I.
SESSION I
1.      The first session
was opened with an introductory speech by Antanas Valionis, member of
the Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Juozas
Olekas, current Minister of Defense, also greeted the participants. German
parliamentarian, Karl Lamers, thanked the Lithuanian Seimas for hosting
the seminar and thereby proving once again its support to democratic reforms in
Belarus. Mr Lamers mentioned that since 2001 the Assembly has invited
representatives of the Belarusian democratic opposition to its meetings. For
over a year, based on the decision of the Assembly’sStanding Committee, the
International Secretariat hosted an activist from Belarus, Ms. Olga
Stuzhinskaya, who in autumn 2006 secured funds for opening of the
Brussels-based Office for a Democratic Belarus.
2.      Ales Mikhalevich,
vice-chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), opened the first panel.
Mikhalevich talked about political developments in Belarus since 1994, the year
Lukashenka was elected the president of Belarus. When elaborating on the 2006
elections, the opposition leader said that pro-democratic political parties
were weaker than during the 2001 presidential elections. This is due to the
total absence of independent media, the closure of non-governmental
organizations and the discrediting picture of the pro-democratic forces
constantly presented to the voters by state propaganda. Despite these
difficulties, however, the pro-democratically oriented parties and NGOs managed
to unite into one coalition and present a presidential candidate, Aliaksandr
Milinkevich. The positive image of Mr. Milinkevich played an important role in
attracting broad popular support. The opposition’s after-election strategy,
according to the speaker, should include further promotion of Milinkevich and
the creation of a broad movement “For Freedomâ€, increasing support to the civil
society and the independent media. As for international assistance, Mikhalevich
mentioned youth exchange programs and the opening of some instruments of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for Belarus. He also asked for
international solidarity with the repressed people in Belarus. The BNF leader also emphasized the political significance of efforts designed to
promote the culture of Belarus. Establishment of analytical institutes and
cooperation with the Belarusian diaspora must be on the agenda as well.
3.      During the Q&A
period, Bart von Winsen from the Netherlands asked what the strategy of
the opposition for the local elections in January 2007 is and if Milinkevich is
going to support local candidates. The response of the speaker was that
Milinkevich is personally involved in supporting each candidate. Yaraslau
Ramanchuk from the United Civil Party of Belarus disagreed with the
statement of Mikhalevich and denounced Milinkevich as the current leader of the
unified opposition. He accused the former presidential candidate of ignoring
other political parties when forming the movement “For Freeedomâ€. Uladzimir
Nistyuk of the Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (Hramada) proposed
adopting a statement on the jailed Aliaksandr Kazulin, leader of the BSDP (H)
and another former candidate for the presidential elections.
4.      In his presentation
on the economic situation in Belarus Yaroslav Romanchuk described the
economy of Belarus as centrally planned with controlled prices, severely
restricted property rights, regulated degree of competition, dominance of the
state in the financial market, severe regulation costs, profits and sales of
enterprises, and aggressive protectionism (even against Russia). According to
the expert, the roots of the today’s relative stability in Belarus are oil, gas and energy subsidies from Russia that constitute about 13 per cent of the
Belarusian GDP. Plus, favorable external demand for fertilizers, metals,
chemicals and transport contribute to the stability. Among other reasons are
soft monetary policy, coincidence of Soviet production and external demand in
2002-2006, trust in the national banking system, low expectations of the
population and an informational vacuum. Mr Romanchuk also named possible risks
and challenges the Belarusian economy might face in the near future. According
to him, factors such as the possible rise of gas prices and the fall of prices
for chemicals and fertilizers might have influence. Terms of trade with Russia, growth of budget liability, shrinking tax base, accumulation of debts and bad
investment, inflationary pressure and some other challenges were also listed by
Mr Romanchuk.
5.      Bart von Winsen
asked the expert if there is any FDI
going into Belarus from the West and what the climate for investment is in
general. The response was that big business is basically not allowed into the
country, or if so it has to share profits with the administration. Only those
small businesses which managed to establish good “working†relations with the
government are prospering.
6.        Zhanna Litvina, head of the Belarusian Association of Journalists,
explained the grave situation of the remaining independent media in the
country. Belarus is one of 10 countries in the
world with the strictest censorship. Persecution and pressure upon independent
mass media from official authorities visibly increased in 2006. The pressure on
the independent press became especially strong close to March President
Elections and after it. Authorities arrested scores of domestic and foreign
journalists, who were trying to cover the election campaign and the subsequent
protests in the capital. For months before the elections, the Lukashenka
administration practically disabled independent and oppositional mass media of
the possibility to report news and comments to their audience. The state mail
service refused to deliver newspapers, which criticized the authorities; the
state agency on press distribution refused to sell such newspapers in
newsstands; printing houses refused to these publications under authority
pressure, and border guards have taken away the whole print run of editions,
who, evading the ban, were printed abroad.
7.      Mrs
Litvina called the state-owned media one of the means of survival for the
current government and one of the main sectors in the propaganda structure.
According to her, thanks almost total information vacuum in Belarus, about a half of the population is not aware of such facts as political
disappearance or imprisonment of the ex-candidate for presidential elections,
Aliaksandr Kazulin. When talking about possible support from the international
community, Mrs Litvina said it is important to save the remaining newspapers,
provide more support to internet-based outlets, improve and widen broadcasting
of the new external radio projects.
8.      Minsk’s security and defence strategy were presented by Dzyanis Melyantsou, analyst
of the Center for European Integration Problems. Basic geopolitical discourses
of Belarus today include, he said, the following points: independence from the
East and West; presentation of Belarus as a center of Eastern-Slavonic
civilization; and Belarus as a “transit bridge†between East and West.
According to the official defence and security line, Belarus protects the EU
from transnational threats, and protects Russia from the West while
simultaneously being the leader of the Belarus-Russia Union and an active
participant in the Non-Aligned Movement. The National Security Concept,
according to official sources can be characterized as democratic, peace-loving
and Russia-oriented, Melyantsou said. He informed the audience that the current
government sees Belarus today becoming an object of political pressure from the
side of the United States and other NATO members, which supposedly help
“internal destructive forces to destabilize social and political situation in
the country in order to change violently the constitutional orderâ€.
9.      The
main principles of Belarusian military policy, explained Melyantsou, include such
commonly recognized values as the inviolability of state borders and the
absence of territorial claims, political independence and state sovereignty of
other countries, and reduction of armaments on the European continent. One of
the principles is that not a single state is considered as a potential enemy.
10.    On
relations with Russia, the National Security Concept says that “the most
important factor of external security is the union with Russiaâ€. The legal basis for Belarus-Russia cooperation, the expert described, includes
agreements on military cooperation and joint use of military assets, joint
defence policy concept and a security concept of the Union, as well as a
military doctrine of the Union and a Collective Security Treaty. There are two
Russian military objects on the territory of Belarus: a radar station in Volga of the anti-missile early warning system and a communication center “Anthey†in
Vileika.
11.    Another
priority of the Belarusian foreign and security policy includes cooperation with
China, Iran, Venezuela and Cuba. Relations with NATO Mr Melyantsou described
by quoting President Lukashenka: “ The border between different
politico-military organizations should be not a line of confrontation, but a
line of good neighbourhood. Moreover, there are a lot of common problems,
challenges and tasks… Therefore cooperation between Belarus and NATO is not
just theoretically possible, but is necessary and mutually beneficialâ€. This
statement clearly shows that Belarus tries to save its relations with NATO in
order to avoid full isolation in case of the worsening of the Belarus-Russia
relations.
12.    Other
conclusions that can be made from the presentation of Mr Melyantsou are that Russia remains the main guarantor of the Belarus security; Belarus makes attempts to find other
footholds in foreign and security policy; Belarus does not pose a military
threat to neighbouring countries.
13.    Andres
Herkel, chairman of the sub-committee on Belarus in the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly, spoke about his experience as observer during the last
presidential election in Belarus and the impressive level of fraud, repression
and lack of transparency he saw. The Council of Europe started its official
relations with Belarus in 1992 and the guest status was suspended in 1997 after
the first referendum on a longer term in office for the president. PACE issued
two very important reports in 2004—on disappeared people and on freedom of
media. Since then, the special Rapporteur of the organization has been denied
access to the country.
14.    Mr
Herkel supported the view of Dr. Evgenij Volk, Head of the Heritage
Foundation Moscow Office, that Russia is the key player in solving the
Belarusian problem. He also, to a certain degree, supported the opinion of the
Ukrainian expert and his comparison of Belarus with the situation in Azerbaijan. However, Herkel stressed, the situation in Belarus is much worse. For example,
one of the big differences is the existence of some independent newspapers.
15.    As
for some possible actions that international organizations could undertake to
improve the situation, the expert was quite pessimistic, saying that there is
not much organizations like PACE can offer apart from resolutions and
statements. At least, he said, hopefully the special rapporteur will be able to
visit the country at some point and get objective and detailed information. One
thing is clear, the Estonian parliamentarian concluded, the struggle is
continuing in very difficult circumstances.
II.
SESSION II
16.    The second session of
our seminar focused on international dimension of the issue. The chair of this
session, Rasa Jukneviciene, Deputy Head of the Lithuanian delegation to
the NATO PA, noted that developments in Belarus continue to be the subject of grave concern among members of the international
community, which on many occasions has condemned the abuse of power by Mr
Lukashenka and his circles. Unfortunately, the unwillingness of the Belarusian
government to comply with recommendations of the international community and
the steadily deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus once again
underline the regime’s refusal to cooperate.
17.    The second session
was divided into two panel discussions, focusing on the role of neighbouring
countries and the contribution of the international organisations,
respectively.
A.
PANEL I
18.    In the first panel,
three experts discussed the perspectives of three of Belarus' neighbours: Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
19.    The Lithuanian
speaker, Kristina Vaiciunaite, Director, Eastern Europe Studies Center, named the main factors that serve in favour of Mr. Lukashenka: the punitive and
isolationist policy of the EU, the artificially stable economy, weak
opposition, regime-dependent media and disorganised civil society. While
clearly acknowledging the regime's crimes against the Belarusian people, it is
still worthwhile to maintain dialogue with different political levels of Belarus authorities (and Lithuania might be the lead country in this respect), perhaps avoiding
direct contacts with Mr. Lukashenka personally. After all, Ms. Vaiciunaite
noted, the international community negotiates terms of nuclear
non-proliferation with the leaders of Iran or North Korea. In the case of Belarus, the themes of a dialogue could include the transit of natural gas, communication
systems, arms control, environmental issues, the fight against terror, etc.
20.    Ms. Vaiciunaite
stressed the need to lower visa prices for the citizens of Belarus, thus enabling more Belarusians to travel to EU countries and to receive a different picture
of the EU than that given by the official Minsk propaganda. It is also
necessary to increase the visibility of Belarus in the EU, because often
knowledge of Belarus issues among Europeans is much poorer than one could
expect.
21.    Doubtlessly, Russia is the key neighbour of Belarus. Dr. Yevgenyi Volk, regretted that too many misconceptions and stereotypes still
exist in Russia with regard to the West and to Belarus. In the Soviet era, the
myth was created of Russia being a 'big brother' for Belarus, and this
perception is still strongly rooted in minds of both Russians and Belarusians.
It largely explains the way Russia continues to support the current regime in Minsk: while despising Mr. Lukashenka's methods, many Russians tend to agree with what he
is trying to achieve. Mr. Lukashenka is "socially close" to ordinary
Russians, while Mr. Saakashvili, for example, is "socially distant".
Thus, the democratisation of Russia is a prerequisite for democratisation of Belarus.
22.    In additional to
these psychological considerations, Belarus is important for the Kremlin
military. The military co-operation of the two countries is particularly
robust, as clearly demonstrated by the recent military exercise United
Security-2006. This vast exercise was openly anti-West, indicating that NATO is
still considered as a potential enemy. Further elaborating on the motives
behind Moscow's support to Mr. Lukashenka Dr. Volk asserted that economically Belarus is of little interest to Russia. However, owing to the fact that no customs exist between
the two countries, influential Russian oligarchs use Belarus as a 'black hole'
for their obscure financial operations.
23.    Modelling future
scenarios, Dr. Volk believed it was hardly possible that the two countries
either completely merge into one state or completely split, with Mr. Lukashenka
turning to the West. One can probably expect further half-hearted movement with
many controversies and pullbacks: "two steps forward, two steps back",
as Dr. Volk put it. The speaker personally regretted Russia’s policy to support
the Belarusian dictator, calling it a "doomed policy".
24.    In his presentation, Oleh
Soskin, Director of Institute of Society Transformation and the former
Advisor to the President of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine is an extremely
important partner of Belarus in political and socio-economic terms. Ukraine and Belarus share a common border (the demarcation of which is yet to be endorsed by the
Belarusian side), their transport infrastructures are tightly inter-connected
and they both suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. Moreover, the two nations
are very close in history, culture, and language. All these factors
predetermine Ukraine's position towards its northern neighbour: on
the one hand, Kyiv joins the Western countries in condemning the
anti-democratic nature of the Belarusian regime, but on the other hand, Ukraine
has to maintain dialogue and co-operation with this country and its president,
who is in control of the situation in Belarus and has the support of a large
part of the Belarusian population.
25.    Mr. Soskin noted that
the political relations between the two countries were considerably more
dynamic under President Kuchma, whose meetings with Mr. Lukashenka took place on
a regular basis. Mr. Yushchenko appears to be much more reluctant to establish
close ties with his Belarusian counterpart than his predecessor. Contrary to
what one could expect, the co-operation on prime ministerial level is virtually
non-existent as well. Mr. Soskin pointed out that this political chill is
inconsistent with flourishing economic co-operation between Belarus and Ukraine. He further stressed that the expected rise in Russian natural gas prices will
result in serious a deterioration of Russian-Belarusian relations. The West
should ask itself how best to use this situation to achieve the goal of the
democratisation of Belarus. As for Ukraine, he outlined three possible options:
1. The 'Conflict' option: Ukraine, together with the EU,
suspends all political and economic relations with Belarus and uses all
available means to support Belarusian opposition. Consequently, Mr. Lukashenka
would have no other choice but to seek Russia's patronage and to sacrifice Belarus' sovereignty.
2. The 'Passive' option: Ukraine refrains from any
systematic actions on a state level. While formally supporting the EU's
position on Belarus, Ukraine allows economic co-operation to blossom with this
country. It is impossible to predict where would such policy lead, as the
outcome will depend on incidental factors.
3. The 'Creative' option: Ukraine, together with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and supported by the EU, establish a mechanism of an
intensive dialogue with Belarus, including a presidential 'round table' with
Mr. Lukashenka aiming to "start working with" the Belarusian
President, persuading him to liberalise the political system in return for
practical co-operation projects. In addition, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Slovakia would launch a joint consortium to transport natural gas, thereby
ensuring alternative energy supply for themselves and for the EU. Belarus should also be included in the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea partnership.
26.    Mr. Soskin favoured
the third option, which, he believed, would preserve the sovereignty of Belarus and would provide the international community with a tool to influence democratisation
processes in Belarus.
27.    In the ensuing
discussions, Mr. Nistiuk said that it is impossible for opposition candidates
to carry out a visible election campaign due to the virtual absence of
financial resources. The Belarusian opposition receives very little or no
support from the international community in this respect. Mr. Soskin replied
that the Ukrainian democratic candidates were not financed by the West either
but managed to win the elections nonetheless. He urged the Belarusian
opposition to show more resolve and, first of all, to develop a joint strategic
vision for Belarus. He also underlined the importance of the upcoming municipal
elections in Belarus, stating that the success of the Ukrainian democratic
forces would not have been possible without strong positions in local
authorities.
28.    Lord Sewel (UK) and Jorge Neto (Portugal) shared the views of Dr. Volk that Russia, and not the EU or
NATO, is the key player when it comes to the question of influencing processes
in Belarus. Mr. Neto stressed that Mr. Putin's administration is openly using
its vast energy resources to exert political pressure on its neighbouring
countries.
B.
PANEL II
29.    The second panel
dealt with Belarus-EU relations as well as the role of NATO.
30.    Jean Eric
Holzapfel, co-ordinator for Belarus of the Delegation of the European
Commission to Ukraine and Belarus introduced a short history of the EU position
on Belarus as of 1996, after the flawed referendum on changes to the Belarusian
Constitution and the Union’s response establishing a new policy framework
regarding this country. The following EU positions were, according to speaker,
reactions to different events, such as irregular elections, reports of
international organizations, facts of political prosecution and others. The EU
has adjusted its policy in light of the March 2006 elections by placing visa
bans and introducing assets freezes, which targeted individuals responsible for
flawed elections and mass repression—including Mr Lukashenka. In several
declarations, Holzapfel noted, the EU Presidency, however, reminded the
authorities and the citizens of Belarus that the door remains open and the
Union would like to develop its relations with Belarus provided that the
authorities prove a sincere willingness to respect human rights, the rule of
law, democratic values and initiate reforms.
31.    The EU policy on Belarus has several dimensions, Holzapfel explained: a political dimension through
political positions and actions; trade; and cooperation as one of the EU
external assistance recipients. The cooperation policy has a double-track
approach whereby its tough attitude towards these responsible for human rights
violations in Belarusian government is balanced by active engagement with the
civil society.
32.    The co-ordinator for Belarus continued by discussing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which covers Belarus. No action plan for Belarus is foreseen. However, he said the European Commission
is currently working on an informal one, which could explain to the Belarusian
population what it would gain from a rapprochement with the EU. In trade
issues, he said, the Union is currently discussing withdrawal of Belarus from the benefits of the General System of Preferences (GSP).
33.    Holzapfel mentioned
such obstacles in implementation of the above mentioned framework, as refusal
of the Belarusian authorities to open a Commision Delegation in Minsk; the blockade
and delays of some Tacis programmes; and projects implemented by NGOs blocked
by the regime. In order to tackle these problems, Commission complements Tacis
with the EIDHR and Decentralized Cooperation programmes. However, the
Belarusian legislation on NGO registration, Holzapfel said, can effectively
block most of the activities to be carried out inside the country. Two new
projects are aimed at addressing the difficult situation of media in Belarus: the two year project led by Media Consulta, which covers radio and TV broadcast,
internet, support to some written press and training of journalists. The second
program is aimed at assisting students potentially sanctioned by the regime.
34.    In his concluding
words, the Commission representative underlined that the major key factor for
change in Belarus-EU relations would be political change in Belarus. Until that, it is important to inform the people of Belarus about the EU and what
it can offer in the framework of its neighbourhood policy.
35.    Laurie Walker,
desk officer for Belarus at NATO, informed participants of the seminar about
relations between the Alliance and Belarus through the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) program in the political framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. Belarus submitted its presentation document for participation
in PfP in 1996, he said, but at the end of March 1999 Belarus suspended its cooperation with the Alliance to protest against NATO military operation in Yugoslavia. The decision of President Lukashenka to restore relations with NATO at the end
of August 1999 resumed the country's membership in Partnership for Peace in
autumn 1999. He expressed his approval of the draft Individual Partnership
Program of Belarus with NATO for 2000-2001 which in July 1999 was approved of
by NATO North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). On 30 July 2000 this document came into
effect. Main areas for cooperation are
emergency situations, civil defense, development of defense policy and
strategies, medical service, language training and military training are
viewed.
36.    Laurie Walker informed the audience about several
statements made by the NATO Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council
condemning the results of the rigged presidential election in March 2006.
Events of the spring 2006 in Minsk marked the beginning of the review of
Belarus-NATO relations. Allied conclusions included sending clear and
politically critical statements to the government of Belarus. The organization
decided, however, that cutting all ties and stopping cooperation would be
counterproductive. To implement the review, elaborated Mr Walker, the Alliance decided to concentrate on public political criticism and frank exchanges within
the EAPC framework. NATO’s conclusions were to continue with the Individual Partnership
Programme and cooperation in the area of landmine destruction.
III.
session III
37.    Under the
chairmanship of Jose Lello, Vice-President of the NATO PA, the participants proceeded with the third and the last
session of the seminar. The idea of this session was to give an
opportunity to a number of independent experts on Belarus to analyse and sum up
what was said by the Belarusian and international speakers on the first two
sessions of the seminar as well as to allow other participants to present their
ideas and views on the prospects of democratisation in Belarus and what would
be the most efficient strategy to achieve this objective.
38.    Pawel Kazanecki,
chairman of the East European Democratic Centre, Poland, discussed the
effectiveness of the EU instruments with regard to Belarus. He regretted that
the implementation of TACIS programmes was hampered by bureaucracy, delays and
the lack of enthusiasm. These programmes failed to reach the 'right people',
largely because all projects had to be approved by the Belarusian government.
The programmes are not adapted to local conditions. Mr. Kazanecki also noted
that, while the European Commission made decisions to endorse TV and radio
projects designed to provide alternative information for Belarusians, these
decisions are somewhat controversial as the implementation of the projects was
largely entrusted to a Russian media company. The EU procedures are also not
flexible enough to provide direct assistance to oppressed NGOs and other
opposition organisations. Therefore, he backed the idea of working out a
completely new EU instrument, run by impartial professionals and tasked to
elaborate a comprehensive long-term strategy towards Belarus.
39.    At present, Mr.
Kazanecki asserted, the EU is more concerned about its own security than the
lack of democracy in Belarus. The West is prepared to tolerate the Lukashenka
regime as long as it guarantees stability in the region and ensures proper
border protection to prevent illegal migration and illicit trafficking of
drugs, arms and humans.
40.    In her rather
provocative presentation, Rimante Budryte, an independent Lithuanian
analyst from the Centre for Strategic Studies, essentially agreed that the
latter assessment can be applied to Lithuania's approach towards Belarus. She underlined that, as far as Lithuania's national interests are concerned, the
question of maintaining Belarus' independence from Russia is more important
than the human rights situation in this country. Ms. Budryte claimed that Mr.
Lukashenka is not, in fact, an aggressive neighbour and Lithuania does not sense any threat from him. The security situation for Lithuania, however, would change dramatically should Belarus become a part of Russian Federation. Therefore, as long as Mr. Lukashenka resists unification plans with Russia, albeit for completely different reasons, his regime is acceptable for Lithuania. She also suggested putting more focus on the programmes designed to promote
national language and strengthen Belarusian national identity, thereby
supporting Belarusian statehood.
41.    Balazs Jarabik,
political analyst from Slovakia, insisted that it is possible for the
international community to induce Minsk to change its politics. Currently, the
regime is at a turning point. In light of foreseeable disagreements between Russia and Belarus over natural gas and oil prices, Mr. Lukashenka finds himself in uncertainty and
is, therefore, in need of other options for co-operation. Europe should use
this opportune moment to exert pressure on official Minsk, insisting on
democratic change in the country. Unfortunately, Mr. Jarabik pointed out, the
EU does not seem to have a solid strategy towards Belarus. For example, some
Central and Eastern European countries of the EU refuse to support the proposal
to expelling Belarus from the EU's
Generalised System of Preferences on trade, thus sending a wrong signal to Mr.
Lukashenka. Mr. Jarabik stressed that "tough"
language was the only one the Belarusian dictator understands.
42.    The ensuing
discussions reflected evident disagreements among the participants of the
seminar along the lines of the classical "engagement vs. sanctions"
dilemma. Mr. Soskin passionately argued, referring to the experience of his own
country, Ukraine, that the "tough" stance on Belarus will only result in Mr. Lukashenka's rapprochement with Moscow. Mr. Nistiuk also advocated
the "pro-engagement" and suggested re-launching inter-parliamentary
co-operation projects, such as joint visits to Belarus by representatives of
different European parliamentary assemblies. However, David Hobbs, NATO PA
Deputy Secretary General, pointed out that such visits might be easily
misinterpreted by the Belarusian authorities, while Mr. Jarabik stressed that
it is impossible to imagine democratically-elected European bodies establishing
relations with puppet Belarusian legislators.
43.    Mr. Nistiuk also
strongly opposed the idea of economic sanctions against Belarus, noting that such sanctions would only hurt ordinary people. Yet Mr. Anatolyi
Lebedko, one of the most prominent leaders of the Belarusian opposition,
observed that the EU possesses an effective tool to influence Mr. Lukashenka
since more than 50% of Belarus' trade goes to the EU. Prof. Vytautas
Landsbergis, MEP and the former head of the Lithuanian state, backed Mr.
Lebedka's arguments by quoting famous Russian dissident Anatolyi Sakharov, who
was brave enough to urge the Western democracies to press his own country in
order to undermine the totalitarian Soviet system.
44.    The discussions also
demonstrated the lack of unity among the members of the Belarusian democratic
opposition. Representatives of the
Social-Democratic Party (Hramada) and the United Civic Party of Belarus refused
to regard Mr. Alexander Milinkevich as the leader of the opposition. The
evident disagreements within the opposition led some of the seminar's
participants to express their disappointment in Belarusian democratic forces.
Mr. Kazanecki asserted that the Belarusian opposition is politically bankrupt.
Its only visible achievement in recent years was the election and promotion of
Mr. Milinkevich who has become an internationally recognised symbol of the
Belarusian democracy. However, even this achievement is currently being
compromised.
45.    Mr. Soskin, Prof.
Landsbergis and other participants criticised the Belarusian opposition for
failing to develop a single, comprehensive doctrine and vision of the future of
the country, and thus present an attractive alternative to 'lukashism'. Mr.
Soskin argued that Ukrainian democrats, while finding themselves in just as
difficult situation as their Belarusian colleagues, managed to work out such a
vision for their country, and that was largely the key to the success of the
Orange Revolution. He challenged the Belarusian opposition to do likewise.
46.    On the other hand, it
was clearly acknowledged that the environment for opposition activity is
extremely hostile, and that tribute must be paid to those democrats who dared
to oppose the regime, risking their jobs, freedom or even their lives.
