


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# **NATO Parliamentary Assembly**

## **SUMMARY**

of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee  
*Hall A, Tecnopolo, Funchal, Madeira*

Sunday 27 May 2007

**ATTENDANCE LIST**

<b>Chairman</b>	Julio Miranda-Calha (Portugal)
<b>General Rapporteur</b>	Frank Cook (United Kingdom)
<b>Rapporteur, Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation</b>	John Shimkus (United States)
<b>Rapporteur, Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities</b>	Sverre Myrli (Norway)
<b>President of the NATO PA</b>	José Lello (Portugal)
<b>Secretary General of the NATO PA</b>	Simon Lunn
<b>Member Delegations</b>	
Bulgaria	Assen Agov
Canada	Claude Bachand
	Blaine Calkins
	Joseph A. Day
	Peter Downe
	Cherryl Gallant
Czech Republic	Jiri Nedoma
Denmark	Morten Helveg Petersen
Estonia	Sven Mikser
France	Didier Boulaud
	Jean-Guy Branger
Germany	Jürgen Herrmann
	Robert Hochbaum
	Werner Hoyer
	Karl A. Lamers
	Markus Meckel
	Ursula Mogg
	Winfried Nachtwei
	Hans Raidel
	Kurt Rossmanith
	Thomas Röwekamp
	Anita Schäfer
	Andreas Weigel
Greece	Marios Salmas
Hungary	Vilmos Szabo
Italy	Francesco Bosi
	Antonio Cabras
	Elettra Deiana
	Giulio Marini
	Gustavo Selva
Latvia	Visvaldis Lacis
	Ainars Latkovskis
	Dzintars Rasnacs
Luxembourg	Claude Adam
	Marc Angel
Lithuania	Rasa Jukneviene

Netherlands	Luuk Blom Arend Jan Boekesteijn Willem Hoekzema Raymond Knops Tiny Kox Hendrik Jan Ormel Bart van Winsen
Norway	Per Ove Width
Poland	Piotr Boron Rafal Slusarz Jan Tomaka
Portugal	Rui Gomes da Silva Manuel Correia de Jesus
Romania	Ion Mocioalca Attila Verestóy Petru Gabriel Vlase
Slovakia	Rodolf Pucik
Slovenia	Anton Anderlic Milan Petek
Spain	Jordi Marsal Maria Asuncion Oltra
United Kingdom	Hugh Bayley Peter Bottomley David Crausby Paul Keetch Denis MacShane Michael Moore Sir John Stanley
United States	John Boozman Baron Hill Kendrick Meek Dennis Moore John Tanner Ellen Tauscher

**Associate delegations**

Albania	Pandeli Majko
Austria	Reinhard Bösch Walter Murauer Katharina Pfeffer
Azerbaijan	Zityafat Asgarov Gudrat Hasanguliyev Siyavush Novruzov
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Halid Genjac Ivo-Miro Jovic Milorad Zivkovic
Croatia	Krešimir Cosić Marin Jurjevic
Finland	Juha Korkeaoja Johannes Koskinen Esko-Juhani Tennilä
Georgia	David Gamkrelidze Irakli Kavtaradze

Montenegro  
Russian Federation

Borislav Banovic  
Mikhail Kapura  
Nikolai Kondratenko

Serbia  
Sweden

Victor A. Ozerov  
Dusan Prorokovic  
Karin Enström  
Christian Holm  
Peter Jonsson  
Allan Widman

Switzerland

Endi Engelberger  
Théo Maissen

The FYR of Macedonia\*  
Ukraine

Besim Dogani  
Stepan Bulba  
Yuriy Samoylenko  
Andriy Shkil

### **Mediterranean Associate Delegations**

Algeria

Mostefa Chelloufi  
Salah Tazdait  
Amira Dotan  
Elhanan Glazer

Israel

### **European Parliament**

Ana Maria Gomes  
Vasco Fraça Moura  
Pawel Piskorski

### **Parliamentary Observers**

Japan  
Kazakhstan

Masataka Suzuki  
Rashit Akhmetiv  
Zhandarbek Kakishev

### **Interparliamentary Assembly**

AWEU (IESDA)

Robert Walter

### **Parliamentary guests**

Afghanistan

Shakila Hashimi  
Haji Raz Mohammad  
Mohammad Khalid Pashton  
Abdul Raza Razai

Assembly of Kosovo

Dejan Jankovic  
Naim Maluku

Pakistan

Muhammad Ali Brohi  
Gul e-Farkhanda  
Khalid Iqbal Memon  
Mohammedimian Soomro  
Mushahid Hussain Sayed  
Semeen Siddiqui

### **Speakers**

**Daniel P. Fata**, Deputy Secretary Assistant of  
Defense for European and NATO Policy, US  
Department of Defense

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\* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

**Nuno Severiano Teixeira**, Minister of National Defence, Portugal

**General Luís Valença Pinto**, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces

**Lawrence J. KORB**, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress and Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Information

**International Secretariat**

Alex Tiersky, director

Valérie Geffroy, co-ordinator

François-Xavier Finet, research assistant

Luca Tardelli, research assistant

Bianca Jinga, research assistant

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**Speakers:**

**Daniel P. Fata**, Deputy Secretary Assistant of Defense for European and NATO Policy, US Department of Defense

**Nuno Severiano Teixeira**, Minister of National Defence, Portugal

**General General Luís Valença Pinto**, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces

**Lawrence J. Korb**, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress and Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Information

**I. JOINT PRESENTATION FOR THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE AND THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE.****A. Briefing by Daniel P. Fata, Deputy Secretary Assistant of Defense for European and NATO Policy, US Department of Defense, on *Proposed US Missile Defense Installations in Europe*.**

1. **Daniel P. Fata**, Deputy Secretary Assistant of Defense for European and NATO Policy for the US Department of Defense, described US plans to develop and field a missile defence system as stemming from a growing ballistic missile threat to the US and its Allies. This threat originated from worrying trends in the Middle East (particularly Iran) and North Korea. The US system was intended to prevent attempts at blackmailing by rogue states with long range missile capabilities. He suggested that the Bush Administration had transitioned from a National Missile Defence to a Missile Defence writ large in order to protect the indivisibility of security of its Allies.

2. Mr Fata described the installations the US has proposed to field in Europe, which would include radar in Czech Republic, an interceptor site located in Poland and a forward-deployed radar in Southeast Europe. This capability was designed for threats from the Middle East and was not directed against Russia. It was a purely defensive system, which could not be equipped with offensive warheads. Most importantly, the missile defence (MD) system would provide defensive coverage of a considerable part of Europe, a symbol of US commitment to the European security. Mr Fata suggested negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic might be concluded by the end of this year, and with funding from Congress, construction could start in 2008, with the goal of completing the installations by 2010.

3. The US had regularly briefed Russian officials on this system, Mr Fata indicated, including three briefings since November in the NATO-Russia Council. Russia has never accepted nor rejected cooperation offers from the US. Mr Fata also cited the existence of a nuclear-armed Russian missile defence system around Moscow as evidence that Russia does not oppose missile defence *per se*.

**B. Presentation by Dennis Mays, Chief Engineer, Missile Defence Agency**

4. Mr Fata was accompanied by **Dennis Mays**, Acting Deputy Director for Systems Engineering and Integration Chief Engineer, Missile Defence Agency, who provided additional technical details on the MD system. After describing the threat from Iran and North Korea, he reviewed recent successes in tests of the MD system (16 of 17 tests were considered successes). He described the logic behind placing the proposed European sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, and stated that the proposed system would, in 2011, cover all European states that were at risk from long-range ballistic missiles and would complement a potential NATO system that could counter shorter range threats.

5. In the lively debate that followed, Mr Mays confirmed to **Cheryl Gallant** (CA) that the US already used space-based sensors in their testing. Ms Gallant also asked whether NATO would be expected to shoulder some of the costs of the proposed installations; Mr Fata responded that the US anticipated funding the entire system.

6. **Victor Ozerov** (RU) insisted that the Russian Federation was ready to dialogue on this issue. Russia had been assured by NATO and the US at the end of the Cold War that neither troops nor NATO infrastructures would be deployed close to Russian borders, he stated, and those promises were not being kept. Russia had not been sufficiently consulted at the expert level, he asserted, and warned that Russia must take action in response to the US deployments, for instance by withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Mr Fata stated the only disagreement with Russia on whether Iran was a threat was only in its immediacy, and that the US had repeatedly offered partnerships on missile defenses. He also suggested that the proposed system could actually provide protection for some Russian territory.

7. **Frank Cook** (UK), **Hélène Luc** (FR) and **Ainars Latkovskis** (LV) emphasized the need to address the concerns of the people that live in the vicinity of the missile defence sites and the utility of communication directly with the general public. **Tómas Dub** (CZ) said that the MD system, which was a high priority for the Czech Republic, would be approved through Parliament rather than a referendum. **Jordi Marsal** (ES) asked whether the system would cover all Mediterranean countries, or if NATO will provide protection for these countries. **Heikki Holmas** (NO) requested clarifications regarding the system's ability to knock down missiles (kill rate); whether an MD system offered a sense of invulnerability to the US and potentially dangerous freedom of action; and whether the major US parties were united on MD.

8. Mr Fata reaffirmed that NATO members as Turkey are threatened not by long-range missiles but by short-range missiles; a NATO MD system in South-East Europe could serve this purpose. He underlined that Czech or Polish refusal of installations would preclude and US deployments in those countries. Mays explained that the kill rate of the system is greater than 80% against a single incoming missile and could reach 90% if two interceptors are launched against one target. Mr Fata added that no defense is perfect, and only 10 interceptors could not stop all adversaries. In this sense, the US is not seeking invulnerability.

9. **Ellen Tauscher** (US), Chair of the US Congressional Committee with responsibility over these systems, described the current Congressional majority's views on MD. She agreed that there was a very significant threat that also affected Europe. She stated that the Democrats have historically supported a comprehensive missile defence strategy, but suggested that the current proposals needed to include dramatic engagement through NATO, including ensuring interoperability and wider public support. The US Congress had therefore cut funding for the construction of sites in the Czech Republic and Poland, although funding was provided for the purchase of the necessary interceptors and radars. She advocated wider parliamentary and public discussion of this issue, and called for a stronger commitment from NATO to develop its MD system.

10. **Raymond Knops** (NL) asked how could one guarantee that the US could not equip the interceptor missiles with offensive warheads. **Bato-Zhargal Zhambalnimbuev** (RU) also related the widespread belief in Russia that the proposed interceptors in Poland could be transformed into offensive weapons. Mr Fata replied that the MD sites would be easily monitored and could not be secretly converted, and that any funding to do so would require Congressional approval. He also stated that the silos are designed for 2-stage missiles rather than the 3-stage, offensive missiles. He also suggested Russian officials could inspect the facilities.

11. **Anna-Maria R.M. Gomes** (European Parliament) wondered why the system was being developed outside the NATO context. Mr Fata responded that the US felt it could proceed more

quickly on a national basis to counter an emerging threat than if it had pursued a NATO solution. However, he suggested that the US was seeking full integration and complementarity with a NATO system, and suggested expediting development of that system.

## II. MEETING OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

12. Opening remarks by the Chairman, **Julio Miranda Calha** (PT).

13. Adoption of the draft Agenda [089 DSC 07 E Rev.1] and adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Quebec City, Canada, on 14-15 November 2006 [208 DSC 06 E]

14. Consideration of the *Comments of the Secretary General of NATO on the Policy Recommendations adopted in 2006 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly* [029 SESP 07 E]

### A. Presentation by Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Minister of National Defence, Portugal.

15. **Nuno Severiano Teixeira**, Minister of National Defence of Portugal, stated that prior crises in transatlantic relations were over, and reaffirmed Portugal's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. He considered that NATO and the EU, the two fundamental pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security system, must be pragmatic to find ways to effectively cooperate in theatres in which both are engaged. Portugal, a security provider, has recognized the changing international security environment, and has contributed its part to peace operations throughout the world. It bases its interventions on three basic principles: respect for international law, democracy and rule of law; equilibrium of participation in missions of the EU and NATO; and limiting the geographic and numerical spread of operations, in order to maximize the positive impact of Portuguese participation. Mr Severiano Teixeira stated that operations abroad have been critical to the restructuring and modernization of the Portuguese armed forces. Finally, he laid out the priorities of the Portuguese presidency of the European Council, pledging that Portugal would seek to promote cooperation between NATO and the EU through a greater number of formal and informal meetings at many levels and between the bureaucracies. Portugal also planned deeper cooperation with Africa and with the Mediterranean.

16. Responding to a question from Mr Cook, Mr Severiano Teixeira stated that there needed to be greater emphasis on reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan, and this required more than NATO-only efforts. There could be no reconstruction without security, and no security without reconstruction. Portugal would not be increasing its participation, he said, while underlining that Portuguese forces were under no caveats in Afghanistan.

17. **Claude Bachand** (CA) raised the NATO-EU relationship, expressing his concern that some European countries are deliberately keeping the two institutions apart. **John Skimkus** (US) expressed his hope that the problems between NATO and the EU could be solved with Portuguese help, and asked about relations with Tunisia and Morocco. Mr Severiano Teixeira pointed out that bilateral relations with both countries were very good, and described the importance of having a good relationship with the southern bank of the Mediterranean.

18. Mr Ozerov asked about the Portuguese stance on the adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, underlining that the treaty was signed in a different political context. Mr Severiano Teixeira emphasized that Portugal adhered to the Alliance position on this issue. Responding to a question from **Antonio Cabras** (IT) on the future of European security policy, relations with NATO, and the Portuguese presidency of the EU, Mr Severiano Teixeira underlined the need for political will to develop a strong European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well



as improving the institutional relationship with NATO. He suggested that better capabilities for the EU meant a stronger ally for NATO and the US.

19. In response to **Yuriy Samoylenko** (UA), who praised the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and asked about Ukraine-Portugal military cooperation, Mr Severiano Teixeira stated that Portugal supported an "open door" policy for NATO, and that he hoped to sign a bilateral agreement with Ukraine on bilateral military cooperation shortly.

**B. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities, on *The three Adriatic Aspirants: Capabilities and Preparation* [038 DSCFC 07 E] by Sverre MYRLI (Norway), Rapporteur**

20. The meeting continued with the presentation of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, on *The Three Adriatic Aspirants: Capabilities and Preparations* [038 DSCFC 07 E], by **Sverre Myrli** (NO), Rapporteur.

21. **Tiny Kox** (NL) inquired as to how soon these countries might be ready for NATO membership; he also noted that Croatian public support for NATO membership was low, and wondered why this might be the case. **Kresimir Cosic** (HR) offered updated poll data on Croatian opinion, citing a poll from May 2007, in which 52% stated support for NATO accession, which Mr Cosic attributed to the positive impact of successful reforms. He suggested public support would rise further due to deliberate communications campaign. **Besim Dogani** (FYROM) made specific recommendations on the report regarding his country, including on the level of public support for NATO, on parliamentary commissions on security issues, and on progress made against crime and corruption, as well as implementation of pending issues regarding the Ohrid Agreement.

22. **Marios Salmas** (GR) raised concerns regarding corruption, unemployment, organized crime, and electoral processes in Albania. He requested that the reports designate countries using NATO terminology, and saw a need for more discussion of other countries in the region. He also asserted that Croatia's application is more advanced than that of its neighbors. **Hugh Bayley** (UK) highlighted the positive role NATO has played in encouraging reforms in these countries; he also underlined the importance of independence for Kosovo, as well as the importance of full cooperation of all countries in the region on war criminals. Finally, he asserted that a country should have the right to choose its name.

23. **Attila Verestoy** (RO) agreed with the Rapporteur that all of these countries have made progress. He called for increased cooperation with their parliaments in order to help them to improve their legal framework. **Didier Boulaud** (FR) underlined the continued sensitivity of Southeast Europe and of the Kosovo issue. He also expressed surprise that Albania is using its stance on the Iraq war as an argument for NATO adhesion.

24. Sub-Committee Rapporteur Sverre Myrli was grateful for the feedback and agreed that the NATO nomenclature will be used in the report. He suggested that 2008 was a reasonable timeline for a NATO invitation, if the countries are judged ready on a case-by-case basis.

**C. Presentation by General Luís Valença Pinto, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces**

25. The Committee next heard from **General Luís Valença Pinto**, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces, who described their ongoing transformation efforts. These included organisational changes, acquisition of equipment and the establishment of a permanent Joint

Operational Command, all intended to shape the Portuguese military into a high-level expeditionary force. Portugal currently had 680 personnel involved in crisis response and peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN, NATO and the EU, in places such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Kosovo. Portuguese units took direct part both to NATO's Response Force (NRF) and EU's Battle Groups. Mr Shimkus highlighted that the 1.3% of GDP spent by Portugal on defence is below NATO's informal standard of 2%, and asked whether a larger defence budget would mean more Portuguese units in high-priority NATO operations. He also asked about how Portugal seeks to balance commitments to national defence as well as to the EU and to the NRF. The General replied that an increase in the defence budget is unlikely before 2009-2010. However, spending approximately 1.8% of GDP on defence would likely allow for additional capabilities and contributions to operations abroad. The General also underscored the importance of increasing the flexibility of both the NRF and EU battlegroup concepts, which would ease some of the difficulties associated with their coordinated use. He laid the blame for NATO-EU difficulties largely at the feet of the civilian bureaucracies of both organizations, rather than their political or military leadership.

**D. Consideration of the draft General Report on *Afghanistan: Assessing progress and key challenges for the Alliance* [037 DSC 07 E] by Frank Cook (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur**

26. Following the presentation of the draft General Report on *Afghanistan: Assessing Progress and Key Challenges for the Alliance* [037 DSC 07 E] by Mr Cook, General Rapporteur, **Francesco Bosi** (IT) suggested that the political dimension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should be reaffirmed. He also praised the Italian contribution for its sensitivity to the humanitarian dimension of intervention and contested implied criticisms of some of the contingents, for instance regarding national caveats. Ms Gomes deplored the narrow geographic scope of the authority of the central government of Afghanistan. The approach followed in Afghanistan has lacked a clear political and economic dimension, and an EU contribution, including the ESDP Police and rule of law missions, could help overcome this gap, she said. She therefore was especially concerned that obstacles in NATO-EU relations in the field be overcome. Finally, Gomes underlined the EU Parliament's commitment to a significant presence of women in the EU missions in Afghanistan. Mr Kox also expressed concern regarding the ISAF military approach, and sought further information on the opinion of ordinary Afghan citizens, as well as on the likelihood of a process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

27. **Eletra Deiana** (IT) suggested Italian public opinion was poorly described in the report; the majority of Italian public opinion was against a continued, endless military operation in Afghanistan, but supported continued civilian and humanitarian assistance. She underlined the problems of the role of warlords in Afghanistan, as well as the plight of women in Afghan society.

28. Mr Bachand stated that civilian casualties must be avoided at all costs, and inquired whether NATO is considering an agreement on the issue of Afghan prisoners with the Government of Afghanistan. He also suggested consideration of possible mechanisms for rotating troops from North to South and vice-versa. **Allan Widman** (SE) stated that as a NATO Partner, Sweden was proud to contribute to NATO's important operations. However, Sweden still had problems in such operations, including in intelligence sharing, which he said needed to be increased in order to minimize loss of life. After underscoring the importance of public opinion and of the "media offensive" conducted by the Taliban, Ms Gallant raised the problem of opium production and the Senlis Council's proposal for re-directing opium into medical and pharmaceutical purposes.

29. **Nikolay Kondratenko** (RU), noting the defeats of the USSR and the UK in Afghanistan, asserted that the presence of foreign troops unified Afghan tribes. He added that NATO cohesion was at risk if political solutions were not implemented soon. **Winfried Nachtwei** (DE) deplored that

national approaches differed so greatly in Afghanistan despite a consensus on overall strategy; he also emphasized the importance of a responsible and efficient police force, whose training has been led by Germany. His delegation remained committed to working for increased German public support for the ISAF mission.

30. **Jean-Guy Branger** (FR) stated that NATO countries should provide the necessary resources to address continuing challenges in the country, but stressed that there remains confusion about NATO's final objectives in Afghanistan. He called for clear deadlines for the end of the NATO commitment, which would prevent further deterioration of morale in member countries. **Visvaldis Lacis** (LV), speaking for himself only, stated that American and British leaders had not understood that deep divisions between different ethnic groups constituted a critical problem that could only be solved through a political compromise based on establishing autonomous democratic governments in ethnically-based regions.

31. **Mohammad Khalid Pashton** (AF) responded that Afghans are not as divided as Mr Lacis had affirmed. Mr Pashton also underlined the gravity of the problem of civilian casualties of NATO operations; he cited specifically the problem of NATO units firing indiscriminately while passing through Afghan cities. Mr Pashton also expressed the gratitude of the Afghan delegation for NATO's contribution in Afghanistan. Mr Pashton added that other problems Afghanistan faces include corruption, opium, and terrorism, and that Afghanistan's neighbours must also be a part of the solution.

32. **Mushahid Hussain Sayed** (PK) regarded many of the problems facing Afghanistan as originating from the American strategy for toppling the Taliban using only a small permanent contingent, which forced a reliance on local warlords, an approach that eventually backfired. Unity of command between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom remained a significant problem. Sayed also proposed the establishment of a Tripartite Commission between the Afghan Parliament, the Parliament of Pakistan and the NATO PA.

33. In response to the extensive debate, the General Rapporteur stressed the progress made in Afghanistan since 2001 at the military, political, economic and social levels. He endorsed calls for greater involvement of women in Afghanistan, and condemned 'unacceptable' civilian casualties while emphasizing their unintended nature and their partial inevitability given the presence of al-Qaida forces hiding among civilians. He reaffirmed that NATO is seeking political solutions and not only working using military tools. The Rapporteur stressed the need for member countries to abide by the terms and responsibilities set out in NATO's Treaty. Mr Cook explained the downsides to any new troop rotation scheme, including the time required for each contingent to become familiar with their surroundings. Mr Cook reminded the Committee that 37 countries are engaged in Afghanistan, including all NATO Allies - not only the US and the UK. He underscored the need for sustaining public support in member countries for the operation, as this is a key pre-condition of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans. He resisted calls for precise deadlines for allied commitment to Afghanistan, due to the fluidity of the situation there. Finally, he underlined that while counter narcotics is not NATO's direct responsibility, the many different organizations working on this problem must coordinate better if they hope to find success.

**E. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation, on *NATO-EU Operational Co-operation* [039 DSCTC 07 E] by John SHIMKUS (United States), Rapporteur**

34. Mr Shimkus, Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation, next presented his draft report on *NATO-EU Operational Co-operation* [039 DSCTC 07 E]. Ms Gomes supported the conclusions of the report and proposed a joint meeting with the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Security and Defence. Ms Gomes

also suggested some technical changes to the report. **Kurt Rossmann** (DE) underlined that soldiers should not pay the price for poor communication between NATO and the EU, and requested that more possible solutions be presented in the report.

35. **Robert Walter** (WEU), Chair of the WEU Defence Committee, reminded the Committee that it was national parliaments that make decisions on committing to EU operations and not the European Parliament. He also reminded the Committee about the WEU's historical role in security issues, and suggested that the EU should not create a separate planning and command unit, as there were enough resources in SHAPE and national commands to support national operations. He also praised the EU Battlegroups as mechanisms for getting greater military commitments out of smaller EU nations which are thus creating greater capabilities within the Alliance.

36. **Mario Salmas** (GR) stated that a strengthened EU was not a challenge to NATO. He suggested that discussions between the organizations were blocked not by Cyprus, but rather by Turkey's opposition to NATO-EU cooperation beyond the Berlin Plus framework. Mr Bachand remarked that this debate was not new, and sought explanation from his European colleagues on why some European states sought to limit cooperation with NATO in order to resist American influence.

37. Sub-Committee Rapporteur John Shimkus appreciated the very important discussion among his colleagues, which reaffirmed the need to solve communication problems between the two institutions. He considered that more capable individual states make for a stronger Alliance. He also suggested that military commanders, who had no difficulties working together on the ground, should not be hampered by politicians' inability to cooperate.

**F. Presentation by Lawrence J. KORB, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress and Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Information, on *National security strategy in an age of terrorists, tyrants, and WMD***

38. The final presentation to the Committee was given by **Lawrence J. Korb** (US), Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, on the subject of *National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and WMD*. Mr Korb offered an extensive critique of the Bush administration's security strategy, contesting the terminology of the "war on terror". The principal threats to the US today in the shorter term were violent, extremist non-state actors, violent and extreme regimes and weak and failing states. In the longer term, managing the rise of Chinese power peacefully was critical. The current US national security strategy was based on three pillars: preventive war, the imposition of democracy through force, and military superiority. These three elements, together with their underlying premises of a belief in American exceptionalism and American power, lead the US to consider military force as a tool of first resort. Mr Korb suggested instead pursuing an "integrated power," combining elements of hard and soft power in a more multilateral approach.

39. Kicking off a wide-ranging debate, Ms Tauscher raised the challenge of differences in threat perception and intelligence analyses. Mr Cox questioned whether the current American Strategy is the direct consequence of the Bush Administration's policies, or a characteristic feature of American politics and society. Mr Cook raised the spectre of a renewed US isolationism. Mr Day asked whether the concept of preventive war was gaining acceptance at the international level. **Sven Mikser** (EE) highlighted the fungibility of military superiority and the inevitable tendency to use it for both defensive and dissuasive purposes. **Dennis Moore** (US) asked at what point the speaker considered it appropriate to suspend dialogue with other international actors during disputes. Ms Gomes expressed concern regarding the spread of small arms, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) standstill, and militarization of space. Mr Shimkus asserted that there was international consensus that Iran was a problem; when, then, would the international community reach a definitive decision point?

40. Responding to the extensive discussion, Mr Korb noted that the US needed to strike a better balance between hard and soft power. He emphasized the need to make strategic decisions based not on political pressures but on their merits. Mr Korb expressed concern that although the neo-conservative viewpoint had been discredited, there was still a danger of an isolationist reaction by the American public to the current strategic situation. Mr Korb also cited the need to engage in dialogue with strategic adversaries, as with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. He lamented the “over-reaction to 9/11,” which was used as a political tool; 9/11 did not change *everything* in international relations as had been claimed. He advocated reenergizing the NPT, and preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the weaponization of space. Finally, Mr Korb insisted that military force remained an option that should never be excluded, but that all diplomatic solutions should be pursued first.

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