I.
Introduction
The implications
of Iran's nuclear policy, the future of the global WMD non-proliferation
regime, prospects for nuclear disarmament and the challenges of net-centricity
were the major topics of discussion during the visit of the Science and
Technology Committee Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology
delegation to New York and Monterey from 12-15 June 2006. The sixteen members
of the NATO PA delegation, led by sub-committee Chairman, Jérôme Rivière
(FR), and Committee Chairman, Michael Mates (UK), met with several
key ambassadors to the UN, senior UN officials, academics and representatives
of defence technology companies.
II.
Meetings at the United Nations
The Sub-Committee
visit in the US started in New York. Ambassador Dr. Wolfgang Trautwein,
Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, and Bernd Heinze,
Political Counsellor of the German Mission, provided an overview of the main
issues and challenges facing the UN. Ambassador Trautwein noted that the UN reform
process, initiated in 2004 by the report of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan,
is very comprehensive and is aimed at adjusting the UN system to the most
relevant challenges of the modern world. The UN is considerably expanding its
peacekeeping and peace-building activities, as demonstrated by the
establishment of the UN Peace-Building Commission. In the area of human rights,
the UN established a new institution, the Human Rights Council, as the old
Human Rights Commission did not quite live up to the expectations. Another
outstanding question facing the UN is that of a restructuring of its budget.
Failure to resolve this issue seriously hampers the smooth functioning of the
UN institutions.
From the meeting
in New York, the sub-committee delegation gained the rather pessimistic
impression that the UN system as a whole is in serious crisis. Nobuaki
Tanaka, UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, observed that
the existing stalemate both in nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation is a result of certain groups of countries preferring one
solution to another. Mr. Tanaka, however, called for a balanced approach and
exponential progress in both areas.
III.
Meeting with H.E. Ambassador Mohammad Javad
Zarif, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN.
According to
Ambassador Zarif, the logic of international law maintains that countries
assume obligations in return for certain benefits. However, the NPT did not
provide any benefits for his country. Iran had no other choice but to engage in
cooperation with the clandestine network of A.Q.Kahn because Western countries
would refuse to sell nuclear fuel cycle technology to Iran, despite their commitments under the Article IV of the NPT. On the other hand,
countries like India are being rewarded without even being a member of the NPT.
The ambassador believed it was a clear example of a policy of double standards.
With regard to the
current tensions between the West and Iran, Mr. Zarif made it clear that Iran would not abandon its nuclear programme which – despite some initial assistance from
outside – is essentially developed by the Iranians themselves. This makes the
case of Iran completely different from that of Libya, which merely bought
nuclear technology and did not put nearly as much effort to develop its own
nuclear programme as the Iranians did. "The genie is out of the
bottle", as Mr. Zarif put it, suggesting that the best solution is to
accept Iran's nuclear programme and to put it under the most stringent international
monitoring.
Mr. Rivière and
Mr. Mates agreed with the Ambassador that it is necessary to avoid the
escalation of tensions in the region. However, they pointed out that the
rhetoric of the Iranian president, especially with regard to Israel, is counterproductive in this respect. The Iranian ambassador said that President's
statements were taken out of context. He stated that his country is prepared to
provide security guarantees to any country in the world and challenged the United States to do the same with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Asked by Mr. Mates
about Iran's position towards "the package of incentives", the Iranian Ambassador stated that it would
have been easier to reach an agreement between the West and Iran had Iranian representatives been involved in the preparation of such a package.
Christian Buzea
(RO) questioned whether it
was economically rational for Iran to embark upon an extensive nuclear
programme while possessing abundant oil and natural gas resources. Mr. Zarif
disagreed with this assessment and pointed out that, given the current rate of
energy consumption in his country and the dramatic growth of the population, Iran would become an energy importer in the not too distant future. Besides, it is always
reasonable to diversify a country's energy sector.
Lord Jopling
(UK) agreed that it would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to induce Iran to relinquish its nuclear
ambitions. Therefore, he suggested considering the option of recognising Iran's right to conduct limited research-scale uranium enrichment activities, strictly limiting the
number of centrifuges to the degree that would make it impossible for Iran to produce sufficient quantities of enriched uranium to produce nuclear weapons. The
Iranian Ambassador did not completely rule out this idea, but did not believe
it was likely that his government would agree to such limitations.
Nevertheless, he reiterated Iran's willingness to accept international
monitoring, although he stressed that there is no fool-proof mechanism to
completely preclude clandestine activities.
IV.
Briefings at the Monterey Center for
Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS)
Dr. William
Potter, Director of the
CNS, addressed the concerns raised by the controversial nuclear cooperation
agreement between the US and India. He called this deal a 'wound' to the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although countries like France and the UK as
well as the Head of the IAEA Dr. ElBaradei welcomed the deal, Dr. Potter
believed such a shift in US policy is counterproductive and may lead to
mushrooming of new nuclear weapons states. In a way, the US administration
differentiates "good proliferators' from 'bad proliferators'. The
principle of exceptionism will erode the norms of the NPT and will make it more
difficult to maintain effective multinational export control regime, Dr. Potter
warned. Following this path, Russia, for example, might rightfully demand
exceptions for Iran and China, and also might do so with regard to Pakistan.
Dr. Potter regretted that the current US administration is less and less
emphasising the importance of the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements.
Jean du Preez, Director of the
International Organizations and Non-proliferation Program of the CNS, focused
specifically on the case of Iran. The historical overview of Tehran's
nuclear endeavours clearly shows that "Iran has played a bluffing
game" with the international community. The winner of this game is clear –
it's Iran. At this point, the West is prepared to offer an extremely generous
'package of incentives' to Iran. According to the speaker, in return for Iran halting uranium
enrichment, these incentives include assistance in building a light-water
reactor, a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel, a dialogue on regional security
issues, membership to the WTO, and the easing of US trade sanctions on Iran.
Reported disincentives include travel bans for individuals associated with the
nuclear programme, asset freezes, bans on investment in certain areas of
Iranian activity, and an embargo on missile and nuclear technologies. However,
according to Mr. du Preez,
these disincentives are nothing more than a 'paper tiger', as Iran would not be
seriously affected by them. Nevertheless, he believed there was no alternative
to a comprehensive 'sticks and carrots' strategy towards Iran.
In his second
presentation, Mr. du Preez discussed the issue of
nuclear disarmament. The CNS is working on a project "Progress
towards Reducing the Threat and Numbers of Nuclear Weapons". Its purpose
is to provide factual information on nuclear weapons related issues to the
general public, policy-makers, journalists, students, etc. and to raise public
awareness about the continued threat of nuclear weapons. The commitment towards the eventual elimination of nuclear
arsenals is indicated in the NPT Article VI and reiterated in the conclusions
of 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, while thousands of nuclear
warheads were destroyed during and immediately after the Cold War, very little
concrete progress has been achieved since. Fifteen years after the end of the
Cold War, more than 27,000 warheads remain.
In the post-Cold
War period, one could witness more emphasis being put on nuclear
non-proliferation rather than on nuclear disarmament. Yet there is a
correlation between these two objectives. As Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General,
put it: "the objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the
fact that the nuclear weapon states continue to insist that those weapons in
their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to
world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this
situation would be less alarming". Mr. du Preez argued in favour of
accelerating the pace of nuclear disarmament. He believed that there is no
justification for US nuclear deployment in the European NATO countries and that
US nuclear weapons withdrawal from NATO countries will positively impact global
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He mentioned that, according to the Strategic
Communications survey, 63 % of Europeans want a nuclear-free Europe. Committee
Chairman Mr. Mates challenged some of the speaker's conclusions by pointing out
that democratic countries hastily scraping their nuclear weapon capabilities
would leave them in an unfavourable situation vis-Ã -vis some rogue countries
that seek to develop such capabilities.
In her
presentation, Elena Sokova, Director of the
CNS Newly Independent States Non-proliferation Program, argued that the
threat of nuclear terrorism is to be taken seriously. A gun-type improvised
nuclear device (IND) is well within the technical reach of terrorists and
designs are available in open source. In addition, highly-enriched uranium
(HEU) is hard to detect. The largest obstacle to nuclear terrorists is access
to nuclear materials. Currently, there are 1,900 tons of HEU globally,
including 50-100 tons in the civilian sector. Civilian facilities often lack
adequate security. In the civilian sector, HEU is still used in research and
test reactors, medical isotope production, icebreakers and some other
applications. However, in most, if not all civilian applications low-enriched
uranium (LEU) can be substituted for HEU. The key element for a coordinated
international effort to eliminate the civilian use of HEU are in place, but a
political decision is needed to move forward and institutionalise a global
phase-out of civilian HEU.
Lord Jopling noted
that, for terrorists, radiological dispersal devices, known as 'dirty bombs',
could be more attractive than INDs, as 'dirty bombs' are considerably easier to
produce and the effect of using them would be dramatic. Mrs. Sokova replied by
stressing that the magnitude of a nuclear explosion using INDs would be
incomparably more devastating than the effect of a 'dirty bomb'. She also noted
that INDs are not too sophisticated to pose serious technological problems in
producing them.
Dr. Raymond
Zilinskas, director of the
CNS Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Program, briefed the
delegation on the interesting issue of possible security implications of
synthetic biology (SB). SB is a new discipline at the frontier of biological
science and engineering that will make it possible to build living machines
from off-the-shelf chemical ingredients. Dr. Zilinskas predicted that over the
next decade, the field will enter a phase of exponential growth and spread to
many countries. Creation of bio-engineered synthetic organisms will be able to
produce pharmaceuticals, detect toxic chemicals, repair defective genes,
destroy cancer cells, generate hydrogen as a fuel source, etc. However, SB may
pose risks of inadvertent harm or deliberate misuse. SB can be used to
re-create known pathogens as well as to develop new, more lethal or effective
BW agents. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans development and
synthesis of microbes for hostile purposes, but BWC is not universal, lacks a
formal verification mechanism and is not binding on persons or sub-national
entities. Dr. Zilinskas urged legislators to pass appropriate laws to control
the development of SB.
Members of the STC
were concerned that all necessary information, including DNA sequence of deadly
pathogens, was available on the Internet. Mr. Rivière asked if SB would have a
potential of creating bioagents that can target specific people or ethnic
groups. Dr. Zilinskas was sceptical about such a prospect and believed that it
was impossible to explicitly differentiate people by their genetic
characteristics.
Dr. James Clay
Moltz, Deputy Director of
the CNS, addressed the emerging space security issues. Despite of numerous
attempts to use space for military purposes, he stated that there is still time
to make a decision about whether or not the realm of space should be placed
under specific international control, banning all military activities. In the
US, opinions vary on this questions. The opponents of the G.W. Bush
administration’s plans to develop a strategic missile defence (MD) system with
space-based assets underline that there is no immediate threat for the US in
this regard as no other nation has placed its weapons in space. They also
question the effectiveness of the system, particularly given the enormous
amount of funding it receives. Deployment and tests of space weapons, especially
kinetic energy weapons, would also considerably exacerbate the problem of space
debris. The proponents of the space-based MD system, on the other hand, believe
it is within the national interests of the United States to remain firmly in
the forefront of developing such capabilities, as it is only the matter of time
until other nations will engage in military-related activities in space. For
example, China already has ambitious civilian and passive military space
programmes. However, Dr. Moltz underlined that even the major American
space-based weapon systems, especially more sophisticated ones, such as lasers,
are still in the very initial stage of development. Asked by Andrius
Baranauskas (LT) about the technological possibilities to defend the Earth
against a massive meteorite impact, Dr. Moltz noted that no nation has such
capabilities yet.
V.
CISCO
On 15 June,
members of the STC visited the Cisco Systems Corporate Headquarters in San
Jose. Cisco Systems is the worldwide leader in networking for the Internet.
Today, networks are an essential part of business, education, government and
home communications, and Cisco's Internet Protocol-based (IP) networking
solutions are the foundation of these networks. As Brad Boston, Senior
Vice President and CIO of the Cisco Systems, told NATO Parliamentarians, Cisco
is the market leader in multiple areas, such as routing and switching, unified
communications, wireless and security. The company helped catalyse the
industry's move toward IP and, now that it is fully underway, the company is at
the centre of fundamental changes in the way the world communicates. Cisco
spends $3.2 billion on research and development, and it employs 12,000
engineers. The company's branches are spread all over the world. Its customers
include commercial companies, private persons and governments as well as
military and intelligence sectors. The Cisco Systems' Global Government
Solutions Group (GGSG) and especially its branch Global Defense, Space and
Security Group (GDSS) work with relevant governmental and defence agencies,
defence companies such as Lockheed Martin, and space customers to identify and
meet their advanced technology solution needs in an increasingly
network-centric world. The company has working relations with NATO for which Cisco
Systems is an important technology advisor.
Cisco engineers
are particularly preoccupied with issues of network delays and network
security, elaborating various mechanisms to counter cyber-attacks against
critical infrastructure networks. The goal of these efforts is to allow network
access only to compliant and trusted endpoint devices. Asked by Lord Jopling
what legislative support is required for these efforts, Mr. Boston replied that
one should be extremely cautious when it comes to introducing new legislation
in this area. The experience of the Cisco Systems shows that excessively
invasive regulation can have many unexpected negative effects.
Ms.
Laura Ipsen,
Vice-President of Worldwide Government Affairs for Cisco Systems, spoke about
the impact of the Information Age on society. She explained that there is a
clear correlation between the growing use of IT technologies and the overall
growth of the world's economy. New technologies foster educational programmes
and contribute significantly to increasing standards of living in many
countries of the world. However, Mrs. Ipsen pointed out that governmental
support is crucial for these programmes to succeed.
The keynote
presentation on network-centric warfare was given by Terrence Morgan, Director, GDSS
Net-Centric Operations, Cisco Systems. He accentuated that we are living in a
time of profound change called 'the digital revolution'. In effect, NATO
commanders must forget everything they know about C3 (command, control and
communications). The importance of network-enabled capabilities is being
increasingly realised by militaries of many countries. Net-centricity is about
leveraging technology to create new synergies in the way militaries train,
organise, and lead that will enable more effective military operations.
Network-centric capabilities (NEC) provide information superiority, deeper
sensor reach, shared battlespace awareness, faster decision cycle, etc.
According to Mr. Morgan, maneuver, mass, surprise, firepower, and logistics
have been coins of the military realm. But in the Information Age, information
is transforming both the concepts of mass and maneuver, redefining firepower,
and greatly simplifying logistics. Information can, in effect, be directly
substituted in the "manufacture" of each of these capabilities.
Today's
operational C4ISR (C3, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance) environment is still far from perfect: bandwidth is limited
with choke points and interoperability issues, infrastructure is too diverse
and complex to support plug and play, and the time to field new applications is
unacceptably long. In other words, sensor and shooter have too much separation.
In coalition warfare, network-centric capabilities enable commanders and
warriors to get immediate access to the information necessary to accomplish
their mission. While mastering networks, it is important to filter and
prioritise relevant information as its overflow can be counterproductive on a
battlefield. Mr. Morgan suggested that it would be wiser for military leaders
to use standard-based, commercial off-the-shelf components to create such
networks, rather that highly specialised proprietary military equipment. Mr.
Morgan also emphasised that technological compatibility is not the only
prerequisite of net-centricity. Human factor and joint training are equally, if
not more important.
After the
briefings, the Cisco Systems representatives organised a tour of technologies
demonstrations for the STC members to get a feel for what is in the realm of the
possible for addressing the needs of citizens, first responders and the
military. The NATO legislators were particularly impressed by the company's
video-communication systems that enable military commanders and warriors to
communicate easily and effectively.
VI.
Lockheed Martin
On the last day of
their visit, the NATO PA delegation visited the Lockheed Martin Space
Systems Company (LMSSC) headquarters in Sunnyvale, California. LMSSC is one
of the 5 major business divisions of Lockheed Martin. LMSSC is a world leader
in the design, production and integration of launch vehicles and systems,
satellite communications and navigation, remote sensing and space science, as
well as missile systems for defensive and strategic missions. Ms. Jeannie
Seelbach, Vice President Business Development, introduced the LMSSC, whose
major customers are the US Department of Defence and NASA. The company employs
18,000 people and its annual sales amount to $6.8 billion.
Julie Pound, Director, Business Development, gave an overview
of LMSSC achievements in the field of missile defence systems. The company is
working on systems designed to intercept enemy missiles in all three phases: 1)
the boost phase (kinetic energy interceptors, airborne laser); 2) the midcourse
phase (Aegis ballistic missile defence, ground-based midcourse defence,
multiple kill vehicles), and 3) the terminal phase (Patriot Advanced
Capability-3, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence-THAAD). LMSSC is also engaged
in NATO's pursuit of the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence
(ALTBMD).
Tom McGrath, Vice President and Programme Manager of
the THAAD Programme, focused specifically on the THAAD development programme.
THAAD defends against short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles on
various altitudes. The system provides unique and cost-effective capabilities
for critical ballistic missile defence missions; it is highly lethal and easily
transportable. The speaker explained in detail how different components of the
system co-work in order to ensure interception of a missile. He also explained
the differences between the THAAD and the MEADS, which can intercept cruise
missiles, in addition to ballistic ones, but cannot be used against
intermediate-range missiles. Mr. McGrath further said that the cost of one
THAAD system is approximately $400-500 million, but the maintenance costs are
much higher. It takes at least 100 military persons to operate a THAAD system.
Chuch Rudiger from the Lockheed Martin Advanced
Technology Centre (ATC) spoke about the research areas and products designed by
the ATC. 646 engineers and scientists at the ATC are working on development of
the Airborne Laser (ABL),
which is a key part of the U.S. Air Force theatre missile defence system, the
next generation optics, solar observation techniques and highly-sophisticated
space-related technologies.
