Det Energipolitiske Udvalg 2006-07
EPU Alm.del Bilag 76
Offentligt
329990_0001.png
Summary and
Conclusions
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
329990_0002.png
Two visions of the energy future:
under-invested, vulnerable and dirty,
or
clean, clever and competitive.
Both are explored in this new edition of the authoritative
World
Energy Outlook.
In it, the International Energy Agency responds to the remit of the
G8 world leaders by
mapping a new energy future,
contrasting
it with where we are now headed.
WEO 2006
shows how to change
course. It counts the costs and benefits - and the benefits win.
World Energy Outlook 2006
also answers these questions:
is the economic reaction to
high energy prices
merely delayed?
is
oil and gas investment
on track?
are the conditions shaping up for a
nuclear energy
revival?
can
biofuels
erode the oil monopoly in road transport?
can
2.5 billion people in developing countries
switch to
modern energy for cooking?
is
Brazil
learning new lessons or teaching the world?
With extensive statistics, detailed projections, analysis and advice,
WEO 2006
equips policy makers and the public to re-make the
energy future.
www.iea.org
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
329990_0003.png
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The world is facing twin energy-related threats: that of not having
adequate and secure supplies of energy at affordable prices and that of
environmental harm caused by consuming too much of it.
Soaring energy
prices and recent geopolitical events have reminded us of the essential role
affordable energy plays in economic growth and human development, and of
the vulnerability of the global energy system to supply disruptions.
Safeguarding energy supplies is once again at the top of the international policy
agenda. Yet the current pattern of energy supply carries the threat of severe and
irreversible environmental damage – including changes in global climate.
Reconciling the goals of energy security and environmental protection requires
strong and coordinated government action and public support.
The need to curb the growth in fossil-energy demand, to increase
geographic and fuel-supply diversity and to mitigate climate-destabilising
emissions is more urgent than ever.
G8 leaders, meeting with the leaders of
several major developing countries and heads of international organisations –
including the International Energy Agency – at Gleneagles in July 2005 and in
St. Petersburg in July 2006 called on the IEA to “advise on alternative energy
scenarios and strategies aimed at a clean, clever and competitive energy future”.
This year’s
Outlook
responds to that request. It confirms that fossil-fuel demand
and trade flows, and greenhouse-gas emissions would follow their current
unsustainable paths through to 2030 in the absence of new government action –
the underlying premise of our Reference Scenario. It also demonstrates, in an
Alternative Policy Scenario, that a package of policies and measures that countries
around the world are considering would, if implemented, significantly reduce the
rate of increase in demand and emissions. Importantly, the economic cost of these
policies would be more than outweighed by the economic benefits that would
come from using and producing energy more efficiently.
Fossil energy will remain dominant to 2030
Global primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario is projected to
increase by just over one-half between now and 2030 – an average
annual rate of 1.6%.
Demand grows by more than one-quarter in the
period to 2015 alone. Over 70% of the increase in demand over the
projection period comes from developing countries, with China alone
accounting for 30%. Their economies and population grow much faster than
in the OECD, shifting the centre of gravity of global energy demand. Almost
Summary and Conclusions
1
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
half of the increase in global primary energy use goes to generating electricity
and one-fifth to meeting transport needs – almost entirely in the form of oil-
based fuels.
Globally, fossil fuels will remain the dominant source of energy to 2030 in
both scenarios.
In the Reference Scenario, they account for 83% of the overall
increase in energy demand between 2004 and 2030. As a result, their share of
world demand edges up, from 80% to 81%. The share of oil drops, though oil
remains the largest single fuel in the global energy mix in 2030. Global oil
demand reaches 99 million barrels per day in 2015 and 116 mb/d in 2030 –
up from 84 mb/d in 2005. In contrast to
WEO-2005,
coal sees the biggest
increase in demand in absolute terms, driven mainly by power generation.
China and India account for almost four-fifths of the incremental demand for
coal. It remains the second-largest primary fuel, its share in global demand
increasing slightly. The share of natural gas also rises, even though gas use grows
less quickly than projected in the last
Outlook,
due to higher prices.
Hydropower’s share of primary energy use rises slightly, while that of nuclear
power falls. The share of biomass falls marginally, as developing countries
increasingly switch to using modern commercial energy, offsetting the growing
use of biomass as feedstock for biofuels production and for power and heat
generation. Non-hydro renewables – including wind, solar and geothermal –
grow quickest, but from a small base.
We have revised upwards our assumptions for oil prices in this
Outlook,
in
the expectation that crude oil and refined-product markets remain tight.
Market fundamentals point to a modest easing of prices as new capacity comes
on stream and demand growth slows. But new geopolitical tensions or, worse,
a major supply disruption could drive prices even higher. We assume the
average IEA crude oil import price falls back to $47 per barrel in real terms in
the early part of the next decade and then rises steadily through to 2030.
Natural gas prices are assumed broadly to follow the trend in oil prices, because
of the continuing widespread use of oil-price indexation in long-term gas
supply contracts and because of inter-fuel competition. Coal prices are assumed
to change proportionately less over time, but follow the direction of oil and
gas prices.
The threat to the world’s energy security is real
and growing
Rising oil and gas demand, if unchecked, would accentuate the
consuming countries’ vulnerability to a severe supply disruption and
resulting price shock.
OECD and developing Asian countries become
increasingly dependent on imports as their indigenous production fails to keep
2
World Energy Outlook 2006
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
pace with demand. Non-OPEC production of conventional crude oil and
natural gas liquids is set to peak within a decade. By 2030, the OECD as a
whole imports two-thirds of its oil needs in the Reference Scenario, compared
with 56% today. Much of the additional imports come from the Middle East,
along vulnerable maritime routes. The concentration of oil production in a
small group of countries with large reserves – notably Middle East OPEC
members and Russia – will increase their market dominance and their ability
to impose higher prices. An increasing share of gas demand is also expected to
be met by imports, via pipeline or in the form of liquefied natural gas from
increasingly distant suppliers.
The growing insensitivity of oil demand to price accentuates the potential
impact on international oil prices of a supply disruption.
The share of
transport demand – which is price-inelastic relative to other energy services –
in global oil consumption is projected to rise in the Reference Scenario. As a
result, oil demand becomes less and less responsive to movements in
international crude oil prices. The corollary of this is that prices would fluctuate
more than in the past in response to future short-term shifts in demand and
supply. The cushioning effect of subsidies to oil consumers on demand
contributes to the insensitivity of global oil demand to changes in international
prices. Current subsidies on oil products in non-OECD countries are estimated
at over $90 billion annually. Subsidies on all forms of final energy outside the
OECD amount to over $250 billion per year – equal to all the investment
needed in the power sector each year, on average, in those countries.
Oil prices still matter to the economic health of the global economy.
Although most oil-importing economies around the world have continued to
grow strongly since 2002, they would have grown even more rapidly had the
price of oil and other forms of energy not increased. In many importing
countries, increases in the value of exports of non-energy commodities, the
prices of which have also risen, have offset at least part of the impact of higher
energy prices. The eventual impact of higher energy prices on macroeconomic
prospects remains uncertain, partly because the effects of recent price increases
have not fully worked their way through the economic system. There are
growing signs of inflationary pressures, leading to higher interest rates. Most
OECD countries have experienced a worsening of their current account
balances, most obviously the United States. The recycling of petro-dollars may
have helped to mitigate the increase in long-term interest rates, delaying the
adverse impact on real incomes and output of higher energy prices. The longer
prices remain at current levels or the more they rise, the greater the threat to
economic growth in importing countries. An oil-price shock caused by a
sudden and severe supply disruption would be particularly damaging – for
heavily indebted poor countries most of all.
Summary and Conclusions
3
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
Will the investment come?
Meeting the world’s growing hunger for energy requires massive investment
in energy-supply infrastructure.
The Reference Scenario projections in this
Outlook
call for cumulative investment of just over $20 trillion (in year-2005
dollars) over 2005-2030. This is around $3 trillion higher than in
WEO-2005,
mainly because of recent sharp increases in unit capital costs, especially in the oil
and gas industry. The power sector accounts for 56% of total investment – or
around two-thirds if investment in the supply chain to meet the fuel needs of
power stations is included. Oil investment – three-quarters of which goes to the
upstream – amounts to over $4 trillion in total over 2005-2030. Upstream
investment needs are more sensitive to changes in decline rates at producing
fields than to the rate of growth of demand for oil. More than half of all the
energy investment needed worldwide is in developing countries, where demand
and production increase most quickly. China alone needs to invest about
$3.7 trillion – 18% of the world total.
There is no guarantee that all of the investment needed will be forthcoming.
Government policies, geopolitical factors, unexpected changes in unit costs and
prices, and new technology could all affect the opportunities and incentives for
private and publicly-owned companies to invest in different parts of the various
energy-supply chains. The investment decisions of the major oil- and gas-
producing countries are of crucial importance, as they will increasingly affect the
volume and cost of imports in the consuming countries. There are doubts, for
example, about whether investment in Russia’s gas industry will be sufficient even
to maintain current export levels to Europe and to start exporting to Asia.
The ability and willingness of major oil and gas producers to step up
investment in order to meet rising global demand are particularly uncertain.
Capital spending by the world’s leading oil and gas companies increased sharply
in nominal terms over the course of the first half of the current decade and,
according to company plans, will rise further to 2010. But the impact on new
capacity of higher spending is being blunted by rising costs. Expressed in cost
inflation-adjusted terms, investment in 2005 was only 5% above that in 2000.
Planned upstream investment to 2010 is expected to boost slightly global spare
crude oil production capacity. But capacity additions could be smaller on account
of shortages of skilled personnel and equipment, regulatory delays, cost inflation,
higher decline rates at existing fields and geopolitics. Increased capital spending
on refining is expected to raise throughput capacity by almost 8 mb/d by 2010.
Beyond the current decade, higher investment in real terms will be needed to
maintain growth in upstream and downstream capacity. In a Deferred
Investment Case, lower OPEC crude oil production, partially offset by increased
non-OPEC production, pushes oil prices up by one-third, trimming global oil
demand by 7 mb/d, or 6%, in 2030 relative to the Reference Scenario.
4
World Energy Outlook 2006
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
On current energy trends, carbon-dioxide
emissions will accelerate
Global energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO
2
) emissions increase by 55%
between 2004 and 2030, or 1.7% per year, in the Reference Scenario.
They reach 40 gigatonnes in 2030, an increase of 14 Gt over the 2004 level.
Power generation contributes half of the increase in global emissions over
the projection period. Coal overtook oil in 2003 as the leading contributor
to global energy-related CO
2
emissions and consolidates this position
through to 2030. Emissions are projected to grow slightly faster than
primary energy demand – reversing the trend of the last two-and-a-half
decades – because the average carbon content of primary energy
consumption increases.
Developing countries account for over three-quarters of the increase in
global CO
2
emissions between 2004 and 2030 in this scenario.
They
overtake the OECD as the biggest emitter by soon after 2010. The share of
developing countries in world emissions rises from 39% in 2004 to over
one-half by 2030. This increase is faster than that of their share in energy
demand, because their incremental energy use is more carbon-intensive than
that of the OECD and transition economies. In general, the developing
countries use proportionately more coal and less gas. China alone is
responsible for about 39% of the rise in global emissions. China’s emissions
more than double between 2004 and 2030, driven by strong economic
growth and heavy reliance on coal in power generation and industry. China
overtakes the United States as the world’s biggest emitter before 2010. Other
Asian countries, notably India, also contribute heavily to the increase in global
emissions. The per-capita emissions of non-OECD countries nonetheless
remain well below those of the OECD.
Prompt government action can alter energy
and emission trends
The Reference Scenario trends described above are not set in stone.
Indeed,
governments may well take stronger action to steer the energy system onto a
more sustainable path. In the Alternative Policy Scenario, the policies and
measures that governments are currently considering aimed at enhancing
energy security and mitigating CO
2
emissions are assumed to be implemented.
This would result in significantly slower growth in fossil-fuel demand, in oil
and gas imports and in emissions. These interventions include efforts to
improve efficiency in energy production and use, to increase reliance on non-
fossil fuels and to sustain the domestic supply of oil and gas within net energy-
importing countries.
Summary and Conclusions
5
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
World primary energy demand in 2030 is about 10% lower in the
Alternative Policy Scenario than in the Reference Scenario – roughly
equivalent to China’s entire energy consumption today.
Global demand
grows, by 37% between 2004 and 2030, but more slowly: 1.2% annually
against 1.6% in the Reference Scenario. The biggest energy savings in both
absolute and percentage terms come from coal. The impact on energy demand
of new policies is less marked in the first decade of the
Outlook
period, but far
from negligible. The difference in global energy demand between the two
scenarios in 2015 is about 4%.
In stark contrast with the Reference Scenario, OECD oil imports level off
by around 2015 and then begin to fall.
Even so, all three OECD regions and
developing Asia are more dependent on oil imports by the end of the
projection period, though markedly less so than in the Reference Scenario.
Global oil demand reaches 103 mb/d in 2030 in the Alternative Policy
Scenario – an increase of 20 mb/d on the 2005 level but 13 mb/d less than in
the Reference Scenario. Measures in the transport sector produce close to 60%
of all the oil savings in the Alternative Policy Scenario. More than two-thirds
come from more efficient new vehicles. Increased biofuels use and production,
especially in Brazil, Europe and the United States, also helps reduce oil needs.
Globally, gas demand and reliance on gas imports are also sharply reduced vis-
à-vis the Reference Scenario.
Energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions are cut by 1.7 Gt, or 5%, in 2015
and by 6.3 Gt, or 16%, in 2030 relative to the Reference Scenario.
The
actions taken in the Alternative Policy Scenario cause emissions in the OECD
and in the transition economies to stabilise and then decline before 2030. Their
emissions in 2030 are still slightly higher than in 2004, but well below the
Reference Scenario level. Emissions in the European Union and Japan fall to
below current levels. Emissions in developing regions carry on growing, but the
rate of increase slows appreciably over the
Outlook
period compared with the
Reference Scenario.
Policies that encourage the more efficient production and use of energy
contribute almost 80% of the avoided CO
2
emissions.
The remainder comes
from switching to low- and or zero-carbon fuels. More efficient use of fuels,
mainly through more efficient cars and trucks, accounts for almost 36% of the
emissions saved. More efficient use of electricity in a wide range of applications,
including lighting, air-conditioning, appliances and industrial motors, accounts
for another 30%. More efficient energy production contributes 13%.
Renewables and biofuels together yield another 12% and nuclear the remaining
10%. The implementation of only a dozen policies would result in nearly 40%
of avoided CO
2
emissions by 2030. The policies that are most effective in
reducing emissions also yield the biggest reductions in oil and gas imports.
6
World Energy Outlook 2006
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
New policies and measures would pay for
themselves
In aggregate, the new policies and measures analysed yield financial
savings that far exceed the initial extra investment cost for consumers –
a key result of the Alternative Policy Scenario.
Cumulative investment in
2005-2030 along the energy chain – from the producer to the consumer – is
$560 billion lower than in the Reference Scenario. Investment in end-use
equipment and buildings is $2.4 trillion higher, but this is more than
outweighed by the $3 trillion of investment that is avoided on the supply side.
Over the same period, the cost of the fuel saved by consumers amounts to
$8.1 trillion, more than offsetting the extra demand-side investments required
to generate these savings.
The changes in electricity-related investment brought about by the
policies included in the Alternative Policy Scenario yield particularly
big savings.
On average, an additional dollar invested in more efficient
electrical equipment, appliances and buildings avoids more than two dollars
in investment in electricity supply. This ratio is highest in non-OECD
countries. Two-thirds of the additional demand-side capital spending is
borne by consumers in OECD countries. The payback periods of the
additional demand-side investments are very short, ranging from one to
eight years. They are shortest in developing countries and for those polices
introduced before 2015.
Nuclear power has renewed promise
– if public concerns are met
Nuclear power – a proven technology for baseload electricity generation
– could make a major contribution to reducing dependence on
imported gas and curbing CO
2
emissions.
In the Reference Scenario, world
nuclear power generating capacity increases from 368 GW in 2005 to
416 GW in 2030. But its share in the primary energy mix still falls, on the
assumption that few new reactors are built and that several existing ones are
retired. In the Alternative Policy Scenario, more favourable nuclear policies
raise nuclear power generating capacity to 519 GW by 2030, so that its share
in the energy mix rises.
Interest in building nuclear reactors has increased as a result of higher
fossil-energy prices, which have made nuclear power relatively more
competitive.
New nuclear power plants could produce electricity at a cost of
less than five US cents per kWh, if construction and operating risks are
appropriately managed by plant vendors and power companies. At this cost,
nuclear power would be cheaper than gas-based electricity if gas prices are
Summary and Conclusions
7
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
above $4.70 per MBtu. Nuclear power would still be more expensive than
conventional coal-fired plants at coal prices of less than $70 per tonne. The
breakeven costs of nuclear power would be lower if a financial penalty on
CO
2
emissions were introduced.
Nuclear power will only become more important if the governments of
countries where nuclear power is acceptable play a stronger role in
facilitating private investment, especially in liberalised markets.
Nuclear
power plants are capital-intensive, requiring initial investment of $2 billion to
$3.5 billion per reactor. On the other hand, nuclear power generating costs are
less vulnerable to fuel-price changes than coal- or gas-fired generation.
Moreover, uranium resources are abundant and widely distributed around the
globe. These two advantages make nuclear power a potentially attractive option
for enhancing the security of electricity supply – if concerns about plant safety,
nuclear waste disposal and the risk of proliferation can be solved to the
satisfaction of the public.
The contribution of biofuels hinges on new
technology
Biofuels are expected to make a significant contribution to meeting global
road-transport energy needs, especially in the Alternative Policy Scenario.
They account for 7% of the road-fuel consumption in 2030 in that scenario,
up from 1% today. In the Reference Scenario, the share reaches 4%. In both
scenarios, the United States, the European Union and Brazil account for the
bulk of the increase and remain the leading producers and consumers of
biofuels. Ethanol is expected to account for most of the increase in biofuels use
worldwide, as production costs are expected to fall faster than those of biodiesel
– the other main biofuel. The share of biofuels in transport-fuel use remains far
and away the highest in Brazil – the world’s lowest-cost producer of ethanol.
Rising food demand, which competes with biofuels for existing arable and
pasture land, will constrain the potential for biofuels production using
current technology.
About 14 million hectares of land are now used for the
production of biofuels, equal to about 1% of the world’s currently available
arable land. This share rises to 2% in the Reference Scenario and 3.5% in the
Alternative Policy Scenario. The amount of arable land needed in 2030 is equal
to more than that of France and Spain in the Reference Scenario and that of all
the OECD Pacific countries – including Australia – in the Alternative Policy
Scenario.
New biofuels technologies being developed today, notably ligno-cellulosic
ethanol, could allow biofuels to play a much bigger role than that foreseen
in either scenario.
But significant technological challenges still need to be
8
World Energy Outlook 2006
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
overcome for these second-generation technologies to become commercially
viable. Trade and subsidy policies will be critical factors in determining where
and with what resources and technologies biofuels will be produced in the
coming decades, the overall burden of subsidy on taxpayers and the cost-
effectiveness of biofuels as a way of promoting energy diversity and reducing
carbon-dioxide emissions.
Making the Alternative Policy Scenario a reality
There are formidable hurdles to the adoption and implementation of the
policies and measures in the Alternative Policy Scenario.
In practice, it will
take considerable political will to push these policies through, many of which
are bound to encounter resistance from some industry and consumer interests.
Politicians need to spell out clearly the benefits to the economy and to society
as a whole of the proposed measures. In most countries, the public is becoming
familiar with the energy-security and environmental advantages of action to
encourage more efficient energy use and to boost the role of renewables.
Private-sector support and international cooperation will be needed for
more stringent government policy initiatives.
While most energy-related
investment will have to come from the private sector, governments have a key
role to play in creating the appropriate investment environment. The
industrialised countries will need to help developing countries leapfrog to the
most advanced technologies and adopt efficient equipment and practices.
This will require programmes to promote technology transfer, capacity
building and collaborative research and development. A strong degree of
cooperation between countries, and between industry and government will
be needed. Non-OECD countries can seek help from multilateral lending
institutions and other international organisations in devising and
implementing new policies. This may be particularly critical for small
developing countries which, unlike China and India, may struggle to attract
investment.
The analysis of the Alternative Policy Scenario demonstrates the urgency
with which policy action is required.
Each year of delay in implementing
the policies analysed would have a disproportionately larger effect on
emissions. For example, if the policies were to be delayed by ten years, with
implementation starting only in 2015, the cumulative avoided emissions by
2030 vis-à-vis the Reference Scenario would be only 2%, compared with 8%
in the Alternative Policy Scenario. In addition, delays in stepping up energy-
related research and development efforts, particularly in the field of CO
2
capture and storage, would hinder prospects for bringing down emissions
after 2030.
Summary and Conclusions
9
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
Larger energy savings would require
an even bigger policy push
Even if governments actually implement, as we assume, all the policies
they are considering to curb energy imports and emissions, both would
still rise through to 2030.
Keeping global CO
2
emissions at current levels
would require much stronger policies. In practice, technological breakthroughs
that change profoundly the way we produce and consume energy will almost
certainly be needed as well. The difficulties in making this happen in the time
frame of our analysis do not justify inaction or delay, which would raise the
long-term economic, security and environmental cost. The sooner a start is
made, the quicker a new generation of more efficient and low- or zero-carbon
energy systems can be put in place.
A much more sustainable energy future is within our reach, using
technologies that are already available or close to commercialisation.
A
recently published IEA report,
Energy Technology Perspectives,
demonstrates that
a portfolio approach to technology development and deployment is needed. In
this
Outlook,
a Beyond the Alternative Policy Scenario (BAPS) Case illustrates
how the extremely challenging goal of capping CO
2
emissions in 2030 at
today’s levels could be achieved. This would require emissions to be cut by 8 Gt
more than in the Alternative Policy Scenario. Four-fifths of the energy and
emissions savings in the BAPS Case come from even stronger policy efforts to
improve energy efficiency, to boost nuclear power and renewables-based
electricity generation and to support the introduction of CO
2
capture and
storage technology – one of the most promising options for mitigating
emissions in the longer term. Yet the technology shifts outlined in the BAPS
Case, while technically feasible, would be unprecedented in scale and speed of
deployment.
Bringing modern energy to the world’s poor
is an urgent necessity
Although steady progress is made in both scenarios in expanding the use
of modern household energy services in developing countries, many
people still depend on traditional biomass in 2030.
Today, 2.5 billion
people use fuelwood, charcoal, agricultural waste and animal dung to meet
most of their daily energy needs for cooking and heating. In many countries,
these resources account for over 90% of total household energy consumption.
The inefficient and unsustainable use of biomass has severe consequences for
health, the environment and economic development. Shockingly, about
1.3 million people – mostly women and children – die prematurely every year
because of exposure to indoor air pollution from biomass. There is evidence
10
World Energy Outlook 2006
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
that, in countries where local prices have adjusted to recent high international
energy prices, the shift to cleaner, more efficient ways of cooking has actually
slowed and even reversed. In the Reference Scenario, the number of people
using biomass increases to 2.6 billion by 2015 and to 2.7 billion by 2030 as
population rises. That is, one-third of the world’s population will still be relying
on these fuels, a share barely smaller than today. There are still 1.6 billion
people in the world without electricity. To achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, this number would need to fall to less than one billion
by 2015.
Action to encourage more efficient and sustainable use of traditional
biomass and help people switch to modern cooking fuels and technologies
is needed urgently.
The appropriate policy approach depends on local
circumstances such as per-capita incomes and the availability of a sustainable
biomass supply. Alternative fuels and technologies are already available at
reasonable cost. Halving the number of households using biomass for cooking
by 2015 – a recommendation of the UN Millennium Project – would involve
1.3 billion people switching to liquefied petroleum gas and other commercial
fuels. This would not have a significant impact on world oil demand and the
equipment would cost, at most, $1.5 billion per year. But vigorous and
concerted government action – with support from the industrialised countries
– is needed to achieve this target, together with increased funding from both
public and private sources. Policies would need to address barriers to access,
affordability and supply, and to form a central component of broader
development strategies.
Summary and Conclusions
11
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
329990_0014.png
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body which was established in
November 1974 within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) to implement an international energy programme.
It carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among twenty-six of the
OECD’s thirty member countries. The basic aims of the IEA are:
• to maintain and improve systems for coping with oil supply disruptions;
• to promote rational energy policies in a global context through co-operative relations
with non-member countries, industry and international organisations;
• to operate a permanent information system on the international oil market;
• to improve the world’s energy supply and demand structure by developing alternative
energy sources and increasing the efficiency of energy use;
• to assist in the integration of environmental and energy policies.
The IEA member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. The European
Commission takes part in the work of the IEA.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO- OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of thirty democracies work together
to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD
is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new
developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy
and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where
governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems,
identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD.
© OECD/IEA, 2006
No reproduction, copy, transmission or translation of this publication may be made
without written permission. Applications should be sent to:
International Energy Agency (IEA), Head of Publications Service,
9 rue de la Fédération, 75739 Paris Cedex 15, France.
 EPU, Alm.del - 2006-07 - Bilag 76: Materiale fra møde med Det Internationale Energiagentur den 30/11-06
329990_0015.png
The Online Bookshop
International Energy Agency
All IEA publications can be bought
online on the IEA Web site:
w w w. i e a . o r g / b o o k s
You can also obtain PDFs of
all IEA books at 20% discount.
Books published before January 2005
- with the exception of the statistics publications -
can be downloaded in PDF, free of charge,
from the IEA website.
IEA BOOKS
Tel: +33 (0)1 40 57 66 90
Fax: +33 (0)1 40 57 67 75
E-mail: [email protected]
International Energy Agency
9, rue de la Fédération
75739 Paris Cedex 15, France
CUSTOMERS IN
NORTH AMERICA
Turpin Distribution
The Bleachery
143 West Street, New Milford
Connecticut 06776, USA
Toll free: +1 (800) 456 6323
Fax: +1 (860) 350 0039
[email protected]
www.turpin-distribution.com
You can also send
your order
to your nearest
OECD sales point
or through
the OECD online
services:
www.oecdbookshop.org
CUSTOMERS IN
THE REST OF THE WORLD
Turpin Distribution Services Ltd
Stratton Business Park,
Pegasus Drive, Biggleswade,
Bedfordshire SG18 8QB, UK
Tel.: +44 (0) 1767 604960
Fax: +44 (0) 1767 604640
[email protected]
www.turpin-distribution.com