1.      Members
of the Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Proliferation of
Military Technology visited London, UK, from 19-20 March 2007. The delegation
of 23 legislators from member and associate countries, led by Committee
Chairman Michael Mates (UK) and Subcommittee Vice Chairwoman Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale
(UK), met with representatives of the Foreign and Defence Ministries and
political scientists from Royal United Services Institute
for Defence & Security Studies (RUSI) and International Institute for Security Studies (IISS). The delegation also received briefings from BAE
Systems, the premier defence company in Europe.
I.
Proliferation of WMD
2.      Paul
Arkwright, Head of Counter-Proliferation Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, presented the position of the United Kingdom on the most acute issues in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation. The UK’s policy rests on 4 D’s:
-
Dissuade states from acquiring or proliferating WMD.
The UK Foreign Office focuses on diplomatic means to achieve this, particularly
via reinvigorating international regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), etc. The Foreign Office is also concerned about
the proliferation of conventional weapons: for example, the UK is lobbying for the international Arms Trade Treaty, designed to curb import, export and
transfer of such weapons.
-
Detect WMD-related activities by supporting
international watchdogs, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Organisation (CTBTO).
-
Deny access to deadly weapons and materials
through intensive co-operation with international partners. Dual-use technology
is an issue that requires particular attention.
-
Defend against an attack using WMD. The Foreign
Office is not the lead institution in this regard, but it has a role to play,
for example, in engaging in contingency planning. Mr. Arkwright emphasized
that the diplomatic track is the one the UK prefers, considering military
response to be the last resort.
3.      The
speaker singled out three WMD programmes that cause particular concern:
-
Iran’s nuclear programme. The international
community must continue efforts to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear-weapon
(NW) capabilities by offering substantial incentives. Otherwise, Iran will have to face international sanctions.
-
North Korea’s WMD programme. Sanctions, imposed by UN
Resolution 1718, and international pressure induced Pyongyang to come back to
the Six Party Talks and agree to halt its nuclear weapon programme. The main
challenge is to ensure the implementation of this agreement.
-
Libya’s WMD programme was developed through
extensive help from the clandestine network of A.Q. Khan. The international
pressure, followed by an attractive package of incentives, succeeded in
persuading Libya to relinquish its WMD capabilities. The UK’s assessment is that Libyan authorities revealed all of the country’s nuclear
capabilities and fulfilled their promise. The UK believes that the “Libyan
model†could be implemented elsewhere as well.
4.      Members of the delegation asked
Mr. Arkwright to comment on other countries that are believed to have nuclear
weapons programmes, such as India, Pakistan and Israel. The speaker stated that
the UK supports the decision of the United States to engage in nuclear
co-operation with India, since this co-operation will make India’s nuclear programme more transparent. He admitted, however, that the US-India deal
does have some “uncomfortable†aspects to it, such as India not being a member of the NPT. As for Pakistan, Mr. Arkwright felt that the country
is moving in the right direction but it takes time to repair the damage caused
by the case of A.Q. Khan. With regard to Israel, it is understandable that this
country feels insecure, especially following the remarks of the President
Ahmadinejad of Iran. However, Mr. Arkwright stressed that the UK is wholeheartedly supporting the universalisation of the NPT.
5.      Asked
about the proliferation of WMD means of delivery, the speaker emphasised that
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) needs to be reinforced. He doubted
if there is a necessity to strengthen the legal basis of missile
non-proliferation efforts. The main task is to ensure rigorous implementation
of the existing regime, Mr. Arkwright stressed.
6.      In his
presentation, Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, IISS, focused mostly on the case of Iran. His assessment was that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapon capability (not necessarily NW themselves, but rather the
ability to produce them quickly when necessary). Iran’s ambitious plan to build
an enrichment facility with 54,000 centrifuges does not seem to be realistic. Iran will probably concentrate on finishing its current 3,000-centrifuge pilot-scale
facility.
7.      With
regard to the ways to deal with Tehran, Mr. Fitzpatrick opposed endorsing
limited enrichment capability for Iran. He believed that legitimisation of
enrichment would make it very difficult to control proliferation of sensitive
materials and technologies to Iran.
8.      Mr Holmas
(Norway) asked if denuclearisation of the Middle East is feasible. Mr
Fitzpatrick was pessimistic and claimed that even Israel’s unilateral
renunciation of nuclear weapons would not dissuade Iran from developing NW
capability. However, he agreed that certain steps on Israel’s part could reduce
the tension, for example, cutting off production of fissile material. Mr.
Fomenko (Russia) said one should not exaggerate the threats to Israel posed by Iran: Jerusalem is a sacred city for Muslims as well, and Tehran would never launch
an attack on it.
9.      Commenting
on the question from Mr Tagarinski (Bulgaria) on Iran, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the most prominent British
scholars, said that
this country’s nuclear programme is obviously facing serious technological
challenges. The international community has still time to give diplomacy
another chance. The military option may be kept in the background, but other
sanctions have to be exhausted first.
10.    Dr Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs and
Editor, Survival, IISS, was worried that the desperate desire to achieve a
unified position of the UN Security Council on Iran may be counterproductive.
He questioned whether this unity would be flexible enough to reach a workable
deal with Iranian authorities.
11.    Committee Chairman Mr Mates (UK)
was interested in whether Iran’s ballistic missile programme posed a serious
enough threat to justify the US plans to install missile defence elements in
Poland and the Czech Republic. Mr. Fitzpatrick replied that Iran is working on missile designs that would allow the mounting of a nuclear warhead. The
Shahab-3 missile is capable of reaching Turkey, but Iran is also reportedly
developing longer-range missiles as well. Thus, it is safe to assume that a
missile defence installation in Central Europe would indeed be helpful to
counter the Iranian missile threat. In the longer run, however, these
installations might be useful against other, currently unknown threats. Dr.
Giegerich added that the bilateral format seems suitable for this plan, and
NATO’s involvement might be useful but not necessary.
II.
Transformation, technology and Network-Enabled
Capability
12.    In his
presentation, Sir Lawrence Freedman discussed the issue of
transformation of military affairs. He argued that one could currently witness
the emergence of a new dimension of military transformation. Until now, the
high-tech end of military transformation was a clear priority. Accuracy, speed,
real-time communication and situational awareness are the key elements of the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the concept that began to take shape
after the 1991 Gulf War. RMA emphasises the advantages that armed forces
acquire in the Information Age. Modern technologies enable a military to defeat
the enemy much more quickly and with minimal losses.
13.    However,
since approximately 2003, strategic thinking began to change. The experience in
Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the US military must make a greater effort to
come to terms with irregular warfare. It became obvious that modern military
technology is not particularly efficient in dealing with asymmetric threats in
failed states. For example, existing technology cannot tell civilians from
insurgents. However, some indications suggest that there is an increasing understanding that the process
of military transformation should incorporate not only cutting-edge
technologies but also focus on counter-insurgency and peacekeeping
capabilities. This understanding is expressed in the latest US 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review.
14.    The
Committee Chairman Mr Mates (UK) noted that it might be relatively easy to
introduce new technological solutions, but is often more difficult to change
mindsets of national decision-makers. Sir Freedman pointed out that one could
detect certain changes in the US attitude towards its allies. The US still
wants to remain in the lead, but its leaders realise that they need allies to
achieve their foreign and security policy objectives. Mr Bilgic (Turkey)
questioned whether NATO should be dealing with asymmetric threats at all. Since
one’s ‘terrorist’ is another man’s ‘freedom fighter’, NATO’s involvement in
fighting the insurgents in some countries might send a wrong signal. Sir
Freedman was of a different opinion since NATO has valuable experience in this
field and represents an impressive group of democratic countries. However, he
agreed that Islamic countries could be more actively engaged in joint efforts
to promote stability in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
15.    Dr
Bastian Giegerich, Research Fellow for European Security, IISS, discussed
the issue of military transformation and the role of technology. He noted that
transformation in Europe takes place in the context of steadily decreasing
defence budgets. Many European countries are also not paying enough attention
to information and networking technologies, thereby hindering interoperability
with the increasingly networked American forces. NATO has to be more active in
setting standards that would link military networks of coalition partners. On
the other hand, Dr. Giegerich pointed out that NEC is yet to prove its
worth. Employing NEC has already brought certain results, but they are not as
spectacular as originally anticipated.
16.    Mr. Bilgic (Turkey) and Mr.
Fomenko (Russia) noted that the Western countries seem to be preoccupied merely
with stepping up their military capacity in order to achieve their defence and
security policy goals. However, one needs to understand that modern conflicts
are more about ideological and cultural differences, and hence the main focus
should be on winning the hearts and minds of local population.
17.    The
Brigadier Neil Couch, Director, Command and Battlespace Management (CBM)
and Defence Joint 6, Ministry of Defence, briefed the members on the UK
Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) programme. Net-centricity is said to be a
revolution in warfare and it is the way military will operate in the world,
which is increasingly networked. The UK defence planners consider NEC to be a
priority. Evidence from studies, experiments, exercises and operations confirms
that NEC has the potential to allow UK forces to achieve mission success more
effectively and efficiently. NEC will be implemented through the development of necessary equipments,
software, processes, structures and individual and collective training,
underpinned by the development of a secure, robust and extensive network of
networks.
18.    Brigadier Couch also named
several NEC-related challenges such as:
-
Heavy reliance on the
network
-
Information overload
-
Benefits can be lost
through inadequate investment
-
Sometimes it is
extremely difficult to network coalition partners
-
Potential for
interfering: NEC technologies allow strategic leaders to intefere at the
tactical level.
19.    The
speaker also stressed that net-centricity is not all about communication
networks, the human domain (cultural change, training, doctrine, confidence in
partners) is just as important for NEC. For NEC to succeed, it should not be
regarded as a purely military programme. There is a need for a comprehensive
approach, and a number of agencies need to be involved as well as international
partners and even NGOs.
20.    Asked by
Mr Nolin to specify what are the challenges that NEC presents to coalitions,
Brigadier Couch said that interconnection even between the UK Foreign Office
and MoD are not great, to say nothing about multinational missions. Allied
forces in Afghanistan had serious communication problems, but the speaker
believed these problems were caused not by the lack or incompatibility of
technologies, but by inflexible information protection and exchange rules. It
is critical to ensure that these problems are dealt with in future missions and
that new standards are developed. Unfortunately, decision-makers, including
those of NATO, do not always understand the importance of NEC, and progress is
not very visible. Procurement policies need to be revised to meet the challenge
of net-centricity.
21.    The
presentation of Mr. Graham Jordan, Senior Science and Technology
Advisor, RUSI, addressed the issue of technology policies across the Atlantic
and the asymmetries in American, British and French mechanisms of R&D and
the NATO role. He noted that European defence expenditure, while significant in
aggregate, is highly fragmented and comes mostly from only six nations. Europe’s
GDP is slightly bigger than that of the US, but the US spends 5 times more on
defence R&D than Europe. NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation (RTO)
is good at providing dialogue about technology priorities, but it has rarely
facilitated joint research between nations and made no major direct
contribution to generating the technology that the Alliance needs.
22.    To improve
the situation, NATO should lead the trend towards joint technology development,
rather than standing aside. Also, the US government should review its
technology-sharing policies. Nations with small or no defence R&D budgets
can provide a valuable reservoir of scientific talent. Therefore, it would be
helpful if NATO had a small budget to fund R&D in “intellect rich, budget
poor†nations.
23.    Asked by
Mr. Holmas (Norway) about NATO’s Science Programme (SP), the speaker said that
SP focuses on projects in partner countries, for instance, funding redirection
of former Soviet weapon scientists. The threat of proliferation of expertise has
diminished in recent years, causing calls for cutting SP’s budget. However, it
would be more appropriate to redirect that money to NATO’s own technology
projects. Mr. Bilgic (Turkey) was interested in the causes of such a dramatic
technology gap between the US and Europe. Mr. Jordan responded that if one
spends 1 Euro in research, it takes 10 Euro to produce a technology
demonstrator and 100 Euro to make the actual product. Due to budgetary
constraints, European investment is limited to the research/laboratory level
only. It is cheaper for Europe to buy an American strike fighter than to
develop its own. As a solution, Mr Jordan suggested that Europe focus only on
equipment that is necessary to implement the ‘Petersburg tasks’. Europe could
achieve more if member states would integrate their defence R&D to avoid
duplication of efforts, but co-operation is hindered by the fact that nations
consider the field of defence to be very sensitive and inalienably related to
their sovereignty.
III.
Nuclear Weapon Capabilities of the United
Kingdom
24.    Tom
McKane, Director, General Strategic Requirements, Ministry of Defence,
discussed the future of the UK's nuclear forces. He stressed that, since the
Cold War, UK nuclear forces were subject to substantial reductions. The UK
retains only a “minimum deterrent†capability, having moved exclusively to
submarine-based NW. Currently, the country has 4 submarines, with only one
being on patrol. The UK’s stockpile of NW (up to 16 Trident missiles with 48
warheads) comprises less than 1% of the world’s total. Missiles are detargeted.
The UK is committed to refraining from conducting nuclear weapon tests and
producing weapons-grade fissile material.
25.    The
ultimate goal for the UK is nuclear-free world, but this can only be achieved
by multilateral action, and unilateral disarmament by the UK would not be
instrumental. The ongoing proliferation of WMD and the potential risks from
state-sponsored terrorists armed with NW are the factors that caused the
British authorities to opt for maintaining and upgrading its nuclear deterrent.
Critics of the decision to upgrade Trident missiles usually refer to the
political/moral side of the issue as well as the cost of the programme (£15-20 billion). Mr. McKane, however, believed the decision
was a right one, because defence of the country is state’s main duty.
26.    Mr. Nolin
(Canada) questioned if Britain’s modest NW capabilities actually contribute to
its security. Canada, for example, does not feel insecure being non-NW state.
At least one of the NW States could show wisdom by unilaterally disarming,
and the UK could set such a precedent. Mr. McKane replied that the UK and
Canada have different historical contexts. The UK’s NW capability is inherited
from the Cold War era. However, although the strategic situation has changed
dramatically after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are still too many
uncertainties in today’s world and too few positive developments to justify
unilateral disarmament.
IV.
Climate Change
27.    The next
topic – the UK's strategy with regard to climate change and the Kyoto Protocol
– was addressed by Mr Eliot
Morley MP, the Government's Special Representative on the
Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainability. He stressed that the environment is a
topic that must be on NATO’s agenda. Climate security is an integral element of
overall security. There is no doubt that temperatures are rising, and our
infrastructure, including military equipment, is often not prepared to deal
with it. Water shortages, caused by global warming, could lead to competition
for water and the build-up of geopolitical tensions in already vulnerable
regions, such Palestine, India-Pakistan or Northeast Africa. The US and Mexico
are already competing for the waters of Rio Grande. The opening of the
Northwest Passage has also instigated a sovereignty debate between the US and
Canada.
28.    In the
last 10 years, the number of extreme weather events has doubled in the UK. The
latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirmed
that global warming is happening faster than originally predicted. The Arctic sea lost 8% of its ice in last decade, and sea
levels are rising at 1-2 cm per decade. If no action is taken, temperatures
would rise by up to 5.8C this century, causing irreversible melting of
Greenland and even the Antarctic ice sheet. This would result in a sea level
rise of up to 12m, significant slowing of the Gulf Stream, oceans becoming more
acidic and threatening the food chain. Melting permafrost is already damaging
roads in the North. In addition, the global warming might accelerate as melting
permafrost
releases methane, as oceans warm and as biosphere ceases to absorb excess CO2.
29.    The human
and economic losses caused by global warming are tremendous. The floods in the UK in autumn 2000 cost £1bn, whereas
Hurricane Katrina took more than 1300 lives and caused $200 bn in total losses.
According to the estimations of the “Stern reportâ€, if temperatures rise by
five degrees Celsius, up to 10% of global output could be lost. The poorest
countries would lose more than 10% of their output. However, stabilising global
warming at manageable levels in the next 20 years would cost only 1% of GDP.
30.    Industrial
nations have to take a greater responsibility in global mitigation efforts (the
UK, for example, aims
to reduce its CO2 emissions by 60 % by 2050), but the developing world also needs to
be involved. China will become the world’s major polluter by 2025. It would be
unwise for the developing countries to go through the same ‘dirty phase’ as the
industrial nations did. Urgent action on climate change is required across all
countries, and the delay would be dangerous and much more costly.
31.    Mr.
Holmas (Norway) asked to what extent the UK intends to use the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) to achieve its ambitious goals. Mr. Morley replied that earning carbon
credits by implementing projects in the developing countries is not enough.
Industrial countries need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions domestically
as well. Mr. Tagarinski (Bulgaria) wondered if nuclear energy might be a
solution. Mr. Morley said that, at least for the UK, the cost of launching a
nuclear energy programme from the scratch would be massive. Besides, the problem
of nuclear waste is yet to be resolved. Nuclear energy might become
cost-effective sometime in the future, but currently low-carbon technologies
should be a priority.
V.
Energy Security
32.    Dr.
Jonathan Eyal, Director of International Security Studies, RUSI, spoke
about the acute issue of energy security and the role of Russia. He noted that
Kremlin seeks to maintain complete state control over energy companies while
disguising them as independent commercial entities (for example, Gazprom is
nothing but Russia’s Ministry of Energy). The state has an open monopoly over
pipelines, thus seeking to control oligarchs and its neighbouring states.
Russian authorities also are attempting to create a circle of “privileged
customersâ€, including Germany, France and maybe even the UK. The goal of
Russia’s energy policy is to eliminate the ability of Central European
countries to have a say in energy matters and thereby make them completely
irrelevant. Russia also seeks to block alternative projects such as EU’s Nabucco
pipeline.
33.    However, Dr. Eyal predicted that
Russia itself would be the ultimate victim of such policy. The country does not
have sufficient funds and technology to sustain its ambitious plans, and the
Gazprom will not be able to fulfil its generous supply commitments. In fact,
Dr. Eyal asserted, Russia will itself face gas shortages as of 2010. Besides,
Russia will spoil its relationships with its neighbours. Thus, Russia’s energy
policy is counter-productive in the longer run and it is destined to fail.
34.    Dr. Eyal
also touched upon the recent debate on missile defence systems that the United
States plans to field in Poland and the Czech Republic. He regretted that the
Russian leaders still think in terms of ‘spheres of influence’, although the Cold
War is long over. It is also characteristic that Moscow prefers to discuss the
missile defence issue with Washington directly, ignoring the Central European
countries involved. He urged the Allied nations not to be frightened and stand
for what they believe is right.
35.    Mr. Nowak
(Poland) shared the speaker’s views and stressed that Europe needs a Musketeer
Pact on energy to avoid Russia’s blackmail. Mr. Nolin (Canada) questioned
whether the portrayal of Russia as an unreliable partner is always applicable.
For instance, Canada enjoys constructive co-operation with Russia in the field
of energy. Dr. Eyal replied that it was precisely Russia’s policy to keep some
countries happy, while exerting pressure on the others. For example, Lithuanian
authorities chose to sell their large oil refinery plant to the Polish company
PK Orlen instead of Russia’s Lukoil. The reaction was immediate: the supply of
Russian oil to the plant was cut off due to “technical problemsâ€.
36.    The
Russian members of the delegation, Mr. Voitenko and Mr. Zhukov, completely
disagreed with the speaker and believed that his speech represented certain
irritation that the West feels witnessing the revival of Russia as a world
power. They asserted that Russia’s oil and gas sector is transparent and
pursues purely commercial goals. It is true that the substantial part of
Russia’s budget comes from oil and gas, but the country’s leadership is also
aware of the need to diversify its energy sector and is determined to do that
in near future.
37.    With
regard to the missile defence debate, Mr. Voitenko said Russia feels threatened
by new installation very close to its borders. Moscow will be forced to react
by deploying additional missile forces. However, he stressed that Russia does
not want this new arms race.
VI.
BAE Systems
38.    The NATO
PA delegation visited the London headquarters of BAE Systems, Europe’s premier
defence company, ranking at No. 4 in the world. BAE Systems is engaged in the
development, delivery and support of advanced defence and aerospace systems in
the air, on land and at sea. With 88,000 employees worldwide, BAE Systems'
sales exceeded £13.7 billion in 2006. BAE Systems mostly sells to the US and
British markets (36 and 38 % respectively) as well as to Saudi Arabia (12%). The
rest of the world accounts for 14% of its sales. The company produces a wide
variety of equipment, including armoured combat vehicles, warships, submarines,
aircraft, C4ISR systems and homeland defence infrastructure.
39.    Simon
Jewell, Strategic Business Development Director, spoke about the advantages
of autonomous systems (AS), one of the priority areas for the company. AS is a
rapidly developing technology that is expected to significantly increase
surveillance, reconnaissance and possibly even attack capabilities. AS is often
associated with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but it can also include
ground, naval or underwater systems. Unmanned systems are being developed at an
incredible pace, making an essential breakthrough in a mere 6 years. Members of
the NATO PA were shown videos demonstrating various types of unmanned systems
developed by BAE Systems.
40.    Mr. Jewell
stressed that it is important to distinguish AS from remotely-piloted systems. While every move
of the remotely-piloted (or “uninhabitedâ€) vehicle is remotely controlled and
guided by a trained officer, autonomous systems (or “dronesâ€) are able to perform various tasks, including obstacle
avoidance and situation assessment, with minimal or no intervention from a
remote human operator. AS have clear advantages over remotely-piloted systems,
as they better react to changing environment and never get tired or bored.
Therefore, AS could be very helpful in dealing with asymmetric threats, such as
hostile insurgent or guerrilla groups in countries like Afghanistan or Iraq.
The challenge is, however, how to programme an autonomous vehicle in a way that
it would change its course when confronted with unforeseen obstacles, but would
still continue to execute its mission. One of the solutions is defining an
aerial ‘corridor’ within which a drone could have liberty to alter its
trajectory. The United States is clearly in the lead when it comes to
developing and especially fielding the remotely-piloted vehicles, while in
R&D of autonomous systems, Europe is rapidly catching up. BAE Systems’
Corax UAV, for example, is fully autonomous and has demonstrated its
reliability.
41.    NATO has
to be engaged in regulation and integration of unmanned and autonomous systems.
A framework has to be established to co-ordinate flights and enhance
communication of UAVs to avoid collision. Also, there has to be a new code of
behaviour for the situation when a pilot is removed from the cabin (it is a
serious cultural shock).
42.    Mr.
Ellingsen (Norway) asked what are major challenges of developing such systems.
Mr. Jewell replied that sense-and-avoid technologies, mounted on an autonomous
UAV, need to be extremely sophisticated. Networking UAVs is another critical
challenge. Lord Jopling (UK) was interested in the cost of AS. Mr. Jewell said
that it depends on a system. The American Global Hawk is very expensive, but
smaller tactical UAVs are much cheaper. On the average, however, a system of 3
UAVs with a ground station would approximately cost £10 million. The lion’s
share of the cost comes from software and sensors, not platforms.
43.    Kevin
Porter, Capability Director, discussed the contribution of BAE Systems to
the UK’s Network-Enabled Capability Programme (NEC). NEC is very much about
relevant information exchange and management. Information needs to be delivered
quickly, to the right people and in the right format. One of the most acute
problems, experience by coalition troops in Iraq, is the overload of
information. BAE’s experts are developing capabilities to separate critical
information from that which is redundant. BAE Systems is also providing
technology that allows the British military to connect to the major American
military network – SIPRNET. The speaker also stressed that, in order to avoid
unnecessary duplication, NEC has to be based on commercial off-the-shelf
technology (COTS). NATO needs to expand its co-ordination and standardisation
efforts.
44.    Cris
Courtaux, Theme Director, introduced the project called NITEworks (Network Integration Test and Experimentation
Works), an experimental environment that allows the UK Ministry of Defence to
assess the benefits of Network Enabled Capability (NEC). This unique partnership allows the UK to
pursue more effective defence procurement policy. The industry benefits as
well, as it has a better understanding of what the government needs.
Experimentation within the framework of NITEworks enables the government to
assess products well before it is procured, thus saving money. For example, the
procurement of unmanned underwater vehicles for the British armed forces was
based on the results of NITEworks experiments.
