UM del - 2006-07 - Bilag 60: Amnesty International-rapport fra Afghanistan

1. Introduction........................................................................................................12. Background ........................................................................................................43. Attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects ...............................................113.1 Attacks on schools and teachers ................................................................173.2 Attacks on women......................................................................................224. Indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian deaths ...........................................265. Rough ‘justice’ and unlawful killing of captives............................................305.1. Killings after quasi-judicial procedures ....................................................336. Applicable international law ............................................................................366.1 International criminal law and the responsibility of armed groups ...........387. Recommendations............................................................................................41Appendix 1. Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 –Conflicts not of an international character...........................................................44Appendix 2. Taleban military rulebook, theLayeha...........................................45

1. IntroductionAfghan civilians have paid a heavy price since hostilities between the Taleban and US-ledcoalition forces began in October 2001 – and they continue to do so. The international armedconflict1formally ended with the conferral of power to the Afghan Transitional Governmentin June 2002. Since then civilians have been directly targeted for attack by the Taleban andother armed groups. They have also been caught up in the crossfire in the ongoing armedconflict between the Afghan army and foreign forces on the one side, and the Taleban andother armed groups opposed to the Afghan government and presence of foreign troops on theother.2Both sides have committed serious human rights abuses and violations of internationalhumanitarian law – the ‘laws of war’ – resulting in the deaths or injury of Afghan civilians.3The Taleban have been responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths. According to theAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),4around 600 civilians were killedUnder international humanitarian law, the conflict in Afghanistan evolved from an internationalconflict to a non-international conflict when the Transitional government was established inAfghanistan following the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) of June 2002. The participation of foreignforces in the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan does not affect this status. The conflict differs froman international conflict in that foreign forces are fighting alongside the state against an internal enemyrather than against the state.2There are two simultaneous military engagements in Afghanistan: (i) “Operation Enduring Freedom”is a US-led Coalition of approximately 11,000 troops with a counter-terrorist and training mission; (ii)The NATO-led, UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supports the extensionof Afghan Government control across the country. ISAF conducts security and stabilization operations,including the direction of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which, in addition to fosteringsecurity, support security sector reform and facilitate reconstruction and development acrossAfghanistan. ISAF consists of approximately 35,000 personnel from 37 countries.3International humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war or law of armed conflict, is a set ofrules which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict. It includes rules to protect persons who are notor are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. The keyrules and principles of international humanitarian law are found in the four Geneva Conventions of1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.4The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is a national institution established bythe Bonn Agreement of 22 December 2001 and the Presidential Decree of 6th June 2002 with a1

or wounded in the first seven months of 2006. Around 70 per cent of these casualties werelinked to Taleban attacks.5The Taleban have targeted and killed civilians whom theyconsider to be “spies” or “collaborators”, including Afghan and foreign reconstruction and aidworkers, religious leaders, government administrators, women’s rights activists and teachers.The Taleban have attacked civilians and civilian objects, such as school buildings, with littleor no effort to distinguish between these and military targets, such as soldiers and combatvehicles.Hundreds of people have been killed or injured, including children, as a result ofindiscriminate attacks using car bombs, suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices,such as roadside bombs, aimed at military convoy patrols and bases of the foreign forces.Targets of indiscriminate attacks have also included government administrators, police andprivate individuals.Many of these killings constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. As such,there is an obligation on both the Afghan government and the international community atlarge to ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are identified and brought to justice.International humanitarian law clearly identifies certain acts as war crimes irrespective of thecauses of a conflict or the grounds on which the contending parties justify their involvement.While Amnesty International has reported elsewhere on its concerns over the past twoyears relating to abuses by international forces,6this report focuses on violations ofinternational humanitarian law and human rights abuses by the Taleban, covering the periodJanuary 2005 to March 2007, including threats, intimidation and attack targeting civilians andindiscriminate attacks, including suicide bombings attacks on schools, abductions andunlawful killings of captives. The report urges all parties to the conflict to adhere to

mandate to monitor, promote and investigate abuses of human rights in Afghanistan. The BonnAgreement, concluded on 22 December 2001, provided a roadmap for a six-month interim governmentin Afghanistan under the leadership of Hamid Karzai.5Amnesty International telephone interview with a Commissioner of AIHRC, 20 September 2006;Agence France Presse (AFP),“600 Afghan civilians killed, hurt in violence this year”, 22 July 2002.6See for example:- Amnesty International Public Statement,Afghanistan: NATO member states must uphold humanrights standards through the establishment of body to investigate alleged violations of Afghanistan’shuman rights laws, empowered to provide restitution,(AI Index: ASA 11/020/2006):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110202006?open&of=ENG-AFG- Amnesty International,Afghanistan: Amnesty International’s campaign to stop torture and ill-treatment in the ‘war on terror’,(AI Index: ASA 11/005/2006):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110052006?open&of=ENG-AFG- Amnesty International,USA / Afghanistan: More deaths and impunity,(AI Index: AMR51/172/2005): http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511722005?open&of=ENG-AFG- Amnesty International,US detentions in Afghanistan: an aide-mémoire for continued action,(AIIndex: AMR 51/093/2005): http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510932005Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

international humanitarian law by which they are bound and to operate within a human rightsframework, and makes detailed recommendations to the Taleban and other armed groups.Amnesty International is independent of any government, political persuasion orreligious creed. It neither supported nor opposed the war in Afghanistan in October 2001, andtakes no position on the legitimacy of armed struggle against foreign or Afghan armed forces.As in other international or non-international armed conflicts, Amnesty International’s focushas been to report on and campaign against abuses of human rights and violations ofinternational humanitarian law by all those involved in the hostilities.MethodologyThis report is primarily based on secondary sources. Primary sources used include interviewswith individuals working in the human rights and development sectors in Afghanistan.Testimonies were provided to Amnesty International delegates in December 2005 fromindividuals formerly resident in Zabul province, southern Afghanistan. Testimonies frompeople in southern Afghanistan were also provided to Amnesty International by anindependent observer present in the country from May to October 2006. Telephone interviewswere conducted with Qari Yousef Ahmadi who maintains to represent the Taleban and iswidely cited in media reports claiming responsibility for attacks as their “spokesperson”.7Ahmadi is one of several Taleban “spokespersons”. It is difficult to determine how reflectiveAhamdi’s views are of the Taleban’s leadership, as well as the accuracy of the information heprovides. Media statements from different spokespersons have sometimes been contradictory.In addition, Amnesty International has drawn upon documents published by theTaleban, including their military rulebook, theLayeha.Published material such as newspaperand press agency bulletins and articles, as well as reports from international policy think tankswere also consulted.8For the most part, Amnesty International has chosen to highlight cases of attackstargeting civilians and indiscriminate attacks, including suicide bombings, abductions andunlawful killings of captives, for which the Taleban have claimed responsibility. The cases

See for example:- BBC News Online,“Taleban appoint ‘new spokesmen’”, 14 October 2006:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4342478.stm-Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,“Neo-Taliban appoint new spokespersons”, 17 October 2005:http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/10/6-swa/swa-171005.asp“Qari Yousef Ahmadi” also appears as “Qari Mohammad Yousef” in various sources. However, toavoid confusion, this report uses “Qari Yousef Ahmadi” throughout.8It is extremely difficult to obtain first-hand information from the southern provinces of Afghanistanowing to the volatile security situation. A staff member of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA) told Amnesty International that “all the reports that we receive are first-hand from localsources but they will be receiving it second and third-hand from local contacts…it is very difficult toverify the information.”

2. BackgroundWho are the Taleban?The make-up of the insurgency in Afghanistan is diverse and complex and it is not alwaysclear who is behind the violence. Many armed groups are said to be operating in Afghanistan,including al-Qa’ida, Jeysh-e-Mohammadi, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the armed political group,Hezb-e-Eslami. The term “Taleban” has often served as a catch-all tag for armed groups orelements hostile to the central government and foreign forces. As a result, some attacksattributed to the Taleban by the media may have been carried out by al-Qa’ida, or the armedpolitical group Hezb-e-Eslami, headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hezb-e-Eslami and al-Qa’ida each oppose the international intervention. Other elements attributed to the Talebanmight include local warlords, criminal gangs involved in the drugs trade or private individuals.Wherever possible, every effort has been made in this report to distinguish between thoseattacks carried out by the Taleban and other armed elements operating in Afghanistan.The Taleban overwhelmingly comprise Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan.Widespread support for the Taleban movement is also derived from Pashtuns living across theborder in Pakistan, largely in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas. In these two regions, as well as parts of Baluchistan, the majority people are ofPashtun ethnicity and share the same history, norms and religious beliefs as their Afghancounterparts. Many Pashtuns in both countries do not recognize the porous Pakistan-Afghanborder and cross it at will.9In 2003 the Taleban’s leader, Mullah Omar, created a 10-member council (RahbariShura)of commanders to lead Taleban military operations in Afghanistan. The council hassince expanded to 33 members and includes members of the older Taleban leadership, wholed campaigns against US military operations in 2001-2002, as well as newer fightersrecruited from religious seminaries ormadrassasin Pakistan.10A small portion of the

The Pakistan-Afghan border, known as the Durand Line, was imposed by the British in 1893 and iscontinuing source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1949 Afghanistan declared theborder invalid following India’s independence. The 2,640 kilometre (1,610 mile) border divides thePashtun ethnic group. Today there are some 28 million Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side of theborder.10It is generally estimated that around 13,000madrassas(religious schools) in Pakistan provide freereligious education, shelter and food for about one million children, mainly boys from poor families.They are financed by charities and function autonomously. Children at these religious seminaries alsoinclude those from among Afghan refugees.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

movement consists of foreign fighters, including Arabs, Chechens and Iranians.11Currently,there are believed to be 5,000 “core” fighters and 10,000 “part-timers” in the Taleban’sranks.12Financial support for the Taleban flows in from supporters in the region but is alsothought to come from wealthy donors from the Persian Gulf states. Other sources of incomeare derived from the illegal drugs trade, kidnappings in which ransoms are demanded and thesmuggling of goods. The Taleban also receive money and support in strongholds in southernAfghanistan either by coercion, for example, by the demanding of food and shelter, or byZakat(the religious obligation of Muslims to make an annual charitable donation as definedby the Qur’an).With regard to their international legal obligations, the Taleban’s Constitution makesclear the limits of the Taleban’s acceptance of international law. The Constitution states: “TheIslamic Emirate of Afghanistan supports and upholds….the Universal Declaration of HumanRights and other accepted treaties, as long as they do not contravene Islamic doctrine…”13The Taleban have repeatedly claimed that their policies are in accordance with Islamic lawand Afghan culture, and thus not open to question. The Taleban leader, Mullah MohammadOmar, has been reported as saying: “We do not accept something which somebody imposeson us under the name of human rights which is contradictory to the holy Quranic law.”“Anybody who talks to us should be within Islam’s framework. The holy Qur’an cannotadjust itself to other people’s requirements. People should adjust themselves to therequirements of the holy Qur’an.”Taleban ousted but insecurity prevailsThe failure to win “hearts and minds” in the ongoing armed conflict and to establish securityin the country has led to an erosion in public confidence in the Afghan government and US-led intervention. The US removal from power of the Taleban in 2001 was generallywelcomed across Afghanistan. Over time, however, public support seems to have declined.

Jane’s Intelligence Review,“Taliban insurgency shows signs of enduring strength”, 16 October 2006:http://frp.janes.com/public/frp/index.shtml12Bloomberg,“NATO troops need reinforcement to defeat Taliban in Afghanistan”, 25 January 2007:http://www.iiss.org.uk/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/january-2007/nato-needs-reinforcement-to-defeat-taliban13The Taleban Constitution, Chapter Nine, “Foreign Affairs”: http://www.alemarah.org/The basic rules of international humanitarian law, for example, the obligation to protect woundedpeople, detainees and civilians, were discussed in relation to Shari’a law with 42 religious leadersacross Afghanistan and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the three-dayconference in Kabul in September 2006. Following the conference the ICRC stated that “nothing in theessence of humanitarian law contradicted the basic rules of Shari’a law” and that “everyone able toinfluence the plight of the population should constantly remind the warring parties of their obligation torespect the rules applicable to armed conflict”.

Much of the discontent is attributable to human rights violations by the Afghan stateforces and foreign forces. Between 2001 and 2004, foreign forces, alongside the Afghannational army, arrested and arbitrarily detained hundreds of men, in many cases withoutrespect for human rights, including guarantees of due process. Many detainees were subjectedto torture or other ill-treatment, and at least eight men died in US custody.14The detention ofmen, often the principal breadwinners in Afghan society, meant that family members leftbehind often faced poverty and destitution.The thousands of civilian deaths resulting from foreign military operations since theUS-led intervention began in 2001 has steadily increased discontent, especially in the south.15The aggressive, sometimes violent, conduct of foreign troops during house raids and the lackof cultural sensitivity shown towards women during house searches have also fuelled localresentments.While the failure to deliver on security is considered a key factor in the resurgence ofthe Taleban,16a failure in the state-building process has also contributed to distrust of thegovernment. Following the overthrow of the Taleban and the Bonn Agreement of December2001, Afghanistan and its international partners were provided with a key opportunity to buildan effective, functioning state. The failure in the state-building process has resulted ininstitutions that are weak and corrupt,17notably the Ministry of Interior, the judiciary and thepolice force: “Without effective and honest administrators, police and judges, the state can dolittle to provide internal security – if the government does not provide security people will notrecognize it as a government,” noted Barnett Rubin, a director at the US-based Center onInternational Co-operation and an expert on Afghanistan, in his address to the US SenateForeign Relations Committee.18These weak institutions have resulted in corrupt governanceand the absence of rule of law across the country, leaving a security gap for the Taleban to fill.14

See for example: Amnesty International,US detentions in Afghanistan: an aide-mémoire forcontinued action,(AI Index: AMR 51/093/2005):http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr51093200515There are no official statistics on civilian casualties resulting from the international militaryintervention of October 2001. Neither the Afghan government nor the foreign forces have keptcomprehensive records but various reports estimate casualties to be in the thousands (See for example:The Guardian,“Forgotten Victims”, 20 May 2002 and Bi-Annual JCMB Report, November 2006).16Between October 2001 and July 2006, the presence of foreign troops in southern Afghanistan wasextremely sparse and large areas remained lawless and outside the reach of government, allowing theTaleban to effectively gain ground in the region.17See for example:- UN Security Council,Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan 11 to 16 November2006,(S/2006/935), 4 December 2006:http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/631/38/PDF/N0663138.pdf?OpenElement-Foreign Affairs,“Saving Afghanistan”, Barnett R. Rubin, January/February 2007:http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html18Barnett R. Rubin,Foreign Affairs,“Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink”, testimonyprepared for the US Foreign Relations Committee, 21 September 2006:Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

The government’s harsh opium eradication campaign with little or no effort toprovide alternative livelihoods to farmers has provoked local opposition, especially in theopium-producing centre of Helmand. The Taleban have effectively exploited this policy,winning the support of poppy farmers by providing them protection. Meanwhile, the poorprovision of effective aid and development in the south and southeast, has increased publicfrustration and disillusionment towards the Afghan government and the internationalcommunity.19The prevailing situation has shifted some degree of public support towards theTaleban, with young men resentful of the international intervention joining their ranks. Inaddition, poverty and lack of economic opportunity has enhanced the Taleban’s ability toboost their ranks. A Taleban fighter is paid around US$300 a month, while an Afghansoldier’s monthly salary is around US$100, proving a financial incentive to many living inone of the world’s poorest countries.20In addition, in areas where the Taleban have gainedcontrol, young men are often reportedly coerced into joining the armed group.These factors, together with escalating violence, now threaten to reverse some of theearlier gains made in the country’s political, social and economic development.21TheTaleban have capitalized on the political, economic and security vacuum and have gaineddefactocontrol over large swathes of territory in the south and east of the country and attacksare reportedly growing near the outskirts of Kabul and in centres in the north-west along theborder with Iran and Turkmenistan.22

http://www.cfr.org/publication/11486/still_ours_to_lose.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Ftestimony l19See for example:- UN Security Council,Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan 11 to 16 November2006,(S/2006/935), 4 December 2006:http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/631/38/PDF/N0663138.pdf?OpenElement- The International Crisis Group,Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,2 November2006: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=448520According to the UN’s 2004 Afghanistan National Human Development Report’s ‘HumanDevelopment Index’, Afghanistan is the poorest country outside of sub-Saharan Africa. The country isranked 173 out of 178 countries, above Burundi, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra Leone. See:http://www.undp.org/dpa/nhdr/af/AfghanHDR2004.htm21“Poor governance resulting from a lack of accountability, widespread corruption and limited capacity,exacerbated by the large and growing narcotics sector, has deterred development efforts”. Bi-Annualreport by the Joint Co-ordination Monitoring Board, November 2006: See:http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/22It is believed that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Eslami armed political group is behind someincidents in Northern Afghanistan. Some attacks may be linked to local conflicts between feudingfactions over resources.

As the insurgency gained ground in 2003, the resurgent Taleban began emulatingtactics used in Iraq. These consist of suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices,assassinations and beheadings – all with scant regard for civilian lives.23Pakistan connectionMuch of the strength and support for the Taleban can be linked to Pakistan’s apparenttolerance of Afghan Taleban and local Taleban fighters in its border regions, notably theNorthwest Frontier Province, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas and parts ofBaluchistan.24Taleban fighters – local and Afghan – have reportedly regrouped andresupplied from bases in these regions, directing attacks in Afghanistan from thesestrongholds, in many instances with little interference from the Pakistani authorities.25A report inJane’s Intelligence Reviewnotes that:“Talibanleaders based in Pakistan have divided their operations in southernAfghanistan into three areas of control…. From Quetta, operations are directed in Kandahar,Helmand and Uruzgan and sometimes in Farah. In Miranshah, leaders direct operations inKhost, Paktia and Paktika. In Peshawar, they direct operations in Jalalabad, Kunar andLogar and Laghman. … According to a coalition expert, the commanders based in these citiesuse deputies to communicate with mid-level commanders in Afghanistan, who typicallycontrol 50 to 100 fighters, while smaller cells of 10 to 15 operate more independently.”26In March 2004 the Pakistan government launched its most intensive militaryoperation in the Tribal Areas since its troops first entered the region early in 2002. ThePakistan government said it was committed to continue the campaign to “flush out at anycost” people associated with al-Qa’ida who remained in the region.27This offensive, alongwith Pakistan President Musharraf’s continuing support of the US-led invasion, hasradicalized sections of the local population and increased their hostility towards the Pakistangovernment.In an attempt to diffuse the tension and violence following the 2004 militaryoffensive in the Tribal Areas, the Pakistan government signed two peace accords in South

The Senlis Council,Helmand at War: the changing nature of the insurgency in southern Afghanistanand its effects on the future of the country,June 2006:http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/010_publication24See for example: UNAMA Press Briefing by Chris Alexander, UN Deputy Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General, and UN agencies in Afghanistan, 8 January 2006.25International Crisis Group,Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,11 December 2006:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4568&l=126Jane’s Intelligence Review,“Taliban insurgency shows signs of enduring strength”, October 2006:http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/terrorism.shtml27Information Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed: “This operation will continue at whatsoever the costmay be”,Reuters,26 March 2004.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

Waziristan in March 2004 and North Waziristan in September 2006.28The terms of peacedeals effectively gave foreign fighters a “safe haven” and may have strengthened theinsurgency. While attacks on the Pakistan military decreased following the 2006 agreement,NATO, US and Afghan officials recorded a threefold increase in attacks on their forces,increasingly by suicide bombers, particularly in areas in Afghanistan bordering NorthWaziristan. Some media reports claim that most of the suicide bombers who carry out attacksin Afghanistan come from across the border in Pakistan.29Pakistan army intervention in the Tribal Areas is considered by many observers tohave undermined the status and influence of tribal elders, government-appointed PoliticalAgents30and local elected representatives. This leadership vacuum has increasingly beenfilled by militant clerics, pursuing and enforcing a strict Islamist agenda with the help ofresurgent Pashtun groups under their leadership.31The Tribal Areas have witnessed a creeping“Talebanization” including the development of Taleban quasi-governmental structures,including administrative bodies, tax collection, judicial structures and a “penal code”.32The Pakistan government’s military operations met with resistance, particularly fromIslamic groups. The most prominent Pakistani religious political group in the region is theMuttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six influential Islamic political parties,including Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamaiat Ulema-i-Islam.33Many religious seminaries thatThe South Waziristan peace deal of March 2004 stipulated that tribes cease harbouring foreignfighters and hand them over to the government or ensure their registration. The North Waziristan peacedeal of September 2006, provided for the release of arrested tribal fighters, return of their weapons andwithdrawal of troops and checkpoints in return for foreigners settled in North Waziristan respecting thelaw and renouncing attacks in Afghanistan.29See for example:-New York Times,“Pakistan link seen in Afghan Suicide attacks”, 14 November 2006:http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/world/asia/14afghan.html?fta=y&pagewanted=all-Reuters Alternet,“Suicide bomber cult is alive and well in Pakistan”, 25 January 2007:http://altermet.org/story/41660/30Political Agents hold wide executive and judicial powers under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901,the law regulating the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.31Daily Times,25 May 2006. President Musharraf acknowledged that “extremism and Talebanizationare spreading”. (Reuters, 26 May 2006.)32See for example:- Amnesty International,Pakistan: Working to stop human rights violations in the “war on terror”(AIIndex: ASA 33/051/2006): http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA330512006Between 2005-2006, more than 200 people were reportedly killed in attacks, including tribal leaders,government supporters and so-called American “spies”. See:New York Times,“Taliban and Alliestighten grip in North of Pakistan”, 11 December 2006:http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html?fta=y33“The Taliban’s political mentor and main Pakistani ally, Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam(JUI-F), controls the two provinces that border on Afghanistan, running the government in the Pashtun-majority Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and in the ruling coalition with President Musharraf’sPakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) in Balochistan.” (The International Crisis Group,Countering28

reportedly have links to the MMA Islamic parties have been implicated in nurturinginsurgents for the Taleban cause. The International Crisis Group notes that: “PresidentMusharraf is playing a double game, gaining international support as an ally in the “war onterror” while failing to change the policies of his government that feeds extremism. ThePakistan military government’s political survival rests upon accommodation with the veryIslamist parties who supported – and continue to support – the Taleban.”34While President Musharraf has repeatedly denied government support for the Taleban,in September 2006, a document prepared by an official of the Defence Academy, a think-tanklinked to the UK’s Defence Ministry, which was leaked to the press, alleged that the InterServices Intelligence (ISI)35were supporting the Taleban.36Seth Jones of the RandCorporation, a think-tank which works closely with the US military, said in November 2006that the US government believed the ISI to be involved in providing training, money andsensitive information to the Taleban, especially “information … about movement of US andNATO forces, in some cases very strategic information”.37Afghan government officials have repeatedly urged Pakistani authorities to stopTaleban infiltration. Similarly, while US officials praise Pakistan as a “key ally“ in the “waron terror”, they have called for the country to take more effective action against the Taleban.38Pakistani officials have rejected such criticism saying that Pakistan would take steps on any“actionable material as to where Taleban leaders are”, provided by US or NATO forces.39

Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,2 November 2006:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4485)34The International Crisis Group,Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,2 November2006: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4485 See also: International Crisis Group,Media Release,Pakistan Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,11 December 2006:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4568&m=135The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, also known as the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI,is the largest and most powerful of Pakistan’s three main intelligence agencies. Its responsibilitiesinclude, gathering foreign and domestic intelligence, the co-ordination of intelligence betweenPakistan’s three main military branches, training spies, and maintaining security over the country’snuclear programme.36Reuters,1 October 2006; the UK government distanced itself from the report, saying that the repostdid not express its views.37The Guardian(UK), “As Taliban insurgency gains strength and sophistication, suspicion falls onPakistan”, 13 November 2006: http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1946279,00.htmlDuring a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on 21 September 2006, General James Jones,NATO’s former supreme commander, reported that the Taleban headquarters remained in Quetta (TheNew York Times,“At the Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge”, 21 January 2007).38Henry Crumpton, US State Department Coordinator on Terrorism commended the Pakistanigovernment as a “vital security ally”, but days later, on 6 May in Kabul said that Taleban and al-Qa’idaleaders were probably hiding in Pakistan and that Islamabad was “not doing enough in the war onterror”. (Editorial inThe Friday Times,12-18 May 2006.)39Army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan, quoted inDaily Times,25 May 2006.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

3. Attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects“there is no difference between the armed people who are fighting against us and civilianswho are co-operating with foreigners.”Qari Yousef Ahmadi, Taleban spokesperson, 25October 2006The Taleban consistently fail to distinguish between military targets and civilians orcivilian objects thus breaching their obligations under international humanitarian law whichstrictly forbids the targeting of civilians. Scores of Afghan civilians have been killed byTaleban insurgents in the past two years, apparently because they were branded “spies” or“collaborators”. Targets have included election candidates, clerics, government administrators,teachers, health workers, and other civilians working for aid agencies or for the foreign forces.

Talebanfatwaorders death to so-called “infidels”Afatwa,or religious edict, reportedly issued by the Taleban in December 2005 and signed by some100 religious scholars in Afghanistan, orders the death of anyone who supports the US-ledintervention.40Qari Yousef Ahmadi, Taleban spokesperson, elaborated:“It says in thefatwathat people should have no sympathy for infidels, they should avoid friendshipwith them and should also avoid giving them any moral or material support. Anyone who supportsthem morally or materially should be killed.”Ahamdi continued: “Government servants are told in thefatwato quit government service. Anyonewho has a father working for the Americans should cut their relations with them and treat them as anenemy because they are favouring the infidels.”In the 2005fatwa,the Ulema, or religious scholars, consider the current situation in Afghanistan. Intheir view “jihad” (in this context “jihad” means armed struggle) is a legal duty because the foreignforces are viewed by the scholars as an “occupying force”.41The 2005fatwaapparently follows a similarfatwaissued by the Taleban in Kabul in September 2001which reportedly imposes the death penalty for spying.42Under Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which is binding on the Taleban, it isprohibited to attack “persons taking no active part in the hostilities”. Amnesty International isconcerned that the sweeping language of thefatwacondones acts which would constitute war crimes.

Attacks against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their staff by armedgroups have resulted in humanitarian agencies scaling back their projects or operating infewer districts, most notably in the south.43Immunization and health programmes have beencurtailed and Afghanistan has seen a six-fold rise in the number of polio cases in 2006 – allbut one of the 26 cases has occurred in the restive southern region.44The ability to deliverfood aid has also been hindered by Taleban attacks on food convoys coming from Quetta inPakistan.45The interruption of the delivery of essential aid and development to areas where itis most needed is affecting millions of already impoverished Afghans. A sustained reductionin access by humanitarian agencies may lead to large areas of the country remaining acutelyunder-developed.46The Taleban are prohibited under a customary rule of international humanitarian lawfrom attacking, destroying, removing or rendering objects that are indispensable to thesurvival of the civilian population.47The Taleban have been accused by the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) of using human shields. Colonel Tom Collins, ISAF spokesperson, reported that on 12February 2007, “during an action in Kajaki district, Helmand province, Taliban extremistsresorted to the use of human shields, specifically, local Afghani children, to escape fire.”48In- Amnesty Public Statement,Afghanistan: Amnesty International condemns reported summaryexecutions by the Taleban,(AI Index: 11/025/2001):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110252001?open&of=ENG-384- Amnesty Public Statement:Afghanistan: summary execution of civilians in Yakaolang,(AI Index:11/001/2001): http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110012001?open&of=ENG-AFG43ANSO/CARE,Insecurity continues to impede aid delivery in Afghanistan,May 2005:http://www.care.org/newsroom/articles/2005/05/20050505_afghansecurityreport.asp44UNAMA Press Briefing by Adrian Edwards, Spokesperson for the Special Representative of theSecretary-General, and UN agencies in Afghanistan, 4 September 2005:http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_pb/_english/2006/_september/06sep04.htm45The Observer,“Starving Afghans sell girls of eight as brides”, 7 January 2007:http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1984396,00.html46A 2006 Bi-Annual report by the Joint Co-ordination Monitoring Board, warns that insurgent activitycould result “in partial or total withdrawal of international agencies in a number of the worst-affectedprovinces”. The JCMB is a 28-member committee comprising Afghan government officials andmembers of the international donor community, charged with monitoring the implementation of theAfghanistan Compact, a five-year plan for reconstruction of the country agreed at a donor conferencein London, 31 January to 1 February, 2006: See: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/See also: International Crisis Group,Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact,29 January 2007:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=463147Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules,Rule54, pages 189-193 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press & International Committee of the RedCross 2005).48Amnesty International email communication with ISAF spokesperson on 22 February 2007 andtelephone interview on 28 March 2007. Reports of the Taleban’s use of human shields by ISAF havebeen difficult to corroborate and verify.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

a separate incident in October 2006, former NATO chief, General James Jones reported thatTaleban fighters had used human shields during military operations in the Panjwai district inKandahar province in October 2006. Local officials were reported to have said that between30 to 80 civilians were killed.49The Taleban are reported to have further endangered thesafety of civilians under their control in Kandahar and Helmand by “transforming houses intobases and checkpoints”.50A staff member of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) toldAmnesty International that: “The moment that the Taleban says that this place is under ourcontrol, most of the population flee in the anticipation that there’s going to be fightingthere…That’s certainly the case in Musa Qala… the population leaves in the expectation thatISAF or the Afghan National Forces will very shortly launch a military operation to take itback.”51A legal adviser working for AIHRC echoed the account given by the UNAMAofficial, saying that when the Taleban seized control of Musa Qala, the local populationevacuated the area for “fear of being bombed”.52International humanitarian law requires that each party to the conflict must, to theextent feasible, avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.53Taleban military rules

International Herald Tribune,“NATO general says Taliban using civilians as human shields,apologizes for recent deaths”, 28 October 2006:http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/afghan.php50See for example: The Senlis Council,Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban,September 2006: http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication51Amnesty International telephone interview with UNAMA staff member on 5 March 2007. TheUNAMA official also notes that the reach of government control over certain areas in the south hasbeen limited, allowing the Taleban to easily fill the security gap.52Amnesty International telephone interview with a legal adviser of AIHRC on 5 March 2007.In late September 2006, British commanders struck a deal with elders in the Musa Qala district inHelmand. They agreed that British troops and Taleban fighters would move out of the town centre. Inexchange, the elders pledged to keep Taleban fighters out of the district centre and secure the area withtheir own auxiliary police unit, enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid. On 2 February 2007, theTaleban seized control of the district. See for example:-BBC News Online,“Tough steps on road to Afghan Peace”, 8 February 2007:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6342835.stm-New York Times,“Taliban Truce in District of Afghanistan Sets Off Debate”, 2 December 2006:http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?ex=1322715600&en=c90826508fbba306&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss53Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules,Rule23, page 71 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press & International Committee of the Red Cross2005). This rule does not affect the obligations of parties to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians.

A Taleban military rulebook, orLayeha,54containing 30 rules was distributed to the Taleban’shighest council, theRahbari Shura,by Haji Obaidullah, the Taleban’s former DefenceMinister, during Ramadan 2006. The rulebook essentially covers three areas: the treatment ofthose believed to be “enemies”; discipline and conduct of soldiers; and the administration ofjustice. The rulebook has since been disseminated to fighters on the ground although it isdifficult to determine how often it is referred to by Taleban fighters.55The rules, however, paylittle or no heed to the provisions of international humanitarian law to which the Taleban arebound. The rulebook offers no explanation of who is a “civilian” and, compared tointernational humanitarian law, offers little in the way of their protection. Internationalhumanitarian law provides that civilians and others not actively engaged in hostilities must“in all circumstances be treated humanely”, while the Taleban rulebook only requires thegroup to guarantee the “personal security” and “security of possessions” of those who “turn[s][their] back on infidels”.56Some rules explicitly sanction the targeting and killing of civilians. Rule 25 states thata teacher who ignores warnings from the Taleban and continues to teach “must be beaten”and should they “continue to teach contrary to the principles of Islam, the [Taleban] districtcommander or a group leader must kill him”. Rule 26 suggests that NGOs and humanitarianworkers may be targeted: “Those NGOs that come to the country under the rule of the infidelsmust be treated as the government is treated…we tolerate none of their activities, whether itbe building of roads, bridges, clinics, schools,madrassasor other works”.The existence of the Taleban military rulebook was confirmed by Talebanspokesperson, Qari Yousef Ahmadi. On 25 October 2006, Amnesty International interviewedhim to gain an understanding of the Taleban views and interpretation of internationalhumanitarian law. He revealed that the Taleban leadership’s understanding of what constitutesa “civilian” is far removed from the provisions of international humanitarian law. Ahmadiasserted that attacking “unarmed” civilians who were not considered a threat by the Talebanwas “forbidden”. Legitimate targets, according to Ahmadi, are firstly “American and foreigntroops” and, secondly, “people who are not armed but who are working and co-operating withforeigners”. He added that, “there is no difference between the armed people who are fightingagainst us and civilians who are co-operating with foreigners.”See for example:-Signandsight.com,“The new Taliban Codex”, 28 November 2006:http://www.signandsight.com/features/1069.html- Signandsight.com,“A new layeha for the Mujahideen”, 29 November 2006:http://www.signandsight.com/features/1071.html55Taleban fighters have been seen carrying the rulebook in several regions of Afghanistan. (SeeNewsweek,“By the Book: Taliban fighters play by their own rules”, 3 December 2006:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16011275/site/newsweek/)56The Layeha.Rule 1: “A Taliban commander is permitted to extend an invitation to all Afghans whosupport infidels so that they may convert to the true Islam.” Rule 2: “We guarantee to any man whoturns his back on the infidels, personal security and the security of his possessions. But if he becomesinvolved in a dispute, or someone accuses him of something, he must submit to our judiciary.”Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/200754

When asked to clarify what he meant by “co-operation”, Ahmadi stated that, forexample, all employees working for the Ministry of Defence and most of those working forthe Ministry of Interior were “fighting against the Taleban and co-operating with foreigners”.These employees were therefore considered legitimate targets for attack: “Several times wewarned these people to stop co-operating with governmental agencies that are combatantforces”.57Institutions involved in “civilian activities” and “service provision” such as theMinistry of Public Health, Water and Electricity and the Red Crescent were not consideredtargets.The rules contained in theLayehaand Ahmadi’s interpretations are inconsistent withthe Taleban’s obligations under international humanitarian law. In practice, civilians appearto be targeted liberally by the Taleban.The following cases are examples of civilians reportedly targeted and killed by theTaleban in violation of international humanitarian law.•On 23 July 2005, Judge Qazi Namatullah was shot dead by two suspected Talebangunmen on a motorbike in Panjwai district in Kandahar province. A Talebanspokesperson said that he was killed by the Taleban because he worked for thegovernment.58On 9 August 2005, Taleban insurgents reportedly dragged a woman from her house inMirzan district in Zabul province and shot her dead. Taleban spokesperson, AbdulLatif Hakimi, was reported to have said that the Taleban killed her “because she wasspying for the American invaders”.59On 21 August 2005, Taleban insurgents reportedly killed Maulawi Abdullah Malang,the Deputy Head of the Ulema Shura (Council of Religious Scholars), and hiscolleague while they were on the way to their mosque. Latif Hakimi claimedresponsibility for the attack on behalf of the Taleban, saying: “We will continue tocarry out such attacks in the future.”On 12 October 2005, suspected Taleban insurgents reportedly killed five and injuredthree staff of the Afghan Health Development Services. The two doctors, one

pharmacist, one nurse and an administrator were reportedly killed in the district ofZherai south of Kandahar city while returning from a visit to a village.60•On 3 January 2006, suspected Taleban insurgents reportedly targeted and shot in thehead Engineer Mirwais, an Afghan aid worker, while he was praying in a mosque inLashkar Gar.61On 23 May 2006, a doctor, two nurses and their driver working for the Afghan HealthDevelopment Services were reportedly killed by a remote-controlled bomb thattargeted their vehicle in Wardak province. Interior Ministry spokesperson, YousefStanizai, blamed the attack on “enemy elements of Afghanistan”, a term often used todescribe Taleban insurgents.62On 15 June 2006, Taleban insurgents reportedly carried out a bomb attack on aminibus in Kandahar City, killing at least 10 people and injuring a further 15. The buswas transporting Afghan labourers to their workplace at a coalition military base inthe city. A Taleban spokesperson claimed responsibility for the attack in a telephonecall to a local news agency.63On 27 August 2006, Haji Atiqullah, aWolesi Jirga(lower house of parliament)candidate, was shot dead in Uruzgan province when his convoy was attacked by 15insurgents. Taleban spokesperson Abdul Latif Hakimi claimed responsibility for hiskilling on behalf of the Taleban.64

See for example:-AHDS Annual Report 2005:http://www.ahds.org/rep7annual2005.htm-Reuters,“Taliban kill five Afghan aid workers-agency”, 12 October 2005.61See for example:Pajhwok Afghan News,“NGO worker shot dead in Helmand mosque”, 3 January2006: http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=1127362See for example:AFP,“Bomb kills three Afghan health workers and driver”, 23 May 2006.63See for example:-BBC News Online,“Taleban target Afghan Civilians”, 15 June 2006:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5082042.stm- UNAMA, Statement of Tom Koenings, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General forAfghanistan, on the bus explosion in Kandahar city, 15 June 2006:http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2006/06jun15.htm64See for example:- Human Rights Watch,Afghanistan on the Eve of Parliamentary and Provincial Elections,AppendixA: List of attacks on candidates, September 2005:http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0905/4.htm#_Toc114482188- AIHRC-UNAMA,Joint Verification of Political Rights, Wolesi Jirga and Provincial CouncilElections Third Report, 17 August - 13 September 2005:http://www.aihrc.org.af/jvr_on_election.pdfAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

3.1 Attacks on schools and teachers“With all that the children of Afghanistan have gone through, to expose them to this kind ofterrible violence is appalling.”Bernt Aasen, UNICEF representative in Afghanistan, 4August 2006Despite the five-fold increase in the number of children attending school since the fallof the Taleban in December 2001, seven million children are missing out on a formaleducation, according to the development agency Oxfam.65Currently, around 5 millionchildren, including girls, attend school. In primary education Grades 1-6, there areapproximately 1.73 million girls currently attending school, compared to around 3 millionboys.66However, the unrelentingly violent campaign against schools by armed groups isseriously damaging the government’s ambitious education programme for the country,especially in the south and southeast.Attacks on schools in Afghanistan have been attributed to a number of differentgroups, including the Taleban and Hezb-e-Eslami. Other attacks have been reportedlyattributed to local warlords who target schools in an effort to undermine governmentintervention in their regions of control. Criminal gangs have also been implicated in schoolattacks apparently designed to divert attention away from their involvement in illegalactivities such as drug-trafficking.67A clear and common motive behind these attacks is theintention to undermine the authority of the central government. A common effect of suchattacks is that civilians are killed and injured and an already fragile education system isseriously undermined.Violent attacks directed against the country’s education system have increaseddramatically during the course of 2006 and have taken the form of missile attacks, bombattacks and arson. Statistics on attacks on schools reveal the extent of disruption to thecountry’s education system.•At least 172 violent attacks on schools took place in the first six months of 2006compared with 60 for the whole of 2005.68

Parents in various regions are now reluctant to send their children to school for fear ofattacks. According to a Commissioner of the AIHRC: “Most of the schools have been closedbecause of the fear of attacks by Taleban and al-Qa’ida forces and, due to the insecurity thatthe people in the region [feel], parents are refusing to send their kids to schools.”73A HumanRights Watch report notes that: “Insecurity may reinforce conservative beliefs about girls’education, for example by exposing girls to real physical risks either at school or en route andby preventing or discouraging female teachers from going to certain areas”.74The WorldBank notes in a report:“[I]t is difficult to separate the issue of cultural barriers to mobility from those ofsecurity—how much of the constraint on women’s mobility, and allowing girls to walk toschool, is related to the poor security situation—which may in fact improve as politicalstability comes about? How much of the demand is constrained by the lack of supply of femaleteachers, which in turn may be related to security as well as differing cultural norms?”75Like all civilians, students, teachers, and other school personnel must not be targetedfor attack as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities in which case they wouldlose their protection as civilians. The deliberate killing of civilians, including teachers andstudents, is strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law. Targeting civilian objectssuch as school buildings is likewise prohibited. School buildings are considered civilianhttp://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/20440808F17EFE70C12571C500242B99?opendocument69Afghan Ministry of Education figures at 22 February 2007.70See footnote 68.71See footnote 68.72Press Release,UNICEF alarmed as attacks on Afghan schools rise,4 August 2006:http://www.unicef.org/media/media_35196.html?q=printme73See for example:Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,“Afghanistan: Militants Are Targeting Schools”,22 February 2006:http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/162380e9-affd-47a2-8410-4ff416d865f3.html74See for example: Human Rights Watch, “Chapter IV. The Indirect Impact of Insecurity onEducation”,Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan,July 2006:http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/5.htm#_Toc13926390075World Bank,Afghanistan: National Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction – the Role of Women inAfghanistan’s Future,p32, March 2005:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/AfghanistanGenderReport.pdfAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

objects unless they are, without doubt, being used for military purposes. Under the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court “(i)ntentionally directing attacks against buildingsdedicated to…education” is considered a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.76Furthermore, acts or threats of violence which aim to spread terror among the civilianpopulation are prohibited under international humanitarian law.77The Taleban have issuedthreats in the form of “night letters” (shabnameh)– notes or posters pinned during the nightto trees, mosques or the walls of school buildings warning of attacks against teachers orstudents.78In the southern province of Helmand, suspected Taleban insurgents distributedthreatening night letters in several districts warning school staff to stop working. One suchletter read: “If you want to be safe in the world and in the hereafter, then don’t go to thecentres set up by the infidels.” The letter continues: “Teachers salaries are financed by non-believers. Unless you stop getting wages from them, you will be counted among theAmerican puppets.”79The concerted nature of these attacks and the threats to schools and teachersconstitute a deliberate assault on the education system. The climate of fear generated by theseattacks is undermining the right to education of thousands of children, particularly girls.Afghanistan is a party to several international human rights conventions that recognize theright to education, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,the body charged with monitoring the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of theChild, notes that provisions essential for the fulfilment of rights of children affected by armedconflict include, among other things, “access to food, healthcare and education”.80Furthermore, article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventionsprovides that: “Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular(a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping withthe wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care”.Although Afghanistan is not a party to Additional Protocol II, this particular article providesan international standard for protecting education that the Taleban should adhere to.

The following cases are examples of teachers, students and schools reportedlytargeted by the Taleban and other armed groups.•On the night of 3 January 2005, Abdul Habib, the headmaster of Sheykh Matthy BabaSchool in Zabul province, was beheaded in his home in front of his children. Theschool was a mixed school teaching both boys and girls. The Provincial EducationDirector was reported to have said that insurgents sometimes displayed intimidatingposters in the region demanding an end to girls’ education and threatening to killteachers.81On 18 October 2005, suspected Taleban insurgents shot dead headmaster Abdul Waliat his home in the Panjwai district of Kandahar Province. He was killed shortly afterthe murder of two senior government education officials in Paktika province.82On 14 December 2005, two suspected Taleban fighters reportedly dragged a teacherknown as Laghmani from a classroom of students in Zarghon village in Nad Alidistrict, Helmand, and shot him at the school gates after he ignored letters (shabnameh)warning him to stop teaching girls.83On 27 March 2006, suspected Taleban militants reportedly set fire to a girls’ middleschool during the night in the Tanar area of Khas Konar District in Konar Province.84Late night on 3 September 2006, suspected Taleban insurgents reportedly arrived inQarabaghi village, Ghazni Province. They threatened the residents not to send theirdaughters to the local school otherwise they would set fire to it.85On 9 December 2006, suspected Taleban insurgents broke into a house in Kunarprovince killing two sisters who were teachers, along with their mother, grandmotherand a male relative. The Provincial Education Director reportedly said that theTaleban followed through a death threat that warned the sisters to stop teachingotherwise they would be killed.86

See for example:The Guardian(UK), “Headteacher decapitated by Taliban”, 5 January 2006:http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,1678199,00.html82Pajhwok Afghan News,“Headmaster gunned down in Kandahar”, 19 October 2005:http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=782883See for example:The Guardian(UK), “Fears of a lost generation of Afghan pupils as Taliban targetsschools”, 16 March 2006: http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1731929,00.html84Pajhwok Afghan News,“Girls’ school torched in Kunar”, 28 March 2006:http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=1562785Aina TV,Kabul/Sheberghan, 4 September 2006.86See for example:Associated Press,“New Taliban rules target teachers”, 9 December 2006:http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2713281&page=1Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

In a BBCNewsnightreport,87a Taleban spokesperson, Dr Mohammad Hanif, deniedthat the Taleban were targeting schools. He stated that: “The Mojahedin of the IslamicEmirate don’t burn schools, they’re against burning schools. To destroy a school building or ahospital causes damage to the people. The Mojahedin do not do anything that can causedamage to people… Generally these schools are being burned by the soldiers of Karzai’spuppet government to discredit the Mojahedin. I say again: the Mojahedin do not burnschools.”Hanif’s denial contradicts the Taleban rulebook which confirms a Taleban policy ofburning schools, targeting teachers and of restricting the right to education. Rule 26 declares:“If a school fails to heed a warning to close, it must be burned.” It also confirms the Taleban’sopposition to the country’s current education system under rule 24: “It is forbidden to work asa teacher under the current puppet regime, because this strengthens the system of theinfidels.” The rule continues that “True Muslims should apply to study with a religiouslytrained teacher and study in a Mosque or similar institution. Textbooks must come from theperiod of the Jihad or from the Taleban regime.” All Afghans with aspirations to educate theirdaughters and sons within the current state system risk being considered collaborators.In the same BBCNewsnightreport Taleban fighter Haji Mullah Wahidullah’s viewswere consistent with the rulebook and contradicted Dr Hanif: “We are against those schoolsthat teach western culture, secularism and obscenity, while our religious schools are beingbombed and our Qur’an is torn apart. We do burn those schools. We are not against education;we have brains. But while they burn our religious schools and our Qur’an, we want to stopthose schools that teach girls to wear a kind of uniform that reveals their bodies.”During a telephone interview with Amnesty International, Taleban spokesperson QariYousef Ahmadi maintained that the Taleban were “closing” those schools whose “books havebeen printed in the USA” and whose “curriculum was developed by foreigners”. He assertedthat the Taleban were “against the school curriculum; not school buildings.”88In January 2007, Abdul Hai Mutmayn, another Taleban spokesperson, announced thatthe movement would open schools in 10 districts under its control during March-May 2007 ata cost of US$1 million. No mention was made by Mutmayn of the Taleban’s violentcampaign against state education. Lessons, he said, would be based on the same curriculumfollowed when the Taleban were in control of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.89The planwould establish boys’ schools “first” and girls’ schools “later”.90This development is ofparticular concern, given the Taleban’s record on education when they were in power. DuringDavid Loyn, “Travelling with the Taleban”,BBC Newsnightreport, broadcast 25 October 2006.Amnesty International telephone interview with Qari Yousef Ahmadi on 25 October 2006.89Statement by the Taleban Leadership Council onAl-Emarahwebsite announcing the opening ofschools in 10 districts under their control: http://www.alemarah.org/english-3-21-1-2007.html90See for example:BBC,“Taleban ‘to build Afghan schools’”, 23 January 2007:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6291885.stm8887

3.2 Attacks on womenThe Taleban’s oppressive treatment of women while they held power from 1996 to 2001 hasbeen well documented.91Under their hardline rule, women were discriminated against in allwalks of life, including the denial of education, employment, freedom of movement andpolitical participation and representation. They were excluded from public life and prohibitedfrom studying, working or leaving the house without being chaperoned by amahram,a maleblood relative. The severe restrictions on their freedom of movement virtually confinedwomen to the home.92The effects of these restrictions were particularly hard on widows andother women-headed households. Many forms of gender-based violence were also perpetratedby the Taleban state including stoning to death for “adultery”.93During this period AmnestyInternational repeatedly expressed concern over these policies.94

Rashid, Ahmed,Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords,Pan, 2001. This book was originallypublished in 2000 and titled,Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.92It should be noted that when the Taleban held power from 1996 to 2001, the group imposed asnational law, customs and traditional practices which already existed in Afghanistan. The Taleban’sview of the role of women and their treatment of women was extreme, but it is not alien to ruralcommunities in southern Afghanistan.93See for example:- UN High Commission for Human Rights,Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence againstwomen, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance withCommission on Human Rights resolution 1997/44,Mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan (1-13September 1999):http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/10d49a98d398bd52802568be0051fd45/$FILE/G0011581.pdf- Associated Press,“Taliban stone woman to death for adultery”, 1 May 2001:http://www.rawa.org/stoning.htm- Associated Press,“Taliban beat a mother and daughter for immoral behaviour publicly”, 19 April1999: http://www.rawa.org/lashes.htm94See for example:- Amnesty International,Women in Afghanistan: pawns in men’s power struggles(ASA 11/011/1999):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110111999?open&of=ENG-AFG- Amnesty International,Women in Afghanistan: the violations continue(ASA 11/005/1997):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110051997?open&of=ENG-AFGAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

In the ongoing armed conflict, women continue to face attacks, threats andharassment by the Taleban and other armed groups. During the past two years women aidand health workers, election candidates, teachers, women’s rights activists and other humanrights defenders have been subjected to threats and attacks, in some cases resulting in death.Women have also been injured or killed in indiscriminate attacks like suicide bombings. Asnoted above, the country’s education system has come under relentless assault from theTaleban and other groups, with girls’ schools and their teachers subject to attack.Attacks on women human rights defendersOn 25 September 2006,The Voice of Jihad; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,also known asAl-Emarah,a website widely associated with the Taleban, posted an announcement thatSafiye Amajan, Director of Women’s Affairs department in Kandahar province, “was shotand killed by the Islamic Emirate Mojahedin for spying for the United States of America inthe name of women’s rights against the Mojahedin.”95A Taleban commander, Mullah HayatKhan, was reported as saying that Safiye Amajan had been “executed” because she workedfor the government. “We have told people again and again that anyone working for thegovernment, and that includes women, will be killed.”96When questioned about the killing of Safiye Amajan, Taleban spokesman QariYousef Ahmadi denied that the Taleban were responsible for her death despite the statementissued on the day of her killing on theAl-Emarahwebsite.97Safiye Amajan’s death brought to greater attention the dangers that women’s rightsactivists and human rights defenders face daily in the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan.Amajan’s killing added to the climate of fear and insecurity for many women activists whoseactivities often engender hostility as they are perceived as defying cultural, religious or socialnorms about the role of women in Afghan society.98Safiye Amajan’s counterpart in the neighbouring province of Helmand, Fauzia Olumi,was attacked by armed men on a visit to the governor’s office in April 2006.99She heads awomen’s centre that runs classes for women in tailoring, maths, computers, English andTaleban statement on theAl-Emarahwebsite confirming the killing of Safiye Amajan:http://www.alemarah.org/4-25-9-2006.html “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” was the officialname of Afghanistan while the Taleban were in power. See also: Amnesty International PublicStatement,Afghanistan: Killing of Safiye Amajan violates laws of war and signals need for protectionof activists,(AI Index: ASA 11/016/2006):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110162006?open&of=ENG-34696See for example:Independent (UK),“The woman who defied the Taliban, and paid with her life”, 26September 2006: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article1757264.ece97Amnesty International telephone interview with Qari Yousef Ahmadi on 25 October 2006.98Amnesty International,Afghanistan: Women still under attack – a systematic failure to protect,(ASA 11/007/2005): http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa11007200599Amnesty International telephone interview with Fauzia Olumi, the provincial head of the Departmentof Women’s Affairs in Helmand, 5 March 2007.95

beauty treatments. Her accountant, who was doubling as her driver at the time, was killed inthe attack. As yet, neither the Taleban nor any other armed group, have claimedresponsibility for the attack. Fauzia Olumi has also received death threats, which wererenewed following the killing of Safiye Amajan: “I receive phone calls at one or two in themorning and I do not know who these people are.” She reports that in Girishk in Helmand,women frequently face threats and intimidation. Activities for women have virtually ceasedin this district, while Lashkar Gar, the capital of Helmand, remains the only centre in theprovince where women’s activities continue. Insurgent attacks have impacted severely onwomen, causing “psychological damage”, she notes. “Executions, killings and assassinationshave destroyed women,” she adds.Safiye Amajan’s colleague in the eastern province of Nuristan told AmnestyInternational that she had faced threats to her security. These have been made by mobilephone, “night letters” and by messages delivered by hand to her place of work.The provincial heads of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in the provinces of Nimrouz,Farah, Zabul, Khost, Uruzgan, Paktia, Logar and Paktika provinces have all reportedly faceddeath threats from unidentified men. Taken together, these provinces cover the entire south ofAfghanistan, as well as parts of the centre and east of the country.

Letter from woman human rights defenderOn 3 October, a prominent woman human rights defender in Kandahar wrote to Amnesty Internationaldescribing “the challenges of defending women’s rights in the southern province of Kandahar”.100Inher letter she wrote:101“Despitethe severely deteriorating security situation in Kandahar City, I continue to work for women’srights in a circumspect manner and amidst real threats all around me. Struggling for women’s social,economic and political rights, we hold our meetings in private houses to at least be able [to] expressand discuss some of the core issues in regard to our civic rights and search for the few ways possible tosecure them.“Whatreally threatens women in Kandahar province these days is their overall security and safetywhile outdoors; safety amid terrorist threats from the extremist and regrouped Taleban and theongoing fighting between government forces and militants in the region. For this reason, women do notdare come out of their homes and send their girls to schools. On the other hand, job and foodinsecurity for women has further weakened their state in this conservative society.“Almostevery day there are suicide attacks, bomb blasts and fighting that always results in the killingof civilians in large numbers, including women and girls…”

She continues:“Girls’schools in rural areas are either being burnt down or closed due to continuing threats fromTaleban. People in the war-torn areas now say ‘we now both (sic) hate Taleban andGovernment/Coalition’.“Ihave also confirmed reports from the city districts that in the past nine months, seven women havebeen found dead in different parts of the city with no-one claiming responsibility for their killings. Inmost cases, the suspicion goes to domestic violence and the recent terrorist killings by the Taleban inorder to stop women from coming out of their houses to work for their livelihood.“Sofar as my personal security is concerned, I'm still on my own. I have no armed protection fromgovernment nor can I keep private guards to accompany me all the time. In the past few months, I havebeen receiving phone threats from unknown numbers and people threatening me if I don’t give upworking for women’s rights they will kill me. As a precautionary measure, I am trying to keep myprofile as low as possible these days and until it’s a bit safer to move around.”

The human rights situation for women and girls has deteriorated progressively as theinsurgency has deepened. Women are afraid to leave their homes and send their girls toschools, their freedom of movement is limited, including their ability to go out to work andparticipate in public life.102The attacks against women human rights defenders reveal theextent of insecurity these women face in Afghanistan. As a report by the UK non-governmental organization Womankind notes: “Insecurity remains the overwhelmingchallenge characterizing all aspects of daily life for women.103Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits discriminationon the basis of gender. It provides, among other things, that “[P]ersons taking no active part inthe hostilities... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adversedistinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similarcriteria.” Common Article 3 prohibits, among other things, “violence to life and person” and“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment”.Article 4 of Additional Protocol II specifically prohibits, among other things, “rape,enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.” These provisions are considered asreflecting rules of customary international law.104As noted, the Taleban have beenperpetrators of violence against and oppression of women, both past and present. In the

4. Indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian deaths“We have prepared a group of self-sacrificing attackers”Mohammad Hanif, Talebanspokesperson, 11 September 2006During 2005 and 2006 hundreds of Afghans were killed or wounded as a result of car bombs,improvised explosive devices such as roadside bombs, or suicide attacks attributed to theTaleban. Those killed and wounded include children.105Suicide bombings, unknown inAfghanistan until 2001,106are now a routine tactic of warfare by the Taleban. In November2005, Taleban commander and former Defence Minister, Mullah Obaidullah, announced thatthe “Taleban have planned and prepared for suicide attacks since long ago and a large numberof Taleban is present in all cities in Afghanistan, including Kabul, and are only waiting fororders to attack.”107Later in February 2006, Taleban commander Mullah Dadullah wasreported to have said: “Praise be to God, we have announced some 200 suicide bombers, butthat number is now in the thousands and more people are coming forward.”108The number of suicide attacks carried out in the insurgency has surged since thenational and provincial elections of September 2005. Figures provided by the UN Departmentof Safety and Security (UNDSS) indicate that suicide attacks have risen six-fold over the pasttwo years. In 2006 there were 123 suicide attacks, while in 2005 there were a total of 17suicide attacks.UNDSS recorded a total of 237 civilian deaths as a result of suicide attacks in2006.In addition, figures provided by NATO indicate that 519 civilians were killed as aresult of attacks using improvised explosive devices, such as roadside bombs, in the sameyear.110109

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,“A Chronology of suicide attacks in Afghanistan since 2001”, 17January 2006: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/9ac36a59-d683-4189-a2b9-94fe5fbf32ad.html106The first suicide attack carried out by Algerian suicide bombers targeted Ahmad Shah Masoud, theNorthern Alliance commander on 9 September 2001, two days before the attacks in the USA of 11September. The next suicide attack occurred on 9 June 2003 when a taxi filled with explosives rammedinto bus carrying German ISAF soldiers.107Reuters,“Afghan suicide attacks raise threat to US, NATO”, 17 November 2005.108Afghan Islamic Press interview with Mullah Dadullah, 8 February 2006.109The figures for civilian deaths do not include the deaths of suicide bombers.110NATO press briefing, 2 November 2006: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061102d.htmAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

Suicide attacks, whether aimed at military or civilian targets, frequently cause a highnumber of deaths and injuries among the civilian population in the vicinity of the attack. Insome cases suicide attacks have been directed at military targets such as convoys and basesbut have also struck civilians and civilian objects (shops, market stalls, schools) causingdisproportionate harm to civilians. In other cases attacks have targeted civilians not activelytaking part in military operations, including police, governors, civil servants, ambassadors andprivate individuals.Under international humanitarian law, targeting civilians – that is intentionallydirecting attacks at civilians not taking part in hostilities – is unlawful. Likewise, when thetarget of an attack is the military, the attack is unlawful if it causes disproportionate harm tocivilians. Both types of attack are war crimes, including under the Rome Statute whichAfghanistan ratified in 2003.111Under international humanitarian law, members of the police and similar civiliansecurity forces are considered civilians and therefore unlawful targets for attack, unless theytake a direct part in the hostilities.112The following cases are examples of indiscriminate attacks allegedly carried out bythe Taleban:•In mid-November 2005, three suicide attacks aimed at military convoys occurred inthe space of three days, killing a German peace keeper and several Afghan civilians.Mullah Obaidullah, a Taleban commander and former Defence Minister during thetime the Taleban controlled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 reported that “Taleban[fighters] have long planned and prepared for suicide attacks, and a large number ofTaleban are present in cities all over Afghanistan, including Kabul, and are onlywaiting for orders to attack.”113On 5 January 2006, at least 10 people were reportedly killed and 50 wounded when asuicide bomber apparently targeted the US ambassador while he was visiting thegovernor’s office in Tirin Kot, Uruzgan. It is thought that all the victims werecivilians. Qari Yousef Ahmadi claimed that Mullah Abdul Rahim, a resident ofUruzgan, carried out the attack on behalf of the Taleban.114

On 31 July 2006, the provincial governor of Nangarhar, Gul Agha Sherzai, reportedlysurvived a remote-controlled bomb blast that killed five policemen and three civilians.Five police and a further seven civilians were wounded. A police car exploded a fewminutes before the governor left Hada mosque south of Jalalabad city. The AfghanIslamic Press reported Taleban spokesperson Muhammad Hanif stating that a Talebfighter, Ahmad Baseer, had carried out the attack.115On 28 August 2006, a suicide bomber targeted a market in Lashkar Gah, killing 17people and injuring 47. Qari Yousef Ahmadi reportedly claimed responsibility butregretted the high death toll, saying that the bomb was targeted at Khan Noorzai, aformer police chief, who died alongside his son in the blast.116On 10 September, Abdul Hakim Taniwal, the Governor of Paktia and former Ministerfor Mines and Industry, was killed in a suicide attack along with his nephew andbodyguard. The attack occurred in the provincial capital of Gardez when a suicidebomber hurled himself at his car. Mohammad Hanif claimed responsibility for theattack and added: “Our Mojahedin will conduct similar attacks. We have prepared agroup of self-sacrificing attackers.”117On 18 September 2006, a suicide bomber targeted a patrol of Canadian soldiers asthey were giving out pens and notebooks to a crowd of children in the village of CharKota in Pashmul. At least four soldiers were reportedly killed and some civilians wereamong the casualties; a further 24 civilians were injured, most of whom were children.Qari Yousef Ahmadi claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that a Talebanfighter from Kandahar named Qudratollah carried out the attack against the Canadianpatrol.118On 26 September 2006, Mohammed Daoud Safi, the governor of Helmand, was thetarget of a suicide bomb which reportedly killed at least 18 civilians, includingpilgrims seeking paperwork to travel to Mecca for the Haj. The bomb was detonated

See for example:-Afghan Islamic Press Online,“Taliban accepted responsibility of Ningarhar explosion”, 31 July 2006:http://www.afghanislamicpress.com/site/default.asp?lang=en-Afghan Islamic Press Online,“Two children among eight die in Ningarhar bomb blast”, 31 July 2006:http://www.afghanislamicpress.com/site/default.asp?lang=en116See for example:The Guardian(UK), “17 die in suicide bombing at Afghan market”, 29 August2006: http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1860133,00.html117The Independent (UK),“Nato claims 100 Taliban dead, as provincial governor assassinated”, 11September 2006: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article1466358.ece118See for example:-AFP,“Suicide attack in crowd of children”, 18 September 2006.-BBC News Online:“Canadians die in Afghan bombing”, 18 September 2006:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5355478.stmAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

5. Rough ‘justice’ and unlawful killing of captives“We are trying hard not to misbehave with prisoners”Qari Yousef Ahmadi, Talebanspokesperson, 25 October 2006In areas where the Taleban have control, incidents of torture and other ill-treatment towardscivilians, including threats, beatings and killings, have been reported. Article 3 common to thefour Geneva Conventions prohibits such treatment and provides that all persons taking noactive part in the hostilities must “in all circumstances be treated humanely”.According to the Taleban rulebook, under Rule 16 fighters are not allowed “to searchhouses or confiscate weapons without the permission of a district or provincial commander”.Rule 17 forbids seizing “money or personal possessions of civilians”. However, numerousreports indicate that Taleban treatment of civilians appears to contradict their own rules.In December 2005, locals from the districts of Zabul province reported to AmnestyInternational that Taleban insurgents threatened and beat villagers if they did not provide food,petrol and the use of vehicles or other supplies to the Taleban. In Shah Jui, Taleban insurgentsreportedly forced farmers to pay a tax either in money or in kind. If this demand was refused,then the farmers faced the possibility of being beaten, shot or having their sons abducted.A staff member with UNAMA reported that: “The nature of the Taleban actions hasaltered particularly in recent months and weeks as ISAF has been winning tactical militaryvictories. Certainly since the end of last year it has become obvious that local Afghans nativeto their districts are less and less willing to support the Taleban. So the Taleban, in particularTaleban [insurgents] that are external, either from other districts, or other provinces or evenfrom outside the country, are having to use rather more harsh persuasive measures to instilfear in the population to persuade the [local] population to fight for them. There have beenunverified stories of people being threatened that they must provide a young male from thefamily to fight with the Taleban and stories of kidnappings.”122

An independent observer123who visited a makeshift refugee camp in Helmand filledwith people seeking temporary refuge from the fighting spoke to an Afghan man who fled hisvillage when the Taleban arrived: “We came here to free ourselves from theazaabs(suffering). We did not wish to join them [the Taleban] and die for their money.” AnotherAfghan man from Lashkar Gar commented: “If for example a person is captured by theTaleban he will be forced to obey the Taleban. If he doesn’t then the Taleban accuse him ofbeing a government official.”In Taleban-controlled areas in Afghanistan, the Taleban rule partly through co-operation with localshuras(councils) but largely through fear and intimidation. Afghancivilians living in these areas frequently face harassment and ill-treatment. In Lashkar Gar,Helmand, suspected Taleban insurgents broke into a guesthouse and shaved the heads of aresident and his guests for listening to music. This was then followed by a beating. They werethreatened with death if they listened to music again. A similar tale was recounted by aresident of Mian-Pista village. “You would be punished according to Shari’a if you listened tomusic or shaved your beard.”124Abductions and killingsAmnesty International is concerned at reports that scores of Afghans and foreign nationalshave been abducted by insurgents linked to the Taleban. Many of those abducted were laterkilled. Most of the victims have been civilians, including reconstruction and aid workers,drivers and private contractors.The Taleban and other armed groups have taken hostages for a variety of purposes,including as a lever to pressure foreign governments to withdraw troops, or compel foreigncompanies to suspend their commercial activities in the country. The Taleban have also usedhostage-taking, abductions and killings to spread fear.125Recently aired footage from aTaleban video showed the armed group’s operations. One segment of the video entitledTheFate of Spiesreportedly showed a Taleban commander, Mullah Dadullah, beheading fivepersons allegedly captured on “charges” of spying.126Some press reports say that eightcaptives were killed. The men are reportedly described as “spies” working for “Christians andcrusaders”. The video appears to be part of a Taleban campaign to both gain recruits andinstill fear in the local Afghan population to deter them from supporting or co-operating withthe government and foreign forces.127Name withheld for security reasons.Pajhwok Afghan News,“Taleban punish Afghan villagers for listening to music”, 5 December 2005.125For the purposes of the report hostage-taking refers to a kidnapping in which some form of ransom(financial or otherwise) is demanded in return for the individual’s release while abduction refers to akidnapping without the element of a demand.126During the period of Taleban control over Afghanistan from 1996-2001, Dadullah was reportedlylinked to massacres of Shi’a between 1998-2000 and the scorched earth policy of Shi’a villages in 2001.His methods were so brutal that he was reportedly disarmed for a period of time following an orderfrom Taleban leader Mullah Omar.127See for example:124123

On the Taleban’s legal duty to treat prisoners humanely, Qari Yousef Ahmadi toldAmnesty International: “…we are trying hard not to misbehave with prisoners and this is notonly our duty as humans, but our Shari'a obligations require us to behave properly withprisoners.”128He added that former Taleban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, “alwaysemphasizes good behavior, and prevention of… inhuman and degrading acts againstprisoners”. Ahmadi continued: “We are always acting in accordance with human rights andinternational law...” Ahmadi clarified, however, that “human rights and internationalconventions and treaties” were only acceptable to the Taleban in so far as they conform toShari’a Islamic law: “We are against those rules and regulations that contradict our Islamicand Shari’a values.”The following cases of abductions followed by killings are examples of a pattern ofabuse towards civilians.129•On 29 April 2006, an Indian engineer, K. Suryanarayana, was reportedly abducted byTaleban insurgents who threatened to kill him unless their demand that all Indianworkers pull out from Afghanistan was met. Suryanarayana, who was working for aBahrain-based telecommunications company, was reportedly shot dead whileattempting to escape. His body was discovered in Zabul province. Talebanspokesman, Qari Yousef Ahmadi, claimed responsibility for his death on behalf of theTaleban.130On 12 June 2006, suspected Taleban insurgents reportedly killed Jan Mohammed, ahigh court deputy judge, outside his home in Qara Bagh district of Ghazni provinceafter abducting him. The armed men also reportedly abducted his young son.131On 11 August 2005, Taleban militants in the southern province of Helmandreportedly abducted two people, one of them a police officer, and beheaded them.

-Jane’s Intelligence Review,“Taliban insurgency shows signs of enduring strength”, October 2006:http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml-The Sunday Times,“Taliban chief beheads 8 ‘spies’ working for British”, 15 October 2006:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2404313.html128Amnesty International telephone interview with Qari Yousef Ahmadi on 25 October 2006.129Amnesty International has condemned such killings in the past. See for example:- Amnesty Public Statement,Afghanistan: armed group must end hostage-taking,(AI Index: ASA11/016/2004):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110162004?open&of=ENG-AFG- Amnesty Public Statement,Afghanistan: Amnesty International condemns the reported beheading ofTaleban prisoners,(AI Index: ASA 11/011/2004):http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110112004?open&of=ENG-AFG130See for example:Financial Times,“Hostage killing fuels Indian fears over Pakistan”, 30 April 2006:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f75f844a-d870-11da-9715-0000779e2340.html131See for example:BBC News Online,“Taleban target Afghan civilians”, 15 June 2006:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5082042.stmAmnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007

Taleban spokesperson Abdul Latif Hakimi claimed responsibility: “We killed them.We beheaded them because they were American spies”. Hakimi also reported thattwo Afghans in the neighbouring province of Zabul were also beheaded for allegedly“spying”.132•On 31 August 2006, the Taleban reportedly beheaded a man called Fakhrudin in thedistrict of Greshk, in Helmand province. He was reportedly abducted three daysearlier by insurgents. His body was found dumped on a river bank in the same district.According to Pajhwok Afghan News, a Taleban spokesperson Mullah MuhammadUsmani said that he had been beheaded by the Taleban for spying for US forces.133On 19 December 2006, as many as 26 Afghan males were reportedly killed by theTaleban in Panjwai district and their beheaded bodies put on display around a localvillage. Letters were pinned to their bodies stating that the Taleban would hanganyone found to be assisting foreign forces and anyone involved in distributinghumanitarian aid.134

“courts” which they view as fairer and less corrupt than state justice system. Althoughinformation concerning the charges against individuals is limited, the majority of people whohave come before such courts have been “charged” with spying, others have been chargedwith murder and prostitution. Many of those who come before such bodies have beenabducted by the Taleban. In many cases death sentences have been issued and carried out.Few details about the nature of proceedings are known. A legal adviser at AIHRC said that:“the Taleban try to carry out the process quickly and leave no time for legal procedures likeaccess to defence lawyers. In many cases, they decide to kill individuals without the presenceof a court. They accuse people of spying to create an environment of fear and intimidation forothers”.135Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions prohibits “murder of all kinds”and “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgementpronounced by a regularly constituted court”.On 8 June 2006, Leandro Despouy, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independenceof judges and lawyers, condemned the public unlawful killing of an alleged murderer,Badshah Khan, in early May 2006. Khan’s “execution” followed a “trial” by a local Talebancourt in Ququr village in the town of Gizab in Daikundi. “The administration of justice is afunction that clearly belongs to the State of Afghanistan,” Despouy stated. “It is entirelyunacceptable for a non-state entity, such as the Taleban, to exercise a state function by tryingand punishing an alleged criminal.”136The following cases illustrate the use of Taleban informal judicial bodies, resulting insummary killings:•On 19 June 2005, following afatwa(a religious edict) from mullahs, Talebaninsurgents reportedly executed District Police Chief Nanai Khan and seven out of 31other policemen whom they were holding captive in Kandahar. Taleban spokesperson,Abdul Latif Hakimi, claimed responsibility for the killings, saying that the men wereshot following the orders of religious leaders during trials.137On 2 September 2005, Khan Mohammad Yaqoubi, a candidate for theWolesi Jirga(the lower house of parliament) was abducted with four others in the Ghorak district

of Kandahar when their vehicle was ambushed by gunmen. Their bodies, beheadedand riddled with bullets, were discovered on 9 September. Abdul Latif Hakimireportedly telephoned the Afghan Islamic Press Agency, claiming responsibility onbehalf of the Taleban, saying that the five were killed by firing squad following theorders of a Taleban court.138•On 3 September 2005, the body of David Addison, a British engineer, was found inFarah province. He had been abducted three days earlier by Taleban insurgents.Taleban spokesperson, Abdul Latif Hakimi, reportedly told Afghan Islamic Press thatAddison was believed to be a “military official” and that he was shot dead, along withfive other hostages, following orders from a Taleban council.139On 12 March 2006, Taleban insurgents reportedly abducted three ethnic AlbanianMacedonians and a German employee of the company, Ecolog, along with fourAfghan colleagues. Taleban spokesperson, Qari Yousef Ahmadi, phonedPajhwokAfghan Newsand claimed that the foreign workers were killed after the Talebancentral council found them guilty of spying for US forces.140On 13 July 2006, Zahra Madadi was reportedly killed by the Taleban in southernGhazni province. Zahra, 23, was working part-time with the Refugees and ReturneesAffairs Department. Taleban insurgents reportedly abducted her for her allegedinvolvement in prostitution and, after keeping her for two days in captivity, killed her.Taleban spokesperson Mullah Hilal reportedly claimed that she was killed after beingfound guilty of prostitution by a Taleban court.141On 26 November 2006, four Afghan workers were reportedly killed by the Taleban inManogay district of Kunar province after being abducted a day earlier by the group.

See for example:- Joint Verification of Political Rights,Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections Third Report,17August - 13 September 2005:http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Electoral%20Docs/Political--Afghan Islamic Press Agency,“Bodies of kidnapped Afghan official, four others discovered inKandahar”, 8 September 2005.139BBC News Online,“Afghanistan Briton ‘found dead’”, 3 September 2005:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4211424.stm140See for example:-Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,“Bodies Of Kidnapped Foreigners Found In SouthernAfghanistan”, 16 March 2006:http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/68BE6182-40DC-405F-B1F7-BBE2C6F62F29.html-Pajhwok Afghan News,“Bodies of kidnapped foreigners found in Kandahar”, 16 March 2006:http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=15118141See for example:Pajhwok Afghan News,“Taliban kill girl on charges of prostitution”, 13 July 2005:http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=21266

6. Applicable international lawInternational humanitarian law comprises principles and rules governing the conduct of allparties to international and non-international armed conflicts. Key provisions of moderninternational humanitarian law were set by the international community after the SecondWorld War in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and later in their two AdditionalProtocols of 1977.143Many of the provisions of international humanitarian law have become rules ofcustomary international law, that is, rules which are derived from consistent practice by statesand consistent consideration by states that they are bound by these rules. Certain rulesoriginally formulated for international armed conflict are now understood to bind parties tonon-international armed conflict as well.The current conflict in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict – foreignforces are involved but fight alongside rather than against the state. All parties to a non-international armed conflict are obliged, as a minimum, to apply Article 3 common to the fourGeneva Conventions, which protects all persons taking no active part in hostilities. ThisArticle reflects principles and rules of customary international law, outlined below, whichbind the Taleban, as well as the foreign forces and the Afghan National Army.The principle of distinctionA fundamental principle of international humanitarian law is that parties to an armed conflictmust at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objectsand military objectives.144Operations may only be directed against combatants and militaryobjectives. It is never permitted to target civilians or civilian objects for attack. This principle,Pajhwok Afghan News,“Afghan Taleban kill hostages accused of spying for USA”, 26 November2006: http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=27994143Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in ArmedForces in the Field; Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sickand Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces; Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War; Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to theProtection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to theGeneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts.144Military objectives are defined in Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2) as including objects “whichby their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whosetotal or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers adefinitive military advantage”.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007142

known as the “principle of distinction”, is codified in Additional Protocol I to the GenevaConventions and is a rule of customary international law, binding on all parties to armedconflicts, whether international or non-international.145Intentionally directing attacks againstcivilians is a war crime that comes within the jurisdiction of the International CriminalCourt.146According to international humanitarian law a civilian is any person who is not amember of the armed forces.147Members of the armed forces comprise all organized armedforces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to the party, includingmilitia and volunteer corps forming part of such forces.148With regard to non-internationalarmed conflicts, Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions, which protects “personstaking no active part in the hostilities”, is understood to contain the principle of distinction aswell.149The principle of proportionalityAttacks which although directed at a military target may cause disproportionate harm tocivilians or civilian objects are also prohibited under international humanitarian law.Additional Protocol I’s definition of indiscriminate attacks includes:“…anattack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury tocivilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive inrelation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”150While there are no provisions for proportionality explicitly applicable to non-international armed conflicts, this obligation is considered to be inherent in the principle ofhumanity which is applicable to these conflicts.151Humane treatmentCommon Article 3 extends protection to “persons taking no active part in the hostilities,including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placedhors decombat[those no longer involved in combat] by sickness, wounds, detention or any othercause...”. The Article provides that “in all circumstances” such people “shall be treatedhumanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birthor wealth, or any other similar criteria”. The Article prohibits certain acts against these people“at any time and in any place whatsoever”, including: “(a) violence to life and person, inSee Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck,Customary International Humanitarian Law,Volume 1: Rules(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press & International Committee of the Red Cross2005).146Rome Statute articles 8(2)(e).147See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Rule 5, p.17.148Additional Protocol I, Article 43.149See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Rule 1, pp.5-8.150Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b).151See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, pp.48-49.145

6.1 International criminal law and the responsibility of armedgroupsIn Amnesty International’s view, many of the acts carried out by the Taleban as cited aboveconstitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. War crimes and crimes against humanityare among the most serious crimes under international law, and are considered offencesagainst humanity as a whole. Bringing perpetrators of these and other serious crimes to justiceis therefore the concern and responsibility of the whole international community. This view isillustrated in the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted inJuly 1998, which affirms “that the most serious crimes of concern to the internationalcommunity as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must beensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing internationalcooperation.”153The Rome Statute establishes the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court overacts perpetrated within the specific context of armed conflict (war crimes) as well as actsperpetrated in any circumstances (genocide and crimes against humanity). The Rome Statuteprovisions on war crimes and crimes against humanity reflect the rules of customaryinternational law. As noted, customary international law is binding on all parties inAfghanistan, including armed groups.War crimesUnder customary international humanitarian law, as reflected in Article 8 of the Rome Statute,war crimes are acts committed during international and non-international armed conflicts.154They include acts such as willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; taking hostages;intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population; intentionally directing attacksagainst people involved in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping; indiscriminate attacks,Amnesty International opposes executions under any circumstances, by governments or armedgroups, in line with its absolute opposition to the death penalty in all its forms.153Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998 (A/CONF.183/9),entered into force on 1 July 2002, preamble.154Customary international humanitarian law is largely reflected in Article 8 of the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court (Rome Statute). See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck.Amnesty International April 2007AI Index: ASA 11/001/2007152

which violate fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, including distinctionbetween civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand, and members of armed forces andmilitary objectives, on the other; killing those who have surrendered; attacking religiousinstitutions; and “[k]illing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary”,155for exampleby approaching enemy soldiers pretending to be a civilian so as to attack them by surprise.Many of the acts reportedly perpetrated by the Taleban and other armed groups in theongoing non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan, constitute war crimes.The principle of command and superior responsibility, namely the responsibility ofcommanders or superiors for acts of people under their effective command and control, isapplicable to leaders of armed groups just as it is to those of armed forces.156Crimes against humanityUnder customary international law, as reflected in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, crimesagainst humanity are acts which are committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attackdirected against any civilian population”, “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or157organizational policy to commit such attack.” Among the relevant crimes listed in theStatute are murder, unlawful imprisonment, torture and other inhumane acts.158Acts thatconstitute war crimes may also amount to crimes against humanity if they meet therequirements of the definition.With regard to crimes such as war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity andother crimes under international law, the question of whether the perpetrator belonged to anarmy of a state, an armed group or any other capacity is of little relevance – anyoneresponsible for such crimes may and should be brought to justice.Many of the unlawful killings and other abuses by the Taleban described in this reportare crimes against humanity, in addition to being war crimes. In particular, acts of murder,unlawful imprisonment and other severe deprivations of physical liberty in violation offundamental rules of international law, and persecution have been committed by the Talebanin Afghanistan. These acts form part of attacks against the civilian population that have beenwidespread, as well as systematic, and under a publicly declared policy of targeting for killingcivilians such as teachers and similar government employees, those perceived as supporting

To the Taleban and other armed groupsAmnesty International calls on armed groups in Afghanistan to immediately cease:•attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects; attacks that do not attempt todistinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects; alldisproportionate attacks.in particular, attacks on teachers, students, education officials and school buildings,all attacks against members of local and international humanitarian organizations andagencies, and ensure unhindered and safe access for humanitarian agencies to allareas.locating military objectives among civilian concentrations and take all othernecessary measures to protect the civilian population from the dangers arising frommilitary operations.killing civilians, as a result of quasi-judicial procedures; and holding all suchprocedures.all abductions and hostage-taking.all torture and other ill-treatment.all harassment, and threats of death or abduction against civilians.

Amnesty International urges the government of Afghanistan to:•ensure that perpetrators of human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes againsthumanity are brought to justice, in accordance with its obligations under internationallaw. International law prohibits amnesties, or similar measures for crimes underinternational law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such measuresprevent the emergence of the truth, a final judicial determination of guilt or innocence,and full reparation for the victims.ensure that victims are provided with other forms of redress, including reparations.The government should explore all options for providing redress, including truthcommissions or similar mechanisms.make every effort to keep a record of all civilian casualties in the ongoing armedconflict in Afghanistan.

To religious and community leaders in Afghanistan and abroad, and leaders of thediaspora communityAmnesty International urges religious, community and diaspora leaders to:•use their influence with respect to the Taleban and other armed groups and theirsupporters to convince armed groups not to commit abuses, including targetingcivilians and other non-combatants, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,hostage-taking, unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment.publicly condemn, where possible, all attacks by the Taleban and other armed groupsagainst civilians and civilian objects, in particular, attacks targeting local andinternational humanitarian agencies; teachers, students, education officials and schoolbuildings; and women and groups promoting women’s rights.

Appendix 1. Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of1949 – Conflicts not of an international characterIn the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of oneof the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as aminimum, the following provisions:(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces whohave laid down their arms and those placed ‘horsde combat’by sickness, wounds, detention,or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adversedistinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similarcriteria.To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any placewhatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatmentand torture;(b) taking of hostages;(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgmentpronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which arerecognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, mayoffer its services to the Parties to the conflict.The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of specialagreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties tothe conflict.

Every Mujahid must abide by the following rules:1) A Taliban commander is permitted to extend an invitation to all Afghans who supportinfidels so that they may convert to the true Islam.2) We guarantee to any man who turns his back on infidels, personal security and the securityof his possessions. But if he becomes involved in a dispute, or someone accuses him ofsomething, he must submit to our judiciary.3) Mujahideen who protect new Taliban recruits must inform their commander.4) A convert to the Taliban, who does not behave loyally and becomes a traitor, forfeits ourprotection. He will be given no second chance.5) A Mujahid who kills a new Taliban recruit forfeits our protection and will be punishedaccording to Islamic law.6) If a Taliban fighter wants to move to another district, he is permitted to do so, but he mustfirst acquire the permission of his group leader.7) A Mujahid who takes a foreign infidel as prisoner with the consent of a group leader maynot exchange him for other prisoners or money.8) A provincial, district or regional commander may not sign a contract to work for a non-governmental organization or accept money from an NGO. TheShura(the highest Talibancouncil) alone may determine all dealings with NGOs.9) Taliban may not use Jihad equipment or property for personal ends.10) Every Talib is accountable to his superiors in matters of money spending and equipmentusage.11) Mujahideen may not sell equipment, unless the provincial commander permits him to doso.12) A group of Mujahideen may not take in Mujahideen from another group to increase theirown power. This is only allowed when there are good reasons for it, such as a lack of fightersin one particular group. Then written permission must be given and the weapons of the newmembers must stay with their old group.

13) Weapons and equipment taken from infidels or their allies must be fairly distributedamong the Mujahideen.14) If someone who works with infidels wants to cooperate with Mujahideen, he should notbe killed. If he is killed, his murderer must stand before an Islamic court.15) A Mujahid or leader who torments an innocent person must be warned by his superiors. Ifhe does not change his behaviour he must be thrown out of the Taliban movement.16) It is strictly forbidden to search houses or confiscate weapons without the permission of adistrict or provincial commander.17) Mujahideen have no right to confiscate money or personal possessions of civilians.18) Mujahideen should refrain from smoking cigarettes.19) Mujahideen are not allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield orinto their private quarters.20) If members of the opposition or the civil government wish to be loyal to the Taliban, wemay take their conditions into consideration. A final decision must be made by the militarycouncil.21) Anyone with a bad reputation or who has killed civilians during the Jihad may not beaccepted into the Taliban movement. If the highest leader has personally forgiven him, he willremain at home in the future.22) If a Mujahid is found guilty of a crime and his commander has barred him from the group,no other group may take him in. If he wishes to resume contact with the Taliban, he must askforgiveness from his former group.23) If a Mujahid is faced with a problem that is not described in this book, his commandermust find a solution in consultation with the group.24) It is forbidden to work as a teacher under the current puppet regime, because thisstrengthens the system of the infidels. True Muslims should apply to study with a religiouslytrained teacher and study in a Mosque or similar institution. Textbooks must come from theperiod of the Jihad or from the Taliban regime.25) Anyone who works as a teacher for the current puppet regime must receive a warning. Ifhe nevertheless refuses to give up his job, he must be beaten. If the teacher still continues toinstruct contrary to the principles of Islam, the district commander or a group leader must killhim.

26) Those NGOs that come to the country under the rule of the infidels must be treated as thegovernment is treated. They have come under the guise of helping people but in fact are partof the regime. Thus we tolerate none of their activities, whether it be building of streets,bridges, clinics, schools,madrassas(schools for Koran study) or other works. If a school failsto heed a warning to close, it must be burned. But all religious books must be securedbeforehand.27) As long as a person has not been convicted of espionage and punished for it, no one maytake up the issue on their own. Only the district commander is in charge. Witnesses whotestify in a procedure must be in good psychological condition, possess an untarnishedreligious reputation, and not have committed any major crime. The punishment may takeplace only after the conclusion of the trial.28) No lower-level commander may interfere with contention among the populace. If anargument cannot be resolved, the district or regional commander must step in to handle thematter. The case should be discussed by religious experts (Ulema) or a council of elders(Jirga). If they find no solution, the case must be referred to well-known religious authorities.29) Every Mujahid must post a watch, day and night.30) The above 29 rules are obligatory. Anyone who offends this code must be judgedaccording to the laws of the Islamic Emirates.This Book of Rules is intended for the Mujahideen who dedicate their lives to Islam and thealmighty Allah. This is a complete guidebook for the progress of Jihad, and every Mujahidmust keep these rules; it is the duty of every Jihadist and true believer.Signed by the highest leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.159