

Status quo/Perspectives  
in civilian, police and civil-military capabilities development within the EU  
and cooperation with CHG 2008

Presentation

Given by

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## Introduction

It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you today to address the issue of civilian and military capabilities development within the EU. The topic of this conference - in the way it is formulated - enables us both to take stock of the achievements reached in the past 8 years since the ESDP was born, and to look ahead to the perspectives and challenges the EU is likely to face. I will focus on the present situation and short-term way ahead. In doing so, I intend to summarise the prospects of the capability development in the EU and to offer some thoughts on the way ahead. Being Director of Policy and Plans Division in the EU Military Staff, I will also address the question on where and how the civilian capabilities development could be better connected with the military dimension to achieve greater coherence, thus making the EU's overall crisis management more effective.

## Political-strategic Framework

We should start with a simple question: What is the EU's level of ambition? A clear answer, however, is difficult. It certainly includes the EU's overall strategic vision and its interests as a global actor contributing to international crisis management, as outlined in the *European Security Strategy (ESS)* adopted at the end of 2003. I venture to summarise it this way: The EU's overall objective is to support, restore, and contribute to self-sustaining stability, primarily in regions that are of strategic interest to the EU, mainly through endeavours in the field of crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction, thereby following a comprehensive and – ideally – holistic approach in which security and development are two complementary sides of the same coin. To achieve this, a range of crisis-management instruments is needed in addition to political, diplomatic, and humanitarian tools. We need *military capabilities* which are available in time, and which can be effectively commanded and sustained for expeditionary mission, both for intervention-type and stabilisation-type operations. In parallel, we need *civilian capabilities* able to contribute to internal stability and institution building, in particular in the area of police, justice and rule of law, and civil administration; and last, but certainly not least, the large field of short-term humanitarian relief activities and of mid- and long-term economic development and reconstruction programmes provided through the *European Commission*. The successful implementation of an well coordinated, or even integrated, “one-stop” civilian-military approach is the distinctive feature, the specific value that the EU can add to international crisis management.

The parameters for effective crisis management are set in the European Security Strategy, which recalls the imperative for the EU to become *more active, more capable and more coherent*. Three factors are essential:

- timely reaction including ability for Rapid Response both on the military and the civilian side,
- tailoring the intervention to the specific requirements of an individual crisis, making optimal use of the civilian and military crisis management instruments concerted at the EU level, and
- co-operation with relevant actors and organisations.

These principles have been confirmed by our experiences in the field. Again, they apply both to military and civilian missions. Within the last four years the EU has conducted or concluded 16 operations on three continents, 12 civilian or civilian/military and 4 military ones. In the Balkans, in Africa and elsewhere we have learned that there is no simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. Today, almost all military operations need a complementary civilian effort. On the other hand, many of our civilian crisis management missions do rely on military support or take place in an environment where security requires military assistance. Two further challenging civilian operations are likely to be deployed this year: in Kosovo and Afghanistan. What does all this mean for the development of capabilities in - what is of our particular interest today - the civilian and civil-military fields respectively? I will only briefly touch military capabilities in order to then present civilian and civil-military dimension in a broader and complete picture.

### Military Capabilities

In the first HLG 2003, adopted back in 1999, the EU set itself the aim to develop the capabilities required to deploy within 60 days a joint/combined contingent of up to army corps size (+/- 60.000 staff). This goal was defined by the shock of the Balkan wars. Europe wanted to be able to manage itself, in its own "backyard", a Peace Support Operation of the initial size of NATO's IFOR/SFOR operation in BiH. It is assessed that the EU has now met the HLG 2003 although it is still limited today and constrained by a number of significant and well known shortfalls which, not surprisingly, are comparable with those suffered by European NATO Allies : strategic transport, satellite capabilities, ISTAR, etc.

However, our strategic environment has evolved significantly since 1999, and new challenges have moved capability-building to a new dimension. Based on the *European Security Strategy* Member States have committed themselves to a new Headline Goal with a 2010 horizon. This new commitment reflects the transition from the idea of deployment of large Corps-sized forces to the idea of deploying smaller, but highly efficient *mission-tailored force packages* at high readiness able to accomplish – what I call – ‘Petersberg-Plus’<sup>1</sup> tasks in accordance with the *ESS*. This HLG was certainly inspired by the first autonomous ESDP operation ARTEMIS (+/- 2.000 men) in Eastern CONGO. The EU thus needs forces that are more flexible, mobile and interoperable. We have to be able to intervene quickly and decisively before a small conflict spirals out of control, or even in a preventive capacity as in the successful EUFOR DRC Congo operation in 2006.

The subsequent planning process to identify the required military capabilities has been conducted over two years and their operational impact is now being under evaluation. In this context, one important question is how to get on with the capability development process beyond 2010 and towards the long-term requirements. Another question is how to coordinate this process with the capability development conducted within NATO, which is a major concern for many EU NATO Nations. Finally, there might be a need to explore, inter alia, possibilities for striking a balance between generically identified requirements, strategic priorities, and Member States aspirations and potentials; this might enable us to define a realistic military level of ambition as well as the associated risk and political consequences.

In principle, capability development can be conducted along two lines: first, through improvement of the "hardware" such as investments in strategic transport; second the softer and often less expensive way of improving arrangements and procedures. The EU is currently addressing four strands of work simultaneously: Full Operational Capability of the *Battle-group Concept*; the follow-on work to the *Maritime Dimension Study*; the *RR Air Initiative* and the implications of rapid response for the *strategic planning processes*. Regardless of the particular strand of work concerned, there are four common issues that deserve further consideration if we want to increase the efficiency of EU Military Rapid Response – Command

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<sup>1</sup> The 'Petersberg Tasks' proper comprise Humanitarian and Rescue Operations, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement (Combat forces in Crisis Management including Peacemaking); these tasks have been complemented by Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; Security Sector Reform; and Support to third countries in combating terrorism

and Control, force generation, concurrency and jointness. Without going much into details let me just highlight that these four aspects being characteristics of military capabilities development have also much relevance with regard to the development of the civilian capabilities.

### Civilian Capabilities

Civilian Crisis Management is less well-known among the public and less spectacular than military operations are. Their stabilising effect, however, is equally important. Experiences in well-known crisis regions show that civilian instruments constitute an essential part of comprehensive crisis management, and by far the majority of ESDP operations have been of a civilian nature.

EU Member States are therefore making particular efforts to strengthen civilian ESDP capabilities in six priority areas: police, justice, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, and generic support to operations or EU Special Representatives (EUSR). In terms of numbers, Member States have made remarkable commitments. However, we are lacking assurance of the timely availability of adequately trained and equipped personnel for multiple commitments.<sup>2</sup> The *Civilian Headline Goal 2008* has been established to better address these issues, following the same methodology as applied to the military HLG process. We are using similar planning scenarios that cover the whole range of possible missions – from entire *substitution* of all institutions in a failed state to *strengthening* those institutions in a country considerably weakened by internal strife, corruption and organised crime. As a result and across the priority areas, executive functions, on the one hand, and the advisory, mentoring and monitoring functions, on the other, required in civilian operations were identified.

Subsequent work conducted thus far has resulted in detailed information on the civilian capabilities which EU Member States and a number of non-EU European NATO nations, as well as certain third states, have declared. Critical shortfalls have been identified and prioritised, focusing on Police and Rule of Law. They are addressed in the framework of the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Plan 2007. I think, however, we can safely say that the CHG process

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<sup>2</sup> Currently, Member States have deployed less than 25 % of the declared police capabilities both to EU and UN operations, including Kosovo. Despite some 5,700 police officers declared to be available if needed, Member States have not been able to provide more than an average of 20 police officers, out of 50 posts, to the EU support action to AMIS. On the other hand, a significant number of Member States' police officers are serving in Kosovo under UN auspices, and a total of some 880 police officers are deployed to EUPM in Bosnia and UNMIK in Kosovo.

has contributed to the success of current ESDP operations, in terms of planning, mission support, and identifying adequately qualified personnel required in the various priority areas.

You will have noted that civilian ESDP capabilities are primarily constituted by skilled individual experts, able to work in a mentoring, monitoring and advisory function embedded in the (senior) management level of the administration or the executive of the country concerned. This contrasts with the military capabilities, which are normally conceived as and provided by weapon systems and/or equipped and trained units. In certain situations, however, effective civilian crisis management also demands multi-functional, trained, and equipped civilian capability packages rapidly available for various deployments. *Rapidly Deployable Police Elements* (RDPE), such as *Integrated Police Units* (IPU) and *Formed Police Units* (FPU) that can be deployed within 30 days, are an essential tool in areas where the EU efforts aim at contributing to fill the “law enforcement gap” at the beginning of a crisis intervention when often only military forces are deployed. IPU and FPU are robust police forces able to perform a vast spectrum of executive police tasks and intervene in complex scenarios. Under certain circumstances an IPU can be temporarily included in a military chain of command, whereas FPUs perform executive police tasks, including in non-stabilised situations under a civilian chain of command. The concept of RDPE has been subject to significant discussion and it has turned out that further work is needed to achieve Member State's common understanding on the complex parameters and modalities for the structure and use of these police forces. Since 2006, the *European Gendarmerie Force*, constituted by five nations, has been set up; it remains to be seen under which circumstances and modalities they might be used by the EU.

In the domain of Rapid Reaction, a noteworthy achievement of last year is the establishment of multidisciplinary *Civilian Response Teams* (CRT), which are deployable within 5 days. They are able to conduct early needs assessment and fact finding in the crisis region, and can establish a rapid operational presence on the ground; the planned use of CRT-resources to prepare the setting up of our civilian mission in Afghanistan is a good example. CRTs can also provide support to and reinforcement of existing EU in-theatre presence, including that to EUSRs. Based on operational experience a proposal has been made to consider a joint deployment of a CRT alongside a Battlegroup, which would permit the BG to better focus on its key military tasks and support early planning for comprehensive follow-on ESDP commitment.

There is of course much work ahead. Under the German Presidency, work towards implementation of the “*Civilian Capability Plan*” continues; priorities are: (1) addressing qualitative and quantitative shortfalls, in particular in the area of Justice, (2) involvement of third states and the UN/OSCE, (3) evaluating lessons from ongoing missions, (4) and last but not least, focus on civil-military cooperation. The forthcoming police/rule of law operation in Kosovo that will probably consist of some 1,200 to 1,400 personnel, and the envisaged police/rule of law operation in Afghanistan will pose unprecedented challenges in terms of recruitment and management, in a particularly difficult environment and over strategic distances. It shows that the search for specifically qualified personnel within the CHG 2008 is not a theoretical exercise.

### **Role of the European Commission**

Any presentation of EU crisis management would be incomplete without mentioning the huge array of instruments of the *European Commission* can provide, in particular in the field of humanitarian assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation, long-term institution building, and development. I am, however, not well qualified to represent the Commission’s case. On the other hand, the EU Military Staff and more precisely Civ/Mil Cell located within the EUMS includes two EC representatives who are providing an initial working level interface for better coordinated planning. This is a modest, but important first step towards more effective *inter-pillar* coordination and cooperation in mission planning. Indeed, in order to ensure the necessary coherence and complementarity between ESDP operations and related EC assistance effective coordination is essential, not least at the early planning stages. It can help to ensure that the planning and implementation of limited duration ESDP operations take due account of longer-term EC strategies for assistance to the concerned countries - and vice versa. In addition, through the new "Instrument for Stability" the Commission has acquired an important 'rapid response' tool to improve the impact of EU assistance in an acute or impending crisis situation, in close coordination with ESDP actions. By working closely with the Commission, including its Delegations in the field, we have already demonstrated how together we can optimise the overall impact of the combined EU efforts : in the case of the ESDP Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), where Community financing of the moderation of the peace negotiations and programmes for reintegration of former combatants and the work of the AMM were mutually reinforcing. We have to create more of such win-win situations in the future. – This leads me to the last part of my 'capability *tour d'horizon*'.

## **The Challenges of Civil/Military Coordination (CMCO)**

Seen from the proven military principle of unity of effort and command, the weakness of the current EU system is that not all instruments are in one hand. In other words, the EU's richness and potential for crisis management cause, at the same time, difficulties in coordinating the different actors and balancing the different means. The arrangements foreseen in the Constitution Treaty in this respect, and in particular the joint External Action Service, are in my view bitterly missed. Much work has been done over recent Presidencies to take CMCO forward, from integrated planning at the Brussels-level to better cooperation in the field. There are a number of areas, however, where further progress is needed and possible. Today's crisis management missions require considerable resources and MS' capabilities. The EU clearly must strive to fill the "hardware" capability shortfalls on military side. But as we have seen, we can make complementary efforts to improve our operational capability and performance, at little cost, by looking at our structures and procedures and this could apply both to civilian and military dimension. The key point is to deliver strategic effect following a clear political-strategic objective marking the desired end-state. This requires comprehensive and coherent planning, starting in Brussels.

In terms of *capabilities development*, this could be seen as a particular form of advance planning. ESDP operations will be expeditionary; multinational in nature; 'joint', from a military perspective, and 'multi-instrumental' in a comprehensive context. With this in mind, it seems sensible to further link the civilian and military capabilities development. Obviously, we need to achieve the objectives that the EU has set itself in the two present HLGs. But how do we proceed beyond 2008 and 2010 respectively? Should we continue with two different processes and timelines? Or is there scope for harmonisation both in terms of content and timing? Given that future crises will require an ever more comprehensive approach, I think it is worth exploring the potential of a truly comprehensive civilian/military capability development process. This notably involves the definition, by all civilian and military actors concerned working jointly, of future challenges and strategic options.

## **Post Hampton Court / civilian C-2 issues**

In terms of the *planning and conduct of operations*, you are aware of the proposals Dr. Solana has submitted to meet the mandate, given by the European Council in 2005 at *Hampton Court*, to strengthen the crisis management structures in view of our increasing future chal-



lenges. Nowhere is this required improvement more apparent than in the domain of rapid and coordinated action where one of the most demanding aspects is timely and coherent planning. The key to the solution is to undertake, to the greatest extent possible, 'planning in advance' - to be better prepared in addressing security risks and emerging crisis, not least by identifying opportunities earlier, by better informing decision-making, and by reducing the overall response time.

These factors are not unrecognised: Member States agreed the establishment of the Civ/Mil Cell within the EU Military Staff and its capacity for *Strategic Contingency Planning* linking “work across the EU on anticipating crises, including opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation”, that means including the Commission. The findings of the *Exercise Study 06* hosted by the Finnish Presidency in Nov last year stressed that advance planning can provide valuable time-saving input for both civilian and military crisis response planning. Contingent strategic options could inform political decision-makers of the 'bounds of the functionally possible' and provide a firm baseline for the transition from contingency planning to crisis response planning. This approach could particularly inform the preparation of Battlegroups on stand-by. An open question is, however, if there is scope for participation of Member States HQ on a strictly informal and non-committing basis and to what extent.

Finally, in terms of *command and control*, the provisions for timely planning and decision making at the political-strategic level need to be underpinned by more robust arrangements at the operational level for the planning and conduct of operations using civilian and military means. In particular with a view to the specific challenges associated with the upcoming civilian Kosovo and Afghanistan operations, there is a need for a robust management capability. As pointed out by the SG/HR Solana, we think it makes sense to establish a fully developed chain of command for civilian ESDP operations, including the appointment of a Civilian Operations Commander, authorised to oversee and direct the Heads of Mission in the field and supported by a dedicated staff capacity within the General Secretariat performing the role and function of a civilian Operational Headquarters (OHQ).

Furthermore, based on lessons from the civilian/military Aceh Monitoring Mission and the ongoing civilian/military EU Support Action to the AU/AMIS in Sudan/Darfur, the need has become obvious for closer coordination and mutual support of civilian and military planning and conduct of ESDP operations at the strategic level in order to realise greater civil-

ian/military synergy. To achieve this, how should the envisaged Civilian OHQ capacity be combined with the capacities available in the EU Military Staff as both are collocated within the General Secretariat? And how to ensure effective coordination with external military OHQ capabilities? A permanent joint civilian/military *Watch Keeping Capability* will ensure that robust, crisis-resilient arrangements are in place in Brussels that will enhance the capacity to monitor and communicate with ongoing ESDP operations, particularly during crisis periods, and could help to provide a comprehensive picture of all ongoing ESDP operations at any time.

The challenges of capability shortfalls and the need for rapid reaction and civil-military coordination will remain with us for the years to come. We have no choice but to proceed step by step towards truly comprehensive and coherent crisis management using the civilian and military dimension. This must be adequately reflected, not only in our structures, but also in the wider setup of our respective institutions and procedures. The EU with its broad set of instruments, with its specific culture of cooperation and coordination, and with its growing self-confidence and international recognition, after a number of successful ESDP operations, has a unique potential to live up to these challenges.