We also have projects for thedemobilisation and re-integration of childrenaVected by war. We are working on women inParliament and also on issues of policy andadvocacywithrespecttogovernance,accountability, transparency and civil/militaryrelations.

considerably. We are vulnerable in the sense we donot have close protection; we do not have armouredvehicles or the military looking after us.Q74 Chairman:That makes you soft targets?Ms Winter:Yes. At one point it appeared that theinsurgents were considering not going for NGOs butmuch more for the military and government but thatseems to have changed again. We are extremelyvulnerable. As to working with the Government ofAfghanistan, that is a tricky question. We havesupported the Government; obviously, a countryneeds a state, but if we are too closely allied withsome of it it can be used as a weapon against us. Wehave to address that dilemma constantly. Many ofour partners and member agencies work closely withthe Afghan Government in various ways, whether itis at policy level or being the implementing partnerin programmes like NSP.24Mr Page:Certainly, Afghanaid has suVered quite alot. Over the past year in Nuristan we have had threegroups of staV kidnapped. Mercifully, they werereleased unharmed, but that kind of thing has beengoing on. In some cases this is not us being targetedbecause we are trying to implement a governmentprogramme but because there is a criminal elementat play. That is equally an issue in the north. In thenorthern areas where development is still possible inthe traditional sense and security has beenreasonable we see some deterioration. For example,in Badakhshan in the north east and in Ghowr somedistricts are problematic; there is some overspillfrom Helmand. The fact that this coincides with acertain attrition in funding for the kind of frontlineservice tasks we have been doing in agriculture andveterinary work means that it makes matters worse.Obviously, the NSP is doing well and we have beenvery much involved in it, but it does not cover a lotof the interventions in agriculture, veterinary workand so on in which we have traditionally beeninvolved. As David Mansﬁeld said, obviouslyagriculture is a key area in which we ﬁnd it verydiYcult to attract funding. It is the coming togetherof two factors, growing insecurity and an attrition infunding, which makes matters worse.Q75 Chairman:We shall come to that particularpoint in a minute.Mr Siddiqui:It is evident that the security situationhas an impact on NGO operations and places a lot ofstrain on our work there. NGOs pretty much dependon the good will of the communities and they are theones who provide security. It is not as if we go roundwith guns. In the absence of any development worktaking place in the villages they tend to lose faith.They see us on a day-to-day basis and sometimes holdus responsible for funds not coming in, and that iscontributed to by the local political dynamics. Localpower holders also tend to blame each other or theNGOs for situations such as these. One of theimportant aspects is the lack of regular analysis of thesituation to make adjustments on the ground. Thereis no regular political conﬂict analysis taking place in24

the country. DFID says in its strategy paper thatthere should be regular conﬂict analysis to guide thedepartment’s intervention in the country, but it hasnot been happening in Afghanistan. Unless and untilwe do that we will not be able to position ourselves forthe changing situation in the country.Q76 Chairman:The relationship between agencieslike DFID and NGOs is clearly a dynamic andchanging one. As a committee obviously weconstantly discuss the role of budget support anddirect budget aid. Whilst in Afghanistan we looked atco-ordination through the Afghan ReconstructionTrust Fund which, to be fair, we felt was an eVectiveway to try to pull together what donors did, but fromyour point of view do you understand that and do youthink it is a valid objective? At the same time, does itadversely aVect what you are doing? To be quite openand honest, the Government has a policy objectiveand you are independent NGOs with your ownobjectives. There is not an automatic right for you tobe supported by the Government, or vice versa, so itmight help if you explained how you think thedynamics work or do not work in that context.Mr Siddiqui:As far as the ARTF is concerned we allthink that it is needed and it is doing well, but we alsothink it can do better. There are a lot of issues withARTF management in terms of accountability. Itattempts to bring coherence to donor support in thecountry which is very much needed; otherwise,diVerent owners will go in diVerent directions. That isquite good. But where is the accountability of thedonors when they do not fulﬁl their commitments andpledges. ARTF does not provide any mechanism foraccountability? There is no aid monitoring andevaluation system. There is also no civil societyparticipation with respect to oversight. Civil society isvery much involved in the ARTF. As NSPimplementers we get our money, implement ourprojects and then we say goodbye.Q77 Chairman:We had a brieﬁng from the WorldBank which was instructed to provide the monitoringand accountability to the ARTF. It went out of itsway to point out that it is done on the ground incountry, not from Washington, and uses independentauditors. It maintains quite strongly that there isproper monitoring. That is very important to usbecause, after all, we are here trying to investigate ourGovernment’s accountability to the taxpayer and weneed reassurances that that is the case.Mr Siddiqui:My personal interaction with the WorldBank has been in Kabul. It has said quite openly thatit cannot hold donors accountable if they do not givemoney. They make pledges but there is nothing inwriting. If they go back or delay their funding it canalways request it but there is no mechanism to applypressure.Q78 Chairman:We are perhaps talking of twodiVerent things here: one is the extent to whichdonors commit funding and the other is whathappens when the money goes to the ARTF.

Mr Siddiqui:Yes. But there is a gap between thecommitment and the money, whether or not it iscoming. There is also a gap on how the money isspent and whether there is oversight of that. Theydeﬁnitely have auditors but how do they involvegovernment and civil society, because the latter andalso communities are part of the same buildingprocess? Is there a bottom up accountabilitymechanism over there? Unfortunately, not.Ms Winter:To go back to the more general questionof funding of NGOs, we support HMG’s25view thatit should be funding the Government of Afghanistanand building its capacity. There is no question aboutthat. We have questions, however, about the way itis being done and the fact it was done by throwingthe baby out with the bathwater at a time when theAfghan Government did not have the capacity toprovide services or do things that the population ordonors expected of them. We have also been toldthat the transaction costs for DFID are high andthey cannot really fund NGOs in the way they usedto. Therefore, these two things work together. Whathas happened instead is that these transaction costshave been passed on to NGOs which have beensubsidising to a great extent programmes like NSPbecause of the delays in funding. You may hear moreabout that later. Therefore, it has been extremelydiYcult for NGOs to operate as partners in theseprogrammes.Q79 James Duddridge:When you refer totransaction costs to what exactly are you referring?Ms Winter:NGOs are told that it is too expensivefor DFID to give money to them and that asking forsmall amounts requires a lot of monitoring andsupervision. We would argue that it should havemore staV in that case.Q80 James Duddridge:That is another issue.Ms Winter:Yes. DFID has been given a lot moremoney and told to reduce its staV which is a hugeproblem. The main issue is that NGOs are notasking for money for themselves per se; they areasking to be able to provide services to Afghans whoare in great need. At the moment, having had theirprogrammes and funding reduced there has been aservice gap, as identiﬁed in a recent ODI26report.That means many of the programmes NGOs havebeen running both because of lack of funds andsecurity have had to close. That has been a realproblem for beneﬁciaries. Our view is that fundingof NGOs should have continued. Some of it willtrickle down through the eVective ministries, whichat the moment tend to be education, MRRD andhealth, but by and large NGOs have had a majorissue with that and with security and theirprogrammes have been at risk. Therefore,beneﬁciaries have suVered in terms of the frontlinework about which you have already heard. On topof that agriculture and other programmes are under-funded; higher education is not funded, et cetera.That is why we have been asking for a review of thepolicies and where we have got to. We need to have2526

a look at what we have achieved so far. Maybe thependulum went too far in direct budgetary support,because the other aspect of it is that the capacitydevelopment of the Afghan Government has beendone in a very piecemeal, ad hoc, unmonitored andunevaluated way. If you talk to Afghans in theGovernment as I have, they would welcome realcapacity development and an independent review—the World Bank has gone some way towards doingthat, showing this piecemeal eVect—asking Afghanshow they have experienced capacity developmentand what they really need to be able to fulﬁl thefunctions that they are required to fulﬁl in a goodstate that looks after its people.Mr Page:In terms of the ARTF, we are animplementing partner, as is ActionAid, for the NSP.We are working in 900 communities. The NSP hasbeen an extremely successful programme and hasestablished community developments councils inover 20,000 villages. One sees that as a hugelyimportant step forward having seen elections takeplace in some of these CDCs. Given that electionshave not taken place in Afghanistan for 20 or 30years they have made great strides. It has alsoinvolved women at the CDC level, which isextremely important. We are very pleased and proudto be involved in that. What we are disappointed andworried about is the fact that NSP funding as suchfor the whole programme is always unpredictable.As we speak today, there is an anticipation of ashortfall of something like $200 million in Marchnext year. There are constant cash ﬂow problems.For example, between April and September of thisyear Afghanaid has been paying staV out of its ownreserves. There was a six-month delay in receivingthe payment for the work.Q81 Chairman:Where was the money comingfrom—the Government of Afghanistan or the trustfund?Mr Page:It was coming from the MRRD and theNSP organisation. There are two problems: one isthat the donors are not providing the money whichthey pledged; the other is that there are cash ﬂowproblems in getting the money out.Q82 Chairman:I am told that part of the problem isthat it is all paid in arrears.Mr Page:That is another factor. For example, youare helping villagers to decide on their priorities.This is a very democratic system. Mostly they decideon infrastructure improvements, but you help themas a facilitating partner to put up their proposals andthey wait for 10 months to get the money.Q83 Chairman:We met a number of them.Mr Page:Some of these problems are now beingsorted out, but there is uncertainty. Anotherworrying thing about NSP is that the ﬁrst part is athree-year phase; the second is a two-year phase. Ifyou have delays in funding there is a season in whichyou work and the whole thing can be delayed and soon. There is an expectation. We do not know what isgoing to happen. Is it just going to be two years whenyou do this work and then move on? If this is a

critical democratic building block for the futuredevelopment of the country in which men andwomen are involved there needs to be some furtherassurance that this money will be available.Chairman:We might want to pursue that.Q84 Ann McKechin:In my local community a delayof 10 months in the provision of money forinfrastructure would not be unusual. I wonderwhether it is just about people’s expectation of whatthey think local government is when they see itsimply as a funding agency and one in which at themoment there is no infrastructure for collectingrevenue from local people, so there is a degree ofresponsibility and rights within the relationship withlocal government at one level. If they simply see it asa grant-making body and something to take from isthat perhaps setting the wrong incentive and culturewithin local communities?Mr Page:We are doing all sorts of things toencourage local empowerment. The NSPprogramme is one in which money is being madeavailable for infrastructure improvements.Q85 Ann McKechin:Should it not be a two-wayprocess in that people contribute to it as well?Mr Page:One has situations where the localcommunity is expected to make contributions, forexample to building or irrigation, whether it islabour or whatever. It is not simply a matter ofhanding out money. This has been the system andalso the expectation. Obviously, it must bereinforced by the kinds of things that a lot of NGOsare doing, for example by encouraging self-helpgroups. It has proved to be a very useful initiative,particularly for women. To see the way in whichwomen are now managing some of these projects isextremely encouraging.Q86 Hugh Bayley:I turn to the Counter-NarcoticsTrust Fund. Mr Page, you said some pretty harshthings about the fund. In your evidence you say thatyou have applied to the trust fund for resources andhave been told to rewrite your proposal ﬁve timesand you still have not received clear answers aboutwhether or not you will get funding. What do youbelieve is the problem, and what is your prescriptionfor changing it?Mr Page:I think David Mansﬁeld may well be rightthat there is been a lack of clarity about what is beingattempted with the fund. The rules have changedquite dramatically since the beginning. I think thatin April 2006 we applied for money from this fundand that was at a time when DFID funding for someof the work we were doing—integrated ruraldevelopment in Badakhshan—was coming to anend. We were certainly encouraged by DFID tothink that perhaps this might be a source of fundingfor continuing that important work. A newgovernment fund had been set up and we might beable to get something through that.Q87 Hugh Bayley:What are you bidding for? Whatdoes the Afghanaid project seek?

Mr Page:Basically, we provide a range of diVerentinterventions in Badakhshan to improve wheatvarieties and help to increase productivity. We havea veterinary service for the villages with which wework. We provide women’s resource centres. Wehave a child rights programme and also a micro-ﬁnance programme. We are involved in self-helpgroups.Q88 Hugh Bayley:Broadly, you are saying thatDFID and the EU have withdrawn funding for theseprogrammes of work and you made a bid to the trustfund for a continuation of funding.Mr Page:It was not exactly a continuation.Q89 Hugh Bayley:It was for the next phase of thiskind of work.Mr Page:Yes. Badakhshan is one of the ﬁve majorpoppy-growing areas in the country and this is theCounter-Narcotics Trust Fund. We were providinga range of interventions, if you like, in an attempt tohelp farmers develop alternative livelihoods orencourage them to increase their productivity andeconomic situation. We were led to hope that thisfund might be a source of assistance for that. Weapproached it ﬁrst through the agriculture ministry,which we were encouraged to do. That took a longtime. When it got to the counter-narcotics ministrywe went to the bottom of the queue. The counter-narcotics ministry then decided that all theseprojects should be tendered, so they had to beneutralised and made less speciﬁc. We are not reallysure why it has taken the turn it has, but 18 monthslater we still do not know whether our proposal hasbeen accepted.Q90 Hugh Bayley:My brieﬁng note says that about$19 million has been allocated or pledged to the fundand about $3 million has been distributed. Can youremember what the value of your bid was?Mr Page:I think we were asking for something like$4 million in Badakhshan and Ghowr provinces forwork in that area.Q91 Hugh Bayley:You state in your paper that theintellectual property that you have in your way ofworking would be put at risk if there was a tenderingprocess. It seems to me that you need to ﬁnd someway to reconcile good practice with public money onthe one hand and the way NGOs work on the other.I entirely understand the frustration if you are toldtwo years into the process that the rules are beingchanged and they now want tendering rather thangrant application, but why is tendering a bad ideafor NGOs?Mr Page:There is no problem with tendering. If theywant to have a tendering process and they want todo some counter-narcotic work in Badakhshan let ushave a tendering process; as many NGOs as wish cantender, but to ask people to apply through theagriculture ministry or other ministry for this fundand then tell them that the ground rules havechanged completely does not seem to be a verysensible way of proceeding, particularly when we putforward a proposal that is based on our knowledge

of that particular area. There are ministries inAfghanistan that work well and one should notknock them as a whole. The MRRD and educationministries have done extremely good work. It justappears that the counter-narcotics ministry, forwhatever reason—there are other stakeholders aswell, the DFID is one and UNDP is another—hasnot been able to develop a clear process for this.Q92 Hugh Bayley:What is the role of UNDP in thetrust fund?Mr Page:I am not entirely sure of the precise role,but it is involved in managing the thing. DFID is themain donor and then the counter-narcotics ministryhas the ﬁnal say in looking at these things.Q93 Hugh Bayley:We certainly saw a variable levelof engagement, competence and corruption betweendiVerent government departments, but it seems tome that the diYculty is that you face bureaucraticproblems dealing with government ministries. Theimplication is that the funders, DFID and others,should really be managing ways through theseprocesses.Mr Page:Obviously, donors are involved inassisting and advising a lot of these ministries andthat is the way the situation works. Our hope is thatsome greater clarity can be brought to this so thismoney is not simply locked up, because it is moneythat could be used for these purposes. Therefore,there is a degree of frustration. We do not say thatwe shall necessarily be successful, but to have asystem where there is no decision and no clarityseems to be very unfortunate.Ms Winter:Under this tendering process theproblem would be that the programmes devised byAfghanaid based on its experience and abilitieswould then be tendered at a lower rate by anorganisation that did not know how to run them.That was the fear. As to who runs the trust, it isadministered by UNDP. DFID will tell you that ithas done its utmost to try to get the bureaucracy towork. Somebody new was appointed in the summerto UNDP to get the thing right and to get it workingbecause DFID’s view was that that was where themoney should come from for NGOs to do the ruraldevelopment programmes that are so badly needed.I talked to that person in the summer and she toldme that the plan was to evaluate the CNTF, where itwas at and what it had already disbursed. There wasan argument going on because DFID felt that itshould disburse the money and then evaluate it.There was one bureaucratic hurdle after another,plus lack of clarity in the mission, as it were, on thepart of all stakeholders involved in it. The upshot isthat the money has basically not been disbursed andeverybody is waiting around for it. It needs to besorted out.Q94 Ann McKechin:We have talked about thenational trust fund the bulk of which I understand isused to pay public sector salaries of teachers, nursesand doctors. You have also spoken about problemsoccasioned by the capacity of individual governmentdepartments and some are doing much better than

others. Can you point to some examples of bestpractice where you think the donors have beenassisting the capacity of departments? Otherdepartments seem to be bedevilled by issuesregarding corruption. Does that require a politicalrather than funding change?Ms Winter:I think that political change andpressure need to be brought to bear so there is realcapacity development and that the levels ofcorruption are dealt with. Those ministries that havegood ministers in them are the ones that attract thesupport of development funding et cetera and theyare the ones that are able to use it. You have thehaves and have-nots. That was very clearlyillustrated when the Minister of RuralRehabilitation and Development moved over toeducation and money moved with him, as it were.That is something that needs to be looked at. Thoseministries that are functioning well are the ones towhich we have already referred: rural development,education and health. Not surprisingly, they are theones that value and use NGOs in a very sensible way.For example, in the health ministry NGOs areinvolved very much in planning policy andimplementation, looking to future programmes andso on. That works well. As to education, it wasNGOs that provided the services by and large,particularly the Swedish Committee. It has handedover its schools wholesale to the Ministry ofEducation but retained a certain number that it isworking with as model schools, particularly in termsof girls’ education and so on. There is a very goodworking relationship between the ministries andmoney, therefore, does get to the NGOs. We need toevaluate what has already been done, because theseare examples of good practice, and try to use themparticularly with the Ministry of Agriculture andMinistry of Higher Education. Another issue hasbeen lack of capacity because people did not receiveeducation even to secondary, let alone tertiary, level,and that is being perpetuated. Non-formaleducation is also an area that needs to be looked at.Q95 Ann McKechin:In Mazar-e Sharif we met awoman who was working with an NGO. She was ateacher by profession. I was very disappointed thatan NGO should appoint a teacher given the vastshortage of members of that profession in statefacilities. The point made repeatedly is that NGOshave been recruiting away from government the bestquality staV and in many cases entrenching theproblems rather than dealing with them.Ms Winter:There will be odd cases where you havepeople who are appointed to jobs in areas that arenot within their technical competence. One getsexamples of that whether one looks at the UN or theGovernment of Afghanistan. There are alsoexamples of NGOs having very good engineeringdepartments, of which Afghanaid is one. TheGovernment then scooped all of them up into theMinistry of Rural Rehabilitation and Developmentbecause it needed engineers; it sucked all of themfrom the NGO system. It works both ways.

Q96 Ann McKechin:Ten thousand are working withthe United Nations. That is a very high number.Ms Winter:Some of them are specialists in ruraldevelopment and they work as drivers andinterpreters. It is a major issue. Another problem isthat government departments pay very low salaries.In ministries where they know their way around theinternational system they will do top up, whichmeans that they can attract people.Q97 Ann McKechin:You recognise that there is aproblem in that the NGO community does notappear to have a co-ordinated approach to tacklethis. It is taking people away from the state sector ata time when it lacks enormous amounts of capacity.Ms Winter:I will give you another example where Ibelieve it is largely refuted. I would like to see theevidence, but certainly NGOs get the blame forthings like this. More than any other institutions inAfghanistan NGOs have built the capacity ofgovernment oYcials. For example, when AshrafGhani and other ministers came in they took peoplewholesale from the NGO sector to work in theGovernment. I was asked whom they shouldapproach. Several ministers—some are still in theirjobs—came out of the NGO ﬁeld. They did not comefrom higher education elsewhere or the Afghansystem but from NGOs that had worked for years inPeshawar and Afghanistan. It is very easy—all of usprobably do it from time to time—to blame anothersector for doing things, but I would like to see theevidence. I would be very surprised if it is true thatNGOs are taking the best people. Having said that,at the end of the day if you are an Afghan with someeducation who wants to look after your family, plusrebuild your country, you will try to make thatcontribution where you feel it will be most eVective.Q98 Ann McKechin:It would certainly be helpful ifthe NGOs kept accurate statistics which were readilyavailable to the Afghan Government andParliament so it could assess the level of the problem.Ms Winter:Readily available statistics on what?Q99 Ann McKechin:I am referring to statistics interms of whom you are recruiting, what theacademic qualiﬁcations are, how long they stay withyou and what salaries you pay, so we can have anaccurate analysis, because it seems to me the majorproblem is that the Afghan Government has verylittle control over a lot of areas about which youwould expect any other government to know.Mr Page:I totally sympathise with your concernthat the Afghan Government should become moreeVective; we all want to see that, but as far as NGOsare concerned I do not believe we are seeing a hugeincrease in staV at the moment. It is not as if we arerecruiting enormous numbers of people. Forexample, the staYng of Afghanaid has been fairlystable for the past three or four years. There is atremendous capacity in NGOs which the AfghanGovernment itself recognises, in the sense that whenit comes to implementing the NSP it decides that itneeds to have NGO support to do it. The whole ofthe NSP programme and setting up of all 23,000

CDCs across the whole of Afghanistan has beendone by NGOs. It is the skill of the NGOs that hasmade this possible. I agree that there is an issueabout comparative salaries.Q100 Ann McKechin:It is also a matter of statisticsand having some idea of where skilled labour isbased. It would be very helpful if NGOs could dothat themselves. Surely, it is within their capacity todo so.Mr Page:Obviously, we are monitoring fairlyclosely our staV recruitment. We are ﬁnding it morediYcult to ﬁnd Afghans who are competent to do thekind of work that we were employing them to dofour or ﬁve years ago. We have had to lookinternationally for some of the people we need forour work simply because a lot of the experiencedAfghans we had on our staV before have gone totake on work particularly in the UN sector, some ofthem with government.Q101 Ann McKechin:This kind of analysis would bevery helpful in ﬁnding out where skilled labour is inAfghanistan, which agencies it is passing betweenand what the various agencies are doing in respect oftraining up and recruiting new staV. Without thatthe ability of any government to ﬁnd out where skillshortages are and how it will address them in futureis incredibly weak. I put it to you that there is someonus on the NGO community, as with all otherdonors, to try to address this issue because at themoment there are so few skilled people inAfghanistan.Mr Page:NGOs realise that they have these skillsand they have been saying to government and othersthey would like those skills to be used to help buildthe capacity of the Afghan Government. If you go toa province like Ghowr you will ﬁnd that thegovernor who is presiding over a growingadministration where there is an issue ofcompetence, skill and so on will want NGOs to helpin that process. But the international communityand Afghan Government have been quite reluctantto take that skill and capacity-building help fromNGOs. One does not quite know why. Perhaps partof the reason is that there is a tendency with themanagement of all the donor funds to drive downcosts to a point where the job cannot always be doneat the necessary level.Ms Winter:We will take away this point.27BAAGwill look at it in conjunction with ACBAR28becauseif this is a recommendation that is coming to us wewill take it seriously. It will be a diYcult job to do.Perhaps we can have a word about it afterwards.Mr Siddiqui:There is an argument that NGOs tendto get some of the quality staV. We should look intoit. Having said that, one must also recognise the rolethat NGOs have played in developing capacity notonly in providing on-the-job training to people. I cangive you a recent example of the National SolidarityProgramme where the Government has said that inthe last year of implementation each district musthave two staV from the local MRRD department2728

seconded to the NGO implementing the project toprovide on-the-job training. NGOs have been doingthat, but some of us have also faced problems wherethe Government has not been able to provide its ownstaV to deal with it. Further, NGOs have establishedsome training institutes. BRAC, a BangladeshiNGO, has been running a training institute and theyare providing low-cost training on management andvarious other issues. ActionAid had its owncapacity-building unit. We provided training onrural development and three-month fellowshipprogrammes. There is a demand for it to the extentthat we are now converting our department into anindependent training institute which will providefellowship training on development and humanrights issues to create a cadre of local developmentworkers who can work in the communities.Therefore, at one level one must look at theargument that NGOs have provided not only on-the-job training but contributed otherwise todeveloping capacity.Chairman:I appreciate that you take that point andon that basis we will come back to it.Q102 Sir Robert Smith:Obviously, one of thepositive experiences in Afghanistan has been theability to go to a school and sit with a whole lot ofgirls with textbooks who are studying, meetingwomen Members of Parliament and visiting micro-ﬁnance initiatives that mainly beneﬁt womenbecause they are more likely to repay loans thanmen. But underneath we heard concerns that lack offaith in the formal justice system meant that a lot ofpeople looked to traditional justice and a number ofattitudes to women and their involvement were stillvery negative. At some meetings we could not meetthe women members of CDCs because we did nothave a female interpreter. When we met thePresident he cautioned against the idea of radicalapproaches because of the lack of popularity andthere was a need to move at the pace at which societywas moving. What is your view of the position ofwomen and where it is going? What is the role thatNGOs can have in increasing the voice of women inparliament and in local consultation?Mr Siddiqui:There is deﬁnitely a level of progress interms of women’s participation. We all agree that wecannot go for radical developments. There is adeﬁnite lack of faith in the justice system which isreﬂected in the latest human rights report onAfghanistan by UNDP. That argues that perhapsthere must be a level of correlation between thetraditional justice system and formal justice system.Having said that, NGOs have been providingsupport in terms of making staV available on theground to work with women separately. Forexample, when we are implementing the NationalSolidarity Programme or any other community-based development programme we tend to employwomen staV to go and work with women,understanding the fact that men cannot go and workwith the women, but the same thing has to happenwith the Government as well. Unfortunately, thathas not happened. It employs more and morewomen staV who could go and work with women.

We are not at a stage in Afghanistan where men cango and work with women directly. I think thatNGOs have pretty much pitched in over there.Mr Page:We have certainly been involved in tryingto empower women at the local level where we work.We have always done this on a holistic basis in thesense we have been working with communities andhave tried to provide whatever support we can forwomen. We provide women resource centres inwhich we give vocational training; we have providedliteracy and health training and so on. But we dothat within communities and with the support ofcommunities. Obviously, there are dangers if onehas a one-item programme and one goes intocommunities. It is valuable to go in and say that youare helping with agriculture, veterinary work and soon and also want to help women to become moreeducated. It is extremely encouraging to see smallself-help groups of women in Badakhshan inparticular putting together small amounts of moneyand enabling one of their number to buy a cow, orwhatever it is, and start a small business. As you say,women are good repayers and have tremendousacumen. Some of the projects that we are runningwith our CDCs are managed by women. From whatwe hear, they are also doing very well. One issue thatemerges from some of the other submissions iswhether the Afghan Government is itself perhapsproviding the kind of funding for women’s groupsand civil society organisations that take an interestin these things. It is not doing so. DFID hasrecognised that by funding certain initiatives forwomen. There is a question about how you fundwomen’s groups to raise the voices of women if thatis not something that perhaps traditional societywould naturally see as a priority. It is part of thebroader question whether you need to ﬁnd a betterbalance between, if you like, supporting theGovernment and seeing that as the main source ofprogress or whether you should also fund directlycivil society as part of a better balance. Therefore,you seek to support civil society and its pressure ongovernment to make it more accountable by thatmeans.Ms Winter:While it is true that one should not haveradical, insensitive or not properly thought outsolutions so one can just tick a box saying that onehas said one will do something about women andtherefore it is all right, that does not mean oneshould be too nervous of doing anything. There aresolutions to this which will have to be gradual andlong term. That means funding civil societydevelopment and providing support to people whorun, often at great personal cost, shelters for womenwho have been subjected to abuse of all kinds andwho are also working very hard to bring them intothe judicial system and persuade members of thejudiciary that they have a case and in turn theyshould try to support them. All these things take alot of time. Meanwhile, there is a lot of underlyingviolence. Women are a particularly vulnerablegroup as are the children they look after. In apositive note CPAU (Co-operation, Peace andUnity) has done work in community peace-buildingwhich we strongly believe is another matter that

ought to be supported. It has found as a spin-oV thatthe age of marriage has increased in the communitiesand the amount of physical violence towards womendecreased. There are sensitive, strategic ways inwhich this can be tackled, and I think you have seensome of the recommendations in the submissionsthat have been made to you.Q103 Sir Robert Smith:Last night the all-partyparliamentary group met members of the AfghanParliament. When I ﬁrst put this scenario I got a one-line answer: there was no problem with traditionaljustice and this issue did not exist.Ms Winter:Perhaps we can look at who it was whosaid that.Q104 Chairman:Men, I think!Ms Winter:Part of the problem is not wanting tohave shameful things in the public domain. If youare in a meeting like that you may feel that that is theappropriate thing to say. If you talk to women it isa very diVerent story. If women begin to speak outon their own behalf, as many have done, they arealso subject to assassination. There have been two orthree notable examples of that recently. I think theinternational community needs to take a strategicview, put its money where its mouth is in terms of thecommitments it has made and pursue a long, slowprocess in supporting the Afghan Government andothers in dealing with this.Q105 Chairman:When we raised with PresidentKarzai that originally it had been agreed there wouldbe a female vice-president and female ministers—now there is only one female minister and she is theminister for women—he said that he did not believein gesture politics and what have you. Our responsewas that if he was telling us there were no ablewomen we had met some of them. There seemed tobe a reluctance right at the heart of government tohave women role models. Is that something onwhich NGOs engage with government? It is not aquestion of putting people in particular situations;government is a good place to show that they aredoing departmental, functional jobs, not ‘women’sjobs’, and just happen to be females.Ms Winter:NGOs have discussed this and continueto press for it. There is no question that there is aproblem at the heart of government. Having saidthat, it has taken us a very long time in our ownsociety to get to the state where women begin to takepositions of seniority. Many times in the past NGOshave argued with the UN and governments andasked why there are no women on their missions. Assoon as you start to see women do these kinds ofthings you get a diVerent perspective. It is part of theeducation process. We have to continue to supportthese initiatives.Q106 Richard Burden:You expressed some concernearlier on about the future funding of the NSP andthings like community development councils. If welook at it the other way round, perhaps you can giveyour perspective on how you see communitydevelopment councils developing and their role in

relation to other sub-national governmentstructures. When we were in Afghanistan thereseemed to be a general consensus amongcommentators about the importance of developingsub-nationalstructurestomovementinAfghanistan. In addition to your worries about themoney drying up, how do you think they shoulddevelop, and what should their roles be?Mr Page:Mr Siddiqui would like to say somethingabout this. I shall happily contribute, but he haslooked at this recently in some detail.Mr Siddiqui:The NGOs have been quite categoricalfrom 2004 when the CDCs were just one year old indemanding that there be some legal recognition ofthese institutions. Millions of dollars have been putinto them and capacity has been built up at locallevel. As we all know, elections have taken place.This is something very new for Afghanistan becausefor 30 or 40 years elections have not taken place.Recognising the importance of CDCs asinstitutions, NGOs demanded that there be a degreeof legal recognition. To that there was initially noresponse, but in September 2005 the Ministry ofRural Rehabilitation and Development establisheda working group to look at the drafting of a lawwhich would give some degree of legal recognition tothe community development councils. NGOs wereinvited to participate but unfortunately it was a one-oV event and NGOs heard of it only later. InDecember 2006 there was a presidential decreeabout a CDC bylaw giving those bodies legal status.In its current form that bylaw is vague andambiguous in terms of whether they are localinstitutions of governance or parts of civil society. Ithink the response of NGOs varies; there is no singleposition where all NGOs say that CDCs should beonly local civil society organisations or part of thegovernment as they are in other developingcountries. The current national consultation processin Afghanistan—today is the last day—on CDCsustainability and its future is supposed to look intoit. NGOs did come out with a position paper on theCDC bylaw which gave a very detailed analysisbased on their interaction with communities and ourown ﬁeld staV on the ambiguities in the currentbylaw and legal status. What we have been arguingis that the Government has to come up with a clearand coherent strategy as to whether CDCs arevillage councils, as envisaged in chapter 8 and article140 of the constitution of Afghanistan, or they willjust be civil society organisations. Further, the CDCbylaw talks about an inter-ministerial workinggroup which has to see whether it is limited only toMRRD and citizens or should be used by otherministries. It is unfortunate that the steeringcommittee does not include the Ministry of theInterior which is the heart of governance inAfghanistan. There have also been contradictions inthat MRRD is going ahead with the CDC bylaw butat the same time an independent directorate of localgovernance has been established within thepresidential oYce with the status of a cabinetministry to look into local government issues. Thereis no coherence at government level which makesthings quite ambiguous at village level where people

are not clear whether CDCs will or will not stay.Their performance also varies depending on thequality of facilitation and the time NGOs can spendworking with them. There is a deﬁnite recognitionthat they are an important institution. A lot ofmoney has been invested and capacity developed inthose institutions. One should not let go of CDCs; asa project of NSP they should be taken forward.Q107 Richard Burden:It is interesting that you referto the commission that has been establishednationally under the president’s oYce. Presumably,that is Mr Popal’s commission. The way it was putto us both by him and others was that thatcommission was established precisely to bringcoherence and empower not speciﬁcally CDCs butto give some oomph, if you like, to the sub-nationalagenda. You appear to be saying that thatcommission could be a way of muddying rather thanclarifying the waters. Do I read you aright?Mr Siddiqui:One hopes that the directorate of localgovernance, the independent commission, producesgreater coherence, but for me it is unfortunate thatthe day before yesterday it refused to participate inone of the sessions which was supposed to look at thesustainability of CDCs, saying that by itsparticipation in the national consultation processwith CDCs it did not want to give legitimacy to therecommendations that would come out of theconsultation process. If it is supposed to bringcoherence it should actively participate in organisingthe consultation which brings together diVerentministries and members of CDCs to Kabul. Threehundred delegates are sitting there to discuss andmake recommendations on how CDCs shouldfunction. Everybody—donors and civil societyorganisations—is there, but we learned that theindependent commission on local governance wasreluctant to participate, thinking that that wouldgive legitimacy to the recommendations that cameout of it and that might not fulﬁl its expectations.Their participation in organising the nationalconsultation process was also missing. It has beendriven very much by the Ministry of RuralRehabilitation and Development.Mr Page:The CDCs have emerged as a veryimportant unit of local governance. It would be agreat shame if through lack of funding or clarity thatbuilding block was not established for the future. Alot of piecemeal work is going on to build up fromthe bottom, which is something in which NGOs areinterested. CDCs are being built into clusters so thatthere is a greater demand-led approach to a lot of theissues that aVect them, but at the moment it is allvery piecemeal. We are doing something like this inSamangan at the moment with the support of theSwiss Development Corporation. There is no clarityabout this nationally. It needs a national approach.I think that now everybody recognises that a greatdeal has been done to try to improve the capacity ofthe national government ministries, but if you go tothe provinces that is where the concentration shouldnow take place. Essentially, you have governorsappointed in Kabul. There is a bit of a clash betweenthe centralising tendency of a lot of the thinking

about how to drive forward progress and the naturaldiversity of Afghanistan and tendency towardsautonomy in a lot of these regions. Marrying upthese things and working out how democracy shouldbe implemented at that level is something that needsto be sorted out.Q108 Ann McKechin:Given the changes that aretaking place and the proposals for sub-nationalgovernance, where do you think the NationalSolidarity Programme should ﬁt? What should be itsrole? How do you see it being developed?Mr Page:We believe that the National SolidarityProgramme has achieved a great deal and helped toset these building blocks. What one would like to seeis a continued stream of funding, not just for twoyears in a particular place but thinking about how itmight be funded over a much longer period. Fromthe building block which essentially sets up theseelected councils one must start to do the work ofdevelopment, encouraging all sorts of initiatives tomake sure that the local economy grows, educationcomes and so on. That is the natural focus for doingit and it would be a great shame if it was abandoned.Q109 Chairman:We have discussed brieﬂy theimportance of agriculture. Mr Mansﬁeld made itclear that one had to bring in other livelihoods aswell. Speciﬁcally, what do you think can be done toimprove the delivery of agricultural development? Isit a role for DFID? Is it a matter of supporting theagriculture ministry, or is there a clear role forNGOs; in other words, where is the best capacity orpotential for developing that capacity?Mr Page:Obviously, some attention needs to bepaid to the agriculture ministry because that is not aseVective as it should be. As far as NGOs areconcerned, certainly the experience of Afghanaid isthat there is a shortage of money to do the kind ofwork that it was doing in agriculture and in theveterinary ﬁeld. I think we employ the only Afghanvet in Ghowr which is one of the most importantlivestock provinces in that country. We ﬁnd it verydiYcult to get funding for that work. That is anillustration of the problems. It would certainly beuseful if funding could be made available for someof the frontline work that has been done whichNGOs now struggle to keep going. That is one wayto ensure that this kind of agriculture and veterinarydevelopment continues. If one has to wait until agreat number of issues are sorted out in Kabul theseprojects dry up and that sends the wrong message tothe people.Q110 Chairman:Could DFID perform a useful rolein training agricultural extension staV? We haveagricultural capacity in this country which it claimsis under-utilised. By pulling together those peoplecould DFID help to develop with the agricultureministry an extension network by training peoplelocally in such work?Mr Page:This is not one of the three issues whichDFID regards as its priorities. If DFID wasinterested in doing that it would be a greatadvantage.

Chairman:That is one recommendation to which weare giving consideration.Q111 James Duddridge:I should like to turn to theprovincial reconstruction teams. In areas of relativestability what should their role be going forward?Should they be disbanded in areas of relativestability?Ms Winter:They should certainly have an exitstrategy in areas of stability. We have always arguedthat their main role should be to bring humansecurity and safety to an area. If that exists then weargue there is no longer a need for them and aid anddevelopment should be done by civilian actors.Q112 Hugh Bayley:In Helmand the PRT is oftendescribed as a military-led initiative, but it appearedto me to be a good solid partnership between theForeign OYce, the military and DFID. In Helmandwhere there is virtually no UN presence it is verydiYcult for NGOs to work, yet it is necessary toprovide initiatives to improve quality of life and therural livelihoods of people. It is very diYcult to seewhat the alternative would be if you did not have aPRT to supplement the work that the nationalgovernment agencies are doing. Do you share thatview?Ms Winter:Certainly, in an area like Helmand it isvery diYcult for NGOs to operate. Nonetheless,there has been some capacity in Mercy Corps andothers. I think you had meetings with Nigel Pont.Clearly, you need to provide some assistance to thepopulation and if NGOs and the Government ofAfghanistan cannot do it there must be analternative. I do not believe we argue that PRTsshould not exist, but in the past we would haveargued that they were second or third best toexpanding ISAF29outside Kabul and put in realdevelopment assistance. There are now lots ofdiscussions about what eVect the military presencehas per se and the lack of single command with thecoalition and so on. BAAG is undertaking someresearch at the moment to ﬁnd out informationabout some of these issues, particularly from localpopulations to gain their experience of PRTs and thestabilisation forces.Q113 Hugh Bayley:How would you do thatresearch work?Ms Winter:We have undertaken to take on twoindependent specialists along with Afghanresearchers to go into three provinces and discusswith people their experience and to talk to themilitary, DFID and so on. It is an ongoing researchinitiative and we hope that the report will bepublished fairly soon. I understand that you will bedrafting your own report before too long, so if wecan give you the preliminary results of that workobviously we shall do so.29

Q114 Hugh Bayley:You mentioned working withDFID. Are you doing ﬁeld work in Helmand or not?Ms Winter:Yes.Mr Siddiqui:Oruzgan and Paktika are two of whichI am aware.Q115 Hugh Bayley:If you could provide us withinformation about consumer experience, as it were,of the work of PRT it would be very helpful. Havingvisited four sites where PRT-supported work wasbeing done, I saw some valuable tasks beingundertaken, but I had no idea how priorities weredecided and in reality the extent to which localpeople were setting priorities. We were told thatwhenever work was proposed in a particular villagethere would be a local meeting to discuss thepriorities. If your work can give some insight intohow that process operates and whether it is assensitive as it could be given the diYcult workingcircumstances that would be very valuable.Ms Winter:We have always said that we need a goodevaluation of what work the PRTs do so we knowwhat is valuable and can be done elsewhere as aresult. Certainly, local consultation is probablyfairly thin on the ground and by and large does notinclude women, but we will come back to you onthese things.Q116 Chairman:The problem is that they are patchyand variable. When we were in Mazar-e Sharif welearned that the Swedes had been very reluctant todivert their central government funding but hadagreed to do so to fund a hospital. That was donejust to provide visible proof that they were doingthings; it was not their own preferred option.Ms Winter:That is right.Sir Robert Smith:The other worry in Helmand wasabout the decision to build a school and whether anythought had been given to the resourceconsequences of making it available.Q117 Chairman:One of the people we met on ourvisit summarised the situation by saying that theproblem with Afghanistan was that everything wasa problem.Ms Winter:I entirely agree.Q118 Chairman:In an hour’s conversation withanybody one goes from total pessimism toconsiderable optimism. All of these factors collide,which makes it very diYcult for us to write a reportbut we shall do so.Ms Winter:It is very timely and we are delighted youare doing it.Q119 Chairman:If you have any further reﬂectionsthat you think are helpful in the light of the exchangethis morning please feel free to submit them to us sowe can take them into account. Thank you verymuch.Mr Page:We value the opportunity.

Witnesses:Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP,Secretary of State for International Development,Mr MarshallElliott,Head of DFID Afghanistan, andMs Philippa Rogers,Deputy Head of Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU), FCO, gave evidence.Q120 Chairman:Good morning, Secretary of State,and welcome to the ﬁrst formal occasion you haveappeared in front of the Committee, and I am sure itwill not be the last. We welcome you and your team.We know Marshall of course but I think for therecord it would helpful if you could introduce yourteam.Mr Alexander:Marshall Elliott, as you know, is theHead of our DFID Afghanistan oYce based inKabul. Many of you met him during the course of theSelect Committee’s recent visit to Afghanistan.Philippa Rogers is the acting Head of the AfghanDrugs Inter-Departmental Unit, physically based inthe Foreign OYce but a cross- government unit whichleads the UK’s work on counter-narcotics.Q121 Chairman:Two or three things have happenedsince our visit which I thought we could explore withyou ﬁrst of all. Perhaps the most topical, sadly, is weas a Committee stayed in the Serena Hotel (and mostpeople do although not everybody) which wassubjected to a recent attack where a number of peoplewere killed. I just wondered whether that was seen asa deterioration in the security situation and whetherthat has any implications for the Government’s andDFID’s work in Afghanistan, which is, after all,insecure and diYcult enough as it is?Mr Alexander:I would be cautious of drawingsigniﬁcance out of a single event, even one as seriousas the attack at the Serena Hotel, where I know anumber of you stayed in Kabul. Clearly as a BritishGovernment we have condemned in the strongestpossible terms the attack that took place on thecivilians in the hotel. I understand that the Talibanhave claimed responsibility for the attack, but ofcourse we want to see the perpetrators and sponsorsof this crime brought to justice within the Afghanjustice system. That being said, I think it is fair to saythat when I visited Afghanistan prior to your visit, theforce commanders who I met, particularly in thesouth and in Helmand, were clear that Britishmilitary forces were prevailing in the speciﬁcengagements that they were having with insurgencyforces, but were mindful of the possibility that in thelight of the success that was being enjoyed by Britishforces working in support of the Afghan NationalArmy, there was always the possibility that therewould be moves towards a more asymmetric form ofconﬂict. There have been a number of attacks, as youknow, in Kabul in recent weeks and months of whichthe Serena Hotel is just one of the latest, so it is amatter which is of concern both to the BritishGovernment and to the Government of Afghanistan,but it really is for others, both our force commanderson the ground and the Government of Afghanistan,to judge how best to respond to what is inevitably achanging security challenge that we face.Q122 Chairman:Can I say on behalf of theCommittee that we were very well looked after by theclose protection (CP) team that was allocated to us.We were impressed by the seriousness of what theywere doing and the seriousness of the potentialthreats. I am sure you will have appreciated when youactually go through that hour’s training andpresentation it brings it home to you what might ormight not happen, and although we were veryfortunate that there were no incidents, that attack lastweek demonstrates that all of that was absolutelynecessary.Mr Alexander:Yes, I could not agree more. On myown visit, there was a suicide bombing of the airportgate at Kabul when I left, and indeed the daypreceding my visit to Kandahar in the south, therewas an international force soldier lost to anImprovised Explosive Device (IED) incident. It is avery real security challenge that is faced, and it wouldbe remiss of me to do anything other, as you have beengenerous enough to do, than to pay tribute to not justour own staV but the staV who support ouroperations within Afghanistan, because it is achallenging security environment.Chairman:And they are very professional indeed.James?Q123 James Duddridge:Whilst we were there we sawa balance between the security but also getting out,seeing the projects and actually feeling what thecountry is about and how it works and talking to thepeople. Given the threat of further attacks,particularly in Kabul, particularly targeted at the ex-patriate community, has DFID’s ability to get outand about been further constrained subsequent to theattack on the Serena?Mr Alexander:Firstly let me try and contextualise thesecurity challenge that we face. This was bestdescribed to me by one of the Afghan ministers, whoI met who said the best way to understand thechallenges facing Afghanistan at the moment is torealise that we face four simultaneous challenges.Firstly, there is the insurgency; secondly, which nodoubt we will touch on today, there is the issue of

narcotics; thirdly, there is the issue of governance,and fourthly, there is the issue of poverty, which is thecore work that we are addressing in the Departmentfor International Development. We have always beenmindful that security is one of the key challengeswhich contextualise the eVorts that we make. Thereare a number of procedures in place wherebyassessments are made as to the security environmentin which we ask our staV to operate. We co-operatevery closely with the Foreign OYce in thatendeavour. It might be helpful if Marshall as head ofthe country oYce sets out for you the steps that wetake in country to be assured of the safety and securityof our staV. There are two instances that I would cite.Firstly was obviously the attack on the Serena Hotelwhich is used by a number of internationals. Secondlythere was a bomb that inﬂicted damage on propertiesin which DFID staV were present. Immediatelyfollowing that attack, as you would expect, there waswork undertaken by oYcials, at my request, to ensurethat there was a further full audit of the securityarrangements in place for our staV to ensure that allnecessary measures are being taken. Once Marshallhas set out the speciﬁcs of the steps taken in relation tothe Serena, I would be happy to say a word or twoabout the implications more broadly across thecountry.Q124 James Duddridge:It would be very helpful if MrElliott did that and focus his comments on the changein risk assessment and practices and the impacts onDFID since the attack on the Serena. Prior to that Ithink we are fully aware of the very comprehensiverisk assessment process that you have gone through.Mr Elliott:It is worth mentioning the incident whichthe Secretary of State has just mentioned. It was adevice which exploded close to properties you sawduring your visit. We have taken steps since then tostrengthen security at these locations. Thankfully,testimony to the strength of the systems already inplace, when the device went oV, no-one was hurt. Itdoes aVect our social movements. Both that incidentand the recent incident this week at the Serena haveaVected our ability to go out and about to do thingsother than work. In terms of doing our business it hasnot changed the situation. We are still getting out todo meetings. We can still go out and make visitselsewhere in the country, where we are supported verysolidly and very professionally by CP, so it has notchanged our business movements.Mr Alexander:I would add at the policy level thatwhile of course it is incumbent upon both myself andmy oYcials to have due regard for the safety andwelfare of DFID personnel working in Afghanistan,we also need to send out a very clear message that suchattacks on civilians will not in any way diminish ourresolve and our determination to continue to act insupport of the Government of Afghanistan. In thatsense, clearly it is not appropriate for us in everyinstance to discuss all the measures that are taken orthe assessments that emerge from particularincidents, but I can assure you that the resolve andcommitment to continue work in Afghanistan is in noway diminished by the attack on the Serena Hotel.

Q125 Chairman:In the light of press reportsyesterday and today, which appear to conﬁrm thatLord Ashdown is to be the UN Representative inAfghanistan, are you able to give us a formalconﬁrmation of that and any more information as tohow that will operate? In this speciﬁc context,according to theFinancial Timesit just put a commentat the end: “There is concern in Kabul that LordAshdown’s appointment will heighten anti-Britishsentiment among ordinary people. One seniorEuropean diplomat warned Lord Ashdown that heshould expect such antipathy.” Firstly, could youcomment on the general principle of his appointmentand what he is going to be doing and, secondly,whether his being British, in the light of the previousdiscussion, has any further implications?Mr Alexander:Firstly, I am not in a position tooYcially conﬁrm because obviously the position ofthe United Nations Special Representative of theSecretary-General is a matter for Ban Ki-moon,although of course I have seen the same reports towhich you refer. Let me begin by saying the term ofthe Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalﬁnishes in February, although in fact Mr Koenigsleft, I understand, late last year, so in that sense thereis no secret that there are discussions underway interms of what we are looking for. Let me therefore, ifyou would indulge me, speak in terms of what we arelooking for from the senior high-level candidate whowe hope will ﬁll the position, and then let me say aword in terms of whether it would inﬂuence the viewsof the United Kingdom if such a candidate as PaddyAshdown were to emerge, as the press reportsindicate. What are we looking for ﬁrst of all? This rolehas to be recognised as supporting the Governmentof Afghanistan, and in that sense the work that PaddyAshdown did in Bosnia, while outstanding—and Iwas Europe Minister at the time and I had theopportunity to discuss with him the challenges thatwere being faced in Bosnia—the nature of the job issomewhat diVerent from the High Representativerole that he discharged with such distinction inBosnia. There is of course a parallel to the Bosniansituation which is the need to eVectively co-ordinateboth the military and civilian dimensions of the work.It is crucial for us, in particular in tackling insurgency,that there is coherence in terms of the counter-insurgency work that is being taken forward. Wewould like to see a national counter-insurgencystrategy, a COIN strategy, being accepted acrossAfghanistan. Thirdly, and this leads me naturallyinto the point that you raise about the possibility of itbeing a British representative, I think it is importantthat there is one face and one voice for theinternational eVort. One of the points that Iunderstand has already been raised in the course ofdiscussions before this Committee, following yourvisit, is the perception that somehow there is a largeproportion of the Afghan population who areunaware of the nature of the support being oVered bythe international community. In that sense, I regard itas an opportunity rather than a threat to better alignthe eVort and work and the ﬁnancial resource that hasbeen put in, with a recognition of the supportive butvital role being played by the international

community. In that sense, the United Statesobviously have been supportive of Paddy Ashdown’scandidacy, he is an individual of outstandingintegrity and ability, and we are very hopeful in termsof the role that this Special Representative can play inAfghanistan in the months to come.Q126 Sir Robert Smith:Do you see the role beingfulﬁlled through the personality of the holder of theoYce or will there be a change in terms of the oYce?Will there be a buy-in from the EU or NATO intorecognising that if we are going to create this coherentstrategy, it will have to be a bit more than symbolic?Mr Alexander:Candidly, I do not see it as either/or.Of course the fact that both the EU and the NATOrepresentatives are up for replacement around thesame time oVers opportunities for there to be eVectiveco-ordination and discussion. There were somesuggestions that have been ﬂoated in terms of a singlecandidate for all three oYces. My understanding isthat there are some diYculties in that proposed wayforward in terms of the respective organisationalstructures of NATO and the EU. That being said, Iam optimistic as to the ability for thoseorganisations—the UN, the EU and NATO—tobetter align their work in the future, but clearly thecharacter and attributes of the individual broughtintotheSecretary-General’sSpecialRepresentative’s role will be absolutely key to thatnot simply being a theoretical hope but being apractical result.Q127 Chairman:I think General McNeill1characterised the requirements as being an 800 lbgorilla. I am not sure whether Paddy Ashdown wouldconcur with that description!Mr Alexander:I shall leave it to you. You have knownPaddy for longer than I to judge whether he isequipped for that role!Q128 Chairman:Another incident was the expulsionof two international diplomats by the Government ofAfghanistan for apparently negotiating with theTaliban. That raised a slightly diYcult area which ishow you deﬁne negotiations with the Taliban. It wasclearly stated to us by both the Afghan Governmentand representatives of the international communitythat there had to be some process where you tried todraw people away from the Taliban and back into co-operation with the Government, and that involvedsome kind of dialogue, not necessarily with theleadership but with elements of it. Obviously therewas a concern here that two experienced diplomatshad incurred the wrath of the Government ofAfghanistan. I just wonder whether that was to dowith who should be taking the lead on it, namely theGovernment of Afghanistan feeling that it was theirjob to lead on this, not the internationalcommunity’s,orsomebreakdownincommunication, and what eVect that has on where wego from here between the Government and the1

international community in trying to bring aboutthat reconciliation of the disaVected people, thepeople who are being pulled back from the Taliban?Mr Alexander:Firstly the policy and then the speciﬁcmatter to which you refer. The clearest articulation ofour policy in relation to this, notwithstanding somemisplaced headlines the day before, was thestatement oVered by the Prime Minister in the Houseof Commons towards the end of the year,2whichmade it clear that we were supportive of the eVortsthat were being made and being led by theAfghanistan Government to be able to move forwarda process whereby a number of former ﬁghters had re-entered the mainstream of Afghan society. Clearlywhen we talk to our own force commanders on theground, they are clear that, notwithstanding theprogress that has been made in the kinetic phase of thecampaign, there does also have to be a politicaldimension to counter-insurgency, and they arethemselves supportive of the work that has beentaken forward by the Government of Afghanistan. Inrelation to the speciﬁc incident that you describe, ourAmbassador Sherard Cowper-Coles, who I knowyou have met, discussed the expulsions with PresidentKarzai on 29 December, at the turn of the year. In thecourse of those discussions, he strongly refuted thesuggestion that as the United Kingdom we did notclear reconciliation projects with the relevant Afghanauthorities in Kabul and Helmand, and I think in thatsense the description that you oVer in terms ofrespective roles and responsibilities lies at the heart ofthis issue rather than there being any fundamentaldivergence as to the need to align the kinetic phase ofthe counter-insurgency operation with othernecessary aspects of that.Q129 James Duddridge:For clarity’s sake, given thatBritish diplomats, the British Army and possibly (I donot know) DFID staV have discussions with theTaliban, what is the diVerence between discussionsand negotiations and when do discussions technicallybecome negotiations?Mr Alexander:The position of the BritishGovernment in relation to that is that we have madeclear that we are not negotiating with the Taliban.The Prime Minister made that clear in the course ofhis statement. On the other hand, it is of course thecase that whether in terms of our responsibilities inthe south and Helmand through the PRT,3and forexample the work that has been undertaken in MusaQala, or whether it is through the work of ourembassy in Kabul, there is a wide range of discussionswith a wide range of interlocutors. I cannot better thewords that our Prime Minister oVered at the dispatchbox in making clear that we wish to isolate and toremove the leadership of the insurgency, at the sametime as supporting the eVorts of the Government ofAfghanistan in terms of bringing into the mainstreamthose who want to leave behind the insurgency andcome back. My recollection is that the ﬁgure quotedwas around 5,000 former ﬁghters who have already23

chosen to move back into the mainstream. Clearly weare supportive of that work, but this has to be a matterthat is led by the Afghans.Q130 Chairman:In the Prime Minister’s statement on12 December, he announced the increase indevelopment funding to £450 million for the period2009–12. That is an increase on £330 million over2006–09. Is that extra £120 million additional moneyor is it coming from the Stabilisation-Aid Fund? Howmuch of it is going into development and how much isgoing into stabilisation activities?Mr Alexander:The announcement that the PrimeMinister made combines both money for theStabilisation-Aid Fund, which supports theparticular work of stabilisation, and the on-goingdevelopment needs. We are doing development workin Helmand and there are also decisions that will bereached in terms of allocations for the Stabilisation-Aid Fund. In terms of the proportions that areanticipated being spent from the Prime Minister’sstatement—DFID’s £345 million, that is £115 millioneach year—that is new money and an additional andbigger allocation than our previous commitment of£330 million over the equivalent period of 2006–09.The total ﬁgure that was spoken of in the statementwas £450 million and £105 million of that is forstabilisation activities. So of the £450 million, £105million is for stabilisation activities and theadditional money, the £345 million, is development.Q131 Chairman:In that context I am going to bring inJohn Battle, but what we did ﬁnd both in the UK andwhen we were in Afghanistan, inevitably andunderstandably because of the high level of militaryengagement in Helmand, is there was a presumptionthat all the British aid development was going intoHelmand. I think it is perhaps important both on therecord and from you to make it clear that a signiﬁcantamount of our development activity is going directlytowards the Government of Afghanistan andpresumably the whole country?Mr Alexander:I would fully accept thatresponsibility. I was looking at the ﬁgures inpreparation for the Committee. My recollection isthat from a budget of £107 million, £20 million isbeing spent in Helmand. When I was in Afghanistan,I visited work that we are doing in terms of allocationoutside of Kabul. I also took the opportunity to visita school where through the support that we areproviding to the Government of Afghanistan we arehelping to pay for the teachers’ salaries at that school.I very much regard it as my responsibility to reﬂect thebreadth of work that we are undertaking in thecountry, not least to the British public. I think it isprobably inevitable, and certainly appropriate, thatmuch of the coverage of Afghanistan in the UKmedia centres on the work that is being taken forwardby the British troops principally in Helmand in thesouth, but in terms of the eVorts that we are making,you are absolutely right to recognise that it is only aproportion of the development work that isunderway. I think that bears on two issues. Firstly isour ﬁnancing and secondly the nature of thechallenges that Afghanistan faces. I think it is

important for people to realise the scale of thechallenge. One in ﬁve children die before their ﬁfthbirthday, average life expectancy is 46; they are oVtrack on every one of the MDGs. Even if there wereno insurgency, this is a desperately poor country andtherefore even if there was not the immediatechallenge that we face in terms of stabilisation therewould be a responsibility on us to be working tosupport the development objectives of theMillennium Development Goals.Q132 John Battle:I concur with that last point; itcannot be underlined enough. It is not just the ﬁguresnow but too often a glib comparison is made with Iraqbecause there seem to be parallels of tacklinginsurgency and working on development. When Ijoined this Committee in 2001, if I remember rightly,all the World Bank statistics showed Afghanistan atthe bottom of the whole world in terms of all thepoverty indices. We forget how far back Afghanistanwas before the whole issue of the military insurgencyand the movement to try and do something about it.Those ﬁgures from 2000 are still burned in my brain.Afghanistan was at the bottom of the league on everysingle one of the MDGs, so start from there andmeasure it from there. Even if there were noinsurgency, it would be the biggest task in history tobring about development, to move Afghanistansociety into the 20th century, never mind the 21st. Ithink that is often forgotten. On those terms though,I want to explore the relationship between theamount of aid going into development and thecapacity to deal with the money and the expectationsof what can be done. The resources are there but youcannot spend them, it is sometimes said. The DAC4ﬁgures show that Afghanistan receives about $67 percapita. I think that was the ﬁgure in the 2006 DACreport. That is a lot less than Bosnia Herzegovina, forexample, and I think it is more than the DemocraticRepublic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The questionhas been raised, and DFID oYcials have raised it,that even if we have a budget for aid, there is not thecapacity to actually do anything with the budget. Myquestion to you would be is it a case of increasing theaid because the capacity is getting there now or is theemphasis on creating the capacity in order to be ableto absorb more aid?Mr Alexander:I do not want to give a very NewLabour response but it is not either/or; it is both, inthe sense that we have long recognised post-2001 theimmediate challenges that Afghanistan faced. Interms of what shaped our work in the yearsimmediately following the fall of the Taliban regime,it was ﬁrstly to develop a mechanism whereby theinternational donor community could eVectivelycontribute resource, and we were key to thedevelopment of the Afghanistan ReconstructionTrust Fund (ARTF), but simultaneously we had tobuild the capacity of the institutions of governance toallow that money to be spent eVectively. Of course, allmembers of the Committee will be aware thatapproximately 80% of our spending is now throughthe Government of Afghanistan. That reﬂects the4

priorities which as a Department we have identiﬁedcan make the biggest contribution to the work ofpoverty reduction within Afghanistan. One of the keycontemporary challenges that we face is developingthat capability of governance, the capacity of thestate to spend money eVectively. That is one challengeand explains, as I say, the work of the ARTF.Secondly, there is the issue of economic management.If you look at the proportion of revenue raised by theGovernment of Afghanistan against the GDP, that isdesperately low, I think it is about 7%; far lower thanmany of the Sub-Saharan African countries who wewould regard as desperately poor. In that sense,whether it is in terms of revenue-raising capability orindeed just basic state capability, it is vital that westrengthen economic management as well. So that isstate capacity, economic management and, thirdly,of course livelihoods, given the desperate poverty andthe fact that many people are agricultural workerswho are looking for a means of sustaining themselvesthrough a range of diVerent livelihoods. I wouldcertainly accept the analysis which says that capacityis a huge challenge for the emerging Government ofAfghanistan. I would certainly accept that there doneed to be increased aid ﬂows, and the statement thatthe Prime Minister made reﬂected an up-lift, as Isuggested, from the previous three years. I also wouldnot diminish the scale of progress that has been madein a relatively short period of time. For example onthe number of children going to school, when theTaliban fell, there were about 900,000 boys ineducation in Afghanistan; girls were barred. We arenow in a position where there are in excess of ﬁvemillion children in school of whom more than twomillion are girls. One of the force commanders said tome when I asked him about the nature of theinsurgency, “It is said here where the roads end theTaliban begin.” More than 9,000 kilometres of roadshave been rehabilitated in recent years. I think interms of both the policy work we do but also ourpublic messaging, we have to recognise this is for thelong haul, we have to recognise the need for Afghanleadership, be honest about the scale of the capacitychallenge and the need for continued externalresources, but equally be clear that progress is beingmade in what, as you say, is a desperately poorcountry.Q133 John Battle:I am tempted to be oV the wallChairman, but the poet Thomas Hardy said that thetest of how we become human beings is our capacityto look the worst in the face and still develop forward.Could you give me some kind of vision where despiteall the problems—security, political, the warlordsand all the rest of it—where Afghanistan is the mostadvanced country in the world in bringing indevelopment in a new way, with new patterns forpersonal and economic development, trying newmethodologies locally, and the rest of it? Is thatthinking even going on, would you suggest, within theDepartment and within the Government ofAfghanistan, or is it really survival and trying to geton their feet day-to-day after a bombing and thehotels being blown up and the rest of it? Are we

anywhere near having Afghanistan, which is bottomof the league, as the test-bed for development policiesin the 21st century?Mr Alexander:I was appointed DevelopmentSecretary in July and Afghanistan was one of myearliest visits. Together with the Defence Secretaryand the Foreign Secretary, who of course had takenup his post at the same time, we resolved that all of uswould ensure that in the course of those summermonths we would go to Afghanistan quickly. I thinkfew would doubt the priority or signiﬁcance that weattach to Afghanistan. That was reﬂected in thestatement that the Prime Minister made on behalf ofthe Government at the dispatch box before the turn ofthe year, so I can assure you that there is an ambitionfor the people of Afghanistan. Signiﬁcant numbers ofrefugees have returned since 2001. People havebraved the threat of bombs, bullets and intimidationto vote in the country’s elections. There is adetermination and an ambition on the part of theBritish Government. It is right to recognise that thathowever is balanced by a very clear-headed sense as tothe scale of the challenges that we face. That is why thePrime Minister was so clear in saying that this is along-term objective. I think we owe it to the people ofAfghanistan to be candid as to the scale of thechallenge, while at the same time, as I sought to do atthe beginning of this session, be very clear that ourresolve and determination to work with others to ﬁndthe way forward is undiminished by the kind of attackthat we saw on the Serena Hotel. I think it is alsoimportant though, in discourse such as this, to havethe humility to say all of those eVorts, ambitiousthough they are, and although we have committedBritish troops and they are in harm’s way on a dailybasis in Helmand in their endeavour of supportingthe Government of Afghanistan, and in light of thefact that we are raising the money—all of that shouldnot diminish the fact that this needs to be an Afghan-led development strategy. In that sense we have torecognise the scale of the challenge, the need forAfghan leadership and also the fact that we are asigniﬁcant player but by no means the only player.The Americans for example account for about 50% ofthe civilian eVort and 70% of the military eVort of theinternational community in Afghanistan, which iswhy it is so critical, as we have been doing, that wework closely with our American counterparts, ourcounterparts from NATO and our counterparts fromthe EU. I think the international community’s resolveis undiminished that this must be one of the successes.Q134 John Battle:In the jargon of bottom-linepolitics you see then the ODA5increasing fundingover the three, ﬁve, ten years in the future, so ODAmoney is in there to get that development shifted?Mr Alexander:Yes of course we want to see anincrease in development spending, but at the sametime, as I sought to reﬂect earlier, part of what we aretrying to do is to spend the money as wisely as we canto increase the revenue base of the Government ofAfghanistan itself.5

Q135 Chairman:Just on a clariﬁcation of that, beforeI bring in Hugh Bayley, on the ﬁgures you gave usbefore the development spend by DFID in 2006–09was £330 million. On the 2009–12 ﬁgures it increasesto £345 million, in other words of the £120 million£105 million is going to the Stabilisation-Aid Fund. Iknow the Prime Minister has said that he wouldregard some of that as development but, in the light ofJohn Battle’s questions, is there not capacity for moreresources to go into development fundingspeciﬁcally? I guess what we are saying to you,Secretary of State, is might you be arguing for furtherfunds speciﬁcally to your Department or anallocation within your budget for the work that youdo for that purpose?Mr Alexander:The easy point is to say of course I amalways looking for more resources for theDepartment.Q136 Chairman:What I mean is £15 million is not abig increase on the development ﬁgure.Mr Alexander:With respect, this was a point I wasgoing to come back to you on in terms of seeing theStabilisation Fund as somehow not beingdevelopment, in the sense that it is not ODA-scorableSAF money, and in that sense I would not want theimpression to be left that it is only if it is comingstraight out of DFID budget lines that it is realdevelopment. I think the ﬁgures that the PrimeMinister announced, almost half a billion pounds,reﬂects the priority we do attach. It is not for me toprescribe where we will be in terms of either futureComprehensive Spending Reviews or further year-on-year budgets. I do assure you that this is a veryhigh priority for my Department, as it is for the wholeof the Government and in that sense we will continueto look very carefully at what are the developmentneeds of the country. The scale of spend of the BritishGovernment reﬂects in large measure the securitychallenge that is faced, along with the developmenteVort. I cannot at this stage predict what the securityenvironment will be in the future and, in turn, thecapacity for more money to be spent eVectively, but itwould be wrong to ignore the extent to which we arealready contributing very signiﬁcant additionalfunds as well as budgets speciﬁcally badged asdevelopment funds to the eVort to secure anenvironment in which the Millennium DevelopmentGoals can be reached, and that is part of the work thatis being taken forward by the MoD and the FCO.Q137 Hugh Bayley:I want to ask you not about thevolume of funds committed but the impact thatdevelopment spending has on the ground. MarshallElliott and his team, who work in a very diYcultenvironment, as you know, went to great lengths toget the group of us who went to Helmand out in theﬁeld, away from the military umbrella, if I can put itlike that, talking to farmers, getting in thecountryside, getting our shoes dirty. I would like verybrieﬂy to share two development stories which madea great impact on me. We visited the state-run andfunded hospital in Lashkar Gar. I was extremelyimpressed to ﬁnd that they were providing servicesnot just for people in the areas controlled by the

Government of Afghanistan but in insurgent-heldareas. Patients were coming in from the insurgent-held areas to be treated and some of the staV trainedat the hospital would go out and be allocated to workas peripatetic midwives in the insurgent areas. If theidea is to get development through to the people,doing it through the Government is extremelyimportant. By contrast, we saw a fabulous road, builtwith stone sets, which you have obviously seenyourself, which is great for four-wheel drive vehiclesbut you see local people who are walking or cycling orgoing with animals walking on the dirt beside theroad because the stone sets that the road is made outof twist the ankles of people and animals. That wasprovided by USAID without co-operation with thelocal government. The lesson I draw from that is thatdirecting money wherever possible through theGovernment of Afghanistan creates a better localimpact. We have had evidence from the PeaceDividend Trust that suggests that although theUnited States spends six times as much on aid inAfghanistan as we do, the impact in local terms is onlytwice that. In other words, the impact of their aid is athird dollar-for-dollar of the impact that our aid has.Given that the outcome in Afghanistan hangs soﬁnely in the balance, what representations are youmaking, Secretary of State, to your counterparts inthe United States to try to persuade them to put moreof their enormous aid spend through the Governmentof Afghanistan?Mr Alexander:You are right of course in recognisingthe scale of the development assistance being oVeredby the Americans. I think the ﬁgure is about US $1.4billion, but the majority of that does not go throughthe Government of Afghanistan in the way that, as Isaid, 80% of ours does. In terms of the speciﬁccontacts that we have had, obviously when I was thereat the end of August I held quite a long usefuldiscussion with the American Ambassador on theground in Kabul. I have also had the opportunitywhen I was in Washington to meet with HenriettaFore, who is the USAID head. I had a furtherdiscussion with her about Afghanistan in the marginsof the Donors’ Conference in Paris at the beginning ofDecember for the Middle East peace process, andAfghanistan was one of the key issues that wediscussed. That reﬂects some speciﬁc contact I havehad with my counterparts. One of the challenges asDevelopment Secretary is there is no obviouscounterpart in the United States Administration, inthe sense that some of the work is undertaken by theState Department, some of the work is undertaken byUSAID, and some by others. There is minister levelcontact on that issue from DFID. Of course Marshalland Sherard, our Ambassador in Kabul, have regulardialogue with the Americans on a range of diVerentissues, including the nature of the developmentchallenge. There is also clearly strong military co-operation, as you would expect, at the highest levelsof government. At every level of government there isengagement in these issues. It is ultimately of coursefor the Administration to explain and account for theactions that they are taking, but I would also observethat I am optimistic in terms of the discussionsaround a new United Nations Secretary-General’s

Special Representative that there is a genuinewillingness on the part of the Americans to look andsee how we can work together eVectively as aninternational community. It is sometimes suggestedthat the Americans are not really involved withgovernment funding of course, but that is not whollytrue. They are part of the ARTF and part of theirfunding does go through the ARTF, but this is anissue which we continue to work on at every level.Marshall, is there anything else you would add from acountry perspective?Mr Elliott:I would just like to add that it is easy toknock the US for not channelling money through thegovernment system but, as has already beenmentioned by the Chairman, there is a capacity issuewithin government. In that context what is moreimportant is that that support is aligned toGovernment priorities, doing what the Governmentis wanting us to do, rather than necessarilychannelling all of the international eVort at a pointwhere capacity is a constraint through governmentsystems. The US is putting some of their supportthrough government systems and, as thosestrengthen, the indications they have given to me incountry are that they will put more through thosesystems. They have also indicated that with thedevelopment of the ANDS,6which sets outgovernment strategy and its requirements much moreclearly than in the past, they will align their support tothe ANDS, so dialogue on the ground is positive inthis respect.Q138 Hugh Bayley:I am reassured by those answers.AligningdevelopmentactivitywiththeGovernment’s priorities, if not doing it through theGovernment, would be a big step forward. One of thereasons why the Peace Dividend Trust believes thatthe impact of American development assistance islower than it might be is because a great volume oftheir money is spent on US contractors. When we metGeneral McNeill we were told about I think it wascalled the Afghanistan Engineering Division, but Iforget the precise name of the unit, a US militarydivision with a budget of $1 billion over a period oftime to spend on infrastructure, roads, schools and soon, and they had taken a policy decision to spend allof that through Afghan building ﬁrms. I believe itwould be worth exploring with the State Departmentwhether they can follow a lead which the Departmentof Defense appears to be taking in contracting morefrom Afghan companies. After all, if you want todevelop the Afghan economy you do that byproviding business opportunity for Afghanentrepreneurs.Mr Alexander:I take the point and I would be happyto ensure that those points are brought to theattention of the State Department. A couple of pointson that. One is we have just received a jointly fundedstudy from the World Bank looking at the issue of thealternative economics of non-poppy production,which perhaps we will touch on later in the session,and one of the recommendations in the course of thatreport is the capacity for international forces and6

Q139 Sir Robert Smith:On the co-ordination of aid, Iappreciate that decisions are taken in extremelydiYcult environments, but one of the things we didsee in Lashkar Gar at the hospital was the veryimpressive new accommodation block built withBritish aid money for midwives in training. However,in terms of the co-ordination, that was built on theassumption the Americans were going to fund thetraining of the midwives. By the time the block wasbuilt with the British money, it was empty because theAmericans had not got the money to pay for thetraining of the midwives. There was hope expressedwhile we were there that because the block was nowthere the Americans might ﬁnd the money. Iwondered a) if you could give us an update onwhether that block is now in use and b) what can bedone to improve things, because obviously if bothsides are involved it is important to make sure that thefollow-through is there?Mr Alexander:Marshall, are you aware of anythingon the ground?Mr Elliott:I am afraid I am not but we can get thatinformation to you.7Mr Alexander:Frankly, the example you cite makesthe case, whether it be at Helmand level in terms of theneed for eVective co-ordination, or in terms of thedonor community. We would like to be in aposition—and this reﬂects at a higher level the workthat we did initially both in terms of working with theGovernment of Afghanistan to establish theNational Development Strategy but also co-ordinating donors’ responses to the NationalDevelopment Strategy, to see that as a way that weshould be working at every level, which isAfghanistan Government-led, them being clear as todevelopment priorities, but then a co-ordinateddonor response, which would avoid exactly the kindof example that you describe.7

Q140 Mr Singh:Secretary of State, you referredearlier to the Stabilisation-Aid Fund and it is myunderstanding that the stabilisation money has takenover from the Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction moneyand that the Stabilisation-Aid Fund is a replacementfor the Global Conﬂict Prevention Pool. What isdiVerent with the new set-up from the old set-up andwhat is the reasoning behind this new set-up?Mr Alexander:I think there is a growing recognitionwithin government, and that has been the case over aperiod of time, as to how distinctive the challenge ofpost-conﬂict reconstruction stabilisation actually is.I think the PCRU was a signiﬁcant and importantstart to the Government’s joint working on that issue,but the Prime Minister has already made speechesabout what he terms the “stabilisation gap”. This isnot a challenge distinctive to the United Kingdom. Icited the State Department a couple of minutes agoand, similarly, there is already a public debate in theUnited States as to whether in terms of theirinstitutions of governance having one departmentthat basically leads on defence, the Department ofDefense, and one department that leads ondiplomacy, is suYcient when actually there is a keyelement between diplomacy and defence which isactually that reconstruction work. It is an evolutionand a step change from where we were previously. Wewill now be in a position where there are dedicatedstaV who will work to the Stabilisation Unit. I will askMarshall to say a word or two in a moment aboutwhat that opens up in terms of, for example, the dutyof care that we owe to the staV and the way that thestaV can work, because obviously we haveobligations as the Department for InternationalDevelopment which are long-standing, as do theForeign OYce for their own staV. Given that we areestablishing this new unit, there is an opportunity forus to look at how we can get staV into environmentswhere they can do the work that has been described.There has been mention of getting out of the Britishmilitary facility in Lashkar Gar to see in those otherrequirements. In order to do stabilisation work, weneed people qualiﬁed and protected to be able to dowork outside of secure environments. In that sense, Ithink it reﬂects a number of things: ﬁrstly, a dedicatedbudget, which has been increased, some of which isODA-scorable but not all, reﬂecting the threedepartments involved, the FCO, MoD and DFID;secondly, new opportunities to reappraise the skillsmix and capabilities we need of the staV to do this vitalbut distinctive job; and thirdly, it reﬂects the higherpriority that is attached to this work, not least giventhe progress that has been made by British militaryforces in the south and what that has taught uscollectively as to the work that needs to be done. Theother example that I would cite, before I ask Marshallto say another word or two, would be we are alreadybeginning to see, I think, that closer workingrelationship taking hold in terms of the work that isbeing done in Musa Qala following the success ofBritish military forces, working with the Afghans, interms of the conﬂict with the insurgents there, wherealready work is happening on the ground, whether itbe in terms of rebuilding mosques, rebuilding highschools, rebuilding the town centre in that

community. There is a stabilisation eVort which hasmoved in very rapidly after the kinetic phase of thatparticular campaign.Mr Elliott:The Stabilisation-Aid Fund doesrepresent a very signiﬁcant scaling-up of eVort interms of stabilisation and reconstruction activity inthese volatile and hostile environments. Although theactual division of the total amount of money has notyet been decided, and will be done shortly, bids areunder process, so planning is underway, and theexpectation is a major expansion of both activity andstaYng in Helmand. I think those who visited wouldhave commented that the size of the civilian presencein relation to the military presence meant that therewas a challenge on the civilian side to keep up withand have a comparable eVort with regard to what weare trying to achieve in Helmand. Thus there will be ascaling-up and the proposal is that the majority ofstaYng, as part of the increase of staYng in the south,would be managed by the Stabilisation Unit. One ofthe beneﬁts of doing that for DFID and the FCO isthat the Stabilisation Unit could take on new termsand conditions and duty of care arrangements whichwould enable staV to get out alongside the military ina way that they are not currently able to do on thecurrent duty of care arrangements. Again, I think youwould have noted when you visited that currentarrangements limit the movement of DFID andFCO staV.Q141 Mr Singh:I might be the only person on thisCommittee who feels this but quite often I ambewildered by the terminology that comes out fromthe development industry.Mr Alexander:Do not worry, I am the Secretary ofState and I feel the same way!Q142 Mr Singh:We went to see a school just outsideKabul which I think was a new school and that wascalled “development”, but if you rebuild a school orreconstruct a school that is called “stabilisation”. Iam not quite sure where the diVerence lies betweendevelopment and stabilisation. The Prime Minister,for example, said the funds would be “used to driveforward reconstruction projects and provide expertcivilian support to rebuild basic services.” Thatsounds like development to me.Mr Alexander:I think there is a key distinction whichcan be drawn which is not so much is a brick laidoutside Kabul diVerent from a brick laid outsideLashkar Gar, or anywhere else in Helmand, it is thecontext which is diVerent, in the sense that in theseenvironments which are often hostile, and certainlyvolatile, in circumstances immediately post thekinetic phase of a campaign, then the skills of the staVthat you need to be able to work in that environmentare often diVerent. The urgency and the need forimmediate change can be diVerent. In that sense, ineVective stabilisation work there is a clear alignmentbetween the military eVort that has been expendedand the capacity to secure and sustain consentfollowing that. In that sense, I do think the more wehave worked in Afghanistan the clearer it is. In certainparts of the country—perhaps the school that youvisited—there is conventional development work

which would be recognisable in many other countriesof relative stability albeit desperate poverty. Theskills mix that you need to work in Helmand inimmediate post-conﬂict circumstances are diVerentfrom running a conventional development project ina country such as Tanzania. In that sense, there is agrowing awareness within government that we needto recognise the distinctiveness not of the projects butof the skills that are required, the context in which thework happens and sometimes the timescale in whichthat work needs to be undertaken.Q143 Mr Singh:So would you say that this is a DFIDrapid response unit?Mr Alexander:I do not think it would be for DFIDalone to claim the credit for this thinking. As I say,both internationally and within the BritishGovernment in every department directly involvedthere is a recognition that this is an area in which thereneeds to be competence and strength developed.Conventional humanitarian support is familiar, wehave done it for many years, and conventionaldevelopment work, whilst challenging, is alsofamiliar to us. However, given the growingcoincidence of conﬂict and poverty, this has tobecome part of DFID’s core business in the years tocome because we will be called on to continue to workin challenging environments.Q144 Mr Singh:The Stabilisation-Aid Fund can bedrawn upon by other countries, such as Iraq forexample. Would money for Afghanistan be ring-fenced then or will it be up for grabs for each countryto draw on?Mr Alexander:Allocations have not yet been madeby Ministers but I think there is a clear expectationthat, given the signiﬁcance of Afghanistan in terms ofour development eVorts and also the fact that thestabilisation needs are very clear, not least in our ownPRT area, that there will be a signiﬁcant call on thoseresources from Afghanistan. However, theallocations have not yet been made.Q145 Richard Burden:On that same issue really, theway that both of you have described the Stabilisation-Aid Fund its signiﬁcance really should not be under-stated, but there do appear to be an awful lot ofpotential calls on it, both in terms of some of thephysical projects that it could be being used for plusthe very major commitment, important though it is,as far as building up staYng and support for staYngin places like Helmand. I know exactly the kind ofthing that Marsha was talking about there. I do havesomething of a nervousness about the quantity there.I understand that the allocations have not been madebut if we are talking about a £260 million fundglobally and you have got Iraq coming out of it aswell, can we be conﬁdent that there will be suYcient tomeet the various diVerent objectives that we havebeen talking about?Mr Alexander:I would start by drawing quite a clearconceptual diVerence between Iraq and Afghanistan.Iraq is a potentially much richer country thanAfghanistan in the immediate term. If you look at theoil reserves that are being accumulated by the

Government of Iraq, the principal stabilisation/development challenge in Iraq is the capacity to spendthe money, there is not an absence of resource, and inthat sense I think it is in a diVerent category fromAfghanistan, albeit that there may be speciﬁc calls onspeciﬁc resources. I visited Basra and Iraq late lastyear and on the basis of the conversations I had withthe Prime Minister and others, my sense is that thereis a recognition there that the challenge is to haveresources to spend equally. It is fair to acknowledge—given we have discussed the Americans in the contextof Afghanistan—that in the context of Iraq throughthe commanders’ resources there are very signiﬁcantAmerican resources available for expenditure withinIraq. The real challenge is to make sure that thatmoney is contracted and that the money is usedwisely. In that sense, I would not regard the matrix ofthe commitment to stabilisation in Iraq as being thesize of the Stabilisation-Aid Fund because it is inquite a diVerent place from Afghanistan in terms ofresources.Q146 Sir Robert Smith:In these militaryengagements there is also a military compensationfund for damage done during the militaryengagement phase. How is that integrated? If a schoolis damaged by military action do you just get on withit and then sort out whether it comes out of militarycompensation or Quick Impact?Mr Elliott:My understanding is that thecompensation fund remains completely separatefrom the Stabilisation-Aid Fund, so it serves adiVerent purpose.Q147 Sir Robert Smith:But does that have to besorted out ﬁrst before you get on with it?Mr Alexander:With respect, if it is helpful, I can getone of my colleagues in the MoD to write to you on it.In the sense of where we are with the Stabilisation-AidFund, we have not made the commitment ofresources across country or within projects. Thegovernance arrangements are well advanced acrossgovernment. Ultimately the alignment of ourrespective departmental expenditure lines with theStabilisation-Aid Fund rests with the hostdepartment and, in that sense, whilst you raise aperfectly legitimate point, it will more likely be amatter that will be being addressed by oYcials andministers within the MoD in the ﬁrst instance toensure that there is alignment between what the MoDdoes, in the same way that our responsibility is toensure that the development piece sits comfortablyand without gaps alongside the stabilisation workfrom a diVerent point of view.Q148 James Duddridge:I think we all had greatadmiration for the DFID staV and particularly theconditions under which they operated down inHelmand, but on a professional level, one of themassive challenges was their inability on a regularbasis to get out and about. As someone who hasworked in developing countries before, you tend toonly ﬁnd out about what is happening when you goand try and buy some fruit and veg or you go into ashop and see what problems they have and what is in

the shop, or by wandering between places,understanding security arrangements. The staVdown in Helmand cannot do that, it is absolutelyimpossible, so it is inevitable that there is going to bea disconnect between what the community want andwhat we are giving them, particularly over QuickImpact Projects where decisions are having to bemade incredibly rapidly. Whilst we were in Helmandthere were question-marks over some decisions thathad been taken. Invariably some of the decisions aregoing to be wrong because they are quick and basedon limited information in diYcult circumstances.How are you improving the Helmand ExecutiveGroup’s decision-making processes and ability tospend money as eVectively as possible in the way thecommunity want, given the constraints that you havetalked about and I have noted?Mr Alexander:It is right, of course, as you say, toacknowledge the security constraints under whichDFID staV have to operate. It is also right toacknowledge that there can be projects, the worth ofwhich are disputed. I was challenged by the BBCcorrespondent when I was there in terms of moneythat had been committed to improving a local park inLashkar Gah. That being said, that is one of theconsequences of country-led development and localdecision-making. If the decision was reached by thosewithin Helmand in authority, in discussion with thelocal population, that this was what they wanted andsome work that needs to be done to facilitate marketsfor fruit and vegetables to take place, then it maybemakes it a bit tougher for the Development Secretarywhen he is in front of the BBC, but ultimately the logicof that is true. I would not see the biggest challenge asbeing simply the Quick Impact Projects ensuring thatthere is strengthening within Helmand of provincialdecision-making and that is why we are supportingthe idea in terms of saying, “What can we do tostrengthen local governance and accountability”because consistent with a country-led approach I donot want to be in a position where in the future theoptimal circumstance is that DFID staV are able toget out and about and meet people at the market,although of course we want to see that, but to be in aposition where DFID staV can be talking to locallyempowered citizens who are deciding for themselveswhat are their priorities. Do you want to say a littlemore in terms of the strengthening of the provincialadministration?Mr Elliott:I would just say that perhaps in the pastdecisions about where to spend Quick Impact moneymay not have involved fully those who representgovernment in that particular location but that isdeﬁnitely not happening now. Wherever decisionsare taken about QIPs they are led by either the localshura or the governor if it is within Lashkar Gahitself. It is government, and there the governoradvised by the provincial council, making thedecision. It is the appropriate representative body forthat particular body which is making the choices andwe are following through on those with regard toQIPs. Working from that immediate reconstructionand what is the current arrangement of QIPs, whichwill become the new SAF,8beyond that, moving into8

obviously trying to get the national government tooutreach as quickly as possible and deliver some of itsnational programmes into these locations, againestablishing some systems like CDCs9through theNSP10but making the decisions themselves aboutwhere the development eVort should go.Q149 James Duddridge:You did mention the ladies’park, which we did see, and in retrospect I personallywould say that probably was not good spend but atthe time I am not convinced that the wrong decisionwas made. Governor Wafa made it very clear that wasthe project that he wanted, however Governor Wafawas appointed by the President and does not comefrom the Helmand area and does not have thecredibility of a directly elected individual. I cannotremember his exact words but I got the impressionthat Governor Wafa felt that the provincial councilwere there to do his bidding rather than listening tothe provincial council. Perhaps the Department willconsider casting the net wider and maybe beyond theprovincial council, certainly beyond the governor.Mr Alexander:Your observation reﬂects the historicand still contemporary weakness of sub-nationalgovernance and that was why I mentioned theIndependent Directorate of Local Government. Weare working continuously to try and strengthen thecapacity of sub-national governance, for example theprovincial councils that you describe. Havingprovincial councils does mark a step forward, but Iwould not underestimate the work and challenge onthe fact that frankly their power, accountability andstrength is lumpy depending on where they areoperating in diVerent parts of the country and wehave got a long way to go.Q150 James Duddridge:We met Mr Popal, who talksa good game, but I am not sure how much credibilityhe had. Certainly when we met with Governor Wafahe was quite dismissive of restructuring sub-nationalgovernance. Are you optimistic?Mr Alexander:As I say, there is a long way to go butwe recognise that it is one of the key elements for thekind of future that the Government of Afghanistanhas identiﬁed. If you look at the work that isunderwayontheAfghanistanNationalDevelopment Strategy there is no doubt that thecapacity not just to deliver national programmes butactually to align the service provision of theGovernment of Afghanistan in the future with localneeds is in part going to be contingent onstrengthening provincial councils and sub-nationalgovernance. As I say, I would not deny that there arereal challenges there but it is important, and I amheartened by the recognition there has been up untilnow of the importance. There is also a reviewunderway in terms of sub-national governance andlooking at these issues over the longer term, so we willsee where we get to.Chairman:As you know, the Committee was inAfghanistan and we all visited Kabul and aroundKabul, but the Committee divided with fourmembers going to Helmand and three members going910

to Mazar-e-Sharif, which gave a somewhat diVerentperspective, and that raises a question from AnnMcKechin.Q151 Ann McKechin:Just before that, I have onequestion I would like to raise about the importance ofgetting out on the ground and ﬁnding the views andopinions of local people. I was deeply concerned thatDFID has no access to female translators in theirstaYng. In one case when we visited a project outsideKabul to speak to the local CDC we were completelyunable to communicate with the women involved inthat CDC because we did not have a translator. Thisseems to me an exceptionally serious gap in ourcurrent resources and I wonder what attention theSecretary of State could give to it.Mr Alexander:The Prime Minister himselfrecognised the need for there to be more translatorsand tribal experts in the statement that he made to theHouse of Commons towards the end of the year, andthat is work which is underway in alignment with thework that is also being done by the FCO. Morebroadly, gender is an issue on which we have a verystrong focus within the Department for InternationalDevelopment in Afghanistan but, frankly, it remainsa contested issue and there is a great deal of work to bedone. I had the opportunity, and requested theopportunity, to meet with a group of femaleparliamentarians when I was in Afghanistan andheard directly the very harrowing stories that theytold me, for example their diYculty in returning totheir home districts from the capital, Kabul. I left myown visit from Afghanistan with a very clear sense asto the importance of us continuing to stay engaged onthis issue of gender. On the speciﬁc issue ofinterpreters, there is work underway and I note whatyou say in terms of female interpreters. On the otherhand, it is a long but vital road that we are walking interms of the gender issue more generally indevelopment.Q152 Ann McKechin:Thank you. Perhaps I couldsuggest it is given better priority. Coming on to theposition regarding the PRTs, the position in the northis certainly not the same as in areas such as Helmandor Kandahar and when we visited Mazar-e-Sharif, asthe Chairman mentioned, most of the primarysecurity function has been largely fulﬁlled by the PRTthere. There seems to be a great lack of clarity aboutwhat the role of the PRT should be in the north ofAfghanistan once their security objective has beenfulﬁlled and how the civilian aspects ofreconstruction work can then be transferred to thelocal state authorities. I just wonder to what extentthere has been any degree of discussion with theAfghan Government and with the internationaldonor community as a whole about what the plansshould be to cover this transition phase.Mr Alexander:In terms of our own PRT, of course, inHelmand it is civilian-led. The establishment of PRTswas originally an American innovation and there arenow 25 across the country led by 13 nations. Theyreﬂect the diVerent characters and challenges of thediVerent areas in which they work. I do not see PRTsexisting forever, they are there to reﬂect the particular

circumstances that were encountered. What we areessentially trying to do, and our partner nations aredoing the same, is to create the conditions in whichgovernment-led development can happen. The rate atwhich that capacity develops will vary from region toregion in Afghanistan, not least because there arevery diVerent security situations. At this stage I wouldnot want to prescribe how long the PRTs willcontinue in their present form, that might be an issueto which the new UN Secretary-General’s SpecialRepresentative in the co-ordinating role weanticipate they will undertake might turn their mind.Q153 Sir Robert Smith:In Helmand there was oneother decision that was highlighted to us as maybe aconcern that is being addressed by increasing staYngand the new arrangements. There was a school builtin Sangin where the concern from the developmentside was it probably was not the right priority. Therewere two concerns and the education ministerlectured us at quite great length on the need to putmoney into paying for teachers rather than buildingmore schools. We wondered if you knew how thatschool had turned out? Is the school now active andare there teachers in place or have the worst fearscome to fruition?Mr Elliott:I am afraid you have asked anotherdiYcult question about a particular programme thatI do not have the answer to.Mr Alexander:We will ﬁnd out and I will ensure areply is forthcoming to you.11Can I make a generalpoint from your speciﬁc example, which is I think wehave to work harder to ensure that the recurrent coststo which we are contributing as an internationalcommunity and as the UK Government through theARTF is understood on the ground in the sense thatthe risk of Quick Impact Projects is you lose theimpact of the other development spend that you areundertaking. We have certainly found circumstanceselsewhere where we have had to explain to governorsthat in addition to speciﬁc identiﬁable projects, likethe building of a school, the teachers or doctors oreducation salaries are actually being paid in largemeasure because of international contributions. Thatis as true in Helmand as anywhere else and it is one ofour challenges, because I encountered similar issueswhen I was there, to ensure that people understandthat in addition to the work that is being takenforward on Quick Impact Projects there are also theserecurrent costs being met whether in that school orelsewhere.Q154 Sir Robert Smith:We did visit a very popularproject which was the new wells that DFID hadfunded and the water was extremely good, nothinghappened to me from drinking from the well.Mr Alexander:I can vouch for the same thing. I amnot sure whether the presence of about eight-plusprotection oYcers from the Met inhibited the localpopulation from coming out and thanking mepersonally.11

Q155 Sir Robert Smith:The local population werequite enthusiastic but the next phase feeding back wasthey were hoping something could be done about theirrigation system because historically there was quitea good irrigation system.Mr Alexander:Actually, this World Bank report thatwe jointly commissioned and undertook with theWorld Bank that has just come on to my deskidentiﬁes irrigation as being one of the key challengesin terms of building sustainable agriculturalalternatives to poppy. You are right, historicallythere has been eVective irrigation in parts of thecountry and it was speciﬁcally identiﬁed by the WorldBank study as being an issue that we should look at.Chairman:People are creating their own demand. Wewere told in a school we visited that they were veryglad there was a school but they wished there weremore science teachers and immediately they werelooking for a wider curriculum and that createspressure as well to deliver a better quality rather thanjust numbers.Q156 Hugh Bayley:I would like to return to theprivate sector. In his statement to the House inDecember the Prime Minister announced thecreation of a new growth fund which was a jointinitiative between the British Government, theGovernment of Afghanistan and the Aga KhanDevelopment Network with an initial £30 millioncapital and he announced an additional £10 millionfor small loans to help women to start up or expandbusinesses. My question is when will this money comeon-stream? Will it be part of the 2006–09 DFID spendor will its introduction be delayed until 2009?Mr Alexander:It is due to start mid-2008.Q157 Hugh Bayley:What is the intended relationshipbetween the fund and the investment window of theARTF?Mr Alexander:The ARTF, as you know, is one of therecurrent costs basically dealing with salaries forteachers, doctors and others, the investment windowbeing for speciﬁc projects. More of the money that weare looking at in terms of the Afghanistan GrowthFund will operate outside the ARTF but will linkclosely to it, the Microﬁnance Project, and alsogovernment spending itself. We need to build thecapacity of the Government of Afghanistan to createan environment in which the private sector can work,and in that sense we are looking at technical advice tothe ministries of commerce and ﬁnance and trainingof civil servants speciﬁcally out of the Growth Fundand also working to see how we can secure furtherdirect investment.Q158 Hugh Bayley:The culture within the civilservice I would say still draws a lot from the Sovietcommand economy days.Mr Alexander:Is this in DFID or Afghanistan? I willpay a heavy price for that comment!Q159 Hugh Bayley:I forget when the Sovietoccupation of London ended, it was much before mytime and yours, Secretary of State! How are you goingto do this? Can you give us some examples of ways in

which you could actually get the government lookingat the private sector as a delivery agent and in whatﬁelds might this be possible?Mr Alexander:Firstly, it might be helpful if I say whywe alighted on the Growth Fund as being necessary.Obviously economic growth is one of the threepriority areas identiﬁed for our work withinAfghanistan as well as capacity and livelihoods. Thatreﬂects the fact that although we have seen verysigniﬁcant economic growth since 2001, presentprojections are that the growth rate will fall fromsomewhere around 14% this year down to 6 or 7% inthe medium term. It has been 10% for the last threeyears. Clearly, if we want to see both the capability forjobs to be generated and, indeed, revenue to begenerated for basic services we need to do what we canto sustain economic growth coming through. You areright in recognising quite how diYcult anenvironment it is for the private sector to work, notjust the security channels that we have discussed butalso the regulatory environment that is presentlyoperating and also, candidly, the private sector isunder-developed. Although we are in a positionwhere your average rural Afghanistan citizen isholding down a number of diVerent positions in thecourse of a year, and therefore has an entrepreneurialcapability, this is not a developed economy and hasnot been as a consequence of more than 30 years ofconﬂict. One of the key challenges, therefore, is tohelp the government to understand what agovernment should do to create an environment inwhich the private sector can operate. It is notparticularly glamorous to be paying for technicaladvice for the Ministry of Commerce but if we want toensure there are people with suYcient capability tomake the right judgments, and informed judgements,about best practice as to what should a regulatoryenvironment look like, and what should a ﬁscalenvironment look like, then we have to start with thebasics and in that sense part of this is building up thecapacity of the government itself. Secondly, and thisbears on Ann’s earlier point in terms of women inAfghanistan, there is a huge amount of researchindicating that spending money on women not justwithin the economy will yield stronger results over thelonger term and in that sense we are conﬁdent thatmicro-ﬁnancing has a key role to play in terms ofstimulating basic economic growth, so creating anenvironment in which the private sector can takehold, trying to ﬁll that investment gap at a local level,and looking at what we can do to facilitate inwardinvestment from international private sectors andinternational sources of capital. The diYculty, notleast given the kind of headlines we have discussedabout the insurgency, is that potentially mobileinternational capital which could otherwise ﬁnd itsway into Afghanistan simply will not for the timebeing. We have got to help the Government ofAfghanistan get a regulatory and ﬁscal environmentin which they are able to attract that kind of capital inthe future.Q160 Hugh Bayley:Secretary of State, do you agreewith me that the private sector, and especially theAfghan grown private sector rather than inward

investment, is necessary not just to drive endogenousgrowth, which aid will never do, but also to providegoods and services which will be likely to be less of atarget to the insurgents than services provided by theGovernment of Afghanistan, because there is conﬂictover the legitimacy of the government from theinsurgents’ point of view, in the same way that theGovernment of Afghanistan could get health servicesout to contested areas of Helmand which a USAIDprogramme or a British aid programme could not?Do you not think that there are some areas whereservices provided by private entrepreneurs would beless of a target for attack by insurgents than servicesprovided by government agencies?Mr Alexander:I was just trying to reconcile myBritish commitment to public service ethos in theNational Health Service with advocating theprivatisation of services in Afghanistan. The pointthat you make in terms of the centrality ofendogenous growth—one should be careful of usingthat phrase—jobs created in Afghanistan by theAfghan population themselves, is absolutely right. Itis right because it is vital both for generating wealthand prosperity and the provision of those services inand of themselves, but it is also right, as you suggest,in giving people a stronger stake in the future. I wasreading a book over Christmas which talked aboutwhat were the attributes of stability in countries andone of them was a burgeoning middle class and it saidmiddle class is not actually determined by level ofincome but by whether a signiﬁcant proportion ofyour population lives in rational hope. I think that isquite a good description of what we are trying to do indevelopment in a number of diVerent countries,which is to grow the proportion of the populationwho rationally see that they have a future in thecountry and, therefore, are less likely to be persuadedthat future insurgency or violence holds any realfuture for them. That has a very practical eVect in theimmediate term in terms of the stabilisation work thatwe are doing because when you were talking aboutthe need to create those jobs within Afghanistan whatcame to my mind was the fact that in Musa Qala oneof the immediate stabilisation priorities is to providework within that community, and I think the ﬁgure is10,000 jobs that are being looked at immediately.Whether it is immediate in terms of the challenge ofstabilisation, whether it is giving a broader share ofthe population a sense of stake in the future, orwhether it is simply the wealth that will create, for allof those reasons the creation of those jobs inAfghanistan is absolutely key.Q161 Richard Burden:The issue of sub-nationalgovernance has been a recurring theme today and, aswe have already told you, we met Jelani Popal, thehead of the newly formed Directorate of LocalGovernment. I would just like to explore that issue alittle further. First of all, when the Prime Ministermade his statement to Parliament recently heannounced UK support from existing funds for twonew programmes in support of stronger provincialand local government. One of those was building upthat Directorate and the other was support for theNational Solidarity Programme, the Community

Development Councils and so on. Could you ﬁrst ofall perhaps clarify for us if you have the informationavailable today and, if not, perhaps let us have it inwriting, the amount of funding that has beenallocated to the two programmes and also how it issplit between the two.Mr Alexander:I have the IDLG ﬁgure for you. Weare providing in 2007–08 £1.5 million to the IDLG,initially via the ESA Foundation which is workingclosely with donors to see how collectively the IDLGcan be best supported. This initiative, as I recollect, isone from the President’s oYce and is looking at theissues we have already been discussing, which is,notwithstanding the progress that has been made inestablishing 18,000 CDCs funded through theNational Solidarity Programme, what is the futurefor sub-national governance. I certainly leftAfghanistan at the end of August with a very clearsense that this was one of the key areas ofvulnerability for the government in the medium term,never mind the long-term, in the sense that thecapacity of Kabul to be identiﬁed with serviceprovision at a local level was contingent uponeVective sub-national governance, of which there wasvery little history. In that sense the alignment of theshuras, the traditional mechanisms of accountabilityat community or district level, with the model thatwas devised of establishing CDCs funded through theNational Solidarity Programme, has made a lot ofprogress, but it is right given the weight of expectationthere is on the ability of sub-national governance tobe the principal service deliverer of those servicesdelivered from national government but at local levelthat the IDLG is looking at. Do we have ﬁgures interms of the National Solidarity Programme? Thatwould be part of the 80% of the money we arespending but I am not clear how much of our fundingof the National Solidarity Programme ﬁnds its waydirectly to the 18,000 CDCs part of its spending.Mr Elliott:Just before ﬁnishing on IDLG, althoughwe are giving £1.5 million support to their centralnational programme of developing ﬁrst of all anational plan, whilst you were there you will haverecognised that the IDLG has just been establishedwith the mandate of formulating a plan for sub-national governance and its roll-out. In the ﬁrst yearit is a kind of planning phase for which we have given£1.5 million support. We have also given £2.4 millionnew support as local government support inHelmand which is the provincial councilstrengthening programme. There are two elements tothe beginning of our new phase of support togovernance. We would expect to do more once wehave got the plan from ILDG later this year.Mr Alexander:The National Solidarity Programmewe fund through the Afghan Government. Weshould probably give the Committee under thenational programmes as to how much we are fundingthrough the National Solidarity Programme which isthe internal funding source for the 18,000Community Development Councils.Mr Elliott:This is future support that we are planningto put through.Q162 Richard Burden:You could let us have thoseﬁgures in writing.1212

Mr Elliott:We have not decided new allocationsunder the new CSR13period because the ANDS isbeing produced currently and as part of the ANDSthere is obviously a budget for supporting the AfghanGovernment’s development priorities and that is yetto be ﬁnalised. The ANDS is due in March of this yearand they will need to submit to their own cabinet andparliament the budget for that and then we, togetherwith other donors, will need to determine how muchof our future allocation ought to go to speciﬁcelements of support of the ANDS, including puttingfurther allocation through the trust fundinstruments, of which the prime one is the ARTFwhich in turn then gives money to the NSP. Thebudgeting for that is not something for the futurewhich has been completed yet.Mr Alexander:As you can probably tell by theanswer—Q163 Richard Burden:I think I am following but inthe next ﬁve minutes I will have lost that.Mr Alexander:The expectation is the NationalSolidarity Programme, which we contribute tothrough the ARTF, will probably end in about 2009/2010, although that is unresolved, but the expectationis that the National Solidarity Programme will end.The issue of these 18,000 CDCs is itself contested. Inpart, the IDLG established in the President’s oYce isto help clarify what will be either the successor or theevolution of both the National SolidarityProgramme, which itself has been the funding streamto the CDCs, and where does the President see thatsub-national governance going. So, as Marshall’scomments reﬂected, it is a contested issue within theAfghan Government at the moment which is why wecan not be speciﬁc on how we are funding themechanism that will resolve it, but not yet, quite whatwe will be doing in terms of the CDCs in the future. Allthat being said, the evidence already from the CDCs,while it varies from area to area, is that this is one ofthe key areas that there needs to be progress on fromthe Government in Kabul because it is the principalservice deliverer of those national programmes at alocal level.Q164 Richard Burden:Could I ﬁnally ask you to say alittle bit more about that. Whilst ultimately thedevelopment of the plan for sub-national governancewill be a decision of the Afghans, and that isabsolutely right, there are contradictions there, arethere not? As you say, the whole role of CDCs iscontested, about how they ﬁt in the overallframework. At one level we want to build up Kabul’swrit in the provinces to strengthen centralgovernment and its role, but at the same time that hasgot to be responsive to forms of governance that ariselocally, whether it be through the shura system orthrough the provincial councils or whatever.Presumably all around that there are particular issueswhere those tensions could easily come out of oneparticular element of that equation being criticisedfor, say, talking to the Taliban and upsetting anotherbit of it in doing that. What is your sense of the goals13

in all of that? Accepting that it is ultimately theirdecision, do you have any sense of the kind offramework you would like to see developing out ofthis?Mr Alexander:I think your last point is where I willstart and this needs ultimately to be a decision inKabul by the Afghan Government. In terms of theconstitution that was established in 2004, the onlyinstitution of sub-national governance that wasidentiﬁed was the provincial councils. That beingsaid, we have already had one example cited ofdisagreement between the governor and theprovincial council in terms of relative priorities ofspending. We have been encouraged by some of theexamples we have seen, whether it be at provincial,district or village level, of what can exist at a lowerlevel, and in that sense part of the conversation that Iencountered when in Kabul, and is still taking place,is how best to align the traditional structures ofauthority at a local level, the shura principally, withthe CDCs which were invented and funded as a partof the National Solidarity Programme. In that sense Ithink the real issue of resolution in the months tocome will be how best to align the legitimacy andauthority in the minds of the local community withthe shura, mindful all the time of the need for genuineaccountability and inclusivity there with having thereach of Kabul continue to be extended into theprovinces in terms of basic service delivery. As I say,these are discussions that are ongoing, it is not amatter that is resolved within the AfghanGovernment itself. We hope in part through thefunding that we are providing to the IDLG that therewill be an informed and useful conversation on it andwe certainly stand ready to participate, at theinvitation of the Afghans, in those ongoingconversations.Chairman:One of the things that I think it was AdibFarhadi, the Director of ANDS, said to us, was thatthe problem with Afghanistan was that everythingwas a problem, everything was a priority andeverything was broken. We have a problem ourselveswith time constraints. There are still a lot of areaswhich we hope to look at and I am going to askcolleagues if they can be brief.Q165 Mr Singh:Secretary of State, one of the mostimportant institutions in a democracy is a properfunctioning and accountable police force. Whereaswe heard in Afghanistan very positive things aboutthe Afghan National Army, we heard exactly thereverse about the Afghan National Police Force. Infact, we heard that they were part of the problemrather than part of the solution, and the Presidentsaid as much to us. One of the issues is about trainingand trainers, and the EU police mission is being fairlyslow in getting to grips with this or in beginning toimplement training programmes. What accounts forthat and should we be pushing more to get trainers inplace and get that EU mission moving more quickly?Secondly, there are divergent views about the natureof the Afghan National Police Force. The Germansare the lead donors on this and believe it should be acivilian law enforcement institution, whereas the

Americans think it should have a counter-insurgencyrole and be part of the security forces. Where does theBritish Government stand on that?Mr Alexander:You are right to recognise that therehas been a lack of co-ordination and not fullalignment between the Germans, who were the G8lead and then the key partner of the AfghanGovernment on the police role, and the Americans,so the Americans have put in very signiﬁcant amountsof resource and have a division in terms of having aparamilitary force and signiﬁcant numbers beingtrained to take that role. I will ask Philippa to say aword or two in a moment about the way forward onthat. In terms of your speciﬁc question on EUPOLand why the slow start, ﬁrst I would say that therewere issues in terms of lack of procurement whichslowed them down in terms of security equipment,and also, candidly, a lack of eVective leadership. Thatis why we are determined, while respectful of others’roles, to have a key role in EUPOL looking forward.I think the Deputy Head is a UK appointee and wehope that, given that a new mission head wasappointed in October, just two or three months ago,we will see a signiﬁcant degree of progress in terms ofEUPOL. The target is to have 200 EUPOLinternational personnel in place by next March.Q166 Mr Singh:This March?Mr Alexander:Yes, March 2008.Ms Rogers:In terms of where we go next or in termsof what the UK Government is doing, clearly, as hasalready been announced by the Secretary of State, theproblem is that there is no coherent vision from theinternational community and from the Governmentof Afghanistan as to what a police force should looklike. We in the UK have focused our eVorts very muchon trying to drive towards some Afghan-ownedstrategy for that police force which recognises thatone size does not ﬁt all and that you need to havepolice that are ready and able to work in permissiveand less permissive environments, but I think youhave to retain a degree of realism. We are not the keypartner nation in this and in terms of our priorities, interms of our resources, this is perhaps, whilst a reallyimportant priority, slightly lower than all the othervery important priorities that are there.Mr Alexander:Ultimately, in terms of our vision, wewould like to see the police being law enforcementoYcers rather than soldiers with policing skills. Toanswer your speciﬁc question, in terms of the wayforward I think we are pretty broadly aligned withour colleagues in EUPOL on that but this is a matterof trying to align where we are with the Americanswho historically have had a somewhat diVerent visionin terms of the way forward.Q167 Ann McKechin:The Ministry of Interior hasbeen described by one report as “corrupt,factionalised and criminalised”, and it was verydiYcult to get any good opinion of that particularministry when we visited Afghanistan. How coulddonor governments collectively encourage thePresident to fundamentally reform the ministry and is

it possible that conditions on donor assistance are anoption, given the current remit of most of the fundsthrough the trust fund mechanism?Mr Alexander:We are not the lead partner nation interms of the MOI and we do not have a bilateralproject working on MOI, although, as I have justsaid, we are involved in EUPOL who are engaged onthe issue of MOI. It was an issue that I raised directlywith President Karzai on one of the occasions that Imet him, and in that sense you are right to recognisethat there have been concerns expressed in terms ofthe Ministry of Interior. Given the substantialAmerican resources that go into that particularministry, I think it is important that there areapproaches made directly to the Government ofAfghanistan but also that we maintain a strongdialogue with the Americans, given that they havebeen very central to the work in terms of the securityenvironment within Afghanistan, and in that sensethose discussions are under way as well.Q168 Ann McKechin:I wonder if I could clarify forthe record—we are now coming to the justice sectorrather than policingper se—whatcontribution hasDFID made towards reform of the justice sector?Ms Rogers:The FCO and DFID work together todrive reforms in the national justice sector. We wenttogether, as you know, to Rome where both DFIDand the FCO at that stage pledged £2 million to drivenational justice sector reform. That is mainly toleverage other support from the rest of theinternational community. Our stance on the justicesector in Afghanistan has been that it is for theAfghanistan Government to take this forward, tounderstand it. Like everything in Afghanistan, itstarted oV at a very low level, so it is going to take timeto get this to work, but we are very much of the viewthat we do not make mistakes that we might havemade in other areas. We need to keep a focusedinternational eVort and the way to do that is bysupporting the Afghan Government in developingtheir own justice sector strategy.Mr Alexander:So, as the Government committed £2million back in July, that justice strategy will in turninform the Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy which is due out in March.Q169 Ann McKechin:I am sure you appreciate that,given that the police act under domestic law, thejustice sector needs to be seen as key, but it did strikeme when we visited Afghanistan that people werevery unclear as to where the reforms in the justicesystem were going to go. There is a formal state justicesystem which is incredibly patchy and there are manyallegations of corruption, and there is also thetraditional justice system used in communities basedon sharia law, and I have to say that we spoke to anumber of parties in the international communitywho kept mentioning words such as “culture” andtradition”, and seemed to fail to recognise that thecurrent system of law as operated is grosslydiscriminatory to both women and children, whocombined represent 70% of the population, and thereseemed to be a failure of trying to consider howAfghanistan is going to square its domestic law with

its obligations under international law, which italready has contributed to. In that regard, in terms ofthe UK’s contribution to the justice sector, what areyou trying to contribute to the debate withinAfghanistan about how they go forward on what areclearly fundamental reforms which are required?Mr Alexander:First, it is important to give a sense ofthe nature of access to justice in Afghanistan at themoment.Q170 Ann McKechin:Yes, practically none.Mr Alexander:Approximately 80% of access tojustice is delivered through the informal system andtherefore one of the challenges the Government ofAfghanistan faces is how to align access to theinformal justice system with the internationalcommitments that it has itself signed up to. We havemade clear our support for the UN articulatedposition, which is to say that access to justice,particularly for those in remote rural areas often whoare reliant on the informal system at the moment, canreally be achieved by trying to combine the bestpractices of the traditional existing institutions, thatis, their accessibility to the local public, with themodern justice system as envisaged in the kinds ofdocuments that we have been describing. At anational level the donor assistance to which we havecontributed a small amount is aimed at strengtheningthe formal systems and reconciling those tensions,although I do not dispute that they are there, whetherit be with the international human rights instrumentsto which the Government of Afghanistan is now asignatory, or Sharia Islamic law and Afghancustomary law, so I do not diminish the challenge, Ido not diminish the need to ﬁnd a way forward. I dosay we are very alive to these issues. That is why, as Isay, in part we assisted the Government ofAfghanistan in entering into its internationalcommitments and why we have in turn contributed alimited amount of resource in terms of support,because we are not the lead partner agency on it.Q171 Ann McKechin:Secretary of State, I got theimpression from government elected oYcials andothers that this was a very long-term process whichthey saw as 20 to 30 years away, but I would ask you,particularly bearing in mind the fact that over half thepopulation are women and children, how long thedonor community and the people they represent inturn are going to support funding a governmentwhich still allows women to be put in jail for yearssimply because they did not marry the person theirfamily chose for them or they ran away from home? Itwould appear to me that it does not get a suYcientlevel of priority in terms of the internationalcommunity’s attention to this matter. It seems to methat it has been downplayed at every opportunity butyet it is an utterly appalling human rights abuse whichis occurring in this country but yet we are supportingthe government with millions of pounds of aid.Mr Alexander:As I say, the Government ofAfghanistan has itself entered into internationalcommitments in terms of human rights and wewelcome the fact that it has done so. That being said,it seems to me that we do face real challenges in terms

of the commitment that we show to an Afghan-ledapproach if we are at every juncture seeking toprescribe their processes and the timescales by whichthe Government of Afghanistan operates. We areourselves determined in the eVorts we are making as agovernment and as a department to improve the lot ofmany desperately poor women in Afghanistan,whether that be through improving the securityenvironment, whether that be through provision ofbasic health services (and if you look at infant andmaternal mortality there are still desperately poorﬁgures), or whether through the provision ofeducation, as I say, where more than two million girlsare now in school who were denied that previously in2001. I do not diminish the scale of the challenge but Ido say that this is one issue where we need to recognisethat this is an issue which has to be worked out withthe Government of Afghanistan rather than being ina position where we would be able to impose a justicesystem on a government, or indeed a country, whichhistorically has seen the kind of discrimination thatyou describe.Q172 Chairman:May I just reaYrm what MsMcKechin has said, that we had a very robustexchange of views with President Karzai on thismatter. A slightly disturbing thing he said was thatthe last leader of Afghanistan that tried to take up therights of women ended up dead. What Ms McKechinis saying is something the committee feels quitestrongly about. The international community doeshave a right to say that there are standards whichthere has to be real aspiration towards, not hidingbehind, “We have a diVerent culture and it will takefor ever”. I just would reinforce that.Mr Alexander:I think that is true. King Amanullahwas who I was quoted when I asked the same questionin terms of rule in 1918, but it is also fair to recognisethat there was very signiﬁcant resistance to theCommunist regime when they implemented changes,which I am sure at least many in the internationalcommunity would welcome in terms of proceduralequality. I think it is important to recognise that therehave historically been signiﬁcant moves against theinterests of the position of women in Afghan societyafter there have been signiﬁcant advancements overthe last century, and in that sense we need to continueto engage in this vital dialogue with the Governmentof Afghanistan to recognise that internationalstandards do need to be adhered to, but equally to bemindful that this has been a very troubled road forAfghanistan to walk over a number of decades.Q173 Sir Robert Smith:The Prime Minister talkedabout tackling the policing problem by increasing“our support for community defence initiativeswhere local volunteers are recruited to defend homesand families”. What is the thinking behind thecommunities self-defence programme?Mr Alexander:First, I would not in any way wish, andyou would not expect me to, to resile from the PrimeMinister’s statement, but, notwithstanding itspresence within the statement, I think it is importantto recognise that we are simply proposing a small-scale pilot project at this stage that recognises the case

for giving those local shuras the ability to recruitmembers of their own community to assist withsecurity. It reﬂects the challenging securityenvironment in which it works and it really is anattempt to respond to the request we have in turnreceived from the Afghan Government to work moreclosely with the grain of Afghanistan society incombating insecurity. It is being developed in full co-operation with the Government of Afghanistan andinternational partners such as ISAF, but we are at afairly early stage in terms of developing exactly howthis will operate.Q174 Sir Robert Smith:Is the idea that they wouldbe armed?Mr Alexander:It is potentially that they would bearmed but we certainly would not be paying forweapons or paying salaries to those bearing arms. Inreality, if you look at somewhere like Musa Qala,there are a number of people, all of whom haveweapons at the moment, who are part of family orplanned systems who could be persuaded by theshuras to protect the community now that it haseVectively been retaken from the insurgents. This is acomplex area but, as I say, we are very clear that thisneeds to be led by the Government of Afghanistan.We ourselves would not pay for the purchase of armsfor CDVs, nor would we pay the salaries of people tobear arms, but on the other hand we do think it isnecessary to explore how we can secure thecommunities who are looking to be protected fromthe kind of violence that is still prevalent in society.Q175 Mr Singh:Does this idea of community selfdefence have its roots in any way in the “awakening”in Iraq and that kind of model of self-defence that itseems to me is happening?Mr Alexander:Actually, discussions that we had withthe Government of Afghanistan reﬂected an olderexperience within Afghanistan itself of the Arbakai,which was in one particular part of Afghanistan amore traditional form of defence of communities, sono, it is more indigenous to Afghanistan rather thanbeing imported from elsewhere.Q176 John Battle:A topic that I want to raise is thepoppy production, the heroin trade. I think as a topicdrugs and development almost merit a separatesession; it is a crucial area. I want to also connect it toheroin in Afghanistan but also, of course, coca inLatin America, particularly Colombia, and I wonderif we are joining up the script there. I might invite youto qualify rather than resile from the Prime Minister’sstatement that the route forward should beeradication. Crop spraying did not work in Colombiaat all, nor does spraying and burning necessarilywork. I just think with the strategy we keep goingbackwards and forwards. The language of alternativelivelihoods is there and welcome but we have tosuggest what it might mean in practice and route it.One of the things that has happened, I think, in theeVorts to do that is that there has been a single cropreplacement solution. In Latin America, to draw theanalogy, it was palm oil. Can we go there? Will theyget as much money for that as they will for the coca? It

is the same in Afghanistan. I understand in Balkhprovince melons were one of the options as analternative, but it was not joined up because there wasnot the water supply for the irrigation. In Colombiaat the local level there are suggestions now for what iscalled building a sustainable village, so you build allthe parts in of the economic rural alternative todisplace the crop. I am just asking can we start to pushdown that line so it is not short-term one-cropreplacement that a few wealthy farmers beneﬁt from?It might include looking at the Colombian bestexamples where you grow the whole village whichincludes the clinic and the education as part of the fullpackage. I am really encouraged by the World Bank’sreport on it because the phrase in there is that“integrated programmes for rural development arenow proposed”. Can we get on with them and can weinclude agricultural extension services?Mr Alexander:First, in terms of was the PrimeMinister suggesting aerial spraying or a variationthereof, no, he was not. The position of the BritishGovernment is again led by the Afghan Governmentbut I am glad to say that they are in the same places.Our view has been that aerial spraying does not oVerthe way forward. Secondly, terminologically is“alternative livelihoods” the optimal description ofwhat we are trying to do? No. I agree with you; I donot think it is. It suggests a kind of binary, one in, oneout, when in fact it is a multi-faceted problem thatneeds to be engaged with. Thirdly, have we yetreached a deﬁnitive view in terms of the World Bank/DFID study that you reﬂected upon? No, we havenot, although I have had the opportunity to look at it,and in the coming days and weeks we will be makingpolicy determinations on that basis. It will be quitequick though. There is a meeting due in February,and by that point we will be in a position to oVer aformal policy position in relation to the paper, but Ihave to say that it is no great secret that we have agreat deal of sympathy with the comprehensive visionof challenging opium production that is articulatedquite eVectively within the document that you cite. Itis a complex problem, it is a long term challenge. Ifyou look at countries like Pakistan or Thailand we aretalking 15 to 20 years for those countries to makethemselves opium-free, but at the heart of thatcomplexity I think there is still quite a simplecalculation, which is that the task of eradicatingopium production is inherently more diYcult whereyou lack security and the rule of law, and in that sensehow do you reconcile the fact that we have seen anuplift in opium production in Helmand while seeing awelcome move from six to 13 provinces opium-freeover the course of the last year in Afghanistan? Iwould say at the heart of that complexity is the factthat if you have space which is either ungoverned orcontested it is much more diYcult to implement thekind of comprehensive approach identiﬁed in theWorld Bank/DFID document.Q177 John Battle:Eradication is not just helicoptersspraying from the sky, is it? What happened when wehad eradication in Latin America was that it waspushed out of Peru but into Bolivia; it was pushed outof Bolivia and is now in Colombia, so we keep going

round, and I know security is an issue but all oursoldiers are there and, as was reported, if they are onthe front line in the Afghan poppy war, unless we aregetting on with the other bits --- I am just asking andpleading for a bit of joining up with what is going onexperimentally on the ground in places like Colombiawith communities to look at new forms of integrateddevelopment to really displace it in the longer term.We have still got the problem of people buying it inBritain and in my neighbourhood, and that is anothermatter. It is complex, but we seem to be permanentlygetting stuck in the short term is what I am saying, interms of it being a security issue, not a displacement/redevelopment issue, and I am hoping we can get tothere quickly.Mr Alexander:I agree and I do not think there isperhaps as much divergence as the question implies. Iwill maybe ask Philippa, because she leads on theseissues within the FCO at the moment, to say a word ortwo in terms of the multi-pillar approach of theAfghan Government itself in respect of which anannouncement was made by the British Governmentback in August 2007, but that does reﬂect exactly themulti-dimensional nature of the developmentchallenge that we face.Ms Rogers:That is right. The National Drug ControlStrategy, which is the Afghanistan’s Government’sown strategy, is just that. It is an eight-pillared fullstrategic priority approach that recognises that inorder to achieve a sustainable reduction you need tobring those things together. You need to enhancerisk, you need to target people that are the traYckers,the narco-traders, but you also need to enhancereward so people that do not grow poppy understandthat they have other forms of supporting theirfamilies, and that is exactly the approach that the UKGovernment is behind.Mr Alexander:We will look carefully at therecommendations, whether it is infrastructure,irrigation, expertise in terms of agricultural produce.We are giving consideration to that at the momentwith our other international partners.Q178 Chairman:Can I press you a little bit further onthat, Secretary of State? Those of us who were inBalkh saw some of the practicalities there. We were ina village which had a drinking water extension and,although they did not tell us, we gathered they hadswitched from poppy to melons. The melons,however, were not very successful, partly becausethey were diseased, but they said that there wasnobody advising them on how to grow melons, howto treat them, in addition to which they were not giventhe irrigation, which actually was not to supply theircrops; it was to feed the animals, which were thereforedying. So having gone out of poppy they foundthemselves in a worse state and the point that wasmade to us was that Balkh may be poppy-free now butnot for very long, and it was speciﬁcally pointed out tous—is that not something DFID could do, work withthe Ministry of Agriculture in Afghanistan to helpdevelop an agricultural extension service that wouldenable those communities that have come out ofpoppy to get real beneﬁt from alternatives that wouldgive them an alternative income?

Mr Alexander:Your example seems to reﬂect twochallenges. One is production, as in can sustainableirrigation and decent crops be provided as a means ofsustaining livelihoods, but also the distribution andsale of those goods in turn: is there a functioningmarket? One of the consequences of the proﬁts thatcan be secured from drugs is that it is made fairly easyfor opium producers to sell their goods. The drugdealers turn up, they purchase them at the site ofproduction, and in that sense that was really a lot ofthe thinking behind the World Bank report whichwas how do we facilitate alternatives and make iteasier? In that regard we will, of course, study verycarefully the terms of the report. It would be wrong ofme if I were not to recognise that actually theAmericans have been the principal lead in terms of theMinistry of Agriculture and in that sense it has notbeen one of our identiﬁed priorities. The Afghansthemselves asked for donors to prioritise three areas anumber of years ago but we will certainly study theterms of the report very carefully.Q179 Sir Robert Smith:I want to join with the otherson the committee in paying tribute to the staV on theground in DFID and the other civilian staV inAfghanistan because the commitment they aremaking on the work to be done and on what needs tobe achieved there is great. To that end should we notwherever possible be making sure that where barrierscan be got out of the way they are? The nature ofAfghanistan is, as we saw, an awful lot of mountainranges and an awful lot of diYculty in travel and thefact that DFID staV are reliant on hitching lifts withthe military puts that easy operation at adisadvantage because, obviously, the military havesudden priorities that mean that the best laid plans getthrown out of the window. I understand there was abid in from DFID and the FCO for a dedicatedcivilian aircraft that would be at their disposal, andwe had the beneﬁt of a borrowed aircraft fromCustoms & Revenue when we were there, but theability to get around in their own time and at theirown behest and the ability to take senior AfghanoYcials with them would make their job a lot easier. Iunderstand the Treasury balked at the idea of thisaircraft. What plans are there to get it?Mr Alexander:First, just let me concur with yourpride in the work that DFID does on behalf of theBritish people in Afghanistan. You are absolutelyright. I think I have got, if not the best job, deﬁnitelyone of the best jobs in the country in terms of theprivilege that you have of seeing these staV, often inquitechallengingcircumstances,doingextraordinary work. It just makes you incrediblyproud so I am grateful for those comments and I willmake sure that they are passed on. In terms of theaircraft speciﬁcally, you are right: it has kind ofrumbled around the system for some time. There havebeen developments, though. First, the ForeignSecretary agreed to the lease of the aircraft which Ithink some of you at least used in 2007. In addition tothat there is now consideration being given to theStabilisation Aid Fund funding of a ﬁxed wingaircraft for the future, though we have not reachedthe allocation decision as we speak, but we will

consider it. Also, in the Prime Minister’s statement atthe beginning of December he mentioned the fact thatthere will be additional Sea King helicoptersprovided which will be available for use as well andpotentiallycouldimprovetheciviliantransportation. So at least the ﬁxed wing aircraft wasput in place; you have used it yourself, and we areactively considering whether the Stabilisation AidFund provides a single basis on which a ﬁxed wingaircraft can be there, and even since your visit there isalso the additional Sea King capacity there.Q180 Mr Singh:I am sure we were all shocked to thecore on Boxing Day when we learned about themurder of Benazir Bhutto and the impact of that willcontinue to unfold in Pakistan with elections coming.However, is there likely to be any impact in terms ofstability and security in Afghanistan from BenazirBhutto’s murder? Has any assessment been made?Mr Alexander:Obviously, these are issues which areunder constant review, not least given the presence ofthe scale of British forces that we have in Helmand atthe moment. The tragic death of Benazir Bhuttoreﬂects the continuing serious threat that is posed byextremism in South Asia and we are mindful of that.One of the points that was made to me by the forcecommanders that I met in Helmand was the inter-related nature of the challenges in the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Balochistanand Waziristan, where there continue to be realextremism challenges. However, that being said, weshould recognise that before Benazir Bhutto’s tragicdeath there had been some real progress made inAfghan/Pakistan relations in terms of the Joint PeaceJirga that took place in Kabul in August. That hadjust taken place when I visited, actually, and there wasa degree of cautious optimism at that point that thatheld out a better prospect. I would simply make thisobservation, looking forward, that while, of course,we continue to monitor the situation and its potentialimpact on the cross-border activities of thoseinvolved in the insurgency it is vital that we ﬁnd a wayforward, both for Afghanistan and for Pakistan.When I ﬁrst visited the Pakistan/Afghan border threeyears ago in my capacity as a then Foreign OYceminister, it was demonstrated to me very graphically

that this is not a border that is widely recognised bythe local community. Quite often people have ﬁeldson one side of the border and live on the other. Thereis a shared pasturing heritage. In that sense we have avery strong interest in ensuring not only that we bringstabilisation and development, working with theAfghan Government on one side of the border, butalso that we are not in a position where thevulnerability of the other side of the border continuesto impact in the way it has in recent years, so we areworking very closely with our colleagues in the FCOwhile events unfold in Pakistan. We, of course,monitor the border very closely in terms of not leastthe protection of our own troops, but we are clear thatthis is an inter-related challenge and are trying towork on both sides of the border to address it.Chairman:Thank you, Secretary of State, and yourteam for coming in to give us evidence. The evidencewe have had today and our own visit and previousevidence reinforce the fact that it is a hugely complexproblem. There is a huge number of issues of everydimension but, as we said in our interim letter to you,and we have not produced our report, the committeerecognises that Afghanistan is a place where the UKand the international community should be and thatwe should recognise that it is for the long term. Wewant the British people to understand the positivereason for doing it and that it is a partnership with theAfghan people and the Afghan Government.Without getting into anything contentious, it isdiVerent from other arenas in which we operate. Ihope our report will reﬂect that and I hope it will makenot too many but worthwhile and constructiverecommendations that will help your department andthe teams with their work. I think we would all like torepeat very much the appreciation we have ofeverybody that we have worked with in thepreparation of this report, in the Foreign OYce and inthe department, and indeed the ancillary services, notleast the close protection teams as well. I think all of uswould concur that it has been a fascinating inquiry.The visit to Afghanistan itself for all of us was a muchmore confused in some ways but positive experiencethan I think many of us anticipated. It is a fascinatingcountry. It deserves to have a future, and anything wecan do to contribute to that we hope will be a positivecontribution. That is certainly our objective.

Written evidenceMemorandum submitted by the Department for International Development (DFID)Executive Summary1. Following twenty-ﬁve years of turmoil and conﬂict, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in theworld, and remains oV-track on all of the Millennium Development Goals. Because of conﬂict andinsecurity, the people of Afghanistan were in the past denied basic services including health care andschooling.2. There has been real progress since 2001, with life improving for many Afghans. Around 5.4 millionchildren are now in school, over a third of them girls. 4.8 million refugees have returned home toAfghanistan. Infant mortality rates have declined. Under-ﬁve mortality rates have dropped. In the last threeyears, the proportion of women receiving ante-natal care has increased from 5% to 30%.3. In economic terms, Afghanistan’s progress over the last six years has been impressive. Afghanistanstarted from a very low base. Gross Domestic Product (excluding opium) grew 42% from 2002–03 to2005–06, and by an average of 10% every year for the past three years. Real income has also been growingsteadily since 2001, up to $335 per capita in 2006. But it is still less than a dollar a day per person and halfthe average in the South Asia region ($684). Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of revenue mobilisationin the world (6% of Gross Domestic Product) and is heavily aid dependent. In 2006 aid accounted for aboutone third of total Gross Domestic Product and made up more than half of the national budget.4. DFID is committed to supporting poverty reduction in Afghanistan over the long term. At the LondonConference on Afghanistan in January 2006, the UK committed to provide £330 million of developmentassistance to Afghanistan over three years (2006–09) as part of a total UK package of £500 million. DFID’sprogramme is focused on three of the Afghan Government’s own objectives, as set out in their InterimAfghanistan National Development Strategy: building eVective state institutions; improving economicmanagement and improving the livelihoods of rural people.5. We support the Government to deliver development and reconstruction nationwide. Over 80% of ourassistance goes through Government channels. This helps the Government to develop the capacity to deliverbasic services; to manage public ﬁnances eVectively; and to build credibility and legitimacy with the Afghanpeople. It is also more cost eVective.6. DFID uses the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund as the main ﬁnancing instrument to a support theGovernment of Afghanistan’s National Priority Programmes. These include the ﬂagship NationalSolidarity Programme, which supports local community development priorities across Afghanistan. NSPis implemented through 23 national and international Non-Governmental Organisations, plus UnitedNations Habitat.7. Nationally, NSP has set up over 17,500 Community Development Councils across Afghanistan withover 29,000 projects in the areas of agriculture, education, health, irrigation, power, transport and watersupply. Through the national micro-ﬁnance programme over £140 million worth of small loans have beengiven to 375,000 recipients. The national roads programme has built over 9,300 km of rural roads andgenerated over 13.5 million days of labour The Helmand Agricultural and Rural Development Programmesupported the construction of four roads, 554 wells, and 482 community projects.8. The drugs trade in Afghanistan presents an enormous challenge. According to the United NationsOYce on Drugs and Crime’s 2007 Annual Opium Survey the area under opium cultivation rose to 193,000hectares from 165,000 in 2006 and the total harvest increased from 6,100 tonnes in 2006 to 8,200 tonnes thisyear. Opium production is heavily concentrated in areas of insecurity with Helmand now the world’s biggestsource of illicit drugs with 102,770 hectares under opium production. The Afghan Inter-DepartmentalDrugs Unit (London) and the British Embassy Drugs Team (Kabul) lead on the UK’s counter-narcoticseVort. DFID is assisting the Government of Afghanistan with institutional reform to help ensure thatGovernment policies and strategies support the growth of legal livelihoods. DFID also has a substantiallivelihoods programme aimed at strengthening and diversifying legal livelihoods.9. Corruption is also a major problem. According to the Corruption Perception Index of TransparencyInternational in 2005, Afghanistan ranked 117th out of 159 countries. In the Investment ClimateAssessment for Afghanistan (2005) survey 53% of enterprises cited corruption as one of the top four majoror severe constraints—along with electricity, access to land, and access to ﬁnance. High levels of corruptionare a key indicator of a weak an ineVective state.10. Co-ordination of the military and development eVort stems from the strategic level discussions thattake place in Whitehall, to operational discussions in Kabul, and to the tactical activities in Helmand.Security and development are linked in the UK Joint Plan for Helmand. Getting the balance right betweensecurity eVorts and reconstruction and development, along with political engagement, requires robust,integrated planning. The Helmand Executive Group provides the mechanism through which this integratedplanning can take place on an ongoing basis in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. ProvincialReconstruction Teams are international civil-military teams, intended to further security and development

across the provinces and help extend the reach of central Government. Originally a US concept, there arenow 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, led by 13 diVerent nations. The UK led theProvincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-i-Sharif from July 2003, handing over to Sweden in March 2006,and has led the Helmand Team since April 2006.11. DFID is playing a major role in helping improve donor coordination. There are two main areas offocus: (a) getting donors to help the Government develop a comprehensive National Development Strategy;and (b) the development of a joint donor strategy process which aligns donor support to the Government’sNational Development Strategy.12. DFID is fully committed to the UK Government’s comprehensive approach to Afghanistan,whereby all departments work towards a jointly-owned UK Strategy in support of the Afghan Government.Adopting an integrated approach to support the Government of Afghanistan to extend its inﬂuence andauthority is being achieved through close cooperation and coordination between Departments. Eachdepartment contributes to overall strategy formulation and delivers according to its skills. DFID leads onthe economic and social development strand, FCO on governance, rule of law and human rights, and MODon security. The inter-departmental Afghanistan drugs unit leads on counter-narcotics, a cross-cuttingpriority.

ContextforDevelopment AssistanceinAfghanistan13. Following decades of turmoil and conﬂict, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world,and remains oV-track on all of the Millennium Development Goals. Because of conﬂict and insecurity, thepeople of Afghanistan have for years been denied basic services including health care and schooling. Againstall human development indicators, Afghanistan ranks amongst the lowest in the world. One in ﬁve Afghanchildren dies before their ﬁfth birthday; around one-third of the population are eating less than the minimumdaily calorie requirement; and under one-third of 15–24 year olds are literate (only one-third of these aregirls). The UN’s 2004 ﬁgures measure Afghanistan’s life expectancy as 46 years and adult literacy rate as28.1%, compared to an average of 52.4 years and 63.7% for the world’s least developed countries.14. But we have also seen real progress since 2001, with life improving for many Afghans. Around 5.4million children are now in school, over a third of them girls. This is up dramatically from an estimated onemillion children in school in 2001, of whom very few were girls, who were oYcially denied access toeducation under the Taliban. 4.8 million refugees have returned home to Afghanistan. Infant mortality rateshave declined from an estimated 165 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to about 129 per 1,000 in 2005—equivalentto around 40,000 more babies surviving per year now than in 2002. Since 2000, under-5 mortality rates havedropped from around 1 in 4 to around 1 in 5. The proportion of women receiving antenatal care increasedfrom 5% in 2003 to 30% in 2006.15. In economic terms, Afghanistan’s progress over the last six years has been impressive. Afghanistanstarted from a very low base. Twenty-ﬁve years of conﬂict destroyed much of the country’s limitedinfrastructure, severely impeded private sector development and undermined normal patterns of economicactivity. But the economy (excluding opium) grew 42% from 2002–03 to 2005–06 and has grown by anaverage of 10% every year for the past three years. The International Monetary Fund has forecast 12%economic growth this ﬁnancial year, driven by a rebound in agricultural output and a sustained growth inthe construction and services sectors. Key macroeconomic indicators such as inﬂation and the exchange ratehave remained relatively stable. The Government, assisted by the donor community, has taken forwardmuch needed reforms in public ﬁnancial management and public administration reform.16. But tough decisions on economic reforms are now needed to sustain growth and stability.Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of revenue mobilisation in the world (6% of Gross Domestic Productcompared to an average of 19% for African countries). At these rates, it is impossible for the Governmentto meet its own costs. In June 2006 the International Monetary Fund agreed a three year Poverty Reductionand Growth Facility arrangement with the Afghan Government to support macroeconomic reform, settinga series of targets for the Government to meet. This includes a set of challenging revenue mobilisation targetswhich (if met) will strengthen the Government’s ability to cover its costs by 2013. However, progress onmeeting the revenue targets is by no means guaranteed and will require tough policy decisions from theGovernment.17. Politically, Afghanistan has progressed considerably since the fall of the Taleban in 2001: adoptionof the constitution; Presidential (2004) and Parliamentary (2005) elections (with over 40% of votes cast bywomen) and the inauguration of the National Assembly in 2005. 28% or 87 MPs (out of 351) are women.25% of these are constitutionally mandated. While the Assembly takes its oversight responsibility seriously,the relationship between, and authority of, Parliament and the Executive is weak. Former warlords andthose running the drugs trade still exercise signiﬁcant power across the provinces. The challenges faced byPresident Karzai and his Government are daunting in managing the diVerent political constituencies and inexercising Government control over a complex and largely rural territory aVected by corruption, thenarcotics trade, and a long history of conﬂict.

18. Outside of Kabul, central government inﬂuence is (very) slowly being felt. But the links remaintenuous, and traditional local ethnic and tribal structures are still very important. Capacity in Afghan lineministries is variable. For example, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Reconstruction andDevelopment are running as well as Afghanistan’s limitations allow, however the Ministry of the Interioris weak. The major ministries have oYces in each province but links between the centre and province areinvariably weak.19. Corruption is a major problem, and is viewed by most Afghans as getting worse, with the securitysector and judiciary seen as the most corrupt institutions. In the short term President Karzai has establisheda high level Anti-Corruption Commission, chaired by the Chief Justice. However corruption is an ongoingchallenge and long term success will require changes in behaviour at senior levels. Tackling corruption is amajor focus of the UK’s long term eVort. DFID has supported this eVort so far by working with the CivilService Commission and other donors to scale up support for public administration reform. DFID has alsoprovided advice to the Government of Afghanistan in developing an anti-corruption roadmap.20. International development support for Afghanistan was cemented by the International Compact forAfghanistan, agreed at the London Conference in January 2006. The Conference was chaired by the AfghanGovernment and the United Nations, and the agreed Compact represents a framework for cooperation forthe ﬁve years up to the end of 2010, with benchmarks for success. It includes commitments on improving aideVectiveness and is monitored by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board co-chaired by the AfghanGovernment and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Interim AfghanistanNational Development Strategy was also launched at the London Conference, and was supported bypledges totalling $10.7 billion from the international community.21. The full Afghanistan National Development Strategy is currently being developed by the AfghanGovernment. It is due to be launched in March 2008 and needs to be implemented for one year as part ofAfghanistan’s bid for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. It will be a keychallenge to ensure that the strategy is realistic and credible, aligned with the national budget, and has fullbuy-in across the Government of Afghanistan and the donor community. It will be important forAfghanistan’s future development that the donor community coordinates its assistance in support of theﬁnal strategy. Although the second largest bilateral donor, DFID’s $216 million commitment this year issmall compared to US and multilateral ﬁnancing which accounts for a large proportion of the $4.3 billioninternational ﬁnancing committed to development in Afghanistan this ﬁnancial year. Coordination ofinternational assistance and improved eVectiveness of aid is a major objective of DFID’s policy support toAfghanistan. Aid eVectiveness would also be helped by a stronger UN coordination role, which DFID isencouraging.22. Working in an insecure environment brings its own challenges. We invest a substantial amount ofresources in ensuring that our staV are protected. The impact of the security situation in Kabul andneighbouring provinces limits the ability of UK staV to undertake regular project monitoring, increasing ourreliance on project partners. In Helmand, the fragile security situation makes operating even more diYcult.Civilian travel is limited and it is diYcult to attract Non-Governmental Organisations as implementingpartners, especially while the United Nations does not have a permanent presence. Coordination with themilitary is particularly important in Helmand, to ensure the comprehensive approach is implemented.Key QuestionsThe objectives of DFID’s programme in Afghanistan; the trade-oV between short term gains and long-termtransformation; balancing and prioritising multiple goals and objectives; DFID’s experience and knowledge ofworking in insecure environments23. DFID is committed to supporting poverty reduction in Afghanistan over the long term. At theLondon Conference on Afghanistan in January 2006, the Prime Minister and Afghan President HamidKarzai signed a 10-year Development Partnership Arrangement, showing the UK’s long-term commitmentto Afghanistan. This includes a commitment of £330 million of development assistance to Afghanistan overthe next three years (2006–09) as part of a total UK package of £500 million—which includes funding forother activities such as counter-narcotics. DFID is Afghanistan’s second largest bilateral donor, spendingover £100 million in 2006–07 (the US is the largest, spending $4.39 billion between 2002 and 2006 and witha budget of around $1.4 billion for 2007). Over the last three years the size of DFID’s programme has grownsubstantially. In 2007–08 we expect to spend £107 million, rising to £115 million in 2008–09.24. Our programme is prioritised at the request of the Government of Afghanistan. We support three ofthe Afghan Government’s own objectives, as set out in their Interim National Development Strategy:— Building eVective state institutions;— Improving economic management; and— Improving the livelihoods of rural people.25. In addition to these three objectives, which account for the majority of our spending in Afghanistan,DFID’s wider goals are to improve donor coordination in Afghanistan; to support the Government ofAfghanistan in developing a full Afghanistan National Development Strategy; and to contribute to the

wider UK government eVort in Helmand. We support development in Helmand both through our rurallivelihoods programme and through HMG’s Quick Impact Projects, designed to deliver immediate beneﬁtsto local communities. DFID spent around £16 million in Helmand in 2006–07, and we have committed tospend up to £20 million this year.26. The majority of our programme is focused on work which will support the long-term transformationof Afghanistan. We direct over 80% of our assistance through Government channels because this helps theGovernment to develop the capacity to deliver basic services; to manage public ﬁnances eVectively; and tobuild credibility and legitimacy with the Afghan people. We support the Government to deliver developmentand reconstruction nationwide, including in Helmand.27. DFID has adapted the way we work to take account of the insecure environment in Afghanistan.DFID follows FCO advice on security related matters, including risk mitigation. We invest a substantialamount of resources in ensuring our staV are protected, both through provision of close protection andarmoured cars and planning and monitoring movements. The security situation in Kabul and neighbouringprovinces limits the ability of UK staV to undertake regular project monitoring, which is mainly undertakenby project partners, in close consultation with us. This is also to lower the proﬁle of visits, which may increasethe risk to local partners.28. In Helmand, the fragile security situation makes operating even more diYcult for a number ofreasons. It is often diYcult for civilians to leave the Provincial Reconstruction Team base, and the numberof locations in the Province to which civilians can travel is limited. The number of project implementingpartners prepared to work in Helmand is limited: there are currently only four national/international Non-Governmental Organisations working in Lashkar Gah (with limited outreach to the districts) and theUnited Nations is still not present. Security concerns also hamper Government of Afghanistan outreach inHelmand, with Governor Wafa rarely venturing beyond Lashkar Gah, and visits from Kabul-basedGovernment of Afghanistan representatives even less frequent. Also, some partners are not willing to visitthe Provincial Reconstruction Team compound as this can compromise their own security. The UK isworking to improve the security situation and to help create the conditions in which longer-termdevelopment can be successful.How much of DFID’s work is in fragile states?29. Fragile states are increasingly DFID’s core business. 11 out of DFID’s 25 Public Sector Agreementcountries are fragile states (according to the list in DFID’s 2005 policy paper,Why we need to work moreeVectively in fragile states).Between 2001 and 2006 DFID increased bilateral expenditure in fragile statesfrom £243.5 million in 2000–01 to £745.6 million in 2005–06. This represents an increase from 17% to 30%of DFID’s overall bilateral spend. In 2006–7 this increased further to £800.1 million or 31% of ourbilateral spend.130. Six of the top 20 recipients of DFID bilateral aid in 2005–06 were fragile states. In 2006–07, the 10largest fragile states recipients accounted for 87% of DFID’s expenditure in fragile states. These are Sudan,Afghanistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Nepal, Sierra Leoneand Zimbabwe.31. The late 1990s marked the beginning of a more systematic and strategic approach to fragile states inDFID and in other aid agencies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentAssistance Committee Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,endorsed by Development Assistance Committee members in April 2007, represent a strong consensus onhow to improve development eVectiveness in fragile states and are in line with our own experience.32. There is no single approach to programming—fragile states are too varied and we need a diVerentmix of instruments depending on the circumstances. Our experience is showing that sustained commitment(eg through ﬁve to 10 year agreements), an integrated approach that brings together development,diplomatic and security actors, and innovative and ﬂexible use of instruments can all help improveperformance.How does DFID manage risk in fragile states?33. The risk of increasing our activities and focus in fragile states has to be balanced against the cost ofnot engaging, and the potential for signiﬁcant gains. DFID is implementing an action plan to strengthenour business process to cope with risk and uncertainty, following the Capability Review. The Statement ofInternal Control, the annual report on DFID’s overall control environment, signed oV by the PermanentSecretary, has been re-written to reﬂect a much more comprehensive treatment of the risks managed by ourinternal controls.34. We are also putting in place additional risk management measures, such as contingency andemergency planning, in our most risky programmes. Scenario and contingency planning is currently beingcarried out in a number of fragile states in Africa and will be part of all future Country Assistance Plans in1

The geographical balance in the distribution, especially between the north and the south36. Over 80% of DFID’s assistance goes directly to the Government of Afghanistan in support of its ownpriorities. This includes support for the government’s National Priority Programmes, which operatethroughout the country. Maintaining nationwide support is important as Afghanistan remains in a fragilesituation.37. Decisions on which projects to support, and where, are driven by the Government Ministries in Kabulthrough which we provide support and locally, by the Provincial Department of Rural Reconstruction andDevelopment. They decide their own priorities, in full consultation with local communities.38. For example, the National Solidarity Programme and the National Rural Access Programme operatein all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The Microﬁnance Investment and Support Facility Afghanistan operatesin 23 provinces, and the Horticulture and Livelihoods Programme (still at an early stage) operates in sevenprovinces.39. DFID has also provided support for Quick Impact Projects in Helmand (£4 million in 2006–07 as partof a total £6.2 million UK contribution), which are focused on delivering immediate beneﬁts. In addition £10million of our support to Helmand last year was directed through Government of Afghanistan NationalPriority Programmes, including work to improve rural infrastructure, water and sanitation facilities, andaccess to micro credit to promote legal livelihoods.

The contribution of budget support, through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to strengtheninginstitutional capacity and accountabilityWhat form of support to the Government of Afghanistan’s budget does DFID provide?40. DFID channels 81% of its aid through Government of Afghanistan systems, of which a signiﬁcantproportion (£70 million this year) goes through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. This Fund ismanaged by the World Bank and receives contributions from 24 countries. It has two strands: a recurrentwindow to support the operating costs of the Afghan Government (predominantly public sector wages) andan investment window to fund development programmes. DFID is the largest single contributor,to theTrust Fund since it began, accounting for a third of all unearmarked contributions in 2006–07.41. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund diVers from more conventional forms of budgetsupport in two major ways. First, resources are provided to Government of Afghanistan on areimbursement basis. Funds are transferred to the Government only when it has demonstrated that actualexpenditures (such as salaries) have been paid, and conform to strict criteria that are scrutinised by anindependent monitoring agent. Second, funds are not totally fungible; they cannot for example be used forsecurity expenditures.42. DFID’s largest Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contribution is to the recurrent window—£55 million this ﬁnancial year. Since 2002–03, the recurrent window has disbursed close to $900 million ($437million of which is from DFID). Around 70% of this funding goes to paying the wages of non-security publicsector workers, including around 90% of the Ministry of Education’s wage bill. This has contributed to theincrease in pupils from 2 million in 2002 to 5.4 million today and the increase in teachers from approximately21,000 in 2001 to more than 128,000 today.43. DFID also provides funding to the investment window of the Afghanistan Reconstruction TrustFund to support the Government’s National Priority Programmes. These programmes help put the AfghanGovernment in the driving seat on development. After two decades of conﬂict it is critical to nationalsolidarity that it is the Government—and not donors—that are seen to be providing services and investmentprogrammes. In addition, the Government has demonstrated that it can deliver services at a fraction of thecost of international donors and NGOs. The investment window has provided around $300 million ofdevelopment spending since 2002. DFID has contributed £40 million to the investment window since 2003,supporting key rural development programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme, the

Institutional Capacity44. The majority (70%) of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund recurrent window currentlysupports the salaries of teachers, nurses and other public servants. In the absence of a large revenue base(Afghanistan currently mobilises only 6% of Gross Domestic Product in domestic revenues), the AfghanGovernment will be reliant on donors to cover a large percentage of its recurrent and development costs formany years to come.45. Public sector salaries are currently low. This makes it diYcult for the Government to attract andretain enough high quality recruits, especially as it is in competition with the private sector and donors whocan oVer higher salaries. This undermines prospects for building basic state capacity. Consequently, in 2007the Afghan Cabinet agreed a new Pay and Grade system for the public service, intended to introduce payincreases linked to grade and responsibility. The Afghan Ministry of Finance devised the system on the basisof sustainability—they think Afghanistan will be able to cover the wage bill in ten years. While theGovernment of Afghanistan revenues grow, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund will continue toensure adequate ﬁnancing of the new public sector wage bill and public administration reforms, hencestrengthening the Government’s basic capacity.46. Financing the Afghan Government’s own development programmes through the AfghanistanReconstruction Trust Fund has also helped to build core capacity in key Ministries. Ministries areimproving their performance in delivering basic services through Government systems, often subcontractedto Non-Governmental Organisations at the point of service delivery. The Ministries of Reconstruction andRural Development, Health and Education are demonstrating progress in delivering basic services acrossthe country, which has contributed in large part to the improvement in education and health indicators since2001. Institutions which have not channelled the same level of support from Afghanistan ReconstructionTrust Fund investment resources are demonstrating much lower performance, including the justice sector.Alignment of the budget to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy will further strengthen keysectors’ capacity to match resources and staYng to institutional priorities.

Accountability47. Accountability is built between state and people when citizens have incentives and opportunities tohold Government to account on the use of resources. Building this link is going to be a very long-term eVortin Afghanistan because democracy is young and Afghanistan has a very low revenue base and smalleconomy. The challenge in the medium-term for donors is how to promote accountability between Afghancitizens and the state on how it spends available aid resources—$2.6 billion of aid is projected to be spent“oV budget” in the external budget for ﬁscal year 1386. Afghan citizens cannot hold lots of diVerent donorprojects to account, nor should they. Our aim is to help build a sustainable Afghan state where donor moneyﬂows through Afghan systems.48. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is a key mechanism through which greateraccountability can be achieved. The National Solidarity Programme is a good example. Using AfghanistanReconstruction Trust Fund money, communities, with help from Non-Governmental Organisations, haveidentiﬁed their own priorities. Since 2003, DFID has provided £17 million support to the National SolidarityProgramme. As of July 2007, the National Solidarity Programme has established over 17,832 CommunityDevelopment Councils across Afghanistan with over 30,463 projects approved and 12,887 projectscompleted. Rural people in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces have beneﬁted from National SolidarityProgramme projects including improved water, roads and other small infrastructure projects. That buildsa strong link and oversight between state and citizens. We want to extend the principle to other big sectorslike education.49. Since the inception of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, revised legislation on PublicFinancial Management and Procurement has been adopted, and the World Bank, through the independentmonitoring agent, is helping the Afghan Government to apply best practice measures and improve publicﬁnancial management procedures. Donors and the Government have recently agreed that the Trust Fundwill be underpinned by a results framework (the Performance Assessment Matrix). This will help to trackthe development impact of Trust Fund funds on key pro-poor sectors such as health and education and willstrengthen mutual accountability and dialogue between the Government and donors on strategic resourceallocation.

Coordination of the military and development eVort, in particular the UK military eVort; progress in the “wholeof government” approach50. Co-ordination of the military and development eVort stems from the strategic level discussions thattake place in Whitehall, to operational discussions in Kabul, and to the tactical activities in Helmand. InHelmand, the co-ordination comes under the control of the Helmand Executive Group. The HelmandExecutive Group comprises the leaders of each of the four strands of the UK Joint Helmand Plan: theDeputy Commander of Task Force Helmand for security, senior FCO representatives for Governance andRule of Law, and a senior DFID representative for Development. These four are co-located to facilitatejoined up decision making on issues such as disbursement of Quick Impact Project funds (US$17 million inthe last year) and reviewing progress on implementing the UK Joint Helmand Plan.51. The UK Joint Plan for Helmand was predicated on the military establishing a secure zone aroundLashkar Gah (often referred to as a secure “lozenge” due to its shape) and preparations were made on thatbasis. The original concept of establishing a “lozenge” remains substantially sound but owing to changedcircumstances, it has extended beyond the area of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and the road in between, to includethe gateway towns of Sangin and Garmsir. This has in some way been driven by the military’s involvementin counter insurgency operations but also changes in the UK’s priorities, such as to provide support to theUSA in Kajaki, the site of USAID’s largest project in Afghanistan—the rehabilitation of the Kajaki multi-purpose dam in the Helmand river valley. This hydropower project will restore water supplies for localcommunities, rehabilitate irrigation systems for farmlands, and provide electricity to around 200 residents,as well as industries.52. The comprehensive approach is being followed in the Provincial Reconstruction Team. The securitycontext has a major impact upon sustainability of development eVorts. To the maximum extent possible,the current stabilisation eVort ensures that projects beneﬁt from community partnership and Governmentof Afghanistan support, and that they are ﬁt for purpose. However, where security is not yet adequate, andthe rule of law is absent, from the beneﬁciary’s and the donor’s perspective, ensuring interventions aresustainable is hard to achieve.53. It is important to note the relationship between the military eVort, reconstruction and developmentwork and the ongoing political transition through national development programmes. The concept of the“lozenge” is driven by military action, yet it can only be stabilised by reconstruction and development,governance and political engagement. The National Development Programmes engage in the “space”created. It is only through sustainable eVorts being encompassed in all the activities that the objectives setout in the UK Helmand Plan will be realised.54. More widely, the UK Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (December 2005) provides an agreed cross-government strategic framework and reﬂects UK priorities, resources and capabilities. The strategy outlinesthe UK contribution to the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and theNational Drug Control Strategy. The plan has six objectives: security; governance, rule of law and humanrights; economic and social development; counter narcotics; international and regional engagement; andstrategic communications. The Joint UK Plan for Helmand was also agreed across Whitehall. Both planswere reviewed and revised in late 2006 (Helmand) and early 2007 (Afghanistan). Departments work closelytogether on implementing these strategies in Helmand, Kabul and Whitehall.Possible tensions between the development and the security agendas; clarity of budget lines and overlap ofstabilisation, reconstruction, humanitarian and development assistance55. DFID does not consider development and security to be separate agendas in Afghanistan. They areinterdependent, and both are central to the UK’s comprehensive approach. They are intrinsically linked inthe UK Joint Plan for Helmand, with its four “strands” of governance, security, economic and socialdevelopment, and rule of law. There is common consensus that you cannot have sustainable developmentwithout security, nor maintain security without development.56. Nevertheless, there are issues around how to achieve both development and security, and the bestorder in which actions should be taken to achieve this. The UK addresses this in Helmand through theHelmand Executive Group, the executive decision-making body in the Provincial Reconstruction Teamwhich brings together all four strands of the UK Plan. Civilians and military work together on the HelmandExecutive Group to develop operational approaches that serve the interdependent security and developmentagendas. The DFID Development Adviser in the Provincial Reconstruction Team is a core member of theHelmand Executive Group.57. There is clarity of budget lines for UK activities in Helmand. DFID provides funding in two mainways: central funding of Government of Afghanistan’s National Priority Programmes to bring longer-termdevelopment to the Province (£30 million through the Helmand Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentProgramme with £10.3 million allocated this ﬁnancial year); and funding to the Provincial ReconstructionTeam for Quick Impact Projects through the Global Conﬂict Prevention Pool. DFID, FCO and MOD allcurrently contribute funds through the Global Conﬂict Prevention Pool for Quick Impact Projects,supporting work across all four strands of the UK Plan and ensuring good coordination and simpleapplication of processes for disbursement and accountability.

58. Stabilisation, reconstruction, humanitarian and development assistance can (and do) overlap. Thereis no clear point at which one stops and another begins. For example, in Helmand development activities arecurrently taking place in and around Lashkar Gah, where some DFID-funded Government of AfghanistanNational Priority Programmes are being implemented, while stabilisation activities (aimed at supporting thepreconditions for longer term development) are being pursued in Sangin and Gereshk. Ideally, over time wewill see a shift from “consent winning activities” through Quick Impact Projects and stabilisation activitiesto more long-term development. Getting the balance right between security eVorts and reconstruction anddevelopment, along with political engagement, requires robust, integrated planning. A good understandingof local politics and dynamics is also essential. The Helmand Executive Group provides the mechanismthrough which this integrated planning can take place on an ongoing basis in the ProvincialReconstruction Team.The eVectiveness of the Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit stabilisation eVort in Helmand Province59. The Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit has been involved in delivering UK stabilisation objectives inHelmand since October 2005. To date, the unit has played an important contributory part in delivering theUK’s stabilisation eVort in Helmand. As the Unit’s role increases, the Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit’sperformance will become ever more critical to the overall success of the UK’s eVorts. The Unit’s role to datehas been in three important areas.60. First, supporting Departments to undertake integrated stabilisation planning. The UK Joint Plan forHelmand was the UK’s ﬁrst attempt at creating a genuinely integrated plan for a joint (civilian-military)operation in a complex environment. The Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit played a key role in“facilitating” this process by:— supporting the Cabinet OYce to coordinate planning involving numerous parts of government;— providing experienced advisers to assist in the analysis of issues and development of options;— providing the logistical means which allowed an inter-departmental planning team to deploy.61. Secondly, supporting the critical review and revision of the UK’s stabilisation eVort. The 2006 jointreview of the Helmand Plan came at a critical time in the UK’s engagement. Post Conﬂict ReconstructionUnit’s support to Cabinet OYce in facilitating the review helped to ensure a rigorous and “joint” exercise.The subsequent adoption of key review recommendations, particularly those around co-location of thecivilian and military leads, has been important in improving the eVectiveness of the UK’s eVorts.62. Thirdly, providing stabilisation expertise. The Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit’s comparativeadvantage in ﬁnding and deploying staV to deliver stabilisation tasks is increasingly recognised acrossWhitehall. Throughout the Helmand deployment, the Unit has been able, often at short notice, to deployexperienced, security trained and cleared staV to the Provincial Reconstruction Team. Initial interimdeployments in 2006 gave impetus to the Helmand Plan, notably the Quick Impact Projects programme andearly direction on governance and rule of law issues.63. More recently, deployment of the Stabilisation Adviser and the creation of the Stabilisation Cell hassigniﬁcantly increased the overall civilian eVort and improved civilian-military linkages, particularly the linkto military planning. Deployment of a Stabilisation Adviser in Regional Command South Head Quartershas added an important civilian advisory capacity to that Head Quarters which has a bearing on stabilisationin Helmand.

The sustainability and eVectiveness of counter-narcotics policies and their impact on development64. The drugs trade in Afghanistan accounts for just under 30% of the Afghan economy and involves12% of the population. Poppy cultivation has risen for the second successive year, with Helmand responsiblefor over half of the crop. At the same time, the number of “poppy free” provinces in the north and centre—where there is access to development, rule of law and security—has risen to 13 from 6 last year. While notingthis success, we need to bear in mind evidence from other countries that sustainable results will require eVortover a number of years across a range of issues such as improved governance, rural livelihood opportunities,security, and justice systems. We must be wary of thinking that there is a quick, simple solution to the drugsproblem in Afghanistan and of diverting attention away from our main eVort in pursuit of a “silver bullet”.For example, untargeted eradication of poppy crops would risk alienating farmers and increasing ruralpoverty. Legalising poppy growth would also fail to solve the problem; there is insuYcient infrastructure toadminister a licit cultivation scheme and Afghanistan’s farmers would only be contributing to an alreadyover-supplied opiates market. The solution to the narcotics problem in Afghanistan will be long-term andmulti-faceted, and led by the Government of Afghanistan, which has ruled out both untargeted spraying ofpoppy crops and legalisation.65. The UK supports the Afghan government’s ﬁve year National Drug Control Strategy, which is nowin its second year. The goal is to secure a sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, traYcking andconsumption of illicit drugs, with a view to complete elimination. This goal is pursued through four nationalpriorities: disrupting the trade by targeting traYckers and their backers, strengthening and diversifying legal

rural livelihoods, developing state institutions, and reducing the demand for illicit drugs and the treatmentof problem drug users. The UK has focused on the ﬁrst three of these (livelihoods is covered in a separatebrief).66. Law enforcement is essential to increase the risk associated with the drugs trade. Improved lawenforcement also helps improve wider governance and security, which are essential for development. TheUK has: (i) provided substantial support to the Counter-Narcotics Police, widely considered to be the mosteVective Afghan law enforcement body; and (ii) allocated over $20 million to the Criminal Justice TaskForce which prosecutes key ﬁgures in the drugs trade. Since May 2005, the Criminal Justice Task Force hassecured around 400 convictions. The UK is also seeking tough action against narco-corruption, which willmake a key contribution to strengthening support for the Government.67. Eradication of the crop can reinforce rule of law as part of a comprehensive Counter-Narcoticsstrategy. The UK supports eradication where alternative legal livelihoods exist. Eradication this yearreached 19,000 hectares, and we are now working to improve the capability of the Afghan eradication forces.68. Strong state institutions are essential to ensure coordinated implementation of the National DrugControl Strategy. The UK is pressing for reform of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to ensure theMinistry’s costs are sustainable, and aVordable by the Government of Afghanistan. The Ministry ofCounter-Narcotics leads the annual pre-planting campaign which highlights the risks and negative impactsassociated with poppy. Such a voluntary approach to the reduction of cultivation is likely to be moresustainable in the longer-term; this is therefore a key element of the overall strategy.

The level of funding for and the appropriateness of the Alternative Livelihoods Programme69. DFID is playing a major role in supporting the development of legal livelihood opportunities throughGovernment of Afghanistan national programmes, and providing policy advice to key ministries on howto support the growth of legal livelihood opportunities. DFID’s alternative livelihoods programmecontributes to the National Drugs Control Strategy as well as to the Interim National DevelopmentStrategy.70. In order to spread risk, most Afghans need several income streams to survive. In rural areas, theseincome streams may include agriculture, remittances and welfare. Poppy is one of the most proﬁtableAfghan crops, and provides an income for many poor labourers. Legal alternatives therefore need to providea reasonable rate of return.71. There are also a number of other factors that need to be in place for farmers to be able and willingto take up legal livelihoods. These include security, access to markets, access to credit, agricultural inputsand equipment, labour opportunities and training. More broadly, rural Afghans need access to education,healthcare and adequate sanitation if they are to be in a position to take advantage of livelihoodopportunities. DFID is working to help create these positive conditions, recognising that substantialprogress will need sustained eVort over many years.72. DFID is one of the biggest donors in the livelihoods sector. The majority of this funding supports theGovernment of Afghanistan’s own national programmes. These programmes are:(i)TheNational Solidarity Programme(over £38 million) which supports the planning andimplementation of community-based projects, funded by the Government of Afghanistan, butchosen by the communities themselves. Since May 2003, the project has led to the establishmentof 17,832 village councils in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, and has funded 30,463 projects, ofwhich 12,887 are completed. This programme is valuable both for the physical assets it provides,but also for the impact it has in raising the Governments visibility across the country.

(ii) TheMicroﬁnance Investment and Support Facility Afghanistan(£20 million) which oVers access tolegal credit. Since 2004, credit has been provided to 375,000 clients in 23 provinces, of whomaround 70% are women).(iii) TheNational Rural Access Programme(£18 million) which funds the rehabilitation of rural roads.Since 2004, over 9,070 km of roads have been rehabilitated, generating 13m employment days inall 34 provinces. This programme therefore helps improve access to markets, and also provides auseful source of income for people in rural areas.(iv) TheHorticulture and Livelihoods Programme(£7 million) which will improve incentives for privateinvestment, and strengthen institutional capacity, in key agricultural sectors. This programme isstill at an early stage, but is expected to deliver an increase in outputs from horticulture, poultryand dairy sectors.73. In addition to funding these programmes at a national level, DFID funds the Helmand elements ofthe National Solidarity Programme, National Rural Access Programme, Microﬁnance Investment andSupport Facility for Afghanistan, and the Government’s Rural Water and Sanitation Programme, underitsHelmand Agriculture and Rural Development Programme(£30 million). Since the start of this year, theprogramme has funded the construction of over 550 wells, and the rehabilitation of 40 km of rural roads.

74. DFID also funds a number of bilateral projects designed to support the National Drug ControlStrategy objectives of strengthening and diversifying legal livelihoods:(v) The Food and Agriculture OrganisationAlternative Livelihoods Programme(just under £3 millionover three years) which is supporting the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock tointegrate a counter-narcotics approach into all of its programmes.(vi) TheResearch in Alternative Livelihoods Fund(£3 million over three years) which funds appliedresearch into legal livelihoods such as alternative crops, livestock, and post-harvest processing,increasing income for communities.(vii) The Food and Agriculture OrganisationSustainable Livelihoods in Eastern Hazarajatproject(£3.77 million over ﬁve years) which is designed to develop the capacity of the rural population inEastern Hazarajat to pursue sustainable legal livelihoods.75. The ﬁnal element of DFID’s livelihoods programme is theSupport to Strategic Planning forSustainable Rural Livelihoodsprogramme (£4.5 million over ﬁve years), which provides advisory supportto strengthen the Ministries’ capacity in policy formulation and planning, budgeting, and monitoring andevaluation.76. DFID is working with the World Bank on a study of economic incentives to reduce opium cultivation,to be completed mid-October. Initial analysis has identiﬁed rural enterprise development, support for highvalue agriculture, and improved infrastructure as the most promising avenues to encourage farmers to moveaway from poppy. Once the work is complete we will be discussing with the Bank and the GoA how bestto take forward its recommendations.The role of Non-Governmental Organisations; the impact of the decline in direct core funding on the provisionof humanitarian services; the impact of the security situation on Non-Governmental Organisation activityThe role of NGOs77. As well as independent operations funded directly from donors, Non-Governmental Organisationsare the main implementing agencies in many UN programmes and in the Government of Afghanistan’sNational Priority Programmes. For example, the ﬂagship National Solidarity Programme is implementedthrough 23 national and International Non-Governmental Organisations. Non-GovernmentalOrganisations also play an important donor and implementation role in the health and education sectors.78. DFID values its partnerships with Non-Governmental Organisations in Afghanistan and conductsregular consultations on programme and policy issues. DFID, MOD, and FCO hold quarterly meetings onAfghanistan with Non-Governmental Organisation representatives in London. DFID would like to seeinternational and national Non-Governmental Organisations focus increasingly on building local civilsociety and appropriate accountability mechanisms.The impact of the decline in direct core funding on the provision of humanitarian services79. DFID’s funding to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund goes towards key GoA-ledprogrammes which are delivering essential services and encouraging long-term development. Non-Governmental Organisations are the main implementing partners for the National Solidarity Programmeand the Microﬁnance Investment and Support Facility for Afghanistan, and are therefore continuing to usetheir skills to deliver humanitarian services and foster sustainable development.80. UK funds are also directly available for Non-Governmental Organisations working in Afghanistan—through the FCO/MOD/DFID Global Conﬂict Prevention Pool, and the DFID-wide Civil SocietyChallenge Fund, Global Conﬂict Fund, and Governance and Transparency Fund. The Civil SocietyChallenge Fund is currently supporting Womankind and War Child programmes in Afghanistan andproposals for work in Afghanistan are currently being developed by Non-Governmental Organisations forsubmission to other funding pools. DFID’s Conﬂict, Humanitarian, and Security Department also fundsNon-Governmental Organisation de-mining work in Afghanistan.81. Since 2001 DFID has provided £120 million of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Prior to2003, the majority of DFID aid to Afghanistan was focussed on immediate reconstruction andhumanitarian needs. In 2003–04, following a change in the needs of the Government of Afghanistan ourfocus shifted to long term developmental programmes.82. DFID continues to provide humanitarian assistance. In 2006–07, the UK committed the followinghumanitarian aid to Afghanistan: £1 million for drought mitigation; £1.2 million to support HALO Trust’sde-mining programme; and £30,000 to provide food and other essential items like soap and blankets for3,000 internally displaced families in Helmand.83. In addition to our own bilateral aid to Afghanistan, DFID provides 17% of the EuropeanCommission’s 2007 commitment of EUR 140 million and over 10% of the World Bank’s commitment of$250-300 million a year. We also contribute to UN agencies and to the Asian Development Bank. Aproportion of this funding can be attributed to Humanitarian assistance.

The impact of the security situation on NGO activity84. Security in most provinces across Afghanistan allows the Government, Provincial ReconstructionTeams, the United Nations, donors, and Non-Governmental Organisations to continue their work. Thelarge United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisation presence in Afghanistan is testament to theirability to operate in the majority of the country. However, in the southern provinces where violence has beenmore intense, security is a major constraint on Non-Governmental Organisation activity.85. Many international Non-Governmental Organisations have decided that it is too insecure to havebases in the southern provinces. However, there are some United Nations agencies and Non-GovernmentalOrganisations operating in Helmand and the other southern provinces. DFID and other ProvincialReconstruction Teams members in Helmand work closely with these Non-Governmental Organisationswho are involved in identifying and implementing Quick Impact Projects, and who act as implementingGovernment of Afghanistan partners for DFID-funded rural development programmes operating inHelmand. DFID works hard to ensure the needs of Non-Governmental Organisations on security andindependence are met in this complex, civil-military environment.Harmonisation and coordination of the donor response; the relationship between diVerent aid modalities; therole and eVectiveness of the integrated mission86. DFID Afghanistan is deeply engaged in work to improve harmonisation and coordination of thedonor response in Afghanistan, which at present is weak. Around two-thirds of aid does not go throughthe Afghan government’s budget, and is therefore diYcult to track, monitor or factor into planning. DFIDstrongly believes that putting funding through the government, using proven funding mechanisms withrigorous safeguards, is far better value for money and signiﬁcantly reduces burdens on government. Goingbeyond both our Paris Declaration obligations and our commitment under the Development PartnershipAgreement (which was for 50% of our money to go through the government budget), we now put 80% ofour live portfolio through government.87. This is supported by evidence from the Peace Dividend Trust, who in a recent study estimated thelocal economic impact of aid spent through government systems to be more than four times greater than aidspent through international contractors or Non-Governmental Organisations. The World Bank, similarly,estimates that health services contracted outside Government are 50% more expensive than those contractedby Government.88. DFID is therefore supporting the Government of Afghanistan to produce a full Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper (the Afghanistan National Development Strategy) which will enable it to set clear prioritiesfor the coming ﬁve years. To ensure this can be eVectively implemented, DFID is also leading work on ajoint donor response to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. This aims to improveharmonisation and coordination of the donor response—bringing a greater proportion of aid into alignmentwith government priorities, as well as aiming to increase the proportion which is on-budget.89. DFID is also working closely with other donors on an external review of the AfghanistanReconstruction Trust Fund, due to report at the end of this year. The review will have two areas of focus:(a) a backward looking focus ie reviewing the extent to which the Afghanistan Reconstruction TrustFund, as originally designed, has achieved its aims and objectives; and(b) a forward looking focus which will determine the extent to which the Afghanistan ReconstructionTrust Fund as currently structured is an appropriate vehicle to meet the development challengesof the next 10 years in Afghanistan. The World Bank will work with donors to examine thepotential for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to evolve into a broader ﬁnancingmechanism capable of supporting a wider range of sectors.

1. Introduction1. ActionAid is a rights-based development agency working in more than 40 countries across Asia,Africa, Caribbean and Americas, with its international secretariat in Johannesburg. ActionAid startedworking in Afghanistan in 2002 and operates in the provinces of Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kabul,Kunduz, Ghazni and Kandhar.2. ActionAid implements a rights based approach in its projects and programmes in its ﬁght against thepoverty, injustice and insecurity that people and particularly women experience in Afghanistan. In additionof the projects in the ﬁeld ActionAid Afghanistan (AAA) also contributes to policy debates through itsresearch and advocacy work.3. At no time since 2001 has the security situation in the country looked so dire. Over the last year, theTaliban have regrouped, reorganised and refunded their insurgency, launching bitter battles across thesouthern third of Afghanistan. In addition, northern Afghanistan has not escaped unscathed from theinsurgency. There has been a spate of school burnings and attacks on police posts, which may be linked tothe Taliban. There are also reports that Islamic militant groups have been able to pay disgruntled militiacommanders to commit acts of violence. Economic motivation seems to be more prominent than ideology.In addition to this, the precarious law and order situation in various parts of the country has madehumanitarian workers and NGOs vulnerable to attacks from criminally motivated gangs and individualslooking to make quick money from robbery, theft and kidnapping.4. For the Taliban, it is important to show instability in northern as well as southern Afghanistan. Thatcan be done by attacking NATO troops or killing NGOs that are implementing government projects suchas the National Solidarity Programme (NSP).

2. The RoleofNGOs, The Impactof theDeclineinDirect Core Fundingon theProvisionofHumanitarian Services; The Impactof theSecurity SituationonNGO Activity5. Afghanistan is moving away from emergency relief to sustainable development. This transitionwarrants a long term strategy and commitment from all actors. But increasing insecurity is the greatestconcern for Afghan civilians and NGOs operating on the ground. Threats of kidnapping and targetedattacks on NGOs and their personnel, perceived to be aligned with international military and/or thegovernment of Afghanistan have rendered many areas out of bounds for any development orhumanitarian work.6. The murder of 3 AAA women staV members and their driver in May 2006 in northern Afghanistansent shockwaves throughout the organisation and larger international development community. Up to nowthe investigation of the case remains inconclusive and like the pace with which similar cases involving otherinternational NGO staV are progressing, it seems unlikely that anything concrete will emerge soon. Sincethe killing of staV members AAA has pulled out of the particular district in Jawzjan a relatively safe provincein northern Afghanistan. The increase in violent acts involving humanitarian workers all over the countryhas put extra an strain on NGO operations. Agencies including AAA are taking extra caution while decidingto operate in a particular area. Thus, leaving out people in areas where the security situation is perceived tobe dangerous. Further, programme quality in the ﬁeld is suVering due to periodic suspension of activitiesbecause of increased acts of violence and threats to staV security. Field staV are ﬁnding it diYcult to achieveprogramme objectives in set time frames; and intimate relationships with communities are gettingcompromised in some areas as staV in not able to spend quality time with the villagers. Lastly, the cost ofoperations has gone up for all NGOs as they are now forced to hire security advisors and put in placeeVective but expensive modes of communication to speed up information sharing and mitigate the risk.7. Donor aid policy including that of DfID for Afghanistan places signiﬁcant emphasis on state-buildinglinked to wider political and military objectives of stabilisation and political transition. As noted in theBOAG Afghanistan brieﬁng paper of September 2006 around 80% of the NGO activities are currently tiedto the government programmes. While ActionAid support the objectives of promoting eVective and

14.Role back of aid in the southAs the security situation has worsened in the south over recent months many aid agencies which haveoperated in the area have pulled out or drastically curtailed their activities.15.DrugsProgrammes to control and eliminate poppy cultivation fuel resentment, which can easily escalate to ageneralised resentment against all “outsiders” who are not part of the aVected community. A review of thecurrent counter narcotics strategy is required along the lines of suggestions made by the NGOs such asincreased focus availability of funds for alternative livelihoods, focus on drug traYcking and lawenforcement, etc.16.CorruptionActionAid’s experience is that resentment in the south focuses most commonly on oYcialdom which isperceived as corrupt and making money out of foreign aid whilst the local communities suVer the eVects ofinsecurity and attempts to curb poppy cultivation. In the north the resentment is aimed more at aid agenciesand ngos who are also seen as siphoning oV reconstruction money. Much of this perception stems from thefact that for many people their lives have not noticeably improved.17.Warlordism and ethnic divisionsMany of the militia commanders from the 1990s hold positions of power at either the national or at thedistrict or local level. The NSP is seen by many as an opportunity to supplement their income by chargingprotection money or a type of local “tax”. This presents a particular threat to agencies such as ActionAidwhich is committed to transparency. Further there seems to be no clear strategy to deal with warlords orwarlordism, this makes the process of reconciliation unclear.18.Police incompetencePolice reform has been one of the major failures of the post 2001 period. Paid only about £35 a month,many police are illiterate, poorly trained and with few skills. Many individual police oYcers have beenimplicated in drug trading, smuggling and human rights abuse.19.Attitudes towards women’s rightsThe work of many aid agencies such as ActionAid in promoting women’s rights is seen as threateningcultural values by many religious leaders.20.Criminality and continued militant activityCriminal activity intersects closely with political militancy as criminals exploit the vacuum of state controlto pursue their activities of extortion, kidnapping and violence.21.Recommendations— DfID should review its current counter narcotics strategy along the lines of suggestions made bythe NGOs.— DfID should continue to work with other donors focusing on police reform, and should explorenew and creative ways of working with police authorities throughout the UK to ensure increasedapplications of British police oVering their services in countries such as Afghanistan to traincounterparts.4. The ContributionofBudget Support, ThroughtheAfghanistan Reconstruction Trust FundtoStrengthening Institutional CapacityandAccountability22. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) has two components, the Recurrent Windowfor funding on-going budget costs, eg wages and operations and maintenance; and the Investment Windowwhich ﬁnances the development projects. In FY March 2004–05 (Solar Year 1383) the Recurrent Windowdisbursed US$235.2 million and the Investment Window US$50.6 million. The UK contributed US$103.06million in that year. As of January 2006 the investment window is made up of 12 investment projectstotalling US$267.6 million divided into three areas: (a) infrastructure; (b) public sector capacitydevelopment, including strengthening quality of education, and (c) rural development.

23. Preliminary ﬁndings of a review and analysis of the experience with Multi-donor trust funds inconﬂict aVected reconstruction presented at the Oslo Inception Workshop in May 20063reported that thegovernment of Afghanistan had strong ownership, and there was widespread support for the ARTF,especially in relation to its budget support. The report states: “For all parties, having the ARTF as a fundingsource has been extremely eYcient. For the Government of Afghanistan there is only one source of fundingfor the recurrent budget and thus only one actor with which to interact. Since the World Bank as a policyprovides on-budget ﬁnancing and has long experience in managing funding in this manner, the governmenthas had an experienced interlocutor back to the donors who in fact are providing a ﬁduciary managementservice that enables more donors than otherwise to provide funding to the budget.”24. However the review also found that there was no eVective strategy for capacity development, eitherfor the budget support functions or for the project implementation. Many projects did have a capacitydevelopment function, but it was on anad hocrather than planned basis. The Inception Report found thatthere was no explicit strategy for maximising the impact of capacity development. At a project level thereview found that the human skills base was aging, and that donors provided their own training with littleco-ordination of human resource development. Technical assistance has also been characterised by poorinstitutional arrangements with little co-ordination to capture best practice or avoid gaps and reduceduplication. The Inception Report found that the ARTF achievements are fragile, and are dependent onexternal technical assistance and continued improvement in national stability and security.25. The vast majority of the government’s funding comes from outside the country. In Solar Year 1383(March 2004–05) 4.8 billion, a large percentage of the government’s annual budget, of this was provided bydonors with only US$1.7 as core budget. Of this 1.7 billion, 1.3 billion was directly supervised by donors.This means that only 8% of public funds were fully controlled by the government itself. At the same timebecause of the historical lack of capacity of the government, ngos and private contractors have played alarge role in project implementation and service delivery.26. ActionAid received funding from the ARTF for project implementation as part of the NationalSolidarity Programme. ActionAid has been facilitating implementation of the NSP since 2004, and last yearits contract budget was US$1.4 million. Currently ActionAid works in 298 communities establishingcommunity development councils, facilitating the elaboration of Village Development Plans, supporting thecommunities in problem prioritisation and developing sub-project proposals. The communities then submitthese proposals to the government for approval and ngos facilitate the implementation of these projects.27. Involvement of non-government organisations and other civil society organisations in the ARTF hasbeen almost purely at the level of project implementation. Ngos have had no input into decision-making,which is mainly the domain of the donors, nor have Ngos and csos had any involvement in monitoring andevaluation. It is a major challenge for ngos and csos to ﬁnd ways to engage with the ARTF in policydevelopment. The emphasis of policy development in the ARTF is primarily in Washington DC at theWorld Bank headquarters.28. The investment window of the ARTF has focused too much on infrastructural projects at the expenseof public sector capacity development. The public sector development aspects of the ARTF take place as ifin a vacuum devoid of a political analysis and conﬂict prevention tools. DfID has committed itself to makingall its development work conﬂict sensitive4and is committed to ensuring that development takes betteraccount of its possible eVect on conﬂict. To this extent, and as a major contributor to the ARTF, it isimportant DfID uses the ﬁndings from its Afghanistan Country Governance Assessment to ensure thatconﬂict sensitivity is applied to all aspects of ARTF’s Investment Window projects.29. DfID should ensure that public sector capacity development and rural development projects withinthe Investment Window of the ARTF include on-going conﬂict analysis, so that they can take account ofviews on the ground, and not just base their analysis on bi-lateral relations with the government. This isinevitably both time consuming and requires dedicated funding. DfID should encourage the use ofassessment tools such as ActionAid’s Participatory Vulnerability Analysis, a methodology which bringstogether diVerent actors within communities to look at their own vulnerabilities and propose solutions toeither minimise or solve them.30. ActionAid’s own experience with the ARTF is that there is a lack of mechanisms to involveimplementing partners. Early on in the ARTF’s implementation, there was a one-oV attempt to set up aforum for implementing partners, run by a foreign consultant attached to the Ministry of RuralDevelopment. However, the forum did not continue, and ActionAid’s experience was that nothing changedin policy or practice terms as a result of the suggestions and ideas raised in forum, although participants feltit had provided a useful focus for the exchange of information between themselves.31. The Inception report in its conclusions on the ARTF noted that “The ARTF has been an extremelyuseful harmonising instrument for budget support and contributed to co-ordination of the national ruraldevelopment programmes”. It went on to note that “It is unclear to what extent ARTF is contributing toany further harmonisation, since is so small compared to other resources”.34

32. In relation to gender, the 2006 review of the ARTF found that in the absence of a clear gender policy,although some projects had clear gender targets, this was on an ad hoc basis and dependent on individualtask managers, rather than a result of a systematic policy. However, the three large development projectsof the ARTF do have gender mandates:—for example the National Solidarity Programme requires theestablishment Community Development Committees with equal participation of women, it also requiresthat female CDC members plan, implement and manage atleast 1 sub-project proposed under NSP. Further,gender has been identiﬁed as a cross cutting theme for Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)to ensure that all sectoral strategies incorporate gender components in the proposed programmes andprojects.33. ActionAid’s experience of the ARTF is that there is an over-emphasis on employing internationalcontractors for implementing its investment window projects, without suYcient emphasis on capacitydevelopment of national staV, or identifying potentially capable national contractors. In its ownimplementation of ARTF funded projects, ActionAid changed the practice in its own development districtsto ensure local recruitment of poor workers. ActionAid used a participatory rural appraisal methodologyto identify the participating workers and carried out a pilot study in one areas, which the government agreedinitially to roll-out nationwide, although in the end this did not happen.

34.Recommendations— DfID should work to inﬂuence World Bank policies at the headquarters level as well as with themanagement of the ARTF to ensure than gender mainstreaming guidelines are applied across theboard in the ARTF. This should include both the Investment Window and the Recurrent Window.— DFID should use its inﬂuence to ensure that CSOs are invited as observers on ARTF.— FID should encourage establishment of an independent aid ombudsman to monitor and evaluatethe work done by donors.— DfID should work in close collaboration with the Afghanistan Ministry of Women’s AVairs toensure than it elaborates a gender policy which is articulated across government.— DfID should use its seat on the World Bank Board of Governors to ensure that all multi-donortrust funds have clearly articulated gender policies and include gender targets throughout itsfunding, from the very inception of the MDTF.— DfID should ensure that the ARTF establishes adequate instruments to ensure that theexperiences and recommendations for policy and practice change made by implementing partnersof the Investment Window are taken into account, and acted on as appropriate.— Multi Donor Trust Funds should give more emphasis to developing national capacity andemploying national contractors. DfID should work with other international donors, as well as useits position within the World Bank Board of Governors to improve MDTF practices in this regard.

5. HarmonisationandCoordinationof theDonor Response;theRelationshipbetweenDifferentAid Modalities,theRoleandEffectivenessof theIntegrated Mission35. In line with the Paris Aid EVectiveness meeting the Ministry of Finance has established an aid co-ordination and eVectiveness group involving all donors. This group has been established keeping in viewthat a lot of donors are channelling their funds outside the state treasury ie funding projects in Afghanistandirectly and not through ARTF/GOA.36. There is no CSO representation on this group as similar to ARTF it is only the donors who are invitedfor the meeting.37. A database has been created by the ministry of ﬁnance where donors are encouraged to report moneythey are channelling through the “external budget”. This is to ensure proper records of the money comingto the country. The External Budget records the expenditures which are directly executed by the donors, iewhich do not go through the Government’s treasury system. The external budget shows an interestingpattern of spending during the past few years. The size of the external budget increased from US$824 millionto US$1,344 million (by 63%) between SY1381 and SY1384. The main drivers of this increase were securityand economic governance expenditures. In SY1385, however, actual external budget expenditures declineddramatically as compared with previous years. Actual external budget expenditure in SY1385 was US$743million, only 44% of the budget (US$1,720 million).38. This decline in external budget can be attributed to two reasons. One is the shift from external budgetto core budget including the national army’s salaries and subsidy of the diesel fuel for power generation inKabul city. The other, more importantly, is deterioration in reporting which appears to be the main reason.The sharp decline in reported external budget security expenditures (from US$937 million in SY1383 toUS$303 million in SY1384 and only US$20 million in SY1385), during a period of time when major securitysector expenditure programs were being ramped up, conﬁrms the importance of this latter reason.

Memorandum submitted by AfghanaidSummary1. As one of the few British NGOs and certainly the oldest British NGO devoted completely to assistingthe people of Afghanistan, Afghanaid is pleased to contribute to the International Development SelectCommittee’s (IDSC) inquiry into the eVectiveness of British aid programmes in that country. Afghanaid hasbeen a major implementing partner for aid programmes of both the British government and the EuropeanCommunity for most of its history in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003 however, there has been a signiﬁcantshift in the way donors have chosen to deliver aid in Afghanistan. Afghanaid is submitting this paper as acase study of one NGO’s experience of that shift in order to accompany and complement the evidencesubmitted by BAAG. Afghanaid’s own experience is presented in this paper, as well as the community levelimpact stemming from (1) declining support for needs-based livelihood assistance, (2) sporadic andunpredictable aid ﬂows, and (3) poor public sector co-ordination. Afghanaid’s conclusions closely mirrorthose of BAAG, as the organisation remains deeply concerned about the erosion of assistance to the remoteand inaccessible communities which we have a mandate to serve.2. Donor funding has shifted in most cases towards almost exclusively investing in budget support andgovernment sub-contracting programmes. In practice, this shift has meant a decline in support to helpcommunities ﬁnd sustainable ways to ensure food security and to meet basic needs. It has also diminishedthe role of formerly key NGO development partners. This donor shift was predicated on the assumptionthat the emerging Afghan government would be able to develop capacity quickly enough to deliver muchneeded programmes across Afghanistan in a timely fashion, an assumption that has proved to be false.While some ministries have indeed made rapid progress, there is still a huge gap between what is needed andgovernment capacity to deliver—particularly at provincial and district levels. Many NGOs have skills andthe interest to assist in sub-national capacity building eVorts, yet they are not being supported to do so, inspite of requests from poorly trained and resourced local government representatives in remote areas.3. There has also been a shift in the focus of rural development programmes. New donor programmesin this sector are increasingly focused on developing market potential rather than ensuring a safety net toensure basic needs, yet both are essential for balanced and equitable development. New value chainstrengthening initiatives are so far very localised and targeted at regions near well developed market towns,leaving the more remote and vulnerable areas without livelihoods support.4. In addition to shifts in sector focus and partnership mechanisms, problems with aid deliverymechanisms for those programmes delivered through the Government of Afghanistan have been severe,further preventing aid from reaching people who need it most. The result of inconsistent, interrupted, andnon needs-based aid programmes has been increased frustration and mistrust by rural communities of boththe international community and the Afghan government. Although Afghanaid like many NGOs iscommitted to locating alternative sources of funding to continue vital front line programmes, sources ofsuch funding are extremely limited. There is currently no national programmes to support livelihoods needsin rural communities (particularly related to agriculture, food security and income generation).Afghanaid Background5. Afghanaid was registered as a charity in the UK in 1983 in order to provide emergency assistance toAfghans displaced by ﬁghting. By 1985, it was running a ﬂeet of ambulances across the border betweenAfghanistan and Pakistan. As ﬁghting became more localised during the early 1990s, Afghanaid beganassisting in the rehabilitation of major infrastructures and the re-vitalisation of food production. Afghanaidis now a largely Afghan-managed NGO with a staV of 450 Afghans. It is governed by a Board of Trustees inthe UK, where there is also a small Afghanaid fundraising oYce. Afghanaid’s Head OYce in Kabul providessupport and oversight to programmes in four provinces.6. Afghanaid’s mission is to work in the most vulnerable and remote areas of Afghanistan. For thatreason, based on criteria including poverty indicators and poor access to essential services, Afghanaid hasbeen implementing community development projects in the provinces of Badakhshan, Samangan, Ghor and

Nuristan for an average of seven years. Sadly, because of the severely deteriorated security situation, ourrecent activities in Nuristan have been limited, but Afghanaid has wide coverage in the other threeprovinces—currently reaching over 900 villages across 14 districts.7. Afghanaid’s own history reﬂects the changing aid priorities in this country that has suVered so muchstrife and conﬂict over the past 25 years. From 1983 to 1995, we focused on emergency relief assistance needs,but then shifted to integrated rural development activities, combining agricultural extension, animal healthcare, vocational training and kitchen gardening for women, micro-ﬁnance, and infrastructure which wouldhelp communities improve production and access to markets. In 2003, Afghanaid entered into a robustpartnership with the Government of Afghanistan by facilitating the National Solidarity Programme (NSP).NSP is an excellent initiative for encouraging wide participation in local governance decisions and inimplementing primarily small scale infrastructure projects. It is one of the Government of Afghanistan’sNational Priority Programmes and is scheduled to reach every rural community throughout Afghanistan ifsecurity conditions and donor support allow.8. Until 2006, with funding from the EC and DFID, Afghanaid was able to complement local governancegains by expanding livelihoods support available to Community Development Councils (CDCs) andvarious interest groups they represented (for example women’s and farmers’ associations). In 2006, bothdonors discontinued their direct support for NGOs facilitating integrated livelihoods activities.

DeclineofNeeds-based Aid9. Until 2005, Afghanaid was able to oVer much needed livelihoods skills training so necessary in theremote areas where Afghanaid works. Funding for this integrated livelihood skills training came fromDFID and the EC. Both agencies discontinued this type of support to rural communities in 2006 followingtheir policy shift towards direct budgetary support or the routing of aid primarily through the Governmentof Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that at that time DFID discontinued funding a successful consortium offour major NGOs (of which two, including Afghanaid, were British) implementing an alternative livelihoodsprogramme in the poppy growing province of Badakhshan.10. Afghanaid entered into a very constructive partnership with the Swiss Government’s developmentagency (SDC) in 2006 which enabled the charity to continue and improve its delivery of livelihood supportin the province of Samangan. In the much more remote provinces of Badakhshan and Ghor, however,discontinuation of DFID and EC support for livelihoods threatens development in 700 communities in ninedistricts. These districts are located in provinces with extreme poverty indicators and continued risk of foodinsecurity. These provinces also suVer from isolation due to long periods of winter inaccessibility.11. Afghanaid has obtained a few small grants from disparate sources in order to continue some of thelivelihoods activities previously covered by the EC and DFID, but coverage will be much reduced, andtransaction costs to Afghanaid much higher. Reduced coverage will inevitably threaten the gains many ruralvillages were able to make in reducing the number of months when families experienced real hunger, whichcame through Afghanaid’s training in improved agricultural techniques, animal husbandry, kitchen gardensand food preservation, not to mention wheat banks which served as a safety net for vulnerable groups.Communities in these districts are well aware that there are no government facilities yet in place that couldtake the place of the extremely useful livelihoods support that Afghanaid has oVered.

SporadicandUnpredictable Aid Flows12. Afghanaid is a long standing and committed partner of one of the most successful Government ofAfghanistan programmes—the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). A series of evaluations haveindicated that NSP is bringing signiﬁcant positive impact in local governance capacities (including women’sparticipation) as well as ownership and pride in the construction of small scale infrastructure projects thatwere prioritised and overseen by village level councils in over 15,000 rural locations. Yet even this highlysuccessful programme continues to be threatened by failures to ensure consistent and adequate fundingﬂows through the pooled funding mechanisms established by donors for national priority programmes. Lesshighly visible programmes have undoubtedly suVered more.13. Failure to achieve consistent funding ﬂows to NSP resulted in over 500 days in the past several yearswhen NSP had no funds to disburse for community block grant allocations—an essential design componentof the NSP. Delays in receiving block grants were compounded in many cases by seasonal inaccessibilityconstraints which meant thousands of communities waiting close to a year to be able to implement projectsthat community members had prioritised. Community members were understandably disillusioned andangry. Credibility of the elected Community Development Council members as well as the Government ofAfghanistan and the NGOs acting as facilitating partners suVered accordingly. In addition, over the threeyears of NSP implementation, many of the NGOs delivering the programme in the rural areas have had toadvance their own unrestricted funds (when possible) to keep NSP running. Because an increasingpercentage of project portfolios of those same NGOs are resourced through sub-contracts with theGovernment of Afghanistan, they are overly vulnerable to such payment delays. Afghanaid for example was

required to spend £600,000 in reserves between April and September 2007 alone to keep NSP running. Onemore month of payment delays of an already six month overdue invoice would have required Afghanaid toshut down NSP activities.14. Analysis of the source of the cash ﬂow interruptions reveals two primary causes which are: (1)inadequate and late donor pledges, and (2) bottlenecks in funding request and approval mechanisms. NSPcontinues to suVer a £125 million funding deﬁcit for its current phase, although the implementing ministryand a group of donors are now working very hard and co-operatively to prevent further cash ﬂowinterruptions. The lesson from this experience seems to be that donors have a responsibility to ensure thatprocessing mechanisms are in place and functioning well and staV adequately trained to access them. Thislesson also highlights the danger of dangers of routing all aid through a pooled funding mechanismdependent on high capacity and co-ordination levels until those attributes are fully in place.Poor Public Sector Co-ordination15. Afghanaid’s experiences with the donor-created “Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund” (CNTF), forwhich the British government took the lead bi-lateral role, may serve as a useful example of the impact ofpoorly designed and executed donor initiatives meant to be delivered through public sector structures.Although the CNTF was originally presented to NGOs as a funding source that could replace some of thediscontinued support for livelihoods development, the guidelines for the CNTF approval processes wereunclear and changed many times. A number of NGOs submitted proposals to the CNTF in good faith, yetafter many months of waiting, and in spite of the fact that the proposals were developed in consultationwith line ministries that endorsed them, they have not yet been approved. Unfortunately, there are few otherprogrammes that could cover rural (alternative) livelihoods activities to turn to outside of the US-fundedalternative livelihoods programmes in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Badakhshan.16. Afghanaid’s application5to the CNTF was submitted in April 2006, and over the past nearly 18months, Afghanaid has been asked to submit revised proposal texts/budgets ﬁve times, yet has receivedneither an approval nor a rejection, because it has failed to reach the end of the review labyrinth. This limbocontinues in spite of endorsement and advice from a number of donor representatives that have contributedto the CNTF. This experience has been shared by other NGOs, and the CNTF has tied up at least $40 millionof aid that could have gone to support rural livelihoods. There is now a widespread perception that the fewprojects ever funded through CNTF were awarded on the basis of personal connections with key ministryﬁgures, rather than more objective criteria.17. Problems with CNTF proposal review procedures have revolved around two key issues:— Ministry involvement: There was widespread confusion over the degree to which proposalssubmitted had to actually be from Ministries. Early guidance indicated that it would be suYcientto indicate a component of partnership with a ministry or at a minimum endorsement from aministry, yet this later proved not to be the case.— Procurement regulations: Six months after the initiation of the CNTF, NGOs with pendingproposals were informed that their project designs and proposals would have to be publiclytendered. Many of the requests for proposal revisions after that date were for the purpose ofensuring proposals were completely generic in nature so that any agency could bid for them. Suchan approach completely disregards the fact that NGOs have built up unique histories andrelationships with communities and local leaders throughout rural Afghanistan, and the designsarising from that unique background cannot be simply be transferred to another implementer.Such tendering would also violate principles of intellectual property rights that the creators ofproject designs have a right to assume will be respected when submitting proposals (unless theyare speciﬁcally contracted to design a project for public tendering).18. Experienced ministries were also under the impression that NGOs could submit proposals to CNTFand then be awarded funds to implement them. This impression persisted as late as September 2006 whenthe Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) requested a number of NGOs to designand submit cash for work infrastructure projects to the CNTF as part of MRRD’s co-ordination of droughtrelief, since CNTF was known to have much needed un-programmed funding. MRRD later had to informthe NGOs that complied with their request (including Afghanaid) that their designs and proposals wouldhave to be tendered to other implementers.19. Many hundreds of hours of skilled professionals’ time have been wasted in an extremely un-transparent CNTF review and approval process. This could have been prevented if the CNTF mechanismshad been designed to match realities on the ground, and if they had been shared in a transparent fashionwith all stakeholders. Other ministries have managed to comply with procurement regulations while stillawarding contracts to NGOs that were based on a competitive process that highlighted each applicant’sstrengths and suitability and not necessarily because of lowest price. But these Ministries have drawn oncapacities to design a programme framework under which proposals can be reviewed—a capacity thatCNTF does not seem to possess. Again, the lesson seems to be that if donors create development funding5

Conclusion20. International donors clearly have immense inﬂuence over the path to be taken in re-buildingAfghanistan after 25 years of war. A balanced, needs-based approach that does not neglect meeting basicneeds is recommended. Unfortunately, the principle that aid should reach the people who need it most hasbecome lost in the competing agendas for state building, market development, poppy eradication, andcounter-insurgency eVorts. Literature reviews of development in Afghanistan indicate that attention tosustainable livelihoods development (particularly for enterprise and job creation and training) for remoteand vulnerable populations would have an important stabilising eVect and reduce dependency on poppycultivation, yet very few donors oVer funding for such activities anymore. NGOs continue to be the mostexperienced and skilled organisations for working in the ﬁeld of sustainable livelihoods, yet there are veryfew resources allowing them to contribute to this ﬁeld.21. Current funding mechanisms of most donors reduce the potential of a valuable aid deliveryresource—the NGOs. In spite of decades of experience in Afghanistan and their ability to pilot innovativeideas, NGOs ﬁnd themselves increasingly side-lined from aid programme design and meaningfulpartnership implementation decisions, in spite of the fact that the cost of their operations are a fraction ofUN agencies or of consulting ﬁrms. This is occurring even though NGOs can and do work in dangerousparts of Afghanistan which government representatives and PRTs consider too volatile to approach. MostNGOs work with minimal security apparatus due to their reliance on community acceptance as protection,yet many donors baulk at even the modest costs of enhanced security related equipment requested by NGOs.In extreme cases, current donor policies will hasten the ﬁnancial ruin of long-established and dependableNGOs of integrity unless those NGOs are either willing to accept an almost entirely sub-contractor rolewhich erodes their independence and neutrality, or can quickly develop non-statutory funding sources.Scandinavian, German, Irish, Japanese, Canadian and American NGOs are able to count on theirgovernments reserving some component of their Afghanistan aid portfolios for their national NGOs, butBritish NGOs are not able to count on such support.In an environment as volatile as Afghanistan, the diminution of long standing non-governmental partnersable to address emergency relief needs as well as to develop rural communities and ﬂedgling civil societygroups should be viewed as risky in the long run. Putting all development resources through not yet fullydeveloped governmental structures is a dangerously undiversiﬁed approach that has resulted in a regrettableneglect of basic needs in rural areas. It risks resulting in overly controlling central government structureswith weak civil society counterparts that will undermine democratic processes. It may also encourage anundesirable expectation that government should provide all development, thereby discouraging self-helpinitiatives and fuelling frustration when those expectations are not met.Annex ACHRONOLOGY CHART OF AFGHANAID’S SUBMISSIONS TO CNTFDateApril 2006May 2006EventAfghanaid submitted CNTF proposal via Ministry of Agriculture for livelihoodsactivities in Ghor and Badakhshan provinces.Based on request from the Ministry of Agriculture (Yaqub Roshan of USAID-funded RAMP project) to reduce mention of CDCs from proposal, text wasrevised and re-submitted.Afghanaid re-submitted proposal in response to a request from Ministry ofAgriculture to excise Afghanaid’s name as the implementing partner in theproposal because otherwise it would fall foul of procurement laws interpreted tomean that agency submitting design could not also be awarded that project.Afghanaid was informed their proposal would have to be tendered if/when alsoapproved by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).Afghanaid received notiﬁcation that the Minstry of Agriculture had approvedAfghanaid’s proposal.Afghanaid and other NGOs were requested to survey, design and submit cash forwork infrastructure projects as a drought relief response in CNTF format by theMRRD with the understanding that if approved, these projects would beimplemented by the NGOs who submitted the proposal.* Later NGOs wereinformed that their designs would have to be tendered to contracting companies.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by AfghanaidI thought you might be interested to see a note which I asked Afghanaid’s Director of Human Resourcesto prepare in response to some of the detailed questions you raised with me and others when we appearedbefore the International Development Committee on 15 November.I have also passed this note on to the British and Irish Afghanistan Agencies Group which is sending somefurther information to the IDC on a range of questions discussed that day.The Afghanaid information shows the extent to which we as an NGO are suVering from a loss of staV toother employers, particularly the UN agencies and in some cases to government itself According to ourstatistics, we have had a 33% turnover of staV over the past two years. In some ﬁelds, like engineering andaccountancy, recruitment and retention problems are particularly acute.As to whether we employ teachers in particular, and in so doing take them away vocational employmentin government schools, the answer is that we do not in general employ teachers, though governmentregulations on this matter vary from province to province.Though this information is only about Afghanaid, our Kabul staV ﬁnd that other NGOs complain ofsimilar diYculties, and I hope you will ﬁnd this snapshot from our experience helpful in answering the kindof concerns which you raised.David PageChair of TrusteesAFGHANAID NOTE ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF STAFF—A RESPONSE TOTHE QUESTIONS OF ANN MCKECHIN MP ON THESE ISSUES

By Muhammad Hyder Wahidi—Afghanaid DirectorofAdministrationandHuman Resources1.Do you run any projects that help to improve capacity of Government personnel?Afghanaid invites employees from the provincial and district agriculture departments to attend normaltraining sessions and ﬁeld days to enhance their expertise and experiences. Afghanaid has established aregular consultation process with the local agriculture departments. In addition, the local agriculturedepartments have agreed to give us counterparts in Baharak, Keshem and Faizabad in Badakhshan (BDK)Province. As a result of this approach the local agriculture department employees will work from two tothree years directly with Afghanaid.In addition, Afghanaid aims to liaise with the government veterinary department in our Brooke projectsin BDK.Likewise, Afghanaid trains for one- year government employees in NSP. For example, two persons(mostly a couple) work in each NSP district on Cycle 2! projects.Training of the government employee will signiﬁcantly enhance their conﬁdence, self-interest in the job,loyalty, commitment, expertise, skills and experience. Afghanaid aims to train the government employeesto excel at their performance to enable them to meet the upcoming challenges successfully. The training willalso encourage career progression.The training will also promote genuine coordination, communication and information sharing betweenNGOs and the government departments.

2.Is there any movement of staV from NGOs to Government or State sector?Since 2003 when we moved our headquarters from Peshawar to Kabul some of our staV have moved fromAfghanaid to state sector in the provinces and in the capital. These staV have joined ministry of agricultureand MRRD/NSP.Please note that most of our colleagues especially our engineers have joined UNOPS. Others have beenhired by World Bank and USAID funded projects due to higher salaries.3.Are you facing any diYculty in the recruitment of staV?We have faced great recruitment diYculties:Firstly, it is hard to ﬁnd experienced and qualiﬁed staV in the provinces where we work. Therefore, wehave to hire staV from other provinces and from Kabul. For instance, we cannot managers, engineers,accountants and IT staV in the provinces where we work. We have to hire them from Kabul and send themto our work areas.Secondly, retention is a major issue. For instance, the out of province staV do not stay longer in theprovinces due to family, security and travelling reasons. Moreover, our working areas are very remote anddiYcult, with very limited facilities. However, we are trying our best to provide the basic living and workingconditions for our colleagues in the provinces where we work.Recruitment of “out of province” female staV to work in provinces is a diYcult matter. This problem isvery high in Ghor and Nuristan.4.Other comments that you wish to make in light of Ann McKechin’s questionsAfghanaid has greatly suVered from staV turnover over the past ﬁve years. We have lost a considerablenumber of committed, competent, experienced and qualiﬁed personnel due to higher salaries paid mostlyby UN, international organizations and USAID funded projects. The situation got worse when ourheadquarters was moved from Peshawar to Kabul in 2003 because quality development staV are scarce inAfghanistan and the competition for them is intense.In order to tackle the staV turnover issue in a reasonable manner, Afghanaid is investing in training anddevelopment of the existing and newly recruited staV in order to create adaptable and qualiﬁed staV to meetthe upcoming challenges. Moreover, we hire and train volunteers on a regular basis. These volunteers caneasily ﬁnd jobs in the NGOs, UN and government oYces.Despite being a long established NGO, Afghanaid can’t compete in terms of salaries with those paid byUSAID funded projects, UN and other international organizations. We attempt, however, to provide otherattractions to retain staV, such as high-quality training, a good working environment and other non-material beneﬁts, as a means of reducing staV turnover.Our analysis of the overall staV turnover since June 2005 indicates that we lost approximately 33% of ourestablishment during this period and illustrates very well the recruitment and retention issues we face.5.Recruitment of TeachersThe table below shows the diVerent positions on hiring teachers of local govt authorities in the provinceswhere we work. Our provincial managers do not generally support the hiring of teachers.S/nProvinceGovernment position onhiring teachersSo far provincial oYcehas not received anyletter “not” to hireteachers.Government has issued aban on hiring teachers.AAD practice on hiringteachersAAD has hired someteachers.A few teachers werehired after obtainingwritten agreement fromthe educationdepartment.A few teachers werehired after obtainingwritten agreement fromthe educationdepartment.Position of AADProvincial ProgramManagersNot to hire teachers.

SummaryThe British Council re-commenced operations in Afghanistan in June 2004. We now have one centre inKabul and a contact point in Balkh (Mazar al Sharif).We play an important role in the UK’s contribution to the international eVorts to build stability andenhance democratic institutions in the country. Our work focuses on extending educational opportunitiesand strengthening the post-Taliban renaissance of culture, particularly re-establishing links and contactswith the outside world, after more than two decades of international isolation.In order to provide access to international sources of knowledge and training, there is an over-riding needfor capacity-building in the English language. This work includes building the capacity of English withinthe Afghan Parliament—both for elected members and for staV—to enable it to co-operate more eVectivelywith its external counterparts and beneﬁt more fully from training provided by its international partners.We also undertake similar work with the Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with the British Embassydrugs team, to assist with implementation of the counter-narcotics programme.We are building strong partnerships with the Ministries of Education and Higher Education, which areassisting in curriculum modernisation for the madrassah system (broadening access to vocationaleducation), providing access to UK experience in education reform, capacity-building for English teachers,and building research and other links for Kabul University and Kabul Medical University. There are 16country-appointed staV and four UK-appointed staV, working to meet the high level of demand for ourservices and for access to UK resources and partners.Security concerns limit our ability to capitalise on these opportunities and place constraints on attractingUK staV, consultants and visitors and on their ability to travel beyond Kabul and the North. As a result,we carefully target our eVorts and resources, with greatest emphasis on reaching enablers and multipliersas well as partners who can help provide impact in the provinces.The points below demonstrate how we achieve national impact despite the constraints of the challengingsecurity situation:1. We work closely with the Afghan government at senior levels in Ministries in order to assist with policydevelopment in such areas as curriculum.1.1 We do this both through employing in-country advisers and bringing in external consultants.Through extensive talks with Afghan oYcials we identify policy areas of interest then sponsor study toursto the UK for Afghan oYcials to identify speciﬁc areas for follow up.1.2 Study groups contain representatives from all levels of engagement—policy (ministers, MPs),administrators and practitioners—and help garner a wide base of support so that the projects havecontinued support even if the government changes.2. The focus of our training activities is to build the capacity of Afghan trainers in universities andministries so that techniques can be passed onto to lecturers, teachers and students in the provinces whomwe would not otherwise be able to reach.2.1 We currently work with central institutions in Kabul which prepare students for work elsewhere inthe country. We will shortly be expanding our outreach by bringing in lecturers and teachers for theprovinces into Kabul to attend workshops.3. Ensuring that our work has a sustainable impact necessitates working closely with Afghaninstitutional and governmental partners.3.1 Our work with the Ministry of Education Control (Inspection) Department enables the AfghanGovernment to assess how far the techniques and methodology learned by trained teachers is being appliedin the country’s schools.

3.2 We are a strong supporter of ELTAA, the Afghan English Language Teachers Association, whichis slowly expanding to have a nationwide presence; the association and its training programme oVer an idealway of providing access to provinces we cannot reach directly.3.3 We also provide ministries with useful information on educational websites they can use, and aremaking our own English Language Teaching website, Go4English, more accessible. Originally in English-Arabic it has already been translated into Farsi and we planning to translate it into Pashto so that thesouthern provinces can beneﬁt.3.4 Among other new methods of extending outreach we are also considering ﬁlming training sessionsand burning them to CD for national distribution.4. Our Direct Teaching provides vital language skills to key oYcials who will be able to use theirimproved knowledge of English to contribute to the development of their country. Past students haveincluded Parliamentarians, ministry oYcials and the Vice President.5. Local partners/NGOs are vital in helping us to carry out work in areas in which it would just be toodangerous/culturally impossible for us to do so. Next week, for example, we will begin conducting musicclasses for girls in Kandahar utilising the services of a local cultural organisation.6. We have countered the restrictions on our limited physical presence by building up a communicationsnetwork across Afghanistan.6.1 In 2006–07 we supplied computers and a one-year Internet subscription to Faculties of Educationacross the country. This has enabled us to interact more directly with those institutions, discussing issuesand exchanging ideas and information.6.2 We have also supplied similar facilities to schools in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar which willtake part in our school links programme (with the UK) as well as a number of government madrassas inother provinces.7. We have a greater programme of material assistance to institutions in Afghanistan than we wouldnormally have in any other country.7.1 We provide computers and small generators (in institutions where they would otherwise have beenunable to power the donated computers), books and CD-ROMS. The latter, materials from British Counciltraining websites, are a particularly valuable tool as many institutions/schools have access to computers butno internet connection.7.2 We have also set up self-access facilities in the Islamic Education, Sports and CurriculumDepartments of the central Ministry of Education which visitors can access from across the country.8. In order to support all these outreach activities we will also deploy Afghan Study Skills OYcers. Theywill initially be responsible for training targeted institutions in the use of computers and the internet andwill then take on responsibility for a wider portfolio of training. This vital training will ensure that maximumbeneﬁt is gained from the computers donated.

Memorandum submitted by the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)Executive SummaryBAAG welcomes the International Development Committee’s Inquiry at this critical stage to examine theUK government’s development assistance in Afghanistan. We support and commend the UK government’scommitment to Afghanistan and recognise that DFID is one of the largest donors of aid and thatAfghanistan is DFID’s ﬁfth largest programme. This report presents an overview of perspectives from theground and challenges faced by international NGOs and their local partners.Since the last Inquiry by the International Development Committee, increasing insecurity has been thegreatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Over the past year levels of violencehave been at their highest since 2001. There have been increased civilian casualties in the insecure areas inthe South, and concerns have been raised by the Afghan and international human rights groups and the UN.As Afghan communities become increasingly disillusioned with the pace of change and the level of servicesthey receive, the threat to the state building exercise currently undertaken by the Afghan government withthe support of the international community is all too evident.Decisions by key donors to channel the majority of funding through the UN and to the Afghangovernment through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have signiﬁcantly reducedfunding and restricted opportunities for innovation for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). DFID, inparticular, has drastically reduced UK funding available for frontline services and livelihoods programmesdelivered by NGOs.While many development NGOs support the objectives of promoting eVective and accountableauthorities, they are concerned that current aid policies are imbalanced. Donor policy emphasises central“state-building” at the expense of providing basic services to populations in regions outside of the capacity

of the government to deliver and of its political or geographic reach. This has led to what the OverseasDevelopment Institute terms a “service gap”: when relief assistance is phased out but state capacity isinsuYcient to ensure the provision of services.6Aid agencies under the umbrella of BAAG and ACBAR have highlighted serious concern at the growingvulnerability of the development and humanitarian eVort in Afghanistan as a result of deteriorating security,unmet aid pledges, lack of government capacity and a marked erosion of donor funding for front-line work(refer to section—Erosion of donor support for services delivered by NGOs). Speciﬁc concerns include theinadequate support for key sectors such as the development of Afghan civil society (refer to section Supportto Civil Society), including support to women’s rights’ NGOs to enable women and girls to take an activerole in the development and reconstruction of the country; unbalanced regional development plans (andconcern that the geographic distribution of humanitarian and development assistance could be partlyinﬂuenced by military imperatives.The opium economy in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted and complex phenomenon, which requires a long-term and multi-faceted response. Short term and military led approaches to counter-narcotics are ineVectiveand non-sustainable. Emphasis should be placed on tackling the root causes of the opium trade and usinglocal government structures and civil society in these eVorts.Support for returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) needs to be maintained, includingcontinued ﬁnancial support for housing and shelter together with livelihoods programmes to enable theirsustainable return (refer to section Refugees and IDPs).British NGOs have raised their concerns with the British government, seeking a review of current aidpolicy, and outlined speciﬁc recommendations to DFID at the end of this report. NGOs oVer decades ofproject delivery experience at grass roots level, and a history of relationships of trust with rural communities.In light of this we urge the Committee to urgently consider the recommendations contained in the lastSection.

Introduction1. BAAG welcomes the International Development Committee’s inquiry into Afghanistan to examinethe UK government’s development assistance in Afghanistan at this critical juncture. The aim of this paperis to reﬂect BAAG members’ views on the current situation with regard to aid policy and development inAfghanistan and present the Committee with speciﬁc recommendations from British NGOs and theirpartner organisations based in Afghanistan.2. BAAG has been privileged to give written and verbal submissions to the International DevelopmentCommittee on several occasions, (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) and earlier this year. Although there is stilla very long way to go there has undoubtedly been progress in Afghanistan since 2001 as a result ofinternational assistance, especially in the sectors of health and education. Nonetheless it is striking how littlesome of our concerns, conclusions and recommendations have changed over the years. These include theneed to address a deteriorating security situation, the need for long-term commitment from the internationalcommunity, for funding to go through the Afghan Government but to be complemented by eVectivecapacity development, and continuing support to NGOs during the transition to the time, when the AfghanGovernment can be entirely responsible for managing and implementing all reconstruction anddevelopment.3. Increasing insecurity is the greatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Overthe past year levels of violence have been at their highest since 2001. There have been increased civiliancasualties in the insecure areas in the South, and concerns have been raised by the Afghan and internationalhuman rights groups and the UN.4. The Taliban and other illegal armed groups have exploited government weaknesses, challenging itslegitimacy through intimidation and violence. The security risks for government civil servants outside thearea of law enforcement, such as teachers and health workers, as well as aid agencies, appear to have6

increased signiﬁcantly in 2006.7Suicide bomber attacks are on the rise in Kabul and in some areas of thenorth and east. From January to July 2006 over 100 violent attacks against schools, teachers or pupils werereported. These tactics are used both directly and indirectly against civilians, including children, renderingmany areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country largely inaccessible to international NGO staV.5. According to a BAAG member agency in Kandahar unoYcial estimates indicate that more than105,000 children may be denied access to education in the south alone as a result of school closures due toinsecurity.8The data from a referral hospital in Kandahar province conﬁrms the increasing trend in thenumber of children under the age of 15 years admitted to hospital due to “weapons-related wounds”; a totalof 42 children were admitted between January and June 2006, with 19 children admitted in June alone.9Attacks against civilians and aid workers are on the increase, limiting agency operations and access to thosemost in need.6. Aid agencies under the umbrella of BAAG and ACBAR have highlighted serious concern at thegrowing vulnerability of the development and humanitarian eVort in Afghanistan as a result of deterioratingsecurity, unmet aid pledges, lack of government capacity and a marked erosion of donor funding for front-line work. These disturbing trends have become more marked over the last year and NGOs working inAfghanistan have been raising the matter urgently with the international community. ACBAR,10submitteda brieﬁng paper on these issues to the UN Security Council mission that visited Afghanistan in November2006.11The British Overseas Agencies Group (BOAG), which brings together ﬁve leading British aidagencies, wrote in September to the British government making similar points and seeking a review ofcurrent aid policy.7. In December 2006 and March 2007 BAAG undertook surveys to determine the extent to which front-line service delivery programmes are under threat. The ﬁndings show a marked decrease in funding supportfor a range of vital programmes, such as alternative and rural livelihoods, water and sanitation, employmentgenerating schemes, TB control and child protection, traditionally delivered by NGOs. It also shows thatin many provinces front line services for rural communities are being closed for want of donor support,aVecting thousands of households.8. A key concern of BAAG members is the reduction of funding available for NGOs to continue doingfront line work in community development providing services essential for food security and sustainablelivelihoods. These might include health education, vaccinations and preventive health care for livestock,promotion of kitchen gardens, food storage and preservation, as well as literacy and skills training for ruralenterprises. While some of these services may be scheduled to be re-initiated through Government ofAfghanistan programmes, there will be a considerable time gap before capacity to deliver these programmesis in place and in the meantime, numerous communities are left without any kind of rural skills training andextension services. These services are essential to food security and well-being in rural communities.Although current national priority programmes such as NSP reach a number of poor rural communities,none of them focus on livelihoods skills. Long-promised livelihoods assistance through the CounterNarcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) is completely stalled for NGOs, and some have already withdrawn theirproposals from the CNTF after losing hope.9. In the absence of viable alternatives some of the poorest communities will bear the brunt of thecurtailment of programmes with serious consequences for security and stability. As Afghan communitiesbecome increasingly disillusioned with the pace of change and the level of services they receive, the dangerto the state building exercise currently undertaken by the Afghan government with the support of theinternational community is evident. State building is a complicated and lengthy process and HMG aretherefore to be commended for attempting to tackle some of the diYculties and to commit the UK to a long-term eVort. The London Compact was a signiﬁcant milestone. However it contains no benchmarks fordonors and while the architecture of aid continues to grow there is too little to show for it in terms ofimproving the lives of the people and governance it aims to support. This is also now true at the sub-national level.12Aid Volume10.Inadequate levels of aid:Afghanistan is receiving a considerably lower per capita ratio of aid thanother post-conﬂict situation in recent times.13(ACBAR, 2006). Increasing donor fatigue has resulted inreduced resources for frontline livelihoods programmes and essential sectors, such as education and health,as this paper will demonstrate.7

Aid Effectiveness11. Current donor aid policy for Afghanistan places signiﬁcant emphasis on state-building; linked towider political and military objectives of stabilisation and political transition. While many developmentNGOs support the objectives of promoting eVective and accountable authorities, they are concerned thatcurrent aid policies are imbalanced. Donor policy emphasises central “state-building” at the expense ofproviding basic services to populations in regions outside of the capacity of government to deliver and ofits political or geographic reach. This has led to what the Overseas Development Institute terms a “servicegap”: when relief assistance is phased out but state capacity is insuYcient to ensure the provision ofservices.1412. DFID, in particular, has drastically reduced UK funding available for frontline services or livelihoodsprogrammes delivered by NGOs. This follows DFID’s decision to place an overwhelming emphasis onchannelling aid through state-centred mechanisms. This is also partly shaped by the broad trend in DFIDaid policy in non-conﬂict contexts towards larger-scale disbursements channelled through direct budgetarysupport to recipient governments. Whilst the rationale for this allocation strategy is partly legitimate, webelieve it is also driven by other imperatives, including the pressure to reduce DFID staV numbers andtransaction costs.Unbalanced state building13. Most bilateral and multilateral donor funding is now channelled predominantly through theGovernment of Afghanistan for national priority programmes (NPP). These programmes were designed to“accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and rehabilitation to that of sustainable development”(GOA 2004). While in general there have been some great achievements from these programmes,15they arenot the complete solution.16And programmes to support agriculture and irrigation—core to livelihoods inAfghanistan—are often absent.17A “uni sectoral” approach cannot be expected to meet the multidevelopment needs of a community; instead a broad based and multi sectoral eVort is required over anumber of years (ACBAR, 2006).

Government capacity to absorb the aid and process it eYciently14. Midway through this ﬁnancial year, the Government of Afghanistan has spent less than ﬁfty percentof what it has been granted for the development budget. This is primarily due to (i) limited capacity in someministries to turn plans into resourced programmes, (ii) delays in approval processes within and betweenministries, and (iii) in some cases, delays amongst donors in giving money to the Afghan Government ontime (ACBAR 2006). There are numerous examples of NGOs seriously aVected by late payments, and forexample, the role of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) is undermined by late delivery ofblock grants.15. BAAG has consistently recommended that funding should be put through the Afghan Government(though allowing for some direct funding to NGOs to continue) and it was the expectation of theInternational Development Committee that if the UN and NGOs would be “each required to bid forallocations, the funding will then ﬂow to whichever organisation has the capacity to deliver”. Unfortunatelysome parts of the Government have lacked the capacity to manage this process. In the Ministries that havehad the capacity, such as Health and Education, NGOs have willingly ceded implementation to them.

budget.”18Despite the success of the ARTF, almost 75% of funding is still provided “oV-budget”—85% ofthat through the UN and private sector. Only 15% goes through NGOs and other channels.19Although allmajor donors still provide short-term emergency funding through NGOs, very few are willing to channelsigniﬁcant amounts of development funding directly to them. USAID and the EU are exceptions to this,with both supporting the contracting-out of health service delivery through NGOs.17. Decisions by key donors to channel the majority of funding through the UN and to governmentthrough the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have dramatically reduced and/or restrictedfunding opportunities for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For BAAG members, managing theimplications of a major change in strategic direction has also been particularly challenging for theirprogrammes in Afghanistan.18.National Priority Programmesare supported through the ARTF, but they have suVered fromdebilitating cash ﬂow interruptions that negate the positive impact that programmes may be achieving. TheNational Solidarity Programme (NSP), for example, is an excellent vehicle for community driveninvestments in infrastructure to over 15,000 communities throughout rural Afghanistan, yet many of thosecommunities had to wait many months20over several years to receive assistance which only served toconﬁrm community level mistrust of the government and the international community. Some of that delaywas related to inadequate donor pledges, but much of it was related to low capacity for ﬁnancial forecastingand in the co-ordination of processing funding requests. (NGOsare taking the blame for this delay).In otherwords, there is not yet adequate institutional capacity within the Government of Afghanistan to ensuresuYcient liquidity or consistent absorption of funds. Capacity building eVorts through budget support inthis way would therefore appear to be less than successful. While it is important to continue these capacitybuilding eVorts, service delivery in the meantime should not suVer and donors have a responsibility to ﬁndways to prevent that happening.19. There has been a general problem in getting funding through from the ministries, particularly forthose programmes which are funded by the World Bank through the Afghan government. There areexamples of member agencies having to borrow signiﬁcant funds from their headquarters in order to preventthe suspension of NSP programmes. Speciﬁc examples include an invoice for USD 1.6 million submitted tothe MRRD in mid December 2006 was released only in late August 2007. According to the ministry’sprocedure, the funding should have been released at the end of January 2007, six weeks after submission.The problem is partially due, according to the ministries, to delays in funding coming through from theWorld Bank. In this instance the member organisation was able to rely on internal ﬁnancial resources. Itshould be noted that smaller organisations may not have this safety net.20.Basic Package of Health ServicesThe Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has contracted outprovision of basic health services, through a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) in all but threeprovinces to NGOs, with funding and technical assistance from donors. As a result, the number offunctioning health facilities has increased by more than 60%. A health facility assessment, commissioned bythe Ministry of Public Health, indicates a 25% improvement in overall quality of health services since 2004.21. Nevertheless, outside this basic package, there are serious gaps and weaknesses that have yet to beaddressed. On a recent assessment visit, a BAAG member agency identiﬁed a number of priority areas thatneed to be addressed. They are largely complementary to and expand upon the BPHS, yet funding for thisis not available.22. Some of the gaps highlighted include: inadequate funding for training and capacity building of healthstaV at community and district level; resultant lack of continuing education programme for health staV;inadequate funds for community level activities, community mobilisation and rights awareness raising (egreproductive and sexual health rights, health rights and child rights); no funding for technical support andtraining in the management of malnutrition and in community based nutrition at district level; inadequatefunding for adolescent friendly health services including HIV/AIDS awareness and addressing drug abuse.Overall, the lack of female service providers remains a key constraint for women and children to access careat all levels in the health system. While DFID’s recent announcement to contribute to salaries of health staVis welcomed, the current level of support for the health system is considered inadequate and does not addressthe wide and far-reaching needs (see section on inadequate support for key sectors: health).23.Unrealistic development transition plans:Support for the national programmes aimed at integratingcommunity organisations into district, provincial and national development programming is short-term and lackadequate exit strategies.A lack of cohesion between donor programmes at the provincial and district levelis limiting joint planning and co-ordination. Planning and consultations with CSOs/NGOs also remainminimal both at a sectoral and national “home country” level. Civil society service providers are oftenprematurely expected to deliver essential services, despite having both little capacity and few resources.Hastened exit strategies are the norm in Afghanistan with little consolidation of programme activities. Thisis a missed opportunity for Afghanistan to beneﬁt from both technical and in-country expertise.181920

24. Current support by donors through NPPs thus does not meet wider “livelihoods” needs; it also doeslittle to promote the growth of a strong civil society. As many front line projects close down for want ofdonor funding, the country is witnessing a loss of development potential and initiative in a number ofprovinces.25.The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)has been extremely disappointing not only because itsfunding mechanism requires an unfeasible degree of co-ordination between ministries, but also because thefunding mechanism was ﬁrst unclear, then frequently changed over the course of the ﬁrst year of operation.Although presented to NGOs as an important new source of funding for alternative livelihoods programmesfollowing DFID’s policy decision not to fund NGOs directly, it soon became clear that NGOs wereeVectively barred from accessing funding through the CNTF. That is because NGO proposals, after monthsof delay, were eventually judged to fall foul of a procurement requirement. NGOs were told their proposalswould have to be publicly tendered and awarded to another agency (since the applicant NGO would not beallowed to bid on their own proposal). This requirement completely contradicts the way NGOs work sincetheir proposals (unless responding to a speciﬁc tender) are built on a unique history of relationships withcommunities, and their project designs remain the NGOs’ intellectual property and should not be tenderedout. The poor design and governance of CNTF resulted in a near complete paralysis of project funding foralternative livelihoods through that vehicle,21tying up many millions of donor pledges in an extremelyunproductive way.26. With the failure of CNTF, no other national mechanism for processing unsolicited proposals for rurallivelihoods from NGOs exists, thus depriving people in the rural areas of programmes that would improvetheir lives. Failure to provide any mechanism by which NGOs can propose good funding ideas will alsoresult in a reduction of the innovative approaches for which NGOs are famous. This in turn means a dearthof pilot experiences on which the government can draw for scaling up.

Erosion of donor support for services delivered by NGOs27.As funding expires for many essential services there is little support in the pipeline to continue to supportrural livelihoods front line work.NGOs, as key development partners, with valuable sources of knowledge,have been and are a critical cost-eVective resource for the international community and the Government ofAfghanistan to meet both the gaps in service provision as well as to build up civil society. It would be amissed opportunity for Afghanistan to lose these key development partners, and a withdrawal of NGOsfrom the provinces warrants serious attention. A key indirect beneﬁt of their work is the creation of anenabling environment for other actors. British NGOs remain particularly challenged due to little directsupport from their national government.28. Limited funds are now being disbursed directly to NGOs. With an increase in national programmingand contracting in recent years (and decrease in direct grants), over 80% of NGO activities are currentlytied to government programmes.This funding shift to predominantly government contracts has jeopardisedthe continuation of some key basic services not covered under the remit of the current government programmes.The lack of ﬂexibility arising from this change has also reduced the ability of NGOs to develop innovativeprogrammes together with Afghan communities.It is also worth mentioning that, since some NGOs havebecome so closely associated with predominantly government programmes (and have little independence),they are now considered to be representatives of the Afghan government and therefore are targeted by theinsurgency.2229. With such a large percentage of donor money distributed through the NPPs through competitivetenders more suited for large for-proﬁt ﬁrms, NGOs that participate as implementing partners end uphaving their roles reduced to being government sub-contractors, which endangers their independence,neutrality and opportunity for innovation, particularly in community and civil society development. It isrecognised that while the involvement of NGOs in the provision of national services is politically sensitive,“NGOs are and will remain a key feature of the service delivery framework in Afghanistan and the (Afghan)government has publicly stated its continued commitment to working with NGOs”.2330. The UK emphasis on channelling aid through the Afghan Government is placing the programmesand, in some cases, the ongoing survival of NGOs at risk. UK NGOs, including smaller, Afghanistan-focused NGOs such as Afghanaid, can oVer distinct comparative advantages, in terms of their institutionalmemory and long-term good relations with local communities. These comparative advantages, if lost dueto cuts in UK funding to NGOs, will be hard to recover in future.31. Many international NGOs operate directly and through local partners. In order to do this eVectively,there needs to be a certain level of funding assurance that is needs based. In order to ensure that the impactof NGO’s programmes are fully realised, long term funding is needed, as are predictability and fundingassurances.21

The geographical balance in the distribution of funding, especially between the north and the south32. NGOs are concerned that the geographic distribution of humanitarian and development assistance is,in part, inﬂuenced by military imperatives. While increased donor attention on the PRT provinces is partlyinevitable, this should not be at the expense of resources for other provinces. Indeed, while it proves diYcultto spend assistance in the southern provinces because of the prevailing insecurity, programmes in other partsof the country are currently under-funded. One provincial governor in central Afghanistan recentlyremarked that local populations in that province might need to initiate violence and increase poppycultivation in order to attract the necessary funds for reconstruction.33. DFID should consolidate gains already made in areas that are stable (eg. Balkh, Jowsjan etc). TheBritish focus on Helmand may lead to a situation where gains made in stable provinces cannot beconsolidated. BAAG members have been encouraged to suggest projects in Helmand and Kabul areas butﬁnd it diYcult to identify and maintain funding for projects in equally poverty-stricken areas.34. An analysis into the transition period between crisis response and state-building,24of contexts wherestate capacity is weak and stability is not achieved, warns, “the quality of transition strategies and how thewithdrawal of the assistance provided during the crisis response is managed may prove signiﬁcant factorsin determining how the state functions subsequently.The ineVective management of transition risksjeopardising the achievements of the initial crisis response, to the detriment of longer-term stability, securityand livelihoods.”

Inadequate SupportforKey SectorsAlternative livelihoods35. DFID has three main program areas (1) building state institutions, (2) improving economicmanagement and aid eVectiveness, and (3) improving the livelihoods of local people. Yet most of DFID’sinvestment in rural livelihoods is actually targeted towards “enabling” environments such as improved localgovernance, ﬁnance, and infrastructure implemented under national priority programmes. Meanwhile,support for the backbone of the rural economy (agriculture) is covered in a very piecemeal and inadequatefashion because the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) currently has very littlecapacity to provide the outreach and extension needed. As a percentage of DFID’s portfolio, support toagriculture features hardly at all. That is regrettable, since support in that sector (and related oV-farmenterprise development) is essential for helping rural communities meet basic needs, and thus become morestable and less prone to succumb to illicit activities. SuYcient support for a range of social protection andsafety net measures is also necessary to alleviate wide-spread food insecurity that is still very prevalent,particularly in more remote and inaccessible areas.36. Yet even if DFID were to signiﬁcantly increase funding in these vital areas that target the most needyand vulnerable tomorrow, there would be no way to eVectively channel it on the scale needed under currentDFID policies of routing most aid through government programmes. Current government programmes donot yet have capacity for outreach and eVective rural livelihoods targeting required in rural areas, and thiscapacity will take years to build. In the meantime, unmet reconstruction and development expectations onthe part of Afghan rural populations are further destabilising the country.37. DFID should concentrate more on sustainable livelihoods programmes as an alternative to a counter-narcotics focus. The aim of addressing poverty and welfare is often overlooked in fragile states as donorsfocus on “state-building” and NGOs on service delivery. All partners need to take an overview on whatpoverty looks like, how the economy does/not function and how to create pro-poor growth.

39. DFID’s recent announcement29of £55 million to help pay the salaries of teachers, doctors and nursesis welcomed. Enormous challenges remain: almost 75% of Afghans over the age of 15 are illiterate and forwomen and girls in rural areas the ﬁgure rises to 92%.30Girls are unable to access quality education becauseof cultural beliefs that prevent them once they reach puberty from attending school together with boys, orin some cases from moving outside of the home at all.31In addition, there are not enough schools or trainedteachers. Children, therefore, have to attend school in shifts: girls in the morning and boys in the afternoon.In some schools almost twice as many teachers are needed as girls can only be taught by women or matureand trustworthy men. This system reduces the amount of quality attention students can receive fromtheir teachers.40. Despite evidence of need, a BAAG member agency that would like to expand their work in this area,has had to close projects over the past year due to funding gaps.Health41. According to the 2004 UNDP Human Development Index, Afghanistan is ranked 173 out of 178countries listed. Life expectancy is only 47 years with 600 children under ﬁve dying every day and 25% ofall children dying before their ﬁfth birthday. The maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world,only Sierra Leone’s is higher. For every 100,000 women who go into labour in Afghanistan, about 1,900die.32According to UNICEF, one in nine women in Afghanistan will die during or shortly after pregnancy.33Fewer than 10% of women in rural areas give birth in a health facility. Of those children who do survive,54% are stunted and 40% are underweight.42. There has been some progress. Infant mortality rates (the number of children who die before one year)in Afghanistan declined from an estimated 165 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to about 135 per 1,000 in 2006,according to preliminary ﬁndings of Johns Hopkins University (JHU) household survey. This means that40,000 fewer infants are dying each year compared to during Taliban rule.Refugees and IDPs43. The Afghanistan Compact benchmark 7.5 highlights the need for the right conditions for returningAfghans.34Speciﬁc needs that are crucial for a sustainable return strategy include housing, access to safedrinking water, education, health facilities and employment opportunities.44. The recent forced deportations of Afghans from Iran and announcements to close camps in Pakistanhighlights the precarious situation facing refugees and IDPs.35Over a three week period in April–May 2007some 96,000 Afghans were expelled from Iran. Afghanistan remains a fragile environment, and lacks theinfrastructure and local governance structures to support the needs of its own population, it is thereforeunable to cope with a sudden arrival of a large number of people over a short space of time. In additionthere is concern that this type of situation will create further displacements internally, mainly in the insecureareas of Afghanistan. Returnees will face additional suVering from the ongoing conﬂict in the southern andsouth western parts of the country.45. Shelter assistance is one of the most signiﬁcant needs for returning refugees. Currently UNHCR withthe Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation administers land allocation sites (LAS) to returnees. Thisinitiative is at the pilot stage so far; it takes around six months to allocate land, therefore some kind ofinterim solution is often needed but none provided.46. Many returnee Afghans in the rural areas are not being supported to rebuild their lives and hence seeno beneﬁt from the new Afghanistan. This does nothing to win the “hearts and minds” of the people whichis critical if the war against the Taliban is to be won. Continued ﬁnancial support for housing is highlighted,as is support for livelihoods programmes for returnees in terms of their sustainable return.Support to Civil Society47. Civil society development is severely under-funded. At a time when human rights abuses andcorruption are widespread and the democratic process still young, donors need to deliberately supportNGOs/CSOs in the development of civil society to allow space for voices from civil society and the growthof independent associations / organisations. The OECDPrinciples for good international engagement infragile states and situationsrefer to the key role of civil society in demanding good governance and in servicedelivery in the wider context of state-building and peace-building.2930

48. Donor delegation of responsibility and authority for programme management to the UN and Afghangovernment, and the resultant lack of direct contact with NGOs and communities they work with, makesit more diYcult for donors to get feedback on civil society issues and perspectives. This can result in donorsbecoming out of touch with realities on the ground and pockets of exclusion developing as a result. In fragilestates such as Afghanistan, where lack of infrastructure and continuing conﬂict have exacerbated socialfragmentation, it is crucially important that donors support civil society development. There are very fewcredible secular grassroots organisations in Afghanistan and those that do exist need to be supported andnurtured if a more pluralistic civil society is to develop in the country. In the absence of predictable fundingand capacity-building support, these institutions are likely to wither and die. Donors should heed the OECDPrinciples for engagement in fragile states,which require them to “...mix and sequence their aid instrumentsaccording to context, and avoid blue-print approaches”.3649. From the recent BAAG survey on NGO funding (March 2007), a signiﬁcant ﬁnding includes the lackof donor support for Afghan local organisations for the development of civil society. This in turn curtailssome of the innovative work done by NGOs and the potential for successful projects to be replicated in otherprovinces. A quote from one of the respondents reﬂects this view: “We think that donors are doing very littleto support an independent civil society in Afghanistan by channelling all their money in to private and publicsectors and missing the third important piece, civil society.”50. There is speciﬁc concern about the lack of government support to national women’s rights’ NGOs.Local women’s rights’ NGOs play a crucial role in reforming laws relating to women’s rights and violenceagainst women; in providing support services and building the skills of Afghan women and girls; and inenabling women and girls to ﬁnd the civil space and skills to take a real active role in the development andreconstruction of the country.51. The provisions to mainstream gender equity within the various sectors of the Government ofAfghanistan’s national policy frameworks, including the ANDS (Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy), the Afghanistan Compact and the NAPWA (National Action Plan for Women) are to bewelcomed. However, it is crucial that the political will and resources are both provided to ensure suchpolicies are implemented across each and every government department. For example, there is still no genderunit within the Afghan Ministry of Finance and no budget allocated speciﬁcally for women or women’sprojects.52. DFID’s Gender Equality Action Plan outlines ways to improve gender mainstreaming across itsprogrammes. Section C437“DFID should support civil society to support voice and accountability forgender equality and women’s empowerment”. However, there is little evidence that DFID have acted onthese commitments either through policy or provision of resources through NGOs or the AfghanGovernment.53. Despite much progress in the area of human rights, such as the establishment of the AfghanIndependent Human Rights Committee (AIHRC), evidence shows that the situation for women and girlsin Afghanistan, in terms of their access to justice, continues to remain extremely limited. In July 2007 forthe Rome Conference on the Rule of Law the BAAG/ENNA statement outlines recommendations for theinternational community to ensure women and girls’ human rights are protected and prioritised under theRule of Law in Afghanistan.Unbalanced Regional Development Plans54. Inconsistent regional development:Uneven distribution of aid across predominantly opium poppyintensive or highly insecure areas in Afghanistan has intensiﬁed the impression that the existing donor aid policyis tightly linked to strategic objectives of the major donor countries.International focus on the South and Eastis creating the impression that the international community is ignoring the needs of other provinces whichare often teetering on the edge, frustrating both the local government and communities alike (ACBAR,2006). CSOs have been harnessed to donor objectives and progressively assumed the role of government sub-contractors. This has restricted the capacity of civil society to capture emerging aspirations in the context oflocal struggles for peace, development and wellbeing.Civilian “space”, NGO aid programmes and civil-military relations55. BAAG submitted written evidence to the Defence Committee in March 2007 and raised issuesconcerning civil military relations and aid policy. A key recommendation from the BAAG submission tothe Defence Committee is for the UK government to commission independent research on the contributionof integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan. Thisrecommendation has been given added weight by the ﬁnding in the World Bank reportService Delivery andGovernance at the Sub-National level,July 2007 that “PRTs confront—in fact they constitute—a critical3637

dilemma: in trying to create the space for the Afghan state to develop and cohere they run the risk ofundermining it . . . PRTs should really only exist where security conditions make them absolutely necessaryand the ESC38should begin to phase them out.”56. 89 aid workers have been killed since 2003, as compared to a very small number who were targetedduring the preceding 14 years. The few agencies continuing to operate in the south and east either beneﬁtfrom long-established programmes in speciﬁc locations, which enable them to negotiate a degree ofprotection from local communities, or they opt to take considerable risks. The Afghan NGO, Afghan Healthand Development Services, has had a signiﬁcant number of its staV killed in its eVorts to provide healthservices to the camps for internally displaced people to the west of Kandahar.Military Implemented reconstruction and development projects57. Problematic development projects implemented by the military:There are reports of poor qualityoutcomes of development projects implemented by the military. This is due to the lack of experienced oversightand questions raised over cost eVectiveness/sustainability. Military actors are not trained in development andtheir approaches are often undertaken with little community ownership or capacity to support communitymaintenance over time.These interventions can also signiﬁcantly damage the reputation of genuine aidagencies operating on the basis of community trust and acceptance; it can also threaten their neutrality.58. Private military companies (PMC), often in consortia with other private sector actors, are looking toincrease their involvement in aid programmes in Afghanistan. In the words of one industry representative,the PMC sector wants “to raid the humanitarian space in Afghanistan”. This is of concern to NGOs in termsof the principles and practice of aid. PMC involvement in the delivery of aid programmes, indeed any armedprovision of assistance, is based on security provided through armed deterrence, rather than acceptance.As such, it undermines the basis for humanitarian access negotiated through the humanitarian principles ofindependence, impartiality and neutrality. In view of this, NGOs would dispute that PMCs present aneVective strategy for reconstruction in Afghanistan. PMCs’ activities in training of the police and auxiliaryforces are also of concern and it is unclear if they meet the most basic UN standards for police training,particularly in ﬁrearms handling. Moreover, their mandates are unclear and their accountability isquestionable.Tensions between the development and security agendas59. NGOs can only operate in insecure provinces on the basis of neutrality, independence and goodrelations with local communities. Across much of Afghanistan, associations, whether real or perceived, witha contested military operation and central government compromise our legitimacy and acceptance amonglocal populations.60. The operational experience of BAAG member agencies in Afghanistan suggests that the militaryapproach to CIMIC has often proved ineVective, or even counter-productive, in terms of both military andcivilian objectives. Instead of facilitating military-implemented or funded QIPs, civil-military relationscapacities should rather focus on promoting eVective co-ordination between the military and the fullspectrum of civilian actors, emphasising their diVerent roles and mandates.UK civil-military relations strategies in Helmand61. The UK Government should consider undertaking an independent evaluation of the contribution ofintegrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan. Internationalforces, including PRTs, have an inevitably political character and so must relate to local powerholders aswell as operate in accordance with their mandate, which emphasises strengthening central governmentauthority across the country. Several PRTs have sought to facilitate linkages between central and provincial-level governance in Afghanistan. DiVerent NATO PRTs contain a varied mix of civilian expertise to providesupport on these political and diplomatic aspects, while PRT Commanders assume a political representativerole at the provincial and local levels. NATO has also played a role in establishing the Afghan-led “PolicyAction Group” (PAG) initiative to support co-ordination on reconstruction and security at central andprovincial levels. The constraints, challenges and eYcacy of diVerent approaches to this aspect of civil-military relations have only just begun to be evaluated, for instance by the Norwegian Government inFaryab province.62. Although the ISAF southern Afghanistan strategy since 2006 resembles—in intent—a more joined-up and civilian-led approach than exercised in past years, concerns have been raised regarding continuedmilitary dominance of decision-making processes. This can be compounded by variables in militaryculture—so that paratroopers are more likely to emphasise military preeminence than line infantry, forexample. Reconstruction requires civilian leadership and capacity to provide the necessary contextunderstanding; political analysis and engagement with local power-holders and communities.Notwithstanding the political acumen of certain individuals within the military, the military intrinsically38

lacks these capacities and qualities. Indeed both their capabilities and their strategic, operational and tacticalimperatives militate against eVectively navigating and aVecting change in local politics. For example, asigniﬁcant component of the military CIMIC support capability consists of technical experts, for exampleengineers, who analyse local needs and promote QIP strategies reﬂecting that technical worldview. Yet, asexperience in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates, building wells or pumps in particular locationsbecause local power-holders identify that as the priority does not equate to an eVective political orreconstruction strategy.63. While to date there has been no thorough evaluation of the developmental value of UK PRT aidprojects, a joint-donor evaluation report of assistance given by ﬁve European countries to Afghanistan since2001, which included the UK, stated that these projects “could have been delivered more cheaply andeYciently by other aid providers” and that “time pressure for delivery during short assignments promotes a“just do it” approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability.”39BAAG is conductingresearch into these issues and hopes to be able to report preliminary ﬁndings to the InternationalDevelopment Committee during the course of the Inquiry.Counter-NarcoticsSustainability and eVectiveness of counter-narcotics and alternative livelihoods policies:64. Reviews of counter-narcotics literature and analysis of economic factors driving poppy productionindicate that success will be primarily linked to overall improvements in governance, security andreconstruction/development progress rather than through a separate counter-narcotics initiative working inisolation. An alternative livelihoods objective should be mainstreamed into general rural developmenteVorts which in turn should receive adequate and consistent ﬁnancial support over a multi-year period. Theliterature also indicates that it is “land poor” rural inhabitants and those living in remote areas with littleaccess to markets that are the most dependent on cultivating poppy. Although DFID counts rurallivelihoods as a component of its counter narcotics eVort, actual investment in that area other than throughthe dysfunctional CNTF is low and not targeted towards the neediest groups.65. Short-term and military-led approaches to counter-narcotics are ineVective. Emphasis should beplaced on tackling root causes of the opium trade, and local and civilian leadership of these eVorts.66. The international community is increasingly concerned by Afghanistan’s opium economy, which hasevident implications for security and stability. Some parliamentarians, the media and other commentatorsin donor countries push for a “quick ﬁx” to poppy cultivation. However, a short-term approach to counter-narcotics would be ineVective and counter-productive. Our operational experience, that of local partnersand the communities we work with, suggest that an eVective strategy must involve holistic and properlysequenced assistance to tackle problems of security, governance and development:“One cannot speak ofcreating legal livelihoods until there is a legal and legitimate context within they can function.”4067. The premise that farmers can be strong-armed into abandoning opium cultivation is ﬂawed.Eradication and cultivation-bans alienate the very communities we need to work with. For example, inThailand, after early failed experiments in eradication, the Thai Government waited until more than adecade of development eVorts had produced suYcient economic alternatives before resuming eradication.41Recent experience in Afghanistan suggests that eradication merely displaces production to new regions.Furthermore, in some regions, such eradication programmes have been used to target political opponentsor economic competitors; thereby contributing to weak and corrupt governance.42This contributes to local-level conﬂict and further erodes support for counter-narcotics eVorts and the Government of Afghanistan.Eradication should only be implemented when the state is capable, trust in communities has been built, andpoor people have access to economically-attractive, legal livelihoods.68. The opium economy in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted and complex phenomenon, which requires along-term and multi-faceted response. Critical factors include inequitable and exploitative patterns of landtenure, share-cropping arrangements, and credit/debt systems. Many small farmers simply have no viablealternatives; their access to land, credit and livelihoods depends on participating in poppy cultivation. Theﬁrst measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppy cultivation mustbe the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.The role of NGOs in the new environment69. Latest ﬁgures from ANSO43(August 2007) demonstrate a clear escalation of the use of kidnap tactics.Country-wide, between January-July 2007 an estimated 195-210 persons have been abducted in 45 incidents,including Afghan and international civilians, ANP or Government of Afghanistan workers. There is aheightened threat of suicide attacks within Kabul, heightened abduction threat for ransom and prisoner39

exchange purposes. The resultant restrictions on NGO staV movement is hindering the implementation ofprogrammes. NGOs have had to improve their security arrangements, including additional investment insecurity measures, provision of security advisors for their staV, thereby increasing their operational costs.International staV are restricted in movement and access to project beneﬁciaries; similarly national staV,particularly women, are aVected by safety concerns and therefore travel to remote areas is severelyrestricted. The ongoing ambient insecurity, together with changes in donor policy and issues of fundinginsecurity, means that it is diYcult for NGOs to attract and retain staV. Member agencies report that theturnover rate for both expatriate and national staV is very high.70. In insecure areas across Afghanistan, NGOs can only operate on the basis of neutrality,independence, low visibility and the acceptance of local communities. The notion of “humanitarian space”captures the moral, political and operational dimensions of our capacity to operate safely and eVectively insuch a chronically insecure situation. Ironically, the concept of “humanitarian space” provides a kind ofcorrelate to the military concept of “campaign authority”. It is every bit as apparently abstract andideological, and yet every bit as real and important to the sustainability and legitimacy of operations on theground.4471. NGOs oVer decades of project delivery experience at a grass roots level, including several BritishNGOs, and a history of relationships of trust with rural communities. A poll conducted by the AsiaFoundation in 2006 conﬁrmed that the Afghan people continue to trust NGOs more than governmentinitiatives. This is in spite of a few Afghan politician blaming NGOs45for all reconstruction failures and theconfusion around the true deﬁnition of NGO that arose during Taliban time when construction businesseswere also registered as NGOs. But NGOs do not wish to work in isolation and most are fully engaged inpartnerships with the government of Afghanistan since they are, after all, implementing most of the nationalpriority programmes.72. Many NGOs are excited by the facilitating role they are playing and can continue to play in buildingcapacity of local governance, preparing community groups to represent their constituencies in district andeventually provincial level planning. Many NGOs are also designing innovative rural livelihoods initiativesthat build on the governance foundation provided by Community Development Councils (CDCs) and othercommunity-based groups.73. The “added value” of NGOs should be emphasised, particularly with regard to DFID’s statedcommitment to gender mainstreaming, strengthening civil society and processes to support the developmentof local governance. NGOs play an important role in Afghanistan. Not only do they contribute withinnovation and creativity in solving the challenges Afghanistan faces, they are also historically an important“backup” service provider when the government fails to provide basic services. Considering the unstablestate that the country is still in, it is important that this capacity, which has been created over many years,is not lost.74. For example, the National Solidarity Programme has established Community Development Councils(CDCs) in 34 provinces of the country, the local level participatory mechanism for NSP. The future of theCDCs is intertwined with the question of Afghanistan’s future governance, and mechanisms fordevelopment at the local level. NGOs as Facilitating Partners (FPs) called for an informal review of the CDCBylaw. The subsequent consultations highlighted some important failings in the current version of the Bylawand looks at questions around the legal status of CDCs and institutional mechanisms of local government;and articulates the concerns of FPs and civil society actors. Concerns include the lack of a mechanism toensure the participation of women in the decision-making process by requiring that the CDC is composedof an equal number of men and women. The role of NGOs in this context provides a vital link betweenministries and consultation at the local level, in designing local governing structures, and the participationof donors in this process needs to be ensured. (The FPs are developing a position on the CDC Bylaw withpractical recommendations and further information can be provided).75. It should be recognised that NGO “coverage” includes some of the most remote areas in the country,including Farah, Badghis, and Faryab. Much of the community based work requires NGOs to have aﬂexible and pragmatic approach in the context of Afghanistan. BAAG members aim to develop andimplement the work as much as possible in line with national plans and strategies. However, where thegovernment has little presence or capacity, NGOs are able to identify gaps where communities can besupported in a way to promote links and synergies with government structures and authorities once theopportunity arises. The ﬁndings of the surveys carried out by BAAG on NGO funding gaps highlighted theneed for ﬂexibility and innovation in the Afghanistan context.44

76. An international NGO with many years’ experience in Afghanistan, has demonstrated that NGOscan play a key role in building government systems and capacity to deliver comprehensive, good-quality,public health services with the active involvement of service users in Afghanistan. A number of innovativeapproaches were used to improve quality and the participation of children and their communities, enablingthem to better hold government to account. The approach taken and success achieved contradicts a commonperception among donors that NGOs’ service delivery programmes in fragile states operate parallel to,rather than in alignment with government systems. Another INGO reports on the positive experienceworking with the Government of Afghanistan particularly in relation to water and wells—a jointly managednational database is one of the key outputs in this regard.77. The following example demonstrates how global institutional experience oVered by INGOs can beadapted for the Afghanistan context. Although not conceived as a tool for fragility analysis, the ChildRights Situation Analysis (CRSA) and child rights programming tools have been useful in helping theBAAG member’s programme to analyse and address violations of children’s rights and the root causes ofviolations, while also emphasising the need to build the capacity of duty-bearers, such as the Afghan state,and civil society to respect, protect and fulﬁl these rights, including the development of legal and institutionalframeworks. This rights-based approach has also enabled the INGO to identify more clearly the mostvulnerable and marginalised groups for its programme work. The child rights programming approach hasalso enabled the programme to maintain a longer-term vision even in the absence of predictable longer-termfunding. The global institutional knowledge of INGOs is a valuable resource from which Afghanistancan beneﬁt.78. Distance or “remote” management can be an eVective strategy to ensure continuity of operations ina large country as Afghanistan where infrastructure is poor and insecurity prevails. However, care needs tobe taken to guard against passing on security risks to national staV and partners in the process. Empoweringand working through strong national teams and partners has enabled one NGO to reach more children inKandahar and Uruzgan. The agency works closely with several national partners and local governmentdepartments, providing training in child rights, child protection and listening to and working with children.The national team understands local attitudes and sensitivities and is able to ﬁnd appropriate ways topresent diYcult and potentially contentious concepts around child rights and protection to partners.National partners are able to negotiate access to locations that the INGO staV—both national andinternational—cannot reach.

ConclusionsandRecommendationsRecommendations to DFID regarding aid policy79. The UK Government, and speciﬁcally DFID, should review and change course in its current aidpolicy for Afghanistan. An emphasis on state-centred aid modalities to deliver “state-building” has led tothe emergence of a “service gap”. Particular attention should be paid to the NGO capacity to provide basicservices and livelihoods support for populations outside of the capacity and political or geographic reach ofgovernment to deliver. DFID should identify creative mechanisms to provide funding to NGOs for frontlineservices, such as support to consortia funding, use of “local funds” arrangements, joint programming andincreased DFID staV capacity to manage NGO funding.80. Decisions on aid allocations should be made according to levels of humanitarian need and thepotential for sustainable reconstruction; and not driven by the geographic focus of military operations.81. NGOs should be supported in their eVorts to innovate through less rigid funding mechanisms. Thesemechanisms can still be co-ordinated by the government of Afghanistan, but a continued insistence that aidbe channelled only through the government of Afghanistan does not seem responsible in the face of theoverwhelming and immediate need for development throughout the country for which the government doesnot yet have capacity to respond. Failure to do so will result in under-utilisation of an importantreconstruction resource which Afghanistan can ill aVord.82. There should be an Afghanistan-speciﬁc approach by donors which does not approach the countryas a part of a group of “conﬂict” or “fragile” states.83. NGOs welcome DFID’s consultation with NGOs/CSOs on its funding policies. DFID shoulddevelop stronger partnerships with NGOs within new funding modalities to capitalise on NGO experienceand knowledge, support scaling-up and replication of NGO successes and improve accountability tocommunities. UK-based charities need to be intimately involved in this approach and strategy formulation.NGOs are willing to continue this engagement and ﬁnd ways to develop a constructive exchange on policydevelopment. In line with the OECD Principles, “wherever possible, international actors should workjointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challengesand priorities.”84. DFID needs to evaluate its strategy of redirecting funds via the Afghan government. In undertakingthis, DFID should draw upon an advisory group of in-country representatives from various UK basedNGOs.

85. We ask DFID to review their current policy of reducing funding for smaller scale developmentprojects to lower the transaction costs and seek alternative methods for disbursing funds for these projects86. Monitoring and evaluation of pooled mechanisms—DFID should continue to monitor theeVectiveness of the ARTF and other pooled funding mechanisms focusing on impact on the ground as wellas on building government capacity and ownership and meeting UN reform and donor harmonisation andcost-eYciency objectives. Feedback from civil society should be proactively sought and NGOs engaged aspartners to support this. Lessons learned should be fed back through OECD work streams and the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) as well as disseminated to other fragile states.87. Pooled fund accountability—DFID should hold the UN accountable for UN overhead costs chargedagainst the pooled “pass-through” funds they manage, and work with the UN and NGOs to streamline andexpedite approval, disbursement and procurement processes for UN-managed funds.88. Funding characteristics—Core characteristics should be as follows:(a) Predictable and long-term, to enable successful interventions to be piloted and scaled-up.(b) In-country decision-making using input of NGOs and civil society(c) A deﬁned timeline and rolling application opportunities (which can provide the ﬂexibility for arapidly shifting environment)89. DFID should acknowledge the additional costs associated with supporting staV and operations in ahigh-risk security environment when reviewing NGO requests for overhead costs.90. DFID should review its gender equality plan in the context of Afghanistan.91. We call on HMG to redouble its eVorts to build Afghan government capacity and to improve theresourcing of National Priority Programmes and to remove bottlenecks in the delivery of funds92. We also seek an urgent review of HMG’s existing development strategy in order to ensure moregeographically balanced, inclusive and broad-based development. Such a review also needs to look at howdevelopment can practically be delivered in the present transitional phase.93. We ask HMG to support British NGOs and their Afghan partners, to continue to commit time andresources necessary and to persuade other donors to honour their pledges, including to the NSP.Recommendations to donors94. Donors should ensure that NGOs are able to maintain their independence and continue critical areasof work that may not be considered the highest priority by the Afghan government but which may beneﬁtit in the long term through improving people’s lives. The suggestion from the BAAG survey to set up an“innovation fund” for NGOs to implement their own projects that can be used as models for the Afghangovernment would require more ﬂexibility from donors. The need remains for an interim phase to allow timefor relevant Ministries to gain suYcient capacity to provide services themselves. It should be recognised thatlocal and national NGOs can play a role in both holding the government to account, especially in the area ofhuman rights, and in building government capacity. In a speciﬁc request to the UK government one BAAGmember states “Even with the political will, it would enable a signiﬁcant amount of capacity building withingovernment to enable them to take on this role in the near future. As such, ... it is crucial that the Britishgovernment ensures funding reaches these local women’s rights NGOs to enable them to continue their workat this pivotal time.”95. The Afghan government needs to be careful that government accountability, essential to buildingtrust with both civil society and the international community, is not undermined as a result of its capacityproblems and governance challenges.96. We believe that until the Afghan government has the capacity to deliver a full range of developmentservices, NGOs remain essential to the development eVort and need to be utilised to deliver progress on theground for ordinary Afghans.97. We ask for improved donor co-ordination, as articulated in the NSP evaluation report46“Anintegrated approach should be adopted by the donor community, both to ensure that international fundinghelps to support national development priorities and to provide for better coverage.”98. We request that donors are more innovative in developing mechanisms to spend more aid in fragilestates. Whilst aid is already reaching conﬂict aVected countries for example through budget support (eg.Rwanda, Sierra Leone), through donor co-ordination and insurance mechanisms (the GEMAP in Liberia),through projects (as is most common currently) or through social/community funds, innovative mechanismsneed to be further developed in order to scale it up. In the case of Afghanistan, we feel that aid delivery is tooheavily invested in budget support, and that there needs to be a better balance with other forms of delivery.99. Existing commitments made by the UK government on gender equality and women’s rights (inparticular the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),the Beijing Platform for Action and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 need to be reinforced.46

100. We urge the Government of Afghanistan and international partners to prioritise their support tothe gender mainstreaming process to secure commitment to gender equality by all stakeholders in thejustice sector.Regarding counter-narcotics101. Political pressure for NATO military forces to become involved in counter-narcotics operations, inparticular eradication programmes, should be opposed.47Sustainable and consent-based strategies shouldbe led by local and civilian authorities, with a particular emphasis on eVective action by the police andjudiciary.102. Counter-narcotics strategies should rely on an appropriately sequenced combination of economicdevelopment within the communities on the one hand and eradication and law enforcement eVorts on theother. The ﬁrst measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppycultivation should be the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.Regarding civil-military relations103. The UK Government should support initiatives to develop country-speciﬁc civil-military relationsguidelines that are explicit about good and bad practice in civil-military relations. Such initiatives shoulddraw on the lessons learned from UN-facilitated country-speciﬁc civil-military guidelines in Iraq andAfghanistan.104. The UK Government should support an initiative to establish an additional, higher-level forumfor dialogue on civil-military relations issues; possibly on a quarterly basis. Its purpose would be to ensuregreater follow-up and political engagement on issues raised in the operational-level discussions of the NGOcivil-military relations working-group, co-hosted by UNAMA and ACBAR.105. The UK Government should commission independent research on the contribution of integratedcivil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan.106. The UK Government must ensure that UK forces abide by international humanitarian law and itshuman rights obligations. Speciﬁc concerns regarding the conduct of US Coalition and NATO ISAFoperations should be addressed, with particular attention to issues of detention and use of “rendition”practices and interrogation at US facilities; and the detention and the transfer of prisoners to Afghannational authorities.Regarding health107. There needs to be a much greater focus on technically feasible and aVordable community-basedinterventions that address the most important causes of illness and death, and on those age groups that aremost vulnerable (women, infants, and young children).108. Much more needs to be done to develop eVective health services and health staV in more remoteareas. Delivery of programmes to these areas is more expensive (staYng, logistics, security) and logisticallydiYcult. This is not suYciently considered in current funding mechanisms.109. Whilst nutrition, disability, mental health and testing, counselling and treatment of HIV have beenadded to the BPHS, the funding to deliver this package did not increase correspondingly. Therefore BPHSproviders are forced to prioritise and these activities are not being done to the quality or coverage that theneeds indicated.110. The lack of female service providers remains a key constraint to access to care at all levels in thehealth system. Women must play a critical role in designing and implementing programs that address theneeds of women and children. The international community still needs to make greater eVorts to addressthis.Regarding human rights111. Donors should be reminded of the existing international instruments regarding the protection andpromotion of human rights in Afghanistan. In line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 werecommend that the Afghan Government reaYrms its commitment to putting an end to impunity and toprosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity; war crimes, including those relating to sexualviolence against women and girls; and to exclude such crimes from amnesty provisions.The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) is an information and advocacy network ofBritish and Irish Non Governmental Organisations that support relief and development programmes inAfghanistan. BAAG also provides a secretariat function for European NGOs through the EuropeanNetwork of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA). It is the only network of NGOs within the UK, Ireland and47

Capacity Developmentwithin theState SectorinAfghanistanDuring the IDSC oral evidence session, the inference was made that NGOs are undermining the capacityof Afghan government by recruiting qualiﬁed staV away from the state sector at a time when the state sectoris seriously lacking In capacity.With reference to this speciﬁc point, we wish to make the following comments:1. There has been, since 2002, outspoken criticism of aid manpower costs, in terms of both the inﬂationof costs and the “poaching” of manpower in Afghanistan. During the course of this debate, both inAfghanistan and internationally, the term “NGOs” in written and spoken comment48has been used toencompass a broad range of organisations, from international and donor organizations to privatecontractors and local and international NGOs. This in turn has fostered a perception in the general public ofa group—called NGOs—who earn high salaries, and undermine state-building eVorts. While this discoursehighlights genuine problems, it also serves to conﬂate in the public’s mind NGOs with multinationalorganizations that have very high salary scales, such as UN Agencies and “for proﬁt” contractors,subcontracted to carry out reconstruction projects. This conﬂation in terminology, in turn, runs risk ofturning NGOs into scapegoats for the very real issue of a human resources crisis in Afghanistan.2. Civil service reforms in Afghanistan have resulted in some career paths within the Government ofAfghanistan which are fully competitive with that which many NGOs are able oVer. As a result, movementof qualiﬁed Afghan personnel from NGOs to the state sector has been considerable in the past few years.3. Many national personnel working for local and international NGOs gain valuable experience andtraining within the NGO sector before moving to the state sector. A considerable number of NGOs haveexperienced high staV turnover over the past ﬁve years, losing committed, experienced and qualiﬁed staVnot only to the UN and other international organizations, but also to government departments. Forexample, within one organization over the last 12 months, seven senior and highly valued staV membershave moved to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigationand Livestock, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education respectively. A recentindependent report into civil military relations carried out for BAAG found that “There is a relatively smallpool of qualiﬁed and experienced Afghans with English or European language skills in Afghanistan. Theseare being pulled between donors, the diplomatic community, aid agencies, the military and the privatesector. This has had a profound impact on International and Afghan NGO staYng and capacity”.48

4. The contribution of NGOs to developing local human resource capacity in Afghanistan is signiﬁcant,sustained and for the most part, in accordance with national government planning. The philosophy thatunderpins the work of many NGOs is based on a commitment to strengthening and supporting local systemsnow and laying foundations for the future. (Please see attached Appendix: Examples of human resourcecapacity development in the state sector.)5. In its report looking into state-building processes in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Research andEvaluation Unit found that “The role of non-state actors, such as NGOs in developing capacity is currentlylargely ignored as a public resource. For example, NSP facilitating partners have trained thousands ofyoung, motivated and gender balanced community organisers that could represent a future pool of stateemployees; The Independent Afghanistan Reform and Civil Service Commission implementation plans forpay and grading reform should consider long-term capacity transfer from the non-state sector” Aiding theState, AREU (April 2007).6. As indicated in the AREU’s report, NGOs, through the NSP and other programmes, have contributedsigniﬁcantly to community development, and improving the ability of the poor to participate in decisionmaking, access information and take control of resources. Yet, there has been an absence of a consistentand strategic approach to capacity development across the state sector (and within civil society) that wouldallow for long term and sustained capacity development at both national and provincial level (For furtherreading see World Bank (2007),Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National Level).We wouldencourage a review and evaluation of the capacity development work that has been undertaken within thestate sector.7. We believe that it is the introduction of strategic, long-term, clearly deﬁned capacity developmentprogrammes with the necessary resources and support from the government ministries and internationaldonors, rather than an audit of qualiﬁed personnel within NGOs that will reinforce the development of thepublic sector in Afghanistan in the longer term.Civil Society Capacity DevelopmentIn contexts of weak governance, civil society can and should play a critical role in strengthening theresponsiveness of state and local government to improve the ability of national government institutions tosecure peace and social justice and human security. Civil society in Afghanistan has a critical role to playin capturing emerging aspirations in the context of local social struggles for peace, development and well-being. To this end, we would like to make the following points:8. BAAG supports the points made by the Chairman of the International Development Committee inhis letter to the Secretary of State for International Development, which state that:“the balance between military and civil and development activities needs to be reassessed. It isimportant that the pace of military engagement does not exceed the capacity of local governancestructures and civil society in relation to stabilisation and development activities”(Point 4.)“insuYcient progress is being made on the status and rights of women who are too often the victimsof domestic violence and who are not yet properly protected by the justice system”.(Point 6.)9. BAAG continues to have concerns regarding the involvement of the British army in aid projects inAfghanistan. These relate to ﬁve aspects of existing Provincial Reconstruction Team projects; the impacton “humanitarian space”49the risk of security objectives dominating their conception; the lack of scrutinyby Parliament of this type of aid spending; the fact that the long-term development value of such projectshas not be publicly evaluated; and the fact that they divert troops away from their core mission ofstabilisation and training Afghan security forces. The World Bank has also recently questioned the valueof PRT involvement in community led initiatives50and expressed concerns about their long-term eVect ongovernment institutions and processes.5110. Often opportunities to extend civil society development work to help develop local capacity iscurtailed by a lack of available funding, particularly core funding that would allow Afghan civil societyorganisations to achieve sustainability and growth. There is also a lack of long-term funding for Afghancivil society capacity development that allows for sustained and predictable programming.11. It is of concern that there is very little support for civil society initiatives in Afghanistan, and eventhose national priority projects meant to stimulate participation of civil society groups in local governance,such as youth groups, parents groups, women’s groups and other interest groups, that appear in the NSPmethodology are also dangerously under-funded. The multi million dollar NSP funding deﬁcits are wellpublicised, but if more funding is not committed on top of that which is needed to overcome the deﬁcit toensure continued capacity building of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and their interaction with49

civil society interest groups, much of the initial investment into NSP will have been wasted. There is a needfor real clarity and an agreed strategy and plan across government for the future role of CDCs, in general,and civil society, in particular, in local governance; one that will capture not lose or undermine theexperience that has been build at local level through programmes such as the NSP.12. Two years of support to CDCs is not suYcient, and cost eVective ways to continue engaging them,linking them to district governance and monitoring and promoting human rights in a meaningful way, andenhancing their capacity to strengthen rural livelihoods options should be investigated. Ear-marked fundingto build female CDC members’ and women’s groups’ leadership skills and ability to liaise with Governmentwould contribute to the gender mainstreaming commitment promoted by DFID. Establishing district levelsmall grant funds for female CDC sub-committees would enable them to implement projects that areresponsive to strategic gender needs, such as literacy and business skills training, and training in themonitoring and responding to violence against women.Increasing Security CostsforNGOsinInsecure Operating Environments13. Due to a deterioration in security in Afghanistan, NGOs’ security management costs are rising andNGOs are ﬁnding it increasingly diYcult to fund security needs from project or central budgets. Such costsrelate to increased costs on communication equipment, to security training to ensure the safety of staV, tocosts relating to robberies and attacks on oYces as well as to the costs associated with delays in projectimplementation resulting from speciﬁc security incidents.14. The sources of insecurity are complex and variable diVering between and within provinces anddistricts across Afghanistan. The level of threat comes not only from armed opposition groups, but alsofrom the high levels of crime, lawlessness and impunity. Incidents of looting, intimidation and abductionsare growing. Funders should be urged to allow for security costs to be built into projects. There is also avery real need for regular in depth conﬂict analysis work on the part of donors.Specific ExamplesofHow InsecurityhasAffected NGOs Include15.Example 1:In the north-eastern Province of Kunduz, Merlin is working to support a local AfghanNGO, Care of Afghan Families, to implement the Basic Package of Health Services. Although Kunduz isconsidered to have a relatively good security proﬁle, the ﬁnancial impact of increased levels of insecuritycan be considerable. Merlin recently submitted a funding request for an additional 1.5% of the total projectfunding, over a period of 22 months to address rising security costs to the organisation in Kunduz. Prior tothe funding request, the area in which the programme was located experienced attacks on clinics, suicidebombings and attacks on police posts.In spite of these challenges however, Merlin was unable to secure additional funding for security costsfrom the donor in question. Despite the diYcult nature of the operating environment, at present noadditional funding has been allocated for rising security costs. The impact of increased insecurity may wellimpact on NGOs ability to deliver services and this remains a critical concern within the current operatingenvironment.16.Example 2:Tearfund is working in Kandahar and the cost related to security are:All staV, both national and international, are now required to ﬂy to Kabul. Whereas up until recently,they could still use the road for national staV, this is no longer possible. A return ticket Kabul—Kandaharon UNHAS is 540 US dollars. This costs the organisation on an annual basis around 18,000 USD extra.Due to insecurity, Tearfund has decided to move its oYce inside the security area as declared by ANSOand UNDSS. Obviously, the house prices in this area are higher than in the previous location, and it willhave to pay an additional 1,700 USD per month on housing rentTearfund have also had to adopt security identity management measures to protect staV as they travelwhich have in turn resulted in an increase in costs associated with travel.The total extra security costs are 56,400 US dollars, on a total budget of around 500,000 US dollars. 10%of the total budget.17.Example 3:WOMANKIND Worldwide has recently decided to revise its’ Women’s EmpowermentProgramme in Afghanistan. The programmes have had a positive impact on Afghan women’s lives to date inMazar, Jalalabad, Peshawar and Kabul through the hard work of our three partner organisations—AWN,AWEC and AWRC.However, recently a mid-term evaluation of the programme made it clear that for the programme to meetits planned outputs until 2010, signiﬁcant additional resources are now required due to the deterioratingoperating environment in which the programme is being implemented; resources to which WOMANKINDdo not currently have access at present.WOMANKIND has been increasingly concerned about the deteriorating security situation inAfghanistan and has been mapping and monitoring the risks to the Women’s Empowerment Programmeson an ongoing basis throughout the year. Poor security has had a negative impact on our local coordinators,partners, partner staV, beneﬁciaries and programmes. As a small development agency WOMANKIND does

not have the capacity to work in very insecure environments—it has inadequate access to security supportand advice. This has been impacting on WOMANKIND’s ability to visit the programme sites as well as itsability to engage directly with partners and build their capacity.In light of these growing security risks to the programme activities, beneﬁciaries and staV, the need foradditional ﬁnancial and organisational resources, and after careful consideration it has reached theconclusion that reducing the scope of activities and partners is the most sensible option for continuation ofthe programme in a way that delivers tangible beneﬁts until March 2010. It has therefore reduced fundingto two of its partners—AWN and AWEC—that work in Peshawar, Mazar and Jalalabad—and willwithdraw all funding to these partners by October 2008.The ImportanceofFundingforAgricultureandSupporting Rural Economies18. Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that agriculture, the key economic sector in Afghanistan,remains largely underfunded. Meaningful investment in agricultural development, both in terms of mediumto large scale irrigation infrastructure and high value horticulture, is important for economic recovery andcounter-narcotics eVorts. DFID and other donors should use the expertise NGOs have developed over theyears to maximise farm related income opportunities employing a country wide approach to reducevulnerabilities to poverty and oVering alternatives to narcotics production. An integrated ‘value chain’approach to agriculture that addresses issues of land, water, credit management and labour is needed. Pleasesee attached chart on recommended rural development/agriculture interventions (Mansﬁeld, David,‘Treating the Opium Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan: Guideline Note’ http://www.davidmansﬁeld.org/data/Mainstreaming/WORLD—BANK/OpiumGuideline.doc)19. BAAG welcomes recent discussions in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development onhow best to support rural enterprise and we hope that this will lead to the development of a long-termprogramme that will be responsive to the needs of local communities.We are happy to provide further information in relation to the issues raised in this letter, if the Committeefeels it would be of use. We continue to believe that it is important for HMG to review its aid programmeto Afghanistan, and we are grateful to you for providing this opportunity for dialogue on this issue.January 2008Appendix to letter to Chairman of the International Development Committee from the British and IrishAgencies Afghanistan GroupSome ExamplesofNGO InvolvementinDeveloping Human Resource Capacityin theState SectorExample 1: NGO investment in developing human resource capacity in Health SectorAn example of Merlin’s investment in developing human resource capacity can be found in theCommunity Midwife Education programme: A collaborative approach involving local and internationalNGOs, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and donors has been adopted to develop a model for thedevelopment and retention of health workforce. Women’s access to health services in Afghanistan is poorand a contributing factor to the high burden of maternal mortality, owing to the lack of female healthworkers. To meet the demand for qualiﬁed female health staV, the MoPH introduced the idea of CommunityMidwife Education (CME) program. Merlin works in partnership with a local Afghan NGO, Care ofAfghan Families, to implement CME and in doing so strengthens the human resource capacity of the healthsector. The success of the program is based on a number of factors:— Communities are involved in selection and guarantee that the candidate will serve their communitywhile working in the district for at least ﬁve years after completing the training;— The training course is accredited and monitored by the MoPH and is linked to vacancies;— Donors commit funds in support of the initiative;— The program does not ﬁnish after completion of training. Instead, each graduate is supportedthrough the initial period of their placement in a health facility. In fact, candidates visit prospectivefacilities where they will work after graduation. They are introduced to facility and communitymembers and eVorts to make their workplace equipped and ready start before they join in;— All the graduate students are guaranteed a reasonably well paid job.The involvement of communities, the contract with the student and the coordination from beginning aremechanisms to ensure that once trained, the health workers don’t leave the area. Working with experiencedAfghan personnel, employed either by Merlin or the local NGO, is critical to the success of programmessuch as CME. Without their input it would not be possible to engage with the community to such a highdegree and to ensure continued training of essential health personnel. Through working on this programme,the qualiﬁed personnel are not lost to the heath sector, but contribute signiﬁcantly to its development andlong term sustainability.

Example 2: NGO investment in developing government human resource capacity in Agriculture and NSPmanagementAfghanaid has established a regular consultation process with the local agriculture departments, invitingemployees from the district level agriculture departments to attend training sessions and ﬁeld days toenhance their expertise and experience. In addition, the local agriculture departments directly co-ordinatewith Afghanaid in Baharak, Keshem and Faizabad in Badakhshan Provinces, so that the local agriculturedepartment employees will work directly with Afghanaid for a period of two to three years, to gainexperience and project management skills.As a facilitating partner for NSP, Afghanaid is training provincial government employees of the Ministrywho will take over management of the programme once the NGO’s cycle of work is complete. This trainingprogramme aims to enhance signiﬁcantly government employees conﬁdence, commitment, expertise, skillsand experience. The training also encourages career progression.The training also helps to promote genuine coordination, communication and information sharingbetween NGOs and the government departments.Example 3: NGO investment in developing human resource capacity in the Education SectorThe Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) has been running six in-service teacher training centresfor both men and women in Afghanistan for several years. Originally when there was no functioning statein Afghanistan, these centres were used to train the teachers in the hundreds of schools managed by SCA.After the fall of Taliban, and the election of the Government of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Educationtook over all SCA schools with the exception of 44 model schools, plus approximately 700 small villagecommunity based schools.The teacher training centres are now used for teachers from both government schools and the SCA modeland village schools. During the last ﬁve to six years thousands of government teachers have received trainingthrough SCA.The SCA model schools are designed to serve as schools “of excellence” with innovative pedagogicmethods. They are being increasingly used for training of government teachers. With regard to the Ministryof Education itself, SCA has senior personnel seconded to ministry assisting with curriculum development,development of text books, and other related activities.Example 4: NGO investment in developing human resource capacity in the Justice SectorWar Child UK has been working with children in prison in Herat, western Afghanistan, since 2003. Thearea has high levels of children in conﬂict with the law for a variety of reasons. High levels of poverty meanthat children are being pushed onto the streets, where they often engage in illegal, hazardous forms of labourto support themselves and their families ﬁnancially. It is on the streets where they are exposed to physical,mental and sexual abuse and are vulnerable to involvement in criminal activities, such as drug-smuggling,petty theft and substance abuse. Indeed, geographically, Herat is a strategic point in the traYcking of drugsfrom Afghanistan to Iran—and War Child’s research suggests that children are being co-opted into the drugtrade in increasing numbers.War Child UK is the only organisation to provide children imprisoned at Herat’s detention centres withrehabilitation and vocational training; psychosocial support; and a family liaison service. This is part of aDFID-funded project that aims to promote the rights of children in conﬂict with the law. No similar projectsfor acutely marginalised children in conﬂict with the law exist elsewhere in the country.Rights Violations Against ChildreninConflictwith theLawIn November 2006, War Child conducted research with child prisoners and juvenile justice stakeholders.All stakeholders described how international juvenile justice standards and the national juvenile justice codewere routinely disregarded, with the result that children were being detained for prolonged periods withoutcharge, trial, or adequate legal representation. The National Security Department, the ProsecutionDepartment, the court and the police were found to routinely violate the rights of children in conﬂict withthe law. Compounding the problem is the fact that the area of defence law is highly undeveloped in theAfghan context, meaning children have no formal mechanism they can utilise to secure their rights.Legal Training Pilot ProjectTo respond to this, War Child has signed an MOU with Herat University Faculty of Law, Islamic Lawand Theology, and has established a pilot project to train law students and social work students in juvenilejustice best practice. Currently, 25 students are receiving juvenile justice training, which involves orientationto international juvenile justice standards, the national juvenile justice code and includes a focus uponpreventative and diversionary justice.

Executive Summary— Christian Aid has been working in Afghanistan since 1986 and has built up considerable expertiseon rural development and civil society mobilisation through its work with Afghan partner NGOsin western Afghanistan.— There have been many achievements of the engagement by the international community inAfghanistan since 2001. However, this progress is now threatened by the growing Taliban-ledinsurgency, weak government capacity, a lack of protection of human rights, and relatively poorco-ordination of aid spending by international donors.— Afghanistan remains the poorest state in Asia. EVorts to tackle poverty in the coming years willbe complicated by the ongoing conﬂict between insurgency groups on one side and theGovernment of Afghanistan (GoA) and NATO/US forces on the other. This is aVecting the overallclimate for reconstruction; the ideological dimension to the conﬂict will also endanger the abilityof Western aid agencies to work across “the frontline” and deliver assistance to the poorestcommunities.— DFID needs to work with other UK government departments to mitigate any divergences betweenmilitary and development objectives, for instance by ensuring that international humanitarian lawis upheld during UK military operations and that all avenues for a peaceful solution to the conﬂictare explored.— The signiﬁcant injection of international aid into Afghanistan since 2001 has brought manybeneﬁts to the population, including new infrastructure and expanded public services. However,donors and GoA also need to pay attention to the large, current gap between domestic revenuesand public expenditure. A concerted eVort is required to increase independent GoA capacity andrevenues so that when aid ﬂows eventually decline, these gains can be safeguarded.— While Christian Aid supports DFID’s existing policy of budgetary support, we believe that moreﬂexibility is required in the way it is operated. This would enable the Department to respond tohumanitarian emergencies or other pressing challenges, such as the under-development of Afghancivil society.— We would caution against a “knee-jerk” response by DFID to the current problem of opiumpoppy cultivation. Its focus should remain on tackling the root causes of production, notably thelack of alternative livelihood options for farmers. This said, there is considerable scope forimprovement in DFID’s existing alternative livelihoods “package” in Afghanistan: it shouldconcentrate above all on strengthening the legal agricultural sector in opium-producingprovinces—since agriculture is the main source of employment for Afghans—as well as raisingoverall living standards.— We would call on the UK Government to undertake a full review of the mandate for its ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. We remain concerned by the ongoing involvementof the military in aid delivery—the development value of these projects is unproven and the use ofthe military in this way continues to have an impact on the perceived neutrality of humanitarianand development aid agencies. We believe a new approach is needed by the UK which re-aYrmsthe importance of distinct roles for military and civilian actors for achieving long-termstabilisation in conﬂict environments.

1.2 Christian Aid’s work is focused on the following thematic areas: (i) rights education and civil societystrengthening; (ii) rural livelihoods and livelihoods-related skills development; (iii) disaster risk reduction;and (iv) the legal and social protection of women. Our programme has three cross-cutting issues, which areintegrated into each of the four themes. These are: gender equality, HIV/AIDS and environmentalsustainability and climate change. The country budget for 2007–08 is $1.6 million.1.3 Our strength lies in the long-term relationships which we have built with Afghan communitiesthrough our partners and our support for community and civil society participation in developmentstrategies at a variety of levels. For example, in 2005–06 we facilitated the setting up of a mechanism throughwhich civil society groups could input to the discussions on the National Development Strategy. One of ourpartners in western Afghanistan has been working to establish democratically-elected “shuras” (villagecommittees) which involve participation by all members of the community.2. Overall AssessmentofSituation2.1 There have been many achievements resulting from the engagement of the international communityin Afghanistan since 2001. These include the new Constitution, the 2004 and 2005 elections, the revival ofeducation, progress in rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure and the return of approximately four millionrefugees to the country. However, this progress is now being undermined by a range of new threats to theAfghan state, some of which have their roots in policy mistakes of the 2001–05 years. These threats includethe growing insurgency, which has now spread to provinces in the west, north and centre of Afghanistan,the high levels of corruption within the government and police, the burgeoning drugs trade and the problemof weak capacity in public institutions.2.2 Afghanistan is still the poorest state in Asia, with over half of the population living below the povertyline. One in nine women is likely to die during their lifetime from pregnancy-related causes and some 40%of the rural population suVer recurring food shortages each year, or are at risk of them. Limited access toa clean water supply, healthcare, electricity, housing and employment remain pressing problems.2.3 The current insecurity—caused by a mix of the Taliban-led insurgency, the ongoing activities of illegalmilitias tied to provincial warlords or factional commanders, and general criminality—is having adebilitating eVect on the environment for development. The direct attacks on aid workers and otherdevelopment actors is one manifestation of the problem and has curtailed the mobility of aid staV. Forexample, since 2003 over 70 NGO staV have been murdered in attacks by armed groups. Another is thegeneral deterioration in the business and investment climate caused by the actual or perceived insecurity.This is now aVecting provinces, such as Herat, which were previously considered more stable.522.4 Since 2001 there has been progress in improving the human rights situation in Afghanistan.Prominent examples would be the lifting of the Taliban regime’s restrictions on girls’ education and thesteady growth of an independent media. On the other hand, the intimidatory power of warlords and theirproxies remains strong in most provinces and the notion that the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) isinterested in protecting ordinary citizens from abuses of power was damaged by the recent election of formerwarlords to Parliament, as well as by the passing this year of the Amnesty Law. (The latter will make itdiYcult for those responsible for gross abuses of human rights during the war years (1978–2001) to be heldto account for their crimes.) In the South the closure of many schools after attacks or the threat of attackby the Taliban, together with the assassination of teachers and many women holding public oYce, havehampered progress on education and women’s rights.3. ConflictbetweenSecurityandDevelopment Agendas[See also section 6]3.1 There is a signiﬁcant conﬂict between these agendas for donors in Afghanistan, including DFID. Theoriginal peace-keeping and stabilisation role for NATO/ISAF53was altered last year by the movement oftroops to the south and the subsequent oVensive against insurgency groups. The more NATO becomesinvolved as a direct party to the conﬂict, the more diYcult it will be for implementing agencies viewed aspro-Western or pro-GoA—including those funded by DFID—to deliver aid to communities lying beyond“the frontline”. Some international NGOs may be able to negotiate humanitarian access with diVerentpolitical factions, as happened during the Taliban period, but the ideological opposition to Westerninvolvement in some quarters is likely to place limits on this.3.2 In Afghanistan, DFID’s development objectives may clash with short-term military objectives and itneeds to work in partnership with other government departments to mitigate any divergences. Firstly, itshould work to ensure that UK and international military forces in the country fully respect internationalhumanitarian law.54While we abhor the deliberate targeting of civilians by insurgency groups, we are also52

concerned by the rising number of civilians killed as a result of NATO and US air-strikes and other militaryoperations. (Civilian casualties resulting from NATO/US operations have risen this year despite assurancesat the end of 2006 that greater eVorts would be made to minimise them.)553.3 Secondly, the Government as a whole should explore new avenues for tackling the insurgency beyondthe purely military option.56It should encourage GoA to begin peace talks with insurgency groups, as wasrecently proposed in a motion by the Upper House of the Afghan Parliament. This could build on theprogress made at the Peace Jirga held in Kabul in August between Afghan and Pakistani tribal leaders andgovernment oYcials and oVer a way out of the current impasse.3.4 Spending on the security sector in Afghanistan easily outstrips spending on health, education or rurallivelihoods (taken individually). According to the World Bank, the security sector accounted for 39% oftotal public expenditures or $1.33 billion in 2004–05. Proposals are currently on the table for a rise in policenumbers to 82,000, even though the Afghanistan Compact envisaged a maximum size of 62,000.57Buildingup the strength and eVectiveness of the Afghan army and police is an important objective in view of thepresent chronic insecurity. However, donors also need to avoid creating structures that could becomeunaVordable in future (see also section 5).3.5 We believe that donor spending on the Afghan National Army and Police should not be increasedfurther until there is more evidence of improved ANA and ANP quality—measured in terms of theirresponsiveness to citizens, non-corrupt practices and an ability to manage eVectively a greater proportionof policing and security tasks. A proper balance also needs to be found between spending in these sectorsand other, currently under-funded areas, such as the justice sector and agriculture. An example of theexisting problems in the criminal justice system was illustrated by a recent survey undertaken by a ChristianAid partner on the issue of domestic violence in western Afghanistan.58In only 10% of cases of chronicdomestic violence had women sought help from the police and courts.3.6 One way of ensuring a more consistent approach to donor funding within the security sector wouldbe to end the current policy of having “lead donors” for each “pillar” or sub-sector. This has led to a widedivergence in available funds for the diVerent pillars. Instead we believe that funding for the criminal justiceelements of the security sector (ie police, counter-narcotics and justice) should be brought under a singleroof and underpinned by a single, GoA-led strategy.

4. Budgetary Support4.1 In general, we support DFID’s decision to allocate the largest share of UK aid to the AfghanGovernment, including through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.59Too much aid is currentlyspent by other donors outside the direct control of the Government through the External Budget—as muchas three-quarters of the total. When decisions on aid spending are taken out of the hands of the Government,this reduces the extent of downward accountability to citizens and Parliament. In the past it has alsoundermined the Afghan Government’s development strategies because spending has often been poorly co-ordinated.4.2 However, there are a number of challenges that DFID faces if it is to make its current policy ofbudgetary support successful in the long term. These relate to the following issues: (i) ﬂexibility,(ii) sustainability, (iii) government capacity and (iv) visibility.4.3 (i) UK aid would be more eVective if spending decisions were made more ﬂexible. For example, ajoint UN-GoA appeal was launched in July 2006 to raise funds from the international community to combatthe severe drought aVecting the country. In November, DFID announced it would allocate £1 million to theMinistry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development for drought-relief activities. However, the capacity ofthis Ministry to respond to humanitarian emergencies such as this is still low. A better approach would havebeen to allocate half of the funds to the relevant UN agency, the World Food Programme, and half to theGovernment—immediately after the launch of the appeal.4.4 At present DFID funding for women’s rights organisations, the media and other civil societyorganisations is very limited, with the FCO generally oVering more assistance in this ﬁeld.60By supportingsmall projects of this type DFID could make an important contribution to strengthening Afghan civilsociety and enable it to deal with some of the serious human rights challenges mentioned in 2.4.55

4.5 (ii) The injection of aid into the Afghan economy post-2001 has brought signiﬁcant beneﬁts to thecountry. However, at some point in the future aid ﬂows to Afghanistan will decline. To safeguard thedevelopment gains of the last six years it is vitally important that donors focus now on measures to improvethe ﬁscal sustainability of the Afghan State in anticipation of this.61The high costs of security sectorexpenditures have already been highlighted above. The donor-funded elements of health services and theNational Solidarity Programme are further examples of programmes that would struggle to survive withoutexternal support. Last year the World Bank reported that domestic revenues only accounted for 4.5% ofAfghan GDP, which was only one quarter of the average for low-incomes states.62To close the large gapbetween recurrent expenditures and domestic revenues will require a concerted eVort to expand the latter,so that a large ﬁscal deﬁcit is avoided when aid ﬂows eventually decline.634.6 We believe DFID should play a lead role in developing and co-ordinating a donor and GoA strategyto tackle this problem of low domestic revenues. Some of the speciﬁc policy issues it should look at are:— Promoting the expansion of Afghan services and industries in the formal sector in order to increasetax revenues.— Reviewing the impact of existing external tariV policies on customs revenues (eg tariVs on importsare low by regional standards).— Expanding the remit for government tax authorities and improving tax law enforcement in thebusiness sector.— Reassessing the current policy which restricts the ability of the Afghan Central Bank to lend to theGovernment.4.7 (iii) A further problem is the ongoing lack of capacity within Afghan institutions, particularly forservice delivery—a key tool for poverty reduction. Surprisingly, the Afghanistan Compact paid very littleattention to this issue. It is clear however that provincial and district governments continue to face a rangeof problems, such as low staYng levels and a chronic shortage of funds for “non-salary” expenditures,including textbooks and furniture for schools, hospital maintenance, and water and sanitation facilities.64Primary healthcare services are by and large still being delivered by international NGOs, although therehave been improvements in the level of care. DFID ought to press for new targets to be included in futurestrategies which focus directly on measures to improve government capacity in frontline public services.4.8 (iv) When we questioned our partners regarding UK assistance, a common response was that theyhad had no direct experience of DFID’s work in Afghanistan, for example in the form of a fundingrelationship or a strong presence in their province. Obviously, UK aid may sometimes be diYcult to identifysince it has passed through implementing agencies or GoA. But their observation does suggest DFID couldbeneﬁt from having a more active presence in provinces where its aid is spent, whether it be in terms of morecommunity outreach work or improved monitoring of aid spending.5. Counter-narcotics5.1 The counter-narcotics policies being pursued by GoA and international donors is suVering from acrisis of credibility. This is due to the year-on-year increases in the cultivation of opium poppy being reportedby the UN OYce on Drugs and Crime and the continuing high level of opium and heroin exports fromAfghanistan.5.2 We would caution the Government against “knee-jerk” reactions to this admittedly worryingdevelopment. The focus on alternative livelihoods (AL) for farmers and interdiction measures higher up thesupply chain must be maintained, although some revisions to the AL strategy should also be considered (see5.5 and 5.6). The appeal of more widespread eradication as a policy response is not based on any accurateunderstanding of the causes of the drugs trade in Afghanistan (see next section). Furthermore, experiencefrom Latin America—and increasingly in Afghanistan—shows that if eradication happens in isolation fromother policies, such as the building up of the rule of law and economic development, it will not succeed andcan engender social unrest and increased support for opposition groups.5.3 The causes of the drugs trade in Afghanistan are various and include rural poverty, a harsh climate(which makes it diYcult to grow other crops), government and police corruption, lax border controls anda strong international market for heroin. In a recent survey conducted by UNODC of more than 300 villageheadmen in poppy-growing areas the main reasons given for the growing of poppy were economic in nature:in order of their frequency of mention, they were (i) poverty reduction, (ii) the ﬁnancial attractiveness ofopium and (ii) the possibility of obtaining immediate credit (“salaam”) by selling the future opium harvestto traders.6561

5.4 Farmers grow opium poppy because it is a proﬁtable and predictable crop and because there arecurrently few alternative sources of income in rural communities. The most eVective method of dealing withthe trade at this level would be to expand rural development programmes in provinces and districts wherepoppy production is highest or where there is a risk of production. Such interventions should be broad-basedand aimed at developing the economic potential of the whole province, including measures to improve theemployment, health and education levels of the population.66This will be more eVective than eVorts tocompensate individual farmers.5.5 Despite the high levels of investment by the UK in AL67—at least from 2005—the bulk of moneyearmarked for AL is being spent on programmes which either provide employment for public works-typeconstruction projects (eg National Rural Access Programme) or oVer micro-credit facilities (eg MISFA).These programmes are useful but do not in themselves address the key cause of the problem, namely theweakness of the agricultural sector. Agriculture employs an estimated 80% of the population in Afghanistanand developing a strong (legal) agricultural sector is crucial if poppy production is to be reduced.5.6 DFID should re-engage with GoA and donors on this issue and consider supporting new policies onagriculture in Afghanistan, including:68— Improving irrigation and water resource management.— Achieving food security through expanded cereal production.— Introducing a formalised credit system and extension services for farmers.— Building the export capacity of perennial horticulture (eg fruits, nuts and vines).— Improving marketing by “oV-farm” rural enterprises, for example by promoting co-operatives.— Increasing agricultural research capacity and encouraging technology transfer.5.7 DFID should also undertake a review of its policy of allocating aid to the Counter-Narcotics TrustFund (CNTF), which has proved an ineVective tool for disbursing funds for AL, especially via NGOs. Itshould withdraw unspent funds from the CNTF and reallocate these funds as well as future ones for AL,in the line with the type of broad-based intervention mentioned above.6. Military InvolvementinAid Delivery6.1 Christian Aid continues to have concerns regarding the involvement of the British Army in aidprojects in Afghanistan. These relate to four aspects of existing Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)projects:69the impact on “humanitarian space”, their unproven development value, the risk of securityobjectives dominating their conception, and the lack of scrutiny by Parliament of this type of aid spending.(An additional problem is that they distract UK and NATO troops from their core mission of stabilisationand expanding the capacity of Afghan security forces.) For these reasons we would call for a review byDFID of its policy of funding Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).6.2 Although the current focus of this debate is Helmand, the importance of protecting “humanitarianspace” has relevance for all provinces of Afghanistan, where there is a continuing threat to the safety ofAfghan and international aid agency staV. This threat is, in part, caused by the association of these agencieswith the military and the Afghan Government, which can be exacerbated if the military is involved in aiddelivery.6.3 Concerns about the development beneﬁts of QIPs were raised in a joint donor evaluation report in2005, to which the UK was a party. It stated that military aid projects “could have been delivered morecheaply and eYciently by other aid providers” and that “time pressure for delivery during short assignmentspromotes a ‘just do it’ approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability”.706.4 In the initial stages of the Helmand deployment (Spring 2006) it appears that there was insuYcientoversight by DFID of aid spent by the military in the province. According to some DFID sources, it wasnot until six months after the deployment that the inter-departmental committee71in charge of monitoringQIPs in Helmand was functioning eVectively—and in the ﬁrst two months there was apparently no66

An example of the beneﬁts of a broad-based approach is illustrated by a recent comment from one of our partners. They saidthat if more health clinics were established in rural districts, people would save money because they would not have to paythe cost of travel to the nearest city for medical treatment. With treatment available locally, they would have more funds topay for the transportation of their fruit and vegetable crops to nearby markets, therefore oVering an alternative source ofincome to poppy.An average of £45 million is being allocated annually for AL programmes.Taken fromRebuilding Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector: Common Recommendations Across NGOs and Governments,July2007, Canadian Agri-Food and Trade Service.These projects vary in nature. Some relate purely to force protection or improving the security and governance environment(eg establishing police posts or conducting political assessments); some relate to reconstruction (eg building roads, healthclinics, schools and wells); and some to development (eg medical and veterinary services, materials for schools and small-scalecommunity development projects). There are also hybrid QIPs that do not ﬁt into a single category, such as “goodwill” aidhandouts by the military, which may serve both force protection and humanitarian objectives.A Joint Evaluation: Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan from Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Swedenand UK,Danish International Development Agency (Danida), 2005.Based in Helmand and composed of oYcials from MoD, DFID and FCO.

monitoring at all. During this period a signiﬁcant amount of aid was used for QIPs with security objectives,such as establishing police posts and making political assessments. This spending should surely have beenmade from the Ministry of Defence’s budget, not by DFID.6.5 DFID should be more transparent about the way aid is spent in Helmand; if there are trade-oVsbetween poverty reduction and military objectives, these must be reported openly to Parliament and thepublic. A public debate is probably required on the admissibility of these types of projects under currentrules for ODA spending.726.6 In view of the problems highlighted here, our recommendation is that DFID should suspend itsfunding of QIPs in Afghanistan until a full review has been conducted of their development value. TheGovernment should also undertake a review of the existing PRT mandate in Afghanistan. It should progresstowards a situation where the development tasks of PRTs are separated from the military tasks. In areaswhere greater stability exists, NATO PRTs should hand over all responsibility for reconstruction anddevelopment to civilian bodies. This would be in line with the UN’s guidelines on the use of military assetsin complex emergencies as well as DFID’s Humanitarian Policy.73Both emphasise that military involvementin humanitarian situations should be a “last resort” (ie only when no civilian alternative exists) and time-bound.

SummaryofRecommendations:1. In light of the growing number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, and in order to safeguard previousdevelopment gains, DFID should work jointly with MoD and FCO to ensure stronger measures are takento minimise civilian deaths from NATO/US airstrikes and other military operations.2. HMG should explore with GoA new avenues for bringing about a peaceful resolution to the existingconﬂict, including through talks with insurgency groups.3. Donor spending should not increase further for the Afghan National Army and Police until there ismore evidence of quality improvements. A better balance must be sought between ANA and ANP fundingand that for under-funded sectors, such as agriculture and justice.4. The practice of nominating “lead donors” for diVerent pillars within the security sector should beended; instead a single fund should established for spending on all elements relating to criminal justice issues,which is underpinned by a single, GoA-led strategy—this would encourage better co-ordination on theseissues and reduce existing spending disparities.5. DFID should retain a greater degree of ﬂexibility in its annual budget to allow it to respond tohumanitarian emergencies and other pressing issues, such as civil society development.6. Donors should address the worrying issue of GoA’s ﬁscal deﬁcit. DFID should take a lead indeveloping and co-ordinating a new strategy to tackle the problem of low domestic revenues.7. In view of the continuing weak capacity of GoA, particularly on service delivery at the provincial level,DFID should press for new targets to be included in future GoA/donor strategies that focus on enhancingthis capacity.8. DFID should consider taking steps to increase its visibility in those provinces of Afghanistan whereUK aid is spent.9. DFID should maintain its focus on alternative livelihoods as a solution to the opium trade. However,it should give enhanced support to broad-based economic development strategies in provinces whereproduction is highest. The primary focus should be on agriculture, in view of the country’s dependence onthis sector, but improving health, education and general living standards are also important.10. DFID should withdraw its funds from the Counter-narcotics Trust Fund and reallocate them tosupport broader rural development programmes.11. DFID should suspend its funding of QIPs until a full review has been conducted of their developmentvalue. HMG (ie DFID, MoD and FCO) should also undertake a review of the existing PRT mandate inAfghanistan. For the Helmand PRT, it should consider introducing a clearer separation between thedevelopment and military tasks of PRTs. And in areas where security has improved, it should argue forNATO PRTs to steadily withdraw from engaging in reconstruction or development work, in line withexisting UN and DFID guidelines.September 2007

Introduction1. David Elliot is an independent Development Consultant with experience working on private sectordevelopment and poverty reduction for the World Bank, UNDP, USAID and the Asian DevelopmentBank, (ADB). In 2005 while working for ADB in Afghanistan he reported fraud and corruption related tofour Technical Assistance projects managed by the ADB and funded by DFID, the UN GlobalEnvironmental Facility (GEF), and the Danish Government, (Danida). The only action taken by the ADBin response was to terminate the Consultant’s contract and blacklist the consultant from obtaining furtherwork with the ADB. Evidence of fraud and abuse of DFID resources was ﬁrst reported to DFID’sDepartment of Internal Audit in January 2007, however no corrective actions were taken. The Projects weresubsequently the subject of a critical report by theFinancial Timesin July 2007. An audit conducted by PriceWaterhouse on behalf of ADB, in October 2007 showed grave shortcomings in program management. Eventhough the auditors conﬁrmed that ADB had falsiﬁed progress reports and improperly used DFID ﬁnancedresources, neither DFID or ADB interviewed the witness or examined the evidence of more seriouscorruption and retaliation.

Recommendations1. DFID’s stated policy regarding fraud is one of “zero tolerance”, and “anyone” is encouraged to reportfraud to DFID’s Department of Internal Audit. However, the rights of a whistleblower submitting evidenceof fraud are not clear. For example, it is ambiguous if the Fraud Policy applies to non-employees of DFIDthat report corruption, or what obligations DFID has to report back to a non-employee whistleblower orCivil Society Organization about any corrective actions taken.2. In a case where a whistleblower alleges retaliation for having taken the appropriate steps to reportcorruption to DFID, it is inadequate to simply write back and thank the informant for the evidencesubmitted.3. In a case were loss of life in aVected communities is a direct consequence of DFID funded projectfailure, a ﬁnancial audit 9 months after such evidence of failure and its consequences is reported, alsoconstitutes an inadequate response.4. There is no eVective process for requiring ADB to investigate and respond to allegations of fraud andwaste of DFID funds. In this particular case no eVective action was taken until the matter was reported bythe Financial Times. A process for initiating an independent investigation of allegations of fraud and wasteshould be included in future agreements with ADB and other multilateral organizations. If evidence ofwrong doing is credible and speciﬁc then DFID should have the right to audit multilateral spending ofDFID funds.5. There is apparently no process governing how DFID would require ADB to return or replenish DFIDfunds that have been wasted or used for corrupt purposes. Such a process should be deﬁned and includedin future funding agreements.6. There is no mechanism for DFID to oVer protection or legal support to a non-employee whistleblowerthat suVers retaliation as a result of reporting fraud against DFID by a multilateral partner. As a result,DFID might recover its funds, but the whistleblower remains exposed to retaliation.7. DFID funding granted to a multilateral and then allocated to speciﬁc country projects should bereported to the relevant DFID country program management. In this particular case, DFID AfghanistanstaV had no knowledge or awareness of the ways ADB was using (or misusing) DFID resources in thecountry.8. A clear framework should also govern decisions regarding ADB’s or other multilaterals’ allocation ofDFID funds to particular projects. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, there was no coordination orintegration of the ADB projects with the larger DFID country program, and DFID would have been moreeVective had it implemented and overseen these TA projects directly.

Associate Parliamentary Groupon women, peace and security is a tripartite forum with input from parliamentarians, civilservants and civil society. The APG subgroups work on Iraq, Afghanistan, widowhood in context of conﬂict and gendertraining of peacekeeping troops.WOMANKINDhas been supporting women in Afghanistan since 2003. Their programme covers Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazarand Peshawar where they work in partnership with three Afghan women’s organisations to promote women’s civil, social,economic and political participation and to address issues regarding violence against women.Women for Women International-Afghanistanis a chapter of Women for Women International, registered in 2002 with theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan. Past and present locations served include the provinces of Afshar, Balkh, Dashti Barchi,Herat, Kabul, Kamari, Kapisa, Khairkhana, Mazar-e-Sharif, Parwan, Shari-naw, Shina, and Wardak. The main oYce is inKabul. Currently, 3,310 women participate in WWI—Afghanistan’s yearlong program, and 10,727 women have been servedsince program inception, beneﬁting almost an additional 54,000 family and community members. Program participantsinclude widows, single heads of household, returnees, IDPs, and the physically challenged.Widows for Peace through Democracy(WPD) is an umbrella organisation for widows associations and organisations acrossSouth Asia, Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. WPD establishes networks to exchange information and good practiceand highlights the roles/needs of widows to governments, donors and the international community.TheInternational Rescue Committee(IRC) is one of the largest and longest-standing NGOs working in Afghanistan and hasbeen working there since 1988. They run programmes on governance, education and child protection, vocational educationand training and HIV.Mark A Drumbl, (2004) p 1 “Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law fro the Women of Afghanistan”,ColumbiaJournal of Transnational Law,Vol 42, No 2.

(i)Prioritise the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan1. Research suggests thatwhere there is acute gender discrimination and abuses of human rights, speciﬁcallywomen’s rights, societies are likely to be more unstable.80Gender equality leads to peace through thepromotion of development and good governance. Higher participation of women in the formal economyand political arena increases competition and as a result, corruption and rent-seeking will be inhibited thusimproving the quality of governance.81According to several studies, good governance is an essentialcomponent for the creation of a peaceful environment. Indeed,improving the situation for women withregards to more political and economic participation and better access to health and education improves statecapacityand good governance.2. GAPS welcome’s the UK Governments eVorts so far in the implementation of UNSCR 1325,particularly the jointly produced UK National Action Plan82by FCO, DFID and MOD. GAPS alsorecognises the importance of HMG’s ﬁnancial support for implementation of Resolution 1325.83However,GAPS agrees with DFID when it notes that“UNSCR 1325 implementation by both the UN and MemberStates needs to go much further,”84particularly in the context of Afghanistan.3. Afghanistan, with the assistance of DFID, is striving to achieve a secure and lasting peace whilst alsoaddressing its political and economic development. However, a key aspect that must be tackled is the pursuitof agender sensitive reconstruction and development process,without which Afghanistan will remainpolitically and socially unstable. What remains absent from many interventions is a focus on enablingwomen to participate safely and meaningful in the post-conﬂict to development transition.4. Despite major progress on paper for women’s rights since the fall of the Taliban, the reality for womenon the ground remains basically unchanged, particularly with regards to gender based violence andeconomic and political marginalisation. For example, quota systems for women MPs have enabled womento sit in the Afghan parliament, yet women MPs continue to experience verbal abuse and intimidation frommale parliamentary colleagues.It is essential that UK development assistance and strategy take into accountthe lack of real progress that has been made with women’s rights.Although the promotion of gender equalityand awareness is complex in the context of Afghanistan, it is necessary for the achievement of sustainablepeace and development. The DFID must take action to ensure women’s rights in the areas of politics,education, judicial reform, security services and livelihoods become a reality.85GAPS Specifically RecommendsthatDFID— Supports women’s organisations to work with Afghan government on National Action Plan forthe Implementation of UNSCR 1325 for Afghanistan.(ii)Include a gender perspective in security sector reform in AfghanistanWomen are not only victims of war, but are central to creating the conditions for lasting andinclusive peace.86UK Policy Promises5. GAPS welcomes DFID’s recognition of the importance of analysing women’s role in post conﬂictreconstruction.87They explicitly note thatwhere it is well placed to assist, the UK . . . will oVer ﬁnancial,technical and political support for strong peace processes, making eVorts to ensure women are included.88However, as the UK recognises, women’s roles remain obscured and under valued.89Furthermore, there islittle access to justice for women in Afghanistan, they are poorly represented within the police and formaljustice sector institutions, they have little representation in the informal or traditional dispute resolutionmechanisms and the Ministry of Women’s AVairs operates at a low capacity and with minimal inﬂuence ongovernment policy.80

Caprioli, Mary (2003) Gender Equality and Civil Wars, CPR Working Paper No 8, World Bank http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482367/WP8trxtsep3.pdfBussmann, M (2007)Gender equality, good governance, and peace,University of Konstanz http://www.sgir.org/archive/turin/uploads/Bussmann-Bussmann–Turin.pdfThe 2006 UK National Action Plan sets out speciﬁcally how the UK aims to ensure the implementation of SCR 1325.DFID helps gender advisers make a diVerence in UN peacekeeping missions and also funds the NGO working group on SCR1325 in New York, to guarantee continued monitoring of implementation of UNSCR1325.Department for International Development Policy Paper (2006)Preventing Violent Conﬂict,p 13 DFID, London.Womankind Worldwide (2006)Taking Stock: Afghan women and Girls Five Years On.p 8, Womankind, London.Response to Post Conﬂict Stabilisation: Improving the UK’s Contribution—a consultation on United Kingdom strategy andpractice and establishment of a post conﬂict reconstruction unit. (2005)www.thewnc.org.uk/pubs/pcruconsultationresponse.pdfDFID refers to research on Central Africa that recognises peace agreements, post-conﬂict reconstruction and governance dobetter when women are involved: Department for International Development Policy Paper (2006)Preventing Violent Conﬂict,p 20 DFID, London.Department for International Development Policy Paper (2006)Preventing Violent Conﬂict,DFID, London.ibid,p 20.

6. As part of DFIDs role in building state institutions and promoting good governance in Afghanistan,GAPS strongly urges that women are consulted and included in security sector reform. In line with Article1 of UNSCR 1325, which states the international community mustensure increased representation of womenat all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for theprevention, management and resolution of conﬂict”,GAPS recommends that DFID:— Supports more women judges to sit on all types of courts, including the Supreme Court, whichinterprets the Constitution and currently has no female judges on the Supreme Court HighCouncil.— Security sector reform that prioritises human security for women in relation to their access toformal, participatory and representative judicial mechanisms.— Builds the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) to provide security for women membersof parliament when they travel to and from their electoral districts throughout the country as partof the parliamentary activities.— Supports, in line with the Draft Interim National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan, thereform of Afghan Government’s legal and judicial systems to guarantee equality and non-discrimination as enshrined in the Constitution. This can include the development of a gendersensitive and regulatory framework including inheritance, property and labour laws.(iii)Urgently protect Afghan women and girls from gender based violencea7. In the 2006Preventing Violent Conﬂictpaper, DFID recognises that violent conﬂict takes its toll onthe poor and most heavily on women and children, with women and girls experiencing rape and other formsof sexual violence.90Indeedwhere abuses of human rights go unchecked and where there is a weak civil society,grievances and disillusionment and disputes are more likely to become violent. As such gender inequality mustbe tackled to reduce the risk of recurrent violent conﬂict.918.Violence against women is pervasive in Afghanistanand an unmistakable and clear barrier to theempowerment of Afghan women and girls by impeding their health, well being, productivity and safety.Women in Afghanistan can not be empowered to participate safely and freely unless, ﬁrstly, there is a generalawareness and promotion of women’s human rights awarded under the constitution; and secondly, womenhave the capacity to challenge those long standing socio-cultural norms safely, without an increased threatof violence being perpetuated against them.9.NGOs have noted increases in some forms of violence against women(honour killings and attacks onwomen election workers, women NGO workers, women educational workers, human rights defenders andjournalists) and a continuation of other forms of violence (traYcking of women and girls and domesticabuse). Most notably there has been a worrying rise in self-immolation.9210. Women’s NGOs have highlighted how thealternative livelihood programs have increased the likelihoodof violence against women.Too often when farmers are unable to pay their creditors, they resort to sellingtheir daughters to pay oV the debt. Evidence suggests this practice has increased for farmers who haveparticipated in alternative livelihood programs.93The continued perpetration of and impunity aroundviolence against women and girls is a gross human rights violation. It must be examined as a consequenceof highly iniquitous power relations between men and women, which are exacerbated by the lack of rule oflaw in Afghanistan and the continued use of the entrenched Customary Law. These issues must be tackledimmediately.11. In line with UK NAP Action Point 9 to“promote justice for women and tackle gender-based violencein post-conﬂict situations”and Articles 10 and 11 of UNSCR 1325, which call for“. . . all parties to armedconﬂict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape andother forms of sexual abuse”;and“. . . an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide,crimes against humanity, war crimes, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls, andin this regard, . . . the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible, from amnesty provisions”,GAPSrecommends DFID:— Gives full institutional support should be given to pass the new law on violence against women(VAW) in Afghanistan.— Develops the capacity of the Afghan National Police to be better able to tackle the issue and receivecases of VAW—including supporting the recruitment of more female police oYcers anddeveloping new processes to document cases of VAW.— Provides ﬁnancial support for local women’s NGOs to collect data on VAW and to providesupport services, including psycho-social support, safe houses for survivors of VAW throughoutthe country.90919293

(iv)Incorporate a gender perspective into the work Provisional Reconstruction TeamsProvincial Reconstruction Teams12. British Provincial Reconstruction Teams94(PRT) consist of military, political and developmentcomponents, with DFID involved through the cross departmental Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction Group toprovide personnel for the promotion of economic development and reconstruction. DFID notes thateVective peace processes and post-conﬂict reconstruction can enable the development of new rules andinstitutions for managing disputes and can lead to signiﬁcant social and political change.13. GAPS observes thatthe use of PRTs remains controversial, as the lines between military security workand civilian humanitarian or development activities have been blurred.This is problematical for both ethicaland operational (security) reasons, except with the proviso of last resort emergency operations, as per IASCguidelines. However, if PRTs continue to be used, it must be recognised that the nature of the process,including who is consulted and participates, will determine future success. ISAF PRT Handbook mentionsthe importance of PRTs “to endeavour to have a gender component” because PRT development activitiesare to support local priorities within the national development framework, such as ANDS.95However, toooften opportunities to involve women are not taken. Indeed,it is clear that PRTs lack gender strategies andwomen have not been eVectively consulted with respect their work.14. Civil society must be involved in implementing and monitoring PRT operations andPRTs shouldconsult Afghan women in local government, communities and NGOs96Afghan women demand a voice insecurity, development and reconstruction97and PRTs must be more transparent and accountable to thepeople of Afghanistan.98Incorporating gender policies into PRT strategies and operations would help toensure that women are targeted beneﬁciaries of PRT’s programmes.99PRT commanders should understandthatincorporating gender policy in their strategies and operations will lead to operational eVectiveness andinﬂuence operation success.15.In line with Articles 4, 5 and 17 of UNSCR 1325, which demand “. . . the expansion of the role andcontribution of women in United Nations ﬁeld-based operations, and especially among military observers,civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel”; “. . . to incorporate a gender perspective intopeacekeeping operations,”and“. . . the reporting . . . [on] progress on gender mainstreaming throughpeacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls”,GAPS recommends DFID:— Increases the number of women represented in PRTs to enable them to interact with local women.— Ensures PRTs recognise the role of local civil society and consult with them on best practice inrelation to gender mainstreaming within development projects.— Ensures women are included in development of PRT projects, through consultation with women’sshurasat a local level, and women’s NGOs at a national level.— Makes the realisation of women’s human rights a benchmark of success in PRT missions inAfghanistan through monitoring factors such as women’s participation in political bodies,property rights, employment rights and incidents of violence against women.— Provide all PRT personnel receive at least three days pre-deployment gender training before theyleave for Afghanistan.94

(v)Increase direct resources to local women’s civil society organisationsDirect Budgetary Support and the impact of the decline in direct core funding on NGO activity16. GAPS welcomes DFID’s promise to help build the capacity of civil society to manage violenceconﬂicts and post-conﬂict reconstruction.100GAPS also welcomes DFID’s support of a ﬁve-year women’sempowerment programme from 2005–10101, implemented by WOMANKIND Worldwide and their supportof UNIFEM in Afghanistan for training and advocacy for increased participation of women in electoralprocesses.102However, overall, the UK provides 80% of its current assistance, estimated to be £107 millionin 2007–08, directly to the Government of Afghanistan, with only 20% of assistance going to the provinciallevel and through NGOs.Most worryingly none of the UK’s direct government funding is reaching thegrassroots women’s movement in Afghanistan which is suVering from a serious lack of ﬁnancial resources.17. Thedecline in core funding for NGO work exacerbates the security risks NGOs faceas the cost ofsecurity for staV and program participants is not adequately covered by donors. The importance of securityprecautions cannot be over-stated. Donors must understand this and adapt their expectations accordingly.For example, security guards are a necessity and their presence should not be limited by budgetaryrestrictions on overhead expenses.18.It is vital that smaller and less powerful and visible civil society groups are supported, especially localwomen’s NGOs.Women’s civil society organisations are essential for the promotion of good governanceand the social, political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Women’s groups are vital for holdingthe Afghan government to account; for providing essential service provision in areas of health and educationand for pushing for needed legal reform. GAPS recognises the crucial work of women peacebuilders inAfghanistan, whose eVorts include the prevention of the restoration of Department of Vice and Virtue; thedevelopment of a new Violence against Women Law; monitoring human rights abuses and pressurising theAfghan government to ensure freedom of speech.

(vi)Support and promote the rights of the most marginalised of women, particularly widows, in Afghanistan19. Widows are neglected in Afghanistan.It is estimated that in Kabul alone there are at least 60,000widows103and CARE Afghanistan estimates there are over one million widows in Afghanistan. Thesewomen—young, middle aged and old—have become widows from the time of the Soviet Invasion, underthe Taliban, as a result of the invasion of 2003, and now under the occupation and insurgency. Many widowsreturned from the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran unable to ﬁnd housing and raise their children. It isthought that 70% of Afghan street children are children of widows.20. It is theessential that work is done to promote the status of widows,protecting them from abuse andsupporting their crucial roles in their families and communities. This should be a vital priority for DFIDfor reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. Gathering statistics on widowhood across the countryis very diYcult due to the security situation. Despite this, the Ministry for Women’s AVairs is intending,resources being available, to conduct a survey on women’s status, situation, income, health in 2008.21. In line with UNSCR 1325 that highlights “theneed to consolidate data on the impact of armed conﬂicton women and girls”,GAPS recommends:— Institutional support for NGOs and the Ministry of Women’s AVairs to gather statistics andconduct a survey of women’s status and situation.— Recognition of widows human rights and widows’ role in social and economic reconstruction inAfghanistan.— Support of widows organisations, particularly in the creation of a National Federation of AfghanWidows Organisations.100101

Memorandum submitted by the Institute for State EVectivenessInstituteforState Effectiveness1. The Institute for State EVectiveness is an independent organisation, founded in 2005, to give neutralpolicy advice and support to countries emerging from instability and conﬂict. To date, it has supportedleaders and managers in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Southern Sudan and Lebanon in formulatinganalysis and crafting policies; and has advised a number of international organisations and nationalgovernments in developing their approaches to state-building. The organisation is led by Dr Ashraf Ghaniand Clare Lockhart, based on a program at the World Bank in the late 1990s preparing toolkits andapproaches to state-building; their work in designing the Bonn Agreement, and the National DevelopmentFramework and strategy in Afghanistan from 2001–05, and preparation of frameworks for state-buildingsince that time. ISE’s work includes designing frameworks for reconstruction and state-building; manuals,guidelines and toolkits on state-building, and providing independent support and advice to policy-makers.More information and conceptual frameworks are available at www.eVectivestates.org.2. Dr Ashraf Ghani was UN adviser, Chief Adviser to President Karzai, and Minister of Finance in the2001–04 period in Afghanistan. He is currently Chairman of the Institute for State EVectiveness and serveson the boards and commissions of a number of global networks. He has recently been considered for theposts of UN Secretary General and World Bank President. He has taught at Johns Hopkins and BerkeleyUniversities, and worked at the World Bank over a number of years. He is currently advising a number ofgovernments on their approaches to state-building and institution-building.3. Clare Lockhart is Director of the Institute for State EVectiveness. Between 2001 and 2004 she servedas policy adviser to the UN and Afghan Government, responsible for the design of national strategies andnational programs, including National Solidarity Program. In 2006, she returned to Kabul as Adviser toGeneral Richards at ISAF. Previously, she managed a program designing approaches to institution-building at the World Bank.4. Ghani and Lockhart’s book,The Framework: Fixing Failed Statesis to be published with OxfordUniversity Press in early 2008. They have also written for several journals and newspapers and appearedfrequently in the media.TestimonyonAfghanistan5. This testimony is prepared by Clare Lockhart based on a series of longer analytical pieces onAfghanistan prepared by the ISE team. Some of these documents are already in the public domain andothers are available on request. Dr Ghani also met with the IDC during their visit to Kabul in October 2007and had the opportunity to share an overview with the IDC. Clare Lockhart would be willing to providefurther details to the Committee on the diVerent dimensions—security, political process and economic—ofrecent and current challenges in Afghanistan.A Changed Context6. A review of the current situation in Afghanistan must recognise the changed context. Policies designedfor one set of conditions cannot be applied to another, and the conditions in 2007 are very diVerent fromthose in 2001, or 2004. In 2001, the Afghan population were internationalist, welcoming the foreign presenceas liberators. While materially poor, the population’s conﬁdence grew in the Bonn settlement, throughcarefully designed measures to gain and enhance their trust. In 2004 trust was high, and a manifesto designedfor the President’s re-election promised a series of ambitious reforms focused on the economy.7. In 2007, by contrast, diVerent characteristics prevail. First, the population’s conﬁdence in both theirinternational partners and leaders from across their political class is waning. Second, while the populationis materially better oV, they are psychologically more uncertain. Third, the dominant perception and moodis one of insecurity and anxiety rather than conﬁdence and hope. The challenge at this point in time lies inarresting further decline and restoring the conﬁdence of the population in a true partnership. Regaining theinitiative will require a modiﬁed approach that takes into account the implementation approaches that canwork in context. While use of force will be required, use of rules and mechanisms for implementation thatharness the considerable resources available internationally will be critical factors in putting Afghanistanback on course.Building Systems 2001–04:anInternational Partnership8. Although context has changed, examining the approach that underlay the state-building agenda2001–04 may have important lessons for a revived state-building eVort. During the period 2001–04, acarefully laid sequence of instruments was crafted to increase both the conﬁdence of the Afghan populationand the capability of the government, over time. The ﬁrst of these building blocks was the Bonn Agreement.The second was then Chairman Karzai’s speech to the Tokyo conference in January 2002, which laid out avision and programs. The third was the National Development Framework, released by the Afghan

Government in April 2002, which became the primary strategy document for all actors (the UKGovernment, EC, Norwegian and Dutch Governments being the ﬁrst to pledge to support it, and subsumetheir own planning processes to this strategy document). Fourth was the Afghan Budget, prepared at thesame time as the Framework. Lastly, and most critical, were a series of National Programs, described by thePresident in his speech. These were designed by a core team established in Afghan Assistance CoordinationAuthority (AACA) in early 2002 (which was supported by Clare Short as Secretary of State for DFID). Theyincluded a National Security Plan, National Emergency Employment Program, the National SolidarityProgram, National Transportation Program, National Financial Management Program, NationalCommunications Program and Afghan Stabilisation Program (these can be viewed atwww.eVectivestates.org). The National Solidarity Program gives block grants to communities, against threesimple rules; an elected village council, a quorum of the village deciding on projects, and posting of accountsin public places. The NSP is now present in 23,000 villages, and on 10 November 2007, representatives fromthe program convened in Kabul for the National Convention of Communities to discuss governance issuesthat concern them.9. Each of these programs contained a series of plans and programs, containing catalytic mechanismsdesigned to produce further eVects and create domestic and regional stakeholders in stability, for examplethe currency exchange, telecoms tender process, the creation of the ANA. To create Afghan leadership, ateam of Afghans were carefully recruited and trained to operate these programs, rules, methods,mechanisms and procedures to make them a reality, carefully built over a three year period. A set ofinstruments, including but not limited to the ARTF (Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund) was put in placeto create interlocking support mechanisms. A second phase of national programs was designed to take eVectfrom January 2005, but due to failure to agree between the reform team and others, the reform team left thegovernment in early 2005.

ProblemswithExisting ApproachestoAidandDevelopment10. One of the challenges regarding aid and development in Afghanistan is proliferation of projects,funding channels, and mal-coordinated bilateral initiatives. This itself generates a coordination problem. In2002, the UN agencies and NGOs prepared a large appeal based on hundreds of atomised projects, whichfailed to deliver a real dividend to the population. Rather, the Afghan population resent enormously theperceived lack of eVectiveness, appropriateness and accountability in these projects, with a generalperception of waste. ISE interviews in Afghanistan in 2006 attest to such disappointment and resentment,which has become grist for the mobilisation of opposition parties and movements in Afghanistan. While theindividuals working in such projects are usually selﬂess, hard-working and dedicated, the combined eVectof such projects are not the intended ones. Indeed, there are so many that they literally cause system-gridlock—the streets of Kabul jammed with the white cars of projects. More damaging, the limited stockof civil servants and professionals in Afghanistan were quickly leached from government positions wherethey were doctors, teachers and managers at $50 per month to become drivers, translators and assistants atsalaries sometimes approaching $1,000 per month. Further analysis and documentation of this problem isavailable.11. DFID itself is not to be blamed for the proliferation in such initiatives. Rather, DFID, together withNorway, Canada, Netherlands, the EC and the World Bank, was at the forefront of supporting theGovernment’s initiatives set out above. Indeed, as suggested above, DFID support allowed for the creationof the AACA which designed all the national programs and oversaw the design of the NationalDevelopment Framework, and the telecoms tender process. The UN agencies, funded primarily by a rangeof other donors, pushed an alternative approach and since 2005, particularly with the expansion of the PRTmodel around the country, projects as opposed to national programs have proliferated.

Recommendations13. While ISE has, and is further reﬁning, a full set of analyses and recommendations on an integratedsecurity and economic approach for Afghanistan, some key elements are set out below:A modiﬁed approach to security14. A security plan should be based on the principle of “Afghanisation” which requires acceleration ofthe balancing and strengthening of the army, police, intelligence and community policing arrangements.There are a series of other mechanisms which could protect NATO, diminish civilian deaths, and see areversal in security problems.A new approach to the economy15. The second key is an economic approach, as opposed to a reconstruction or aid approach, thatmobilises the market behind the imperative of mass job creation. Employment will create genuinestakeholders in stability, give individuals dignity and the means to support themselves, provide a truealternative to the poppy, and create the basis for the future ﬁscal sustainability of the country. Creating thesethings cannot be achieved through alternative livelihoods programs alone, nor through the currentmodalities of the aid system. First, building a sustainable economy requires putting in place a series ofbuilding blocks, including a systematic approach to creating procurement systems (including tendering andlicensing processes and capabilities) that create domestic stakeholders in the economy. At present there isa perception in the population that licences are narrowly awarded to a cluster of individuals and intereststhat do not allow entry to other legitimate stakeholders. Second, there is a vast amount of money withinAfghanistan—running into several billions of dollars—but currently there are no mechanisms to turn it intocapital. A key component of building the market in Afghanistan is to create the mechanisms through whichthis money could be mobilised. Another important block in a strategy to build the Afghan economy is tosystematically design, put in place and nurture linkages across several key industries including marble, jewelsand agriculture as well as a number of other initiatives. Nurturing will mean giving attention to the valuechain from market to producer, and ISE have produced a full plan of what a long-term, integrated economicapproach would entail in practice.A regional approach16. Between 2001–04 the Government built a coherent, carefully designed approach to regionalcooperation. This began with the Bonn Agreement, but followed up with an evaluation of each ofAfghanistan’s neighbours that examined the speciﬁc opportunities and options available. For example,Finance Ministers Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan and Shaukat Aziz of Pakistan worked to build up a tradingrelationship that would create stakeholders in Afghanistan’s stability in both countries. The strategyenvisaged growth in Pakistani exports to Afghanistan from US $2.8 million in 2001 to US $1.5 billion by2004. In 2007 the changed context will again need to be recognised in order for the regional opportunitiesfor Afghan growth to be realised. In particular, for example, the rise of the economic powers of the Gulfpresents an opportunity to rethink the regional prospects for the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan.Imagination and innovation will be needed to spot and exploit the opportunities of the current time in theservice of securing Afghanistan’s future.17. To put in place the above blocks will require a modiﬁed approach from international actors. Keyelements of this will include:(i) Enhanced support for the ARTF: The ARTF is designed to be a dual key mechanism betweenAfghan Government and the people of Afghanistan in service of its people, providing a happymedium between budget support and project support. Currently, it is not adequately funded.While DFID is a major contributor, it will be necessary to persuade the US and Japanesegovernments to channel signiﬁcant funding through this mechanism if it is to function as a uniﬁedﬁnancing channel.(ii) Bolstering the World Bank ﬁnancing and presence: Search for a “coordinator” is something of ared herring. The budget is the mechanism of policy coordination in any functioning system, andthe ARTF gives the international community a mechanism to guide that coordination.Accordingly, the best form of policy coordination will come if the World Bank is formally assignedthe role of economic coordinator, which should accompany a shift from a military to a civilianemphasis. A UN coordination role on the economic side can be highly problematic, as UNagencies are not able to deliver on the whole value to the Afghan population, and even moreimportantly are not seen to deliver value by the Afghan population. (Here there is a key distinctionbetween UN qua secretariat and facilitator of peace, and UN qua agencies: there is yet to be anaudit of the several billions of dollars disbursed by UN agencies 2001–05).(iii) Examining UN agency, contractor and NGO eVectiveness in terms of the criteria of value formoney, transparency and accountability in light of the analysis in (ii) above. Examination of thevalue for money and controls upon the security ﬁrms that are hired to protect the contractors isanother crucial measure. The UK has a particular role to play in this regard as a major ﬁnancier

of both UN agency and NGO operations. Both UK law and donor contracts could be major leversfor increasing NGO accountability, transparency and eVectiveness and reducing the negativeimpacts of NGO operations. The IDC in particular would be advised to pay particular attentionto the fact that NGOs invest considerable funds in lobbying parliament to ensure their budgetsare maintained and increased. Finding mechanisms of independent evaluation, particularly fromAfghan stakeholders, of NGO performance could be an important component of such a process.In our submission, building a domestic service and contracting sector is far more important forboth stability and prosperity as well as sustainability than maintaining an NGO contractingservice. In the light of the conditions in Afghanistan, this calls for a major think in the role ofNGOs.(iv) Examining the eVectiveness of the alternative delivery system of National Programs, Trust Fund,and political process, with particular focus on the National Solidarity Program as an example ofan integrated implementation mechanism. The design principles behind this approach are fully setout in the book,Fixing Failed States,forthcoming with OUP. It is ISE’s recommendation thatexisting programs should be strengthened and new programs designed: further advice can beprovided on these ideas.Comments on UKG and DFID’s approach in the light of the above analysis18. The IDC inquiry asks speciﬁc questions. This summary brieﬁng endeavours to provide short answersto these. Again, further analysis is available if there is interest.— The Strategy embedded within the ARTF/National Program approach allows both for short termand long term balances to be made, and prioritisation of multiple goals and objectives. It alsoallows for geographical balance in the distribution of funding, as funds are allocated according totransparent and fair criteria. Targeted programs are balanced with criteria-based programs,allowing for even-handedness even where speciﬁc targets are provided. The contribution of budgetsupport, through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to strengthen institutional capacityand accountability, remains a core plank of a recommended approach. However, GoUK’s role inpersuading other donors to switch their funding to this mechanism will be critical, and also inworking with the World Bank to alter some of the mechanisms behind the ARTF: the ARTF wasdesigned for a particular moment in time and conditions mean that some design alterations wouldbe optimal.— DFID’s role to date has been truly exemplary and the teams should be congratulated. Remarkableleadership and managerial soundness has been shown from 2001 onwards.— Co-ordination of the military and development eVort could be improved, particularly if eachculture made more eVort to understand the mental models, goals and constraints of the others.“Whole of government” approaches can be misleading, especially if they tend to produceWhitehall ossiﬁcation of approach, rather than alignment to an ever-changing reality on theground in Afghanistan, according to the leadership’s priorities. To the extent that the militarypresence will continue, far more strategic use of military personnel and know-how could be used.Use of military engineers for infrastructure planning and design is a signiﬁcant area where militaryinvolvement could make a critical diVerence. The Royal Engineers, for example, have considerablecapabilities in this area which could be used to a far greater extent.— The alternative livelihoods and counter-narcotics approaches are admirable in intent but do nothave realistic implementation mechanisms reﬂecting the on-the-ground situation built into them.An integrated economic approach is required, and there is little evidence to date of a realistic planin this direction.— The impact of NGO ﬁnancing on state capability shows damaging tendencies. While, as describedabove, individuals are often dedicated and hard-working, as a combined eVect, NGOs canundermine state capability. Further, they expose themselves to risks that take up securitycapability diverting it from protecting Afghan civilians. NGO delivery mechanisms are not—withsome notable exceptions—a sustainable means of service provision in Afghanistan in the short,medium or long-term.

beyond providing healthcare. Based on the information and testimonies collected through our medicalpractice, we identify and highlight violations of human rights, particularly with regard to accessinghealthcare.2.MDMhas been present in Afghanistan since 1992 and currently operates medical clinics in Kabul andHerat. Based upon our experience, we provide the following response to the questions posed by theCommittee in its call for evidence.The ObjectivesofDFID’s ProgrammeinAfghanistan3. MDM shares DFID’s view that it is vital to support the Afghan people in a way that enables them tohelp themselves. But where monitoring and evaluation shows particularly poor performance on the part ofthe government, itself the recipient of funds, more must be done to understand and address the reasons forthe same.4. Where the failure is on the part of those who were meant to provide technical assistance to thegovernment, this must be addressed as well.5. Where there were budgetary disbursements without any activities to justify them, this must beaddressed.6. The obstacles and barriers to achievement in Afghanistan are well known, but progress is possible.Where progress is not being made, there must be a measure of accountability. The absence of accountabilitycan unwittingly send a message that progress is neither possible nor expected.7. In order to ensure that local NGOs are adequately supported, DFID may wish to consider providingrunning costs in advance. This would help ensure stability by introducing a measure of predictability.The Trade-off Between Short-term GainsandLong-term Transformation8. Establishing small scale experimental programs can provide a kick-start for short-term gains by: a)meeting immediate needs; b) demonstrating results with data collected—in order to build credibility withthe government and other stakeholders and; c) laying the groundwork for scaling up and replicating theproject elsewhere in the country by maintaining a particular focus on the training of trainers and theadaptability of project design. The programs thus provide a foundation for longer term transformation.The RoleofNGOs9. In addition to providing direct services and building the capacity of local actors, NGOs are uniquelypositioned to advocate for beneﬁciaries by gathering evidence of the situation on the ground in order tosupport the government in understanding the problem as well as pressuring it to make progress toward itsresolution. NGOs have the combined expertise and autonomy necessary to do this eVectively.HarmonisationandCo-ordinationof theDonor Response10. Although a mechanism exists to improve donor co-ordination, there is still waste which results fromduplicative programming. There is likewise room to improve the eYciency of programs by improving theexchange of best practices, as well as lessons learned. Although this is emphasised by the internationalcommunity in its interactions with the government and civil society, the international community does notitself provide a healthy model for the same. Given the inadequate funding, as measured against the urgencyof need in Afghanistan, this is especially poignant.

Memorandum submitted by MerlinAbout MerlinMerlin is the only UK specialist agency, which responds worldwide with vital healthcare and medicalrelief for vulnerable people caught up in natural disasters, conﬂict, disease and health system collapse.Merlin’s vision is of a world that provides basic health care for all; which responds immediately to save livesin times of crisis and which safeguards long-term heath. Merlin’s contribution is to act in times of acute needwhilst working to ensure access to health care in the longer term. The aim is to ensure that vulnerable peoplein particular, who are excluded from exercising their right to health, have equitable access to appropriateand eVective healthcare.This aim is inspired and underpinned by the World Health Organisation (WHO) declaration104that theenjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human beingwithout discrimination of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. In support of this aim,Merlin works in partnership with global, national and local health agencies and communities to strengthenhealth systems and build community resilience to better prevent, mitigate and respond to health outcomes.104

About MerlininAfghanistanMerlin was one of the ﬁrst NGOs to enter Kandahar in 1993-1994 following the fall of this city to theTaliban. Since then, Merlin’s health activities have included implementation in southern, western, northernand northeastern provinces.Currently Merlin is working in the three northeastern provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and Badakshanimplementing a range of health-related projects including health service delivery and community midwiferyeducation projects. Currently Merlin Afghanistan has a budget of close to $5 million/year (receiving fundsfrom USAID, EC, UNFPA) and employs 600 staV across three provinces. Merlin works in directpartnership with a large local Afghan Non-Governmental Organization (Care of Afghan Families—CAF)and is a member of various NGO coordination bodies and technical fora within Afghanistan.This abbreviated response focuses on a few key areas highlighted by the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference andin addition Merlin is happy to provide a verbal submission to the Committee if needed. The contributionis based on the experience and opinions of an organisation working within the health sector and is alsolimited in its relevance to the south of Afghanistan, due to the sizeable consolidation of Merlin’s activitiesover the past 4–5 years in the northeastern provinces.

DFID’s ObjectivesinAfghanstanDFID has committed to provide predictable funding to Afghanistan over a 10 year period—through itsdevelopment partnership agreement with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) signed in January 2006.The priority focus of the partnership has been identiﬁed as building an eVective state. Fifty per cent of DFIDfunding is going through the budget of the Government of Afghanistan with the intention of movingtowards Poverty Reduction budget support or other forms of direct support. Whilst the relevance andimportance of direct funding for state building, strengthening of governance and state capacity initiativesis not in doubt, the available data suggests that DFID does not have any major targeted focus upon thehealth MDGs. It is our understanding that recent funding provided by DFID for health sector support is notfor direct service implementation but rather for areas such as administrative reform/payment of Ministry ofHealth salaries. In addition DFID support to other line Ministries including the Ministry of Finance mayyield funds for the health sector in the longer term (ie through improvements in revenue collection).Funding for the health sector is currently allocated through donor commitments from USAID, EC andWB and while a reduction in infant mortality within Afghanistan has been seen in recent years, this is againsta very low baseline in terms of infant and child health. It is widely accepted that Afghanistan is oV-track onall the MDGs but given the importance that health plays in the MDGs and the targets that have been setin the recent draft National Health and Nutrition Strategy document to reduce maternal, infant and childmortality, it would seem imperative that even if DFID does not position itself to provide additional speciﬁcfunding to the health sector at this time, that it continues to maintain a close eye on the adequacy of donorcoordination, funding and strategy to the sector and utilises its inﬂuence where appropriate to ensure thathealth remains a priority issue overall.

Coordinationof theMilitaryandDevelopment EffortMerlin has extensive direct experience of working in the north of the country—which is relatively stablecompared to the south—and where neither Merlin nor its staV are seen as primary targets for insurgentactivity. However the area has seen a stepwise increase in criminal behaviour over recent months and aworsening of the rule of law. A signiﬁcant number of attacks have taken place against military, police,civilian and NGO persons.While Merlin recognises that the north is less polarised (between government and insurgency groups) thanthe south and therefore provides an environment in which it is easier to maintain impartiality of action vis-`a-vis its humanitarian/development objectives, it also believes that aligning reconstruction eVorts with themilitary (as has happened in the south) is counter-productive for the achievement of longer termdevelopment goals.Our experience is that at a provincial level, Afghans expect the military to guarantee security whilst otherbodies—especially the Government of Afghanistan and to a lesser extent NGOs—should provide servicedelivery/assistance. The Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in particular may confuse the separationof roles between NGOs and the military. It is our judgement that short-term development projectsimplemented by the military are unlikely to yield any form of security guarantees for the military and thatgreater emphasis on informing the population area about the wider objectives of the military mission offoreign troops in Afghanistan would be more productive. It goes without saying that reducing civiliancasualties of military engagements is also likely to have a positive beneﬁt in terms of the populations’perceptions of the military presence.

Possible Tensions BetweentheDevelopmentand theSecurity AgendasMerlin’s experience shows that direct military initiatives focused on development can in fact underminelonger term recovery eVorts due to the short term approach adopted which often emphasises constructionor one-oV activities (eg vaccination; one-oV supplies or short term projects) and the lack of coordinationwith wider government or donor plans.Merlin has developed its own model of eVective health delivery based on its experience of working in aninsecure environment—which involves both greater community buy-in as well as maintenance of a distancefrom the military. This is not because the population majority in the north of Afghanistan are in any wayunreceptive to foreign troops, but rather because a small minority of the population who are intent ondestabilising the northern region are more likely to target NGOs with links to international military forces.By way of example, for Merlin to become involved in the reconstruction eVort in the south would requirea signiﬁcant shift in means of action and in particular developing a much sharper distinction betweenhumanitarian goals and its current posture as implementer (on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan)of health services. Intervention by Merlin in the south would entail a much greater risk to expatriate andlocal Afghan staV who might be employed by Merlin and would necessitate adoption of a position ofextreme neutrality—much as that adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross—and the ﬁrmbacking of non-Afghan bodies eg UK government as well as the GoA in order to allow Merlin to directlynegotiate humanitarian space with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. It remains to be seen whethersome of these changes in modus operandi might yet be required within the north, in the future, if securitydeteriorates to a signiﬁcant extent within the northeastern provinces.

The RoleofNGOsThe role of NGOs has proved pivotal in the re-development of social services in Afghanistan. Sectorswithin which NGOs form the delivery vehicle are amongst the most cost-eYcient, output eVective of allprojects currently funded through donors (Basic Package of Health Services, National SolidarityProgramme). However the role of NGOs is and should be broader than service delivery—NGOs, bothinternational and local are a critical part of civil society. Merlin’s work in Afghanistan has been inconjunction with a local NGO, Care of Afghan Families. Merlin feels that this international/local NGOpartnership provides the strongest “model” for building local capacity amongst Afghans, ensures a moresustainable outcome and should be supported in the longer term.Currently Merlin is working with CAF in support of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS)covering both primary and secondary health care facilities. Merlin is directly responsible for all aspects ofmanagement (ﬁnancial, administrative) and technical modelling across over 60 health facilities and soonover 350 health posts. This support is providing direct health provision to an estimated 1.1 million peoplein two provinces.Despite the immense scope of actions of NGOs within the country, the role of NGOs is circumscribedby current donor-driven funding arrangements. Opportunities to extend service delivery programming toencompass ﬁelds such as governance in the health sector is limited due to the rigidity of current fundingmechanisms.It is our opinion that the important role of NGOs in support to the health service in Afghanistan needsto be fully recognised and supported, especially in the important transition to greater national ownership.This requires further funding to develop the scope and range of their activities, based on the observation oftheir success in implementation of the BPHS and NSP national programmes. This is not to argue againstthe importance of channelling funding through the GoA but instead to lobby for a nuanced balance ofsupport to both Civil Society Organizations as well as central government.The current security situation aVects the ability of NGOs to deliver eVective programming, limits theopportunities for staV recruitment and has transactional consequences upon security budgets (which are notcurrently allowable under the grants that Merlin receives) and thus has consequences for their work. Whilethere are extensive rules governing expatriate staV security in country, these do not extend to local NGOsor local staV who are in similar if not more dangerous positions. In many cases the outcomes (of targetingor kidnapping) are worse for national NGOs and staV. Merlin currently employs ﬁve expatriate staV inAfghanistan but 650 paid local staV and therefore security initiatives must take into account the balance ofthe NGO workforce. Any security agenda must take into account the vulnerability of NGO staV and anyrisks that might arise from closer alignment of the development and security agendas. Protecting andmaintaining the development initiative is of course vital in order to satisfy the needs of the population asregards humanitarian and development needs—and furthermore in order to reassure the population thatthe overall direction of the international eVort within Afghanistan is to both address development goals aswell as provide security assistance.

HarmonisationandCo-ordinationof theDonor ResponseThe current funding via the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Fund is well received andprovides a good model for donor coordination. Channelling of donor funds through the AfghanGovernment is to be welcomed but needs to be subject to the same tests of eYciency and eVectiveness asother modes of expenditure of donor funds.It is however apparent that there is increasing emphasis being placed upon links between ForeignMinistries and Development Ministries of many foreign governments which currently have forces withinAfghanistan under a UN/NATO mandate. Those countries which do not have military forces withinAfghanistan seem instead to have a greater capacity to engage in a wider response to humanitarian anddevelopment needs eg JICA. Countries which have greater troop presence are being placed under increasedpressure to allocate development funding in line with political and military-protection strategies—using thecivilian arms of PRTs as “development” agencies. An exaggeration of this funding strategy will have long-term consequences for both donor harmonisation as well as equity of funding across diVerent provinces.Numerous examples already exist from northeastern provinces where claims are being made that insecureprovinces in the south are beneﬁting through increasing aid, as compared to the relatively stable north wherethe perception is of reductions in aid funding.October 2007

SummaryThis paper outlines urgent action necessary to address immediate challenges in Afghanistan and to averthumanitarian disaster. It does not seek to address all issues of concern but focuses on essential policy changein development and humanitarian spheres.While aid has contributed to progress in Afghanistan, especially in social and economic infrastructure—and whilst more aid is needed—the development process has to date been too centralised, top-heavy andinsuYcient. It is has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responding to Afghanneeds. As a result millions of Afghans, particularly in rural areas, still face severe hardship comparable withsub-Saharan Africa. Conditions of persistent poverty have been a signiﬁcant factor in the spread ofinsecurity.Donors must improve the impact, eYciency, relevance and sustainability of aid. There needs to bestronger coordination and more even distribution of aid, greater alignment with national and local prioritiesand increased use of Afghan resources. Indicators of aid eVectiveness should be established, and acommission to monitor donor performance.Despite progress in some ministries, government capacity is weak and corruption is widespread, which ishindering service delivery and undermining public conﬁdence in state-building as a whole. Further majorreforms are required in public administration, anti-corruption and the rule of law.Urgent action is required to promote comprehensive rural development, where progress has been slow,through building local government to deliver essential services, reforming sub-national governance, andchannelling more resources directly to communities.Whilst Provincial Reconstruction Teams may be necessary in some areas, they have signiﬁcantly exceededtheir interim, security mandate. Through diverting resources, they have impeded the development ofeVective institutions of local government and PRT projects are no substitute for long-term, community-leddevelopment work. Military projects can also compromise the neutrality and scope of humanitarian work.PRTs should therefore adhere to their mandate: to facilitate the development of stable and secureenvironment, and should only undertake relief or development work where there is a critical need and nocivilian alternative. In accordance with their interim status, each PRT should develop a phased, conditions-based exit strategy.Agriculture, and connected trades, is the mainstay of the nation, supporting 80% of all Afghans, yet it isseverely under-funded. A multi-stakeholder strategy should be developed to ensure the provision ofagricultural support at local level, covering arable and livestock farming, rural trades, and improved landand water management. It must ensure relevant support for the economic and occupational activities ofrural women.Neither aggressive eradication nor licensing will reduce opium production. The Afghan government anddonors should support a long-term, comprehensive approach which seeks to promote sustainable ruraldevelopment and which prioritises support for licit agriculture—and not only in those areas which growpoppy. There needs to be rigorous and balanced implementation of the existing counter-narcotics strategy,with greater outreach to community elders and action against major traYckers.

Despite dramatic improvements in education, still half of Afghan children—predominantly girls—are outof school and drop out rates for girls are particularly high: large-scale investments are required in teachers,education infrastructure, combined with systemic reform.Whilst signiﬁcant progress has been made in the provision of health care, overall public health remainspoor. Donors and the government should do more to expand the provision of health care in remote areas;strengthen institutional capacity, coordination and security at sub-national level; expand and improvehospital care; and increase the number of female health workers.High numbers of civilian casualties are being caused by all parties to the conﬂict. There must be continuedcondemnation of the actions of armed opposition groups which cause civilian casualties, including summaryexecutions, suicide bombs, roadside attacks and the use of civilian locations from which to launch attacks,all of which are wholly unacceptable. International forces must ensure that the use of force is proportionateboth in air strikes and house searches, and even more determined eVorts must be made to ensure the securityof Afghan communities in insurgency-aVected areas. Actions that undermine the good-will of the peopleultimately undermine both stability and opportunities for development.The separation of NATO and US-led coalition commands creates inconsistencies in operating standardsand in civil-military coordination: there should be uniﬁed NATO command of all international forces, closecoordination with Afghan forces and universally applicable standards of operation, rigorously enforced. Anew multi-stakeholder entity should be established through the UN to investigate and monitor allegedabuses. International forces should establish a system to ensure compensation or other reparation forcivilian casualties and the destruction of property.According to the UN there are 130,000 long-term displaced people in Afghanistan, and recent ﬁghtinghas displaced up to 80,000; this year there has also been a substantial inﬂux of refugees and deportees fromPakistan and Iran, respectively. Donors should ensure suYcient resources are available to respond to theseincreasing population movements.Local level disputes have a signiﬁcant cumulative impact on peace, development and the wider conﬂict.There should be a national strategy for community peace-building, which strengthens social cohesion andenhances community capacities to resolve conﬂict; it should be led by community leaders and civil-society,and fully-supported by donors. It should include measures to ensure the participation of women in peace-building activities.As a land-locked country, with vast, largely porous borders, Afghanistan is unavoidably aVected by thepolicies of its neighbours. They should do more to help the country on refugees, security, narcotics, andtrade, which is in their own long-term interests. To address underlying problems, the internationalcommunity in Afghanistan must achieve a deeper level of engagement on regional issues. Military action bya foreign power against Iran, or against groups in the Afghan border areas of Pakistan, could be seriouslydestabilising for Afghanistan.A clear majority of Afghans support the international presence in Afghanistan,105but the developmentprocess has made only a limited diVerence to their lives, and with spreading insecurity a change of courseis now essential. The policy changes proposed in this paper would represent a step towards achieving thatand they should therefore be incorporated into the revised Afghan National Development Strategy.106Peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without improving the lives of ordinary Afghans. This requiresstrong leadership by the Afghan government and sustained and concerted action by donors andneighbouring states. It requires more determined eVorts by all donors, with greater direction from theUnited Nations, which is severely under-resourced, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board(JCMB). A resolute, substantial and long-term commitment by the international community is essential notonly to secure development progress but to halt the spread of insecurity.As by far the largest donor and troop-contributor, the role of the United States in Afghanistan will becritical. However, all donors and troop-contributing states have a crucial role in pressing for urgent actionto meet the challenges facing Afghanistan: millions of lives depend upon it.Further information: for more details please contact Matt Waldman, Policy and Advocacy Adviser,Oxfam International, Afghanistan.1071.Aid eVectivenessSince 2001, Afghanistan has received more than $15 billion in assistance, and the US House ofRepresentatives recently approved $6.4 billion more in economic and development assistance.108Aid willbe crucial to Afghanistan’s development for many years and, as this paper argues, many areas are under-resourced.105

However, too much aid to Afghanistan is provided in ways that are ineVective or ineYcient. For example,Afghanistan’s biggest donor, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) allocates close to halfof its funds to the ﬁve largest US contractors in the country.109As in Iraq, too much aid is absorbed by proﬁtsof companies and sub-contractors, on non-Afghan resources and on high expatriate salaries and living costs.Each full-time expatriate consultant costs up to half a million dollars a year.110The Afghan government has signiﬁcant budget execution problems, due to insuYcient or ineVectivedonor eVorts to build the institutional and implementing capacities of line ministries. Some two-thirds ofUS foreign assistance bypasses the Afghan government that oYcials say they want to strengthen.A number of donors, including the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), providesigniﬁcant funds through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which provides a predictable andaccountable source of funds for recurrent government expenditure. However, it is regrettable that DFIDhas very substantially reduced its funding for Afghan and international NGOs, who play an important rolein grassroots capacity building, rural development and support for delivery of essential services.There is insuYcient direction and support provided by the UN and JCMB, both of which are substantiallyunder-resourced, and too little coordination between donors and the government of Afghanistan. Of alltechnical assistance to Afghanistan, which accounts for a quarter of all aid to the country, only one-tenthis coordinated among donors or with the government.111Nor is there suYcient collaboration on projectwork, which inevitably leads to duplication or incoherence of activities by diVerent donors.Funding for development is a fraction of that spent on military operations: the US military is spending$65,000 a minute in Afghanistan ($35 billion for 2007).112Aid funds are following the ﬁghting: USAIDconcentrates more than half of its budget on the four most insecure provinces; DFID allocates one-ﬁfth ofits budget to Helmand.113Promoting development in the south is essential but, as we have seen over the lasttwo years, if other provinces are neglected then insecurity could spread.RecommendationsThe British Government should ensure its aid programme is consistent with the followingrecommendations; as a major and well-regarded donor to Afghanistan, it should also use its inﬂuence topress other donors, especially the United States, to accept and support them.Reconﬁgure and coordinate aidDonors should ensure aid programmes are consistent with Afghanistan’s national and local developmentpriorities. The JCMB and UN should be signiﬁcantly strengthened to coordinate donor activities and ensurea more even distribution of resources.114They should also seek to ensure that the distribution of aid doesnot disproportionately beneﬁt one or other of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups.Increase transparencyDonors should publicly provide comprehensive information on aid ﬂows, including on tender procedures,use of Afghan resources, and contractor salaries and proﬁt margins.Establish indicators of aid eVectivenessIndicators of aid eVectiveness, with correlative targets, should be established for each objective underAnnex II of the Afghanistan Compact and those contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid EVectiveness.115Establish a Commission for Aid EVectivenessAn independent Commission on Aid EVectiveness should be established, possibly through the UN, andsupported by independent management consultants, to monitor compliance with the proposed aidindicators, and deﬁciencies in the delivery of aid. Each donor should report regularly to the proposedCommission on the extent to which it meets or falls short of aid eVectiveness targets, in particular: impact,eYciency, relevance and sustainability of aid, and use of Afghan resources.109

Increase the volume of aidThere is a powerful case for more aid to be directed to areas highlighted in this paper, such as educationand agriculture, in conjunction with steps to enhance its eVectiveness and build ministerial implementingcapacity. The internationally-administered Trust Funds oVer an eVective means of minimising waste.116Atthe same time, suYcient funds should also be allocated to eVective Afghan and international NGOs.However, any overall increase in the volume of aid to Afghanistan should not be at the expense of aid toother developing countries.2.National GovernanceWeaknesses in governance are increasingly cited by Afghans as a reason for dissatisfaction with thegovernment. They hinder service delivery and undermine the legitimacy and credibility of state-building asa whole, thereby contributing to greater insecurity.Government systems and processes are opaque, bureaucratic and convoluted, giving rise to opportunitiesfor graft. Corruption is widespread, endemic and, as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board putsit, “continues to ﬂourish”.117Despite some improvements, the institutional and technical capacity of lineministries is weak and there are profound deﬁciencies in human resources. Female participation ingovernment institutions and in decision-making remains limited.There is uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of state entities, with poor coordination betweenthem. They are subjected to only limited, ad hoc scrutiny, and parliament is yet to establish an eVectivesystem for scrutinising government policies.These problems are compounded by the opium economy, where there are links to central government,and weaknesses in the justice sector, where, “rule of law remains precarious, governance is fragile, and thejudicial system is ineVectual and inaccessible”.118Despite improvements, the Afghan National Police (ANP)lacks both professionalism and independence.The problems cannot all be attributed to the government: donor programmes have in many cases failedto build institutional capacities or establish proper systems of governance. Incoherent, wasteful and short-term programmes, with weak ﬁnancial oversight, have to some degree accentuated problems of corruption,ineYciency and lack of coordination.RecommendationsStrengthen public administration reformSeveral mechanisms, such as the Advisory Panel on Senior Appointments and the IndependentAdministrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, have been established to ensure fair, transparent,and merit-based appointments, but have not yet delivered results. These bodies must themselves betransparent and subject to independent scrutiny; they should comprise only those members who aredemonstrably independent. It is the duty of the international community—whose funds are at stake—topress for such changes.Pay and grading reform, due to be implemented over a four-year period, should be expedited. Strongerleadership and greater eVorts are required by ministers and donors to increase women’s participation ingovernment and to build the capacity of line ministries to implement the National Action Plan for Women.Continued eVorts must be made to strengthen the capacity of civil administration, clarify responsibilities,and improve coordination between ministries. Reform of sub-national governance is a priority, which isoutlined in following section.Enhance anti-corruption measuresRigorous implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy is essential. The Anti-CorruptionCommission should be overhauled to ensure its transparency and integrity. With international support thereshould be concerted measures to enhance transparency of government operations, especially in tax,procurement and expenditure; build stronger mechanisms for monitoring, oversight and audit; eliminatebureaucracy, and streamline processes and procedures. Measures to address corruption in politics, counter-narcotics institutions and the private sector are equally important. Major reform of the ANP is required toenhance professionalism, accountability and diversity, and to ensure autonomy from politicalinterference.119116

Reform the legal and institutional frameworkAs part of broader reform of the justice sector, the legal and institutional anti-corruption framework mustbe strengthened. This will require measures to enhance the capabilities, independence and integrity of thejudiciary and anti-corruption institutions, and to implement and enforce the UN Convention AgainstCorruption.3.Rural Development and Sub-National GovernanceWhile aid has undoubtedly contributed to progress in Afghanistan, especially in social and economicinfrastructure, the development process has not suYciently beneﬁted the majority of the population wholive in rural areas, where essential services, such as water or electricity, remain scarce or insuYcient.Line ministries are over-centralised and dominate resource allocation, management and planning fromKabul. Provincial line departments have limited autonomy and are subject to interventions by Governors’OYces which creates operational problems and deters the de-concentration of resources. In villages anddistricts government is either non-existent or weak and ineVective having limited capabilities andprofoundly inadequate human and ﬁnancial resources.120There has been very little donor or governmentactivity to build institutional capacity at district and provincial level, and no such eVorts with nationalcoverage.At sub-national level there are a number of administrative, appointed and elected entities, which haveunclear or overlapping responsibilities, with insuYcient or uncertain resources (for example, at provinciallevel: the Governor’s OYce, Line Departments, Provincial Council, Administrative Assembly andDevelopment Committee).There is excessive bureaucracy, lack of transparency and signiﬁcant disparities in the distribution ofgovernment resources throughout the country. (For example some provinces have more than twenty timesthe per capita funding for health than for others.)121In a number of provincial centres corruption is endemicand tribal and ethnic factors, rather than competency, determine key appointments.122Municipalities haveunclear responsibilities and revenue-raising powers, weak ﬁnancial management and limited accountability.The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has succeeded in channelling resources directly to electedCommunity Development Councils (CDCs) representing over 25,000 villages, over 70% of Afghanistan’scommunities. Through the Programme NGO assistance is provided for community-directed developmentprojects, for example water supply or school construction, and there have been several positive assessmentsof the Programme in terms of project implementation, governance and stabilisation. Yet funding for theNSP programme has been irregular and its future is uncertain; the expanded role and legal status of CDCsset out in a new by-law and their relationship to other elements of local government is also uncertain.123RecommendationsBuild local government to deliver essential servicesIntensive eVorts are required to build the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver or oversee thedelivery of essential services at local level, especially education, water, sanitation and health (where mostprovision is indirect). Reform must seek to de-concentrate the centralised powers and resources ofministries, and build institutional systems and capacities at local level. Donors and key ministries, includingthe new Independent Directorate for Local Governance, should establish a group to intensify andcoordinate eVorts on this issue.Reform sub-national governanceLegislative reform is required to clarify the roles, responsibilities and relationships of sub-national stateentities at provincial, municipal, district and village level, including CDCs, and to rationalise and clarifycoordination and planning. Reform should ensure that the primary role of the Governor’s OYces isprovincial coordination and planning, rather than involvement in the operation of line departments. Greatertechnical and ﬁnancial support should be provided to elected bodies, principally Provincial Councils, tosupport monitoring, oversight and representation, particularly on development issues.124Measures are alsorequired to enhance local government transparency, simplify procedures and strengthen ongoing publicadministration reforms. In conjunction with wider legislative, coordination and planning reform, suchmeasures could substantially improve accountability and reduce corruption.120121

4.Provincial Reconstruction TeamsThere are 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan led by 13 diVerent nations. Theirmission statement is to “assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order tofacilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identiﬁed area of operations, and enableSecurity Sector Reform and reconstruction eVorts”.125The PRT Handbook also states that each PRT is an“interim structure”, which, on fulﬁlment of its mission, should be dismantled.PRTs have gone well beyond this interim, security mandate, often engaging in extensive developmentwork, implemented either by the military or government agencies. Afghan communities appreciate anysupport they can get, but whilst PRT resources and activities have expanded, local government institutions,with signiﬁcantly smaller budgets, have been under-used and under-developed. It will not be possible tostrengthen institutions of local government and to improve their accountability, if they are deprived ofresources.126In some cases PRTs have used their inﬂuence to intervene in provincial political oradministrative aVairs which has generated considerable local resentment.There are major variations in funding and activities between PRTs and a signiﬁcant number of projectsare not in alignment with provincial or national plans, or the interim Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy. Being nation-led, they are often driven more by available funding or the political interests of thenation involved rather than development considerations. Frequent use of local contractors, especially in thesouth, has meant many projects are badly implemented; systemic or political pressure and frequent rotationshas tended to result in a large number of small-scale, short-term projects. The absence of communityparticipation, or association with the military, has led to projects which are unsuitable, unused or targetedby militants.�Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such eVorts to win “hearts and minds” are naıve. Itis unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not prevented the deterioration of security.The development process needs to be owned and led by Afghan communities, which is essential forsustainability. PRTs are no substitute for long-term development work.PRTs also blur the distinction between the military and aid workers, jeopardising the perceived neutralityof the latter, putting them in danger and reducing operating space for humanitarian organisations.

5.AgricultureAgriculture, and connected occupations and trades, supports the subsistence or employment of at least80% of Afghans and has traditionally accounted for at least half the economy. However, war, displacement,persistent droughts, ﬂooding, the laying of mines, and the sustained absence of natural resourcemanagement has led to massive environment degradation and the depletion of resources. In recent yearsAfghanistan’s overall agricultural produce has fallen by half.129Over the last decade in some regionsAfghanistan’s livestock population has fallen by up to 60%130and over the last two decades, the country haslost 70% of its forests.131There continue to be major food shortages, and this year the World FoodProgramme aims to provide food to 5.4 million Afghans.132Yet, given the scale of reliance on agriculture, international support in the sector has been modest andgovernment assistance extremely limited. Donors have spent only $270 million directly on agriculturalprojects over the last six years—a fraction of overall assistance to Afghanistan.133For example in Daikundiprovince, there are close to half a million people who depend on the land, yet there is virtually nointernational support for agriculture. The provincial Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestockwhich is responsible for providing all oYcial support for farming in the province, has a threadbare staV of16, only two of whom have relevant qualiﬁcations, with no funds for projects.Rural unemployment is extremely high at over 50%, and is exacerbated by large scale deportations ofeconomic migrants from Iran and the return of refugees. A convoluted system of land rights remains animpediment to greater investment in and use of agricultural land.

RecommendationsDevelop a comprehensive strategy to ensure agricultural support at local levelUrgent eVorts must be made to provide local-level support for agriculture and oV-farm trades, whichwould improve livelihoods, strengthen food security and reduce unemployment. The Afghan government,with the support of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, donors and NGOs, should develop a strategyto enhance the institutional capacity of the Department of Agriculture at district level, and expand the scaleand range of agricultural support.The strategy should cover the recruitment and training of staV, technical support in designing andimplementing projects, streamlining bureaucracy, coordination with other relevant line departments and theprovision of substantial additional resources. Contracting-out to NGOs, as used for health care delivery,could help to overcome short-term capacity constraints.In programme terms, the strategy should address: the distribution of improved seed varieties, fertilisersand pesticides; crop diversiﬁcation, horticulture, and kitchen gardens; training in agricultural skills,techniques and improved animal husbandry methods; livestock development, especially improved use offodder crops, fodder storage, management of grazing land, and herd or ﬂock management; the provisionof veterinary services, especially for vaccinations and disease control in remote areas; and the provision ofagricultural tools and sustainable mechanisation. Wider establishment of community cooperatives couldhelp farmers gain access to ﬁnance, and share best practices and resources. The strategy must ensure thatrural women beneﬁt from increased support, whether in farming or oV-farm rural trades, and that theirparticular skills and resource needs are addressed.

RecommendationsAdopt a comprehensive, long-term approachThere are no simple solutions or quick ﬁxes to the narcotics problem. In particular, only limited progress,if any, can be expected in Helmand province, which produces more than half of Afghan opium. The realityof a global heroin market should be taken into account: as long as demand persists, opium will be producedsomewhere to meet illicit demand.The Afghan government and donors should support a long term, multi-sectoral approach which aboveall seeks to achieve sustainable rural development. As success in tackling opium production in Thailanddemonstrates, counter-narcotics requires broad-based economic development and state-building,particularly at local level.136There needs to be substantial additional support for licit agriculture, as well as oV-farm and other ruraltrades, as outlined in the previous section, so that farmers are not forced to turn to poppy. Agriculturalprogrammes must be comprehensive and not just focused on those areas that grow poppy: alternativelivelihood programmes, where they are area- or target-limited, can create perverse incentives. To support along-term approach, counter-narcotics should be removed from short-term political milestones forAfghanistan which have been established by the international community. In addition, there needs to bemainstreaming of the drugs issue into overall reconstruction and peace-building eVorts, a betterunderstanding of global market dynamics and greater Afghan ownership over the drugs policy debate.

Strengthen implementation of the National Drug Control StrategyThere needs to be a more rigorous and balanced implementation of the National Drugs Control Strategy,which rightly includes elements of interdiction, manual eradication, incentives, public information, demandreduction and law enforcement. In particular, donors and the government should:— Expand outreach to mullahs and community elders who are the central authority, both in moralityand governance, for rural Afghans (more than one in three farmers who have decided not to growpoppy attribute their decision to religion or the disapproval of elders).137— Ensure law enforcement starts at the top: prosecutions or action to undermine the activities ofmajor drug barons or state oYcials who are complicit in traYcking, would have a powerfuldisruptive and deterrent eVect—so far fewer than a dozen mid-level traYckers have beenprosecuted.— Institute treatment and harm reduction programmes for drug users in Afghanistan,138neighbouring countries and international consumption markets, to reduce demand for Afghanopiates and to reduce the risk of blood-borne diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C.129130

Reject proposals for aggressive eradicationEvidence indicates that small farmers cannot easily shift to alternative crops, thus eradication should onlybe used where it is targeted, and where there are substantial and viable livelihood alternatives. Without suchalternatives, eradication can severely exacerbate rural poverty, simply displace cultivation, and even createincentives for farmers to increase opium cultivation in response to actual or threatened eradication. Thegovernment should reject aggressive eradication, such as aerial spraying, which would hit poor Afghanfarmers, not the traYckers. It would drive them to seek protection from anti-government groups, lead togreater backing for the Taliban and create wider insecurity.Reject proposals for licensing cultivation for medical opiatesTo fulﬁl domestic requirements, the Afghan government could legitimately use conﬁscated opiates formedicinal production. However, the Afghan government and donors should reject proposals for licensing,which would be ineVective and unworkable in Afghanistan, for the following reasons:— This would not aVect the production of illicit opium because (1) half the country is highly insecureand in many areas either the Taliban dominate or the government’s authority is too weak tooperate such a programme, and (2) the licit price could never match the illicit price, which couldbe as much as ten times greater, thus the black market would remain.139— The additional demand and greater perceived legitimacy would result in increased cultivation:currently only 4% of Afghanistan’s agricultural land is used for poppy.140— There are insuYcient resources or controls to prevent illicit diversion of the licit crop—which isup to 30% of total production in India.141Thus, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)could not sanction such use, as it requires guaranteed security of the licit crop.— It would confuse messages on drug control from the government, donors and not least, from themullahs who have decreed that it is against Islam.142— It is unnecessary: according to the INDB there is a world over-supply of opiates: nationalshortages or under-usage, especially in developing countries, is caused by restrictive legalregulations and bureaucracy, low health care budget resources and low policy priority forpalliative care.— Production, transport, bureaucratic and control costs would render Afghan morphineuncompetitive as against other licit producers in the global market, such as Australia.7. EducationDespite very signiﬁcant increase in enrolment, approximately half of Afghan children—predominantlygirls—are out of school. In 2006 overall enrolment in primary education was 50% for boys and just 20% forgirls; for secondary education, it was 20% and 5% respectively.Teachers are paid an average of just $50 per month; only 20% are professionally qualiﬁed and less thana third is female. There is an immediate shortage of some 50,000 teachers. A high proportion of girls dropout of school to a lack of female teachers, especially in rural areas.143A signiﬁcant number of government schools charge end-user fees despite a provision in the AfghanConstitution which guarantees free education. Over 5,000 schools have no buildings. There are majorvariations between the quality, cost and investment in education between provinces, and national budgetingand expenditure systems are complex and bureaucratic.As an example, in Daikundi province, of roughly 1,000 oYcial and unoYcial teachers, only two haverelevant professional qualiﬁcations; of 220 schools, only 28 have buildings; and 85% of schools chargeuser-fees.144Increasing insecurity in the south has had a major deleterious impact on education, where over 300schools to close due to violence or threats,145and overall attendance levels for girls remain extremely low.RecommendationsInternational donors should give substantial additional funding to support the implementation of thenational education strategy. As set out in Oxfam’s recent report on education in Afghanistan146amongstother things, the priorities should be to:139140

Recruit, train and support more teachers— Recruit and train of over 50,000 additional primary school teachers, at least 50% female.— Increase the teaching wage and the resettlement allowance for those moving to rural areas.— Establish well-resourced teacher-training colleges in all provinces and institute comprehensive, in-service training to raise the quality of teaching.— Institute training and other measures to eliminate corporal punishment in schools and to addressviolence between students.Build education infrastructure— Construct at least 7,000 school buildings over the next ﬁve years; expand support for outreachclasses or community schools in remote areas.— Eliminate formal and informal end-user fees.— Provide a universal midday meal in all schools, which would cost $200 million per annum, and hasbeen proven to increase enrolment rates, improve student performance and address childmalnutrition.147— Produce and distribute nation-wide high quality text-books to all schools.— Give more support to communities to improve the security of schools, and to achieve greatersecurity of access for girls.Improve ﬁnancial systems, planning and coordination— Move towards a zero-based budgeting system, coordinate planning at district and national level,and establish a system of resource monitoring.— Enhance coordination between donors, NGOs, and PRTs to ensure alignment with national andprovincial plans, especially in respect of school construction, and to ensure a more evendistribution of education funds throughout the country.8.HealthSigniﬁcant progress has been made in the provision of health care through the Basic Package of HealthCare Services (BPHS), which is implemented on a contractual basis by NGOs and other providers, andoverseen by the Ministry of Public Health. Donor-government coordination in health care is eVective andthere has been progress in capacity building of health care institutions and personnel, primarily at acentral level.Progress has been made from a very low base. Over the last ﬁve years there has been a 25% fall in infantmortality, but still, on average, one in ﬁve children die before the age of ﬁve.148The proportion of youngchildren receiving vital immunisations has substantially increased, but still around a third of children do notreceive vaccinations against tuberculosis or polio.149Over the last three years the number of rural women receiving antenatal care has increased dramatically;likewise, those receiving skilled assistance with child-birth has increased three-fold, yet assistance iscurrently available to fewer than one in ﬁve.150The maternal mortality ratio remains one of the highest inthe world; overall life expectancy is just 46 years.Health care standards and resources vary throughout the country, and insecurity, particularly in the southand south-east, is increasingly constraining the provision of health care in those areas; for example, 21 healthclinics have been forced to close in Helmand province.151RecommendationsExpand the provision of health care in remote areasAlthough BPHS coverage is impressive, access is limited for those who live in isolated rural areas as aresult of physical, climactic, cost, insecurity and cultural constrains. Thus, more primary health care centresshould be established in rural areas, with further measures to promote public health awareness, providetraining to district and community health staV, and expand the system of Community Health Workers.147148

Better planning by donors and the MoPH could address provincial disparities in the allocation of resources;donors should also ensure suYcient funding and coordination for the Expanded Programme onImmunization to maximise national coverage.Strengthen institutional capacity, coordination and security at sub-national levelDonors should provide more support for institutional capacity-building of the MoPH at provincial andlocal level, particularly in human resources. The MoPH should establish an eVective, integratedprocurement system and improve provincial-level collaboration and coordination with NGOs and otheragencies. Provincial strategies to ensure the security of clinics and safety of health workers should bedeveloped, which includes enhancing engagement with local communities.Expand and improve secondary and tertiary health careWhilst the BPHS seeks to address primary health care needs, donors and the Afghan government shouldinvest more in hospitals and health centres. The Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) should beimplemented in more hospitals to ensure better management and a higher quality of supplies, facilities andcare in all core clinical functions: medicine, surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology. Hospitalstandards should be developed with eVective monitoring and a comprehensive system of training forhospital staV.152Increase the number of female health workersA key means of improving women’s health, which has been proven to beneﬁt the health of families as awhole, is by expanding access to female health staV. Better opportunities for training and employmentpackages, which include higher salaries, accommodation incentives and security provisions should beprovided in order to attract and retain female health workers.Increase core government spending on healthCore government spending on health is less than 1% of GDP—equating to around 10% of the overallhealth budget, with the remainder provided by external sources.153To secure a sustainable, comprehensivehealth service, the proportion of core government funding for health must be increased.9.ProtectionThe security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated signiﬁcantly: the UN estimates that the frequencyof attacks, bombings and other violent incidents is up 20–30% on 2006.154By October this year, the conﬂicthad claimed between 4,000 and 5,000 lives, signiﬁcantly more according to some sources,155compared toroughly 4,000 for 2006.156At least 1,200 civilians have been killed, approximately half of whom were killedin operations conducted by international and Afghan forces.157There are four times as many air-strikes byinternational forces in Afghanistan as in Iraq, to which a high number of casualties can be attributed.158Searches conducted by Afghan and international forces have on a number of occasions involved excessiveuse of force, destruction of property and/or mistreatment of suspects. Discrete ISAF and US-led commandscreates operational incoherence, variable operating standards, inconsistent practices in civil-military co-ordination, and hinders cooperation with Afghan national security forces.Insurgent and criminal attacks have intensiﬁed, killing over 500 Afghan police159and 150 internationalsoldiers this year; more than 130 suicide attacks have killed well over 200 civilians.160In the south, south-east and east of the country insurgents are mounting an increasingly vigorous terror campaign of threats,abductions and executions aimed against members of the population suspected of being connected to theAfghan government and its military and civilian international supporters.152153

See Draft Public Health Strategy, Ministry of Public Health, March 2007.Ministry of Finance, Health Expenditure Review, 2005.154David Rohde, Afghan police are set back as Taliban adapt,New York Times,26 August 2007.155Associated Presshave estimated over 5,800 killed in 2007: three Afghan police killed in violence, AP, 11 November 2007.156Afghanistan: Slow Progress on Security and Rights, Human Rights Watch, 30 January 2007 (this puts the ﬁgure for 2006 at4,400); Principal Humanitarian Concerns Related to Protection of Civilians in Afghanistan, UN/AIHRC, August 2007 (thisputs the ﬁgure for 2006 at 3,600).157Ibid;UN Envoy says no time to “wobble” in Afghanistan, Reuters, 17 October 2007; The situation in Afghanistan and itsimplications for peace and security, Report of the UN Secretary-General, 21 September 2007, para 54; PrincipalHumanitarian Concerns Related to Protection of Civilians in Afghanistan, UN/AIHRC, August 2007; Civilians complainabout impact of ﬁghting on their lives, IRIN, 3 July 2007; Civilian casualties reportedly peak in August, IRIN, 5 September2007; Afghan army kill scores of insurgents, AP, 1 September 2007; Taliban attacks moving closer to Kabul, TheWashingtonPost,26 September, 2007.158Afghan Violence Numbers, AP, 2 August 2007.159500 Afghan police killed in ﬁve months, AFP, 3 September 2007.160Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–07), UNAMA, September 2007.

According to the UN there are 130,000 long-term displaced people in Afghanistan, and recent ﬁghting inthe south has displaced up to 80,000.161Insecurity has had a wider impact on livelihoods, forcing the closureof education and health facilities. Humanitarian access has been signiﬁcantly curtailed; kidnappings arerife—17 aid workers were abducted in September alone—and close to half the country, the south and south-east, is now categorised as an extreme or high risk environment for NGOs (see Appendix 1).162Security inparts of northern Afghanistan has also deteriorated.Achieving greater security is a priority for Afghans. The inability of the government and internationalcommunity to provide greater protection for communities—undoubtedly a challenging task—is a majorreason for Afghans turning to the aegis of the Taliban or other anti-government groups.RecommendationsEnsure proportionate use of forceAfghan and international forces should take all possible steps to minimise civilian casualties and thedestruction of civilian property, including rigorous veriﬁcation of intelligence, and should ensure thatsearches are conducted with proportionate force and respect for human rights and traditional values.Crucially, the approach must incorporate an empathetic appreciation of the perspective of Afghan people.Unify command of international forces, ensure common operating standards and enhance coordination withAfghan forcesThere should be uniﬁed NATO command for all international forces in Afghanistan, with a permanentmechanism to monitor operating standards of all units, ensure all detainees are treated in accordance withinternational humanitarian law, including those transferred to the custody of Afghan authorities, andstrengthen coordination with Afghan forces. Wherever possible community elders should be engaged orforewarned in respect of military operations.Establish new mechanisms to monitor, investigate and compensate for civilian casualtiesA new cross-sector body should be established, comprising the Afghan government, ISAF, UN andAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission, to monitor and investigate civilian casualties, destructionof property and alleged abuses. A comprehensive system should be instituted to ensure timely and suYcientcompensation is paid to civilians who have suVered from military operations.Support increasing numbers of refugees and IDPsA national action plan should be developed to respond to the needs of IDPs and refugees, coveringprotection, re-settlement support, resolution of land disputes, and longer-term assistance. It should takeaccount of the potential for signiﬁcant future movements in light of increasing insecurity.10.Community Peace-buildingAlmost all of the peace-building work in Afghanistan has been at a political level, where there are linksto warlordism, corruption or criminality, or it is target-limited, such as the disarmament programmes.Initiatives such as the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice are signiﬁcant, but lack clarity andare primarily concerned with peace and reconciliation at a national level. Implementation of the Plan hasbeen non-existent or extremely limited.163Moreover, most peace-building measures only marginally,indirectly or partially concern the people of Afghanistan. The capacity of Afghan communities to resolvetheir own disputes, and build and sustain peace, has largely been neglected.The recent deterioration in security, particularly in the south and south-east of Afghanistan, is evidencethat top-down approaches are by themselves inadequate, without parallel nationwide, peace-work atground level.War has fractured and strained the social fabric of the country and has deepened widespread poverty,which is itself a cause of insecurity. An Oxfam Security Survey of 500 people in six provinces shows thatdisputes at a local level often have root causes in poverty, and are largely related to resources, particularlyland and water, family matters or inter-community and tribal diVerences.161

11.Regional ActionAs a landlocked state sharing largely porous borders with Pakistan (2,400km), Iran (930km),Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China, Afghanistan is necessarily aVected by the policies of itsneighbours, particularly in respect of refugees movements, migration, security, narcotics and trade.Over 2 million Afghan refugees are oYcially living in Pakistan, and 0.9 million in Iran.165This year some350,000 Afghans have returned from Pakistan and 170,000, mainly economic migrants, have been forciblydeported from Iran. As acknowledged in the joint Afghanistan Pakistan peace jirga held in August this year,the Taliban and other illegal armed groups operate with the support of groups based in Afghanistan’sneighbouring states. There is extensive traYcking of opium and heroin across Afghanistan’s northern andsouthern borders, including several thousand tonnes of precursor chemicals, required for reﬁning opium,across the southern border every year.166Afghanistan’s neighbours will be critical to the country’s economic development. A signiﬁcant proportionof Afghanistan’s trade is both with and through neighbouring states; Pakistan, for example, accounts for25% of imports and 20% of exports and is an important transhipment route.167Afghanistan’s trade with Iranhas increased considerably.164

The UrgencytoImplementaCoherent CampaigninAfghanistan3. Notwithstanding six years of strong international presence and commitment, Afghanistan is presentlyfaced with a multifaceted crisis: southern provinces are ravaged by extreme poverty and the rise ofinsurgency. At the centre of this nexus lies the opium crisis with illegal production reaching unprecedentedlevels, as indicated by the United Nations OYce on Drugs Control (UNODC) in its latest report of August2007. The link between opium production and increasing insecurity is of grave concern.4. In southern Afghanistan’s insecure environment, essential food and development aid fails to reach thepopulation in need. In turn, this has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and fuelled public disillusionmenttowards the UK’s military and counter-narcotics operations. Critically, the ineVectiveness to address thepopulation’s basic needs has facilitated the rise of a grassroots insurgency. Afghans living in the numerousrefugee camps under appalling conditions, often as a result of aerial bombing campaigns, are being recruitedby the insurgents. The south of Afghanistan is becoming a recruitment camp for the Taliban, with a deeppool of young, unemployed men willing to ﬁght primarily for economic rather than ideological reasons.5. The reconstruction mission in Afghanistan is at a crossroads: unbalanced, incoherent and ineVectivedevelopment, military and counter-narcotics policies severely jeopardise the mission. We are now enteringa vicious cycle that can only be broken by a radical overhaul of policy. The ever-swelling number of rank-and-ﬁle Taliban is leading to ﬁercer resistance against Western forces in the south; there are not enoughtroops to face the level of hostility eVectively, and as military fatalities rise, so aerial bombings increase. Thisin turn leads to more civilian deaths, which fuel anger and prompt membership of the Taliban, therebyperpetuating the cycle.6.Recommendation:It is imperative that the UK Government takes on a coherent campaign reconcilingdevelopment, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics eVorts. A complete package of clear objectives anddiverse development-based interventions complemented by military eVorts is urgently required. Theprovision of eVective development and essential aid, and a positive counter-narcotics strategy must be animmediate response to Afghanistan’s emergency.

AddressingtheNeedsof theReal Afghanistan: PavingtheWayfor anEffective DevelopmentStrategy7. The Senlis Council commends the UK and Department for International Development (DFID) on itssigniﬁcant contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In particular, its commitment to spending£330 million on reconstruction and development in the country by March 2009. It is crucial that a signiﬁcantportion of this money goes towards desperately required food aid and healthcare, particularly in the conﬂict-ravaged southern provinces.8. The reality in southern Afghanistan is one of escalating violence and poverty. The Senlis Council hasconducted extensive ﬁeld research across the numerous and often overlooked refugee camps in Helmandand Kandahar provinces, revealing the true extent of hunger and despair in the region. Our ﬁeld research hasindicated that the current system of food aid is failing to address even the minimum needs of the hundreds ofthousands of victims of violent conﬂict and drought.9. Should the UK fail to deliver the desperately needed humanitarian and development assistance acrossAfghanistan, stabilisation eVorts in the country are likely to fail. The Taliban are capitalising on thisdevelopment vacuum in southern Afghanistan, gaining psychological control of the local populationthrough coercive means, and increasing its attractiveness as a potential source of income for ordinaryAfghans deprived of alternative ways in which to provide for their families.10. In order to regain local conﬁdence and support, the British eVort in southern Afghanistan needs tobe closely associated with development interventions, enabling immediate aid to reach the population andpromoting initiatives to bring economic development and stability in the short and medium-term. Britishforces in Helmand province are doing a commendable job in an increasingly hostile environment and couldpotentially support DFID’s activities in those areas, helping to identify the Afghan population most in need,securing the areas and assisting with aid delivery. Importantly, a strong presence and eVective provision ofessential aid would help support the military operations.11.Recommendation:A coherent development policy that addresses the real and immediate needs of theAfghan people must be put in place. This calls for an immediate and widespread distribution of food aidand healthcare until medium-term development can be provided in a sustainable manner.

13. Based on extensive ﬁeld research, The Senlis Council has developed a village-based Poppy forMedicine model for Afghanistan as a means of bringing illegal poppy cultivation under control in animmediate yet sustainable manner. The Poppy for Medicine (P4M) project is an integrated counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency initiative that seeks to introduce village-based development projects inrural Afghan communities to boost employment and rural development, stimulate rural diversiﬁcation andconnect Afghan poppy cultivation with those in need of essential painkilling medicines. P4M projects linkAfghanistan’s two most valuable resources—poppy cultivation and strong local governance and controlsystems—through the controlled cultivation of poppy for the local production of pharmaceutical-grademorphine.14. A Poll conducted in the UK on P4M reveals vast support for our proposals on both sides of theAtlantic. Although all four of the states polled—the UK, America, Canada and The Netherlands—were infavour of pilot P4M projects in Afghanistan, UK opinion was particularly ﬁrm in its support of such aninitiative. An overwhelming 86% supported P4M projects, and moreover, 80% stated that they would useAfghan produced morphine. There was also a signiﬁcant disapproval of chemical eradication of opiumpoppy, with 74% of those polled expressing their opposition to this policy.15.Recommendation:The Senlis Council urges DFID to support its call for the immediateimplementation of two pilot P4M projects in two pre-identiﬁed villages in southern Afghanistan.

Memorandum submitted by Stop The TraYk1. Introduction1.1 STOP THE TRAFFIK welcomes the International Development Committee’s inquiry into DFID’sdevelopment assistance in Afghanistan.1.2 STOP THE TRAFFIK welcomes the UK Government’s commitment to reconstruction anddevelopment in Afghanistan, in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) andimprove security.1.3 STOP THE TRAFFIK believes that eVectively delivering development assistance in insecureenvironments can only be achieved if the implications of human traYcking are taken into account.2. International DevelopmentandHuman Trafficking2.1 STOP THE TRAFFIK urges recognition of the links between international development and humantraYcking. This can be demonstrated through addressing the issues raised by the MDGs.2.2 MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hungerInternational Labour Organisation 2005:The majority of traYcked victims arguably come from the poorestcountries and poorest strata of the national population.2.3 MDG 2: Achieve universal primary educationUS Department of State TraYcking in Persons Report 2005:Approximately 50% of people traYckedacross international borders each year are minors.2.4 MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower womenUS Department of State TraYcking In Persons Report 2005:Approximately 80% of people traYckedacross borders each year are female.2.5 MDG 4: Reduce child mortalityChild Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Centre Report 2007:Pregnancy is used as an instrumentof oppression on traYcked girls, and babies are removed and killed whilst their traYcked mothers are forcedto work.2.6 MDG 5: Improve maternal healthChild Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Centre Report 2007:TraYcked girls are abused andabandoned once they become pregnant, decreasing their life-chances.2.7 MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseasesJournal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) Study 2007:The traYcking of women increases thespread of HIV/AIDS, with girls being particularly at risk.2.8 MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainabilityThe Statesman Newspaper Report 2007:Environmental problems and rising townships contribute to the risein human traYcking.

4. Points Addressed4.1 One of the objectives of DFID’s programme in Afghanistan must be to tackle human traYcking,without which the MDGs cannot be achieved. This would balance multiple goals including povertyreduction, development assistance, and basic human rights, and by developing tailored programmes foridentiﬁed people groups vulnerable to human traYcking, short-term gains can contribute to long-termtransformation. This would improve the security of the beneﬁciaries of DFID’s programme in insecureenvironments such as Afghanistan.4.2 Comparable studies in other countries demonstrate how varying levels of poverty between thenorthern and southern regions of a country are directly related to varying degrees of vulnerability to humantraYcking, and patterns of movement and exploitation. Funding should be distributed to areas wherepeople are most likely to be traYcked, as this in turn would help tackle insecurity and poverty.4.3. Strengthening institutional capacity and accountability is crucial to combat corruption, which bothfacilitates and is facilitated by inequality and human traYcking. Frontline training in identifying andsupporting victims of human traYcking for personnel such as border and immigration oYcials and healthand education practitioners would augment institutional capacity and accountability.4.4 The military and development eVort must be coordinated to help tackle human traYcking. Previouscases have demonstrated an increase in the traYcking of women for prostitution to service both foreign anddomestic military personnel in insecure environments. Both UK and other military service personnel shouldbe trained on the implications of human traYcking, and standards enforced.4.5 The above point also marks out tensions between development and security agendas. All areas ofassistance must be coordinated and adopt a holistic approach, with the achievement of the MDGs takingprecedence.4.6 The eVectiveness of the Post Conﬂict Reconstruction Unit would be enhanced if they rescued,rehabilitated, and reintegrated identiﬁed victims of human traYcking, exploitation, and other worst formsof child labour. This would aid the reconstruction of communities following violence and upheaval.4.7 Recent evidence from the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre Scoping Report 2007indicates a hidden pattern of children being traYcked to farm narcotics. Policies must recognise and addressthis growing trend.4.8 The US Department of State’s 2007 TraYcking In Persons Report recommends that Afghanistaninstitute a formal mechanism to refer traYcking victims to NGO protection services. NGO shelters andother activities should be protected and actively supported.4.9 STOP THE TRAFFIK therefore urges the International Development Committee to address theseissues, integrate anti-traYcking into its Inquiry into Afghanistan, and mainstream tackling humantraYcking in all its work.

Memorandum submitted by WOMANKIND WorldwideWOMANKIND Worldwide is an international women’s rights and development charity workingpartnership with organisations around the world.Our aim is to enable women in developing countries to voice their concerns and claim their rights and towork globally for polices and pratices which promote equality between women and men.The main focus of our work is to:— Advance women’s status and wellbing, though increasing their political and civil participation.— Reduce violence against women.— Inform and inﬂuence policy and practice at local, national, regional and international levels.WOMANKIND Worldwide has been working in Afghanistan since 2003. We currently provide technicaland ﬁnancial support to three partner organisations including the Afghan Women’s Network, AfghanWomen’s Educational Centre and Afghan Women’s Resource Centre.We focus on promoting women’s equal participation in govnernance, building awareness among civilsociety and policy makers of women’s human rights, as well as providing educational, health, communityand psyco-social support to those women aVected by violence and conﬂict.WOMANKIND Worldwidewelcomes the International Development Committee’s new inquiry intoDevelopment Assistance in Insecure Environments: Afghanistan. Our response focuses in particular onDFID’s work to promote gender equality and women’s human rights in the region, as we believe this mustbe at the heart of any plans to reduce poverty and promote peace and justice.

1. Make Gender EqualityandWomen’s Human RightsanExplicit GoalofDFID’s PolicyinAfghanistanWhilst there have been some legal, civil and constitutional gains for women in Afghanistan since 2001,there remain a great number of serious challenges to women’s safety and protection, realisation of civil andpolitical rights, and social and economic status that need to be urgently addressed.171Denied education underthe Taliban, women’s literacy rate currently stands at only 15% and economic dependence on men interactwith notions of patriarchy, seclusion and honour to further limit their ability to take part in the social,political and civil life of the country. Those women that do take a public role can end up paying a heavyprice.172As DFID has itself acknowledged, most recently in its 2006 White Paper and the 2007 Gender EqualityAction Plan, gender equality and women’s empowerment are essential pre-conditions for eliminating worldpoverty. Yet, despite the dire needs of women in Afghanistan, DFID has failed to prioritise gender equalityand women’s rights as a strategic goal in the country.173DFID should make the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights an explicit goal of its programmesin Afghanistan and set clear targets and indicators to measure progress on gender equality and women’s rightsinall areas.171

This would bring this policy framework in line with the Afghan government’s commitments to genderequality as enshrined in the constitution and DFID’s Gender Equality Action Plan 2007–09. It would beconsistent with existing commitments made by the UK and Afghan government on gender equality andwomen’s rights, in particular the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen, the Beijing Platform for Action and UN Security Council Resolution 1325.2. Promote EffortstoTackle Violence Against Women (VAW)VAW, including physical, sexual and psychological violence, is pervasive in Afghanistan and aVects anoverwhelming majority of women and girls.Honour crimes are on the rise; an estimated 60—80% of allmarriages are forced; 57% of girls are married before the age of 16; women and girls are exchanged inmarriage as restitution for crime, debts or disputes between households; and women and girls are traYckedinternally and abroad for forced labour and sexual exploitation.174Self-immolation cases have been risingdramatically in Western Afghanistan since 2003, mainly as a result of abusive and forced marriages imposedon women, from which they have little escape. Moves made by the Supreme Court to enact a new MarriageContact175have yet to be implemented.Women who are suVering violence in Afghanistan have almost no formal legal protection or supportavailable to them. Formal courts are failing to protect women under Afghan and international law, andcases where the victim is a woman are unlikely to make it past resolution in a localjirga(tribal council) toone of the very few family courts’.176There is a general lack of data collection on this issue or responsiveprogramming for victims of VAW and very few shelters are available to meet the needs of survivors. Fullsupport needs to be given to the initial moves to develop a new Violence against Women Law in Afghanistanto stop the systematic impunity for such crimes.Violence denies women their most basic rights and undermines the social and economic development ofcommunities and whole countries. It undermines good governance by preventing women’s participation indecision-making at all levels and deprives women and girls of their education, healthcare, self-determinationand social mobility.DFID should actively promote eVorts to make tackling VAW in all its forms an integral part of its economicand social development programmes in Afghanistan. It should promote a personal, household and communitylevel analysis of such issues and acknowledge the role VAW and gender inequality plays in the perpetuatingviolence at each and every level of society.3. Strengthen Accountabilityof theAfghan National GovernmentbySupporting Civil SocietyandParticularly Women’s NGOsWhilst we appreciate that a functioning and accountable government is crucial for Afghanistan’s long-term development and eVective rule of law, there are serious issues relating to DFID’s current policy ofproviding 80% of its current assistance directly to the Government of Afghanistan.177There are very realconcerns that ﬁnancial support to governments to the detriment of NGOs, particularly in transitional andpost-conﬂict states such as Afghanistan, may lead to a loss in service provision where the state does not havethe capacity to spend and/or distribute funds, a lack of representation for marginalised groups (such aswomen) and a decline in democratic accountability at every level.Our partners in Afghanistan for example—designated women’s human rights NGOs—receive none of their funding from the Afghan government and areentirely reliant on INGO support.Women’s organisations on the ground have proven their ability to address women’s needs and rightseVectively and their contribution, voice and experience have been valuable resources to processes ofgovernance and accountability. Women’s participation in drawing up the constitution and in the 2005elections, in advocating for and contributing towards needed legislative reform, as well as their role inpreventing human rights abuses178have all contributed towards long term development in Afghanistan. Yetduring the last 10 years, women’s organisations across the globe have seen a reduction of their fundingcreating obstacles both to the delivery of long term programmes and their organisational sustainability.Furthermore, new aid modalities and in particular the move towards Direct Budgetary Support, have notyet been able to signiﬁcantly address gender inequality and women’s disempowerment and these issues areoften sidelined in national development plans and poverty reduction strategies. In these cases it iswomen’s174175

5. Promote ImplementationofUN Security Council Resolution 1325inAfghanistanDFID should prioritise the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the UKGovernment’s own National Action Plan on 1325 and match this with adequate resources in Afghanistan.Whilst DFID recognise that“although women often play a major role in preventing conﬂict and building peace,their contributions are overlooked and underestimated”,182more needs to be done urgently to ensure theirrepresentation within police and formal justice sector institutions; ensure the Afghan Governments complieswith its CEDAW obligations;183reinvigorate the National Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justiceand ensure crimes of sexual violence are excluded from amnesty provisions; take special measures to protectwomen and girls from gender-based violence (see VAW above); sensitise the Afghan National Army andPolice to women’s human rights and their equality under the Afghan constitution; ensure security sectorreform prioritises human security for women in relation to their access to formal, participatory andrepresentative judicial mechanisms; and ensure an appropriate budget is allocated and appropriate pre-deployment training is provided for gender mainstreaming and promotion of women’s human rights withinNATO and ISAF.Development eVorts in Afghanistan should therefore be implemented in accordance with UN SCR 1325to ensure women are protected, their rights promoted and that they are fully participating in post-conﬂictpeace settlements, reconstruction and development initiatives.179

PRTs are small joint civil-military teams set up to facilitate stability, security, reconstruction and development in the areasthey are employed. DFID funds the establishment of PRTs in Helmand to work on governance, security and justice issues(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmintdev/923/6032303.htm). The PCRU has also managed “quickimpact projects” related to irrigation, more reliable power supply and extending reception of BBC World Service PashtoService in Helmund (DFID,Fragile states, Conﬂicts and Crises).Initial research results from Professor Jude Howell andJeremy Lind (LSE) explains that local Afghans do not understand the distinctions between the many diVerent internationalactors in the country. The role that the military is playing in development through PRTs may have contributed to thisdangerous confusion and placed aid workers at risk (see BAAG, Evidence for the Defence Select Committee, March 2007).180As outlined in Save the Children, Provisional Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan(2004), “Non-governmental humanitarian agencies seek to deliver aid because people need it and aim to do so in a mannerthat meets immediate needs while also maximising long-term prospects. Militaries undertake such action as a means ofwinning ‘hearts and mind’, i.e. on the basis of whether the beneﬁciaries will be of political assistance”.181See Lord Malloch-Brown, Lord Hansard Text, 11 July 207 (Column 458).182From DFID, “Preventing Violent Conﬂict”, 2006.183Article 9 of 1325 states that, “all parties to armed conﬂict respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protectionof women and girls as civilians”. The Convention for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratiﬁed bythe Afghan Government in 2003, obliges them to submit reports at least every four years on its compliance with it treatyobligations, which they have not done. They should also be encouraged to ratify the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, whichprovides both inquiry and complaints procedures to improve on existing enforcement mechanisms for women’s human rights.

7. RecognisetheImpactofDeteriorating Securityon theNGO SectorandProvide IncreasedResourcestoDecrease NGO VulnerabilityThreats against NGO staV from armed opposition groups (AOG) in Afghanistan have been growing steadilysince 2003.Since the beginning of 2007, NGOs have been directly targeted or impacted in 70 separate crimeand conﬂict-related incidents, with the number of incidents escalating each month184. The pace and volumeof attacks in June 2007 are almost double those of 2006 and the Afghanistan NGO Safety OYce (ANSO)assesses that direct contact between NGOs and Taliban is likely to increase further in the coming year dueto an improvement in the manpower capacity of AOG and an increase in the number of oVences byInternational Military Forces. The use of suicide bombs and more powerful “projectile” devices is growingand although NGOs may not be a direct target of attacks, there is a clear need for enhanced preparationfor emergency situations arising from being caught up in cross-ﬁre. It is also worth noting that there are anincreasing number of abductions and killings of national NGO staV across the country.Women in Afghanistan remain particularly vulnerable, as can be seen by the attacks on and threats tofemale journalists, female MPs, girls’ schools and those working on women’s education and empowermentprojects.185As our partners form the linchpin of the women’s movement in Afghanistan by providingservices to women and girls, as well as being outspoken on women’s human rights issues, there is an urgentneed to address their personal and organisational security.186Although little can be done by DFID speciﬁcally to reduce the current direct and indirect threats inAfghanistan to NGOs from AOG, vulnerability can be reduced with the right training and support. As such,DFID should urgently make resources available for NGOs to enable them to build capacity to identify andassess security threats and vulnerability and to control these risks in Afghanistan.September 2007184185