UM del - 2007-08 (1. samling) - Bilag 2: FN-rapport: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, af den 21. september 2007

II. OverviewA.Political developments2.The political transition that began with the signing of the Bonn Agreementnearly six years ago has come under growing internal and external pressure. Whilecertain institutions and ministries continue to mature, public confidence in theGovernment and its leaders is wavering owing to increasing corruption and weakgovernance, particularly at the subnational level. An intensifying Taliban-ledinsurgency that increasingly relies on suicide bombing and other terrorist tactics isundermining confidence in the future and denying access of the Government andinternational aid organizations to a growing number of districts. Despite thesepressures, there has been progress in terms of economic growth, education, health,road building and rural development. Furthermore, international support forAfghanistan has intensified rather than wavered. Progress, at this key moment, willdepend on the international community and the Government of Afghanistan bettercoordinating their efforts to defeat the insurgency, promote good governance andprovide tangible improvements to the lives of Afghans.07-50215 (E) 250907

3.All of this must be achieved at a time when strains have emerged in theAfghan coalition that supported the Bonn Agreement and the Afghanistan Compact.The National Front of Afghanistan, a new alliance of former members of theNorthern Alliance with representatives of the former Communist Government andthe royal family, has become a prominent voice critical of Governmentshortcomings. While the emergence of an institutionalized political opposition willbe a healthy development in the long term, it remains vital for Afghanistan to avoida fragmentation of power in the short term, especially if that fragmentation weakensthe political consensus that has underpinned the successful implementation of theBonn Agreement.4.On a more positive note, at the regional level, a collaborative atmosphere hasbegun to prevail in Afghan-Pakistani relations as the common challenge of terrorismhas come into focus on both sides of the border. With regard to the internationallevel, since March my Special Representative has travelled to capitals to promotethe importance of a coherent approach to Afghanistan, amid a groundswell ofpolitical, financial and diplomatic support for the country. The increased support forAfghanistan underscores the urgent need for an integrated political and militarystrategy that complements the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, but alsoencompasses wider issues and provides a sharper focus on the achievement ofnational reconciliation and regional stability.

Security situation5.Although the expanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and theincreasingly capable Afghan National Army have accrued multiple militarysuccesses during the reporting period, the Taliban and affiliated insurgent groupscontinue to prevent the attainment of full security in a number of areas. Access torural areas of south and south-eastern Afghanistan for official and civil societyactors has continued to decline. The boldness and frequency of suicide bombings,ambushes and direct fire attacks have increased.6.Following counter-insurgency operations in the south and east, the Talibanhave lost a significant number of senior and mid-level commanders. In Hilmand,Kunar, Paktya and Uruzgan Provinces, insurgent leaders have been forced to putforeigners in command positions, further undermining the limited local bases ofsupport. This has heightened the importance to the Taliban of the support it receivesfrom the border regions of Pakistan.7.Rates of insurgent and terrorist violence are at least 20 per cent higher than in2006; an average of 548 incidents per month were recorded in 2007, compared to anaverage of 425 per month in 2006. There have been over 100 suicide attacks to datein 2007, compared to 123 in all of 2006. While 76 per cent of all suicide missionstarget international military and Afghan security forces, their victims have beenlargely civilian bystanders: 143 civilians lost their lives to suicide attacks between1 January and 31 August 2007. Suicide attacks have been accompanied by attacksagainst students and schools, assassinations of officials, elders and mullahs, and thetargeting of police, in a deliberate and calculated effort to impede the establishmentof legitimate Government institutions and to undermine popular confidence in theauthority and capability of the Government of Afghanistan.

8.Defeating the insurgency has been complicated by the growth of criminal anddrug gangs, which enjoy a symbiotic relationship with anti-Government armedgroups. While these groups may not share the political goals of the Taliban, they dohave a common interest in preventing the imposition of State authority in certainareas or corrupting what State authority exists. In the poppy-cultivating Provinces ofBadakhshan, Hilmand and Kandahar, the State is extremely weak or non-existentthroughout much of the countryside, while corruption is endemic in provincialcentres.9.The successes of the counter-insurgency in conventional battles and ineliminating Taliban and other insurgent leaders are undeniable. If the trends of thepast two years are to be reversed, however, a more comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy will be needed to reinforce political outreach to disaffectedgroups and address the security gaps that allow insurgents to recover from theirlosses and, with very few resources, still manage to terrorize local populations orenlist criminal gangs to further their goals.

Institutional challenges10. While some institutions within the judicial, executive and legislative branchesof Government continue to gain capacity and effectiveness, internal disputes andinstitutional corruption threaten efforts to consolidate and legitimize theseinstitutions. The Anti-Corruption Commission established by President Karzai hasnot yet delivered results and faces an uncertain future. The resulting sense ofimpunity has encouraged a culture of patronage and direct involvement in illegalactivities, including the drug trade, especially within the police force.11. Relentless pressure from the international community has resulted in theremoval of some prominent human rights offenders from positions in the Ministry ofthe Interior and their replacement by more professional officers. The lack ofalignment among the international partners involved in reforming the Ministry,however, has contributed to a notable failure to prevent or curb the use of parochialconnections and bribes to determine appointments. Tolerance of corruption has hada particularly corrosive effect on the police. Since many communities’ only contactwith the national Government is through the police, poor police behaviour oftentranslates into a negative perception of the Government and, to some degree, theinternational community that supports it.12. The Office of the Attorney General has attempted a proactive strategy tocombat corruption by arresting, investigating and prosecuting medium- and high-level Government officials, as well as some of its own prosecutors. These efforts arefrustrated, however, by the fact that those targeted are often able to defendthemselves through their personal relationships with powerful figures. Police orjustice officials are commonly bribed to prevent arrests, arrange releases fromdetention or dismiss charges. Sentences, when they are imposed, tend to be lenient.Furthermore, there have been no substantial successes in the restitution or forfeitureof the proceeds from corruption-related crimes.13. Another measure to combat corruption is the creation of a professional andadequately paid civil service. The Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice,adopted as part of the Afghanistan Compact, calls for the Government ofAfghanistan to establish a clear and transparent national appointments mechanism

for all senior-level appointments. Progress on this front has been inadequate. Thesenior appointments panel created for this purpose still has no approved rules ofprocedure that guarantee transparency and impartiality. In addition, it has not beenprovided with premises and is, in general, under-resourced and underperforming.14. For lower level appointments, the Independent Administrative Reform andCivil Service Commission has finalized a revised public administration reformframework and implementation programme. This effort has been underpinned by amore coordinated approach among donors. The Cabinet, after much deliberation,approved a pay and grading reform, with a salary range of $80 to $650 per monthfor civil servants. Implementation, however, will be incremental over a four-yearperiod, meaning that it is unlikely to have a significant effect on reducing corruptionin the immediate term.15. Finally, in August 2007, the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) approved the UnitedNations Convention against Corruption. United Nations agencies, including theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office onDrugs and Crime (UNODC), are providing technical assistance to developlegislation, strategies and capacity to implement the provisions of the Convention.

III. Key political developmentsA.National Assembly, political parties and elections16. During the reporting period, the National Assembly managed to approve thenational budget, as well as important legislation supportive of the AfghanistanCompact, including the review and adoption of the Wolesi Jirga internal rules ofprocedure, the Advocates Law and the Media Law, all of which now are awaitingreview by the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House). In addition, parliamentarycommissions have been engaged with key security sector reform issues, includingpolice reform and the international military presence. The coordinated work ofUNAMA and other organizations with the Wolesi Jirga resulted in a relativelyprogressive Media Law being submitted to the Meshrano Jirga. However,subsequent amendments in the Meshrano Jirga threaten to give excessive control tothe Ministry of Culture and Information and are already undermining principles offree speech as enshrined in the Constitution of Afghanistan.17. These accomplishments have been marred by questionable voting practicesand a tendency towards political posturing. A number of parliamentary decisions,including the attempt to dismiss the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for Refugees,have strained relations between the legislative and the executive branches.18. In April 2007, a new political alliance, the National Front of Afghanistan, waslaunched in Kabul. The Front is composed of former jihadi leaders affiliated withthe Northern Alliance/Shura-i-Nazar, former members of the Communist party,Junbesh members and a member of the royal family. Burhanuddin Rabbani, theformer President of Afghanistan and the head of the jihadi Jamiat-i-Islami party, waselected leader of the Front for a six-month period. The Front did not present itselfofficially as an opposition party, but its leadership announced that the once rivalfactions had united largely in response to the current political situation and growingconcerns for the future. It felt that Government weakness, significant patronage and

administrative corruption were contributing to the rapid deterioration of the State’scapacity and legitimacy. Among the most significant reforms proposed by the Frontis a constitutional amendment to replace the current presidential system with aparliamentary one.19. A crucial upcoming debate in the National Assembly will be over the draftelectoral law and an accompanying law to reform the Independent ElectoralCommission. The five-year presidential and parliamentary terms expire in 2009 and2010, respectively. In May 2007, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board ofthe Afghanistan Compact recommended that the Government and NationalAssembly should ensure timely adoption by the National Assembly of an electorallaw that would allow cost-effective and secure elections, as called for by theAfghanistan Compact. Draft laws on the electoral system and the Commission areunder consideration; given the importance of these laws for members of parliament,they may be hotly debated. In the meantime, a civil/voter registry pilot project, nowbeing implemented by UNDP in cooperation with the Commission, will providerecommendations on how to produce a voter registry and identification documentsin time for the next elections. The challenges ahead are immense. Since theparliamentary elections in 2005, the Commission has received extremely limitedsupport, owing in part to the financial deficit from the parliamentary elections,which has deterred donors from contributing to electoral projects. The Commissionwill need a great deal more attention and resources if it is to play a meaningful rolein organizing the next elections. In the light of the time required in the past toorganize voter registration and elections in Afghanistan, providing this support isnow becoming a matter of urgency.

Provincial developments20. Provincial governments are the main nodes through which the authority of thecentral Government is transmitted across the national territory. Centre-provincerelations are strained in many areas, however, as provincial officials often feelneglected or even undermined by the central Government. In July and August 2007,a series of subnational consultations began in each province with the goal ofensuring that provincial priorities inform the Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy. This was the first time that representatives of government and thecommunity at the provincial level were able to interact with central Governmentofficials at the ministerial level to present their development priorities. UNAMAplayed a key role in both the logistics of these consultations and coordinating UnitedNations agency input and providing technical assistance. The UNAMA regional andprovincial offices also worked to promote the participation of women and minoritieswho, in general, were well represented. Provincial councils played a prominent role,with female members taking the floor to champion women’s participation anddiscuss sensitive issues, such as police performance and corruption.21. While these consultations were a well-conceived and well-executed effort toconnect the centre to the provinces, the central Government’s continuing reliance onethnic and tribal factors rather than merit to appoint provincial administrators hashad a far more serious impact on regional development. Individuals who alignthemselves with key figures in the President’s administration are frequently able todetermine appointments, empowering selected ethnic or tribal networks in theirprovinces of origin. This practice has generated resentment towards the central

Government by those who have been disempowered, while the appointment of tribalnotables rather than proven administrators has impeded the development of goodgovernance.22. The role of provincial councils has varied from province to province.Weaknesses are due mainly to a lack of capacity and clarity of their role relative tothat of the central Government. In March 2007, the provincial council law wasamended to endow the councils with a monitoring role as well as an advisory one,but this distinction remains unclear in practice. According to the Constitution,provincial council elections should also be held in 2009; for the elections to bemeaningful, however, much more attention must be paid to the institutions ofprovincial governance.23. Challenges to development, particularly in the south, south-east and east, areclosely linked to the increased insecurity. As the character of provincialreconstruction teams is determined by individual nations and the disparity of fundsavailable to them, the activities of the teams are not always aligned with thebenchmarks and timelines of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Theincreased field presence of UNAMA has allowed engagement with the teams toaddress these inconsistencies and ensure that all teams achieve a commonunderstanding and approach to the Strategy, in cooperation with the Government ofAfghanistan.24. The failure of development actors to ensure that quieter provinces in the northand west receive a tangible peace dividend has played into the latent north-southfault line within Afghanistan. This is further exacerbated by the perception thatprovinces that grow poppies, mainly in the south and east, are actually beingrewarded with an inordinate share of development assistance. To offset thisperception, resources continue to be committed to the Good Performers Initiativefund ($22.5 million for 2006-2007), which rewards each province that does notgrow poppies with $500,000 for development assistance.25. All UNAMA field offices, including the two recently opened provincial officesin Ghor and Day Kundi, continue to engage in outreach, mediation and conflict-prevention activities with ethnic and political factions. UNAMA also continues tofacilitate dialogue between the central authorities and those groups most estrangedfrom government. This has been most notable in the south-east, where, despitedeteriorating security conditions, UNAMA continues to assist Government efforts tobring alienated tribes into closer contact with the central Government.

Regional environment26. Tensions in the crucial relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan easedduring the reporting period. This easing of tension was due in part to the increasingrecognition that the challenge of terrorism was a shared one that would requireshared responses, and that neither country could afford to lose control of itsrespective border areas. At the conclusion of the Ankara summit hosted by thePresident of Turkey on 29 and 30 April, Presidents Karzai and Musharraf signed adeclaration in which they reaffirmed their commitment to work together on a rangeof topics and to form a joint working group to monitor progress in a number ofissues, including the facilitation of orderly repatriation of Afghan refugees fromPakistan.

27. The joint declaration produced at the four-day Afghanistan-Pakistan peacejirga held in August in Kabul was an important confidence-building measurebetween the two countries and the communities on both sides of the border. Bothsides identified the need to address jointly a broad range of common problems,beginning with terrorism. President Musharraf recognized the support for Talibanactivities inside Afghanistan provided from parts of the border regions of Pakistan.Jirga participants focused on the need to isolate foreign elements in order for bothcountries to pursue the common cause of regional stability and improved prosperitythrough the development of trade routes. The implementation and monitoring of thecommitments contained in the declaration will be the responsibility of a permanent50-member joint peace jirga commission, which will meet every two months. Thenext joint jirga, due to be held in Islamabad, will probably take place after electionsin Pakistan.28. On 14 August, following the visit to Kabul of President Ahmedinejad of theIslamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed ageneral agreement on bilateral cooperation and on capacity-building of Afghanministries. In addition, the two Governments began discussing a mechanism for theissuance of work visas for Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran, an issue that hasstrained relations between the two countries since the recent deportation of Afghanworkers from the Islamic Republic of Iran.29. Afghanistan formally acceded to the South Asian Association for RegionalCooperation, at its fourteenth summit, held in New Delhi on 3 and 4 April 2007. Atthe meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek on 16 August, allparticipants (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation andUzbekistan) voiced strong support for Afghanistan and focused on identifyingpractical measures to implement international programmes aimed at boosting thecountry’s economy (China announced an additional 80 million yuan of developmentassistance), controlling security and the drug-trafficking situation.

IV. Security sector and rule of lawA.Afghan security forcesAfghan National Army30. The Afghan National Army has a current strength of around 40,360 troops, ofwhich approximately 22,000 are consistently present for combat duty. TheAfghanistan Compact calls for a target of 70,000 troops by 2010. A formalizedleave, training and deployment cycle, together with a pay increase, have improvedthe retention of trained forces, although the strain of continual commitment to theintense pace of operations continues to contribute to desertions. Increased trainingand mentoring has improved the army’s capacity to plan and conduct jointoperations with coalition forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)/ISAF. Regular participation by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of theInterior and the National Directorate for Security in coordination and intelligence-sharing meetings indicates a maturing of the national security architecture.

Afghan National Police31. The development of the Afghan National Police has lagged behind that of thearmy; for this reason, additional measures have recently been taken to improve itsperformance. On 1 May, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board decided toincrease the target force size of the police to 82,000. This newly authorized strengthalso includes 18,000 for the Afghan Border Police, 4,995 for the AfghanistanNational Civil Order Police and 11,271 for the Afghan National Auxiliary Police(A/61/799-S/2007/152, para. 27). The resilience of the insurgency has highlightedthe need for a police force with a gendarmerie component that is able to imposeorder and that complements the civilian police force that enforces the law anddetects crimes.32. Another important initiative to accelerate efforts to create a viable police forcewas the launch of the European Police Mission in Afghanistan on 17 June. A total of21 countries, including the non-European Union countries Canada, Croatia, Norwayand Turkey, are participating in the mission. As already noted, serious problemsremain with the performance of the police, many of whose members are involved inthe sale of commissions and other forms of corruption, including direct involvementin narcotics trafficking. On the ground, respect for authority and elementarydiscipline have not yet been instilled, and the actions of the police withincommunities often inspire more fear than confidence in the people. In insurgency-affected areas, the police have therefore not been able to ensure security, even inareas where militants had been cleared following military operations. This cruciallink between institutionalized corruption in the ministry and the consequent inabilityto realize the full gains of counter-insurgency actions needs to be more fullyrecognized and addressed.

International forces and civil/military coordinationInternational forces33. NATO/ISAF forces have grown from 18,500 in July 2006 to 39,500 currently,with troops from 37 countries. The coalition forces led by the United States ofAmerica in Operation Enduring Freedom and the Combined Strategic TransitionCommand-Afghanistan now number close to 10,000. In the past six months, thefocus of the ISAF effort has shifted from the south to the east in response toinfiltration and in order to improve overall security. Sustaining the security effectcreated by these operations relies, however, on capable Afghan national securityforces, and on the Afghan National Police in particular, which are currentlyinadequate in both number and professionalism.34. During the reporting period, the United States command of ISAF improvedcoordination between Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF operations.Nonetheless, the inherent dangers of two forces operating in the same battle spacewith different mandates requires more proactive coordination to ensure success ofthe ISAF mission.Civil military coordination35. The main forum for civil/military coordination at the national level is thePolicy Action Group (A/61/799-S/2007/152, para. 9). The Group has become a

valuable instrument for the coordination of Afghan and international military forcesat the tactical level. Nonetheless, despite the improvements in this area (see para. 30above) the limited scope of Afghan participation in Operation Enduring Freedomand ISAF strategic planning inhibits transmission of valuable political guidancefrom the host nation.36. During the reporting period, UNAMA increased high-level dialogue with theISAF senior leadership, laying the groundwork for the development of an integratedpolitical-military approach in Afghanistan. Complementing this, UNAMAparticipated in civil-military working groups, NATO conferences, ISAF training andprovincial reconstruction team workshops in Afghanistan and abroad. Increasedawareness of the Mission’s role among incoming military staff has ensured thatreconstruction teams seek political guidance, humanitarian expertise andcoordination assistance from UNAMA field offices.

Rule of law37. The Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the AttorneyGeneral continue to experience an enormous deficit of resources (human andfinancial) and infrastructure. The targeting of justice officials, demonstrated recentlyby the deliberate killing of four judges in Ghazni in August, makes it difficult torecruit, deploy and retain justice officials in areas where they are most needed. Lowsalaries (an average of $60 per month for prosecutors and $100 per month forjudges) foster corruption, which undermines public trust in the judicial system.Non-transparent processes for appointments and career advancement, in addition tothe lack of effective mechanisms for accountability and discipline to enforce ethicalcodes of conduct, also need to be addressed.38. In recognition of the need to address these problems, the Conference on Ruleof Law in Afghanistan was held in Rome on 2 and 3 July 2007, which I attendedtogether with President Karzai. The Conference was co-hosted by the Governmentof Italy, the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations, and included high-level delegates from 24 countries. Consensus was reached on the need for a nationaljustice programme and the development of a sector strategy with an Afghan-ledmonitoring and evaluation system overseen by the Joint Coordination andMonitoring Board. Donors also committed to the establishment of a coordinationmechanism at the provincial level and dedicated a total of $360 million to justicereform and the rule of law over a period of five years. Following the Romeconference, a joint donor-Government implementation plan is due to be presented inKabul in October 2007.

40. The unprecedented increase in opium production in 2007 poses a grave threatto reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan. A two-pronged strategy isneeded. The people of the provinces that have become, or are on the brink ofbecoming, free of opium cultivation should be rewarded by enhanced developmentassistance. On the other hand, provinces with expanding opium crops will have to beconfronted with the consequences of violating national laws and generatingresources for insurgents. The international community, drawing on the expertise ofUNODC, should rally behind truly Afghan-led efforts aimed at curbing the drugproblem though the development of the countryside, the promotion of the rule oflaw and the achievement of high standards of governance.41. The increase in poppy cultivation and heroin production in Afghanistan hasencouraged alliances of convenience between narco-interests and insurgents.Following the harvest season, from April to July, for a percentage of the profits,insurgents provided security for traffickers, while Government officials, includingpolice, made tacit non-intervention agreements that allowed the free movement ofchemical precursors and heroin across the borders of Afghanistan. A trilateralagreement signed by Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan in June2007 committed the countries to carry out more joint border operations and toincrease information-sharing. Nonetheless, the financial power of narco-interests,both in Afghanistan and in the neighbouring States through which the contraband issmuggled, is such that they have so far been able to effectively counter Governmentand international efforts to stem or stop the illegal trade.

Disbandment of illegal armed groups42. Renewed momentum behind the project for the disbandment of illegal armedgroups was evident in the progress of the district disarmament initiative, which hasled to the collection of 798 weapons since its launch on 19 April. Tenders forassessed development projects to reward compliance are being issued. However,resistance has been observed in the north-east, north and west, where unverifiedreports of weapons distribution by commanders have increased in recent months, aspreviously reported (A/61/799-S/2007/152, para. 23). Some reports suggest that theongoing viability of the Taliban as a military movement has caused commanders tohold on to their weapons in case the Government is defeated by the Taliban and theextremist group again tries to impose itself on the entire country.43. A conference on the disbandment of illegal armed groups was held in Tokyoon 21 June 2007, co-chaired by Japan, Afghanistan and UNAMA. Participantsagreed on the need to secure personnel, infrastructure and equipment, as well as abudget that would enable the disbandment unit recently established by the Ministryof the Interior to function in a sustainable and independent manner. The conferencefocused on the need to coordinate disbandment, police reform and counter-narcotics,the de-registering of political parties linked to illegal armed groups and thedisqualification of parliamentarians maintaining armed factions or groups.

V. Human rightsA.Human rights and genderHuman rights44. The worsening security conditions and the absence of a consistent rule of law,described above, have had a negative effect on the enjoyment of human rights inAfghanistan, especially the right to life and security, free movement, access toeducation and health and access to livelihood by communities.45. The problems in the judiciary, also described above, have been confirmed bythe Mission’s monitoring of the legal system. In particular, UNAMA has observedchronic judiciary understaffing, corruption and abuse of power leading to violationsof due process. UNAMA and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commissioncontinue to receive and verify complaints of illegal and arbitrary detention, wherepretrial detention timelines are breached, suspects are not given defence counsel andill-treatment and torture are used to force confessions. Very few of those whoserights have been abused are given access to redress mechanisms; this isdisproportionately true for women. Furthermore, UNAMA continues to receivereports of arbitrary denial of justice in disputes over housing, land and propertyrights.46. There are clear signs that freedom of expression is at risk, with continuingreports of arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of journalists. The MediaComplaints Commission, under the Ministry of Information and Culture, lacksindependence and is subject to political interference. There appears to be a generalsentiment, even among some commissioners, that censorship in the currentconditions of conflict and instability is justifiable.47. Progress in implementing the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation andJustice, adopted by the Government in December 2005 and due for completion byend 2008, has been extremely limited. Political support for transitional justice inAfghanistan is almost non-existent. This was exemplified by the adoption of anamnesty law in March 2007 that seriously undermines the Action Plan. However,there are signs that some civil society groups are beginning to organize themselvesaround the issue of transitional justice. The recent discovery of mass graves in theoutskirts of Kabul was a stark reminder of the extent of past abuses. UNAMA andthe Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights brought inforensic experts from Physicians for Human Rights, a non-governmentalorganization, to carry out an assessment. In that regard, families of victims weremobilized to call for justice in respect of the missing and killed. Many Afghans feelthat the time is not yet ripe for a full accounting of past abuses; it is also clear thatthe question cannot be indefinitely postponed. This is an issue on which Afghancivil society will have to take the lead. UNAMA continues to work not only with theAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission, but also with civil society humanrights groups, conducting capacity-building and training activities.Gender48. Strengthening women’s participation and contributions to national peace andreconstruction remain a challenge, although some gains were noted during thereporting period. The ministries and government bodies concerned continue to

pursue the implementation of the gender-specific benchmarks of the AfghanistanCompact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Certain achievementshave been reported, especially in the areas of access to health care, microfinanceand education.49. With regard to education, progress has been achieved in upgrading teachers’skills. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is providing support torebuild schools and teaching facilities in Afghanistan. Over 9,000 female teachershave completed teacher training in the Provinces of Hirat, Jawzjan, Samangan,Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan and Ghazni. A further 225 female teachers have juststarted training in Hirat, while training for nearly 5,000 female teachers is ongoingin the Provinces of Farah and Balkh. It should also be noted, however, that, owing tothe inadequate number of formal schools and qualified teachers, especially femaleteachers, an estimated 2 million children, 1.3 million of them girls, are not coveredby the formal school system. Reports of attacks on schools and threats to teachersand students are plentiful, and risk undermining educational efforts and the gainsachieved to date.50. In pursuance of the benchmarks set by the Compact and the AfghanistanNational Development Strategy, the Government has completed the development ofthe National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan and has presented it toPresident Karzai, who is expected to submit it to his Cabinet for endorsement andimplementation. The Action Plan is the result of extensive consultations withvarious sectors, including consultation workshops in five regions involving 375government and civil society representatives from 26 provinces. The consultationswere conducted by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs with the support of the UnitedNations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UNAMA and civil societycoalitions.51. Raising the capacity of ministries to implement the Action Plan continues to bea great challenge. The Ministry’s capacity to effectively lead, coordinate andmonitor implementation needs to be strengthened. One recent success was thepartnership that the Ministry established with the Civil Service Commission tostrengthen women’s leadership and participation in the civil service. Technicalassistance was provided by UNIFEM.52. Nonetheless, violence against women and discriminatory traditional practicescontinue to infringe on women’s rights. There has been an overall increase in thereporting of violence against women across the country, including cases of self-immolation in the west and south and violence related to child and forced marriages.Reports of honour-related killings are also on the rise, and the failure of authoritiesto investigate and prosecute such cases remains a major concern.53. The Government’s gender equity goals in the Afghan National DevelopmentStrategy remain far from full realization owing to a lack of adequate access toeducation facilities, widespread violence against women, the murder of journalistsand targeting of female activists, teachers, students and Government officials, and aweak political commitment to advancing women’s issues.

Protection of civilians54. Combat operations by both pro- and anti-governmental forces have resulted inthe death or injury of large numbers of non-combatants, and the frequency of suchincidents continues to rise. Against this backdrop, UNAMA has started to monitorclosely the situation of civilians in armed conflict. The Mission has recorded over1,000 civilian deaths from January to 31 August. In many instances, however,security conditions limiting the Mission’s access to combat areas and the politicalsensitivity of the issue make it difficult to gather sufficient information to provide acomprehensive incident report.55. Extensive advocacy regarding the importance of independent verificationefforts of incidents involving civilian casualties has resulted in increased support forindependent reporting. The leadership of international military forces has reacted bysupporting structures to facilitate information-sharing with UNAMA, by announcingmeasures that will be taken to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties, and byconducting after-action reviews in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistanin cases where civilian casualties may have occurred. Many of these positivedevelopments were manifest in the course of a workshop, led by UNAMA and theAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission on the protection of civilians,which was held in August, with the support of the Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs. During the workshop, the most pressing protection challengeswere reviewed, in an effort to lay the foundation for the development of acollaborative protection framework for Afghanistan.

VI. Afghanistan National Development Strategy, JointCoordination and Monitoring Board, andeconomic developmentA.Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the JointCoordination and Monitoring Board56. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board of the Afghanistan Compact,co-chaired by the Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, has evolved into theprimary coordination mechanism between the donor community and theGovernment in delivering progress in key areas and in particular on the AfghanistanNational Development Strategy. While the interim Afghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy, presented at the London Conference in January 2006,continues to guide programming in key development sectors, the full Strategy isbeing finalized for release and implementation in mid-2008. It will articulate howthe Compact goals will be achieved through a set of specific projects andprogrammes that will be costed, prioritized and budgeted. As noted above,subnational consultations were held in all provinces to ensure that the programmesin the Afghanistan National Development Strategy reflect real requirements at theprovincial and district levels.57. At the fifth meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, on1 May, members took important decisions, such as commitments to aid effectivenessand the temporary increase of the police force ceiling from 62,000 to 82,000. Theparticipation of the international community has increased, particularly in the

Economic development58. The Afghan economy remains heavily dependent on international aid flows; itis also considerably distorted by the significant income flows from the illicit drugtrade. Nonetheless, economic developments in the formal sector during the reportingperiod have been generally favourable, although preliminary estimates show adecline in the rate of economic growth from 14 per cent in 2005/06 to 8 per cent in2006/07. Both inflation and exchange rates have remained generally stable.59. On 9 July 2007, the International Monetary Fund and the InternationalDevelopment Association of the World Bank agreed that Afghanistan had taken thesteps necessary to reach its “decision point” under the enhanced Heavily IndebtedPoor Countries Initiative. As a result, it now qualifies for interim debt relief underthe Initiative. In August 2007, the Russian Federation forgave 90 per cent of the$11.13 billion debt dating back to the Soviet era, also clearing the way for theRussian Federation to provide economic assistance to Afghanistan.60. Efforts by both the Government and the international community to build amore prosperous Afghanistan through private sector development are continuing.These efforts were exemplified by the Enabling Environment Conferenceco-sponsored by the Aga Khan Development Network and held on 6 and 7 June, atwhich officials of the Government of Afghanistan, private sector figures, civilsociety leaders and donor community representatives agreed on a series of actionsdesigned to create a favourable climate for the country’s struggling private sector.

VII. Humanitarian situation and human securityA.Humanitarian situation61. Humanitarian access has become a growing challenge; at least 78 districtshave been rated by the United Nations as extremely risky, and therefore inaccessibleto United Nations agencies. The delivery of humanitarian assistance has alsobecome increasingly dangerous. The World Food Programme (WFP) and itsimplementing partners have experienced multiple attacks on food convoys, whileseveral non-governmental organizations, and increasingly those carrying out thevital and dangerous task of demining, have had both national and international staffattacked or killed on road missions. The displacement of populations in the southowing to insecurity required the provision of humanitarian assistance in the form offood and non-food items to at least 4,000 families by United Nations agencies.62. More positively, the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority,supported by UNAMA and UNDP, is improving its humanitarian response capacity.

In particular, the use of Government air assets has helped to both rescue andtransport assistance to populations in dire need following flooding in ParwanProvince.63. There has also been commendable progress in the delivery of health care.Following the polio eradication campaign in 2006, there were only 9 confirmedpolio cases in Afghanistan between January and July 2007, compared to 19 in thesame period in 2006. Seven of the nine cases were in the south, where the securitysituation has limited the access of vaccination teams. In August, Afghanistan andPakistan launched parallel campaigns to vaccinate over 40 million children againstpolio in both countries.64. Pursuant to resolution 1746 (2007), UNAMA, with the assistance of the Officefor the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has continued to strengthen itshumanitarian coordination role, including its disaster management capacity inregional offices and at the provincial level.

Human security65. Following a bumper wheat harvest of 4.5 million tons, the Government isreporting a smaller food shortage for 2007, decreasing the amount of food suppliesWFP will have to provide. The country will be 91 per cent self-sufficient in cerealproduction, estimated at 5.6 million tons (80 per cent of which is wheat). TheGovernment should have a strategic stockpile of 20,000-40,000 tons, some of whichwill be pre-positioned for the winter in remote provinces.66. Although food production increased in the reporting period (because ofincreased rainfall), access to food has actually decreased owing to the deterioratingsecurity situation and poor infrastructure. Flooding and landslides have caused lossof life and property in vulnerable regions, exacerbating inaccessibility problems andrequiring a response from United Nations agencies, which have assisted more than200,000 families.67. The number of children receiving an education in Afghanistan continued torise during the reporting period, reaching 6.07 million, 2.17 million of whom weregirls. This marks the highest number of children ever enrolled in school in Afghanhistory. UNICEF reports that attacks on schools from January to July in 2007 havebeen fewer than the same period in 2006, down from 68 to 27. However, theshooting of schoolgirls in June in the Province of Logar, in which three were killedand eight wounded, was the first time that schoolgirls had been deliberately targetedby anti-Government elements. By June, insecurity had forced 412 of 721 schools toclose in the insurgency-affected Provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Hilmand andZabul. However, 72 schools had reopened by August.68. Since 2000, Afghans have seen a steady drop in the infant mortality rate(3.5 per cent) and the maternal mortality rate (6.6 per cent), a trend which continues.Furthermore, a total of 82 per cent of the population is now covered by a basicpackage of health-care services. In addition, more than 132 million square metres ofland have been cleared of mines, and 84 per cent of the ring road is now open.69. The closure of the Kacha Gari refugee camp in Pakistan in July wasresponsible for 40 per cent of the approximately 91,000 refugees repatriated fromPakistan during the reporting period. On 22 August, faced with indications of

increased pressure on tens of thousands of refugees to leave Jalozai camp in amanner that would lead to a humanitarian crisis during the winter months, UNHCRsuccessfully appealed to the Government of Pakistan to suspend the closure of thiscamp. Refugee returns from the Islamic Republic of Iran are at 4,500, suggestingthat overall figures for Afghanistan for 2007 will be below last year’s figure of139,000, itself the lowest repatriation total since 2001. While the political profile ofdeportations from the Islamic Republic of Iran has been higher in 2007 than in2006, the 170,000 recorded to date represents only a 14 per cent increase over 2006.Although reports indicate that most returning refugees have headed to the north,centre and west, lack of access for aid agencies to some areas of return is a concern,especially Farah Province, as well as the areas along the border with Pakistan.

VIII. Mission operations and support70. Despite the challenges posed by increased violence in different parts of thecountry, UNAMA has been able to implement its mandate and complete itsprogrammed expansion by opening offices in Day Kundi and Ghor Provinces, inApril and July, respectively. The Mission’s commitment to this expansion, whichrepresents more than a doubling of the number of field offices in nine months,despite the spread of insecurity, has been welcomed by the Government, localcommunities and international partners. Over the coming months, UNAMA willfocus on consolidating its current presence of eight fully integrated regional officesand nine provincial offices, ensuring that they are adequately staffed and supported.71. The Mission’s field presence will provide provincial government andnon-government stakeholders with crucial capacity-building and coordinationsupport (including in the security sector), as well as allow political outreach todisaffected groups, particularly in the south, through provision of good offices.72. The Mission’s engagement at the provincial level will be critical ahead of thelaunch of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy in March 2008. As aresult, UNAMA will request an increase in the number of international posts forregional and provincial offices in its 2008 budget. The strong presence ofinternational staff is particularly critical, given the increased work in support ofpolitical outreach, which necessarily requires a neutral and impartial approach thatinternational staff can better provide. UNAMA will continue to rely on and workclosely with national staff to facilitate sustainable capacity-building of Afghanhuman capital.73. Security Council resolution 1746 (2007) reinforced certain dimensions of theMission’s engagement in Afghanistan. These new responsibilities — to promote amore coherent international engagement, to monitor and to engage in protection ofcivilians, and to develop synergies with ISAF — require additional resources andconsolidation of capacity. Fulfilment of the strengthened mandate in thischallenging security environment requires an increase in key personnel, includingthe police and military advisory units.

IX. Observations74.As the transition in Afghanistan comes under increasing strain owing toinsurgency, weak governance and the narco-economy, the Government ofAfghanistan, supported by the international community, will need todemonstrate political will by taking the bold steps necessary to recapture theinitiative in each of these fields and restore confidence to the population intangible ways. Without stronger leadership from the Government, greaterdonor coherence — including improved coordination between the military andcivilian international engagement in Afghanistan — and a strong commitmentfrom neighbouring countries, many of the security, institution-building anddevelopment gains made since the Bonn Conference may yet stall or even bereversed.75.The most urgent priority must be an effective, integrated civilian-militarystrategy and security plan for Afghanistan. A coordinated military response isstill needed to defeat insurgent and terrorist groups, but success in the mediumterm requires the engagement of communities and the provision of lastingsecurity in which development can take place. To achieve that end, Afghancivilian and military leaders need to play a greater role in planning securityoperations and ensuring that military gains are consolidated with the provisionof basic security by State institutions. At the same time, the different goals andmovements within the insurgency present opportunities for political outreachand inclusion that must be seized.76.A key to sustaining security gains in the long term is increasing thecapability, autonomy and integrity of the Afghan National Security Forces,especially the Afghan National Police. The Government and its partners shoulddevelop, through the International Police Coordination Board, a unified visionfor police reform and definitive structure for the national police that addressesthe requirements of both law enforcement and counter-insurgency. It must alsotighten financial and administrative accountability to end corruption andabsenteeism in police ranks.77.An effective, integrated and coherent Government-led subnationalgovernance programme should be developed in partnership with theinternational community. The Government must be prepared to take painfuldecisions now to bring credibility to emerging institutions. It should avoidrotating underperforming officials into new positions, especially in theprovinces, and replace them instead with effective administrators who bothenjoy the confidence of the population, including tribal and religious leaders,and display a capacity to manage security, development and reconstructionprocesses in their provinces and districts. The extension of central authorityand the stabilization of the country will be possible only if the Ministry of theInterior resolutely tackles corruption and improves popular perceptions of thepolice.78.Building on the successes at the Conference on the Rule of Law inAfghanistan, the Government should finalize the justice sector strategy andbegin implementation of the emerging national justice programme fundedthrough the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The Government shouldsimultaneously address the apparent impunity enjoyed by those Government

officials perceived to be abusing their offices. ISAF should support Governmentefforts to enforce the law and to implement the project for the disbandment ofillegal armed groups in areas less affected by the insurgency.79.The continued increase in opium production poses an increasingly gravethreat to reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan. The Governmentmust prioritize interdiction and bring drug traffickers to justice. Theinternational community, supported by a strengthened UNODC, should unitebehind a truly Afghan-led plan that moves beyond eradication efforts, whichhave proved ineffective in isolation.80.The finalization and the future funding of the Afghanistan NationalDevelopment Strategy must remain the overriding focus of donor engagement.Following its expected launch in March 2008, careful management of publicexpectations, follow-up at the provincial and district levels and furtheroutreach that builds on the initial consultations will be crucial to the credibilityof the Strategy. If the Strategy is to become an enduring vehicle for partnershipbetween the Government and people of Afghanistan, it must be seen to delivergenuine results in response to priorities defined by the communities themselves.81.The Government of Afghanistan has demonstrated its determination tocontribute to regional security and prosperity by means of a series of majorregional foreign policy achievements, including the Afghanistan-Pakistan peacejirga, the visit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Kabul andPresident Karzai’s participation in the summit of the Shanghai CooperationOrganization in Bishkek. The Government must retain the trust of itsneighbours by engaging constructively in bilateral and multilateral initiatives,including on the counter-narcotics and migration issues, and by building itscapacity to manage and deepen complex bilateral relationships.82.The recognition by Presidents Karzai and Musharraf at the peace jirga inKabul of the cross-border nature of the insurgency provides a uniqueopportunity for their respective countries to pursue a joint strategy for cross-border peace and security, aimed at defeating extremism and terrorism in bothcountries.83.National reconciliation will require agreement as to which insurgentleaders ought to be subject to military operations or law enforcement. It willalso require both Afghanistan and Pakistan to undertake outreach and dialoguewith those political forces capable of contributing to a peace process. It will bevital for all Member States to ensure implementation of the sanctions providedfor under resolution 1267 (1999) and to include new insurgent and terroristleaders on the consolidated list or remove them after reconciliation, asappropriate.84.The Government of Afghanistan must investigate allegations of arbitrarydetentions, inhumane treatment and torture of detainees by the authorities, andin particular by the National Directorate for Security. The Government shouldinvite the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman ordegrading treatment or punishment and the Working Group on ArbitraryDetention to visit Afghanistan as part of a cooperative process to combatarbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment. The Government should renew

its political commitment towards the full implementation of the Action Plan onPeace, Reconciliation and Justice.85.Presidential elections are due to be held in 2009. The upcoming cycle ofelections will require urgent attention by both the Government and theNational Assembly in order to ensure the adoption of the electoral law by theend of 2007. I reiterate my appeal to donors to meet the remaining shortfallfrom past Afghan elections and provide the resources necessary to support anew voter registry, capacity-building for the Independent ElectoralCommission and planning and preparations for the elections themselves.86.The United Nations will remain fully engaged in Afghanistan and continueto play its central and impartial coordinating role. I personally visitedAfghanistan in July and shortly thereafter co-chaired the Conference on theRule of Law in Afghanistan in Rome. I will, in addition, co-chair a high-levelconference on Afghanistan in September with President Karzai, in the marginsof the General Assembly. I shall continue to remain personally engaged inworking with President Karzai and other partners to ensure success inAfghanistan.87.Finally, I would also like to pay tribute to the dedicated efforts of mySpecial Representative and the staff of the United Nations in Afghanistan, whocontinue to carry out their mission under difficult and increasingly dangerouscircumstances, and whose courage and commitment to Afghanistan have beenessential to the progress achieved so far.