I.
Introduction
1.
As NATO and the European Union look to the
future, a central issue for both organisations is the contribution they can
make to help countries, which are undergoing transition and reconstruction. For
most of these countries, defence and security sector reform (DSSR) is a major
imperative and an essential foundation for building stable, democratic
societies.
2.
NATO and EU enlargement processes have run in
parallel, with both organisations contributing, in different but mutually
reinforcing ways, to the spread of peace and stability. One of NATO's most
notable achievements during the past decade, albeit insufficiently recognised,
is the advice, expertise, and practical assistance it has provided to
transition countries for the reform of their armed forces and defence
establishments.
4.
As post-Riga, the Alliance continues to define
its future role, and as the European Union begins to move into the area of
security sector reform, the seminar attempted to take stock of where we stand
with DSSR and draw lessons for the future. Bringing together NATO and EU
representatives, former and current government officials and independent
experts, the seminar first examined past experiences of DSSR, then turned to
current and future challenges, including the specific issue of post-conflict
peacebuilding and reconstruction, and NATO-EU co-operation. Â
II.
Keynote address
5.
The keynote address set the tone for the
seminar, highlighting the different challenges posed by DSSR depending on the
context in which it takes place. Within NATO, the concept of DSSR has been
progressively redefined. Whilst, for a long time, DSSR was about ensuring that
NATO allies meet NATO capability requirements, it has gained a new meaning with
the process of military transformation of the Alliance and the evolution of its
partnerships.
6.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the democratic
oversight of armed forces had to be promoted on the basis of existing
structures as these countries underwent transition. During this process,
governments encountered various problems and obstacles, including nepotism,
rigid structures that promoted uniformity, a culture of suspicion and
diffidence, as well as other problems connected with the existing hierarchical
and conservative military structures.
7.
Reform in a conflict or post-conflict situation,
like in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, poses additional challenges.
Institutions have to be transformed and reformed, while at the same time the
operational effectiveness of the security forces is indispensable in the face
of an immediate threat. In other words, the new security institutions must be
both immediately effective and permanently democratic and law-abiding. Outside
assistance can provide security in the short term, but domestic security
institutions need to be built for the long term. This requires a far‑reaching
transformation, which should aim at placing all security institutions under
democratic oversight. Preferably a reconciliation program should be set up and
allow for agents of the old regime to be eventually re-integrated in the new
system. In this process, national unity should be preserved, while minorities
need to be protected against the abuse of the majority’s electoral power.
8.
Lessons learned in Iraq demonstrate the
necessity of building effective armed forces able to provide security. They
equally demonstrate that long-lasting success requires both time and money.
Preserving national unity and ensuring that all sections of the population have
faith in the security forces are vital conditions for success. To that end, minority
groups should be part of the army and the local police force. Emphasis should
be put on reconciliation, distinguishing between those agents belonging to the
inner circle of the former security services and those who only took part in
the regime for opportunistic reasons and should be given a second chance.
Meanwhile, fighting corruption should also be a priority. This process should
aim to create a new cadre of competent, well-trained and well-equipped
personnel.
9.
In any event, reform should be underpinned by
local structures as part of a political process, and should not be imposed from
the outside.
III.
Session 1: Enlargement, Partnerships and Defence
Reform: Past Achievements and Current Challenges
10.
The first session took stock of NATO’s
contribution to DSSR in Central and Eastern Europe through its partnership
programmes and the enlargement process. Panellists praised NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PfP) as the Alliance’s greatest achievement since the end of the
Cold War. PfP helped transform Europe in a very short time. Early on, it
provided an outline for reform and a framework for consultations with NATO on
security issues. Within PfP, the Planning and Review Process provided for a
very concrete dialogue on defence planning. It allowed participating countries
to implement reforms at their own speed according to the principle of
differentiation, which guaranteed that no partner had a veto right on any other
partner’s activities. This process proved particularly difficult for all
aspiring members; surprisingly, institutions inherited from the Soviet system
appeared entirely unable to provide the capability to plan and manage defence
programmes.  Â
11.
Partners used PfP in different ways depending on
their national strategy. Some PfP countries saw it as route to NATO membership.
Others saw it as a means to approach NATO closely without becoming members.
Finally, a third group saw it as a tool for allowing them to keep a close watch
on their neighbours. On the basis of these different experiences, three case
studies from CEE were examined in order to identify lessons for NATO’s future
partnership activities in DSSR.
12.
Poland belonged to the first group of countries.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Polish government saw in NATO a means of
protection from any attempt at re-establishing foreign domination of the
country. Nevertheless, in the first stages of transition, both cultural and
institutional obstacles to the rapprochement with NATO remained. Although
committed to integration into NATO, Polish officials still had reservations and
suspicions as to whether NATO would really provide an effective defence
umbrella for Poland. Reformers had to overcome a lingering culture of secrecy,
which made difficult the sharing of classified information, as well as remaining
ties – both formal and informal – between the Polish secret services and the
Soviet services. Another major challenge to reform was a strong resistance to
placing the military under civilian control. Although the military appeared
ready to abandon the central political role it played under the Soviet system,
the main difficulty was in convincing it that the dividing line between
political and tactical decisions was to be established by politicians, not by
the military. Finally, reformers had difficulty dealing with high levels of
public expectation and scrutiny, which put strong pressure on the government to
deliver, together with the necessity to promote rapidly the use of foreign
languages.
13.
Romania’s experience was very similar. PfP was
also considered a security guarantee, as well as a stepping-stone to NATO
membership. Romania faced a specific challenge as DSSR was implemented at the
same time as NATO began its own transformation. In the process of downsizing,
operationalising and rationalising the security sector, close contacts with
Allied Command Transformation, as well as participation in multinational
operations, proved crucial. The Romanian experience also demonstrated that a
well-planned strategy with a clear finality is another condition for success,
as the government strives to integrate a reforming security sector in a
reforming society. This strategy should strive to cover all aspects of reform,
including those segments of the population negatively affected by the reform
process. Timing is also important: downsizing should come first, before
updating the equipment; and the reform process should progressively gain speed
as the first measures start to show results. The reform strategy should also be
communicated to the public, explaining why downsizing the military – from
300,000 to fewer than 100,000 troops in the case of Romania – and cutting
resources is compatible with enhanced security for the country. Eventually,
consistency and credibility of efforts are also essential in the country’s
relations with NATO.
14.
The experience of Lithuania was somewhat
different, as defence and security institutions had to be built from scratch
and because neutrality was briefly considered as an option. The Baltic
experience was also unique because of the close co-operation established
amongst the three countries, for example through the Baltic Battalion, BALTBAT.
In the case of Lithuania, consensus building thus appeared as a key priority
and a pre-condition for reform. This was achieved progressively through a
series of targeted reforms; important steps included the adoption of a Law on
Basics of National Security in 1996, and of a national security strategy and a
defence agreement between all political parties on all aspects of integration
and defence reform in 2002. Lithuania’s strategy consisted in acting as an ally
for NATO in all respects, although not yet being one. Coordination of efforts
amongst both domestic and foreign stakeholders also proved crucial. Finally, as
for other partners, participation in multilateral operations - for example in
the Balkans - was particularly useful.
15.
Building on these experiences in Central and
Eastern Europe, NATO’s engagement in DSSR continues to broaden today. This
creates a first challenge in terms of decision-making: as NATO continues to
enlarge, it might have difficulties in maintaining the efficiency of a
decision-making process based on consensus. Additionally, NATO’s relations with
partner countries are extending more frequently to new areas such as democratisation,
civil society, legal systems, and so on. One consequence of this evolution is
that NATO and EU requirements and areas of intervention increasingly coincide,
although each organisation maintains its distinctive features. Co‑operation is
therefore essential, and existing tensions must be overcome in order to offer
effective assistance to recipient states.Â
IV.
Session 2: The Challenges of Peacebuilding and
Defence and Security Sector Reform: The Role of NATO and the EU
16.
The second session of the seminar explored
current challenges of DSSR, and how the international community can better
address them. The discussion focused, in particular, on two main topics:
firstly, the specificities of DSSR in post-conflict environments such as the
Balkans and Afghanistan; and secondly, the current and future division of
labour and co-operation between NATO and the EU in the field of DSSR.  Â
17.
In the 1990s, the Balkans emerged as a testing
ground for the international community. The context for reform was very different
from Central and Eastern Europe. Security sector institutions had been directly
and heavily engaged in the armed conflict in Yugoslavia, which created a highly
politicised environment, and raised issues of human rights and international
law. The lessons from this experience have not yet been fully absorbed, nor
have all of the consequences of past decisions been well understood. In the
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a major aspect of DSSR consisted in undoing
ethnic control over the security sector. This process is not yet complete in
the police sector.
18.
In Kosovo, there now appears to be a
contradiction between the objectives of DSSR and the political process of
negotiations on the future status of the province. The KLA was demilitarised
under international supervision, and the Kosovo Protection Corps was created
with the understanding that they would one day become the defence forces of an
independent Kosovo, providing a troublesome dynamic in light of ongoing
negotiations.
19.
The experience of the international community in
the Balkans has also contributed to highlight contradictions and tensions
between NATO and the EU. Although there have been success stories, such as the
FYR of Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, where NATO missions have been
successfully transferred to the EU, in many other instances, co‑operation is
far from ideal. Kosovo will be a major test case for the future: as the EU
mission progressively takes over, it will have to learn the lessons of past
failures, including the disastrous management of past unrests in the province.
20.
Finally, the international community has been
far from consistent in its use of conditionality and has proven unable to
strike an adequate balance between sticks and carrots in its relations with the
Balkans. Most recently, NATO’s admission of Serbia into PfP has been criticised
by some for the abandonment of ICTY conditions requiring the delivery of war
criminals to The Hague. As one participant pointed out, it is ultimately more
costly to break promises than to keep them, a lesson that the international
community has not yet fully internalised.
21.
Despite some important achievements, Afghanistan
provides further evidence that the international community has failed to learn
various lessons from previous experiences in DSSR. International efforts have
favoured “off-the-shelfâ€, formulaic approaches, avoiding an appreciation of
informal and traditional structures. Yet, in the case of Afghanistan, the
informal sector plays a crucial role in society. Taking the example of the
legal system, 90% of all cases go through traditional channels, not through the
formal justice system.
22.
Additionally, implementation of DSSR in
Afghanistan has suffered from a coordination deficit. An overarching strategy
was only adopted late in the process. No standing and effective coordination
body was created, and national authorities were not given sufficient means to
play this coordinating role. Instead, international assistance was divided
between 5 main pillars, each to be overseen by a lead-donor nation: military
reform (United States), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), DDR
(Japan) and counter-narcotics (United Kingdom).
23.
Another concern highlighted was that the
international community has imported models for the security forces that impose
costs which Afghanistan may not be able to sustain in the longer term. Current
assistance to the security sector – not including counter-narcotics –
represents some 23% of GDP and 500% of domestic revenues.Â
24.
The bulk of this assistance has gone on hard
security, while soft security, institution‑building, governance and
reconstruction have been largely ignored. The deteriorating security situation
in the country has only encouraged this approach, channelling efforts and
resources towards building up the operation effectiveness of local security
forces, rather than on long-term sustainability and good governance in the
security sector. As a result, several parts of the security sector are
underdeveloped and lack oversight mechanisms, thereby creating a governance
gap. Judicial reform, for example, has received only 2% of security
expenditures. Similarly, the Ministry of Interior lacks an institutional
framework for such fundamental tasks as fighting corruption.
25.
One panellist pointed out that this situation
could be partly improved through a better division of labour between NATO and
the EU, whereby NATO focuses on providing a security buffer, whilst also aiming
to extend the benefits of the reform process to the periphery. Meanwhile, the EU
could lead efforts to improve security sector governance capacity.
26.
NATO and the EU differ on several accounts in
their approach to DSSR. The two organisations can rely on different assets; it
could be argued that NATO offers a superior structure whilst the EU provides
superior scope. NATO’s decision-making process is both top-down and bottom-up,
focusing essentially on joint planning and relying on the leading role of the
Secretary General and of a governing body – the North Atlantic Council – with a
standing mandate.
27.
NATO has a proven track record in assisting
partner countries from the Arctic to Afghanistan with their transformation
process. This expertise gives NATO credibility in the advice and practical
support it provides to an increasing number of partners. Recently three
countries, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were invited to joint
PfP. Afghanistan is also developing a special relationship with NATO, which
allows it access to certain PfP tools.
28.
In comparison, the EU functions in a bottom-up
manner, emphasising voluntary commitments. The EU also bears the additional
burden of having to coordinate its own institutions. Conceptual differences
between member states, as well as between institutions, as to the distribution
of responsibilities and resources on security issues feed internal tensions and
competition. Better coordination is necessary to allow for more effective
action, and one panellist argued that the creation of an EU Foreign Minister
could contribute towards this objective.
29.
Evidence of these divisions within the EU can be
found in the security sector reform concepts adopted separately by the European
Commission and the Council. These documents are based on different
perspectives: the Council discusses security from an operational angle, which
is also NATO’s perspective, whereas the Commission adopts a post-conflict
perspective.
30.
More work should be done to reconcile these
different perspectives within the EU, but also within the international
community. Many contributors argued that we need to redefine the mandate of our
military in the light of the new tasks it has come to perform. In particular,
the international community needs to rethink the strict division of labour
between security and development, and develop closer links between security,
development, and governance programmes. Lessons learned in the Balkans and in
Afghanistan have confirmed that there is more to security than tanks alone and
that security and development should be tackled hand‑in‑hand. Security is necessary
for development, but cannot be sustainable without development.
31.
A comprehensive approach to security sector
reform, which includes good governance and public accountability and tackles
the whole security sector, is thus necessary. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) played a major role in steering reflections
on this nexus of security and development. Currently, the focus remains on the
military aspects, as demonstrated by the creation of the EU Battle Groups and
the NATO Response Force. Yet, several panellists doubted whether these tools
will ever be used in accordance with their mandate. Past experiences have
demonstrated that even when intervention mechanisms already exist, new adhoc
mechanisms are often preferred.
32.
Much therefore remains to be done to integrate
development and security efforts, and NATO and the EU should play their part in
this process. There was a consensus that better institutional and political
coordination between the two organisations is necessary.
33.
A first step would be to develop a common
understanding and language. Security sector reform remains a relatively new
concept and the adoption of a common typology should be encouraged, possibly
through the work of the OECD. Since no single organisation has the capacity to
undertake security sector reform alone, a holistic approach is needed, which
should aim to draw on the best of each organisation through the rapid
mobilisation of a broad range of experts and joint capabilities. One panellist
suggested that the cross‑training or cross-assignment of staff could contribute
towards such a joint approach. However, one should also recognise that
conceptual divisions of labour do not always hold on the ground, particularly
in post-conflict situations, and therefore any coordinated approach will have
to be flexible.
34.
Additionally, it was concluded that no one model
fits all, and therefore tailored and individualised programs are prerequisite
to successful DSSR. Local ownership is also crucial. The reform process has to
make sense nationally to be successful and strike the right balance between
what the country wants, what it needs and what it can afford.
35.
Finally, it is crucial to be realistic and
acknowledge that current reform processes, occurring in less benign
environments, will probably take more time and pose greater challenges than
those faced by states of the former Warsaw pact. As a consequence, domestic
efforts and international assistance both need to rely on long-term
commitments.
