FORUM 266 FOR 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl ia me n ta ry  As s e mb l y PARLIAMENTARY TRANSATLANTIC FORUM SECRETARIAT REPORT Washington D.C., United States 5-6 December 2005 International Secretariat 19 December 2005 * This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

266 FOR 05 E 1 1. Over 70 parliamentarians from 19 NATO member states, along with several legislators from associate  countries,  held  their  5th  Parliamentary  Transatlantic  Forum  at  the  National  Defense University  (NDU)  in  Washington  DC  on  December  5  and  6.  The  meeting,  co-organised  by  the NATO  PA, the  Atlantic Council  of the  United  States  and  NDU,  confirmed  to  be  a  very  important event for European legislators to understand the policies of the US government and discuss the state of transatlantic relations. 2. Four years after 9/11 it is clear that the terrorist attacks on the United States represented a dramatic and permanent change in terms of the American people’s perception of the world. As a consequence,  the  “global  war  on  terror”  and  the  spread  of  democracy  in  the  Middle  East  have come to define the presidency of George W Bush, now in his fifth year in the White House. Despite increasing  domestic  criticism  of  the  administration’s  conduct  in  Iraq,  there  is  still  a  fairly  broad consensus  in  the  United  States  on  the  fact  that  the  ambitious  project  of  bringing  democracy  to Arab-Muslim countries in the broader Middle East - seen as crucial to win the war on terrorism - has come to define US foreign policy. 3. All US speakers, from both the administration and Washington think-tanks, indicated that a majority  in  the  United  States  was  convinced  that  the  spread  of  democracy  was  a  necessary enterprise, because truly democratic countries do not sponsor or produce terrorism and tend to be reluctant  to  wage  war.  Differences,  however,  appeared  to  be  quite  sharp  on  the  tactics  to  fight terrorism  and  on  how  aggressively  pursuing  the  democratization  of  the  Arab  Muslim  world. Participants from Europe clarified that, although their countries subscribed to the project of bringing democracy  to  the  broader  Middle  East,  there  was  a  distinction  between  the  two  sides  of  the Atlantic in terms of the respect of legality and civil liberties, as the recent disagreements on the CIA renditions  of  prisoners  had  demonstrated.  One  speaker  from  the  US  added  that  the  perception around  the  world  that  some  in  Washington  were  supporting  illegal  procedures  was  already undermining the US credibility with regard to the spread of democracy. It was “appalling”, he said, that members of the Bush administration were openly “negotiating with the Congress on the use of torture”. Other participants contended that Europeans were more inclined to strengthen democratic institutions in the region through dialogue and cooperation, using tools such as the now 10-year old EU  Barcelona  process,  in  which  context  a  code  of  conduct  against  terrorism  had  recently  been approved, or NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. 4. US  discussants  recognised  that  the  war  on  terrorism  could  not  be  won  only  by  military means.  One  of  them  even  warned  against  "over-militarising"  the  issue,  because  "responding militarily to the terrorist threat is more often than not going to backfire". Responses to terrorism, he added, should be overwhelmingly based on intelligence and law enforcement, with the addition of some  targeted  use  of  special  forces.  Another  discussant  stressed  the  need  to  invest  more  in human  intelligence,  the  lack  of  which  had  been  one  of  the  major  reasons  for  the  intelligence failures leading to 9/11. 5. One  administration  official  divided  terrorist groups  into four  distinct  baskets: (1)  Anarchists, executing   violence   for  their   personal  goals;  (2)   State-sponsored;   (3)  Westphalian  terrorists, probably  the  largest  group,  including  insurgents,  secessionists  seeking  political  change;  and  (4) Caliphatists,  inspired  by  the  radical  Islamist  "vision"  of  re-establishing  a  Caliphate  that  would reunite all Muslims.  He admitted that boundaries between the last two categories were permeable, and indicated for instance that groups such as Hezbollah, typically belonging to the fourth group, could  eventually  become  Westphalian.  The  advantage  of  this  was  that  "all  the  Westphalian terrorists can be appeased tomorrow", whereas the Caliphatists could never be appeased and are therefore the most dangerous. Muslim participants in the audience objected to this classification, seen as an oversimplification of a complex issue. The Caliphate "vision", they said, is often utilised as an excuse by terrorists with a political agenda who used the Islamic rhetoric in order to appeal to people in the Arab Muslim world. 6. The still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict was indicated by many European participants as  another  major  driver  for  instability  and  terrorism  in  the  Middle  East.  Some  US  speakers

266 FOR 05 E 2 disagreed, believing that the long-overdue resolution of that conflict would certainly ease tensions in the region, but would not stop terrorism. Some positive signals were highlighted, following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip last August. In particular, some mentioned the positive role  played  by  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union  together  with  regard  to  the  recent opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. This, it was said, demonstrated the need for a concerted transatlantic effort to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion. 7. Palestinian  presidential  elections  in  2005  had  sent  a  positive  signal  and  everybody  was looking   forward   to   the   legislative   elections   scheduled   for   25   January   2006   to   confirm   the democratic progress of the PA. One US speaker expressed concern, however, about the risk of Hamas  making  a  good  score  in  the  elections  in  January.  Another  US  analyst  warned  against integrating terrorist groups that also had a "political branch", such as Hamas and Hezbollah, into the democratic process, as "it could backfire". Some Europeans disagreed, believing that bringing Hamas into the political process might help mitigate its more radical positions. The example of the Muslim  Brotherhood  in  countries  like  Jordan  or  Egypt  was  cited  by  some  as  an  example  of  a radical organisation which was able to transform and integrate in the democratic process of those countries. 8. A  degree  of  transatlantic  consensus  emerged  on  the  need  to  tackle  the  root  causes  of terrorism.  There  was,  however,  some  disagreement  among  participants  about  whether  poverty should  be  seen  as  a  generating  factor  for  terrorism.  US  discussants  excluded  it  categorically, whereas other participants from allied countries were more nuanced.  Poverty might not be a direct cause,  they  contended,  but  certainly  when  associated  with  desperation  and  absence  of  political perspectives would provide "fertile soil" for terrorist groups to thrive. The example of the situation of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was cited in this regard. One US speaker disagreed:  the  root  causes,  he  insisted,  were  in  the  political  culture  of  the  Middle  East,  where leaders based their power on force and corruption rather than on legitimate democratic institutions and the rule-of-law. Also, another US discussant declared that these regimes in the Arab Muslim world were reluctant to take a clear stance against terrorism. 9. The  situation  in  the  Middle  East,  most  US  speakers  said,  justified  the  Bush  strategy  of bringing democracy to the region. But, others asked, was it going to work? According to a more sceptical  view  something  in  the  culture  of  the  region  seemed  to  prevent  it.  Others  expressed  a more optimistic view and indicated, as an example, that in the aftermath of World War II analysts were  sceptical  about  bringing  democracy  to  Japan.    Some  European  legislators  doubted  that Western-style democracy could be imposed to the Muslim world, certainly not by force or political diktat,  and  questioned  the  “messianic”  tone  of  American  neo-conservatives  who  had  helped shaping the “Bush Doctrine”. Arab countries, they contended, should be encouraged to find their own  brand  of  democracy,  adapted  to  their  traditions  and  culture.  US  discussants  were  more inclined to think that democracy was a universal value and it was only a question of time for it to spread around the Middle East. 10. The  war  in  Iraq,  in  the  opinion  of  one  US  discussant,  was  precisely  intended  to  ”kick-start democracy in the Middle East” and had ”changed 50 years of US policy in the Middle East”. The same speaker admitted that by imposing democracy with military means the Bush administration had also perhaps “opened a Pandora’s box”. Many Europeans stressed that the presence of US troops in Iraq had greatly contributed to the rise of Islamist radicalism and terrorism in the whole region, and neighbouring countries friends of the West, such as Jordan, were paying a very high price for this. There was also general agreement that the reconstruction phase in Iraq had not been planned  carefully  enough  and  the  US  administration  had  made  several  mistakes.  However,  the overall question “are we better off today?” remained basically unanswered. 11. With regard to the future of Iraq, one speaker indicated that three views were now shaping up in the United States: (1) The United States had done what it could but now its troops were part of the problem, therefore they should be withdrawn as quick as possible; (2) An immediate withdrawal was  counterproductive,  but  troops  should  be  re-deployed  gradually;  (3)  Any  clear  deadline  for

266 FOR 05 E 3 withdrawal  is  dangerous,  troops  should  remain,  as  President  Bush  said,  "until  victory".  Many discussants suggested that an increased role of the Iraqi security forces was crucial to stabilize the country. This, however, according to administration officials, would take a few more years. 12. Participants  also  learned  that,  in  order  not  to  repeat  the  same  mistakes  made  in  the reconstruction of Iraq, the US administration was coming up with a more coherent policy to deal with post-conflict situation. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has recently been created in the Department of State to lead and coordinate US government civilian capacity  to  prevent  or  prepare  for  post-conflict  situations,  and  help  stabilize  and  reconstruct societies in transition from conflict so they can find their way toward democracy and stability. This office,  among  other  things,  would  coordinate  with  international  partners,  such  as  NATO,  the  EU and the UN, to deliver "effective multilateral responses". 13. Most  US  speakers  recognised  that  the  Iraq  war  had  created  a  major  transatlantic  rift,  but many (including Europeans) agreed that now relations had improved, thanks also to a “change of tone”  in  the White  House  from  the  beginning  of  President  Bush’s  second  term.  The  relationship with the Allies, and the NATO missions in the broader Middle East (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Afghanistan, partnerships in Central Asia), were indicated by one administration official as crucial: "we are partners in world security" he said. But this partnership should be enlarged, not only to the broader Middle East but increasingly to countries in Asia and the Far East. Some Europeans were sceptical about the utility of embracing non-democratic regimes in Central Asia. 14. Iran was unanimously indicated as a major threat for the Alliance. No participant doubted that the  real  intention  of  the  regime  in  Tehran  was  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons  capability.  Although some saw it as an inevitable outcome, others seemed to indicate that there was still a chance to reverse   the   country's   drive   towards   actually   acquiring   nuclear   weapons.   Some   participants underscored  the  Iranian  quest  for  regional  power  status  partly  as  a  result  of  Western  -  and particularly  US-  "double  standards",  represented  by  the  tacit  acceptance  of  the  Israeli  nuclear programme.  Suggestions  to  treat  Iran's  case  similarly  to  the  Libyan  one  were  deemed  not appropriate by one US participant. General support was nonetheless expressed by US speakers for the European diplomatic efforts towards Tehran and the role of the IAEA, although there was not  much  optimism  about  their  success. The military  option  was  not  completely  ruled  out  by  US discussants but considered extremely unlikely. 15. The  ambivalent  role  of  Russia  was  mentioned  with  regard  to  Iran,  as  well  as  in  other contexts.  Whether Moscow was going to become a real partner of the West or remain a "reluctant" one would depend, according to one speaker, on its successful transition to a real democracy. At the moment, Russia was still perceived as fuelling instability in strategically important regions such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia, because some in Moscow saw the relationship with the West in these areas as a "zero sum game". The ambiguous role of Russia was also demonstrated, according to one US speaker, by its attitude towards the Lukashenko regime in Belarus. The West, he suggested, should be more aggressive in supporting a democratic change in that country. 16. The rising role of China as a “stakeholder” in international relations was also stresse d. It was not yet clear, however, whether Beijing was going to be a rival or a partner of the West.  According to  US  officials,  much  will  depend  on  the  US-EU  joint  approach  to  it.  Unfortunately,  one  speaker said,  the  issue  is  still  "absent  from  the  strategic  debate  between  the  US  and  Europe",  as  the querelle over the EU arms embargo demonstrated.  Beijing also presented a serious problem to the Allies because of its human rights record and largely insufficient level democratisation. If China became   really   democratic,   however,   its   contribution   to  global   stability   would   be   significant, otherwise, according to one discussant, there might be very dangerous consequences. 17. All these issues were indicated by many discussants as profoundly affecting the transatlantic relationship and the role of NATO in the years to come. As the United States is engaged globally in a struggle to fight terrorism and spread stability through democratisation, NATO missions are also on  the  increase  and  spanning  a  much  wider  geographical  area.    All  allies,  therefore,  have  an

266 FOR 05 E 4 interest in making sure that, in the words of US Senator John McCain, "NATO does not become a hollow alliance". According to one contributor, although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on political strategies in the Middle East, "they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen NATO military forces for future operations in that region and elsewhere". Many participants agreed that if adequate capabilities were lacking, the Alliance would "not be able to  act  even  when  its  political  leaders  agree  on  the  need  to  do  so".  Predictably,  US  participants insisted that European allies should increase their military budgets, indicating that any efforts which would result in more, and more relevant, European military capabilities were "a net benefit for the US" as much as for the Alliance. Others pointed out that building up European defence capabilities would require a more rational policy in transatlantic defence trade, as well as clearer policies on technology  transfer  issues.  The  2006  NATO  Transformation  Summit  was  stressed  by  many  as crucial to address all these issues. 18. A  comprehensive  framework  to  help  guide  NATO  improvements  was  proposed  by  one speaker.  This  would  envision  increasing  capabilities  in  five  areas:  special  operations  forces,  the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilisation and reconstruction forces, and defence sector development assets. The United States would provide one-third of the necessary forces, while Europe would be responsible for the other two-thirds. But Europeans would have to commit  only  10  %  of  their  active  military  manpower,  and  invest  in  such  affordable  assets  as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, and other enablers. 19. Discussions  on  defence  capabilities  were  accompanied  by  a  lengthy  debate  on  the  US defence  transformation  agenda  and  its  implications  for  the  relations  with  allied  and  partner countries.  One  speaker  highlighted  three  major  aspects  of  transformation:  strategic,  information technology, and conflict spectrum. According to one speaker, the US Quadrennial Defense Review recommended the capabilities and structures needed to execute the US National Defense Strategy approved last March and put a great emphasis on transformation. But it also placed a high priority on  working  closely  with  allies  to  improve  their  capabilities.  But  this,  replied  another  contributor, should  not  be  seen  in  terms  of  purely  technological  assets,  as  many  of  the  capabilities  needed were  in  low-tech  areas  such  as  basic  communication,  control  and  command,  or  training  and education. Also, the US and its allies should accept that they will never see things completely in the  same  way,  therefore  there  was  a  need  to  "work  where  overlap  of  interests  was  found".  For Europe, it was not so much a question of spending more on military capabilities as it was of "better marshalling continental resources". 20. Alliance transformation was also discussed with regard to NATO's new role in the area of civil emergency and natural disasters consequence management. With NATO Response Force troops deployed  in Pakistan following a major earthquake and to help the United States after hurricane Katrina,   some   suggestions   were   made   with   a   view   to   improving   NATO's   effectiveness: (1) expanding  North  Atlantic  Council  meetings  ad  hoc  to  include  partner  ministers  dealing  with disaster  management;  (2)  involve  the  NATO  Science  department  in  developing  consequence management   technologies;   and   (3)   use   NATO  Trust   Funds   to   boost   the   capacity   of   local communities in partner countries to deal with natural disasters. It was important, however, that the leadership in such operations remained in the hands of civilians. 21. Developing such capabilities would also greatly enhance NATO's potential role in responding to  terrorist  attacks  involving  Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological  and  Nuclear  (CBRN)  weapons.   With  regard  to  this  area,  one  US  official  indicated  that  multiple,  simultaneous  terrorist  attacks involving CBRN were considered by the United States as an "immediate and likely danger". And as consequence  management  following  such  an  attack  would  almost  necessarily  involve  allied countries,  NATO  should  continue  to  prepare  for  this  and  strengthen  such  units  as  the  CBRN battalion created in 2004.