


8<sup>th</sup> April 2008



For The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

## **Focus-paper - Final**

# **Achievements in the Iraqi-Danish Partnership for Reconstruction**

Based on a Desk Review of Documents and Workshop Discussions

104.Irak.2-21

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## Abbreviations

AMG	Aid Management Guidelines
ASWG	Agriculture Sector Working Group
CPA	Coalition Provisional Administration
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DANCON, DANBAT, DANBN	Danish Military Contingency in Basra
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DIHR	Danish Institute for Human Rights
DKK	Danish Kroner (Danish Currency)
EU	European Union
FSG	Fragile States Group (DAC-OECD)
GCPI	General Company of Ports in Iraq
HR	Human Rights
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IDA	International Development Association (under World Bank)
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
LCC	Local Council Committee
LGF	Local Governance Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Office in MFA responsible for relations with Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoT	Ministry of Transport
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDF	Provincial Development Fund
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RUD	Reconstruction Unit, Denmark
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
ToR	Terms of Reference
USD	United States Dollar

## Executive Summary

The focus of this paper is on the achievements of the **reconstruction** efforts in the Basra province of Iraq for which the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directly responsible and covers the period from April 2003<sup>1</sup>.

The objective of the reconstruction efforts was as quoted from the appropriation document of June 2005 to *"...contribute to the development of a stable and democratic Iraq, enable to secure economic and social development for the population in the country, and in addition promote human rights and good governance."*<sup>2</sup>

The security situation in Basra was difficult in the whole period and very difficult in some periods, and from the end of 2003 it was decided that all advisers travelling outside the guarded camp had to be protected by an armoured protection team. While there were "ups-and-downs" in the security situation for advisers and staff working on Danish supported reconstruction programmes, the situation became generally very difficult from the start of 2006, where e.g. the cartoon crisis led to suspension of most activities for months and the steering unit and advisers were moved three times during the period from start of 2006 until April 2007 when the steering unit was moved to Kuwait. Seven Danish soldiers lost their lives in Iraq in the period covered by this report.

The difficult situation not only made planning, dialogue with local stakeholders, implementation and monitoring of reconstruction projects and programmes a major challenge but also contributed to a lack of systematic documentation of achievements. The steering unit was relocated a number of times due to the security situation, sometimes leading to the evacuation of civilian staff at short notice and often without the possibility of retrieving documents and computers.

It is important to note that the main source of information for this paper has been available documentation and that this for above mentioned circumstances has been limited in some areas. This has meant that it has been a challenge to make a full and fair review of the achievements. The review, besides the existing documentation, relies on a site inspection report of most reconstruction projects. The site inspection took place from mid – October to November 2007. In addition more narrative reporting was obtained from stakeholders participating in a work-shop in Amman the 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008.

There were four main areas of reconstruction efforts; 1) Agriculture, 2) Infrastructure, 3) Human Rights and Judicial Reforms, and 4) Advisory Assistance. The paper attempts to determine the results and review these in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance as well as discusses issues of sustainability and impact. Based on this is presented some tentative "lessons learned".

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<sup>1</sup> It does not cover humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance or assistance under "the regions of origin initiative" or those projects implemented by the Danish Military, Police, Human Rights Centre or ICRT.

<sup>2</sup> Parliamentary Appropriation no. 158. Copenhagen 1st June 2005

Despite the difficult context in which the reconstruction efforts were implemented there have been remarkable results:

The support to agriculture including irrigation (financial contribution in total 30,5 mill DKK) is assessed to be effective, especially the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, but also the smaller projects and the advisory services to agriculture. Also concerning efficiency and not least relevance the agricultural support is assessed to have been well planned and executed. The activities appear to be sustainable, but this is difficult to assess from present knowledge, but the impact is potentially great for an estimated population of 200.000 who are dependent of the activities.

The infrastructure projects are very positively assessed overall. Especially the support to the rehabilitation of the Buoy vessel "Nisr" (26,5 mill DKK) and the "Transport Corridor Study" (6,86 mill DKK) were very well executed projects and score high on effectiveness, efficiency and relevance and have a very high potential for a major impact of the economic development of the province and over time for the whole of Iraq. Also the provision of Jetting and Suction Trucks (6,23 mill DKK) was effective and relevant as it met immediate needs by improving the sanitation in Basra. The achievement of the delivery of 11 Blood Gas Analysers to hospitals probably also met immediate needs, but as only one of these were part of the site inspections, it is difficult to determine how effective this project has been and whether it is sustainable.

The Human Rights, Judicial Reforms and Democratisation programme contains a number of projects for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been directly responsible for implementation, e.g. police training, rehabilitation of torture victims and support to civil society and human rights training. The specific Danish support to judicial improvement is difficult to assess as this has mainly been supported together with US and UK support. The refurbishment of the court house in Basra was jointly done with the US but the provision of furniture was a specific Danish project (0,85 mill DKK) and this has been done effectively, efficiently and was relevant. Local Governance Fund supported 18 projects identified by local councils to meet public service needs, e.g. in education, roads, health and water. The projects have been effective and relevant in relation to expressed needs of the local councils. To what extent they have contributed to improved governance and democracy is less well documented, but it is likely that the LGF-projects have been assisting in building capacity of local councils in prioritising, planning and monitoring the implementation of local public service projects.

The advisory assistance has been provided in a very difficult security situation and with often very limited possibilities for movement. It is therefore not surprising that achievements are less well documented and appear to have been mixed, but there are valuable experiences, which the MFA have learned from in the provision of technical advisory assistance to the central government level in Baghdad from 2007.

**The overall findings and recommendations are:**

It is the overall assessment that the Iraqi-Danish partnership has from April 2003 to December 2007 produced some noteworthy achievements. These are documented in relation to economic and social development, such as improvements to infrastructure, especially in transport, agriculture and irrigation and small-scale rehabilitation of public utilities. The achievements concerning "softer" – but equally important – issues such as democracy, human rights and good governance are less well documented.

It is worth noting that in relation to the difficult and changing security situation in Basra and given the fact that strict security measures have been imposed on advisers, it has in most instances been possible to use good practices for development assistance e.g. stakeholder involvement, promotion of transparent decision making and tendering processes and promotion of cooperation between various levels of authorities. These are in themselves very noteworthy achievements. But there are some instances where the use of general good practices and guidelines for reconstruction and development activities could have been improved.

There was in Iraq – as is often the case in fragile situations and in reconstruction efforts - a demand and a need for demonstrating quick results, not least to the local population in the Basra Governorate, to prove that there was more to win from peace and reconstruction than from counter insurgency but also to the public in donor countries as fragile situations often generate considerable media-interest. This would suggest that;

- In reconstruction efforts in fragile situations attention to and use of good practices of development programmes and projects – concerning identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and follow up, employment of development staff, to ensure local ownership, harmonisation and coordination - should be prioritised and that it is important to secure that experienced and professional development experts are involved at decision-making levels.
- Planning horizons - as defined by the Parliamentary appropriations - have been too short – 20 to 42 months at best but in reality less (e.g. due to a decision early 2007 to re-focus Danish assistance)- from the time of identifying a problem through local stakeholder dialogue to addressing it through design and implementation and to completion of the intervention and closure of Danish assistance. This has not been conducive to fostering good development planning and implementation practices.
- In fragile situations it is necessary to make resources and conditions available so experienced professional staff can be attracted and support this with simple efficient administrative procedures and the creation of a human resource base for fragile situations.

It appears that most projects concerning infrastructure have been managed professionally and documentation available is of sufficient quality to analyse achievements. When there is a lack of overall programme and project documents and more systematic reporting – such as is the case especially with some of the governance projects and the adviser assistance – this makes it difficult to review the achievements and therefore to distil lessons, which could be utilised in similar fragile situations.

- When new experiences are being made it is particularly important that these be documented and that the lessons learned are extracted, documented, and communicated. This enables a learning process to take place. Creative use of IT could facilitate that normal guidelines for project management and reporting also in difficult circumstances could be adhered to, despite the eventual loss of laptop computers etc. in the field.

At the workshop in Amman the 4-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008 (see list of participants in annex 4) there was gratefulness among the Iraqi participants for the Danish support. Especially that the support had materialised as promised, while there was an expressed sense that assistance from some other donors had not been according to the promises made. In addition there was generally satisfaction with the quality of Danish assistance also compared to assistance from other donors. More importantly there was from all participants a general agreement for the need now to move away

from a project approach and increase process facilitation and capacity building. Iraqi participants expressed that Iraq does not lack financial resources but needs expertise in how to use the resources fruitfully by transforming policies into concrete implementation of programmes and ensure their sustainability. There was consequently in general terms support to the shift of focus in the Iraqi-Danish partnership jointly decided in 2007 to concentrate on capacity building of central Iraqi ministries in Baghdad, but there was some dissatisfaction expressed by the local level that the focus was only on the central level and several requested support also to the de-central level not least in Basra as a continuation of the past Danish support.



## 1 Background and Introduction

Since April 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Denmark has provided support to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, focusing mainly on the Basra province.

The support has been implemented in accordance with Parliamentary Appropriations 111 (2003), 158 (2005) and 106 (2007) through a number of projects and programmes covering a broad field of subjects and issues, such as agriculture and irrigation, infrastructure, (e.g. development of harbours and the transport sector), human rights and democracy, humanitarian projects and capacity building.

It should be recognised that the Danish assistance was provided within a very difficult and shifting Iraqi context of deteriorating security situation and political turmoil. The location of the Steering Unit office and its staff in Basra was shifted a number of times and this, obviously, did not only affect the possibility of long term planning but also the possibility of documenting results. Often areas of implementation became 'no go' areas for reasons of security and sometimes computers and files were lost or left behind. Hence the assistance provided had to be flexible and adaptable and with a rather short planning and implementation horizon. The context is described briefly in chapter 5.

The Danish military contingency (DANCON later renamed DANBN) was withdrawn from the Basra province in July 2007 and the Danish support for reconstruction will according to Appropriation 106 in the future mainly be in the form of support to capacity-building at central government level and consequently no longer focus specifically on the Basra area. As a consequence of this decision, and in agreement with the Government of Iraq, a civilian technical advisory office was established in Baghdad in March 2007.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has - based on this change of focus - decided to initiate a process to document the outcome of the past Iraqi-Danish partnership, which focussed on supporting reconstruction in and around Basra and during this process identify possible lessons learned from the Iraqi-Danish Partnership for Reconstruction. The process has included various activities, including an important site inspection carried out from 15<sup>th</sup> October to mid-November 2007 to assess the activities and structures created with financial support from Denmark. The inspection is documented in a separate site inspection report<sup>3</sup>.

A second important activity was a two day workshop for key stakeholders, Danish and Iraqi, which took place in Amman on 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008 (list of participants presented in annex 4). The present focus-paper has been developed based on a draft discussed at the workshop. The main conclusions from the workshop are included in this final focus paper.

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<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida: "Basrah, Iraq: Site Inspection of Selected Bilateral projects." COWI A/S. December 2007

Since April 2003 various forms of Danish assistance have been provided to Iraq and funded from budget-lines according to the form or “modality” of assistance: humanitarian, multilateral, the regions of origin initiative, advisers, and reconstruction.

For the purpose of this paper it has been decided to concentrate on two aspects:

- A. The reconstruction efforts and especially the economic reconstruction
- B. The efforts for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been directly responsible and hence the paper does not include Danish support channelled through multilateral organisations nor those activities which have been executed by other institutions and organisations such as the Danish Police, DANBN, the Danish Human Rights Centre, and NGOs.

Consequently neither the Civilian-Military Co-planning nor the new focus on supporting the Iraq Compact and the establishment of a civilian advisory office in Bagdad will be part of this paper. The Civilian-Military Co-planning in Iraq will be subject to a separate study covering also Afghanistan which is being carried out by Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

The workshop in Amman 4-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008 discussed four issues and this paper will be organised according to these issues;

1. Agricultural support
2. Economic Development (infrastructure)
3. Human Rights, Justice Sector Reforms and Democratisation
4. Danish Adviser Assistance and the Steering Unit in Basra

The paper does not pretend to establish an exhaustive overview of all reconstruction efforts<sup>4</sup>, but based on the available documentation and the discussions at the work-shop, the paper provides an overview of some of the main achievements. Partly due to difficult circumstances of the planning and implementation of the assistance, the written documentation available is not complete, which is why the effort to collect the documented experience was supplemented by a workshop, where further documentation was provided through first hand narratives from the involved stakeholders. The information supplied by the participants during the workshop has been included in this paper.

During the period of implementation of reconstruction projects in Basra – 2003 to 2ndhalf of 2007 - development assistance to - what has been termed - *fragile states* (or fragile situations) has been the object of increasing attention among development actors. A brief overview of current thinking concerning development assistance to fragile states is presented in chapter 2 of this paper. This may provide a framework for raising some pertinent questions and drawing some preliminary conclusions in relation to the Danish support to reconstruction in Iraq. The lessons learned may be used in other Danish support to reconstruction in fragile states and may – where relevant – feed into the international discussions on the same.

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<sup>4</sup> An overview of Danish support to reconstruction and humanitarian activities in Iraq from 2003-2008 and its financial allocations is presented in annex 1 to “Danmarks Engagement i Irak” Maj 2007, Udenrigsministeriet and copied as annex 3 to this report.

It should be stressed that the content of this paper is the responsibility of the consultants only and the opinions expressed therein do not necessarily reflect those of any other institution or organisation except when explicitly stated.

## 2 Objectives of the Partnership

The overall objective for the Danish support to reconstruction in Iraq was from the outset (2003) formulated as;

*"... promote stability and reconciliation and support the democratisation and reconstruction of a state built on law and order."*<sup>5</sup>

The support to reconstruction was planned as complementary to the Danish military engagement in Iraq. The humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq was one of the first examples of Danish civilian and military engagements being planned simultaneously, and while not jointly it was to some extent mutually dependent, and with the intention of creating synergy between the two. The military engagement by providing security for the implementation of the reconstruction efforts – and the reconstruction efforts by providing short term concrete results on the ground, and thereby affecting the local population's perception of and cooperation with also the Danish military presence. But it should be stressed that the reconstruction efforts were planned to benefit the whole province and not specifically the geographic area, which the Danish military contingency was responsible for. Originally the area of operation was the four southern governorates. When the Danish civilian head of the four governorates handed over to UK in September 2003 the focus shifted to the Basra governorate.

The initial reconstruction assistance was planned to cover the period from approval by Danish Parliament of the appropriation in April 2003 to the end of 2004, i.e. some 20 months.

The second appropriation for reconstruction assistance was approved in June 2005 and covered the period till end 2008, i.e. 42 months. However in reality the planning and implementation period of assistance to Basra was reduced with the approval of a third appropriation.

The objective is in this appropriation the objective is more comprehensively formulated as;  
*"...contribute to the development of a stable and democratic Iraq, enable to secure economic and social development for the population in the country, and in addition promote human rights and good governance."*<sup>6</sup>

This formulated objective was maintained in the third appropriation, also requesting the phase-out of project assistance to Basra and the shift of focus to capacity building in Baghdad, which was approved in April 2007. The planning horizon for this appropriation is end 2008, i.e. 20 months.

Initially in 2003 four sectors were identified as possible areas for Danish support: Education and Health, Infrastructure, Democratisation, and Renovation of the Oil-Industry. But it was also stated that this would be based on further identification efforts and assessments. In addition, it was

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<sup>5</sup> Parliamentary Appropriation no. 111. Copenhagen 9 April 2003.(Our translation from Danish)

<sup>6</sup> Parliamentary Appropriation no. 158. Copenhagen 1st June 2005

considered likely that it might be necessary to establish a steering unit and recruit a number of advisers.

Subsequently, in the second appropriation in 2005, it was specified that the majority of activities should continue to be implemented in the southern part of Iraq and with civilian-military co-planning to be continued.

The areas to be covered were – after a process of establishing matches between local (by CPA) defined priorities combined with Danish know-how and capacities - defined as follows;

1. Human Rights and justice-sector reforms, including police training.
2. Democratisation
3. Infrastructure
4. Agriculture

In addition, it was specified that the monitoring unit in Basra would be continued.

The three appropriations cover both reconstruction and other forms of assistance to Iraq, e.g. humanitarian assistance. Reconstruction assistance alone amounted to 372 mill. DKK of which approximately 260 mill. DKK was spent mainly in Basra between 2003 and 2007.

The main risks, which were explicitly mentioned in the appropriations, were the security situation and the relatively weak political and administrative structures in Iraq. The non-presence of traditional development partners, inter alia the UN and the World Bank, is also mentioned.

### 3 Working in Fragile States<sup>7</sup>

Recent years have witnessed considerable progress in the international efforts within the development community to increase aid effectiveness in general. This has taken place in various fora but the developments have to a large extent been driven by the Development Assistance Committee - DAC (under OECD).

This has culminated in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*<sup>8</sup> from March 2005. Within the framework of this Declaration developed and developing countries resolved to ensure more efficient development assistance with increasing impact on poverty and decreasing transaction costs - for recipients as well as for donors – by ensuring national ownership, alignment and harmonisation.

The objective is to:

Ensure *ownership* by recipient government and population of poverty reduction strategies defined through an inclusive and participatory process.

*Align* donor assistance with partners' strategies and to the extent possible use partners' procedures.

*Harmonize* donor assistance by sharing information, developing common donor arrangements and using the same and simplified procedures.

*Manage for results*, which emphasises the importance of focusing on outputs.

Following the Paris Declaration there have been increased efforts to ensure more efficient assistance also to fragile states. The rationale is a concern that donors prefer to support countries where it is easier to get results – the so-called good performers – and shy away from more difficult situations. Donors who were engaged in providing development assistance to difficult situations such as in Iraq were especially active in this work on fragile states. The importance of this work is underlined by numbers: Some sources put the number of people living in these countries at 870 million people or 14% of the World's population<sup>9</sup> and it is increasingly clear that in order for the international community to live up to its commitments concerning the Millennium Development Goals (the MDGs) it is necessary to increase development efforts to fragile states. Of the 84 countries eligible for soft loans (IDA) from the World Bank, 32 are characterised as fragile states – or Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS).

#### 3.1 Definitions

The term "fragile states" is being used by the international community to characterise states that seriously lack the capacity and/or willingness to perform a series of functions regarded as essential to the security and well-being of their citizens. There is, however, no precise definition - and the term "fragile" is often used interchangeably alongside other adjectives such as poorly performing, difficult partnership, weak, under stress, failing, failed, collapsed - with some variation in meaning.

<sup>7</sup> This chapter is a condensed version of parts of: "Development Assistance in Fragile States". By Julian Brett and Finn Skadkær Pedersen, written for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May 2007.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonization/Paris/FINALPARISDECLARATION.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> "Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states", DfID, January 2005, p7.

To a varying degree, fragile states are countries affected by conflict.

Among countries falling within these categories there is understandably some unease about being classified as such because of the perceived negative connotations. This perception is important because the principal objective of current international efforts is greater engagement and the use of terminology should not detract from this objective. In the on-going discussions on the issue, it has been suggested that a more neutral term, such as "fragile situations", could be better.<sup>10</sup>

### 3.2 Development Assistance to Fragile States

Fighting poverty is the overriding goal of the development community. It should, however, be noted that in addition to this goal there are many additional and arguably equally important political concerns when it comes to working in fragile states e.g. humanitarian needs, security, counter-terrorism, human rights, and migration and trafficking.

DAC's Fragile States Group (FSG) has developed a series of principles for more effective international engagement in fragile states.<sup>11</sup> The *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* aim to complement the Paris Declaration and take their starting point in the recognition that a durable exit from poverty and insecurity has to be driven by local leadership and people and that, while it will not put an end to state fragility, international assistance based upon shared principles of engagement can help promote positive impacts and minimise unintentional harm. The *Principles* can also apply in stronger performing countries during periods of temporary fragility.

The *Principles* are currently the best and most widely recognised set of guidelines for aid interventions in fragile states and they are the result of an extensive piloting exercise by DAC members in ten countries.<sup>12</sup>

#### Box 1: Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations

##### The Basics:

1. **Take context as the starting point:** Understand specific context and develop a shared view of the strategic response required. It is especially important to recognise different constraints of *capacity, political will* and *legitimacy* and also difference between countries in *transition* situations, *recovering* from crisis, countries *deteriorating* in governance, and countries in prolonged crisis.
2. **Do no harm:** avoiding activities which create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse. Responses should be based upon sound conflict and governance analysis and must be carefully judged so as not to exacerbate poverty, conflict and insecurity.

<sup>10</sup> See *Summary record of the 6th meeting of the Fragile States Group (FSG)*, DAC, 15th June 2006.

<sup>11</sup> The "*Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*" were endorsed by the Ministers and Heads of Agencies of the OECD DAC in April 2007. This is available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> DRC - Belgium, Guinea-Bissau - Portugal, Haiti - Canada, Nepal - UK, Somalia - World Bank & UK, Solomon Islands - Australia & New Zealand, Sudan - Norway, Yemen - UN and UK, Zimbabwe - EC. Phase 2 of the piloting ended in October 2006 following which the findings were synthesised and fed into the final set of principles agreed in April 2007.

**The Role of State-Building & Peace-Building:**

3. **Focus on state-building as the central objective**, strengthening the relationship between the state and society through enhancing the state's *legitimacy and accountability* and the *capability* of state structures to perform core functions. Civil society has a key role in both of these areas and may play a key role in service delivery.
4. **Prioritise prevention**, sharing and responding to risk analysis, support civil society involved in conflict prevention, addressing the root causes of state fragility and strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, and the peace-building role of regional organisations.
5. **Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives**, while there might be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, especially in the short run such as a focus on peace-keeping and peace- building as a prerequisite for progress against the MDGs. Aim for policy coherence and joined up strategies while preserving the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid.
6. **Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies**. Consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. Measures to promote voice and participation of women, youth and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

**The Practicalities:**

7. **Align with local priorities** in different ways in different contexts. Align assistance with government strategies where there is political will to foster development but a lack of capacity. Where donor-government consensus is not possible, seek wider consultations with national stakeholders and partial or shadow alignment which helps build the basis for government ownership and alignment in the future. Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as parallel systems, without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development.
8. **Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms** between international actors, including upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; co-ordination of political engagement; joint offices, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting frameworks. Work jointly with national reformers, including civil society.
9. **Act fast... but stay engaged** long enough to give success a chance. Flexibility to take advantages of opportunities that occur and respond to changes. Capacity development in core institutions will take at least ten years. Ensure aid predictability by developing systems of mutual consultation and co-ordination, especially prior to changes to aid programming.
10. **Avoid pockets of exclusion**, addressing "aid orphans" where there are no significant barriers to engagement but where aid volumes are low. Ensure co-ordination on field presence and mechanisms to finance promising developments in such countries.

It is also worth highlighting that accompanying the adoption of the *Principles* was a policy commitment from Ministers and Heads of Agency on a range of actions to support their



operationalisation. These actions include: mainstreaming the *Principles* with efforts to implement the *Paris Declaration*; improving *Whole-of-Government Approaches* (i.e. joining up economic, development, diplomatic and security actors); taking steps to improve agency organisational capacity and responsiveness (including field presence, skills, incentives, and policy cohesion); improving the targeting, co-ordination and transparency of resource allocations to fragile states; and setting realistic, transparent, and monitorable goals and objectives.<sup>13</sup>

### 3.3 Civilian-Military Co-planning

As one of a few countries in the world Denmark has developed principles for the cooperation between military and civilian actors in situations where both are present. This exercise was based on the increased engagement of the Danish military in international crises from the 1990s e.g. West-Balkans, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This pointed to the need for an intensified coordination of civilian and military interventions. In March 2004, such an initiative was launched by the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

The principles guiding this initiative include the following<sup>14</sup>:

- To normalise and stabilise the situation for the local population in a conflict area as there is a direct connection between improved socio-economic conditions and security
- To ensure the best use of Danish resources within an internationally co-ordinated framework.
- To the greatest extent possible, ensure a concentrated Danish humanitarian input in the Danish military's area of responsibility.
- As a general rule, private Danish and international humanitarian organisations should undertake [*non-military*] stabilisation interventions financed by Denmark. However, in situations where the security situation prevents these organisations from operating, military forces may be required to provide minor support in the local area.

It has been stressed that the intention of the initiative is not to create an armed emergency-brigade out of the Danish military forces. The importance of the initiative lies in ensuring that Danish participation is coordinated in such a way that it has maximum impact and that assistance reaches people in need. NGOs have been involved in discussing the co-operation principles, and they were first and foremost implemented in Iraq and are now in use in Afghanistan.

### 3.4 Guiding principles for Provincial Reconstruction Team

The *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations* and the civilian-military co-planning presented above could be the frame for discussing the Iraq-Danish partnership.

In addition the PRT Guiding Principles which came out of a recent workshop in London (in late 2007) could more practically be included as a background to these discussions. They are included in annex 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Policy Commitment to Improve Development Effectiveness in Fragile States*, DCD/DAC(2007)29, April 2007.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udviklingspolitik/BistandIPraksis/Civil-militær+samtænkning/> (our translation)

## 4 Methodological issues

This focus-paper is based mainly on available reports and documentation. Unfortunately, the current systematic collection of relevant material has not been finalised yet and some of the findings and conclusions included in this paper might therefore be based on incomplete information. The written information has been supplemented by narrative reports and discussions at the workshop in Amman 4-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008.

It has been attempted in the review of the Danish supported activities in Iraq first of all briefly to describe the concrete outputs produced. When dealing with project activities, which have produced concrete material outputs e.g. buildings or sluices, the recent site inspection report<sup>15</sup> has been the main source, while it has been more difficult to find documentation for results of projects with a less tangible output.

After a brief presentation of the concrete outputs, each of the relevant projects is subjected to a critical review based on the available project documentation. Such reviews are based on standard "Danida policies"<sup>16</sup>, good practices of development management as presented in the Aid Management Guidelines (AMG)<sup>17</sup> and especially the internationally accepted DAC criteria for evaluations<sup>18</sup>.

The first step has consequently been an attempt to identify if the results are in line with formulated project objectives, if possible to review the quality of the identification and preparation processes, and the implementation and follow-up processes.

The review is structured according to the following logic;

1. Description of results – mainly based on the Site Inspection Report
2. Brief review of effectiveness, including reviewing to what extent the project has met the intended project objectives and – to the extent possible – review how it contributed to the reconstruction process
3. Brief review of relevance, including if the support was in line with Iraqi (originally CPA) plans and priorities, quality of needs assessment and risks analysis, and extent of consultations and involvement of relevant stakeholders
4. Brief review of efficiency in relation to cost-efficiency and time, and – if possible – in relation to alternatives
5. Brief discussion of issues of sustainability and impact
6. Based on the five points above, some preliminary lessons learned are presented

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<sup>15</sup> COWI A/S : "Basrah, Iraq: Site Inspection Report of selected Bilateral projects". December 2007

<sup>16</sup> The overall policy is presented in "Partnership 2000" MFA-Danida, October 2000, and has been updated with annual, more short-term policy papers.

<sup>17</sup> <http://amg.um.dk/en>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/21/39119068.pdf>

It should be stressed that most of the written documentation and verbal information provided during the work-shop is provided by actors, who have been involved in implementing the projects. The security situation in Basra has throughout the relevant period been such that site inspections and review missions to implementing entities have not been possible without military protection. Although a relatively small proportion of the documentation and information can thus be considered to be of an independent nature, the Site Inspection Report, as well as this paper, is the products of independent consultants.

## 5 The Context in which the Partnership took place

While a full and comprehensive description of the political and security situation in which the partnership was implemented is not possible inside the limits of this paper, a few important milestones in the development of the political situation during the implementation period in Iraq and especially in Basra are briefly presented below.

### 5.1 Some milestones in the political developments in Iraq 2003-2007

From April 2003 to 28<sup>th</sup> June 2004 Iraq was administered by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) representing the occupation forces and led by an American Administrator. On the Iraqi side a governing council and a government with a number of ministries were established.

The CPA - or rather the freshly appointed chief of CPA – took two very wide-ranging decisions i.e. 1) the order banning the Baath party and excluding its members from all important public employment and 2) the decision to abolish the security apparatus, including the army and police.

The De-Baathification of Iraqi society meant “the removal of “senior party members” from “positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society” and those of lower party rank from the top three layers of management, in one swoop deprived Iraq of its managerial class, regardless of those managers’ character or past conduct<sup>19</sup>.

The disbandment of the army put up to 350,000 men in the street without pay, the promise of a pension or, for senior officers, the prospect of recruitment into the new security organisations. The majority of the rank and file in the army had been Shiites so the decision led to mass protests in most cities in Iraq, including in Basra. The International Crisis group states; “In the absence of comprehensive research, anecdotal evidence collected over the past two-and-a-half years suggests that many former soldiers and officers joined (and perhaps even gave rise to) the incipient insurgency during the hot summer months of 2003 or, in even greater numbers, resorted to crime as a way of making ends meet”<sup>20</sup>.

It in addition led to looting of many ministries and public institutions and banks were closed and payments became very difficult for months.

During the summer of 2003 a steering unit for the Danish assistance was established in Basra headed by a Danish diplomat. It was soon after decided to transfer him to Bagdad to facilitate liaison with the UN-system and with CPA centrally. The diplomat later in the autumn 2003 became head of the Danish Liaison office in Bagdad. When a new head of the steering unit was employed it was initially not possible to accommodate him in Basra and he therefore was attached as

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<sup>19</sup> International Crisis Group Report. “The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict. Crisis Group - Middle East.” Report N°52, 27 February 2006 p. 9

<sup>20</sup> ibid

development administrator to the office in Bagdad. When sovereignty was handed over to the Iraqis in 2004 this Liaison Office became the Danish Embassy.

The security situation for international staff in Iraq changed dramatically during the second half of 2003 after the car-bombings of the UN Headquarter in Bagdad on the 19th of August and in October 2003 with the attack on the hotel in the International zone, which housed most of the international staff based in Bagdad, including a number of Danish citizens.

The general deterioration of the security situation also meant a reduction in the number of international aid workers, e.g. the UN decided to pull all international staff out of Iraq after the bombing of their headquarters. Likewise, most international NGOs discontinued their work in Iraq.

During November 2003 an agreement was released by CPA in Bagdad spelling out Iraq's path to sovereignty and in March, 2004 an interim Constitution; The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, was approved by the Iraqi governing council.

From June 2004 up to the first national elections in January 2005 an Interim Coalition government was created composed of representatives from the three main groups in Iraq; Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. Each of these groups form a majority in their respective areas of Iraq and the Shiite community - while also being the largest of the three – is dominant in the Southern part of Iraq and thus also in the Basra province.

On 30<sup>th</sup> of January 2005 a majority of Iraqi voters voted in an election prepared by the transitional government, which established a 275-member Transitional National Assembly.

The Assembly served as Iraq's national legislature. It appointed a Presidency Council, consisting of a President and two Vice Presidents. The Presidency Council in turn appointed a Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, cabinet ministers. The second and more important role of the Assembly was to oversee the drafting of a new constitution. This constitution was presented to the Iraqi people for their approval in a national referendum in October 2005. Under the new constitution, Iraq would elect a new permanent government.

The current government took office in May 2006. This followed the general elections in December 2005. A broad coalition government with participation of Shiites, Sunni and Kurds under the leadership of Nouri Al-Maliki, who is the leader of the Dawa Shiite party, was formed. The results of the political processes have however been mixed. Work on some important laws have progressed e.g. an investment-law and a law concerning the formation of new regions. Also work on important laws concerning the oil sector and on elections to the provincial councils are reported to be progressing. On the other hand the political process has, since the formation of the coalition government, been hampered by increasing religious and ethnic tensions and polarisations, along with an increase in sectarian violence not least after the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. However during the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2007 there has been a significant improvement in the security situation, with the number casualties being at the same level as of January 2005. This still has to translate into an improved trust and cooperation between the political opponents.

As is well known, the security situation in Iraq has been and still is difficult. Some features of the specific situation in Basra Governorate will be attempted presented below.

## 5.2 International and Danish assistance in relation to political developments

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq an international donor conference led to the creation of a common international frame for reconstruction of Iraq called the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). This facility consisted of a UN administered fund and a fund administered by the World Bank. The original needs assessment was conducted by international experts and formed the basis for the first national development plan in October 2004 covering 2005 to 2007.<sup>21</sup> A new national development plan also building on provincial and district development plans is presently being formulated.

As more and more responsibility was transferred to the Iraqi authorities, a gradual change in the way Danish assistance was implemented and especially in the way the advisers were working obviously had to follow. While the advisers were initially part of the CPA-structures and as such directly implementing, although to the extent possible in consultation with rudimentary council structures and with the help of existing "bureaucracies", this changed when power was transferred to the Iraqi government. While initially there might in practice have been little difference, the more representative the structures became especially after the elections in January 2005 and the more the provincial council took over responsibilities, the more the Iraqi authorities became the main partners and decision-makers for activities, while advisers increasingly concentrated on advising them. However, the security precautions meant that a very close working relationship between advisers and their counterparts was often difficult.

Towards the end of 2005, the coalition in Iraq decided to set up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in all Iraqi governorates in close coordination and cooperation with the coalition's military presence. In Basra three Danish advisers were assigned to this structure which would help define and implement a Provincial development strategy.

Although the Danish support to the International Compact with Iraq is not covered in this paper, it should be noted that The Iraqi Government, the UN and the international donors on the 27<sup>th</sup> of July 2007 launched a comprehensive five year plan or "vision" for establishing a "United, Federal, Democratic country"<sup>22</sup>. The donor support is now provided inside the framework of the Compact.

## 5.3 Developments and security in Basra Province

The so-called "Southern Sector" was under British military protection and the British military was from May 2003 assisted by a Danish military contingency. The Southern Sector, was – under the CPA in Bagdad – governed from Basra city. Basra is the second largest city in Iraq and the Governorate is economically very important due to its rich oil reserves and its important harbours at the Persian Gulf.

A senior Danish civil servant, Ambassador Wøhlers Olsen, was from May 2003 attached to the CPA, Basra, in charge of the Southern Sector and was in September substituted by a British national.

The first MFA identification mission took place in May and early June. In May 2003, a MFA-mission focussed on support to infrastructure and health visited Basra and surrounding areas and this mission identified the important markers for the support to large infrastructure projects (study of

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<sup>21</sup> See [www.irffi.org](http://www.irffi.org) and <http://www.irffi.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20241588~menuPK:497701~pagePK:64168627~piPK:64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html> (visited 06.01.2008)

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.iraqcompact.org/en/default.asp> (visited 28.02.2008)

transport corridor, harbour improvement etc.) and also concluded that the regional hospitals had no reconstruction needs. The early June mission was based on an invitation from the American administration to assist in a mission to assess the judicial sector in Iraq. The Danish part of the mission concentrated its efforts on assessing the Human Rights (HR) situation and the possibilities for supporting the re-establishment of law and order in the Basra-area. The mission formulated the basis for what became the Danish governance programme (police-training, support to NGOs, court improvements, etc.).

The initial decision to establish a steering unit in Basra in mid 2003 was not implemented fully until late 2003 in order to assist in the implementation of the Danish reconstruction support and ensure coordination with the much larger US and UK programmes in the Basra province. From the end of 2003, a Danish steering unit was created including 3-4 advisers, who at the time were also working in the CPA-Basra structure.

#### 5.4 Security situation in Basra Governorate

While the security situation was initially much less serious in and around Basra, the Danish advisers along with other international civilian staff nonetheless moved into better and more secure premises in the Basra Palace during the second half of 2003. As there were an increasing number of incidents of road-side bombs and other attacks on occupation forces and civilian international staff in late 2003 and early 2004, it was decided to provide armed protection to the advisers when travelling outside of the Palace.

An indication of the change in the security situation may be the casualties which the coalition forces suffered in the Province. In the period the numbers were as follows:<sup>23</sup>

Year	Number of casualties
2003	30
2004	16
2005	18
2006	33
2007	43

The Danish contingency had seven fatal casualties; one in 2003, none in 2004, one in 2005, four in 2006, and one in 2007.

The Danish Defence Intelligence has provided a number of evaluations of the threat in Iraq at various times to inform the parliamentary committees, when the members of the committee and the Parliaments discussed the Danish support to Iraq<sup>24</sup>.

Based on this information the development in the security situation can be described as follows:

<sup>23</sup> Based on <http://icasualties.org/oif/Province.aspx> visited 27.01.08

<sup>24</sup> Available on the parliaments website [www.Folketinget.dk](http://www.Folketinget.dk) and <http://forsvaret.dk/FE/Presserum/Situations+og+trusselsvurderinger> are "Situations og Trusselsvurderinger" dated 10. Nov. 2004, 10. January 2005, May 2005, 9. January 2006, 7. Februar 2006, and 10. May 2006 samt "Efterretningsmæssig trusselsvurdering" fra December 2005 og December 2006.

From second half of 2003 to mid 2004 there were relatively few attacks, while there appears to have been a considerable increase up to the 28<sup>th</sup> of August 2004 (when Muqtada al-Sadra agreed to a cease-fire).

At the general elections in January 2005 also Provincial councils were elected and so were some district councils while others were appointed through a so-called caucus process, which was an arrangement, introduced by the CPA. The local councils had consequently from then on a much more representative and legitimate character than prior to 2005, although many of them, including in Basra, were hampered by a lack of willingness to cooperate and compromise among the major political forces (and their respective militia) also *internally* in the Shiite community. And in addition there was a lack of cooperation between the central and the provincial governments. But initially the security situation improved. With an increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) in Basra in mid 2005 the security situation again deteriorated.

The cartoon-crisis led in February 2006 to a temporary cessation of most Danish activities. The Basra Provincial Council boycotted all cooperation with Danish and British (UK troops being accused of having used torture) supported reconstruction efforts. The boycott was lifted again in May 2006.

Based on other information<sup>25</sup> September 2006 saw the start of "Operation Sinbad". This operation was a joint operation between Coalition Forces and Iraqi security Forces and was an attempt to crack down on local militias and hand security over to newly vetted and stronger Iraqi security forces while kick-starting economic reconstruction. The initiation of the operation was followed by a rise in attacks against Coalition bases in Basra, among them Basra Palace.

In September 2006, following the death of Danish soldier from the Danish advisers' protection team and - probably more importantly – following an incident where the British troops destroyed a police station to free two British soldiers, the security situation became so difficult that it was deemed necessary to move the Danish advisers from Basra Palace in the centre of Basra to Sheiba Log Base, outside Basra city, where the Danish battalion was based. When the Danish battalion in January 2007 moved from Sheiba Log Base to Basra Air Station the Danish advisors were again moved.

By March–April 2007, renewed political tensions once more threatened to destabilize the city, and relentless attacks against British forces meant that they had difficulties in patrolling the city<sup>26</sup>. And in April 2007 due, to security considerations, the Danish advisors were moved to Kuwait.

The difficult security situation meant that through most of 2006 and until second half of 2007 the movement of advisors outside the camp was restricted by the availability of the armoured vehicles and accompanying security staff, and although it was possible to receive Iraqi cooperation partners in the camp, security arrangements made this at least cumbersome and sometimes difficult. With increasing threats against Iraqis who cooperated with the foreign forces, the possibilities for cooperation were further crippled. The camps were also often attacked, at periods several times a day with mortars and sometimes rockets, making working conditions very difficult and sometimes leading to the evacuation of civilian staff at short notice and often without the possibility of retrieving documents and computers.


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<sup>25</sup> International Crisis Group Report: "Where is Iraq heading? Lessons from Basra" Middle East Report N°67. 25 June 2007. The report is critical of the situation in which Basra was left by the withdrawal of the Coalition Forces.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid*



The following figure provides an indication of counts of explosion incidents caused by attacks on the main camps of the coalition forces in Basra during 2006 and 2007<sup>27</sup>;



This difficult working environment should be taken into consideration when reviewing the achievements of the Iraqi-Danish partnership.

Limitations in the documentation of some of the Danish supported development activities should consequently be seen against this background: With a rapidly deteriorating security situation and numerous unforeseen interruptions in the work flow, it is understandable that relevant project documents may have been lost and reports not produced. The information provided by participants in the work-shop in Amman in early February 2008 to some extent has compensated for this.

<sup>27</sup> Unofficial count by the British Defense Forces (information provided through Danish advisors)

## 6 Agriculture and Irrigation

Denmark has since 2003 supported the agricultural sector in the Basra Province and has further prioritised its support to the sector as of 2005. This section covers the period up to February 2007, when it was decided to focus Danish support capacity building at the central level in Baghdad. The last irrigation projects in Basra are almost complete and will be handed over to the Iraqi Government in March 2008.

As stated in the Draft Inception report (January 2006), the long term objective of Danish support to the agricultural sector is:

*'to improve the livelihood of the people living in the Southern region by creating rural employment opportunities and raising income'.*

More specifically, the objectives of the support provided to agriculture until early 2007 revolved around three components, namely:

- The provision of technical support to the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries involved in the development of sustainable production and employment generation within the fields of food, agriculture and irrigation in the southern region (through a Senior Agricultural Development Advisor)
- The identification and implementation of other smaller projects within the agricultural sector that would lead to improvements in the sector's performance
- The rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, with focus on labour intensive activities and technologies within the local communities (namely irrigation schemes in the Basra Governorate)

It is worth noting that the focus of agriculture sector development support from 2005 was on irrigation rehabilitation as stated in the Inception Report and less so on capacity development through process facilitation, coordination and policy issues.

The following section attempts to address the five key issues highlighted in Chapter 4, namely project status, effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance. Findings are based on a literature review of documents made available by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, primarily the draft inception report of the Senior Agricultural Development Advisor of January 2006, a summary report<sup>28</sup> highlighting activities and achievements within Danish support to agricultural sector development from 2003-2007, selected monthly progress reports from the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 as well as the COWI Site Inspection Report of December 2007. Additional information was acquired from the workshop held in Amman in February 2008.

### 6.1 Project Status

#### **Senior Agricultural Development Advisor:**

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<sup>28</sup> "Danish support to the Agricultural Sector Development in Iraq 2003 to 2007 (2008)" 10<sup>th</sup> June 2007 senior Agricultural Advisor.

Danish Advisory Assistance and the Steering Unit will be addressed in more details in Chapter 8. However, a brief project status will be presented below, since such assistance constituted one (out of three) component of agricultural support.

The Senior Agricultural Development Advisor was originally posted to Basra CPA by "Landbrugsrådet"<sup>29</sup>. The Advisor was later assigned, based on an EU tendering process, with the responsibility to coordinate overall activities under all three components and to liaise/cooperate with other donors. The Advisor has been providing technical assistance and process facilitation at provincial and central levels. A core aspect of the support entailed process facilitation regarding strategy and planning at the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). As mentioned in the workshop, institutional capacity building was undertaken. An Agricultural Sector Working Group (ASWG) headed by the Basra Council/Governorate representative was formed. The ASWG held its first meeting in December 2005 and thereafter periodically, when possible, to discuss issues relating to agricultural sector development and the planning of the Basra provincial development strategy. At the meeting, the need for a baseline survey was mentioned to be a priority for gaining a better overview of the situation in the Basra province and improving planning. To date, and as noted in the workshop, it seems that the strategy is still in the process of finalisation.

Technical assistance provided to MoA also extended to the Ministry of Water Resources and its Irrigation Directorates as well as the Ministry of Trade in relation to the food ration scheme. Some of the main achievements that overall advisory services contributed to include according to the reports produced by the Adviser:

- the restoration of the Marshlands at a rate of around 60% in Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar provinces.
- the rehabilitation and restoration of the date palm sector
- improvements in tomato production
- the design and implementation of a seasonal credit scheme jointly with MoA and the Agricultural bank across Iraq
- restoration of irrigation and drainage infrastructure including cleaning of canals (as elaborated below)

With respect to donor coordination, meetings with donors were held. However, according to the discussions in the workshop, not many donors operated within the agricultural sector as a start, though interest for agriculture grew over time. As such, donor coordination took place to the extent that donors were present in the sector. The sector work group meetings were also held but mainly comprised Iraqi stakeholders (e.g. ministries and farmer groups). The frequency of meetings was often constrained by the security situation.

Overall, and according to the reviewed documentation, Iraqi and Danish parties seemed to be satisfied with the input of the Danish Senior Agricultural Development Advisor in relation to the advisory services provided.

#### **Smaller projects:**

The small projects part of the programme was intended to support overall process facilitation and capacity building. The inception report re-defined activities under this component to include some activities that initially fell under the first component.

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<sup>29</sup> The Danish Interest Organisation for Agriculture

Process facilitation within this component primarily revolved around private sector and business development, training and study tour, integrated pest management and solar energy. Main activities included:

- the organisation of tomato farmers into cooperatives (5 registered in 2005)
- training courses to MoA and related staff on IT, project planning and administration
- two study tours to Denmark in 2004 and 2007 for MoA personnel
- one study tour to Kuwait in 2007 for tomato producing cooperatives to explore a potential lift of the current ban on import of Iraqi products to Kuwait.
- studies and training for the promotion of the provincial development fund (PDF) for financing SMEs in the agribusiness and food industry sectors
- a solar energy powered water pump as demonstration activity for drip irrigation (2004).

#### **Rehabilitation of irrigation schemes:**

Technical assistance was also separately provided to the irrigation component. An irrigation specialist was employed for six months (August 2005-February 2006) to assist in identifying, planning and implementing support to the irrigation and drainage infrastructure system. Subsequently, a senior construction engineer was assigned for six months (March 2006-August 2007) to supervise the design, tender process and construction of the irrigation and drainage infrastructure, which is still ongoing.

The rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure today includes a total of seven projects that were covered by the COWI Site Inspection Report (December 2007, information collected from 15. Oct. to mid Nov. 2007) namely:

1. Talha Medina Sluices (20)
2. Al Medina Sluices (5)
3. Ez El Deen Saleem Sluices (5)
4. Al Querna Sluices (5)
5. Al Dayr Sluices (9)
6. Al Nashwa Foot Bridges (6)
7. Talha Medina Drainage canal

Two of the projects were at the date of the site inspections completed, four were due to be completed in December 2007 and one was under tender. The report shows that the two completed projects had good quality, were fully functional and are in full use. However, some of the completed projects faced constraints (lack of qualified staff) or needed safety adjustments (which after the site inspection is being followed-up). The report states that delays in construction primarily resulted from delays in payments to contractors. This was also confirmed at the workshop, where delayed payment was also repeatedly mentioned. The delayed payments were due to various circumstances such as the inefficient banking system in Iraq but also due to the fact that payments should only be made, when the necessary inspections of finalisation and quality had been done. It should be noted that the site identification process and data collection were lengthy, which might also have contributed to time delays, particularly given the security situation.

## **6.2 Effectiveness**

### **6.2.1 Meeting intended objectives**

Based on the available documentation and workshop, the support to agriculture seemed to have greatly achieved its objectives, taking the difficult working environment into account. Advisory services have been provided to MoA in support of national policies and priorities as well as capacity

building activities. Donor coordination has also been initiated. A relatively large number of smaller projects were implemented in support to process facilitation and capacity building. Finally, but not least, irrigation infrastructure was repaired or is being made operational. Due to limited documentation, the extent, to which employment generation was induced and the extent focus has been on labour intensive technologies within the local communities, have not been examined.

### 6.2.2 Contribution to the reconstruction process

As mentioned in chapter 2 above, the objective of reconstruction assistance is to “contribute to the development of a stable and democratic Iraq, enable to secure economic and social development for the population”. The support provided to the agricultural sector can be said to have contributed to this reconstruction, particularly in relation to initiating steps towards economic development.

### 6.3 Efficiency

Open tendering was undertaken for the rehabilitation of irrigation projects, where in principle the lowest bid wins, though the evaluation committee is not bound to accept the cheapest bid, taking other criteria into account. This does not in itself ensure a balance between cost efficiency and achievements of outputs on time, but provides a sound basis for achieving efficiency. Currently, most projects are ongoing as delays have been experienced. As mentioned above, delays have been caused by delayed payment, though mostly by the security situation, thereby reducing time efficiency.

Although no basic baseline or impact data have been collected to capture future socio-economic impact of the irrigation projects, the reviewed documentation notes that the projects are expected to benefit 200,000 persons once completed. Should this assessment hold, it is important that future maintenance is carried out to ensure that the achieved benefits are sustained. Follow-up monitoring using satellite imaging of the areas before and after the irrigation projects were initiated and planned should contribute to further documenting the impact of the projects.

### 6.4 Relevance

#### 6.4.1 Responsive to Local Population Needs

The Senior Advisor on different occasions initiated visits to community representatives and local authorities to discuss potential project activities, when possible. Given limited mobility and difficult working conditions, needs were primarily identified based on guidelines from key stakeholders. For instance, the identification of priority irrigation rehabilitation areas was guided by the expressed wishes of local authorities and of community groups, while their participation in the whole identification exercise was not necessarily ensured. This was mainly due to the limited capacity of local authorities and the prevailing lack of security. It should be mentioned that a community committee was formed in November 2005 for the irrigation component in one of the sites, in collaboration with the civil military cooperation (CIMIC) input. Documentation shows that the committee often met at the start up phase but does not clearly note who the members were.

In relation to gender considerations, and as confirmed in the workshop, little attention was given to this issue. However, the workshop underscored the future relevance of accounting for gender issues.

### 6.4.2 Stakeholder Consultation

Stakeholder meetings were planned to the extent possible, particularly for the irrigation component, but not always held due to the security situation and limited mobility. Generally, stakeholders included central and local governments but also donors and community representatives such as farmer groups and traditional leaders.

### 6.4.3 Alignment with national plans

According to the Inception Report, project objectives of agricultural support, including process facilitation for the transition from planned to market economy, are in line with the vision and strategy of the National Development Strategy 2005-2007. The latter highlights the role of the agricultural sector in the envisioned future market oriented economy as part of its four pillars:

- strengthening the foundation of economic growth
- revitalising the private sector
- improving the quality of life
- strengthening good governance and security

The focus on irrigation and drainage falls in line with the Basra provincial agricultural sector strategy, which prioritised irrigation as it is deemed to have large impacts on enhancing productivity and livelihoods in rural areas.

Finally, the workshop confirmed that the vision of the Government of Iraq is still to continue supporting market-led, private sector development including agribusiness development, agricultural financing, further restoration of irrigation and drainage infrastructure and revitalisation of the Marshland as well as fishery development.

## 6.5 Lessons learned

Lessons learned were discussed in the workshop of February 2008. The following is a summary of key lessons learned as seen by the authors with the input from the workshop participants:

- Continuity on the advisor post(s) is seen as an asset, though focus should always be on Iraqi ownership to foster self sustaining processes. Accordingly, exit strategies should be well planned at the start-up phase.
- Quick impact projects should be technologically context-specific and 'do no harm' to longer term strategies. At the same time, support to processes and longer term strategies should not be overlooked at the expense of implementing shorter term projects
- Consultations between central level – the MoA – and the local activities appear to have been useful as it tackled differences in approach and understanding at an early stage
- Documentation on how implementation involved various stakeholders and groups and the extent to which communities and various grouping in communities ( e.g. women and youth) were involved in planning and implementation would have been useful in order to assess the applicability of an inclusive approach even in difficult working environments
- Written documentation on how the security issues have affected implementation - and what measures were taken to deal with them - would have been useful
- To enable the documentation of impact, it would have been beneficial if a simple socio-economic baseline study of affected communities had been undertaken, particularly for the larger irrigation projects. However the intended follow-up by satellite surveys will enable a monitoring of some of the impacts
- To maintain the value created by the projects, it is important to ensure that local capacity and structures exist to carry out future maintenance tasks.

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## 7 Infrastructure

### 7.1 Blood Gas Analysers

The project basically consisted of the purchase and delivery of 11 Blood Gas Analysers. Only the one delivered to Basra town to the Basra Teaching Hospital is part of the Site Inspection Report and only this has been reviewed in this report.

From the Site Inspection Report it appears that the Blood Gas Analyser in Basra only functioned for one week after delivery in October 2004 due to damages caused by interruptions in power supplies.

This information is, however, probably incorrect. Based on the Service Report from the Supplier; Radiometer, and the Warranty Service and Maintenance Service Visit reports signed by officials from the hospital, the Blood Gas Analyser was installed and put to use on the 9<sup>th</sup> October 2004. In September 2005 - about a year after it had been installed – a fuse in the analyser blew because of fluctuations in the electric current. The fuse was changed on 16<sup>th</sup> November 2005 and the analyser put to use again. According to the reports, Radiometer made three service visits to the hospital during the twelve months. Based on the available documentation, it is not possible to establish when the analyser stopped functioning as documented in the Site Inspection Report. Nor is it clear why the Site Inspection Team was misinformed about the performance of the Analyser. Warranty Service and Maintenance Service Visit reports also exist for the remaining ten blood gas analyzers.

MFA is currently considering a separate verification of the blood gas analysers supplied.

The request for the blood gas analysers had come from the Ministry of Health. A procurement agent was involved in selecting the best supplier, which was selected mainly because the instruments were of a type which had previously been used in Iraq. The Ministry probably also provided some assurance of its ability to maintain them.

The firm delivering the analysers carried out agreed training of users and carried out three agreed servicing schedules of the equipment.

The **effectiveness** of this project cannot be fairly assessed based on the one example from Basra. While a service agreement with the provider for 12 months after delivery was included in the contract, the assessment of availability of spare parts and ability of maintenance in the long run may have been based on a too optimistic outlook regarding development in the security situation, but was an optimism which at the time was shared by most donors. Given the knowledge of the highly irregular electricity supply, some sort of safety equipment may have been considered delivered to protect the equipment from the strains of the power interruptions.

The project appears to have been relevant, which it arguably still is. The project was entered into based on a request from relevant officials in Iraq, and it has contributed to maintain the relative high standard of the health services in Iraq. The equipment is believed to have alleviated a

significant and acute problem faced by the hospitals, and the ministry had even requested that an additional delivery of 11 analysers should be made. This latter delivery did not materialise.

Efficiency concerning cost and quality was mainly addressed through the use of an independent procurement agent.

Based on the one example above, it is probably not relevant to look at sustainability. Similarly, the impact can not be assessed fairly.

Tentative lessons learned:

- A more thorough analysis of risk scenarios and their effect on spare part availability and maintenance ability might have been useful including aspects concerning the specific physical context – e.g. power interruptions - in which the instrument was used
- Further follow-up after the service visits could have made chances of sustainability better

## 7.2 Jetting and Suction Trucks

Already in one of the first identification mission reports to Basra<sup>30</sup>, it was recognised that environmental issues in and around Basra city needed to be addressed.

It was found that environmental management was a key area for improving public health conditions through improved sanitation, drinking water supply, etc. Large and stagnant water reservoirs caused by blocked drains and sewers and overflowing septic tanks were identified as a health hazard. Consequently a need for equipment to clean wastewater canals and sewers were identified. J. Hvitved Larsen won the international tender, launched by the MFA, to supply three jetting and suction trucks with spare parts. These were delivered in May 2005 to the Sewerage Directorate in Basra.

At the site inspection on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2007 the three trucks were found to be in working order and used every whole working day. They were used in Basra city as well as in the centre of the Province and were being maintained by local staff.

The effectiveness of the project appears very good given the objective to improve sanitation. The project has most likely contributed to the reconstruction process by removing an obvious nuisance to the population.

Similarly, it can be concluded that the project was very relevant in meeting immediate needs and was based on an urgent request from the local authorities.

Efficiency concerns have been sought accommodated by tendering the purchase of the equipment and this appears to have worked.

Concerning sustainability, it appears that the necessary maintenance knowledge and spare parts have been available. There is, however, some concern about what will happen when some of the more sophisticated parts are worn out or become dysfunctional.

Some lessons learned;

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<sup>30</sup> Scoping Mission on Infrastructure and Health, 5 to 12 May 2003.



- A quick-impact project which addressed immediate as well as more long-term needs which could be copied in similar situations

### 7.3 The Buoy Vessel

The ports of Umm Qasr and Khor al Zubair are the only deep sea water ports in Iraq. They are served by an important road and rail network and are important gateways for import and export of goods and are the only seaports of large scale goods (except oil), while other gateways are over land through neighbouring countries.

Especially the harbour in Umm Qasr is an important life-line for Iraqi trade through the Persian Gulf and especially important for the population in Southern Iraq. The 140 km of channel the ships have to follow to get from the sea to the harbour was made difficult to pass due to sunken ships and changing conditions at the bottom of the channel. Two buoy vessels had been sunk under the first Gulf war and Iraq's then only remaining buoy tender vessel "Nisr" was not functional due to neglect and lack of maintenance. Denmark has, based on a request from the General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI), financed the rehabilitation of "Nisr" as well as the necessary training of crew members for the ship.

The objectives of the project were formulated as;

- Enable GCPI to meet the demand for deployment of navigational aids in the access channels and port areas of Umm Qasr and Khor al Zubair
- Contribute to human resource development and capacity building through familiarisation with new technology and training in buoy handling techniques.

Project management and monitoring was done by GCPI supported by The Danish Consultant DanMarine. The project was finalised towards the end of 2007. "Nisr" was in operation in July 2006 and is carrying out buoy maintenance and replacements and hereby facilitating early access to and from the harbour.

The Site Inspection Report described that the ship was working properly and as required to perform its functions. The report further stated that it is being maintained, although some problems have emerged regarding GCPI's procurement of spare parts. This will be addressed by the MFA in dialogue with GCPI. The vessel has not only enabled the port authorities to maintain the already existing buoys but also furnished new ones in channels which had previously been difficult to use.

The **effectiveness** of the project appears to have been very good as it has met the intended objectives and made possible the use of the two important harbours. It would appear that accessibility has greatly improved, thus saving resources for public authorities and not least facilitating trade and economic development.

The **relevance** of the project appears to be high and it was initiated on the basis of a request from the relevant authorities including the Ministry of Transport. The consultations and cooperation with the relevant authorities seem to have been very good and the assessment of various project choices appears to have been thorough.

Concerning **sustainability** the Site Inspection Report indicated that there was a need for GCPI to develop a plan for a continuous training of new crew and maintenance staff, including the upgrade of some existing staff, and ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for the necessary repairs and upgrading of the vessel. At the workshop in Amman information was provided that there have been

developed plans continuously for training and that GCPI is generating income, part of which has been allocated for future training and maintenance. The impact of the project is potentially very high (but is not documented in the reports available).

Some tentative lessons learned;

- The clear engagement of the central as well as the local authorities in identifying and formulating the demand for the project was an important key to its success, as was the availability of qualified and experienced senior staff in the recipient institution
- The continuous work to develop a clear plan for continuous training and upgrading of crew and other relevant staff as part of the project will improve the possibility of long-term sustainability

#### 7.4 Transport Corridor study

The study was initiated in 2003. Originally the study covered all transport modalities, except air transport. When the CPA agreed to an Italian National Transport Master Plan the scope of the Danish study was modified to map and document the water-transport possibilities and to draw an outline of a road rehabilitation programme. COWI A/S has after winning an international tender implemented the project, which is presently in its third and final phase.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) define the **development** objective of the study as:

The infrastructure and transport system in the Umm Qasr-Baghdad Transport Corridor meet the demands for transport capacity at the end of the planning period 2004-2020, and is managed/operated in a way that maximises the economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of the environment.

The **immediate** objectives are:

- A staged and cost-effective, socially balanced and environmentally sustainable plan for improved Road, Port and Waterway transport services in the Umm Qasr-Baghdad Transport Corridor.
- A process for establishment of institutional set-up to ensure national ownership of the plan and its implementation.
- Capacity building within the Iraq Transport sector. The training element has been identified as an important element in the project.

To meet these objectives the following main issues have been addressed in the study:

- Current status of transport infrastructure in the corridor has been assessed (roads, ports and port approaches) through inspections and condition surveys. The COWI teams have coordinated their activities with other stakeholders as far possible, such as the Italian Consortium for the Iraqi Transport Master Plan (ITMP) study and the donor organisations under IRFFI. Sharing of information and findings is essential to avoid duplications and to provide a cost and time effective execution of the present study. The study has focused on port, port approaches and main roads in the corridor.
- Projection of future transportation demand has been made along with a capacity assessment of critical infrastructure (short term 1-2 years, medium term 5 years and long term 10-15 years)
- Set-up of a prioritised list of actions to establish a cost-effective and sustainable transport system in the corridor.

Distinction has been made between the immediate objectives of getting the transport system up and running as effective as possible under the present constraints (shortage of equipment, lack of

maintenance, poor organisation etc.) and the medium and more long term objectives of developing a cost effective and sustainable transport system in the corridor.

Activities have included,

- Data collection and review, including the establishment of a GIS database,
- Training of Iraqi Staff in surveying,
- Procurement of survey equipment (survey vessel, marine survey equipment and Road Surface Profiler),
- Surveying of ports, port approaches, and roads in the corridor,
- Assessment of ports, port approaches, and main roads in the corridor,
- Hydraulic and sediment modelling,
- Preliminary environmental impact assessment,
- Transport demand forecasting,
- Capacity assessment of critical transport infrastructure,
- Institutional review,
- Financial parameters and economic feasibility evaluations,
- Identification of transport infrastructure projects in the corridor.

The project is implemented in three phases; Inception, Planning and Implementation. Inception and Planning has been finalised<sup>31</sup>. Presently two sub-projects are being implemented:

- 1) Reducing the Sedimentation in Umm Qasr New Port and
- 2) Pavement rehabilitation of Highway no. 26.

The first project aims at reducing the sediments into the new harbour, hereby reducing the costs of maintenance dredging activities by adjusting the piers at the entrance and building the capacity of the port authorities.

The second aims at repairing the first part of the Highway from the harbour in Umm Qasr via Basra to Bagdad to facilitate transport of goods to and from the harbour and to build capacity of the authorities responsible for road maintenance.

Based on the reports available to the review, the **results** to date appear to have been quite remarkable given the difficulties of the situation in Iraq. They include the study – as part of a master plan for the whole of the Iraqi transport sector – of the important corridor from Umm Qasr harbour via Basra to Bagdad by road and water, surveys of roads and waterways, procurement of necessary survey equipment and training in its use, institutional reviews and capacity building and economic feasibility assessments.

**Effectiveness** has been good as the project up to now has met its objectives. The project has the potential to play a crucial role in the economic recovery of Iraq as the transport corridor provides important possibilities for improving trade by making Iraq less dependent on harbours in other Arab countries. The realisation of this potential depends on the extent to which the Iraqi authorities will and can use and implement the study. The capacity of part of the relevant port and road authorities as well as the engineering bureau of Basra University have been improved by the provision of equipment and training, but the efficient functioning of these institutions is still dependent on the functioning of overall government structures, including the Ministry of Transport. The central

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<sup>31</sup> Relevant reports to be found at <http://ftp.cowi.dk/iraq/Index.html>

authorities need to establish ownership of the programme and demonstrate their willingness and ability to use the results of the study.

It should be noted that there are tangible results in the form of capacity building of relevant port and road authorities, and the initiatives which have been implemented to get the harbour and road section into working order. The support to the rehabilitation of the buoy tender vessel “Nisr”, mentioned above, should be seen as complementing this project.

**The relevance** of the project appears to be high, as it forms part of the IFFRI framework and is part of a larger national master plan for the transport sector. The transport sector is key to economic development in Iraq. At the same time, experience shows that there is a high risk of wastage and inefficiency if investments are not carefully planned. Although the local authorities appear to have taken a real ownership to the project, this is not necessarily the case with the central Ministry in Bagdad. As the “permanent” Iraqi Government is now in place, this situation will hopefully improve.

Whether the project has been **efficient** is difficult to ascertain, but as it was awarded based on an international tender, the price and quality has been consciously analysed. There has been regular monitoring of the project through regular reporting, which has enabled regular quality checks and that relevant adjustments to the project have been done in agreement between the relevant stakeholders.

Given the difficult security conditions under which the project had to be implemented, the MFA requested COWI to adjust the proposal and use Iraqi operators. COWI then decided to contract the Basra University Engineering Institute as local sub-consultant. This was a sound decision, as it has not only greatly facilitated the implementation of the project, but also contributed to a considerable capacity-building of a local actor, who will be able to play an important role in the future.

Concerning **sustainability** much depends on the not yet evident Iraqi commitment to utilise the plans, but with the constant consultation and involvement of relevant authorities in the process this commitment can be expected. The same applies in relation to the potential **impact**. However, the already positive impact on emergency repairs and maintenance as well as capacity building of relevant local authorities should be noted. Whether the public-private partnership included in the study and proposed in the plan is in line with the present legislation is not certain, and there is a risk that the legislation is not going to be changed before implementation of the plans. Nevertheless the demonstration-effect of the two sub-projects should not be underestimated.

Some tentative **lessons learned** may be formulated as;

- The bias in reconstruction programmes to concentrate on short term projects which show immediate results – sometimes due to political decisions which limits the initial project period - can sometimes as in this example be balanced with more long-term planning along with capacity development of relevant authorities
- Recognise from the outset that the long-term planning exercises might not be fully “owned” by a weak national partner, and accept the ensuing risk of considerable wastage of valuable resources;
- Acknowledge that the risk could be worth taking, whilst consciously striving to develop the ownership of the national partner
- The decision by the MFA to ask the contractor COWI to subcontract much of the work to an Iraqi institution (Basra University) was successful. Not only to overcome the security challenges for international staff, but also in order to support capacity-building in local

organisations. This example should be an inspiration for working modalities in difficult situations

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## 8 Human Rights, Judicial Reforms and Democratisation

From the start of the Iraqi-Danish partnership, it was acknowledged that (re)creating law and order and promoting human rights and democracy should play an important part and that resources should be allocated for this.

### 8.1 Improving the Rule of Law

Concerning the improvement of law and order, two important initiatives were implemented;

- Training of a new police force and
- Assistance to improvements in the judicial system and especially the functioning of the courts.

#### 8.1.1 Police Training

The police training project has been implemented by the Danish Police and mainly funded over the special allocation for international police work. It is therefore not included in this focus paper. Nevertheless, a few remarks on the project are provided below.

The police training project was initiated in mid 2003 and in September 2003 defined as a comprehensive Management Training Programme, which concentrated on police management training of middle level police-officers. This was continued until July 2004, when it was postponed until a new mandate was in place with the Ministry of Interior and the American general in charge of national police training. The training continued from January 2005.

The Danish training was concentrated on the police force in Basra governorate and was closely coordinated with the British police training activities.

From 2005 and forward the development objective was to contribute to transforming the Iraqi police service to be well functioning in managing crime prevention and law enforcement with full respect of human rights and democratic rule.

Among the immediate objectives were;

- Build a sustainable training capacity for management training
- Train an adequate number of mid-level and high ranking police officers in management
- Enhanced visibility of policing activities
- Training staff in advanced management and investigation for the upcoming regional police academy

Available reports clearly indicate that a considerable number (more than 1000) of mid-level and senior police officers were trained in relevant management skills and that the quality of the training has been well received by those involved and by cooperating partners.

Three problems have impacted on the effectiveness and sustainability of the project.

The first problem was that the central authorities in Bagdad – Iraqi and American – had another approach to policing than the one in use with the authorities in Basra – Iraqi, British as well as Danish. While the central authorities concentrated on security and protection, the Basra authorities concentrated on crime prevention. This difference also contributed to the suspension of Danish training activities in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2004. A Danish Police adviser was seconded to the Ministry of Interior under the National Command Centre in Bagdad from 2006. The police training programme appears now to be conducted in a more coordinated fashion, and the Danish supported EU Just Lex programme seems to play an important role in this. The indication is that the Danish approach to policing appears to be the mode adopted by the Iraqi government for its police force.

The second problem was allegations in 2006 and 2007 that the sectarian militia had infiltrated the police force. Although the validity of these allegations is difficult to ascertain, it did lead to a rethinking of the training activities. Further information provided at the workshop indicates that the infiltration problem only involved a limited number of police officers and therefore was not a hindrance for continuing support to police training.

Thirdly, the regional police academy had to suspend its operation immediately after the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi side in January 2007 since no financial allocation was provided by the Ministry of Finance. . However, the situation was sorted out within a relatively short period of time and now the Academy, according to information from the legal advisor, is functioning and continues to build on some of the courses that the Danish police advisors initiated.

Lesson to be learned:

- The urgent, immediate need to re-establish law and order in post-conflict situations can pre-empt or clash with the long term need for a national plan.
- Lack of agreement on concepts and approaches to police work and police training can create difficulties for a programme of this nature. To the extent possible it should be an objective that programme approaches and concepts are harmonised, especially among the external actors operating with the national authorities in fragile situations
- When embarking on a provincial programme, which has a potential for national roll-out, it is important to be represented on national level from the beginning. Although immediate programme activities are implemented at the provincial level, the central level needs to be “on board”
- There is need for awareness and possibly an ‘early warning’ system for the inherent possibility of external infiltration in such a sensitive a programme as support to police by specific interest groups for ulterior motives.

### 8.1.2 Improved justice

Closely related to improving the quality of policing has been support to improving the quality of the justice system and especially the courts. It has not been possible to establish whether one or more specific programme or project documents were developed for Danish support in this area, but from job-descriptions for the justice adviser and other reports it appears that the Danish activities have been closely coordinated with the justice advisers from UK and US. The Danish Legal Adviser has interacted with and supported the various relevant actors, i.e. judges and prosecutors, the bar association, the law school and the police.

The Legal Advisor was - with the establishment of the PRT - transferred to this team in early May 2006 and with some of the multilateral players coming into the sector (i.e. EU Just Lex and UNAMI)

Danish assistance to the Justice Sector was increasingly being channelled through these instruments. Since October 2007 the Danish adviser has been transferred to the Technical Assistance Office in Baghdad from where further advisory services in this field will be undertaken.

According to information from the adviser, action plans and projects were developed under the PRT umbrella from May 2006. The Danish advisor was during most of this period the only legal adviser to the PRT, as other legal related posts in the team, which should be filled with candidates from other nations, did not materialise.

A specific Danish supported intervention was the refurbishment of the court house in Basra. US funds were used for rehabilitating the buildings while Denmark provided the furniture and handled the overall project execution.

The project concerning the purchase and delivery of furniture is covered by the Site Inspection Report and it appears to have been well executed. The furniture is being used on a daily basis and has contributed to an improved functioning of the court house. However, this relatively small project should be reviewed in the context of the general support to improved justice in the Basra region.

According to information from the adviser, the PRT under the responsibility of Legal Adviser carried out other projects:

- Improving court house security at Basra Main Court
- Design and construction of a new prison in Basra
- Assisting in the creation of an Internal Affairs Division within the Basra police force
- Assisting in the creation of a special prosecution unit to fight corruption within the police
- The closing down of the Al-Jamaet police station and the arrest and prosecution of police-officers under accusation

The Legal Adviser informed at the workshop that although there had been a good working relationship between the different donors, in retrospect, two **lessons learned** were;

- As most of the attention has been on providing police-training this had caused further problems for a judicial system which was already relatively under-resourced concerning well-trained staff, especially of judges. Now a more holistic programme is implemented which supports improved capacity in police as well as in the judiciary and the prisons system
- The attempt to build capacity in the judiciary from “bottom-up” is not necessarily the best strategy as judges are appointed from the top. A strategy which supports all layers is now pursued

A further lesson is that;

- Regular reporting has to be an integral part of a programme – not least of a programme where a site-inspection does not provide proper documentation of achievements - in order to ensure monitoring and documentation of impact. The difficult and fluctuating security situation in Basra with frequent relocation of advisors might explain some difficulty in upholding a regular reporting and filing systems. Without access to the reports developed under the project, it is difficult to ascertain the impact and efficiency of the intervention. According to information submitted by the adviser, reports were submitted through the PRT channels.



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## 8.2 Human Rights and democracy

In addition to the support to improve the rule of law, the Danish Institute for Human Rights and the International Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture-victims (ICRT) have received funding for activities which supplements the support for the rule of law and to democracy. The HR-Institute has among other activities supported an NGO-house in Basra in order to facilitate the development of an independent civil-society, which among other activities would monitor the HR-situation. The institute is at the moment working closely with the law faculty at Basra University.

ICRT has established a centre – which is presently being registered as an Iraqi NGO – for the rehabilitation of torture victims, which provides training for professionals dealing with torture victims and improves health care services to victims of torture and their surroundings.

There has in addition been support to the Ministry of Human Rights in Baghdad. From November 2007 the Danish legal adviser works in Baghdad as personal adviser to the Minister of Human Rights in order to build capacity in this ministry.

## 8.3 Democracy and local governance

Besides substantial support to the general elections in Iraq, to free media and to various conferences for politicians and parliamentarians, Denmark has provided support to improving local democracy through local governance advisers and not least through a Local Governance Fund.

A LGF Manual guiding project administration was developed but an overall programme document or comprehensive report for the support to local government structures have not been available and the participants in the workshop did not include advisors and Iraqi counterparts involved with Local Governance Fund (LGF). However, it is possible to review the LGF. Still, it should be noted that some of the questions concerning the functioning of the fund could probably have been answered if there had been more information available on the advisory and capacity building aspects of the support.

## 8.4 Local Governance Fund

The Local Governance Fund (LGF) was financed under the “regions of origin” budget and therefore falls outside the scope of this paper. However, since it was formulated as a major part of Danish support to democratisation and was directly implemented by MFA through the monitoring unit, it was agreed to include it in this focus paper.

For the purpose of this section, and given limited documentation, the revised LGF Manual has been assumed to provide the overarching framework governing LGF, including objectives and project cycle management.

The LGF was identified in first half of 2004 and launched in January 2005 to provide technical and financial support to the Main District Councils within the Basra Province and Basra City. LGF primarily supported small scale, “quick impact” projects, typically costing less than USD 100,000 in sectors such as water, power, health, education, roads, and sanitation.

Projects were mainly implemented within infrastructure, rehabilitation and public service delivery. However, the objective of the LGF was not solely to provide support but notably *“to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of the local councils through transparent and participatory process as well*

*as implementing actual projects in the Basra province*<sup>32</sup>, i.e. processes promoting good local governance and democratisation. This also included strengthening communication amongst Iraqi authorities at different levels.

The following section presents findings related to the 18 funded LGF projects that were included in the Site Inspection Report of December 2007. An attempt will be made to address the five key issues highlighted in Chapter 4 based on a literature review of documents made available by the MFA and comments received on the draft focus paper by stakeholders at the workshop of February 2008.

Due to the very difficult security situation in Basra, the freedom of movement of the Danish LGF advisors was limited, especially from 2006 and onwards. Since the LGF was largely dependent on meetings, monitoring, site inspections etc. outside the base – especially regarding aspects of capacity building – the functions of the LGF were from time to time severely hampered.

#### 8.4.1 Project Status

The COWI Site Inspection Report examined the implementation progress of LGF projects, their functionality, usage, maintenance, quality of work, needs for extensions, additions, and finally constraints faced.

15 of the projects funded under LGF (80%) are considered completed. Three projects (20%), scheduled for completion in May 2007, are still ongoing and will therefore not be considered in the findings on project status.

The report reveals that all 15 LGF projects are fully or mostly functional. 80% of projects are fully or partly in use. However, it appears that most projects (85%) require extensions or minor additions (e.g. further paving a gravel road). No constraints were documented for any of the projects.

With regard to the quality of work completed, the report shows that more than half of the 15 projects are of medium quality. Only one third (5 projects) were deemed to have been of good quality. Two were deemed to have been of very good quality. Despite the perceived level of quality, the majority of projects (14) have not been subject to maintenance yet. This could have implications on local ownership and sustainability, as will be noted below.

#### 8.4.2 Effectiveness

##### 8.4.2.1 Meeting intended objectives

LGF projects have partly met their intended objective as stated in the LGF Manual. On the one hand, projects were implemented across the list of sectors mentioned above within the Basra Province, with the exception of power and sanitation. The table below shows the actual distribution of projects by sector, indicating extensive coverage of projects within road and education infrastructure.

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<sup>32</sup> LGF Procedures Manual, Edition, 12 October 2006.

	Projects (#)	% of Total
Education:	7	39%
- training	2	28%
- schools/pre-school	5	11%
Roads	7	39%
Health	3	17%
Water	1	6%
Power	0	0%
Sanitation	0	0%
Total	18	100%

On the other hand, the design of LGF projects attempted to promote participatory and transparent processes that target the promotion of the capacity and legitimacy of the local councils; though this may not have fully permeated into practice.

First, participation was mainstreamed in LGF procedures as stakeholder consultation represented an integral part of project proposal forms. In practice, consultation primarily involved local council members, as they were deemed to adequately represent the broader community given that all members were elected. This might have excluded the consultation of other non-governmental representatives as key stakeholders in the local community.

Second, transparent processes were initiated. In relation to disseminating LGF as an initiative, the public was mainly informed through local council members, directors of key local institutions (e.g. hospitals) and word of mouth. In relation to the tendering process, it included invitations to tender for all projects that were advertised. The selection of the winning contractor was also made public.

Third, most projects addressed public service delivery that are provided by Iraqi authorities. The structure of LGF would in principle be seen as having provided a good basis for strengthening the capacity of the Local Council Committees (LCC) in project management of public service delivery projects. It could also be argued that the LGF structure offered an opportunity for LCC to build its legitimacy amongst the local population. According to a Danish advisor, it seems that the process of project selection at local council meetings have contributed to building the capacity of LCC members in relation to prioritisation of projects based on criteria such as value for money, feasibility, target group, impact etc. However, whether the capacity building and legitimacy of local councils were increased greatly hinges upon whether LCC was transparent, accountable, inclusive, and demand-responsive vis à vis the local community in reality.

Fourth, according to Danish advisors, it appears that communication between relevant authorities at the local and provincial levels improved significantly. Although more needs to be done to strengthen communication, this is looked upon as an achievement compared to the baseline situation, where no formal procedures for communication between the different levels existed.

Finally, it is worth noting that the internal short evaluation of projects undertaken upon the completion of the project (AMG Project Completion Sheet) by Danish advisors revealed that most projects were completed in a very satisfactory manner and have fulfilled their objectives. However, objectives may not in all cases have been understood in the same manner by Iraqi counterparts.

#### 8.4.2.2 Contribution to the reconstruction process

Based on the COWI report and the documentation provided, LGF appears to have contributed to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged and lacking infrastructure particularly within road and education, including training facilities, schools and nurseries, as well as health facilities.

### 8.4.3 Relevance

#### 8.4.3.1 Responsive to Local Population Needs

According to the LGF Manual, projects were identified by the local community, prepared and prioritised by the Local Council Committee (LCC). The intention of LGF was therefore to be demand responsive. However, the process of prioritising and selecting projects was carried out by LCC, rather than a community based structure (e.g. village committee), as LCC was assumed to represent the local population, given that its members were elected. The choice of this mechanism for project identification and selection could be well justified particularly in the difficult working conditions in Basra. However, a broader inclusion of non-governmental representatives could have been envisioned to render the process more demand responsive.

Moreover, although the project prioritisation exercise was itself useful to assess what was needed locally, it is not clear how these assessments addressed the demands of the *'broadest possible segment of the local community, taking the needs of marginalised people (disabled, women and children) into consideration'* as stated in the LGF Manual.

#### 8.4.3.2 Stakeholder Consultation

To ensure that project identification and selection is demand responsive, LGF procedures have included stakeholder consultation as part of the project proposal form. While no consultative meetings have been documented, findings from screening project proposals show that consultation with relevant stakeholders involved government bodies, notably members of the municipal council (89%) and the Basra Governorate (61%). Religious leaders were also consulted (44%) according to funded project proposal formats as well as line ministries and the general public (39%). Around one third of the project proposals state that local interest groups were consulted. Only in two cases (11%) were civil society organisations consulted.

In a context where broad public consultation is not normal practice, it is important to highlight the importance of consulting non-decision makers and non-government stakeholders particularly during project identification and preparation to cover different segments of society including women, youth, the elderly etc. Addressing this issue more concretely at the design level, (e.g. via village committees or other structures) could potentially enhance inclusiveness and demand responsiveness in practice.

#### 8.4.3.3 Alignment with local plans

LGF procedures describe how funded projects should be aligned with local and district planning at the identification stage in order to ensure that projects are relevant to local initiatives. First, the LCC assessed and ensured that a project was in line with local planning. Second, the PCC assessed, ensured, and endorsed that the project is in line with 'provincial development strategy for the given sector' and is not funded from other sources.

All funded projects were recommended by LCC and PCC. This assumes that all projects were aligned with local development plans at local and district levels.<sup>33</sup> This is particularly relevant after 2006, when the provincial development strategy was developed. Prior to that, approvals took more the form of 'no objection' as no strategy existed for aligning the projects to.

According to discussions in the workshop, it should be noted that this strategy appears to have been developed in a participatory manner including government institutions and civil society organisations. However, it is not clear if and how the strategy was disseminated at local level.

#### 8.4.4 Efficiency

LGF project were all advertised according to an open tendering procedure in the Basra region. All projects received bids (apart from one small project targeting women). According to LGF procedures, the cheapest bid is normally the winning one, provided that four evaluation criteria and tender requirements are fulfilled. In most cases, the cheapest bidder was chosen thereby underscoring the intention to ensure cost-efficiency. A balance between price and quality was intended. The tender material was very detailed, for instance, listing the type of material to be used. Projects were measured against the official Iraqi standards and requirements, with samples to be approved by the Basra Technical University. More than half of the projects were perceived to have 'medium' quality, according to the Site Inspection Report.

It can be noted that although most projects are completed, delays have been experienced implying that time efficiency might not have been optimal. Moreover, with no ongoing maintenance activities, project usage value could well diminish rapidly over time.

As the COWI report shows, most projects are generally functional and in use. Only three projects are currently not used. These include two health clinics that have not been fully furnished or staffed. It appears that the road projects have been most appreciated by the interviewees covered in the COWI report.

Due to the extremely difficult security situation, no baseline studies were conducted and no initiative was subsequently taken to assess the quantitative and qualitative socio-economic impact of the projects, including an estimate of the project beneficiaries, the extent to which the projects created value the local population was not captured.

#### 8.4.5 Sustainability

Sustainability aspects were taken into consideration in the LGF project cycle. First, technical sustainability was carefully integrated at the identification, implementation, monitoring and hand-over stages. The local manager, who was entrusted with project management and follow-up, had an engineering background. The implementation phase was subject to day to day on-site monitoring, when possible, and quality control of supplies used, for instance asphalt quality was checked. A final on-site technical evaluation of project deliverables was undertaken to ensure that the project was fully completed, and any shortage was deducted in price.

Second, maintenance and ownership were mainstreamed. The rationale behind working in partnership with local councils and Basra Provincial Council (BPC) was to enhance ownership and sustainability. Ten out of 18 project proposal forms addressed partners. Findings from the ten

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<sup>33</sup> According to LGF Manual, LCC assesses and approves project ideas. However, PCC cannot reject a submitted project proposal, but only provide recommendations.

proposal forms show that 60% of project proposals stated there were no partners while 30% stated that the partner was the municipal council. Only 10% mentioned local community organisations as a partner. 10% stated 'others' as partners. In general, LGF work modality facilitated local ownership and emphasised working in partnership with the local council and BPC. However, it appears that partnership as a working modality did not permeate through LGF projects in practice.

Upon project completion, a hand-over letter marked the transfer of ownership to local government authorities. The hand-over agreements emphasised the role of the government counterpart to take responsibility of maintenance and sustainability of the project. These typically included the municipality or directorate general of a given ministry. Of the 15 projects that were completed, the COWI site inspection questionnaires showed that no maintenance activity was yet undertaken, apart from one IT project.

Third, financial sustainability was also integrated within LGF. Project endorsement by PCC stated that 'once completed, the project would be included in the annual budget', and that it would be provided with the needed staff to be paid by the DG budget and in some instances furniture if needed. Furthermore, the hand-over letter described future responsibilities primarily financial responsibilities to ensure financial sustainability. This particularly included an allocation in the yearly budget for maintenance. Follow up on this issue was not initiated, assuming that local authorities will honour their promises as per the hand-over letters. Today, and as indicated in the COWI report, maintenance has so far not been carried out, but might not have been necessary yet.

#### 8.4.6 Lessons Learned

- Even in very difficult circumstances it is possible to implement smaller projects that use accepted good practices in development assistance, such as stakeholder involvement, transparency and partnership between public and private institutions.
- It is important to involve all Iraqi levels of authority in order to increase ownership and sustainability also in difficult situations
- It would have been useful to document project identification, implementation and follow up mechanisms as well as dissemination of LGF and stakeholder consultations
- It is useful to clarify contractual issues such as imposing delay fines, including a breach of contract clause
- Use local contractors to the extent possible to mitigate possible conflicts and enhance socio-economic benefits generated through local procurement
- Ensure that resources (financial and human) for maintenance exist and that mechanisms for channelling those resources are in place as part of an exit strategy
- Baseline studies could be conducted, even if in a rudimentary manner, to document the scope and socio-economic impact of projects on local communities, including the beneficiaries and impact during project implementation (e.g. jobs created through local procurement).

## 9 Danish Advisory Assistance and Steering Unit

### 9.1 Danish Advisers<sup>34</sup>

#### 9.1.1 Numbers and job-descriptions

It has been possible to identify the names of the advisers, which have been posted to Basra over the past 4 ½ years. They are the following in alphabetic order;

Babakan, Hewi, Civilian Adviser to DANBN  
Boye-Møller, Jes, Head of Steering Unit  
Bohr-Christensen, Jack, Deputy PRT  
Dissing, Jens Yde, Legal Adviser, PRT  
Djurhuus, Johanne, Civilian Adviser to DANBN  
Elsnab, Niels, Irrigation Project Adviser (company contract)  
Houstrup, Michael, Local Governance  
Jensen, Lars, Local Governance and Head of Unit  
Jensen, Jesper Frovin, Head of Steering Unit  
Jepsen, Ole Stokholm, Senior Agricultural Adviser (company contract)  
Keller, Nicolas Ørum, LGF-project Advisor  
Madsen, Morten Kamuk, Local governance  
Mayerhofer, Mads, LGF-project Adviser  
Petersen, Tommy, Local Governance  
Kim Schulz Petersen, Head of Steering Unit  
Popp-Madsen, Pauline, Legal Adviser  
Qaraeen, Arif, Technical Consultant (irrigation)  
Riisager, Anders, Legal Adviser  
Smidt, Poul, Communication Adviser to CPA

It appears that from 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2003 and up to mid 2007 there has at any given time been from four to seven advisers employed in Basra.

The advisers have been advising in the following areas:

1. Local Government (including the LGF)
2. Justice and human rights
3. Agriculture and irrigation
4. Civilian Adviser to the military contingency
5. Management of Steering Unit and PRT.

Some advisers have mainly had responsibilities in relation to direct project implementation such as drafting tendering material and overseeing construction projects, while other “softer” issues such as capacity-building have been more prominent in the ToRs of other advisers.

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<sup>34</sup> It should be noted that what the findings are still only very tentative, as delivery of a complete set of job-descriptions have been delayed

In addition to the advisers a number of police-trainers from the Danish police force have been deployed to Basra and have implemented training programmes for Iraqi police officers (up to 11 police trainers deployed at any given time).

### 9.1.2 Employment conditions and procedures

Until late 2007, only a few advisers have been employed on a “company-contract”, e.g. with NIRAS, Ole Stokholm Jepsen and Niels Elsnab. Most advisers were employed on short-term adviser contracts. Short-term contracts are generally used by MFA for short-term specific assistance concerning preparation, implementation and reviews of development activities. The length of contracts for advisers to Iraq appears to have been on a six-month basis, with the possibility of extension.

From the information provided it is not clear what were the specific procedures for reviewing CVs of possible candidates, and for interviewing and selecting candidates prior to their employment. Further clarification is needed before it will be possible to draw a general conclusion as to what kind of skills and experiences have been most important for being successful as an adviser in Iraq.

The preparation prior to deployment has not been documented. However, in subsequent rounds of deployment, many recruited advisers seem to have been in contact with advisers, who had previously served in Iraq.

It should be noted that it has been difficult to attract advisers to work in Iraq. From more narrative and unsystematic information collected especially during the workshop in Amman, it appears that it has especially been difficult to attract more experienced professional development experts to serve in Iraq and that often it has been less experienced persons with a military background, who have been interested in the advisor posts in Iraq. Only a few of the advisers who have served in Iraq have been experienced advisers from reconstruction and development activities in other countries. A better balance between more and less experienced advisers could probably have improved the use of well-known practices in development activities.

A study was undertaken concerning the functioning of the steering unit<sup>35</sup> and many of the recommendations from this report appear to have been followed in the creation of the civilian Technical Advisory Office in Bagdad in March 2007. In December 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen signed a contract with a private consultancy office to operate and staff the Technical Advisory Office thus relieving itself of the administration of advisers [

### 9.1.3 Results and Effectiveness

There are considerable complications related to the review of the achievements of the advisory assistance and consequently of its effectiveness.

The first advisers deployed in 2003 were – as mentioned in chapter 4 – included into the CPA-structures, and mainly dealing with governance issues (justice reforms and local governance) and agriculture. In Basra, the CPA from mid 2003 governed CPA (South) from the tightly guarded premises of the Basra Palace and toward the end of 2003 advisers were under strict orders not to leave the compound unless in the company of a Close Protection Team of four armed people and

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<sup>35</sup> ”Pilotopgave. Gennemgang af udviklingen af den danske styringsenhed i Basra”. April 2007.



two armoured cars. Nevertheless, the security situation was at this time a lot less serious than the situation which prevailed especially in 2006 and 07.

After the CPA had handed over the political power to the Interim Government, which in Basra meant the Interim Provincial Council, the governance advisers were transferred to a joint governance team GT/Basra, which was composed of advisers from various supporting countries (mainly the UK). To what extent they were successful in advising the Iraqi authorities and build up local capacity cannot be answered based on available documentation. It is, however, clear that the provincial council as well as the district councils, although being more and more representative, had difficulties in functioning effectively. Therefore it is probably safe to conclude that systematic capacity building has also been difficult.

It appears that with the creation of the PRTs in May 2006 a more concerted and efficient way of working was established, however advisers have informed that for many reasons mainly related to security issues - it was difficult for the advisers in the PRTs to maintain contact with the political level. It had been planned to place the advisers in the Iraqi offices, which would potentially greatly have improved contact and capacity-building, but due to reasons of safety this was not implemented.

Generally the security measures under which the advisers had to work limited their possibility of working closely with local counterparts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the few reports that are available suggest that a real working relationship did emerge with relevant Iraqi stakeholders.

The advisers concluded at the workshop in Amman that the main achievements of the advisor efforts were;

- ownership was created so that the Iraqis moved from being recipients to becoming cooperation partners able to formulate their own priorities.
- effective and transparent procedures for planning, procurement and implementation of reconstruction projects have been established through the Steering Unit and the PRT.
- local councils became much more professional and more cooperative partners.

The advisers in addition also concluded that in retrospect many things could have been done better if more efforts had been made concerning planning of programmes, such as defining baselines and clearer objectives. Although the tight security situation and consequently the difficulty for the advisers to be present “on the ground” made this a challenge, but in retrospect there might have been local institutions or organisations which could have assisted with this.

#### 9.1.4 Relevance

Based on available information it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions about the relevance of the advisers’ services. Whether these services have been in line with Iraqi plans largely depends on whether the programmes and projects the advisers were attached to were in line with Iraqi plans.

For obvious reasons very few of the adviser posts were based on formal requests from Iraqi authorities. The interim coalition administration situation obviously explains that few – if any – of the job-descriptions have been drafted by the Iraqi authorities. Job-descriptions were initially mainly drafted by the Danish MFA.

### 9.1.5 Efficiency

Obviously the advisers have been expensive compared to local staff, and the costs increased significantly due to the fact that the advisers had to move around with expensive security measures. However, the use of local staff became less attractive due to the fact that their employment with the “foreigners” could jeopardise their security. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the transport Corridor Study and the “Nisr”-project it was in some cases possible to sub-contract some of the functions of the advisors, to e.g. departments at the University or local professional firms. From documentation it is not clear if this was always considered.

### 9.1.6 Sustainability and impact

Whether the advisory services delivered will be sustainable and which impact they might have had is difficult to ascertain. However, small improvements that can arguably be linked to the advisory services are apparent: The introduction of thorough tendering procedures for smaller infrastructural projects, which may be beneficial for a future public-private partnership in Basra, is a case in point. Similarly other procedures such as planning of development activities and consultation of stakeholders in development processes may be used by the local authorities also in the future.

### 9.1.7 Tentative lessons

Although it is difficult to offer conclusions on the basis of the above, the following are tentative lessons learned;

- While recognising the need for speed and flexibility, efforts should be made to ensure that procedures concerning selection, employment and preparation of advisers to fragile situations are done following procedures that are at least as thorough as the ones used for “normal” development advisers
- Consider developing a “pool” of CVs of advisers for use in “fragile situations” and create attractive conditions for their employment, possibly outsourced to a private-sector actor
- To the extent possible ensure that job-descriptions are consulted by national partners and ensure they contain performance indicators
- Ensure that there are well-established selection criteria and procedures, ensuring a proper balance between professional, personal, cultural and language qualities, relevant experiences and personality – and that professional back-up is provided.
- Make sure there is regular work-planning, reporting and monitoring of advisers’ activities - if possible sur place (e.g. through a monitoring unit)
- Ensure clear reporting lines to local structures as well as to MFA-structures
- Consider whether other types of contracts (e.g. long-term or company ) and especially sub-contracting to local institutions or firms, could be more beneficial, less costly in terms of administration and more beneficial in terms of continuity
- Ensure clear and simple administrative rules including concerning security for advisers and communicate these before deployment

## 9.2 Steering Unit<sup>36</sup>

While the steering unit was formed already in 2003, it apparently was not properly organised until 2005<sup>37</sup>. It appears that initially there was some confusion as to its mandate and to its lines of reporting.

<sup>36</sup> This chapter builds first and foremost on the NIRAS-report dated April 2007: “Pilotopgave. Gennemgang og udvikling af den danske styringsenhed i Basra”.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. P. 8

From spring 2005 to May 2006, the unit consisted of one head and six advisers. From May 2006, three of the advisers were transferred to the PRT.

It appears from available documentation that the unit, especially from mid-2006 has been instrumental in overseeing the Danish assistance to reconstruction, maintain contact to Iraqi partners, coordinate with other donors and maintain proper contact with the Embassy in Bagdad and MFA in Copenhagen.

Based on available written analysis and information and discussion at the workshop some tentative conclusions can be made concerning the monitoring unit.

### 9.2.1 Some tentative lessons learned

- It is a challenge for the planning of engagements in post-conflict situations that the time perspective for the engagement is often by political decisions too short
- It would f.i. in hindsight have been useful if a steering unit in Basra had - as planned - been established at the start of the reconstruction programme and maintained over the full period with a clear mandate including responsibility for;
  - coordinating and monitoring – not necessarily implementing – all Danish development activities including the adviser contributions
  - coordinating with local institutions and organisations and other donors
  - identifying new activities and ensuring regular reviews of programmes and projects, including requesting specific short-term assistance for this
  - donor coordination and establishing joint donor planning and programmes
- It should be staffed by relevant professional, experienced staff with knowledge of AMG-procedures and experience with development programming preferably from fragile situations and with few expatriates coupled with experienced local staff
- Have clear administrative guidelines – a simple manual for such situations should be available from MFA
- Clear reporting lines to relevant authority in MFA and/or Embassy
- As far as possible have decentralised decision-making in order to be able to make quick decisions in a volatile and rapidly changing situation
- Ensure that relevant security procedures are known and updated
- The possibility of tendering the operation of the monitoring unit to a private company should have been considered from start, but given the often high political profile of programmes in fragile situations such a company contracted steering unit should report to a senior development MFA staff on the post – rather than Bagdad or Copenhagen. ( in December 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen signed a contract with a private consultancy company to operate and staff the Technical Advisory Office in Baghdad).

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## 10 Lessons learned and questions to be considered

### 10.1 Overall findings and recommendations of the review

The Iraqi-Danish partnership has from April 2003 to December 2007 produced some noteworthy achievements. These are documented in relation to economic and social development, such as improvements to infrastructure, especially in transport, agriculture and irrigation and small-scale rehabilitation of public utilities.

The achievements concerning “softer” – but equally important – issues such as democracy, human rights and good governance are less well documented.

It is worth noting that in relation to the difficult and changing security situation in Basra and given the fact that strict security measures have been imposed on advisers, it has in many instances been possible to use good practices for development assistance e.g. stakeholder involvement, promotion of transparent decision making and tendering processes and promotion of cooperation between various levels of authorities. These are in themselves very noteworthy achievements.

There was in Iraq – as is often the case in fragile situations and in reconstruction efforts - a demand and a need for demonstrating quick results, not least to the local groups in the Basra Province, also as a conflict prevention strategy to convince them that there was more to win from peace and reconstruction than from counter insurgency and continuous destruction. There is often also from the public in donor countries more attention to reconstruction efforts in fragile situations than in “normal” development situations.

This would suggest that;

- In reconstruction efforts in fragile situations there should be more (rather than less) attention to and use of good practices of development programmes and projects – concerning identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and follow up, employment of development staff and to ensure local ownership, harmonisation and coordination and therefore in addition important to ensure that experienced and professional development experts are involved at decision-making levels.

Although Danish reconstruction assistance has been ongoing since 2003, identification, planning and implementation horizons for actual project interventions have been limited by ‘remaining’ time within the time frame defined by each of the three appropriations approved by the Danish Parliament and the decision to re-focus Danish assistance from Basra to Baghdad. In practice this means, that;

- Planning horizons and the focus area of intervention – as defined by the Parliamentary appropriations - have been too short – 20 to 42 months at best but in reality less (e.g. due to a decision early 2007 to re-focus Danish assistance) - from the time of identifying a problem through local stakeholder dialogue to addressing it through design and implementation and to completion of the intervention and closure of Danish assistance.

This has not been conducive to fostering good development planning and implementation practices. This has not been conducive to fostering good development planning and implementation practices.

The fact that the initially identified priorities have been consistent in the implementation period and the fact that there was a need – as is often the case in fragile situations – for a high profile of the efforts

- It would have been useful if overall programme papers for the two main areas, economic development and governance, had been produced with clear overall objectives, with a number of sub-programmes or projects, and some simple indicators for monitoring progress. This could potentially have facilitated more synergy between “hard” and “soft” activities and made it easier to communicate short and long-term objectives and results. The short planning horizon has partly prevented this

The necessary administrative and professional services should be as flexible as possible, but also be effective, and the necessary resources to attract these services should be made available. To employ the right staff is often much more effective than having many members of staff

- In fragile situations it is necessary to make resources and conditions available so the right professional staff can be attracted and support this with simple efficient administrative procedures and possibly outsource the administration of this to more specialised institutions

It is important to note that the main basis for this review has been available documentation and that this has been limited. It appears that most of projects concerning infrastructure have been managed professionally and documentation available is of sufficient quality to analyse achievements. When there is a lack of overall programme and project documents and more systematic reporting based on these documents – such as is the case especially with some of the governance projects and the adviser assistance – this makes it difficult to review the achievements and therefore to distil lessons, which could be utilised in similar fragile situations. There is probably much more relevant documentation on the activities implemented in Iraq, but this information has not been accessible, probably due to that the filing system were difficult to maintain as it was continuously shifted in the very volatile and difficult environment in Iraq.

- When new experiences are being made it is particularly important that these be documented and that the lessons learned are extracted, documented, and communicated. This enables a learning process to take place. The use of IT should facilitate that normal guidelines for project management and reporting also in difficult circumstances could be adhered to.

At the workshop in Amman the 4-6<sup>th</sup> February 2008 (see list of participants in annex 4) there was a general agreement and gratefulness among the Iraqi participants for the Danish assistance. Not least that it had materialised as promised, while there was an expressed sense that assistance from some other donors had not been according to the promises made. In addition there was generally satisfaction with the quality of Danish assistance also compared to assistance from other donors. More importantly there was from all participants a general agreement for the need now to move away from a project approach and increase process facilitation and capacity building. Iraqi participants expressed that Iraq does not lack financial resources but expertise needs to be build in how to transform policies into concrete implementation of programmes and ensure their sustainability. There was consequently in general terms support to the changes in the Iraqi-Danish partnership as decided in 2007 to concentrate on capacity building of Iraqi authorities in Baghdad,

but there was some dissatisfaction expressed that the focus was only on the central level and several requested support also to the de-central level not least in Basra as a continuation of the past Danish support.

## 10.2 Findings and questions in relation to the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations

As mentioned above (chapter 3) the Principles were not developed until after the Iraqi-Danish partnership was initiated and therefore they could not have been applied in the planning or during the main period of implementation. It would consequently be wrong to expect that they should have been taken into consideration in planning and implementing the Danish supported reconstruction efforts. They are used here to inspire the learning process and raise some pertinent questions, which might be useful to consider in a context of Danish engagement in other “fragile situations”.

### 10.2.1 The Basics

#### 10.2.1.1 Take context as a starting point

While an overall needs assessment was made by international organisations in Iraq, and while it appears that the Danish identification recommendations have been proven correct (as they are still explicit priorities 4½ years down the line), the initial analysis of the social, economic and indeed political situation in Iraq was challenged by a rapidly deteriorating security situation, which surprised most of the international community.

The first Danish Iraq analysis is dated April 2005, two years after start of the reconstruction efforts. Before April 2005 the context for the reconstruction efforts was described in the presentation of the Government’s proposals to the parliament’s decisions on the Danish engagement in Iraq. Besides the analysis work that was published, the ministry carried out internal analysis and planning work.

Still, there are indications that the lack of an internationally shared context analysis and vision - at least during the first years – between various actors (e.g. Americans in Bagdad and Brits and Danes in Basra) hampered the implementation of activities. Obviously the fact that the UN – and other international organisations – withdrew their international staff from Iraq after August 2003 had an influence of the diversity of analytical skills.

The pertinent question is here what a small “player” like Denmark can do in similar situations to contribute to a thorough understanding of the context and that such a context-analysis is shared among the donors and foreign actors?

#### 10.2.1.2 Do no harm

The context in which the Iraqi-Danish partnership took place was probably characterised by increasing social divisions (based on clans, gender, religious and political beliefs) and certainly by increased allegations of corruption.

No evidence or indication has been found that the Danish supported reconstruction initiatives contributed to increased division or corruption. On the contrary, from the documentation available, it appears that conscious efforts were made – at least in guidelines for planning of activities – to include various social groups in planning and implementation. Although there might have been less efforts made in practice, there is a strong indication that serious attempts have been made to

include various social groups in the activities, but was obviously restricted by availability of security protection teams.

Attention to gender concerns does not feature frequently in the documentation. Although it has been a difficult issue to tackle in the given context, it is a high priority in Danish development policy and it would be useful if the considerations made had been documented for use in other fragile situations.

Corruption was – as mentioned - a main concern, and the introduction of open and transparent tendering procedures was meant to counter this. It would be useful if the practical experiences concerning the use of such procedures could be documented in a way which made it possible to utilise the procedures which worked best in other situations. It should be mentioned that there has not been registered any financial irregularities concerning the Danish supported projects in Basra.

Finally there are a few questions which may be outside the scope of this paper, but nevertheless should be mentioned (and may be part of the DIIS study of the Civilian-Military Co-planning). Were there harmful effects of having civilian advisors “co-habiting” with the Danish military contingency? And if direct employment by the civilian advisors of Iraqi assistants meant that they were brought into danger? If so could this have been avoided at least to some extent by contracting local institutions and local professional firms to monitor and implement projects?

## 10.2.2 The Role of State-Building & Peace-Building

### 10.2.2.1 Focus on state-building as the central objective

It is important to note that the overall objectives for the Iraqi-Danish partnership were very much in line with this principle, provided that state-building is not a neutral word but is understood as state-building based on human rights and democratic values.

It should similarly be noted that an important consideration for most of the analysed projects was that they should be implemented by – and capacity building should be provided to – the relevant local authorities who should be responsible for implementing programmes and projects.

There were in most of the project documents – even for the pure infrastructure projects – considerations relevant to state-building. The problem was that the capacity building activities, the consultation processes used, the result of workshops and meetings, the advice given and other “soft” activities, which should have contributed to such state-building activities were often not documented and when they were, rarely in a systematic or measurable way.

While the approach of including elements of state-building in all supported activities was done the question is how a proper monitoring and reporting of these activities can be ensured?

### 10.2.2.2 Prioritise prevention

The attention to conflict prevention and peace-building is mainly implicit in the documentation studied. The increasingly violent situation around Basra on the one hand meant that an attention to conflict prevention was important, while it – on the other hand – meant that it for security reason became more and more difficult to interact with local actors and groups that may have been able to mediate in conflicts, based on a knowledge of local tensions and the reasons for strife.

Reportedly the military contingency interacted with local structures (e.g. elected, clan-leaders, elders, and family-heads) in order to prevent conflicts.

An important question is to what extent this was effective and if so if this could have been further supported by reconstruction efforts and if more direct support to other groups e.g. civil-society groups and women-groups could have been useful.

#### 10.2.2.3 Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives

In the overall formulated objectives for the Iraqi-Danish partnership this link is very clear. The problem appears – based on the documentation – to have been the practical implementation of this in relation to the reconstruction efforts carried out in the Basra province.

The civilian-military co-planning was tested for the first time and will be reviewed by the DIIS study and hopefully this will assist in answering if it was effective and if it can be improved.

#### 10.2.2.4 Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies

The inclusion of all, regardless of beliefs, clan, social status or gender is generally stressed in the overall guidelines and planning documents, but only scattered documentation is found concerning its practical implementation. In order to learn from practical experiences, this is evidently unfortunate.

The attention to gender and to participation of marginalised youths could probably have been more consciously included in guidelines as well as in practical implementation.

### 10.2.3 The Practicalities

#### 10.2.3.1 Align with local priorities

The available documentation shows that there have been serious attempts to align to local priorities and it is commendable that generally there has been an awareness of the need to change implementation modalities, with increasing responsibility resting on the Iraqi structures in terms of decision-making, implementation and monitoring. Planning the “post-Basra” activities, which are mainly focussed at central level, was in part done during a joint Iraqi-Danish workshop, with Iraqi government officials in late August 2007 in Copenhagen.

Nevertheless some of the former partners in Basra wanted that it should be considered to follow-up to the support to Basra by continuing assistance to the province in capacity-building.

#### 10.2.3.2 Agree on practical co-ordination mechanism

There appears to have been good coordination especially with the British reconstruction efforts, but less so with other donors. Only relatively late were joint programming developed among most donors such as through the PRT. Joint programming might have been initiated earlier and from documentation it is not clear to what extent procedures for LGF and agricultural related reconstruction efforts were agreed among all donors or whether there were different procedures.

While it appears that coordination concerning implementation of projects was sufficient in Basra and mechanisms in relation to some overall programmes e.g. justice and police were practical and well-functioning, it was only later that efficient coordination mechanisms for economic and infrastructure development were created.



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Concerning joint analyses and joint programme planning there would appear to be room for improvement.

#### 10.2.3.3 Act fast ... but stay engaged

It appears that this principle has not been sufficiently attended to in the Iraqi-Danish partnership. While the initially action was fast the planning horizon was short and only later was it realised that there was need for a longer time-span for support to be efficient. As mentioned some of the bigger infra-structure projects e.g. Transport Corridor and harbours had planned – but not initially funded - phases of longer term.

There was over time developed an increasing number of instruments for quick reactions to a changing situation , but it appears that there was a need for more decentralised decision-making at the steering unit.

In future engagements a longer planning horizon should be considered.

#### 10.2.3.4 Avoid pockets of exclusion

It appears that there have been conscious efforts to ensure that there were no such pockets in the area of operation, partly by coordinating with other donors.

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## Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

### For focus-paper and report from workshop concerning the Iraqi-Danish partnership for reconstruction

30<sup>th</sup> October 2007

#### Background

Since 2003, beginning shortly after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Denmark has provided support to reconstruction in the Basra-province in Iraq.

The support has been implemented in accordance with Parliamentary Appropriations 111, 158 and 106 through a number of projects and programmes covering a broad area of subjects and issues, such as agriculture and irrigation, infrastructure, mainly in development of harbours and to the transport sector, human rights and democracy, humanitarian projects and capacity building.

The Danish military contingency withdrew from the Basra-province in July 2007 and the Danish support for reconstruction is expected in the future not to be focussing on Basra but will be concentrated on supporting capacity-building at central government.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consequently decided to initiate a process to document the outcome of the partnership in Basra and identify lessons learned from the Iraqi-Danish partnership for reconstruction. This process includes a number of activities including site inspection of the physical activities, which have been supported by Danish funds. The inspection will be documented in a report, expected to be presented by Mid November 2007. In addition, a two day workshop for key stakeholders will be conducted in the region (Amman) during 20 – 21 November 2007. The practical arrangement will be organised by the Danida Fellowship Centre.

#### Objectives

The objective of the consultancy is to assist in facilitating a workshop of approximately 45 key stakeholders - Danish and Iraqi - where the partnership for reconstruction will be discussed and major lessons learned will be documented.

#### Outputs

The following outputs should be provided by the consultancy:

- A draft agenda for the workshop
- A focus-paper in preparation of the workshop (of not more than 20 pages)
- A workshop report (not more than 20 pages)

#### Scope of work

The consultancy will take point of departure in the project documentation available, in particular the objectives and planned outputs originally agreed on for the individual projects.

The programme will presumably include working group arrangements and the consultant should include to identify a number of representative working group themes, say 3 á 5.

Apart from considering specific the issues indicated below here, the issue of security should be reflected as well, i.e. one option to address this could be to identify a few key areas where security has had a major impact (planning, implementation and/or subsequent utilisation).

The consultancy will attempt to ensure that the workshop covers, but is not necessarily be limited, to the following issues:

- What was the context in which the projects were implemented?
- Was there a thorough assessment of what could be done and how to do it under the conditions prevailing?
- Was the support in line with Iraqi plans and priorities?
- Were the prioritised activities consulted with the relevant stakeholders?
- Were relevant Iraqi partners involved in identification, and entrusted with implementation and monitoring?
- Did the projects meet the intended results?
- Did the activities enhance the reconstruction process?
- Were the projects implemented efficiently and are they sustainable?
- What is the expected impact of the projects in the short, medium and longer term?
- Are the lessons learned in accordance with the recent findings and recommendations in international fora such as DAC/OECD concerning donor interventions in fragile states and can the lessons learned contribute to the international discussions?

#### **Methods and Organisation of the study**

The focus-paper will be based on existing documentation of the programmes and projects, on the site inspection report and on interviews with MFA officials and Danish advisors to the partnership for reconstruction.

The focus paper will also give an overview of recent international thinking concerning assistance to fragile states.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will provide access to relevant programme and project documentation and to relevant advisers.

#### **Timing and Reporting**

The workshop is planned to take place during 20 – 21 November and the focus-paper should be presented to MFA in draft on 12<sup>th</sup> November and in a final version by 14<sup>th</sup> November., Key background documentation for drafting the focus-paper is available and will be provided by MFA, and be supplemented by inputs to a 'site inspection report' (COWI) consecutively from about 1<sup>st</sup> Nov. till about 6<sup>th</sup> Nov. A draft workshop report should be forwarded to the MFA, one week after the end of the workshop, and a final version one week after the consultant has received comments from MFA (MENA).

#### **The Team**

The team of consultants will include two members, i.e. Mr Finn Skadkaer Pedersen, senior project manager (team leader) and Mrs. Kimiko Hibri Pedersen, community and civil society development specialist (fragile states).

## Annex 2 – Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Guiding Principles

In an informal two-day Workshop in London on 29-30 November 2007, countries leading PRTs across Iraq came together to share experiences, learn lessons and consider how PRTs can best work to build provincial Iraqi ownership.

The Workshop generated a set of “Guiding Principles” reflecting our discussions. These are set out below.

These Principles reflect only the views of those participating in the Workshop, which included PRT Team Leaders, UK military representation, international experts, and policy officials from Denmark, Italy, South Korea, the UK, the US, and a representative from the Iraqi Government.

### Guiding Principles:

1. **Focus on process not projects:** Use our programmes to create incentives for peaceful political participation
2. **Unlock Iraq’s own resources:** Use our programmes to leverage its considerable resources
3. **Foster Iraqi-led self sustaining processes:** It is almost always better to let the Iraqis do it themselves
4. **Plan your exit before you begin any programme**
5. **Make sure quick-impact projects “do no harm” to longer term strategies**
6. **Align all funding streams** (civilian and military) with the provincial development strategies and the International Compact with Iraq
7. **Forge strong links between the centre and the provinces to the benefit of both**
8. **Use the convening ability of the PRT to bring stakeholders together:**
  - Province to province
  - Government to business leaders
  - Government to Civil Society
  - Across sectarian lines
9. **Support private sector growth by improving the business environment**
10. **Support business formation as the best path to sustainable job-creation**
11. **Identify the gaps and impediments in Iraqi governance systems:** Develop “pockets of competence” to overcome key constraints
12. **Encourage provincial authorities to coordinate funding streams** from all sources – donors, military and GOI alike

13. **Don't over-engineer:** Use appropriate technology and solutions
14. **Metrics matter:** Measure what is important – keep your eye on outcomes not inputs
15. **Communicate:** Help Iraqis highlight their own successes. Use the media to improve transparency and accountability

## Annex 3 – Overview of Danish Reconstruction and Humanitarian Activities in Iraq 2003-2008<sup>38</sup>

### 1. Menneskerettigheder og retssektorreformer, herunder polititræning

- Forbedring af børns vilkår i Basra-provinsen, UNICEF (10 millioner kroner, igangværende).
- Kvinders rettigheder, UNIFEM (3,8 millioner kroner, igangværende)
- Polititræning (3,54 millioner kroner, Udenrigsministeriets bidrag er afsluttet, polititræning finansieres nu af de midler, der er afsat på Finansloven til politiets internationale operationer).
- EU Just Lex (2,74 millioner kroner, afsluttet, ny bevilling på 2,3 millioner kroner givet i 2007).
- Institut for Menneskerettigheder, IMR (7,50 millioner kroner, igangværende).
- International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, IRCT (6,78 millioner kroner, igangværende).

### 2. Demokratisering

- Støtte til valgforberedelser (5,2 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- International Media Support (3,03 millioner kroner, igangværende).

### 3. Infrastruktur

- Levering af slamsugere til Basra (6,23 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Renovering af bøjeskibet "NISR" (26,5 millioner kroner, afsluttet, for tiden i garantiperiode).
- Domhus i Basra (0,85 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Leverance af blodgasapparater til hospitaler (4 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- UNDP's udviklingsfond for Irak (20 millioner kroner).
- Genopbygningsprojekter faciliteret af den danske bataljon i Basra som led i civil-militær samtænkning (cirka 8,5 millioner kroner forbrugt, igangværende).
- Udførelse af et transportkorridorstudie fra Den Persiske Golf til Bagdad (6,86 millioner kroner, igangværende).

### 4. Landbrug

- Landbrugsprogram, vandingsprojekter og teknisk bistand (samlet bevilling 30,50 millioner, igangværende).

### 5. Nærområdeindsats

- Local Governance Fund (samlet bevilling: 0 millioner kroner).
- FN's Flygtningehøjkommissær, UNHCR (i alt 35 millioner kroner, igangværende).
- Dansk Flygtningehjælp (i alt 45 millioner kroner, igangværende).
- Den Internationale Organisation for Migration og Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration and Development Cooperation, AGEF (8 millioner kroner, igangværende).

<sup>38</sup> Copied from Annex 1 of "Danmarks Engagement i Irak" Maj 2007

#### 5. Humanitær bistand

- Folkekirkens Nødhjælp (4,3 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Danish Demining Group (35 millioner kroner, igangværende).
- FN's Fødevareprogram (20 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Caritas Danmark (8,6 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Dansk Røde Kors (0 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Red Barnet (2 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- UNICEF (2 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- FN's Kontor for Koordinering af Humanitære Spørgsmål (3 millioner kroner, afsluttet).
- Beredskabsstyrelsen (millioner kroner, afsluttet).

### Annex 4 – List of Participants in Workshop, 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> Feb. 2008, in Amman

Name	Titel/Occupation	Institution
Dr. Faik Abdul Rasool	Senior Adviser to the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation	Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
Mr Abdulrazzaq K. Hassan	Minister Advisor	Ministry of Transport
Mr Safaa Abdulhussein Jaiyz Al-Fayyadh	Deputy Director of General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI)	General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI)
Mr Talib Abdullah Baeish Alsaad	Chief Project Manager	General Company for Ports of Iraq (GCPI)
Mr Mazin Samad Saud Al-Deewan	Manager	State Commission for Roads & Bridges (SCRB)
Mr Karam Yara Aieni	Manager, Planning Dept.	State Commission for Roads & Bridges (SCRB)
Mr Zuhair Abid Jabor	Manager, Design Dept.	State Commission for Roads & Bridges (SCRB)
Mr Ali Kh. Khalaf	COWI Team Leader	
Mr Khalaf Sh. Bastan Al-Shraa	Deputy Chairman	Basra Provincial Council
Mr Ala Uldeen Taher Najm Najm	Director	Dept. of Water Resources. Basra
Mr Yareb Jari Hameed Al-Emara	Member of Basra Prov. Council, Chairman of Agricultural Committee and Agricultural Working Group	Member of Basra Provincial Council
Mr Amer Salman AbdulHussein Al-Kinani	Director	Directorate of Agriculture, Basra
Mr Zuhair Ali-Akbair Abdulkareem	Director	Central Bank, Basra
Dr Talib A. Khalaf Al-Nassari	Deputy Director	Basrah Maritime Science Centre
Mr Ayad Haleem Kassid Al-Meertah		Representative for Contractors
Mr Falih Hadi Ali Al-Ameri	Deputy Minister	Min. of Construction and Housing, Baghdad (MoCH)
Mr Søren Schmidt	Researcher	DIIS
Mr Palle Smidt-Petersen		COWI
Mr Maitham Hassan		COWI
Mr Finn Skadkær Pedersen		
Ms Kimiko Hibri Pedersen		
Mr Claus Jørgensen		NIRAS
Ms Sine Skov	Home Office Manager	NIRAS
Mr Jørgen Stockfleth Carlé	Head of Technical Advisory Office	NIRAS
Mr Erik Krogh Lauritzen	Advisor	NIRAS
Mr Jens Yde Dissing	Senior Legal Adviser, TAO	NIRAS



Mr Niels Elsnab	Team-leader	NIRAS
Mr Ole Stokholm Jepsen	Senior Agricultural Adviser.	NIRAS
Mr Hewi Babakhan	Adviser	NIRAS
Mr Jack Bohr-Christensen	Adviser	
Mr Jesper Frovin Jensen		
Ms Lis Dhundale	Project Manager	Danish Institute for Human Rights
Mr Giorgio Carattiolo	Consultant	The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT)
Mr Andy Andersen	Senior Consultant	Danmarine
Mr Bo Weber	Ambassador	Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Mr Jan Pirouz Poulsen	Head of Section	Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Mr Finn Nielsen	Senior Technical Adviser	Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Mr Poul Nyborg	Senior Technical Adviser	Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Mr Mads Meyerhofer		Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Ms Malene Bøgesvang	Head of Section	Min. of Foreign Affairs, DK
Ms Matilde Descroix		Danida Fellowship Centre