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United Nations
S/2006/137Distr.: General3 March 2006Original: English
Security Council
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant toparagraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004)I.Introduction
1.In paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004 the Security Council requestedthe Secretary-General to report to the Council on a quarterly basis on the fulfilment of theresponsibilities of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The presentreport is the seventh submitted pursuant to that resolution.2.The report provides an update on United Nations activities in Iraq since the lastreport (S/2005/766 of 7 December 2005). It presents a summary of key politicaldevelopments in the period under review, particularly with regard to the December 2005elections, the government formation process, and regional developments pertaining toIraq. The report also provides an update on the activities of my Special Representativefor Iraq, Ashraf Qazi, and UNAMI, an assessment of the security situation and an updateon operational and security matters.
II. Summary of key developments in Iraq

A.

The December election and the political process

3.Following the adoption of the new constitution by the Iraqi people in thereferendum held on 15 October 2005, the December election for a new Parliament, theCouncil of Representatives, marked the beginning of the last phase of the politicaltransition process set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and endorsedby the Security Council in resolution 1546 (2004).4.The election held on 15 December 2005 was the third major national electoralevent in Iraq during the past year. Overall, Election Day was calm and no major
incidents were reported. A total of 307 political entities and 19 coalitions encompassingmore than 7,500 candidates representing almost all Iraqi communities and politicalaffiliations entered the contest over 275 seats in the Council of Representatives. Despitesecurity concerns, voter turnout was high throughout the country. A total of 12,191,133valid votes were cast in approximately 6,300 polling centers that accommodated over30,000 polling stations. Of these valid votes, 295,377 were cast abroad, and 203,856were cast in 255 “special” polling centers for detainees, hospital patients, and members ofIraq’s security forces. These figures translate into a voter participation rate of over 75%,a significant increase from the voter turnout in the January 2005 election whichamounted to approximately 58%.5.Compared to the January 2005 election, Sunni Arab voters in the governoratesof Ninewah, Salah al-Din, Tamim and al-Anbar - the governorates with the lowestturnouts in the January election - participated in significantly greater numbers in theDecember 2005 election. Several Sunni Arab and tribal leaders encouraged localpopulations to support the electoral process and in some areas provided protection topolling centers.6.Campaigning was robust across the country - particularly through the use oftelevision, radio, the press and street posters. While overall levels of violence did notincrease in the pre-election period, there were several acts of campaign violence. TheIndependent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) received 190 complaints during theperiod leading up to polling day. The large majority of these complaints related to posterdamage, intimidation, and aggressive conduct by supporters of political entities.However, some of these complaints were of a criminal nature and involved violentattacks resulting in the death of candidates and electoral staff. The IECI as well as mySpecial Representative repeatedly called upon all concerned to refrain from violence andto ensure an environment conducive to full participation in the electoral process.7.Under the new electoral law, parties were to present separate lists of candidatesfor each governorate instead of a single national list as required during the previouselection. These lists were subject to close scrutiny by the De-Baathification Commissionas required by the electoral law. As a result, about 200 candidates were disqualified fromthe election as they did not meet the requirements of the De-Baathification regulations.In compliance with the electoral law, the IECI notified election entities and candidates ofthe decisions of the De-Baathification Commission. In response, some parties replaceddisqualified candidates.8.Numerous safeguards were established to ensure a fair, genuine and transparentelectoral exercise and to discourage attempts at fraud. The IECI deployed pre-electionand post-election auditors, as well as field monitors. Audit teams which includedmembers of the International Electoral Assistance Team visited Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewah,Baghdad, Hilla, and Babil. Field monitors were deployed in most governorates to assessthe implementation and conduct of operations on polling day. In addition, the IECIaccredited over 270,000 political entity agents and more than 130,000 observers,including 949 accredited by international entities and institutions. Accredited observers
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were able to observe all stages of the electoral process, including the “special voting” on12 December 2005 for detainees, hospital patients, and members of the security forces.More than 3,000 political entity agents and observers were accredited to observe andmonitor the Out-of-Country Voting (OCV) which took place in 15 countries from 13-15December.9.The IECI received a total of 1,980 complaints concerning the Decemberelection, of which 58 carried the potential to impact the outcome of a specific pollingstation. As a result of investigations into these complaints, the IECI annulled the resultsof 227 polling stations, issued penalties in 27 cases, and dismissed polling staff involvedin acts associated with attempts at fraud. The IECI also fined several political entitiesand coalitions for breaching electoral regulations.10.On 19 and 20 December 2005, the IECI announced partial election results. Inresponse, forty-three parties - mainly belonging to the Iraqi National Front, the IraqiAccord Front and the National Dialogue Front - formed a joint group to protestintimidation, ballot stuffing, over-registration, improper apportionment of seats togovernorates and other election-related practices including complaints against the IECI.Amid growing protests over the announced partial results, and calls by political partiesfor an external investigation, the IECI welcomed the decision of the International Missionfor Iraq Elections (IMIE), an international non-governmental body comprised mainly ofindependent electoral management bodies, to deploy a monitoring team as part of itsobservation mandate.11.The IMIE monitoring team, which included two senior officials from theLeague of Arab States, was deployed from 1-18 January and assessed post-electionactivities, including the complaints process and audit visits. The IMIE issued its post-election assessment report on 19 January and concluded that the election “generally metinternational standards,” thus paving the way for the announcement of uncertified resultson 20 January. Twelve appeals of the uncertified results were then submitted to theTransitional Electoral Panel. Once these appeals were decided upon, the IECI on 10February announced the certified results.12.The election resulted in 12 political entities and coalitions representing a broadpolitical, ethnic and religious spectrum winning seats in the Council of Representatives.According to the final certified results, the United Iraqi Alliance will remain the largestpolitical bloc in the parliament with 128 seats. The Kurdish Gathering won 53 seats. TheTawafoq Iraqi Front, an alliance of several parties which includes the GeneralConference for the People of Iraq, the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Iraqi National Dialogue,obtained 44 seats. The Iraqi National List won 25 seats, and the Sunni-dominatedNational Iraqi Hewar [Dialogue] Front gained 11 seats. The Islamic Union of Kurdistansecured 5 seats, and the Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering won 3 seats. The“Progressives” List gained two seats. Finally, the Al-Rafedeen List, the Iraqi TurkomanFront, the Mithal Al-Aloosi List for Iraqi Nation, and the Al Ezediah Movement forProgressing and Reform won one seat each.
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13.In conclusion, the election was conducted transparently and credibly. It was aninclusive exercise that succeeded in incorporating all of Iraq’s numerous communitiesand political parties. The fact that it generally met international standards is not a smallachievement, particularly given that the election took place against the backdrop of anambitious timetable and a very challenging political and security environment.

B. Other political developments

14.During the period under review, the focus of attention has shifted from theelectoral process to the process of government formation. According to Article 143 ofthe new constitution, the constitution “shall come into force after the approval of thepeople thereon in a general referendum, its publication in the Official Gazette and theseating of the government that is formed pursuant to this constitution.” The people ofIraq approved the constitution in the 15 October 2005 referendum. The text of theconstitution was published in the Official Gazette on 28 December 2005. Negotiationson government formation are fully under way.15.The constitution stipulates the government formation process in the followingstages: As a first step, the Council of Representatives has to be convened by the currentPresident within 15 days from the date of the ratification of the elections results, or, if anextension is required, no later than 30 days after such certification. At its first meeting,the Council of Representatives shall elect its Speaker and the two Deputy Speakers.16.As a second step, the Council of Representatives shall elect the PresidencyCouncil by a two-thirds majority of its members within 30 days of its first meeting.According to the transitional provisions of the constitution, this Presidency Council,composed of the President and two Vice-Presidents, will replace the office of thePresident of the Republic during the first four-year term under the new constitution.17.As a third step, the Council of Representatives has to elect the Council ofMinisters composed of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The Presidency Council shallcharge the nominee for Prime Minister of the Council of Representatives bloc with thelargest number of seats to form the Cabinet within 15 days from the date of the electionof the Presidency Council. The Prime Minister-designate shall then undertake to preparea Government programme and name the members of his Cabinet within a period not toexceed 30 days from the date of his designation. The Prime Minister-designate will havegained the confidence of the Council of Representatives upon the approval, by anabsolute majority of the Council of Representatives, of the individual Ministers and theministerial programme.18.Given that discussions about government formation have only just begun, thecomposition and programme of the new Government are the subject of intensivediscussions, including the type and structure of government, the choice of prime minister,and agreement on a common agenda. Early indications are that a government of nationalunity is under consideration by most major parties. On 12 February 2006, the UnitedIraqi Alliance - the coalition with the largest number of seats in the Council of
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Representatives - selected Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari as its candidate to continue as PrimeMinister in the new Government. Mr. al-Jaafari narrowly defeated Adil Abdul Mahdiwith 64 votes to 63 after the other two candidates, Nadim al-Jabiri of the Virtue (Fadhila)Party and Hussein Shahristani an independent Shia, withdrew their candidacies shortlybefore the vote.19.The bombing of the holy Shia Shrine of Imams Ali al-Hadi and al-Hasan al-Askari in Samarra in Samarra on 22 February, clearly aimed at provoking sectarian strife,drew immediate condemnation from Iraqi leaders from across the political and religiousspectrum. The bombing followed two particularly violent days in Iraq and provokedinter-communal violence and reprisal attacks in Baghdad, Basra and other urban centres.Sunni mosques were reportedly attacked and a number occupied. There were also reportsof large-scale demonstrations and violent clashes. In order to calm the situation, theGovernment of Iraq imposed a day-time curfew in Baghdad and three provinces.Negotiations on government formation were temporarily put on hold. Subsequently, anumber of meetings among Iraq’s political leaders were held to defuse the crisis andreach agreement on the way forward. At the time of writing, efforts to overcome thecurrent crisis continue, while tensions remain high.20.In a statement issued on the day of the bombing of the Shrine, I expressed deepshock and sadness and appealed to all communities to show maximum restraint in theface of these provocative actions and further called on all political and religious leaders tocome together in a spirit of dialogue and mutual respect to calm the situation and dedicatetheir efforts to ensure the respect of human rights and the protection of places of worship.For his part, my Special Representative immediately launched intensive consultationswith a broad spectrum of senior Iraqi leaders and hosted several important meetingsbetween them to facilitate inter-communal dialogue. My Special Representative alsoannounced that UNAMI would explore the possibility of assisting in the restoration of thedamaged religious sites, with the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP). My Special Representative will remain actively engaged in supporting ongoingefforts to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.

B.

Regional and international developments

21.The November 2005 preparatory meeting in Cairo for Iraqi National Accordinitiated by the League of Arab States concluded in an agreement to hold a conference inBaghdad in late February or early March 2006, with the aim of bringing together a broadrange of representatives of Iraq’s different communities to promote nationalreconciliation. Due to the extended complaints and appeals process following the 15December election for the Council of Representatives and its impact on the process ofGovernment formation, the League of Arab States decided to postpone the conference.22.My Special Representative continued to maintain contact with the participantsof the preparatory Cairo meeting. In his meetings, he recommended various confidence-building measures to which all participants had agreed. He also discussed the possible
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identification of additional issues and groups for the Conference to widen and intensifytalks with those outside the current dialogue. My Special Representative remains fullycommitted to supporting the Government of Iraq and the League of Arab States in thepreparations for the Conference on Iraqi National Accord. He recently met in Baghdadwith the Special Envoy of the League of Arab States, Mustapha Ismail, to discuss plansfor the Conference. The League of Arab States is now planning to convene theConference in early June. I have requested my Special Representative to continue towork closely with the League of Arab States on this initiative.
III. Update on activities of the Mission

A.

Political activities of the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General

23.During the period under review, my Special Representative remained in closetouch with all key Iraqi leaders to support the electoral process, facilitate negotiations onGovernment formation and promote inter-communal dialogue with the aim of nationalreconciliation.24.During the pre-election period, he held regular meetings with a broad spectrum ofpolitical leaders in Baghdad, including the leadership of smaller and minority parties. Healso met with international and local electoral observer groups and with the Board ofCommissioners of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), with a view toensuring that preparations for the election remained on track. During the post-electionperiod, my Special Representative worked closely with the International Commissionerand the IECI to ensure that allegations of fraud and complaints regarding the electionwere addressed through a fully transparent complaints and appeals process. To this end,my Special Representative met with representatives from all parties and conductedthorough discussions with those contesting the results to ensure them that theircomplaints would be duly considered. He also stayed in close contact with theMultinational Force and resident diplomatic missions to keep them abreast of thetabulation of results.25.On 5 December 2005, my Special Representative visited Najaf for the third timeto meet Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Grand Ayatollah al-Najafi. In January 2006,Mr. Qazi had to cancel his planned visits to Erbil and Sulaymaniah, due to the non-availability of the necessary air assets on short notice.26.In Baghdad, my Special Representative hosted a number of prominent Iraqivisitors, including Prime-Minister al-Jaafari, Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi, ForeignMinister Hoshyar Zebari, the President of the Kurdish Regional Government, Massoud
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Barzani and prominent party leaders. He also hosted the Ambassadors to Iraq of China,France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and met withvisitors representing other Governments and Parliaments.27.From 14-16 February, my Special Representative visited Moscow at the invitationof the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Sergey Lavrov. During his visit,he also met with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko, the Russian SpecialEnvoy for Iraq, Sergey Kirchenko, and other officials. My Special Representative had aconstructive exchange of views on the situation in Iraq and the role of the United Nations.28.On 20 and 21 February 2006, respectively, my Special Representative visitedFalluja and Ramadi. Given the prevailing security environment in al-Anbar province,this was his first occasion to visit these important cities. He met with the Governor ofAnbar and members of the Provincial Council. Separately, he met with the localCommanders of the Multinational Force to discuss the security and political situation. InFalluja, Mr. Qazi met the Mayor and the Chief of Police. In all his meetings, the questionof respect for detainee rights were raised, as was the importance of fully implementingagreements dealing with compensation for damages incurred by homeowners and localbusiness people in the wake of counter-insurgency operations.

B.

Electoral assistance activities

29.Throughout the process leading to polling day, the International ElectoralAssistance Team (IEAT), operating under the policy direction of the United Nations-appointed International Commissioner of the IECI, Mr. Craig Jenness, and with expertsfrom the United Nations, the European Union and IFES, worked closely with the IECI toprovide assistance and support to ensure the timely and successful conduct of theelection.30.The IEAT provided support in the recruitment and training of approximately210,000 polling officials, as well as in the registration and certification of 326 politicalentities and coalitions, with over 7,500 candidates. The IEAT also helped in theaccreditation of some 400,000 political entity agents and observers. Additionally, theteam oversaw the procurement, transportation, distribution, and storage of electoralmaterials. It also assisted with the implementation of operational activities and helped inestablishing the Tally Center, which tabulated results from over 30,000 polling stationsacross the country.31.The IEAT supported the development of required regulations and procedures forthe conduct of the election, and provided legal advice to the Board of Commissioners onseveral issues related to the electoral process. The legal support also included assistancein streamlining the complaints process, including the complaints database, the triage andresolution procedures, and enhancing the capacities of the IECI legal team, which wassupported by lawyers hired from the Baghdad Bar. The Assistance Team also assisted incarrying out field audits, and helped the IECI enhance its monitoring procedures andpractices.
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32.The Assistance Team worked closely with the IECI in developing its votereducation strategy and public outreach programmes. The Assistance Team assisted in thedesign, production, and distribution of 5 million posters and 2 million pamphlets in fivelanguages; the placement of advertisements explaining the electoral process in 37newspapers across the country, on 14 TV channels, 75 billboards, and several radiostations. The team also helped with the accreditation of media officials, the organizationof press events, and the maintenance of the IECI website.33.Out-of-Country Voting was conducted from 12-13 December in 15 countriesusing a total of 560 polling stations. The programme was successfully implemented bythe IECI. To supplement the IECI efforts in this regard, the IEAT provided support ongeneral planning, including logistics and operations, and helped with the drafting of thenecessary regulations and procedures.34.During the past year, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq has built aconsiderable capacity of its own. As requested by the Government of Iraq, the UnitedNations will continue to provide electoral assistance in 2006. Priority activities willinclude the organization of a lessons learned exercise concerning the referendum on theconstitution and the December election, strengthening of electoral institutions, includingthe creation of a permanent Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), support forupcoming governorate and local elections and other electoral events, and providingtechnical advice and support in the upgrading of the voter register.

C. Constitutional support activities

35.Based on ongoing preliminary consultations with a broad spectrum of politicalleaders, academic institutions and non-governmental organizations, the UNAMI Office ofConstitutional Support has been engaged in preparations for assisting in the constitutionalreview process envisaged by the constitution and in developing the legislation,institutions and processes necessary to ensure the effective implementation of theconstitution. Building upon its comprehensive support activities during the previousphase leading to the referendum on constitution on 15 October 2005, UNAMI OCS plansto engage with the new Iraqi authorities and other Iraqi leaders on both procedural andsubstantive issues as early as practicable during the government formation processcurrently under way.36.In preparation for its support role in the constitutional review process, UNAMIOCS is developing advice on the management of the constitutional review processoutlining the key issues that the new Council of Representatives and Government of Iraqwill need to consider in terms of the establishment and rules of procedure of theconstitutional review committee. UNAMI OCS will also provide advice on thesubstantive issues for consideration by this committee.37.With regard to the broader process of implementing the constitution, UNAMI isdeveloping action plans on Federalism/Decentralization, Rule of Law and Human Rightsand National Reconciliation – all of which contain a regional outreach component. These
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plans include a series of workshops aimed at facilitating engagement on the majorconstitutional issues that have been designed in cooperation with other United Nationspartners. The seminars will take place mostly in the region, but also inside Iraq andcountries outside the region. As a follow-up, the Iraqi participants will brief theirconstituencies or professional and civil society organizations on the main conclusions ofthese seminars. UNAMI OCS intends to assist in these events with funding and experts,if required.38.In the coming months, UNAMI OCS will further develop its support activities,based on continuous broad-based consultations with the members of the Council ofRepresentatives, the Iraqi Government and its international partners. I welcome that theEuropean Union remains committed to actively supporting UNAMI’s efforts in this area,including through significant additional financial contributions. Other countries,including Canada, Denmark and Japan have also signaled interest to support UNAMI’sconstitutional support activities.

D.

Reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance

39.In accordance with paragraph 7 (b) of resolution 1546 (2004), UNAMI continuedto support the efforts of the Government of Iraq in the areas of reconstruction,development and humanitarian assistance. UNAMI and United Nations agencies,programmes and funds focused on strengthening management capacities in ministries,providing and coordinating basic services, and restoring public infrastructure. UNAMIalso maintained its leading role in donor coordination. Given the prevailing securityconditions and the constraints on the number of staff deployed inside Iraq, many ofUNAMI’s reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance activities continue tobe carried out mainly through international and national implementing partners.40.UNAMI’s continued support of Iraqi-led Sector Working Groups resulted inenhanced donor participation in critical sectors such as health, education, rule of law andenergy. As part of its support to the implementation of the National DevelopmentStrategy, UNAMI has been facilitating the coordination and information flow betweenthe centre and the provinces. This initiative, led by the Ministry of Planning andDevelopment Cooperation, is supported directly by an international UNAMI Adviserseconded to the Ministry. UNAMI has also been facilitating regular participation ofsenior Government officials in regional and provincial coordination fora. Similarly,UNAMI has continued to facilitate the participation of local officials in discussions withthe Baghdad Coordination Group, the Iraqi Strategic Review Board and other centralbodies responsible for reconstruction and development and the allocation of resources.41.UNAMI has continued to ensure effective donor coordination in Baghdad, led bythe Deputy Reconstruction and Humanitarian Coordinator. This has allowed for thearticulation of common positions between members of the donor community onreconstruction and development challenges, as well as the exchange of information onbilateral donor programmes leading to enhanced efficiency. UNAMI coordination effortshave also led to a greater international focus on issues affecting civil society in Iraq. A
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Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer seconded by UNAMI will assist the PrimeMinister’s Office in the creation of an Emergency Coordination and Response Cell.42.In an effort to complement the political support role of my SpecialRepresentative, my Deputy Special Representative for Reconstruction, Development andHumanitarian Affairs in Iraq, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his team have emphasized theneed for Iraqi leadership on humanitarian and development initiatives as a fundamentalelement to promote political stability.43.Ongoing military activities continue to impact on a significant number of Iraqicivilians, especially in the Western parts of the country. It is estimated that nearly100,000 families remain displaced nationwide, although there have been returns to sometowns in al-Anbar and Ninewa provinces. UNAMI, United Nations agencies and theirpartners continued to provide food, shelter and non-food items. Depots were establishedfor pre-positioning stocks in order to facilitate swift responses to possible emergencies.Efforts to mobilize contingency funding from the International Reconstruction FundFacility for Iraq (IRRFI) and donors have begun to show positive results. It is hoped thatthis will ensure long-term support for vulnerable civilian populations.44.The capacity of UNAMI to mobilize United Nations agencies through theEmergency Working Group and to coordinate efforts with local authorities, has mostrecently been demonstrated during the flooding reported in nine Governorates (Basra,Diyala, Dohuk, Erbil, Missan, Sallah al-Din, Sulaymaniyah, Tameen and Wassit) which,according to initial indications, affected approximately 7,890 families or more than47,000 individuals. Within 24 hours the Area Coordinator established contact with localauthorities, civil society and United Nations agencies, to coordinate United Nationsassistance. A special appeal is being developed to request funding for at least the nextthree months.45.On 30 January 2006, Avian influenza was confirmed as the cause of death of onecitizen in Suleymaniyah Governorate in the north of Iraq. This was followed by anotherconfirmed case in the same area, as well as a possible case in the South. The UNAMIHealth Cluster has taken the lead in coordinating the response. A joint technicalassessment team of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO) traveled to Iraq to determine the next steps for supporting theGovernment’s monitoring and response capacity.46.In preparation for its support role to the new Government of Iraq, the UnitedNations Country Team is revisiting its strategic plan for 2006-2008. Common CountryProgramme training was conducted in early February. The results will be integrated intothe strategic plans of the agency and Cluster activities, which are linked to the NationalDevelopment Strategy.

E.

International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq

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47.As of 31 January 2006, the total contributions to the United NationsDevelopment Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund, one of the two windows of theInternational Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), was $903.4 million. A totalof 83 projects valued at $759.3 million were approved at the end of January for fundingunder the Iraq Trust Fund. At the same time, contracts worth $564.2 million had beeninitiated (74 per cent of approved funding) and $430.1 million (57% per cent of approvedfunding) had been disbursed. These figures represent further progress in deliveringnotable contributions to the reconstruction and development goals of Iraq, particularlyconsidering the security and institutional circumstances under which activities are beingcarried out.48.The highest level of disbursement remained with the Support to the ElectoralProcess Cluster ($153.2 million of $174.7 million approved funding). This reflects asignificant level of assistance given to the IECI, most recently in organizing theDecember 2005 election. The Infrastructure Rehabilitation Cluster also posted asignificant disbursement of $87.6 million (of $228.9 million of approved funding).Together with disbursements under the Education and Culture Cluster ($71million) andthe Health and Nutrition Cluster ($40.3 million), this represents a major contribution insupport of the provision of basic services.49.The UNDG Iraq Trust Fund continues to promote increased transparency andaccountability in its operations, particularly through the active use of its web site(www.irffi.org). Monthly newsletters, highlights of project progress, details onprocurement opportunities and contract award information by all agencies, are posted onthe site.50.The fifth IRFFI Donor Committee Meeting planned for June 2006 is anopportunity for the new Government of Iraq to present its development priorities.UNAMI will play a key role in this process, as well as in supporting the Government inits substantive preparations for the meeting.

F.

Human rights activities

51.The human rights situation in Iraq remains a cause of great concern. The UNAMIHuman Rights Office (HRO) continues to receive consistent allegations of human rightsviolations from individuals, local and national human rights groups, as well as domesticand foreign media. While investigations into these allegations remain difficult due to theprevailing security situation, the UNAMI Human Rights Office has been able tocorroborate claims through contacts with key Ministries, local authorities and a country-wide civil society network.52.The Government of Iraq faced persistent attacks and terrorist actions by armedgroups in large parts of the country challenging the stability of the country, its ability toprotect its citizens, and its capacity to provide basic services. Repeated bombings againstcivilians, mosques and more recently against churches are creating fear, animosity andfeelings of revenge within the communities. A new high in this trend has been observed11
during the reporting period. In Baghdad alone, 787 bodies were received by the ForensicInstitute in December 2005. Of these bodies, 479 had gunshot wounds. In general,violent tactics have been used by armed groups to kill thousands of police officers andmembers of the Iraqi security forces over the last months. Other professional groupssuch as journalists have also paid a high price—since March 2003, over 80 journalistsand media workers have lost their lives due to terrorist attacks.53.The rule of law continues to be challenged by the existence of militias and othergroups that continue to act with impunity at both the local and regional levels. InNorthern Iraq, thousands of Kurdish militias (Peshmerga) have been recruited into Iraqiarmy divisions. The consolidation of local militia power in Southern Iraq is resulting insystematic acts of violence against members of the Sunni community in the area. Suchdevelopments, including recent efforts to form a Sunni Arab militia, could seriouslyhamper efforts at promoting national accord.54.At the same time, the internment of thousands of Iraqis by the Multinational Forceand the Iraqi authorities constitutes de facto arbitrary detention. The extent of suchpractices is not consistent with provisions of international law governing internment onimperative reasons of security. The problems faced by the prison system in Iraq alsoremain a matter of particular concern. These detentions are of dubious consistence withIraqi law, which provides safeguards, limits and conditions that govern authorities otherthan the Ministry of Justice entitled to hold people in detention.55.On 14 November 2005, the Multinational Force and Iraqi security forces carriedout a joint inspection of Al-Jadiryia detention facility run by the Ministry of Interior andrevealed the confinement of 170 detainees. According to various sources, 101 detaineesbore signs of torture and 18 were reported to have died while being detained. The PrimeMinister’s decision to establish an investigative committee to examine Al-Jadiryia abuseswas welcomed by all communities. However, the results of the investigation committeewhich were to be published at the end of November 2005have not yet been made public,nor have any individuals been brought to justice. I am concerned by the delay inpublishing the results of the investigation and in bringing the perpetrators to justice. On10 February, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote to the Prime Ministerasking for the report of the investigation to be released promptly. A separate inquiry waslaunched to determine the legality and conditions of detention in Iraq, but the findings ofthis inquiry have not yet been made public.56.Military operations conducted by the Multinational Force and Iraqi securityforces, especially in the al-Anbar Governorate, have raised a number of human rightsconcerns. Allegations of restrictions to freedom of movement, excessive use of force,mistreatment and theft during raids of private homes, evictions and demolitions of houseshave been received by UNAMI. Such allegations were also raised during the visit of mySpecial Representative to Ramadi and Falluja on 20 and 21 February 2006, respectively.UNAMI is following-up these issues with the Multinational Force and the relevant Iraqiauthorities.
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57.UNAMI continues constructive dialogue with key Iraqi Ministries dealing withlaw and order in Iraq. The Human Rights Office is currently developing a robust humanrights strategy and coordinating efforts to set up a strong national human rights protectionsystem. This will include the creation of an Iraqi human rights institution independent ofthe Government of Iraq. At the same time, the office is working to strengthen thecapacities of key ministries and civil society organizations to promote and protect humanrights in conformity with international human rights treaties and the new constitution.The Human Rights Office aims to strengthen its capacity to monitor the human rightssituation in Iraq and support efforts to ensure a coherent approach to transitional justice,including establishing facts, creating effective accountability mechanisms for pastviolations, and identifying missing and disappeared individuals.58.The second meeting of the Rule of Law Sector Group was held in Baghdad on 15February. Representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Defence and HumanRights, some members of the Shura Council (Higher Judicial body in Iraq) and donorsattended the meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Higher Judicial Council.The meeting agreed on the Terms of Reference of the Working Group, as well as thebroad areas to be covered. The meeting was also an opportunity to map out current donorassistance in this sector.59.The trial of Saddam Hussein and seven co-defendants has continued. Followingthe ejection from the courtroom of Barzan Hassan by the presiding judge on 29 Januaryin the wake of an outburst which amounted to contempt, Saddam Hussein walked out ofthe courtroom. He was followed by his team of privately-retained counsel. The defencecounsel for Saddam Hussein and the other co-defendants failed to appear in court on 1February and were replaced by an Iraq Higher Tribunal duty counsel, as provided forunder Iraqi law. Those of the accused who appeared in court on 1 February signalledtheir disquiet with the replacement of their counsel. None of the accused appeared on 2February. The defendants were compelled to appear in the courtroom on the order of thepresiding judge on 13 February and the court heard additional witnesses on 13 and 14February. The privately-retained counsel have not been reinstated by the Trial Chamberand the right of the defendants to legal counsel of their choice, together with the conductof the court to maintain order in the trial, still remain key issues.
IV.

A.

Security and operational issues

Assessment of the security situation

60.Iraq remains a dangerous place and United Nations staff members are at risk ofbecoming targets of violence. The political transition and attempts to maintain securityby the Multinational Force and Iraqi security forces have been accompanied by thedevelopment of an increasingly complex armed opposition capable of carrying out aconsistently high level of violent activity across the country, with Baghdad, Mosul andthe western province of Anbar experiencing the worst of the destruction. Although thesouthern and northern governorates are less affected, some areas, particularly Basra and
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Kirkuk, have recently witnessed increased tension and a growing number of violentincidents.61.The lethal character of attacks remains high, with large numbers of casualties,especially among civilians, particularly those seeking to join the security forces. Trendsin both targeting and technology are disturbing. In terms of targets, Iraqis involved inwork associated with the Multinational Force, foreign construction companies, andinfrastructure concerns (such as oil production companies) are seen to be of interest to thevarious armed opposition groups, as well as politicians, government workers and theirfamilies. Attacks and kidnappings of foreigners, including journalists and humanitarianworkers, have once again increased. These attacks, coupled with the destruction ofcritical infrastructure, have resulted in severe disruptions in the delivery of essentialservices across the country, including fuel, water and electricity. The targeting of thediplomatic community continues, as embassy staff are being abducted and killed andtheir facilities are being attacked. As for technology, the percentage of casualties anddeaths caused by improvised explosive devices has increased, a trend which can beattributed to improvements in their design, especially in terms of their detonation andarmour penetration capabilities.62.The deteriorating situation is further evinced by the increased levels of sectarianstrife, including almost daily reports of inter-communal intimidation and murder. InBaghdad and its surrounding areas, there are regular reports of bodies of Shia and Sunnimen with signs of torture and summary execution. Violence affecting Kurds and Arabshas also been reported in Kirkuk, while the abduction and intimidation of ordinary Iraqiscontinue to be a growing problem.63.The situation in Basra has also been tense, and the Multinational Force hasrestricted the freedom of movement in this area. Recently, the airport was partiallyclosed under order from the Ministry of Transportation in Baghdad. Demonstrators havedemanded the handover of security responsibilities to local authorities.64.The security of the International Zone (IZ) in Baghdad, which is home to UNAMIpremises, is of great importance to all occupants, including the United Nations.Accordingly, the situation, which is in the midst of a transition from Multinational Forceprimacy to that of the Iraqi Security Forces, is under constant review by UNAMI andDSS. At the moment, the integrity of the IZ perimeter and internal checkpoints are beingmaintained, but the topic is a regular point of discussion with the Multinational Force toensure that the current level of security is sustained. From 9-13 February 2006, theUnder-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, David Veness visited Iraq. During hisvisit, he held discussions with interlocutors from UNAMI and the Multinational Force, aswell as senior Iraqi officials, as part of the continuous United Nations review of securityconditions in Iraq.65.The Organization’s presence and its ability to operate effectively in Iraq remainseverely constrained by the security environment. This high risk setting greatly restrictsfreedom of movement, especially by road. In order to provide United Nations staff
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members with the best security possible, and therefore ensure that the Organization isable to maintain a presence in Iraq, a number of mitigating and protective measures havebeen introduced, which are both expensive and time-consuming. These constraintsunderline the responsibility of all staff members to strictly adhere to the securitymeasures in place. However, even in this regard, the United Nations is dependent on theMultinational Force for movement security and threat information. To keep pace withthe constantly changing security dynamics, UNAMI’s security unit requires access toaccurate information on a regular and timely basis. In this regard, I would like to thankmember states for responding positively to a request in my last report for additionalmilitary advisers and military liaison officers.66.I remain grateful to Fiji for the contribution of personal security detail and guardunits and for the “middle ring” protection provided by troops from Georgia, Romania andthe Republic of Korea. Contributions to the trust fund established to support a distinctentity under the unified command of the Multinational Force, with a dedicated mission toprovide security for the United Nations presence in Iraq, stand at over $20 million from15 Member States. Payments to Georgia and Romania for “middle-ring” protection as of31 December 2005 amounted to $7.9 million. An interim financial report of the TrustFund and a briefing were provided to the contributors in January 2006. I thank MemberStates for their continued support in allocating the necessary personnel, equipment andoperating funds to UNAMI.

B.

Facilities, logistics and support

67.The availability of dedicated air assets is essential for the Mission to implementits mandate effectively. However, the acquisition of such assets by the United Nations inIraq remains a major challenge. The deployment of additional personnel to Erbil andBasra continues to remain on hold until this issue is resolved. Several Member States andNATO were approached with a request to provide such assets. So far, no positiveresponses have been received. I strongly urge Member States with the necessarycapabilities to assist the United Nations with this critical requirement.68.UNAMI continues to maintain offices in Baghdad, Kuwait and Amman, as wellas small United Nations liaison detachments in Erbil and Basra. The construction of thenew regional office in Erbil is completed. UNAMI national staff have already movedinto the new premises there. The refurbishment and construction of the Basra regionaloffice has advanced with the living quarters for the UN Guard Unit and offices forpersonnel now completed. Additional infrastructure requirements are near completionand the finalization of the whole project is expected in late March or early April 2006.69.I am grateful to the Government of Iraq for offering the United Nations a site inBaghdad. UNAMI is now exploring the possibility of establishing, as a matter ofurgency, a single integrated UN compound at this site, which could serve as a long-termlocation for the United Nations presence in Iraq.

C.

Agreements

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70.An agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America withrespect to the protection of the United Nations presence in Iraq by the MultinationalForce was concluded on 8 December 2005. This agreement forms an importantfoundation for the security of United Nations staff in Iraq. I welcome its conclusion.UNAMI is currently in the process of negotiating a series of supplementary arrangementswith the Multinational Force to implement this agreement, and I look forward to theirearly finalization.71.The United Nations continues to await approval of the Status-of-MissionAgreement with the Government of Iraq, signed on 3 June 2005. This confirmation isimportant, as it will offer UNAMI the necessary legal status to allow it to fulfill itsmandate and tasks. The agreement will enter into force following the completion of anexchange of notes of approval between the parties. The United Nations sent such a noteto the Government of Iraq on 6 June 2005, and I urge the newly-elected Government ofIraq to confirm its approval by way of a corresponding note.72.Despite a number of requests for action by UNAMI, the agreement between theState of Kuwait and the United Nations concerning the activities of UNAMI in Kuwait isstill awaiting ratification by the Parliament of Kuwait. The delay in ratification hasbecome an obstacle to the operations of the United Nations in the region. I neverthelesswelcome the decision of Kuwait to address the anomalous legal situation of UNAMIlocally-recruited staff by issuing residency permits for a period of one year.
V.
Observations
73.With the certification of the results of the December election on 10 February2006, the transition timetable set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law andendorsed by resolution 1546 (2004) has been completed. While Iraq has met all the keybenchmarks of this timetable, it continues to face formidable political, security andeconomic challenges. As demonstrated by the heinous bombing of the Imams al-Hadiand al-Askari Shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006 and its aftermath, sectarianviolence has emerged as a main threat to the security and stability of Iraq. Mutual trustand national reconciliation must remain the top priority in setting Iraq on an irreversiblepath towards a peaceful and democratic future. The political and civil society leadershipof Iraq must proclaim and implement their commitments to the unconditional respect forindividual human rights and the establishment of the rule of law. In this endeavour, Iraqwill continue to require sustained international support in the years to come.74.The United Nations continues to believe that sustained and enhanced efforts topromote an inclusive, participatory and transparent political process that responds to theaspirations of all of Iraq’s communities offer the best prospects for improving the overallsecurity situation, consolidating the democratic process and improving the welfare of theIraqi people. Recent calls for calm, restraint and dialogue by a diverse spectrum of Iraq’spolitical leaders give grounds for hope. The need for sustained inter-communal dialogueand confidence-building measures to promote national reconciliation is all the more
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urgent now. The United Nations will continue to do everything possible to support suchefforts.75.In the coming period, the United Nations will therefore continue to make everyeffort to implement its mandate under UN Security Council resolutions 1546 (2004) and1637 (2005), maintaining its core political, electoral and constitutional activities underparagraph 7(a) of resolution 1546 (2004) as well as developing a phased integratedapproach for planning and implementing its reconstruction, development, humanitarianand human rights activities, as circumstances permit. In doing so, the emphasis of itsoverall political strategy will be to institutionalize these processes and to promotenational dialogue and reconciliation.76.While the December election for the new Council of Representatives was the thirdnational electoral event during the past year, it was the first election in which all Iraqiconstituencies participated in large numbers as candidates and voters. The fact that theelection generally met international standards and enjoyed a high turnout, despite anambitious timetable and a very challenging political and security environment, is not asmall achievement. During the past year, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraqhas built a considerable capacity of its own, which will be a solid foundation for theconduct of future electoral events. As requested by the Government of Iraq, the UnitedNations will continue to provide electoral assistance in 2006.77.With the discussions on government formation under way, Iraq has embarked onthe next important phase of its political transition. I am encouraged that the new Councilof Representatives is broadly representative of Iraq’s communities and includes asubstantial percentage of women. It is now incumbent on the parties represented in thenew Council to work with resolve toward the early formation of a fully inclusiveGovernment, which remains a major challenge. Once established, the new Governmentwill have a unique opportunity to demonstrate responsible leadership by uniting todevelop an agreed national compact that is responsive to the aspirations of all of Iraq’scommunities.78.The constitutional review process envisaged by the constitution will be a key stepto forge such a national compact. The constitution provides for the early establishment ofa Constitutional Review Committee of the Council of Representatives. It is my hope thatthe members of the new Council will use this process to reach a national consensus on astrong framework for the Iraqi State, which is an essential prerequisite for the country’slong-term stability. Based on preliminary consultations with a broad spectrum ofpolitical leaders, the United Nations, in close cooperation with the European Union andother international partners, is fully committed to supporting the constitutional reviewprocess and the effective implementation of the constitution.79.The completion of the transition timetable should also encourage Iraq’s politicaland economic reintegration into the region. Building on initiatives undertaken so far,there is a need to consider new ways to promote greater regional engagement betweenIraq and its neighbours. While regional countries have legitimate concerns about the
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current situation in Iraq, they also have an essential responsibility to do everythingpossible to promote peace and stability in the country. I remain supportive of theinitiative by the League of Arab States to convene a Conference on Iraqi NationalAccord, which could potentially contribute to forging a broader national consensus inIraq. In addition, the time has come to take the necessary steps to normalize Iraq’sinternational status, particularly in the Security Council.80.UNAMI’s focus over the past year has been on the implementation of thebenchmarks envisaged by UN Security Council resolution 1546 (2004). While politicalfacilitation will remain a priority in 2006, UNAMI intends to strengthen its activities inthe other key areas of its mandate, particularly in the areas of reconstruction anddevelopment. One of the key priorities of the new Iraqi Government will be the tangibleimprovement of the quality of life for all Iraqis. UNAMI will therefore maintain animportant role in donor coordination. UNAMI also intends to increase its assistanceactivities in seven key areas which are focused on strengthening the managementcapacity in ministries, coordinating the provision of basic services and supporting therestoration of public infrastructure. The fifth International Reconstruction Fund Facilityfor Iraq Donor Committee Meeting planned for June should also be seen as an importantopportunity in this regard.81.The human rights situation in Iraq remains a cause of great concern. In its latestbi-monthly human rights report, UNAMI alerted the international community to issues ofmass detention, torture and extrajudicial killings. The Multinational Force and the Iraqisecurity forces have a particular responsibility to act in full accordance with internationalhumanitarian and human rights law. While the Government has taken initial steps toaddress the situation, there is a need for further measures to ensure that both past andpresent abuses are dealt with based on the rule of law and in accordance withinternational obligations. Without an improvement in the human rights situation, thedevelopment of mutual trust and national reconciliation efforts will prove elusive. Onceestablished, the new Government will have a particular responsibility to enhance itsefforts in this regard.82.I remain gravely concerned by the security situation as demonstrated by the largenumber of casualties among civilians as a result of terrorist, insurgent, paramilitary andmilitary action. I also remain very concerned about the increasingly sectarian nature ofthe violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas, to which the almost daily reports ofinter-communal intimidation, murder and attacks against sacred buildings bear testimony.The role of militias and irregular armed elements remains disturbing in this regard. Thetraining of Iraqi security forces is an indispensable step to improve the security situation.I take note of the efforts of the Multinational Force in this regard. Ultimately, the bestway to address the security situation beyond the training of Iraqi security forces is acredible and inclusive political process, as well as the quick improvement of the basicliving conditions of the Iraqi people.83.While UNAMI is seeking to step up its activities following the completion of thetransition timetable endorsed by resolution 1546 (2004), in the current political and
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security environment in Iraq United Nations staff members remain at risk of becomingtargets of violence. Staff security therefore remains UNAMI’s overarching guidingprinciple. Given the continuously changing environment on the ground, UNAMI mustdevelop flexible plans for its operations and security arrangements. Although the natureof the deployment of the Multinational Force is likely to change, UNAMI’s need for adedicated protection force for all its activities in Iraq remains. Operational constraints,such as the lack of dedicated air assets, will also have to be addressed as a matter ofpriority. I look forward to the continuing engagement with Member States on thepractical steps that need to taken to provide UNAMI with the necessary level of supportin order to fulfill its long-term commitment of the United Nations to supporting thepeople of Iraq. The development of a new integrated United Nations complex in Iraq willbe essential in this regard.84.As Iraq enters a new phase of its transition, I am pleased that UNAMI, under theleadership of my Special Representative, Mr. Ashraf Qazi, was able to provide all thenecessary assistance in enabling Iraq to meet the key benchmarks of its politicaltransition under resolution 1546 (2004). I also wish to pay tribute to the national andinternational staff of UNAMI and United Nations agencies for their dedicated work undervery challenging circumstances.
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