UM del - 2005-06 - Bilag 7: Rapport fra Detlev Mehlis Commissioner (UNIIIC): "Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Establiched Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005)".

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1.The Security Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7 April 2005, decided toestablish an international independent investigation Commission based in Lebanon toassist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the terrorist attackwhich took place on 14 February 2005 in Beirut that killed former Lebanese PrimeMinister Rafik Hariri and others, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors,organizers and accomplices.2.The Secretary-General notified the Council that the Commission began its fulloperations with effect from 16 June 2005. The Commission was granted an extension tothe initial period of investigation mandated by the Council, until 26 October 2005.3.During the course of its investigation, the Commission received extensivesupport from the Government of Lebanon and benefited from expert inputs from anumber of national and international entities.4.The main lines of investigation of the Commission focused on the crime scene,technical aspects of the crime, analysis of telephone intercepts, the testimony of morethan 500 witnesses and sources, as well as the institutional context in which the crimetook place.5.The full case file of the investigation was transmitted to the Lebaneseauthorities during October 2005.6.The present report sets out the main lines of enquiry of the investigationconducted by the Commission, its observations thereon, and its conclusions, for theconsideration of the Security Council. It also identifies those matters on which furtherinvestigation may be necessary.7.It is the Commission’s view that the assassination of 14 February 2005 wascarried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources andcapabilities. The crime had been prepared over the course of several months. For thispurpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitoredand the itineraries of his convoy recorded in detail.8.Building on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to dateand on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leadspursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrianinvolvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligencehad a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrianforces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanonwere their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the

Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult toenvisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carriedout without their knowledge.9.It is the Commission’s conclusion that the continuing investigation should becarried forward by the appropriate Lebanese judicial and security authorities, who haveproved during the investigation that with international assistance and support, they canmove ahead and at times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At thesame time, the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramificationsincluding bank transactions. The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearlyagainst the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could belinks between some, if not all, of them.10.The Commission is therefore of the view that a sustained effort on the part ofthe international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platformtogether with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential.This will considerably boost the trust of the Lebanese people in their security system,while building self-confidence in their capabilities.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, MID 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2005200426 August 2004, Rafik Hariri meets in Damascus with Syrian President BasharAssad to discuss the extension of the term of President Lahoud.2 September 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1559concerning the situation in the Middle East, calling for the withdrawal of allforeign forces from Lebanon.3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri bloc approves the extension law for PresidentLahoud.3 September 2004, the Lebanese parliament adopts the extension law forPresident Lahoud and forwards it to the Lebanese government for execution.7 September 2004, Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Culture Minister GhaziAridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat and Environment MinisterFares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet in protest at the constitutionalamendment.9 September 2004, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri indicates to journalists that he willresign.1 October 2004, Assassination attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri resigns as prime minister.11 October 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad delivers a speech condemninghis critics within Lebanon and the United Nations.19 October 2004, United Nations Security Council expresses concern thatresolution 1559 has not been implemented.20 October 2004, President Lahoud accepts Hariri’s resignation and names OmarKarame to form the new government.

200514 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and 22 other individuals are killed in a massiveblast in a seafront area of central Beirut.25 February 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission arrives in Lebanon.8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a one million strong “pro-Syrian” march.14 March 2005, a Christian/Sunni-led counter demonstration demands thewithdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of the security andintelligence services.19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in Jdeideh, a northern suburb of Beirut,wounding 11 people.23 March 2005, three people are killed and three others wounded in an explosionin the Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut.25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission issues its report in NewYork.26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb explodes in an industrial zone in northeastBeirut, injuring six.

1 April 2005, nine people are injured in an underground garage in an emptycommercial and residential building in Broumana.7 April 2005, the Security Council forms the United Nations InternationalIndependent Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and22 others on 14 February 2005.19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati announces thatparliamentary elections will be held on 30 May 2005.22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed, head of the Internal Security Forces andGeneral Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale, decide to put their functions atthe disposal of Prime Minister Najib al Makati.26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops leave Lebanon ending a 29 year militarypresence.26 April 2005, the United Nations Verification Mission starts its mission to verifythe complete withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence agents from Lebanonand its full compliance with the resolution 1559.6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in Jounieh north of Beirut injuring 29 people.7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to adopt the proposed changes to the electorallaw of 2000.30 May 2005, the first round of the elections was held. The Rafik Hariri MartyrList, a coalition of Saad Hariri's Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Partyand the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, won the majority of the seats in Parliament.2 June 2005, journalist Samir Kassir is killed when his car explodes in east Beirut.21 June 2005, former Lebanese Communist Party leader George Hawi is killedwhen his car explodes close to his home in Wata Musaytbeh.30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former finance minister under Rafik Hariri, formsthe new government composed of 23 ministers.12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias Murr is wounded and two other people arekilled in a car bomb attack in Beirut.22 July 2005, at least three people are wounded near rue Monot when a bombexplodes in the Ashrafieh quarter.22 August 2005, three persons are injured in an explosion in a garage near thePromenade Hotel in the Al-Zalqa area north of Beirut.16 September 2005, one person is killed and ten others wounded by a bomb near abank in Ashrafieh.19 September 2005, one person is killed and two wounded in a small explosion atthe Kuwaiti information office in Beirut.25 September 2005, a car bomb injures prominent news anchor, May Chidiac, innorth Beirut.

1.The present report details progress made in the implementation of SecurityCouncil resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on 7 April 2005, the SecurityCouncil, condemning the 14 February 2005 terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killedformer Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strictrespect of Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and notingthe conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided toestablish an international independent investigation Commission (hereafter called UNIIICor the Commission) to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspectsof this terrorist act, in order to, among other things, help identify its perpetrators,sponsors, organizers and accomplices.2.Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security Council had examined thereport of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March2005. The report reflected the outcome of a three-week enquiry, including a set ofrecommendations. The fact-finding mission was of the opinion that, since the credibilityof the Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was questioned, an internationalindependent investigation should be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a teamwith executive authority needed to be created, covering all the fields of expertise neededfor such an investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the factfinding mission was granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been ofconsiderable value to the Commission.3.In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the Government of Lebanonexpressed its approval of the Security Council’s decision to establish an internationalcommission of inquiry as well as its readiness to cooperate with the commission withinthe framework of Lebanese sovereignty and of its legal system.4.Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive consultations took placeregarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing and its logistical support. On 26 May2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut.Mindful of the urgency of the matter, from a temporary headquarters, the teamendeavored to create the support platform for its future work.5.On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the Lebanese judicialauthorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between theGovernment of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU detailed the modalities ofcooperation between the two parties. Of particular importance to the Commission was theagreement that “the Government of Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is freefrom interference in the conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessaryassistance to fulfill its mandate.” The Commission was to determine its own procedures,collect evidence, both documentary and physical, meet and interview any civilians or/andofficials it deemed necessary and have unrestricted access to all premises throughout theLebanese territory, taking into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The

Lebanese authorities, for their part, were to assist the Commission in its work byproviding all documentary and material evidence in their possession and by locatingwitnesses as requested by the Commission.6.On 16 June 2005, the Secretary-General declared the Commission operational. On17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the Commissioner to solicit publicly theassistance of the Lebanese authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to help theCommission by relaying any information which might be of interest to the investigation.Two hotlines were set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.7.Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese authorities transmitted to theCommission an 8000 page case docket containing all the information and evidencecollected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth, the Commission conducted a thoroughcriminal and judicial investigation in close cooperation with the relevant Lebanesejudicial (State General Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (InternalSecurity Forces) authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictorymeasures.8.The Commission established close links with the Lebanese security and judicialauthorities. Regular discussions were held, particularly with the judicial authorities, toexchange updated information and files, share results and plan for the emerging phases ofthe investigation. Most of the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summonedthrough the Lebanese judicial and security authorities. A case in point was the 30 August2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators closelycoordinated the house raid and search of former senior security officials, prior to theirtransfer under close escort to the Commission’s Main Operating Base (MOB) forinterviewing.9.The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in establishing the MOB, aswell as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work of the Commission. Lebanesesecurity teams (police and military) worked hand in hand with the Commission’s securityteam to ensure the safety and security of the staff and premises.10.Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive authority, theCommission to a large extent was supported by the Lebanese judicial and securityauthorities during search and raid operations. Moreover, although the Commission wasqualified to make proposals to the Lebanese authorities regarding the arrest of personsallegedly involved in the assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of theLebanese authorities to proceed with such actions.11.From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United Nations, has emerged acomplementary and unified investigation carried forward in tandem by the Commissionand the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese authorities have steadily shown the capacityto take increasing responsibility in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the factthat they took the initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.

12.Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the Lebanese people towards theirsecurity and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has become a source of great expectation andhope for change, as well as an “interface” between the Lebanese people and theirauthorities. The two press conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to theinterview of the first suspect, and the arrest of the former senior security officials at theCommission’s suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the eyes ofthe Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted Lebanese confidence. Morewitnesses came forward as the work of the Commission progressed. However, a numberof people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the Lebanese authorities.13.There are other points worth highlighting. First, a number of witnesses werefearful that they would be harmed if it were known publicly that they were cooperatingwith the Commission. For this reason, the Commission took great care to ensure thatwitness interviews were conducted in a confidential manner. Because the Commissioncredits the concern that these individuals have for their safety, this report will not revealthe identity of those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses oftenprovide information beyond the scope of the investigation being conducted. TheCommission has and will continue to forward to Lebanese authorities all informationrelated to any criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission’s investigation.Finally, the Commission interviewed people whose agenda was to point the Commissionnot in the direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the direction the particularindividual(s) wanted the Commission to go. The Commission dealt with theseindividuals and situations by remaining focused on its single mission – to follow theevidence wherever it might lead and not to follow the agenda of any particular person orentity.14.Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that, once UNIIIC hasdelivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be “left alone”. A prevailing fear isthat, in the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC’s work, and sooner rather than later,the Syrian security and intelligence services will be back, orchestrating a “revengecampaign” in a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements. Recentbombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have been carried out withimpunity; deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses have sustained this state ofmind and have deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC.15.Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer information as theCommission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25 October), it is fair to say thatthe Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come forward to help theCommission carry out its work.16.The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum, particularly in Lebanon.It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a dialogue inthe Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying above any challenging orprovocative statements. Both press conferences were aimed at countering suchspeculation and clarifying the status of the investigation. Inevitably, their effect wasshort-lived.

17.To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working with the judicialauthorities entailed keeping the highest political authorities abreast of developments inthe investigation, to the extent that such action did not call into question the independentnature of the Commission nor have a direct impact on the course of the investigation perse.18.During the course of its investigation, the Commission had to face majorlogistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive support and assistance of sisterorganizations of the United Nations system and Interpol were invaluable in the dailywork of the Commission.19.The international community, for its part, was always prompt, when asked, incoming forward with expertise. This assistance greatly facilitated the work of theCommission and gave added value to its work. However, although resolution 1595 calledon all States to provide the Commission with any relevant information pertaining to theHariri case, it is to be regretted that no Member State relayed useable information to theCommission. A number of contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or statements offacts. It is the Commission’s reading of the resolution that the pertinent informationenvisaged by the Security Council would have included among other things, intelligenceinformation that could have been submitted without any prior request from theCommission.20.Despite the human, technical and financial capacities mobilized for the purposeof the investigation, and although considerable progress has been made and significantresults achieved in the time allotted, the investigation of such a terrorist act with multi-faceted international dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if notyears) to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a potential trial of anyaccused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to continue to pursue the trail bothwithin and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is only part of a broader process.Even as this report is being written a significant arrest was made just a few days ago;witness interviews are continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.21.The Commission has established facts and identified suspects on the basis ofevidence gathered or available to it. The Commission has checked and examined thisevidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the investigation is completed, all new leadsand evidence are fully analyzed, and an independent and impartial prosecutionmechanism is set up, one cannot know the complete story of what happened, how ithappened and who is responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of22 other innocent people. Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.22.In producing this report the Commission has endeavored to ensure that nothing itdoes or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and any trials that mayfollow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements andfacts it has in its possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. TheCommission has tried to set forth the facts and to present the analysis of those facts in a

23.Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon. During the Ottoman Empire,the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall administrative territory governedfrom Damascus. When the countries were established in the aftermath of the First WorldWar, Lebanon was created from what many Arab nationalists considered to be rightfullypart of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became independent, they have never hadformal diplomatic relations.24.Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese President Suleiman Franjiehin May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil war. In the Taif Agreement, reachedamong members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the civil war in 1989,inter alia,Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying its forces in the Lebanon. Aprovision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria to determine jointly the futureredeployment of those forces. A later agreement reached between the two countries inMay of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that provision. Syrian forces withdrew inMay 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria25.The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon have longasserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful day-to-day and overallstrategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The apparent growing conflictbetween Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad,was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through interviewsand documents. A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26August 2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In that meeting, which allegedlylasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri, who was then PrimeMinister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would extend the term in office ofLebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. Hariri opposed.26.Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a meeting between Mr.Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem, provided the Commissionwith sharply differing versions of what was said in that meeting. A number of Lebanesewitnesses – including then former ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druzeleader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat, parliament memberBassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported that Mr. Hariri told them thatPresident Assad brusquely informed him of the decision to extend President Lahoud’sterm and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr. Hariri’s] head and WalidJumblat’s” if Mr. Hariri (and presumably Mr. Jumblat) did not agree to support theextension of President Lahoud’s term. Syrian officials characterized the meetingdifferently. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa and General Ghazali , head of Syrian

intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive terms. General Ghazali toldthe Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a“friend,” and described a cordial, respectful meeting in which President Assad consultedMr. Hariri on the matter.27.Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by the Commission regarding the26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to the Commission from Mr. Sharaa,and a portion of the transcript of a taped conversation between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-Moallem:Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, letter to the Commission of 17August 2005:“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad and late Prime Minister RafikAl-Hariri in Damascus on August 26th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoingpolitical consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A general reviewwas made of the local and regional developments, including the possible extension of themandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view of the troubled regionalconditions and based on the mutual interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri requested that in case a consensus regarding the mandate extension is reached inthe Council of Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to bettercooperate in the forthcoming period. The President requested Mr. Hariri to consult withhis group and with whom he deems suitable and to take the appropriate position.”Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to the Commission by letter of 17August 2005:“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date(26 August 2004)with Prime Minister Hariri.The first was in the morning of August 26th, 2004, on his way to Damascus to meetPresident Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was on his return trip fromDamascus to Beirut after meeting with President Bashar Assad in Damascus. The lattermeeting was also held in our office at Anjar.”(…)“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri) looked relaxed.Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting with President Bashar Assad was cordial andbrief. According to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we inSyria have always been dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister ofLebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister ofLebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently witnessed by this region, withLebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in the interest of Lebanon to maintainthe continuity of the regime by extending the term of office of President Lahoud. As afriend, we would like you to clarify your position regarding this matter. We are in nohurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think about it at your convenience.”Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:

“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and Mr. Berri were all invitedto go to Damascus in order to be informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’smandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to discuss it withPresident Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer should be “yes” before setting upany appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond positively because this wasa strategic matter for President Assad. Mr. Jumblat’s answer was negative. One hourlater, Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian Intelligence had cancelled hisappointment.In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr. Hariri. He said that R. Ghazaliinsisted that as long as his answer was not positive, he would not confirm hisappointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in his house (…) until furthernotice. The following day, he was called in for a short meeting.”(…)“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residencein Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri’s motorcadewas back by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty short. We sawMr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating. He told the four of us that PresidentLahoud was to be reelected or “he will have to pay a high price”. (…)He reportedPresident Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblat’s head.”Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me outof Lebanon, I will consider different options and will let you know. Either you are with usor against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President. I will make sure he is thePresident. I will wait for your answer. (…) Tell Walid Jumblat that if he has Druzepeople in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am ready to do anything.”Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I want to renew his mandate.(…) If Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to myhouse, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He was in a very bad position.”Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Haririalso told me, that President Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that votingagainst the extension would be considered as being directed against Syria. According toMr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case they, the Syrians, would “blow himup” and any of his family members and that they would find them anywhere in theworld.”Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:

“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with President Assad, I met him at WalidJumblat’s house.”(…)“He reported to us President Assad’s words who has put it bluntly: “I am personallyinterested in this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the matter with President Assad. He saidthat President Assad told him that the matter was not open for discussion, that it wasbound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He was extremely aggravated. Hetold me that for the sake of Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he willdo, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who could do anything.”Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri, the extension of President Lahoud’sterm. He told me that President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is what Iwant. If you think that President Chirac and you are going to run Lebanon, you aremistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I tell him, hefollows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break Lebanon over your head andWalid Jumblat’s.(…)So, you either do as you are told or we will get you and your familywherever you are.”Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al-Moallem on 1 February 2005:“In connection with the extension episode, he(President Assad)sent for me and met mefor 10 to 15 minutes.”(…)“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time hascome for you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did notask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister oras Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was totally flustered,at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”(…)“He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I havedecided to do this, don’t answer me, think and come back to me.””(…)“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us oragainst us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my bodyguard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”28.In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that he believed thatPresident Assad was being deliberately misinformed by the Syrian security services andMr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated excerpts of the meeting includethe following statements by Mr. Hariri:

29.During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the[security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, “Please do not takethings lightly.”30.The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem’s witness interview of20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1 February meeting as “friendly andconstructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the questions put to him.Syrian cooperation with the Commission31.The information set forth above, and the evidence collected by the Commission asdescribed in the section below entitledPlanning of the Assassination,point to thepossibility that Syrian officials were involved in the assassination of Mr. Hariri. Whenthe Commission attempted to get the cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuingthese lines of the investigation, the Commission was met with cooperation in form, notsubstance.32.The initial contact between the Commission and the Syrian authorities took placeon 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner sent a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister,requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian government. Mr. Sharaa repliedon 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government’s support for the investigation in generalterms. On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview several witnesses including thePresident of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 26 August, at the request of the Syriangovernment, a meeting took place between the Commissioner and a representative of theSyrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland. At that meeting, the Commissionerwas given a letter containing written statements of four witnesses. It was indicated thatPresident Assad would not be available for any interview. The Commissioner repeatedhis request for direct witness interviews and was told that the request was underconsideration but that President Assad would not be available to be interviewed.33.On 30 August the Commission sent another request to the Syrian ForeignMinister, requesting interviews of several additional witnesses and suspects in Syria. Theletter requested the support of the Syrian government to search the premises of thesuspects. On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa informed the Commission in writingthat while the Commission’s evidence was based on false testimony, his Governmentagreed that the persons listed in the Commission’s requests of 19 July and 30 August,except for President Assad, could be interviewed.34.On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews were discussed between theCommission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry. The Commissionexpressed its wish that the interviews should be held in a third country, neither Lebanon

nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian authorities insisted that the interviews takeplace in Syria with the participation of Syrian officials. The interviews took placebetween 20 and 23 September. Each interview was conducted in the presence of theLegal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or another representative of theForeign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and at times, an additional personwhose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the interview process, it was apparentthat the interviewees had given uniform answers to questions. Many of those answerswere contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by the UNIIIC from a variety ofother sources. The Commission has not had the opportunity to follow up on theseinterviews or pursue its investigation regarding a possible Syrian involvement in thecrime.35.The Commission has concluded that the Government of Syria’s lack ofsubstantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded the investigation and made itdifficult to follow leads established by the evidence collected from a variety of sources.If the investigation is to be completed, it is essential that the Government of Syria fullycooperate with the investigating authorities, including by allowing for interviews to beheld outside Syria and for interviewees not to be accompanied by Syrian officials.

Lebanese authorities in the period from the execution of the crime until UNIIIC wasestablished.Investigative Judge40.Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher was responsible for thecrime investigation during the period from 14 to 21 February 2005. On the latter date, adecision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the crime was a terrorist acttargeting the Republic, which led to the case being transferred to a new competent courtof jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon, the Justice Council. Aconsequence of this decision was that a new investigative judge was appointed to lead theinvestigation, Judge Michel Abou Arraj, the representative of the Prosecutor General’sOffice.41.Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an hour after the blast,accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor General’s Office. He hasdescribed the situation at the crime scene as a chaos. His first decisions were to appointthe Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, as the person in charge of thescene and to assign him the task of removing all dead bodies and wounded people fromthe scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter, to withdraw all people from the scene andclose it off(witness statement).42.At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with all the involved bodies,both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military, comprising in total 10 officers.During the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for the different bodies and gavefurther directions for the course of the investigation(witness statement).43.The representatives from the Internal Security Forces during the meeting were:General Aouar as the acting Commander of the Judicial Police and Head of the ForensicUnit, General Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut Police Force, General SalahEid as the responsible person for the blast site and Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman inthe capacity of the Head of the Information Division(witness statement).44.After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge Mezher returned to the crimescene for a second time. He was not satisfied with his observations at the crime scene,but hoped it should be better the next day since responsibilities had been distributed at theearlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of lack of equipment, means ofassistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack of communication between thevarious bodies involved, the directions from the Investigative Judge were not followedand he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the progress in the investigation(witness statement).45.During the period of his functions as Investigative Judge, Judge Mezhersummoned approximately 10 people to his office for interrogations, comprising stafffrom the St. George Hotel, Mr. Hariri’s close protection officers, the father and mother ofMr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in consultation with Judge Jean Fahd,

took the decision to request assistance from Switzerland regarding a forensic expert teamto assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation. When Judge Mezher left thefunction of Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no sustainable results had beenachieved in the investigation.46.The file was handed over to the new Investigative Judge, Judge Abou Arraj.Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the investigation from 22 February to 23March 2005. He was appointed by First Judge Tanios Khoury, at the Supreme Council,and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office on 22 February 2005(witness statement). Hisfirst opinions when reviewing the file, were that the crime had been a terrorist attack thatwould require a long period of time and extensive investigative measures to beundertaken, in addition to the application of substantial resources. In his opinion, all theinitial investigative measures had been performed in a professional and accurate way. Hewas surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He did not meet with Judge Mezher,but telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed(witness statement).47.During the period of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as the Investigative Judge, thefollowing measures were undertaken(compiled notes case file).Date22 February24 FebruaryMeasuresRecording of the lawsuitSecond Beirut Regional Detachment RecordInspection of St George’sA summary of all military writsSigning writs: Sûreté Générale , InternalSecurity Forces, State Security, IntelligenceThe writ of the of the Special CriminalInvestigation SectionInvestigations about the diggings in StGeorge’s areaThe writ of the Special CriminalInvestigation Section: Notifications.Affected persons

48.On 23 March 2005, Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from the post ofInvestigative Judge. The reason for this was the tense political atmosphere at thisparticular time: a lot of mistrust was being directed towards the Lebanese judiciary andcriticism being leveled at the manner of the investigation. In addition, while in charge ofthe Hariri investigation, he also had to discharge his normal functions. The case wascontaminated with political issues and during demonstrations in Beirut on 14 March2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical manner(witness statement).49.At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge, the only achievement in theinvestigation was the Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite attempts to focus on the modusoperandi of the explosion and to get all experts involved to come up with one consensusopinion(witness statement).50.Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative Judge Elias Eid, who as ofOctober 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.Internal Security Forces51.On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the Head of the Internal SecurityForces (ISF). He was promoted to the post in November 2004, allegedly appointed bythe Syrians, he stepped down from the post during spring 2005 in the aftermath of theblast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was at his office when he wasalerted about the blast. He immediately went to the crime scene by car. During the ride hecalled General Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services and Operations Division withinISF, who told him that it was a huge blast. General Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Khoury tosend all responsible units to the scene. The units comprised the Forensic Unit under thecommand of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit under the command of GeneralAbdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the Investigation Unit under the command of LieutenantColonel Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility, to provide sufficient resources.After the arrival of the Investigative Judge, all ISF staff was under the command of theJudge and General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the investigation(witness statement).

52.In his opinion, the problems at the scene were related to the presence of too manydifferent agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State Security and Public Security.53.Later that afternoon, General Al-Hajj joined a meeting with the Higher DefenceCouncil at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was chaired by the President. Otherparticipants were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Minister ofForeign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy, the Deputy PrimeMinister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of Beirut and Commanders from thevarious security agencies. The meeting discussed the subject matter of the crime, itsreferral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications of the crime.54.After the meeting General Al-Hajj returned to his office: soon thereafter the Al-Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad Abu Adass claimedresponsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr. Hariri. From that time all available ISFresources, except those occupied with the crime scene work, were focused on the AbuAdass track.Military Intelligence55.On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the Head of MilitaryIntelligence. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped down duringspring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to hisstatement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel Mohamed Fehmi, Head of theMilitary Security Branch. He did not go to the crime scene, but followed the case indetail from his office, together with Colonel Albert Karam, the Chief of BeirutIntelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and General Ghazali about the blastat the time of its occurrence(witness statement).56.Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly specialists in the field of explosives)visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the examination. They confirmed thatthe type of explosives used were TNT and the estimated amount to be some 300kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was handed over later to the ISF(General Hisham Aouar) and to General Azar’s knowledge there were some metalfragments and a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF, but also the ProsecutorGeneral’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had the overall responsibility for the crimeinvestigation.57.In the afternoon of 14 February 2005, General Azar attended the meeting at theHigher Defence Council. At the meeting, a presentation was made about theassassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that were available at that time. Eachparticipant presented his own point of view.58.At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to focus on three elements:The videotape of Ahmad Abu AdassThe cellular communications that took place in the area of the explosion

Sûreté Générale59.On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed was the Head of theSûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped downduring spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to hisstatement, he was at his office when he heard the blast, but thought that the noise was aresult of Israeli air fighters passing through the sound barrier. Somewhere between 1315and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed him of the blast and that Mr.Hariri’s motorcade had been the target. He stayed at his office and no one from the SûretéGénérale was sent to the scene. He called the President, the Minister of the Interior andGeneral Ghazali.60.Later that afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the meeting at the HigherDefence Council. The meeting was focused on the consequences in the near future on theground. The suggestions were submitted to the Government, which had a meeting laterthe same evening.61.On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, he got a phone call from a journalistfrom Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up the Abu Adass videotape. Thetape was brought to him 16 February 2005. He made a copy and sent the original to theInvestigative Judge Abou Arraj.Crime Scene InvestigationISF Report62.As with any similar criminal case, prompt examination of the crime scene and itssurroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome of the investigation. Theofficer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the sceneat 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has issued a report dated 3 March 2005, on thecrime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese authorities (General Directorate ofInternal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.: 95) stating the following:“On implementation of investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court inBeirut regarding the investigations and anything that can throw light on the enquiry into the explosionwhich caused the death of former Prime Minister Hariri and others.Record: Investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court in BeirutNo23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.Order from the General Department of Referrals No 207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion took place in Beirut which the operations roomreported as being close to the St. George Hotel. All patrols were ordered to go to the scene. I proceededthere and arrived within a few minutes. Cars on both sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and therewas a lot of smoke. Civil defense, fire brigade and Red Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took actionto put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security

and military personnel were mixed with civilians, firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaperjournalists and the media were all eager to get to the scene. I ordered all the officers and police officers andpatrols to do everything necessary to maintain security corridors and to take the requisite measures tosafeguard the scene of the crime and keep away onlookers and made the commander of the second Beirutregional secretariat responsible for implementation.The preliminary indications are that the explosion took place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri butthe outcome is not yet know.Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts began their work.In addition to political and security officers, there came to the scene a Government commissioner from theMilitary Court with some support staff; and Rasheed Mezher, the first investigating judge from the MilitaryCourt in Beirut, who orally delegated me, in my capacity as officer in charge of the police during theabsence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on a mission abroad, or whoever I should see fit,to undertake the investigations and anything that could throw light on that explosion and to duly informhim. The oral authorization would be followed up in writing.As soon as the General Director of Internal Security arrived at the scene, I informed him of all the above.In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation of authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid toundertake the necessary investigative procedures in his capacity as the commander of the second Beirutregional secretariat, within the remit of which the explosion took place, and to keep me informed.The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the wounded to hospital continued, as did the work ofpersonnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the explosive experts. A complete sweep was made ofthe scene and the surroundings. A team of engineers from the Lebanese Army came and took samples fromthe scene in order to carry out tests thereupon. An army detachment carried out a search of the site andbuildings and assisted in imposing a security cordon.In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to theleadership of the regional police unit and to police unit commanders in which we asked that all thenecessary investigations should be carried out within the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses thathad been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order to permit their relatives to identify them and dulyinform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of the relevant authorities for the return to theirrelatives of those corpses. Depositions were to be taken from the wounded and a copy deposited in the fileof the overall investigation, through the Al- Burj squad.Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005, sent to unit departments regarding the isolationof the scene of the crime and establishment of a security cordon around it, we ordered the commander ofthe second Beirut regional secretariat to use whatever personnel were necessary to perform those tasks andto place metal barricades and yellow tape around the scene and, in coordination with the commander of thetraffic secretariat, to ensure the flow of traffic.Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed thefirst investigating judge from the Military Court. The corpses were handed over to their relatives inaccordance with legal principles.On the instructions of the first investigating judge of the Military Court, and with the approval of theGeneral Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Heloubarracks, once they had been photographed in situ and a video recording had been made in the presence ofthe commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, the commander of the second Beirut traffic squad,the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a squad of criminal investigators, and using the lightsprovided by the civil defense, in accordance with report No. 144/302 dated 14 February 2005. They weredeposited in the Helou barracks.

In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to the commander of the emergency services, werequested that they should be safeguarded and that no-one should be allowed to touch them.At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi, the commander of the Beirut police unit,reported and assumed his command. He informed me of all the procedures that had been taken and allincidents that had occurred, and we followed up the process of the investigation being undertaken by MajorSalah Eid. We then duly informed the first investigating judge of the Military Court of the same.Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005, the unit commander transferred to us the writtendelegation of authority issued by the first investigating judge of the Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated 14February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was transmitted to us for implementation by the GeneralDirectorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant No. 206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, writtenauthorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to keep thecars from the Hariri motorcade inside the barracks, cover them with tents and place them under guard,which was done.In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18 February 2005, The first investigating judge of theMilitary Court have us written authorization Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an orderto contact the Governor of Beirut, who should supply us with the names of those recently working at aworkshop at the site of the explosion. The aforementioned authority was carried out by means of adocument of 14 pages which is attached.Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred to above; on the basis of the order to the commander ofthe second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the investigation; and as a result of the first report, No.302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the investigations arranged by the units in the police unit and theregional police unit, we hereby submit the following:Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses that have been returned to their relatives.Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons injured by this explosion.Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made concerning the explosion.A table has been prepared showing the measures that were taken: an examination of the scene of the crime;articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person at the site of the explosion and the failure to findhim.All those procedures have been verified in report No. 302/1 dated 14 February 2005”.

Swiss Forensic Report63.The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene examination, representing avariety of different agencies, came up with different opinions on the findings and resultsof the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a meeting at the Military Courtin the presence of the Prosecutor General(witness statement). The meeting led to a request fromthe Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance in examining the crime scene, which wasdirected to the Government of Switzerland. A Swiss forensic expert team visited Lebanonin March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation. The team’s final report stated(excerpt):“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under ground are based upon the following examinations:Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size and shape of fragmentsInterpretations based on size and shape of crater

(…)Concerning the fact that the charge was possibly placed in a car, it must have been of larger size. If such avehicle has been used we expect some big fragments (e.g. from the frame) of the vehicle close to the centerof the explosion.The grade of damage of the metal fragments which were shown to us by the police (said to be originated ofa Mitsubishi Canter) is consistent with fragments we would expect if such a vehicle was located in thecenter of the explosion.(…)After having conducted all the analysis and discussions of the facts we have collected, we came to theconclusion that it was most likely an explosion above ground.According to this finding we estimate an amount of 1000kg of high explosive.The unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis of a soil sample of the crater showedTrinitrotoleune (TNT) as explosive charge”.

Rifi Report64.In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General Ashraf Rifi, prepared areport on the initial measures undertaken by the competent Lebanese authorities on thescene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN Fact Finding Mission. The reportconcluded (excerpt):“II.Measures taken:The importance of this tragic event that led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri hadan effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.A.Rescue and evacuation operations and find of bodies:In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, security, military and civil defense organs as well as the RedCross rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties. In spite of all the measures taken, these were,unfortunately, not up to the level that would save the face of these organs. These measures were flawed.Therefore, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25 February2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the Internal Security Forces to investigate the deeds andactions. Based on the results, he suggested the dismissal of both the General, Chief of Beirut Police and theGeneral, Chief of the Judicial Police.B.Preservation of the crime scene:Immediately after the explosion happened, the military investigating judge was put in charge of theinvestigation. Al the security and judicial police personnel were put at his disposal. He gave rogatorycommissions and stipulated the kind of measures to be carried out, especially the preservation of the crime

scene. However, the measures taken were below the required level and contrary to the obviousfundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this one or even less serious crimes are investigated, inwhich case, strict measures ought to be taken in order to prevent any tampering with the crime scene or anyclues that could be used as criminal evidence to help in the investigation and uncover the truth. This couldhave been carried out without neglecting the humanitarian aspect of the tasks to be implemented, i.e. givingpriority to finding the victims and the injured, providing the latter with the first aid in order to save them.Serious mistakes were recorded in this regard:There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not only during the first few hours following theexplosion, during which much focus is on extinguishing the fire, saving the injured and lookingfor the missing, but regrettably and unnecessarily for a much longer time.b) There was no coordination between all the security organs present on the crime scene.c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way.Some were later found by accident or by their families. The following controversial elementswere recorded:The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was found on 15 March 2005.According to the medical examiner, the victim had survived the explosion forapproximately 12 hours.The body of one of the victims was found by coincidence 8 days after the explosion.The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeni, a Lebanese citizen, was found 16 days after theexplosion by his family and not the judicial or civil defense officers.The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he is still missing. It is feared thatfinding his body would constitute yet another scandal.a)

d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around 2300 hrs, major evidence was removed fromthe crime scene. The convoy cars of the late former Prime Minister were transferred to HelouBarracks under the pretext of preserving them although what was left of the cars did not justifytheir preservation except for their value as criminal evidence because they were the target of theexplosion. This was not the only instance bearing proof of the tampering with the crime scene. ABMW car that was not part of the convoy was also removed whereas focus should have been onnot removing any cars and maintaining them the way they rested after the explosion in order todetermine how the crime was committed.e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on the day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, inthe evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the Minister of Interior and Municipalities gotknowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and preserve the crime scene as it was.C.The conduct of the investigation, its conditions and the determination of how the crime wascommitted:a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made in the course of conducting theinvestigation, among which the leaking of information that created confusion. This in turncompromised the trustworthiness of the local investigation.(….)III.a)(….)ResponsibilitiesResponsibility for a tragic crime such as the one we are dealing with cannot be limited to oneaspect. As mentioned above, it encompasses the political, judicial and security aspects.

there was a collective will to perform a professional crime scene examination in order totrack down the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The confusion, reflected in thevariety of statements from the officials most closely involved, speaks for itself.Investigative Judge Mezher66.At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher was at his home, when he got a phonecall from General Naji Mulaeb, who informed the Judge that the representatives from thevarious agencies at the crime scene had started collecting pieces of metal from themotorcade vehicles in order to perform their own further forensic examinations. Therewas nothing General Mulaeb could do to stop them. He suggested that the motorcadevehicles be removed to a safe place and proposed the Helou barracks in Beirut. JudgeMezher agreed to the proposal under the following conditions. The vehicles should befilmed on the spot, they should be marked and numbered: they should also be filmedduring the transportation and again upon arrival at the Helou barracks, where they shouldbe covered and guarded around the clock in order to avoid any tampering with evidence.Judge Mezher had no information about a decision to fill the crater and reopen the street(witness statement). The vehicles were moved from the crime scene during the night of 14February.General Jamil Al-Sayyed67.On the morning of 15 February 2005, General Al-Sayyed read in the newspaperabout the removal of the motorcade vehicles. At 0800 hrs, he called General Ali Al-Hajj, the Head of the ISF and asked what was going on. General Al-Hajj replied thattwo teams were working on clearing the road which would be reopened at 1000 hrs. Inresponse to a direct question, General Al-Hajj stated that the orders came from MustaphaHamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard(witness statement).General Ali Al-Hajj68.On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr. Saddik received a telephone call at hisoffice, (where he was with General Hisham Aouar) from the Director General of thePublic Works Ministry, Mr. Fadi Nammar. Mr. Nammar told him that a decision hadbeen taken to re-open the road the next day and that his staff were ready to start workingat sunrise the next morning. The call was on the landline and was overheard by GeneralAouar. He claimed to be surprised about the telephone call because Mr. Nammar had nojurisdiction in the matter. It was publicly recognized that Fadi Nammar was very close tothe Republican Palace, which meant that he was taking his orders from there. Mr.Nammar alleged that he had cleared the matter with the Investigative Judge. He calledthe acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, and informed him about the callfrom Mr. Nammar and asked him to check with Judge Mezher whether he was aware ofthis decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who was aware of the decision to re-open the road and had no objection. General Mulaeb then asked what should be donewith the vehicles. Judge Mezher replied that they should be brought to a secure place andproposed the Helou Barracks(witness statement).

69.The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. Nammar met with the Governor ofBeirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to arrange for the re-opening of the Minae Al-HosnStreet. Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace and he was also aware of thedecision(witness statement).General Hisham Aouar70.With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General Aouar indicated that he didnot know who gave the order. He was asked to assist in the filming of the removal of themotorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with the Investigative Judge, butnothing else was mentioned about the removal of the motorcade vehicles from the crimescene. On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs, he was at the office of the ISFGeneral Director, General Ali Al-Hajj, and he told him that the cars were going to beremoved. He also told him that the ISF had to provide assistance by marking the locationsof the vehicles and their filming(witness statement).Director General Fadi Nammar71.Mr. Nammar did not remember whether General Al-Hajj telephoned him on 14February 2005, but he remembered his calling General Al-Hajj the next day, as healways did in similar situations. At the time of the telephone call, he was at the office ofthe Governor of Beirut. He told General Al-Hajj that they were prepared, if needed, tooffer help. General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General working for ISF, who told himthat there was a survey going on at the crime scene. The General stated he would comeback to Mr. Nammar in due course. Mr. Nammar did not recall the name of the General,but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no authority to decide to open roads in Beirut and he didnot give any orders to remove the motorcade vehicles. He also denied any contacts to theRepublican Palace(witness statement).72.Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists) that General Ali Al-Hajjmade the telephone call from his landline to Mr. Nammar’s mobile phone on the eveningof 14 February 2005. It was also confirmed that Mr. Nammar made the telephone call toGeneral Al-Hajj the following day(witness statement).The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoob Sarraf73.According to his statement he did not give any instructions. The Army and thePolice took over. He had telephone contact with Mr. Fadi Nammar on 14 February 2005.Acting Commander of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb74.Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005, General Mulaeb received atelephone call at his office from General Ali Al-Hajj who ordered General Mulaeb totransfer the convoy vehicles from the crime scene and secure them in a safe place, on theunderstanding that within two days the road would be re-opened. If experts wanted to

come and inspect the vehicles, they would be available. General Mulaeb was surprisedby this order and did not accept it. He told General Al-Hajj that he had nothing to dowith the crime scene, since the site was under the authority of Judge Mezher. GeneralAl-Hajj told General Mulaeb to contact the Judge, which he did. The Judge was alsosurprised and asked the reason for the hurry. General Mulaeb told him that he receivedhis orders from General Al-Hajj and that he was surprised as well. The Judge told him togive him some time and that he would call back. After a while, between 10 and 30minutes, the Judge called back and said that the cars could be transferred(witness statement).General Mustapha Hamdan75.After the blast on 14 February 2005, General Hamdan took all necessarymeasures to protect the President and the Presidential areas. He did not recall any details,but he did not go to the scene of the blast. He did not issue any orders or directivesregarding the activities at the crime scene, since it did not fall within his responsibilities.Thus, he had nothing to do with any orders to clean the street, to fill the crater or toremove the motorcade vehicles(witness statement).Head of Internal Security Forces, General Ashraf Rifi76.In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General Rifi stated that the person whogave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the crime scene to fill the hole causedby the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who at the time of the incident wasthe Commander of President Lahoud’s security detail and therefore by Lebanese law hadnothing to do with issues related to crime scene investigation(witness statement).Lebanese Investigation: Ahmad Abu Adass77.At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005, barely an hour after theexplosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received an anonymous telephone call from a manwith an accent that was not Lebanese but which she could not identify. According to Ms.Bassam, as soon as she answered the call, the man directed her to “[w]rite this down,”told her to be quiet, and then read the following statement in classical Arabic:“We,al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham,declare that we have meted out duepunishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so that he may be an example to others.”The caller concluded with an Islamic religious saying and then hung up.78.Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of Al-Jazeera, recalls receivingfour telephone calls that day related to the same claim of responsibility. In the firsttelephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as speaking poor Arabic in anAfrican, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed thatAl-Nasra wal Jihadwas responsible forMr. Hariri’s execution by a suicide bomb. Shortly thereafter, Al-Jazeera informed the

public about this claim of responsibility.1Al-Jazeera next received a call from anotheranonymous person claiming to be from the same group, this time a fluent Arabic speaker,who explained where Ben Jeddou and his colleagues could locate a videocassettecontaining further information about the assassination -- namely, in a tree near theESCWA building in downtown Beirut -- and directing them to fetch the tape within 15minutes. Mr. Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the videocassette. Eventually, awhite envelope containing a type-written detailed statement and a videocassette wasfound. After more calls from the same group asking why the tape had not yet been aired,Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that afternoon.79.The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be from the Nasra and JihadGroup of Greater Syria, states in part:“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra and Jihad is victorious in GreaterSyria, and with God’s blessings the agent of the infidels in Mecca and Medina,Rafik Hariri, has been meted out his due punishment through a suicide operationexecuted by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass bearing the banner of Nasra andJihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14 February 2005, the 5thof Muhurram 1426according to the Islamic Calendar, in Beirut. …. Attached is film recording of themartyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor of the operation.”In the tape, an individual identifying himself asphraseology.Mr. Abu Adass, uses similar

80.Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese authorities had acquired extensiveinformation about Mr. Abu Adass’s background and began questioning his family andassociates. Much of this information apparently came from Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, ofAl-Ahbash, an Islamic group active in the area of the Palestinian camps where Mr. AbuAdass had reportedly lived. Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to UNIIIC that he received atelephone call from the presidential palace shortly after the airing of the Abu Adassvideo, enquiring whether Abdel-Al had any information about Mr. Abu Adass.According to Mr. Abdel-Al, he obtained information about Mr. Abu Adass’s background,including his address, the fact that he often went to Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi,that he was well-educated, had probably studied computer science, and that he visitedAbu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham). Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained thenames of Mr. Abu Adass’ family and friends: he sent this information by facsimile toPresident Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea Jamea, and Maher al Toufeily.Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly also met with Syrian intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, onthe evening of 14 February 2005 and gave him the information about Mr. Abu Adass,which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed to the ISF.81.The ISF visited Abu Abass’ house, accompanied by a member of Al-Ahbash, andseized a computer, as well as a number of compact disks which were primarily of a1

fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on the search noted that most of thedocuments stored on the computer were downloaded from the internet, there was noindication that Mr. Abu Adass’ home had internet access. Many of Mr. Abu Adass’friends and relatives were interviewed extensively by the authorities (including by theISF and military intelligence) in the days immediately following the explosion. Mr. AbuAdass himself, however, could not be located. On the day of the explosion 10 peoplewere questioned and over the course of next two months approximately 40 people wereinterviewed. The Lebanese investigation further revealed that Mr. Abu Adass had beenemployed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which was owned in part by SheikhAhmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed Miqati and Ismaíl Al-Khatib network.82.In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General Sayyed to Judge Mezher,General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas,who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite participant in the assassination.” Theonly basis provided for this conclusion was the statement that “[t]he way in which hedelivers the statement and shows himself without any covering over his face is themanner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The fact that he did not conceal hisface while making the statement indicates that he must have been personally responsiblefor setting off the explosion.” (Information About Facts Relating to the Broadcast onAl-Jazeeraof a Videotape Claiming Responsibility, No. 606/A’A, 17 February 2005)Australian Investigation83.On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the Australian Federal Policefrom the Prosecutor General requesting that six individuals be arrested as suspects forparticipating in the Hariri assassination.The responsible ISF official at BeirutInternational Airport, informed ISF General Al-Hajj about these six individuals. GeneralAl-Hajj transmitted this information directly to Prosecutor General, Judge RabiaKaddoura, who contacted the Australian authorities. The Australian investigationabsolved these six suspects of any involvement in this crime, a position with which theLebanese authorities in charge of the investigation agreed.84.The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities based their suspicion on thefollowing factors:a) The six persons of interest departed from Beirut International Airport one and ahalf hours after the bombing occurred;b) The six persons had no luggage; andc) One of the six persons bore a resemblance to Mr. Abu Adass, who was depictedin a video of an extremist group that had claimed responsibility for the bombing.85.The Australian authorities executed an extensive investigation to assist theLebanese authorities. The investigation included raising airport alerts, interviews of thesix individuals and other members of the group, explosive residual swabbing (includingthe individuals, their airplane seating, and their luggage), and examining the aircraft forpossible explosives. Although it was reported that the six persons identified as

Overview87.UNIIIC was declared operational by the Secretary General on 16 June 2005.From 16 June to 6 October 2005, 244 witness statements, 293 investigator’s notes and 22suspect statements have been issued. A number of searches have been conducted and 453crime scene exhibits have been seized. A total of 16,711 pages of documents have beenproduced. Thirty investigators from 17 different nations have been involved in theUNIIIC investigative measures, as well as external experts.88.At the outset, the time factor affecting the Commission has to be emphasized.UNIIIC was declared operational four months after the actual crime, which means thatthe perpetrators and their accomplices have had plenty of time to destroy evidence and/orto collude with each other, the ability to recall of potential witnesses has been diminished,and previous omissions and inadvertent or deliberate loss and destruction of evidencecould not be undone.89.The first month after the Secretary-General declared UNIIIC operational wasfocused on updating the investigators on the current status of the investigation, includingan assessment of measures undertaken by the Lebanese authorities. Much time was spenton analysis of material handed over to the Commission by the Prosecutor General,followed by interviews for clarification with key witnesses, based on written materials onthe following topics:Reconstruction of actions and whereabouts of Mr. Hariri prior to the blast.Findings and results from activities by the Lebanese authoritiesundertaken at the crime scene and adjacent areas.Tampering with evidence.Road works at the scene prior to the blast.The Abu Adass trackThe Mitsubishi Canter vanCollection and analysis of telephone listsCollection and analysis of CCTV-material, videos and photos collectedfrom a diversity set of possessors depicting the scene prior to and after theblast.

90.These measures in turn led to new witnesses. A public information “hot line” wasinstalled on which anybody could approach the Commission about the case: this measureresulted in several new interviews and new clues that needed to be followed up.91.The compilation and organization of files and evidence was time-consuming,involving maintaining and improving the system for storing and recording evidence,which includes thousands of pages of documents and written testimonies, as well asnumerous videos and photographs. Legal issues highlighted the need for research intoLebanese criminal law and procedure in order to ensure the proper protocols for searches,arrests, suspect interviews, and charging documents. The Lebanese authorities’ assistancein these matters was very praiseworthy.92.The second month was characterized by a change in investigative directions andpriorities, in the sense that investigators followed up new clues and tracked down newwitnesses based on their conclusions from previous measures and professional analysis.Many different sources approached the Commission and provided the investigation withuseful information. The vast majority of senior officials in the involved Lebaneseauthorities were interviewed to clarify the allotment of competencies, chains-of-command, and their extent of involvement, as well as decisions taken (or which wereneglected). During this period of time the support base of the Commission wasreinforced and new software programmes were installed, which made the data-base moreoperational.93.During the third month, a full scale crime scene examination was conducted by ajoint Dutch / British / Japanese expert team at the site itself and in adjacent areas,including the sea floor adjacent to the scene of the blast. The aim of this operation was tofind physical evidence at the crime scene, to reconstruct the improvised explosive device(IED) used and to identify the Mitsubishi Canter van. The operation was accomplishedinsituduring September.Planning of the Assassination94.During all measures and efforts undertaken by the UNIIIC, no new hard leads ortraces regarding the motive and reason for assassinating Mr. Hariri have emerged tosupplement those which can be attributed to events during the second half of 2004 whichculminated in Mr. Hariri’s decision to step down as the Prime Minister and the prognosisof the outcome of the general elections in Lebanon. Strong indicators on the latter matterare the massive Future Party election campaign; the Lebanese authorities’ reaction on theolive oil affair, in February 2005, where the distributors were arrested (by the Lebaneseauthorities while distributing free olive at the behest of Mr. Hariri)(investigator notes): and lastbut not least the factual outcome of the elections. New witnesses have approached theCommission who were reluctant to have any contacts with the Lebanese authorities dueto lack of confidence, stating that the assassination of the former Prime Minister could

96.One witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon, who claims to have workedfor the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, has stated that approximately two weeksafter the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559, senior Lebanese and Syrianofficials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. He claimed that a senior Lebanese securityofficial went several times to Syria to plan the crime, meeting once at the Meridian Hotelin Damascus and several times at the Presidential Place and the office of a senior Syriansecurity official. The last meeting was held in the house of the same senior Syriansecurity official approximately seven to 10 days before the assassination and includedanother senior Lebanese security official. The witness had close contact with high rankedSyrian officers posted in Lebanon.97.At the beginning of January 2005, one of the high ranked officers told the witnessthat Rafik Hariri was a big problem to Syria. Approximately a month later the officer toldthe witness that there soon would be an “earthquake” that would re-write the history ofLebanon.98.The witness visited several Syrian military bases in Lebanon. At one such base, inHammana, he observed a white Mitsubishi van, with a white tarpaulin over the flatbed.The observations were made on 11, 12 and 13 February 2005. The Mitsubishi left theMilitary base in Hammana on the morning of 14 February 2005. The Mitsubishi Cantervan, which was used as the bomb carrier, entered Lebanon from Syria through the Bekaaborder and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005, at 1320 hrs. It was driven by a SyrianColonel from the Army Tenth Division.99.On 13 February 2005, the witness drove one of the Syrian officers to the St.George area in Beirut on a reconnaissance exercise, as he subsequently understood it tohave been after the assassination took place.100. Regarding Mr. Abu Adass, the witness has stated that he played no role in thecrime except as a decoy. He was detained in Syria and forced at gunpoint to record thevideo tape. Subsequently, he was killed in Syria. The videotape was sent to Beirut on themorning of 14 February 2005, and handed over to Jamil Al Sayyed. A civilian with acriminal record and an officer from the Sûreté Générale were tasked with putting the tapesomewhere in Hamra and then calling Ghassan Ben Jeddo, an Al-Jazeera TV reporter.101. General Jamil Al-Sayyed, according to the witness, cooperated closely withGeneral Mustapha Hamdan and General Raymond Azar in the preparation of theassassination of Mr. Hariri. He also coordinated with General Ghazali (and, amongothers, people from Mr. Ahmad Jibreel in Lebanon). General Hamdan and General Azarprovided logistical support, providing money, telephones, cars, walkie-talkies, pagers,weapons, ID-cards etc. Those who knew of the crime in advance were among others,Nasser Kandil and General Ali Al-Hajj.102. Fifteen minutes before the assassination, the witness was in the vicinity of the St.George area. He received a telephone call from one of the senior Syrian officers, who

asked the witness where he was. When he answered, he got the advice to leave the areaimmediately.103. Another witness approached the Commission and stated that he had met withGeneral Hamdan in the middle of October 2004. General Hamdan talked very negativelyabout Mr. Hariri accusing him of being pro-Israeli. General Hamdan ended theconversation by stating: “We are going to send him on a trip, bye, bye Hariri”. After theassassination, the witness was strongly reminded not to discuss this conversation withanyone.104. Another “witness” who later became a suspect, Zuhir Ibn Mohamed Said Saddik,has given detailed information to the Commission about the crime, in particular insofar asthe planning phase is concerned. Paragraphs 105 to 110 set out the main points of Mr.Saddik’s statement.105. One of the main issues raised in Mr. Saddik’s statement was a report that he saidwas drafted by Nasser Kandil. This report stated that Mr. Hariri and Marwan Hamadehhad a meeting in Sardinia. At the end of the report Kandil stated that a decision should betaken to eliminate Mr. Hariri. Nasser Kandil was tasked to plan and implement acampaign aiming at ruining Mr. Hariri’s reputation on religious and media level. TheBaath Party in Lebanon decided that they should get rid of Mr. Hariri by any possiblemeans and isolate him since President Lahoud’s attempt to remove him from the politicalscene failed.106. Mr. Saddik stated that the decision to assassinate Mr. Hariri had been taken inSyria, followed by clandestine meetings in Lebanon between senior Lebanese and Syrianofficers, who had been designated to plan and pave the way for the execution of theassault. These meetings started in July 2004 and lasted until December 2004. The sevensenior Syrian officials and four senior Lebanese officials were alleged to have beeninvolved in the plot.107. Planning meetings started in Mr. Saddik’s apartment in Khaldeh and weresubsequently moved to an apartment in Al-Dahiyye, a district of Beirut. Some of theseindividuals visited the area around the St. George Hotel under different guises and atdifferent times for planning and preparation purposes of the assassination.108. Mr. Saddik also gave information about the Mitsubishi itself and that the drivereventually assigned had been an Iraqi individual who had been led to believe that thetarget was Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (who happened to be in Beirut prior to theassassination).109. Mr. Saddik had been informed that TNT and some special explosives had beenused in order to direct suspicions towards extremist Islamic groups, as these kinds ofexplosive had only been used in operations in Iraq.

110. A trip by Mr. Saddik with Abdel-Kareem Abbas led to a camp in Zabadane. Al-Saddik claimed to have seen the Mitsubishi Canter van in this camp: mechanics wereworking on it and emptying the sides. The sides of the car’s flatbed, as well as the doorsof the Mitsubishi had been widened and filled with explosives, which had also been putunderneath the driver’s seat. In the camp he had seen a young man whom he had beenable to identify as Mr. Abu Adass after seeing the video on TV on 14 February 2005.111. On 30 August 2005, the Commission sent an official letter to Syria with questionsregarding the Zabadane camp. The answer was handed over personally to theCommissioner in New York, confirming the existence of the camp but denying it to beused for any other purposes than juvenile educational activities. However, from otherinformation given to the Commission, there are strong indications of activities within thecamp during the period, 5-9 September 2005, geared towards changing the features andoperations within the premises. Satellite pictures also show high walls and watch towersin the area.112. On 26 September 2005, investigators of UNIIIC had a meeting with Mr. Saddik.On 27 September, Mr. Saddik confessed in a handwritten document that he hadparticipated in the immediate planning phase before the assassination (January andFebruary 2005) and that he was acting as a driver for several of the above-mentionedsuspects during the entire day of 14 February.113. Consequently, on 13 October 2005, on the suggestion of the Commission, theLebanese Prosecutor-General issued an arrest warrant concerning Mr. Saddik, which ledto his arrest on 16 October.114. At the present stage of investigation, a certain amount of information given byMr. Saddik cannot be confirmed through other evidence.115. The wife of Mr. Saddik has confirmed that, during the period July to December2004, her husband met a huge group of people on several occasions in their home inKhaldeh as at other locations. He did not want her to be present, since these peoplewished not to be identified. She has also confirmed visits at their home by and DhaferAl-Yussef, in the company of three other men unknown to her.116. The fact that Mr. Saddik implicates himself in the assassination, which ultimatelyled to his arrest, adds to his credibility.117. Other witnesses have informed the Commission that the day before theassassination of Mr. Hariri, the late chief of Mr. Hariri’s close protection (Mr. Yehya Al-Arab alias Abu Tareq) had a meeting with General Ghazali. It seemed that Mr. Al-Arabwas badly shaken up by that meeting. Instead of reporting immediately to Mr. Hariri asusual, he went to his house, turned off his phone and stayed there for a few hours. Theversion given by General Ghazali of this meeting is not compatible with the informationgiven by other witnesses to the Commission.

Other elements to be considered118. Some other circumstances to be kept in mind regarding the planning phase of thecrime are the surveillance measures targeting Mr. Hariri undertaken by the ISF and thewiretapping of Mr. Hariri’s telephones by the Military Intelligence (see sectionSurveillance and telephone wiretapping of Mr. Hariri).119. One of the first measures General Al-Hajj undertook after being appointed to thepost as the Head of the Internal Security Forces was to reduce the number of statesecurity personnel around Mr. Hariri from a level of 40 down to eight in November 2004.The reason was asserted to be a letter from the Lebanese President and the PrimeMinister that Lebanese law should be applied on all levels and in all matters. Accordingto a decree (3509 of 1993), the number of security staff for a person in the Hariri categoryshould be eight. Whether anyone else was affected by the same decree, the Commissionhas not been able to ascertain.120. There are still some activities on the Minae Al-Hosn Street in Beirut prior to theblast that have to be further investigated, which could elucidate details from the planningphase and as such lead to the perpetrators.121. The investigation shows that eight telephone numbers and 10 mobile telephoneswere used to organize surveillance on Mr. Hariri and to carry out the assassination. Thelines were put into circulation on 4 January 2005 in the northern part of Lebanon,between Terbol and Menyeh. The lines were used on individual days to observe Mr.Hariri’s habits, mostly in the area of Beirut city.122. On 14 February 2005, six of the telephone were used in the area stretching fromParliament Square to the St. George Hotel and the axes of Zqaq el Blat and Al Bachoura.The calls occurred at 1100 hrs. They covered all routes linking the Parliament toKuraytem Palace. The telephone located at the Parliament made four calls to the othertelephones at 1253 hrs, the time when the Hariri motorcade left Nejmeh Square. Thetelephones have been inactive since the blast at 1256 hrs. The lines were only used tomake calls with each other for the entire period from early January to 14 February 2005.123. With all these circumstances in mind, including the previously describedconversation of 26 August 2004, there is little probability that a third party wouldundertake surveillance and monitoring measures against Mr. Hariri for more than amonth prior to the blast and maintain the resources, logistics and capacity needed toinitiate, plan and commit a crime of this magnitude, without the knowledge of thecompetent Lebanese authorities. This includes the procurement, handling andmaintenance of a large quantity of highly aggressive explosive, a stolen MitsubishiCanter van, the recruitment of the related human resources, as well as a base station fornecessary preparations.Conclusion:

125. Colonel Ghassan Tufayli was responsible in the Lebanese Military IntelligenceService for the technical department. It included the telecommunication - and the wiretapping -service. The department tapped political, military and suspect people. Hissuperior was the head of the Military Intelligence Service, General Raymond Azar.Colonel Tufayli received his orders from his superior in oral rather than written form.Several important people such as former presidents, prime ministers and deputies werepermanently wiretapped. Although Mr. Hariri was no longer Prime Minister in early2005, he was a very important political and economic figure in Lebanon and the MiddleEast. Therefore he was under permanent wiretapping. The technical departmentmonitored and recorded conversations. Staff from the Lebanese Sûreté Généralesupported Tufayli’s army unit. The protocols were forwarded on a daily basis to GeneralRaymond Azar and to the head of the army, General Michel Suleyman. The head of theLebanese Sûreté Générale , Jamil Al-Sayyed, was also provided with the results.According to Colonel Tufayli’s statement, General Raymond Azar sent the protocols tothe Lebanese President and to General Ghazali, the head of the Syrian MilitaryIntelligence Service in Lebanon.126. Colonel Tufaily mentioned that the Republican Guard Brigade also had aninternal wiretapping service.

assassination, implying that individuals involved in the assassination may possibly havehad an opportunity to install a bomb or a remote bomb device underneath the road, thuscausing the explosion.128. Municipal records show that the last work permits for work in the area near thecrime scene, granted prior to the blast were provided in January 2005. For example,from 3 to 8 January 2005, the Beirut Water authorities were provided permits to dig for awater pipe and to excavate the main roads around the St. George Hotel. Ogero, thetelecommunications company, was granted a permit to install a telecommunications cablebetween 13 and 20 January 2005. However, some witnesses have stated that there may infact have been road works conducted in the area in front of St. George closer to the dayof the explosion, including the night before. For example, a taxi driver reported that hedropped two passengers at the Phoenicia Hotel on 12 February 2005 at approximately0615 hrs in the morning. As he turned left onto Minet El Hosn, he realized that the streetwas closed just in front of the St. George Hotel facing the HSBC bank and that some roadworks were being conducted, including two open manholes in front of the St. George,and that workers and military personnel were present at the location. Another witness, amarina worker, noted that while the installation of the telephone wires had started at themarina, they were not in use as they had not been connected to an external wire and nocables were connected for the television or computers. Another individual reported thaton Sunday afternoon, the day before the assassination, as he and his wife approached thesite of the explosion, they saw three people working in the middle of the street andlowering into a hole in the ground near the St. George Hotel what appeared to be a palletand also observed two black cables with about half inch in diameter running from thehole to the St. George Hotel. By contrast, other witnesses were certain that there were noroad works in the vicinity in the days prior to the explosion.Conclusion:The issue of whether there was excavation in front of the St. George Hotel remainsan open question that the Commission has not been able to resolve beyond certainwitnesses’ recollections which have not been independently substantiated.Municipal records do appear to make clear, however, that excavation close to thetime of the crime was not carried out pursuant to city permits.Execution of the Bombing129. A branch of the HSBC bank is located close to the scene of the explosion. Thebank operated its own CCTV security system which recorded the movements of theHariri motorcade immediately prior to the explosion, but did not record the scene of theblast itself. On close scrutiny, the recorded footage showed a white Mitsubishi Canter vanentering the area of the explosion shortly before Mr. Hariri’s convoy.130. The recording clearly showed that this Mitsubishi Canter was movingapproximately six times slower than all other vehicles traversing the same stretch ofroadway. A time series analysis showed that for the approximately 50 meters of roadcovered by the camera, a normal car took 3-4 seconds to cover the distance, while a large

truck took 5-6 seconds to travel the distance. The Mitsubishi Canter took approximately22 seconds to travel the distance and entered the area one minute and 49 seconds beforethe Hariri convoy.131. Collected samples from the crime scene and further forensic examinations, havesucceeded in identifying the Mitsubishi Canter van. Through a part of the engine block,found and collected at the crime scene, it has been concluded that the engine comes froma Mitsubishi vehicle stolen on 12 October 2004 in Sagamihara City, Japan.132. The Commission has interviewed all the survivors who were involved in theHariri motorcade, eyewitnesses on the spot and in adjacent areas as well as shop owners,employees, vendors, residents etc in the neighborhood of the crime scene.133. None of the people interviewed has made any unusual observations on 14February 2005, at Minae Al-Hosn Street or in adjacent areas of activity different from thenormal situation at these locations.134. One of the main issues for the Commission was to determine how it was knownthat Mr. Hariri would take the Maritime route on his way back to the Kuraytem Palacefrom the meeting at the Parliament.135. It was a common knowledge that Mr. Hariri would attend the pre-electionmeeting at the Parliament this particular morning. It was also known that he would returnto the Kuraytem Palace after the meeting, since he had invited more than twenty peoplefor lunch at the Palace.136. From the Nejmeh Square back to Kuraytem there were three options of routes.The decision to take the Maritime road was made just before departure by a senior staffmember in Mr. Hariri’s private security detail and communicated to the lead car, but itwas already envisaged in the morning that if the motorcade was able to return to thePalace before 1400 they would have chosen the Maritime road. If not, another road wouldhave been taken. The motorcade left the Nejmeh Square area and drove along AhdabStreet and Foch Street. At the junction of Foch Street and the Seaport Street the convoywas delayed for several minutes due to some traffic hindrance. At the mentioned junctionthe convoy turned left and took the Maritime road towards Ain Mreisa and the St. GeorgeHotel.137. The motorcade was composed of six cars. The first car, a Toyota Land Cruiser,was manned with four officers from the Internal Security Forces, the second was aMercedes 500 S manned by three persons from Mr. Hariri’s private security team. Thethird car was an armored Mercedes driven by Mr. Hariri and with Mr. Fleyhan aspassenger. The fourth and the fifth cars were Mercedes 500 S, each manned by threesecurity officers from Mr. Hariri’s private security team and positioned in the convoy onthe flanks of the third car. The last car in the convoy was a Chevrolet, fully equipped asan ambulance and manned by three Hariri staff members, two of whom were paramedics.

The second, fourth and fifth cars were equipped with jamming devices, which wereswitched on and functional.138. When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at Minae Al-Hosn Street, at1256 hours, a huge explosion occurred, which resulted in the death of Mr. Hariri and 21others. In addition, more than 220 persons were injured and the damage to surroundingbuildings and vehicles was severe. Mr. Hariri was taken to the American UniversityHospital, where his body was identified and the cause of death concluded to beimmediate brain injury resulting in cardiac arrest.139. An Opel which followed the motorcade from Nejmeh Square to the junction ofFoch Street and Seaport Street has not been identified. It should be noted that because themotorcade was delayed at a T-junction, for a short while it went against the traffic on aone-way street from Nejmeh Square to Foch Street, followed by the Opel. TheCommission has not succeeded in elucidating the reason for the delay of the motorcade atthe T-junction.140. The FitzGerald report concluded that Mr. Hariri during the last three monthsprior to the blast had taken the Maritime Road at six different occasions, but it should bekept in mind that, during the same period of time, he only appeared in public in the Beirutarea fewer than 10 times.141. The Commission has not found any indication that there were leaks from, oraccomplices, within Mr. Hariri’s close staff members. However, UNIIIC determined thatMr. Hariri was under surveillance at least one month prior to the blast, by peopleplanning the crime (see the phone analysis section above).142. The weaknesses in the initial measures taken by the Lebanese authorities and thetampering with evidence during the first crime scene examination have worked againstidentifying the type of explosives used in the blast. The first collected samples of residueswere tested in an “itemizer”, which only gives an indication of the explosives. In this caseit indicated TNT, but no forensic laboratory examinations of the samples wereundertaken. This fact has hampered the investigation, since it has been impossible totrack down the origin of the explosives, which subsequently could lead to theperpetrators.143. In addition, no other CCTV security systems were seized in the area except thosefrom the HSBC bank. This negligence could have led to the loss of important evidence.Conclusion:It would not have been difficult for individuals outside of Hariri’s “inner circle” topredict the route that his convoy would follow on 14 February 2005. The MitsubishiCanter van shown on the HSBC bank CCTV security system was the carrier of theexplosives. The negligence of the Lebanese authorities to undertake properinvestigative measures and a full-scale professional crime scene examinationimmediately after the blast has made it difficult to resolve key questions regarding

Use of Prepaid Telephone Cards144. Investigations by both the ISF and Military Intelligence have led to six pre-paidcalling cards, which telephone records demonstrate were instrumental in the planning ofthe assassination. Beginning at approximately 1100 hrs on 14 February 2005, cell siterecords show that cellular telephones utilizing these six calling cards were located in thearea stretching from the Nejmeh Square to the St. George Hotel, within a few-blockradius and made numerous calls with each other and only with each other. The phoneswere situated so that they covered every route linking the Parliament to Kuraytem Palace:that is, cellsite records demonstrate that these telephones were placed to cover any routethat Hariri would have taken that day. One of the cellphones located near the Parliamentmade four calls with the other telephone lines at 1253 hrs --- the time that Mr. Hariri’sconvoy left the Nejmeh Square . The calls --- and all usage on the cards --- terminated at1253 hrs on 14 February, a few minutes before the blast. The lines have all been inactivesince.145. Further investigation has revealed that these six lines --- along with two others ---were put into circulation on the 4 January 2005, after calling number 1456 activatedthem. They were all activated at the same location in northern Lebanon between Terboland Menyeh. Since they were first purchased in early January 2005, until the time of theexplosion, the lines only had calls with each other. In that time period, until theassassination, there appears to be a correlation between their location and Hariri’smovements, suggesting that they might have been used to follow Hariri’s movements inthat time period.146. The Commission, in conjunction with the Lebanese authorities, continued theinvestigation of the origin of these telephone lines. The six pre-paid cards originated,along with four others, from the Powergroup Company, Beirut, a store owned by areportedly active member of Al-Ahbash with close ties to Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Al.According to company records, the lines were delivered to the store’s Tripoli branch.One of the employees of that Tripoli store reported that on the 30 December 2004, hereceived a telephone call from Raed Fakhreddin, the owner of another cell shop in Tripoliand the nephew of Tarek Ismat Fakhreddin, a prominent businessman and consultant toformer Lebanese prime minister Omar Karame. Raed Fakhreddin reportedly urgentlywanted to buy 10 prepaid cards; the Tripoli store employee noted that the inquiry itselfwas unusual as Raed Fakhreddin did not customarily buy lines from the Tripoli store nortypically have commercial dealings with the Tripoli store other than mobile handsetpurchases. However, the ten calling cards bearing these particular lines were located, andRaed Fakhreddin sent a messenger to pick up the calling cards bearing these lines fromthe Tripoli store. That messenger reported to the Commission that he paid $700 USD incash at the Tripoli store to purchase these ten lines and deliver them to Raed Fakhreddin.The forms legally required for purchasing cellular lines were not filled out that day,

however, but rather over two weeks after the lines had been sold, on 12 January 2005.The supporting identification required for the purchase, which was provided by RaedFakhreddin, proved to be false. On 14 September 2005, the ISF arrested RaedFakhreddin, along with others involved in the transfer and sale of these calling cards.Raed Fakhreddin was subsequently interviewed as a suspect by the Commission. In thatinterview, while he admitted that he purchased the lines, he denied any knowledge of theuse of six of the lines in connection with the Hariri assassination.147. Of the ten mobile phones used in connection with these ten cellular telephonecards, five have been traced to a store in Tripoli.Conclusion:The investigation of the prepaid telephone cards is one of the most important leadsin this investigation in terms of who was actually on the ground executing theassassination. This is a line of investigation that needs to be pursued thoroughly.Jamming Devices148. Hariri’s convoy included three vehicles equipped with jamming devices, designedto disturb the signals of remote-controlled IED.149. Although UNIIIC received information from one source that a trusted associate ofMr. Hariri’s had tampered with the jamming devices prior to the blast, the Commissionhas not been able to corroborate this information. Indeed, all available evidence indicatesthat these jamming devices were operational and in proper working condition at the timeof the assassination. Those responsible for managing the jamming devices reported thatthey conducted a detailed check of the jammers every three months, an operationperformed for the last time in early January 2005 when no problems were observed. Inaddition, the jamming system was checked by a member of Mr. Hariri’s security detailtwo days before the explosion and was deemed to be in good working condition. Of thethree jamming devices, one was completely destroyed by the blast, another was burnedbut was retrieved and is maintained as evidence, and a third was still operational and,upon testing, was found to be working properly. Moreover, the report of the Dutchforensic explosives experts about the two devices which survived as evidence furtherconcluded that the intact jammer had essentially been operational. Finally, thetelecommunication firms, MTC Touch and ALFA, reported that their networks weredisrupted on 14 February from about 1200 hrs to 1300 hrs between Place de l’Etoile andthe St. George Hotel. UNIIIC investigators conducted a reconstruction on 19 August2005 in cooperation with MTC and ALFA, by taking three vehicles similar to those inMr. Hariri’s convoy equipped with similar jamming devices along the same route that theconvoy took from the Place de l’Etoile to the St. George Hotel. This reconstructionproduced relatively similar results regarding the temporary disruption oftelecommunications as occurred on 14 February, even accounting for other factors thatcould have affected telecommunications in the area. Thus, it can be assumed that at leastone of the three jamming devices was operational and functional at the time of theexplosion.

150. Even though at least one jamming device was operational, investigation hasrevealed that there are ways to overcome, avoid, evade or use jamming devices.Different possibilities include a suicide bomber, a wireless explosion using differentfrequencies from those of the jamming devices or using the frequencies of the jammingdevices , a wireless explosion using the jamming devices themselves, a wirelessexplosion using a satellite phone from Thuraya, the only telephone company working onLebanese territory with satellite links, a wired explosion using a TNT cable, or a wiredexplosion using another kind of installed cable such as a telephone line as a connectingwire. Although it appears to the Commission based on its investigation to date,specifically, the results of the Dutch forensic examination of the crime scene, that it ispossible that a suicide bomber caused this explosion, these other possibilities warrantfurther investigation, both as to whether they were feasible standing alone or inconjunction with a suicide bomber.Conclusion:It appears that the jamming devices in Hariri’s convoy were operational andfunctional on 14 February at the time of the blast. Further investigation mayprovide information about how the IED was activated.Telecommunications interferences in downtown Beirut151. UNIIIC received information that there was interference on 14 February 2005from 0900 hrs until 1400 hrs of the telecommunications antenna covering the area ofRiad Solh, which includes the crime scene area. The matter was investigated with theMinistry of Telecommunication. This information was confirmed through informationprovided by the telecommunications provider MTC Touch. Consequently, the mobilephone callers on the crime scene area could not use this specific antenna and werediverted to other antennas. No evidence has been found to date which would clearlypoint to internal manipulation at MTC Touch, although such internal manipulation cannotyet be completely discounted. It remains equally possible that an outside individual,criminal organization, company or authority would also have been able to generate suchinterferences, for example with a mobile appliance. Moreover, a direct connectionbetween these interferences and the assassination cannot be excluded.Conclusion:It appears that there was interference with a telecommunications antenna in thecrime scene area during the time of the crime. This is a line of enquiry that shouldbe thoroughly pursued.Crime Scene152. Until the establishment of UNIIIC, the Lebanese authorities had not carried out athorough crime scene examination. Since this constitutes the basis of any criminalinvestigation, the Commission deemed it necessary to seek the assistance of UN member

states to second experts in order to determine primarily, among other things, whether theexplosion took place aboveground or underground.The German Forensic Team153. On 6 July 2005, the German Forensic Team, comprising four forensic experts,submitted their report to UNIIIC.2Excerpts of the most important paragraphs conclude:“The Swiss expert team’s findings and conclusions can be fully supported. Due to the distribution of the sofar located parts of a Mitsubishi Canter lorry, it can be assumed that that vehicle played a significant part inthe course of action and was possibly used as carrier of the bomb.After the assessment of all facts and estimations an aboveground explosion is the most feasible possibility.If we assume such an explosion, the amount of explosive must have been around 1,000 kg. Highlyaggressive explosive was used. The result of an A-sample from the crater wall shows that TNT was used.But this result is not one that has been achieved in the presence of an expert from the UN Fact FindingMission to Lebanon and thus must be regarded as preliminary and not finally confirmed result. During ourwork at the location of the incident we could not detect any hints with regard to the kind of trigger that hasbeen used”.

The Dutch Forensic Team154. During the period 12 August – 25 September 2005, a Dutch forensic teamconducted an the examination of the prime crime scene and periphery areas of interest.The team was composed of seven experts specialized in post-blast investigations. Theobjective for the forensic investigation of the explosion site was to find physicalevidence to reconstruct the IED which caused the explosion. To examine a crime scenenearly half a year after the incident occurred is not a common practice. Moreover, it wasknown that the crime scene was disturbed on several occasions. This seriouslydiminishes the strength of conclusions that can be drawn from the location where theexhibits were found. It can never be excluded that the materials at the crime scene weremanipulated by someone or intentionally put there. Notwithstanding, it was felt to beuseful to carry out a full crime scene search, mainly because it was likely that certainareas of the crime scene had not been contaminated, such as the upper floors of theByblos and St George’s Hotel. The crime scene area was cordoned off on 15 February2005, according to ISF, and was guarded 24/7 from this day on.155. The Dutch forensic team was assisted by many people in carrying out the crimescene investigation, e.g. forensic police officers from ISF, a team of British divers, aFrench expert on explosives, a forensic scientist from Northern Ireland, a Germanelectrical engineer specialized on jamming devices, a team of Japanese crime sceneinvestigators, a German car expert, a Dutch car expert and a number of Lebanesespecialists.

156. A coherent and comprehensive report on the findings and results from the crimescene investigation has been submitted to the Commission. The report comprised 87pages and contained four main conclusions:1.Detonation of high explosivesThe damage inflicted on the buildings, vehicles, surrounding lamp posts and otherobjects in the vicinity of the explosion site demonstrates that a large amount of highexplosives was activated and detonated to the left side in front of the main entrance ofthe St George’s Hotel on Minae Al-Hosn Street. This detonation set fire to manyvehicles within the distance of 20 to 30 meters of the explosion centre. From the damagepattern it is clear that it was one explosion of a charge of high explosives.2.Mitsubishi Canter vehicleRegarding the physical evidence recovered, the human remains identified by theLebanese forensic specialist, the HSBC security video and the damage on the vehiclesparked on the road, the most likely scenario is that a Mitsubishi Canter van containingthe IED was activated when the Hariri convoy of six vehicles drove by. The enginenumber of this Mitsubishi Canter van was found amongst the debris on the crime scene.This engine number has led to the vehicle registration number and the production date.No remains of the constituents of the IED have been found amongst the debris, apartfrom the vehicle parts of the Mitsubishi Canter in which the IED was placed. Because ofthe size of the explosion and the exploded charge this is not unexpected. A few damagedparts of circuit board have been recovered which may be related to the activationmechanism. However, these circuit boards should first be examined by electronicsexperts, who might give an indication of the application of these boards.3.Location of convoy vehicles and bomb vehicleWhen the explosive was activated, the Mitsubishi Canter was parked almost in line withthe other parked vehicles along the pavement in front of the St George’s Hotel with thefront of the vehicle facing the west. It was not parked fully in line judging from thedirection of the explosion force acted on the red Ford vehicle which was most likelyparked directly in front of the Mitsubishi. This red Ford vehicle was most severelydamaged from the left rear side which means that the Mitsubishi could not have beenparked fully in line with the Red Ford vehicle.Among the six convoy vehicles the black Mercedes numbered 404 was closest to theexplosion center when the IED detonated. The direction of the explosive force on thisvehicle was from the right side, meaning it was most likely located alongside of theMitsubishi. From the damage patterns it can be stated that vehicles 401, 402 and 403, thelatter with Messrs. Hariri and Fleyhan as occupants, had just passed by the Mitsubishiwhen the explosion occurred. Vehicles 405 and 406 were damaged most severely at theright front side, meaning that these vehicles had not yet driven by the Mitsubishi at themoment of the detonation.4.Activation mechanism of the IED

The British Forensic Team157. On 5 September 2005, the British Forensic Team submitted their report to theCommission. The British team was composed of seven experts. The objective for theteam was to conduct a underwater search of the sea floor and the Marina adjacent to thescene of the blast. While performing their duties, the British team was assisted byLebanese divers from the Civil Defense Fire and Rescue Team. Forty items werecollected and seized during the underwater search, of which the vast majority werevehicle parts.The Japanese Forensic Team158. On 27 September 2005, the Japanese team submitted their report to theCommission. The team comprised of three forensic experts accompanied by aninterpreter. The objective of the team was to identify the Mitsubishi Canter van.159. The Japanese experts examined all the evidence recovered from the crime sceneand sorted out 69 pieces as suspected Mitsubishi Canter parts. Of the 69 pieces, 44 itemswere identified as Canter parts by the Mitsubishi Fuso Corporation in Japan.160. The Mitsubishi Canter Van was finally identified. The vehicle was stolen inSagamihara City, Japan on 12 October 2004.The Northern Irish and French Experts on IEDs161. The experts were in agreement with the comments and conclusions in the DutchForensic Team’s report.Conclusion:The explosion that killed Mr. Hariri and 22 others took place above ground. Forthis purpose, an amount of no less than 1000 kilgrams of military explosives wasused.AFTER THE CRIME : ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

162. The Commission has undertaken extensive measures to map Mr. Hariri, hiswhereabouts and doings prior to the blast as well as other occurrences, in order to find themotive and the reasons behind the crime.163. Interviews have been conducted with his relatives, staff members, friends,associates and colleagues. None of these efforts have led anywhere else than to theprelude of Mr. Hariri stepping down from the post as Prime Minister.164. This information has reinforced a picture of a tense relationship between Mr.Hariri on the one hand and President Lahoud and the Syrian authorities on the other.Evidence is also adduced from the phone conversation between General Ghazali and asenior Lebanese official on 19 July 2004; the conversation between President Assad andMr. Hariri on 26 August 2004; in Syria, the approach to Mr. Hariri by Yehya Al-Arab,Wissam El-Hassan and Salim Diab in October-November 2004 to increase the securityaround him due to the political tension and Mr. Hariri’s response that “they don’t dare totouch me”; the meeting between General Ghazali and Yehya Al-Arab on 13 February2005; and the Lebanese authorities response to the distribution of olive oil duringFebruary 2005.165. All the key players amongst the competent Lebanese authorities have beeninterviewed as well as their experts involved in the initial measures of the investigation.The early investigation showed a pattern that no one claimed they had the slightest cluethat something was going on around Mr. Hariri that could threaten his life. The effortsundertaken by the Commission during a limited period of time have come to adiametrically opposite conclusion. There were a number of warning signs regarding Mr.Hariri’s security in his immediate surroundings in the aftermath of the occurrences duringthe second half of 2004, in particular when it comes to the context of previous Lebaneseexperiences of assaults targeting individuals through bombings.166. On 30 August 2005, the Lebanese authorities arrested and detained four high-level officials of the Lebanese security and intelligence apparatus, pursuant to arrestwarrants issued by the Lebanese Prosecutor General based on recommendations fromUNIIIC that there was probable cause to arrest and detain them for conspiracy to commitmurder in connection with the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The individuals arrestedwere General Jameel Al-Sayyed, former director general the Sûreté Générale ; GeneralAli Al-Hajj, former head of the ISF; General Raymond Azar, former head of militaryintelligence; and General Mustapha Hamdan, Commander of the Republican GuardBrigade.167. The four have been interviewed by UNIIIC in the presence of counsel. They eachcontinue to deny any involvement in the planning or execution of the assassination ofHariri, any awareness of such a conspiracy beforehand, and undertaking or ordering anyactions designed to obstruct the investigation afterwards.

169. UNIIIC’s investigation into the Abu Adass lead focused on seeking to determineMr. Abu Adass’s whereabouts and evaluating the likelihood that Mr. Abu Adass wasactually the suicide bomber he was purported to be.170. UNIIIC was unable to interview Mr. Abu Adass’s father, who had beeninterviewed by the Lebanese authorities on 14 February 2005, because he died on 7March 2005 shortly after being called to appear before the Investigative Judge.171. Mr. Abu Adass’s mother, Nehad Moussa, was interviewed by UNIIIC on 7 July2005, and had previously been interviewed at least four times by Lebanese authorities,the first time on the 14 February 2005. She and Mr. Abu Adass’s father Tayser Moussawere illegally detained for approximately 10 days. She stated that she told the Lebaneseauthorities the following: Mr. Abu Adass disappeared on 16 January 2005 and was notheard from since. According to her, in early January 2005, Mr. Abu Adass explained toher that he had met an individual whom she knew only as “Mohammed” who wanted toconvert to Islam from Christianity and Mr. Abu Adass was helping him. Mr. Abu Adassreported that Mohammed appeared to be wealthy and he would occasionally disappearfor a period of a week or so. After one such disappearance, on the evening of Saturday,15 January 2005, Mohammed called their home. Mohammed told Mr. Abu Adass thathe would come to pick Mr. Abu Adass up the next morning, to show him a surprise.Mr. Abu Adass left with Mohammed that Sunday, 16 January 2005, promising his motherhe would be out only for a few hours, since she had requested that he stay to help herclean a large carpet. Mr. Abu Adass never returned. On Monday morning, Mr. AbuAdass’s mother received a call from an individual who told her not to worry aboutAhmed as he was in Tripoli where their car had broken down and they were just waitingto have it fixed. Ms. Moussa understood that this was the same individual called“Mohammed” whom she had spoken to on the telephone two days earlier. She asked tospeak to her son, but was told that her son was waiting at a house without a phone and thecaller was in the car shop. The caller told Ms. Moussa that her son would be back in timeto help clean the carpet. At approximately 9 p.m. that same day, she received another callfrom the individual called “Mohammed” who said they did not have an accident and didnot break down. The caller went on to say that Mr. Abu Adass wanted to go to Iraq andwould not be coming back. When Ms. Moussa expressed surprise and stated that Mr.Abu Adass had never mentioned any such interest before, the caller said he would try toget her Mr. Abu Adass’s phone number so she could try to change his mind. The callerhung up and never called back. The family filed an official missing person’s report withthe ISF on 19 January 2005.172. In a follow-up interview with UNIIIC, Ms. Moussa added that Mr. Abu Adass’sbest friend was a man by the name of Ziad Ramadan whom he had met as a colleague at a

computer company approximately two years earlier. The last contact she had with Mr.Ramadan was when he called her several days after her son disappeared to ask if she hadany news from her son. In her interviews with the Lebanese authorities, Ms. Moussastated that she had confirmed that her son did not have a driver’s license and that therewas no internet connection in their house.173. UNIIIC was unable to locate Ziad Ramadan to interview. After being interviewedby the Lebanese authorities on 14 February 2005, it appears that Mr. Ramadan returnedto Syria with his family. In his interview with the Lebanese authorities, Mr. Ramadanstated that he had known Mr. Abu Adass for approximately two years, as they workedtogether in the same company for two months. Mr. Ramadan saw Abass last theThursday or Friday preceding his disappearance, when Abass discussed his newemployment decorating book covers.174. One individual whom neither UNIIIC nor the Lebanese authorities was able tointerview so far was Khaled Midhat Taha, another religious associate of Mr. AbuAdass’s, who is of significant interest, based on the travel records available for him andsome unusual coincidences. Mr. Taha met Mr. Abu Adass when they were students atthe Arab University where they used to meet in the University’s mosque. According totravel records, Mr. Taha departed from Beirut International Airport for the United ArabEmirates on 21 July 2003 and returned to Beirut on 17 October 2003. The next record forhim is an entry into Lebanon coming from Syria by land on 15 January 2005, the daybefore Mr. Abu Adass’s disappearance. The next day, Mr. Taha left Lebanon by landtowards Syria. The records do not show a departure from Lebanon prior to 15 January2005, which indicates that he entered Syria prior to that date illegally. Furtherinvestigation revealed that three of Mr. Taha’s e-mail addresses went through Damascusand the fourth went through Lebanon itself while purporting to be in Turkey..Moreover, the date of his final departure for Syria from Lebanon --- 16 January 2005 ---is the same as the date of Mr. Abu Adass’s disappearance, suggesting a possible linkbetween Mr. Taha’s trip to Lebanon and Mr. Abu Adass’s disappearance. Moreover, asthe Lebanese authorities noted in their report, he was never arrested for his apparentlyillegal entry into Syria prior to 15 January 2005, even upon his return to Syria on 16January 2005, an uncommon occurrence, suggesting that his departure and entry thefollowing day were facilitated by someone. The Syrian authorities have recently beenapproached by UNIIIC to provide the Commission with detailed information on KhaledTaha, especially his travel records into and out of Syria.175. As noted above, in the course of their investigation, the Lebanese intervieweesincluded Mr. Abu Adass’s friends and associates, former neighbors, acquaintances fromthe mosque, colleagues from former jobs, and classmates. A number of these individualswere re-interviewed by UNIIIC. None had ever heard of Al-Nasra wal Jihad, the groupthat Mr. Abu Adass was purportedly a member of according to the suicide bomb videomessage. Many of them reported similar stories of being taken by the ISF, handcuffed,blindfolded, and stripped, and detained for a period of time while being questioned aboutMr. Abu Adass and his affiliations with Islamic groups; most reported that they shared

with their interrogators their view that Mr. Abu Adass was a loner and introvert who didnot have the intelligence to be capable of committing such a crime176. In response to a request through the Lebanese authorities, the Syrian governmentinformed UNIIIC that their computer files showed no indications that Mr. Abu Adasseither entered or left Syria. Iraqi authorities informed the Lebanese authorities throughthe Iraqi embassy in Beirut that Mr. Abu Adass had not obtained a visa to Iraq.177. UNIIIC also submitted a request for details of any organization within Lebanonwho may have had Mr. Abu Adass under observation between September 2004 andJanuary 2005. The files obtained in response to this request confirmed that nodepartment within Lebanon had Mr. Abu Adass under any observation during therelevant time period.178. A number of sources, confidential and otherwise, provided information to UNIIICon the role and whereabouts of Mr. Abu Adass. Although the information provided hasnot been independently verified, significantly, none of this source information supportedthe theory that he was a lone suicide bomber acting for an Islamic fundamentalist group.Indeed, all of the source information pointed to the likelihood of Mr. Abu Adass beingused by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities as a scapegoat for the crime, rather thanbeing the instigator of crime himself. For example, one witness claimed to have seen Mr.Abu Adass in the hallway outside of General Ghazali’s office in December 2004 inAnjar. Another witness claimed that Mr. Abu Adass was currently held in prison in Syriaand will be killed once this investigation is over. According to him, Mr. Abu Adass hadno role in the assassination except as a decoy, and the videotape was recorded at gunpointapproximately 45 days before the assassination. He later stated that General AssefShawkat forced Mr. Abu Adass to record the tape approximately 15 days before theassassination in Damascus. He also stated that the tape was given to Al-Jazeera by awoman with the nickname “Um Alaa.” Another witness stated that the day after theassassination Faysal Al-Rasheed insisted that the case had been solved and theperpetrator was Mr. Abu Adass, as a suicide bomb and that Mr. Abu Adass’s body wasstill at the crime scene. Zuhir Saddik stated that in early February 2005, he had seenMr. Abu Adass at the Zabadane training camp in Syria, and that his information was thatMr. Abu Adass had initially planned to commit the assassination but had changed hismind at the last minute. He said that Mr. Abu Adass was subsequently killed by theSyrians, and his body was placed in the vehicle containing the bomb, and thus wasdestroyed in the crime scene.179. To date, no DNA evidence has been found on the crime scene that can be linkedto Mr. Abu Adass.180. Despite months of investigation by both UNIIIC and the Lebanese authorities,Mr. Abu Adass remains a mysterious figure. A few significant points can still be made,however, in connection with the Abu Adass investigation.

181. Other than the videotape itself which definitely was of Mr. Abu Adass, there islittle else supporting the idea that he perpetrated this assassination through a suicidebomb. There is no evidence, other than the claim on the video itself, of the existence of agroup called the Nasra and Jihad Group Of Greater Syria. There is no information aboutsuch a group in any open sources prior to 14 February 2005, for example, and neither theLebanese authorities nor Mr. Abu Adass’s friends and acquaintances appear to have evenheard of the group prior to the day of the assassination. Nor have any of Lebanon’sneighboring countries’ security authorities, which have been asked by UNIIIC to provideinformation on the assassination, have any knowledge of this group. Moreover, Mr. AbuAdass’s disappearance on 16 January 2005 has not been explained in a manner that isconsistent with the notion that he would be a suicide bomber a month later. Notably,none of the individuals who knew him well considered it likely that he could commitsuch a crime, in light of his nature and intelligence. Finally, although there is always thepossibility that no trace of DNA of a suicide bomber conducting a massive blast would befound, it is noted that there is no evidence of Mr. Abu Adass’s DNA at the crime scene orindeed any other evidence, such as witnesses, that he was present at the crime scene at thetime of the crime.182. However, one aspect of the investigation to date is clear: much of the informationsurrounding Mr. Abu Adass and his disappearance points to Syria. Khaled Taha’speculiar travel records, indicating an entry into Lebanon from Syria the day before Mr.Abu Adass’s disappearance, as well as the attempt to obscure his presence in Syria byseeking to show that his emails came from Turkey when they in fact came from Syria, areindicative of the type of evidence pointing to Syrian involvement in Mr. Abu Adass’s fatewhich cannot be discounted as mere coincidence. Moreover, the vague informationavailable about “Mohamed” indicates that he was likely Syrian, and the sudden return toSyria of Mr. Abu Adass’s Syrian best friend, Ziad Ramadan, shortly after beinginterviewed by the Lebanese authorities, all suggest Syrian connections to Mr. AbuAdass’s disappearance. Finally, much of the source information relevant to Mr. AbuAdass’s fate points to Syria and Syrian officials, as well as certain Lebanese officials.While it is true that little of this source information has been independently corroborated,it is significant that no information points to any other entity as being involved in hisdisappearance or that he was a suicide bomber. Although this is not definitive, theserepeated connections to Syria bear further investigation.Conclusion:There is no evidence that Mr. Abu Adass belonged to the groupal nasra wal-jihadfee bilad Al-Shamas claimed in the Al-Jazeera videotape, nor even that such a grouphas ever existed or does exist now. There are no indications (other than thevideotape) that he drove a truck containing the bomb that killed Hariri. Theevidence does show that it is likely that Mr. Abu Adass left his home on 16 January2005 and was taken, voluntarily or not, to Syria, where he has since disappeared.

183. One of the most important aspects of this investigation has been the analysis oftelephones. A specialized software was used to analyze and investigate numeroustelephone calls by those figures identified as the most important to the investigation,permitting UNIIIC to achieve an optimal result with limited staff members and a shorttimeframe. The assistance of the Lebanese telephone companies and authorities wasessential to making the analysis effective.For example, the Lebanesetelecommunications companies MTC Touch and Alpha responded quickly to requests forcellphone subscriber information and toll records. Similar information on landlines wasprovided to the Commission through the Ministry of Telecommunications. This promptassistance was invaluable as it permitted investigators to quickly analyze specifictelephone calls of subscribers and to establish patterns of communication betweenparticular groups of subscribers. In total, the Commission requested information onapproximately 2,235 subscribers and obtained telephone connection data forapproximately 70,195 telephone calls. The telephone analysis, which has already beencritical in establishing leads and determining connections between the key figures, willcontinue to be a central aspect of this investigation as it evolves.184. According to Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the director of Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera receivedfour calls on the afternoon of 14 February prior to airing the Abu Adass videotape. Therecords revealed only three calls to Al-Jazeera that afternoon, however, at 1411 hrs, 1527hrs and 1704 hrs.185. It has not been possible to identify the time or origin of the reported fourth call toAl-Jazeera.186. Leila Bassam of Reuters reported that they received one telephone call on 14February regarding Mr. Abu Adass’s claim of responsibility for the bombing, whichrecords show occurred at 1411 hrs.187. Telephone records reveal that the same prepaid card was used to contact Al-Jazeera and Reuters for all of the above telephone calls. It was purchased in Beirut,Najaar, on 10 February 2005. The calls to Al-Jazeera and Reuters were made from fourdifferent telephone booths, all located in Beirut and one of which is near the ESCWACenter in downtown Beirut, approximately two kilometers from the crime scene. Thisprepaid card was only used to dial Al-Jazeera and Reuters and there is no record that itwas used to make any other telephone call.188. The videotape of Mr. Abu Adass confessing to the crime was placed in a tree infront of the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut. UNIIIC obtained and viewed theCCTV tapes from ESCWA for the 14 February 2005 in order to seek to identify anyindividuals or vehicles that could have been connected to the drop-off of that videotapeand the subsequent calls to Al-Jazeera. After viewing these images, however, it wasdetermined that it was not possible to clearly identify any vehicles or individualsapproaching the tree in front of ESCWA from the video. UNIIIC investigators also

189. Investigative Judge Elias Eid obtained records for and reviewed all of the phonecalls on 14 February 2005 to Al-Jazeera. Judge Eid noted one mobile phone call to Al-Jazeera as particularly significant: a call made to Al-Jazeera on a prepaid card at 2207 hrson 14 February 2005. This same prepaid card received a telephone call one minute afterthe blast, at 1257 hrs, from a telephone booth located in Tripoli near a building housingSyrian Intelligence Services. On 30 January a call was made to the landline at the homeof Mr. Abu Adass’s from that same Tripoli phone booth.190. UNIIIC obtained and reviewed the call records for prepaid card number 03925152based on this information from Judge Eid. UNIIIC’s investigation has revealed so farthat while there is no identified subscriber, the card bears significant connections. On 8February 2005, for example, that prepaid card had a contact with a mobile telephonenumber belonging to Tarek Ismat Fakhreddin.Mr. Fakhreddin, a prominentbusinessman, is a close associate of then-Prime Minister Omar Karame. TarekFakhreddin also made calls hours after the blast to General Hamdan, General Azar,General Hajj and the Syrian intelligence officer Jamea Jamea. In addition, he hadtelephone contact with his nephew Raed Fakhreddin at 1337 hrs on the 14 February 2005.Raed Fakhreddin is heavily suspected to have bought the prepaid cards which were usedto organize the assassination. The prepaid card also had contacts with another telephonenumber which was in contact with Raed Fakhreddin’s mobile phone in December 2004,and January, February and March 2005.191. This pre-paid card has also been connected to a number of prominent Lebaneseand Syrian officials. For example, the card was in contact with three different numberswhich in turn were in contact with Mustafa Hamdan’s mobile phone in January, March,and July 2005. Two days before the explosion, on 12 February 2005, this pre-paid cardwas also in contact with a mobile phone number belonging to ex-Minister Abel RahimYussef Murad. Mr. Murad’s mobile phone in turn called Ali Hajj after the blast. Themobile phones of Mr. Murad and Tarek Isamt Fakhreddin were in contact with each otheron 17 January 2005, one day after Ahmad Abu Adass’s disappearance. This prepaid cardalso had contacts with a telephone number which in turn was in regular contact with themobile phone number belonging to the politician Nasser Kandil, and the card hadcontacts with two mobile phone numbers in February and March 2005 which in turn were

193. In an interview with UNIIIC, Adnan Addoum, Minister of Justice at the time ofthe bombing, stated that it was his belief that UNIIIC investigators should pursue thisinvestigation and question the six Australian suspects as to their purpose of traveling. Healso indicated his belief that in light of the fact that the vehicle allegedly used in thebombing was a right-hand drive vehicle (as used in Australia), further suspicion shouldbe cast on those six suspects. He added that it was his belief that “due to media andreligious pressures, the investigation judge did not give this matter enough importance.”194. UNIIIC investigators thoroughly reviewed the results of the Lebanese andAustralian investigation into these six suspects and, as set forth below, have concludedthat there is no basis for believing that they had any involvement in the assassination ofHariri. In pursuing this review, UNIIIC investigators also were aware that there were sixsim cards used in connection with the assassination, and that usage on the sim cardsterminated at the time of the explosion. Noting that there were six suspiciousAustralians, and six suspicious sim cards, an unusual coincidence, UNIIIC believed that areview of the Australian and Lebanese investigations into this area would be prudent195.Having closely examined the file, UNIIIC can highlight the following points:The Lebanese authorities reported and requested assistance from Interpol to locateand interview the identified suspects in accordance with established protocol.The protocol followed by Interpol was correct.The Australian authorities were contacted via Interpol to follow up on this matter.The Australian authorities carried out a thorough investigation into the matter andpresented a report on their findings to the Lebanese authorities.The Lebanese authorities properly suspended this present line of inquiry based onthe report presented by the Australian authorities.

196. Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Al, a prominent figure in the Al-Ahbash, was responsiblefor the public relations and military and intelligence for Al-Ahbash, the Association ofIslamic Philanthopic Projects, a Lebanese group with strong historical ties to the Syrianauthorities. Abdel-Al has proven to be a significant figure in the light of his links toseveral aspects of this investigation, especially through his mobile phone which hadnumerous contacts with all the important figures in this investigation; indeed, it does notappear that any other figure is as linked to all the various aspects of this investigation asAbdel-Al.197. Abdel-Al was interviewed as a witness and later as a suspect by UNIIIC. Some ofhis actions, and some statements during his interview, suggest attempts to hideinformation from the investigation. For example, he tried to hide the origin of his mobiletelephone number on giving his prepaid card on 12 March 2005 to his Al-Ahbash friendMohammed Halawani and requesting that the card be registered in Halawani’s name.During UNIIIC’s interview with Halawani, it took him several hours to admit that thetelephone number in question was in fact used by Ahmad Abdel-Al. Additionally,according to Abdel-Al’s statement, on 14 February 2005, he left home and went to theAl-Ahbash office. His telephone records reveal that at 1147 hrs, he had a telephonecontact with a number which phoned his home telephone number a number of timesimmediately before the explosion --- 1226 hrs, 1246 hrs and 1247 hrs. While Abdel-Altold UNIIIC that he called home shortly after the explosion at 1256 hrs, telephone recordsshow that the call was made at 1254 hrs, two minutes before the explosion. Abdel-Alstated, that he did not leave the Al-Ahbash office the day of the blast for security reasons.The telephone records showed four calls to Syrian intelligence officer Jamea Jamea, at1142 hrs, 1814 hrs, 2023 hrs and 2026 hrs. According to a witness, Abdel-Al visitedJamea Jamea’s office the evening of the blast at 19:30 in which the two discussed Mr.Abu Adass. Moreover, shortly after his visit to Jamea Jamea’s office, Abdel-Al’s mobilephone registered a call to General Ghazali, at 1956 hrs. Abdel-Al also sought to steer theinvestigation towards Mr. Abu Adass, not only by providing the Lebanese authoritieswith extensive information on Mr. Abu Adass shortly after the blast, but also stating toUNIIIC that the Al-Ahbash Security Service had seen Mr. Abu Adass before theassassination in the Ain Al-Hilweh Palestinian camp together with Abu Obeida thedeputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar.198. There are also numerous contacts between Ahmad Abdel-Al and Lebanese StateSecurity on the day of the blast. For example, Abdel-Al had almost daily telephonecontact with Brigadier General Faysal Rasheed, Chief of State Security in Beirut and on14 February 2005, they had telephone contact at 1035 hrs, 2008 hrs, 2113 hrs, 214 hrs

and 2216 hrs. Ahmad Abdel-Al also had contact with suspect Raymond Azar, of theLebanese Army, on 14 February 2005, as well as 16 and 17 February 2005. There was acall between the mobile phone of Albert Karam, another member of the Lebanese ArmyIntelligence, and Ahmad Abdel-Al on 14 February as well, at 1212 hrs, about 44 minutesbefore the blast.199. Abdel-Al’s phone also had extensive telephone contacts with Mustafa Hamdan’sphone, as 97 calls occurred between the two between January and April 2005. Of these,four were made on 14 February 2005, after the explosion. Ahmad had two telephonecontacts with his brother, Walid Abdel-Al, a member of the Republican Guard, the day ofthe blast at 16:15 and 17:29. In addition, Abdel-Al received a call on 11 February 2005at 2217 hrs from the same telephone booth used to call Al-Jazeera shortly after the blaston the 14 February. He also received a call on the 4 February 2005 at 19:34 and on 26February 2005 at 0933 hrs from the booth used to call Reuters shortly after the blast.200. Abdel-Al has been in frequent contact with Mahmoud Abdel-Al, his brother, whois also active in Al-Ahbash. Mahmoud Abdel-Al’s telephone calls on 14 February arealso interesting: he made a call minutes before the blast, at 1247 hrs, to the mobile phoneof Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and at 1249 hrs had contact with Raymond Azar’smobile telephone.201. Abdel-Al also has notable connections to a significant weapons store discoveredin southern Beirut in July 2005. This weapons store was raided by the ISF on 26 July2005 and five people, with close connections to the former Mourabitoun militia, werearrested. One of the arrestees was the driver and bodyguard of Majed Hamdan, MustafaHamdan’s brother, who runs a firm which reportedly provided security for the St. GeorgeHotel.Abdel-Al reportedly arranged for another arrestee to be employed as anelectrician in the presidential palace. Furthermore, immediately after the arrests, anotherindividual fled and promptly telephoned Ahmad Abdel-Al.Conclusion:The evidence, including his links to other important figures, especially MustaphaHamdan and the Republican Guard, his telephone calls and his involvement in theLebanese investigation into Mr. Abu Adass, make Ahmad Abdel-Al a key figure inany ongoing investigation.

203. Building on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to dateand on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leadspursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrianinvolvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligencehad a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian forcespursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were theirappointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian andLebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage ascenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out withouttheir knowledge.204. It is also the Commission’s view that the context of the assassination of Mr. Haririwas one of extreme political polarization and tension. Accusations and counteraccusations targeting mainly Mr. Hariri over the period preceding his assassinationcorroborate the Commission’s conclusion that the likely motive of the assassination waspolitical. However, since the crime was not the work of individuals but rather of asophisticated group, it very much seems that fraud, corruption, and money-launderingcould also have been motives for individuals to participate in the operation.205. The Commission considers that the investigation must continue for some time tocome. In the short time period of four months more than 400 persons have beeninterviewed, 60 000 documents reviewed, several suspects identified, and some mainleads established. Yet, the investigation is not complete.206. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the continuing investigation should becarried forward by the appropriate Lebanese judicial and security authorities, who haveproved during the investigation that with international assistance and support, they canmove ahead and at times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At thesame time, the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramificationsincluding bank transactions. The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearlyagainst the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could belinks between some, if not all, of them.207. The Commission is therefore of the view that, should the Lebanese authorities sowish it, a sustained effort on the part of the international community to establish anassistance and cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities in the field ofsecurity and justice is essential. This will considerably boost the trust of the Lebanesepeople in their security system, while building self-confidence in their capabilities.208. The recent decision to proceed with new senior security appointments was hailedby all the Lebanese parties. It was an important step towards improving the integrity andcredibility of the security apparatus. However, it took place after months of a securityvacuum and extensive sectarian-political debate. Much needs to be done to overcomesectarian divisions, disentangle security from politics, and restructure the securityapparatus to avoid parallel lines of reporting and duplication and to enhanceaccountability.

209. It is the Commission’s conclusion that, after having interviewed witnesses andsuspects in the Syrian Arab Republic and establishing that many leads point directlytowards Syrian security officials as being involved with the assassination, it is incumbentupon Syria to clarify a considerable part of the unresolved questions. While the Syrianauthorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with theCommission, several interviewees tried to mislead the investigation by giving false orinaccurate statements. The letter addressed to the Commission by the Foreign Minister ofthe Syrian Arab Republic proved to contain false information. The full picture of theassassination can only be reached through an extensive and credible investigation thatwould be conducted in an open and transparent manner to the full satisfaction ofinternational scrutiny.210. As a result of the Commission’s investigation to date, a number of people havebeen arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit murder and related crimes inconnection with the assassination of Mr. Hariri and twenty-two others. The Commissionis of course of the view that all people, including those charged with serious crimesshould be considered innocent until proven guilty following a fair trial.