1.      Military transformation and the
Revolution in Military Affairs is not as forthright a process as it was
perceived only several years ago. The globalisation and the boom of
information, computing, networking, satellite and precision technologies all
have tremendous implications for the defence and security sector. The extensive
use of modern technologies in the offensive campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq enabled the military to achieve an unprecedented operational tempo and
precision, and to win wars in the course of several weeks, instead of years, as
was the case in the not too distant past. The high-tech side of military
transformation proved to be enormously promising, prompting a number of states to
assign a significant part of their military budget to programmes such as
Network-Enabled Capability (NEC).
2.      The recent experience of allied
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated, however, that high-tech is not an
answer to everything. While new technologies are critical to winning wars, they
seem to be ill-equipped to winning peace. These technologies, although helpful
in some cases, are not the ultimate answer when it comes to fighting small
groups of insurgents or maintaining order in post-conflict areas. Thus, there
is an increasing understanding that the process of military transformation
should incorporate not only cutting-edge technologies but also focus on counter‑insurgency
and peacekeeping capabilities. This understanding is expressed in the latest US
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. These two trends of transformation sometimes
can be mutually contradicting. For example, network-enabled and unmanned
capabilities can be expected to significantly reduce the need for manpower to
be deployed in the areas of conflict, whereas counter-insurgency missions would
imply the opposite.
3.      While bearing in mind this
two-fold nature of military transformation, in this report, the Rapporteur will
address the topic of advanced military technology, which is a natural subject
for the Science and Technology Committee. This report will particularly focus
on two most prominent nascent capabilities – network-enabled and unmanned
systems – that promise to revolutionise the way military operations are carried
out in the 21st century. The new technologies raise a number of
issues of vital importance for policy-makers: how the increased importance of
information security will affect the functioning of military alliances? Will
these developments lead to a greater synergy of efforts or will they result in
an unprecedented technology divide? Will NATO maintain its relevance or will
the focus shift towards coalitions of several most trusted partners? Should
technology transfer policies become more flexible or tougher? Should the
Alliance develop its own network-enabled and unmanned systems, or should it be
the exclusive responsibility of member states? Are the new sophisticated
technologies instrumental when it comes to fighting terrorism, or do these
technologies provide yet another tool for terrorists? How will these
technologies alter the military decision-making hierarchy: will decision-making
be more effective or more chaotic? Will human control of autonomous
war-fighting systems be maintained? Should there be an international convention
to address possible proliferation of these technologies? All these questions
are of paramount political relevance, and therefore it is crucial that
legislators systematically follow the developments of network-enabled and
unmanned technologies and do not disregard the issue as a merely technical one.
4.      Net-centricity, the military
expression of the Information Age, is a relatively new concept, coined and
introduced by US Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski
and John J. Garstka, Assistant Director of the US Office of Force
Transformation, in their article “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and
Future†in 1998. Net-centricity is not merely about sharing information between
different branches of the armed forces using modern technology. The virtue of
network-enabled capability (NEC) is that it creates an added value by providing
all battlespace entities with real- or near-to-real time access to the information
exchange system and thus dramatically reduces the ‘fog of war’. The three most
prominent experts of NEC, David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and
Frederick P. Stein defined net-centricity as:
"An
information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased
combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to achieve
shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations,
greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronisation.
In essence, [network-centric warfare] translates information superiority into
combat power".
5.      Thus, NEC is about fundamentally
improving sensor-to-shooter capabilities (C4ISTAR – command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance) that become a critical, rather than supplementary, element of
military capabilities. Just like in business, new technologies and better
co-ordination of efforts generate “mass-effects†and maximise the efficiency of
armed forces. In the Information Age, information is redefining the concepts of
mass, manoeuvre, firepower and logistics.
6.      The rudiments of NEC have already
been tested in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq.
However, NEC is still in a nascent phase. According to Terrence Morgan,
Director of Net-Centric Operations, Cisco Systems, in today's operational
environment, sensor and shooter have too much separation: bandwidth is limited
with choke points and interoperability issues, infrastructure is too diverse
and complex to support 'plug-and-play', and time to field “new†applications is
unacceptably long.
7.      In addition to technical issues,
NEC requires revolutionary changes in command and control (C2). The traditional
hierarchical C2 structure is not flexible enough to deal with a situation when
even low-level commanders have access to all relevant information and are in a
position to make a decision without waiting for instructions from their
superiors.
-
a relentless drive for innovation may hurt
security
-
wishful thinking becomes strategy
-
bureaucracy takes over the dynamics of war
-
command and control loses its human dimension
-
machines replace humans
-
overwhelming power disdains war diplomacy.
10.    The United States is an
undisputed global leader and pioneer in developing NEC. The Network-Centric
Warfare (NCW) programme is at the heart of the US transformation strategy, as
defined in the Joint Vision 2020. According to Former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “our (US) ability to leverage the power of
information and networks will be key to our successâ€. By 2012, NCW should reach full capability,
which will include a single network of sensors, deciders and shooters; IP
addressable warriors, weapons and sensors; and commanders’ shared awareness and
knowledge.
11.    Major American network-enabled
capabilities are:
-
Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG system
will be the largest information network in the world and the key element of US
network-centric capabilities. Based on commercial technologies, it will provide
processing, storage, management, and transport of information to support all
DoD, national security, and related Intelligence Community missions and
functions. GIG capabilities will be available from all operating locations:
bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed
sites. The GIG will interface with allied, coalition, and non-GIG systems.
Next-generation satellites will provide massive amounts of real-time
information to platforms and weapon systems deployed on the tactical edge.
Every square metre of the globe will have its own IP address, thus enabling
effective tracking of all actors on the battlefield. The $34 billion programme
should be completed by 2011. Thanks
to GIG, deployed American soldiers will no longer be at the mercy of someone
remote from the fight determining what information they need.
-
FBCB2-Blue Force Tracking. This satellite-based
system is credited with creating battlefield picture during the Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and enabling US and British armed forces to track each other’s and the
enemy’s positions.
-
LandWarNet. Includes all
networks of US ground forces - from sustaining military bases to
forward-deployed forces. It
provides for processing, storing, and transporting information over a seamless
network. Its main enabler, the $10 billion Warfighter
Information Network‑Tactical (WIN-T), will be the backbone communications
network for the US Army and is expected to provide enhanced digital C4ISR
capabilities that are mobile, secure, survivable and seamless. The first Army
unit is scheduled to field WIN-T by 2008.
-
FORCEnet is the Navy’s equivalent of LandWarNet.
FORCEnet, as integrated information technology architectural framework, will
link warfighters ashore, at sea and in the air.
-
ConstellationNet, the US Air Force counterpart
of LandWarNet and FORCEnet, will store and communicate voice, data, imagery and
video information and will serve as the interface to GIG.
-
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a critical communication tool for ground and air forces and a pivotal
US transformation programme. JTRS is a class of software-defined radios,
intended to replace a massive assortment of conventional military radios that
are built to different standards and operate on different fixed frequencies. By
introducing a common set of standards, JTRS will considerably facilitate
interoperability of joint forces and dramatically increase the amount of data
that can be transmitted. JTRS will provide not only
voice communication but also instantaneous video and data download and network
connectivity. JTRS-equipped troops and platforms would be able to log onto the
network much like a wireless computer can pick up a signal and connect to the
Internet. However, despite the significant promise of JTRS, the US Government
Accountability Office found that a number of related management and technical
issues must be overcome. For example, integrating the radio’s hardware
onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power
limitations has been a longstanding challenge that must be overcome.
12.    Besides the United States, of all
the NATO countries, only the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy consider
network-centricity a priority in their military transformation efforts. The
United Kingdom has the most conceptual approach with its Network-Enabled
Capabilities Initiative. Having recently achieved the initial
state of interconnection, the United Kingdom expects to reach the stage of
"full integration" by 2015 and "full synchronization" by
2025. The UK is also the only Ally that has
participated in network centric operations: the British Expeditionary Forces
were granted access to exploit American networks during the Iraqi campaign.
Examples of British network-centric capabilities include Bowman, Cormorant, DII (Future Deployed) and Falcon digital
communications systems; the SKYNET 5 next-generation
military satellite communications system; the Watchkeeper UAV (Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle) for ISTAR missions; ASTOR ground surveillance system and OPLOC system
designed to track personnel on operations.
16.    NEC is becoming a buzzword within
the Alliance and one of the key elements of its military transformation. The
Riga Summit Declaration made a reference to NEC and NEC-related programmes
emphasising the need to:
-
work to develop a NATO
Network‑Enabled Capability to share information, data and intelligence
reliably, securely and without delay in Alliance operations, while improving
protection of our key information systems against cyber attacks;
-
[activate] an Intelligence
Fusion Centre to improve information and intelligence sharing for Alliance
operations;
-
[continue] progress in the
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme, with a view to achieving real
capabilities to support Alliance forces.
17.    NATO Network-Enabled Capability
(NNEC) is being developed by NATO agencies both in Norfolk (ACT Information
Superiority & NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities Integrated Capability Team
- IS&NNEC) and Brussels (NATO Command Control and Communications Agency -
NC3A). The ACT team is preparing a strategic framework and a road map that will
modernize joint Alliance capabilities and enable NATO to create a truly
networked force, while NC3A is striving to create technical standards and
templates for new architectures. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, former Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, testified that NEC “underpins all of
what we're doing [at ACT]â€. NATO
agencies have prepared the NNEC Feasibility Study which provides the basis upon
which the requirements that the Alliance as a whole has to address to achieve a
network-enabled capability are pulled together. The remaining challenge lies in
enforcement and governance.
18.    NEC is particularly critical in the
context of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was declared fully operational
at the Riga Summit in November 2006. The absence of
joint network architecture might seriously impede the viability of this
rotational multinational force and, particularly, its ability to operate with
the United States after every rotation. Therefore, the ACT IS&NNEC team is assigned
to analyse the differences in each six-month NRF rotation and develop the
common core network-centric capability for the Force.
-
The NATO Air Command And Control System (ACCS) is a €1.5 billion project intended to provide a unified air C2 system, enabling NATO’s European nations to
seamlessly manage all types of air operations over their territory, and beyond.
ACCS will incorporate the most modern technologies, and will enable NATO
members to adapt to the requirements of network-centric operations. ACCS will provide an initial operational capability within the next few years.
21.    Various interoperability committees
and fora under the aegis of NATO are usually very productive and constructive.
As Keith Hooey, the representative of Canada in some of these meeting,
testified to the Committee, national experts usually manage to reach consensus
on recommendations for operational procedures, information architectures, and
information exchange technologies. The very constructive attitude was most
notable among the US participants. However, when the assembled experts agree on
how to proceed, it generally means one or more states must change the direction
of one or more of its major system acquisitions, at considerable economic
penalty. They may agree in principle to change direction, but commitments to a
schedule are difficult to extract. This requires political will at the highest
levels.
22.    From the technological standpoint,
in order to effectively participate in network-centric operations, coalition
partners need, firstly, to have the necessary technology and, secondly, to be
able to connect to their partners’ networks. Even if military commanders were
granted significant authority to release pertinent information in a timely
manner, they may lack technical means for doing so, releasing what is necessary
without opening sensitive non-relevant files. As one study asserted, in
coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003, US Central Command
(CENTCOM) had to deal with more than 84 different coalition networks, of which
only 26 had an acceptable level of security. Under these circumstances,
interoperability and information exchange among coalition partners was often
sluggish and virtually non-existent. These data-exchange problems, for example, constrained the
operational tempo of the British forces by the
inability to access US targeting systems such as JSTARS and Global Hawk.
23.    Responding to these challenges, the
United States Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) has recently fielded
the Combined Enterprise Regional Exchange System (CENTRIXS), designed to allow
the United States to securely and seamlessly exchange operational-tactical
information with its coalition and mission partners in Afghanistan and Iraq.
CENTRIXS is a combination of multilateral and bilateral networks and it
includes 77 participating states. More than 26,000 people use the system at 150
sites worldwide.
However, CENTRIXS lacks a comprehensive security
system and is not connected to other classified networks. Therefore, in order
to transfer information between the national and CENTRIXS environments,
additional infrastructure such as terminals and communications links is
required.
24.    On the strategic-operational level,
the US has established the classified “Griffin†network designed to facilitate
communication among defence planners using secure e-mail and chat services.
Only a handful of states - the closest US partners and those that develop
network-centric capabilities - are authorised to access the Griffin. According to Dr. Linton Wells II, the US Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration),
“We need to move
beyond present coalition networks like CENTRIXS and Griffin to truly
multinational information systems, but this will take hard work both in
designing the systems and in constructing the information sharing policies to
support them.â€
25.    Connectivity itself is not
difficult to achieve. NEC technologies are based on the same standards used in
civilian sector. In fact, these technologies are mostly developed not by covert
military laboratories, but by commercial companies such as Cisco Systems,
Ericsson or Boeing. The US military, and increasingly NATO, use Internet
protocols (TCP/IP) for command, control and communications. One major
implication, however, is the existence of one dominant player that sets these
standards. Just like computer software and hardware companies realise that
their products would be worthless if not compatible with Microsoft Windows
operating system, so producers of NEC technologies have to adjust to the
SIPRNET, which is the national network of the world’s leading military power.
26.    The NATO C3 Agency, responsible for
implementation of NNEC, suggests a service‑oriented
rather than system-design-oriented approach, i.e., moving from a closed black‑box
system architecture to a ‘system-of-systems’ where differently developed
systems could plug in and interoperate. This will require a different set of
technical non-proprietary standards that remain to be developed. Such an
approach will help to diminish the cost for NATO countries seeking to
participate in network-enabled operations, as it will not require procurement
of completely new equipment. However, some Allies, particularly new NATO
members, have a different position: they have a relatively ‘clean slate’ as
their C4ISR technologies are either utterly obsolete or non-existent. These
states have to build their communication and information systems infrastructure
almost from scratch, thus making it easier to avoid problems of compatibility.
27.    Another important NEC-related
technological challenge is the growing demand for radio frequencies for
military use. The electromagnetic
spectrum is the key enabler of NEC and wireless
communications are becoming indispensable in modern-day military operations.
However, the spectrum of frequencies is a limited natural resource, which needs
to be carefully managed and co-ordinated in order to avoid bottlenecks. The
problem is aggravated by the fact that the demand for bandwidth is skyrocketing
in the commercial sector as well. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has taken
a number of initiatives to tackle this issue by encouraging new spectrum management technologies, and updating its governance
rules on the military use of the spectrum. Nevertheless, additional high-level guidance, including the involvement of NATO, is necessary
to accommodate the frequency needs of networked coalition forces. According to Paige Atkins, director of the US Defense Spectrum Organization
(DSO), the challenge is to find new ways for Allies to share the spectrum: “as
the environment gets much more crowded, we have to find new ways of
understanding when systems are not using pieces of the spectrum, to be able to
more efficiently use themâ€.
28.    Protection of networks is another
technical challenge of paramount importance. As information is the key facet of
NEC, its security is of critical importance. Digital information can be easily
changed, added, deleted or disseminated. The problem of malicious interference,
identity fraud or “malicious insiders†poses a serious security threat.
Therefore, it is understandable why the increasingly networked US military
sector has been alarmed by reports that China is developing a cyberwar
capability. According to Pentagon officials, China’s competence in information
technology has evolved from defending its own networks to attacking the
networks of adversaries.
China’s ability to threaten satellite systems, which are critically important
to the American military, was prominently displayed in January 2007, when an
anti-satellite weapon was used against an aging weather
satellite. Thus, the biggest challenge is to find an
optimal solution that would permit a seamless flow of information among
authorised entities and personnel, at the same time preserving the integrity of
the network.
31.    Technical experts can rapidly agree
on standards for enabling NEC, but this does not solve a persistent information
release problem. According to Mr. Keith Hooey, one could even sense that there
is a willingness for commanders of multi-national forces to be more forthcoming
of critical elements of information, but they are blocked by policies in many
cases. A means for negotiating and distributing release policies in near-real
time is required to take full advantage of NEC.
32.    High-ranking NATO officials also
emphasise the importance of political and cultural aspects of networked
interoperability. For example, Mr. Dag Wilhelmsen, NC3A General Manager, stated
that the political and cultural arenas pose a greater challenge to NEC than
technical architectures and standards. As a solution, he suggested that the
NATO C3 Agency could act as "an unbiased coherent agentâ€, assisting states
in finding good, workable solutions between national systems and international
infrastructures.
33.    The political challenge of
net-centricity basically comes down to the question of trust between the United
States and its allies. As the US armed forces are becoming increasingly
network-enabled, the security of its networks might become more important than
co-operation with partners. Unless the US has complete trust in its allies it
would be reluctant to grant access to its military networks. While Europe is
benefiting from American technology in programmes like Joint Tactical Radio
System, Global Hawk, MEADS or night-vision devices, the list of critical US NCW‑related
projects with limited, no-release policy, is also quite extensive and includes
programmes such as Future Combat System (FCS), Future Battle Command - Brigade
and Below (FBCB2), Blue Force Tracking (BFT), Army Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS) and Warfighter’s Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T).
35.    In the unipolar world of Pax
Americana, the US leaders will be increasingly facing an acute dilemma:
while the US will continue to need allies in its military operations for
political reasons, the effectiveness of these operations can be compromised by
inclusion of other states’ forces. In other words, the main question for the
American policy-makers is whether the US national interests would be better
guarded and foreign policy goals better achieved by:
-
keeping its global military supremacy
unchallenged, although at the expense of losing its partners; or
-
building multinational coalitions, but risking
its military pre-eminence.
36.    Thus, albeit unintentionally, the
development of NEC will have serious repercussions for the integrity of the
Alliance. The strive for security of relevant information is likely to force
the American leaders to opt for ad hoc “coalitions of the willingâ€
rather than NATO as a whole. The experience with the War in Iraq has
demonstrated that NATO members can have very different philosophies with regard
to foreign policy and defence strategy. Therefore, releasing sensitive
information to all Allies might seem awkward and perilous from the US
standpoint. Officially, the US strategic documents, such as the Quadriennal
Defense Review (QDR) or the US National Security Strategy, emphasise the need
for the allies. In reality, however, the latest developments induced the then
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to state that the US must “avoid trying
so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals
or jeopardise the command structureâ€. As
Paul T.Mitchel has put it, NEC “may be painting the US into a very secure
digital cornerâ€.
38.    While NEC and unmanned systems are
two different technological developments, there is a great degree of cohesion
between them. In a way, emerging drone technology is a physical extension of
NEC. Network-centric C4ISTAR systems will increasingly depend on Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) as a tool to collect intelligence and reconnaissance data and
even to attack targets. Unmanned vehicles, on the other hand, cannot operate
without being plugged into the network. Given that unmanned systems tend to
become increasingly autonomous, it will be essential for them to be connected
to other sensors in the theatre so that they could independently make
corrections to their flight path in order to complete their mission. Both NEC
and unmanned systems are expected to dramatically reduce the need for deployed
troops and increase their survivability.
39.    The emergence of unmanned,
autonomous and robotic technologies is often perceived as the next wave of
technological revolution. The most prominent technology gurus, such as
Bill Gates, predict that the world is at the dawn of the age of robots. He
compared the current state of robotics industry to that of computers in
mid-1970s, when he and Paul Allen launched Microsoft. Mr. Gates envisioned that
robotics will open “a new era, when the PC will get up off the desktop and
allow us to see, hear, touch and manipulate objects in places where we are not
physically presentâ€. He also stated that autonomous systems “will be a central
feature of security systems.†Microsoft even launched Microsoft Robotics in
order to earn a prominent place in the new field, which is expected to grow
ten-fold by 2025.
40.    From a
technological standpoint, there is an important difference between
“remotely-piloted†and “autonomous†systems. While every move of the
remotely-piloted (or “uninhabitedâ€) vehicle is remotely controlled and guided
by a trained officer, autonomous systems (or “dronesâ€) are able to perform various tasks, including obstacle avoidance and situation
assessment, with minimal or no intervention from a remote human operator. As
the experts of BAE Systems, the largest European defence company, testified to
the members of the STC during the Sub-Committee visit to London, autonomous
systems have clear advantages over remotely-piloted ones, as they better react
to changing environment and never get tired or bored. The challenge is,
however, how to programme an autonomous vehicle in a way that it would change
its course when confronted with unforeseen obstacles, but would still continue
to execute its mission. One of the solutions is defining an aerial ‘corridor’
within which a drone could have liberty to alter its trajectory. The BAE
Systems experts noted that the United States is clearly in the lead when it
comes to developing and especially fielding the remotely-piloted vehicles,
while in R&D (Research & Development) of autonomous systems, Europe is
rapidly catching up. BAE Systems' Corax UAV, for
example, is fully autonomous and has demonstrated its reliability. It also has
to be noted that not only aerial systems are going autonomous. Israel recently
introduced a system called “See-Shoot†along its 60-km border with Gaza. This
system – consisting of sensors and gun turrets – will initially be controlled
by humans, but eventually will operate autonomously.
42.    At first glance, UAS have many advantages:
-
First and foremost, unmanned systems save lives
by removing pilots from the cockpit. UAS are expected to take over the
so-called 3D (dull-dirty-dangerous) missions. The use of ground or underwater
drones is already widespread in demining operations.
-
Leaving some troops at home yields clear
logistical benefits. Equipment and manpower does not have to move forward. This
reduces the amount of lift, lodging, catering and security forces needed to
support troops in the theatre.
-
The price constitutes a strong incentive too. A
F16 fighter aircraft costs US$ 30 million, while a MQ-9 Reaper, the latest US
combat drone (UCAV) with a payload capacity approaching that of the F16, costs
approximately US$ 7 million. Moreover, UCAV could be a cheaper alternative to
skyrocketing costs of some fighter programmes in which NATO member states are
involved (For instance one F35 Joint Strike Fighter costs US$ 100 million and a
F22 Raptor US$ 200 million while the estimated costs of X-45 UCAV is US$
40 million.)
-
Their long endurance is also an asset. Close air
support aircrafts generally orbit 30 minutes over the battlefield before having
to leave for refuelling. In comparison, a MQ-1 Predator could fly as much as 24
hours over the target area. Nonetheless, these aircrafts do not have
air-refuelling capabilities, and are still extremely slow, needing more time to
reach their mission area.
-
UAS can be updated more frequently and in
reasonable cost, thus making them much more flexible and attractive than manned
aircraft when it comes to meeting new emerging threats. UAS have already proved
to be effective against asymmetric threats. For example, the US has developed
tactical UAVs called BUSTER, weighting 1.5 kg. Soldiers in missions can carry
these systems in their bags and launch them to get extraordinary situational
awareness in the area.
-
Finally, removing humans from the cockpit opens
the gates for technological innovations that were previously unimaginable.
Indeed, the presence of humans puts very strict limitations on the size, shape,
speed, altitude and many other technical characteristics of an aircraft. Without these limitations, engineers can
create machines that would change our understanding of what an aircraft can do
and it could look like. Unmanned systems that exist today range from miniature
Wasp, which weights less than 225 grams an is only 20 cm long, to Global Hawk,
weighting more than 14 tons and being 15 meters long.
43.    Nevertheless, serious pitfalls command attention. First of
all, the massive number of UAVs in congested skies dramatically complicates air
traffic control. Because altitudes below 3000ft are usually crowded with
helicopters, low-flying aircrafts and “blind†UAVs, crashes can occur and
reportedly occurred at least three times in Afghanistan since the war
operations began. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, “the
current UAV accident rate is 100 times that of manned aircraftâ€. High UAV accident rates even forced the US
military to put inscriptions in Arabic written on their fuselage of UAVs
fielded in Afghanistan, saying that a bounty will be offered if lost vehicles
are handed back to their owners. Equipping UAVs with collision avoidance system
or transponders is impractical for any but the largest. As a consequence they
do not meet civilian regulations and therefore would not be allowed to fly in
civilian airspace. Hence, detecting and avoiding airborne objects is the most
pressing and technically challenging task for engineers.
44.    There is a serious danger of UAVs
being used as a terrorist weapon. Being in many ways similar to cruise missiles
and capable of flying at low altitudes, they make ground control systems unable
to detect intrusion of a hostile UAS, particularly the small ones.
Hypothetically, hostile groups could either convert an anti-ship cruise missile
into one capable of flying over land or convert a small aircraft into an armed
UAV. According to the Director General of Intelligence for Canada’s armed
forces, terrorist groups have already purchased ultra-light aircraft and
hang-gliders. Furthermore, the existing
multinational non-proliferation and export-control regimes seem to be
ill-equipped to handle UAV transfers. According to prominent
defence analyst Dennis Gormley, unarmed UAVs can be transformed into armed ones
simply by changing their payload, meaning that an unmanned UAV purchased for
one stated purpose could easily be converted into a weapon.
45.    Military UAS have been used in reconnaissance and
intelligence-gathering role since the 1950s, and more challenging roles are
envisioned, including combat missions, detection of WMD (Weapons of Mass
Destruction), emergency supplies delivery, etc. UAS manufacturers even began
working on civilian applications, such as protection against natural disaster,
maritime surveillance and forest fire detection.
46.    Nonetheless, explosive interest for unmanned aircrafts has
been slow to come. In the early 1990s the United States DoD sought UAS to
satisfy surveillance requirements in close range, short range or endurance
categories. Close
range missions were defined to be within 50 km and performed by man-portable
micro UAS at the platoon/section level. “Short Range†was defined as within
200km, the range of Tactical UAS (TUAS), the most commonly used. Finally
strategic UAS took on the endurance missions in either HALE mode (High Altitude
Long Endurance) or MALE mode (Medium Altitude Long Endurance). With their
stealth, speed, payload, price, sometimes auto-repair abilities, autonomous
strategic UAS are offering the most tempting prospects for air warfare.
Strategic UAS may have yet to grow past their infancy, but their long-term
potential should not be underestimated.
47.    By the late 1990s, technological thresholds were crossed and
UAS were no longer considered to be toys that could easily find their place in
a remotely-controlled model airplanes enthusiasts’ show. They became ‘must have
weapons’ for all those wanting-to-be modern armies. The unmanned systems are rapidly becoming
an increasingly important part of the armed forces, particularly that of the
United States. According to the US Defense Department's "Unmanned Systems Roadmap
2005-2030" study, “unmanned aircraft have matured to the point where one
no longer needs to ‘look for niche missions’… Instead of asking, ‘Can we find a
mission for this [unmanned aircraft], one will ask “why are we still doing this
with a human?â€. Gen. William T. Hobbins,
the commander of US Air Force in Europe, asserted that from the year 2000 to
2010, unmanned aircraft are expected to grow from 4% of total US funding for
all aircraft to 31%. Â The US
Army alone plans to have 10,000 UAS by 2011, compared with around 1,200 today.
48.    Consequently, a technology spillover is bound to come:
nowadays 32 countries are developing more than 250 different models of UAV;
customers across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Asia are expected to
capture nearly 40 percent of the global market. Currently, 17 NATO countries
have more than 25 operational models of aircraft, with more than 3,600
operational unmanned aircraft in NATO, of which approximately 3,000 (15 models)
are owned by the United States. As an
attempt to catch up with the US, several European countries, led by France,
launched the multinational EuroMALE UAV initiative in 2002. However, after
initial enthusiasm, European countries failed to elaborate a joint approach
with regard to technological requirements for these UAVs, and chose to
concentrate on their national UAV programmes.
49.    The issue of unmanned systems
appeared on NATO’s agenda in 2002, when a NATO Standardisation Agreement
(STANAG) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles was published. In addition, NATO countries
have committed to acquiring HALE or MALE systems in accordance with the Prague
Capabilities Commitment. Acquisition of Global Hawk UAV is also envisaged in
NATO’s network-centric Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme. These
initiatives are very significant, because in recent years the Alliance
encountered serious difficulties recruiting unmanned aircraft for
reconnaissance purposes from member states. According to the NATO study,
generated by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), NATO's premier aerospace think tank, NATO needs approximately 50 HALE and 20 MALE aircraft. While there
seem to be enough aircraft in NATO to fill these needs, in reality things are
somewhat complicated. Firstly, the United States is the only country that has
HALE UAVs. Other Allies, despite the Prague Capabilities Commitment, are not
actually acquiring these capabilities. As for MALE, technically these aircraft
exist, but, as NATO is not the only “customerâ€, these assets are not usually
available when needed. According to one NATO official, UAV access for the
Alliance in Afghanistan is merely “intermittentâ€. In addition, NATO lacks appropriate ground
control and C2 systems and it does not train personnel on how to interpret data
from UAVs.
50.    In order to tackle these problems
effectively, JAPCC experts suggests that NATO:
-
establish a body that is responsible for all
NATO UAV-related activities;
-
procure its own unmanned systems to ensure that
these systems would be available when needed in NATO operations;
-
encourage procurement of HALE UAVs by US NATO
allies;
-
incorporate unmanned systems into its C4ISTAR
and network-enabled capabilities;
-
develop a clear policy with regard to combat
UAVs, including defence against enemy UCAVs.
51.    Procuring NATO’s own UAV fleet, in
a similar way to the manned AWACS aircraft, might seem like an attractive
option, but it would be extremely difficult to implement, as NATO countries
prefer to pursue their own defence programmes. According to Lt. Gen.
Hans-Joachim Schubert, Executive Director of JAPCC, “the reality is that
nations are sovereign and have their own programmes. If you are looking at
acquisition then the tendency in Europe is quite clearâ€. Therefore, NATO’s
approach focuses on the integration of communications standards and control
methods rather than on platforms.
53.    The issue of bandwidth limitations is also extremely acute
for unmanned systems, since they are more dependent upon wireless
communications than manned systems. For example, as the NATO study notes,
frequency conflicts caused British forces to lose connection with their Phoenix
UAV, thus putting British ground troops in jeopardy. Furthermore, remotely-controlled aircrafts
need totally secure connections. These connections do not always exist: many
links with UAV were lost because of the so-called ‘electronic fratricide’
(interference from friendly sources). NATO experts suggest dedicating a certain
part of the bandwidth spectrum specifically for UAV use. Frequency issues are also extremely
important when it comes to discussing the feasibility of unmanned ground
vehicles, which are expected to carry out a number of tasks, including
reconnaissance and surveillance, demining and transportation. However, the
guidance of these vehicles becomes problematic when operating in dense urban
landscape where concrete and steel buildings impede radio communications. The solution usually presented to reach
full interactive effectiveness is proper integration into “network-centric
warfareâ€. If the United States is on the brink of this, European armies are
clearly lagging behind. One should stress that this will extend the technology
gap between the two shores of the Atlantic and threaten the capacity to mount
complex joint operations.
54.    NATO has created a working group to
address the issue of developing standards for unmanned ground vehicles.
Respective STANAGs, due to be adopted by 2008, will seek to facilitate
interoperability among the robotic combat devices of different NATO and partner
countries. As Frank Schneider, chairman of the NATO working group, put it,
these STANAGs “should enable a French high-resolution camera to be plugged into
a Swedish robot and to communicate the data to another robotised military
vehicle, for instance.†The EU’s European Defence Agency (EDA) goes even further
than suggesting mere standardisation. EDA pushes European national defence
agencies to jointly pursue critical robotic technologies and pool assets.
55.    The development of network-centric
and unmanned systems raises questions that are far greater than purely
technological ones. The ability to remotely detect,
analyse, target and attack elements of the battlefield and instantly share
information requires a substantial review of existing military doctrines and
philosophy. The actual consequences of these trends can only be guessed. For
example, network-enabled capability will allow strategic leaders, up to
commander-in-chief, to make decisions even on a tactical level. On the other
hand, commanders on the ground will have full situational awareness and will be
able to act without instructions from their superiors. How these two
contradictory trends will interact remains to be seen, but it is obvious that
the traditional hierarchical decision-making method will change profoundly.
56.    Net-centricity and unmanned
systems are already substantially contributing to the increasing military
superiority of NATO Allies, thus saving lives of our soldiers. The Rapporteur
urges NATO parliamentarians to consider the promise of these technologies when it
comes to discussing defence budgets, force structure, acquisition and
technology transfer policies in their national parliaments.
57.    However, these systems should not
be seen as a panacea of all problems. While some enthusiasts, such as Robert Finkelstein, a professor at the University of
Maryland's School of Management and Technology, predict that “well before the
end of the century, there will be no people on the battlefieldâ€, there is an equally strong
tendency to emphasise the importance of human and cultural factors that are
necessary to win the hearts and minds of population. Using unmanned (and
especially autonomous) systems as combat vehicles also raises acute moral
issues.
58.    Although the political side of
these problems, discussed in this report, is the most relevant one, additional
efforts are also necessary to encourage development of common technical
standards and protection mechanisms both for networks and unmanned systems. The
issue of bandwidth limitations needs to be effectively addressed on the NATO
level.
59.    Developing an effective
information-sharing arrangement among coalition partners is of particular
importance in the Information Age. Some authors believe
it is impossible to overcome the problem net-centricity poses to effective
functioning of military alliances. According to Paul T. Mitchel,
“seamless interoperability will be impossible. Information is simply too
central to the competitive advantages offered by NCW to be jeopardised by
automatic disclosureâ€.
However, if the political will was there, NATO countries could agree on a
workable solution. As Gen. Harald Kujat, chairman of NATO's
Military Committee, has put it, “if you can't operate together, you not only
get less efficient, but you risk mission failure and put soldiers' lives at
risk. We shouldn't be a coalition of the willing, but a coalition of the
interoperableâ€.
                                                                                                         Â
