[Enter location of document J:] DEFENCE AND SECURITY 200 DSCTC 05 E Original: English NAT O   Pa rl i a me n t a ry  As s e mb l y SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION VISIT TO HALIFAX, CANADA SECRETARIAT REPORT 26-28 SEPTEMBER 2005 International Secretariat 20 October 2005 * This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int
200 DSCTC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1. The Defence and Security Committee Subcommittee on Transatlantic Security and Defence Cooperation  visited  Canada  from  25-28  September.    Led  by  Subcommittee  Chair  Sven  Mikser (Estonia), the delegation of fifteen members of parliament from member and associate countries met  with  military  commanders,  government  officials  and  independent  analysts.    The  delegation also toured several vessels at the Canadian Forces Base in Halifax, Nova Scotia.   2. Most  of  the  discussion  focused  on  Canada’s ongoing plan to revitalize its military over the next five years.  The government plans to spend an additional 12 billion Canadian dollars over the next 5 years.  A significant part of this plan is to increase the active duty force by 5000 and the reserves  by  3000.    The  military  is  being  restructured  to  better  cope  with  emerging  dangers  and improve  jointness  between  the  services,  and  improve  its  ability  to  work  with  other  government ministries that may be involved in security operations.   3. Other meetings focused on the peculiar situation of Canada as a country with a huge land and  sea  area,  middle-sized  population  and  proximity  to  the  United  States  (US).    The  delegation was repeatedly made aware of the consistent efforts of Canada to maintain a distinct foreign and security  policy  from  that  of  the  US,  while  at  the  same  time  accommodating  the  reality  of  the tremendous  degree  of  interdependence  between  Canada  and  the  US.    The  vast  majority  of Canada’s foreign trade is with the US and maintaining a free flow of people and goods across the border is of the highest importance.   II. MEETINGS WITH CANADIAN MILITARY OFFICIALS 4. Several themes were consistently emphasized during the meetings with the Commander of Joint Task Force Atlantic Rear Admiral Dan McNeil and his staff.  First, Canada is increasing its defence budget by 12.8 billion Canadian Dollars to fund much needed improvements in its defence capabilities.    Second,  Canada  is  committed  to  participating  in  international  missions.    Third, Canada  is  working  to  improve  joint  operations  between  the  branches  of  the  military  and  with  its international partners.  Fourth, Canada is consistently aware of its close relations with the US and strives to maintain an independent voice and policy within the context of a highly interdependent relationship.   5. Canada  recently  created  the  Marine  Security  Operations  Center  (MSOC) based in Halifax.    The MSOC is a joint facility that brings together all of the government entities responsible for the marine  areas  of  Canada  including  the  Coast  Guard,  Border  Security  Agency,  Royal  Canadian Mounted Police and the Ministry of National Defence.  It provides a single secure location where the representatives from those bureaucracies can collect, share and assess information regarding potential threats to Canadian security and enhance their common awareness of any situation.  The MSOC  collects  and  distributes  data  on  shipping  as  it  approaches  Canadian  waters  with  several days  advance  notice.    This  gives  authorities  time  to  assess  and  focus  on  vessels  that  have  a higher  probability  of  carrying  contraband  or  otherwise  be  engaged  in  activity  that  could  harm Canada or the US.  The MSOC has close bilateral arrangements with its sister organization in the US and the two are working to improve their interoperability through officer exchanges and other programmes. 6. Questions  from  the  delegation  focused  on  cargo  screening  and  cooperation  with  the  US.   There  is  clearly  never  enough  time  to  screen  all  cargo  and  only  three  percent  of  all  cargo  is actually  screened  before  entry  into  Canada.    Solid  intelligence  and  analysis  is  critical  to  focus attention on the most likely targets.  Canada has a close relationship with the US in this regard, and the level of cooperation is increasing.  Canada receives a considerable amount of intelligence
200 DSCTC 05 E 2 from  the  US  and  is  at  times  challenged  to  cope  with  all  of  the  information  provided  by  the  US exchange officers stationed at the MSOC.   7. Like most other Alliance members, the Canadian armed forces are going through a process of  military  transformation.    The  goal  is  to  improve  Canada’s  ability  to  participate  in  international operations  and  secure  its  national  territory.    Military  commanders  briefed  the  delegation  on  the significance  of  the  base  at  Halifax,  which  in  itself  represented  a  transformative  step  in  joint operations.  It combines the strengths of the military services and also draws on the strengths of other  government  ministries  and  departments  with  related  portfolios.    The  military  is  also  being restructured into six task forces and Halifax is home to the Joint Task Force Atlantic.  The current structure is being reformed to break down the stovepipe organizational structure to improve joint planning,  training  and  push  operational  decision-making  down  to  the  regional  task  force  level.    The  point  of  this  is  to  develop  a  more  efficient  and  responsive  force  that  can  better  combat terrorism and the problems arising from failed or failing states.   8. Other concrete steps are being taken as well.  A critical issue is expanding the size of the military.  Over then next few years, Canada plans to increase the size of the active duty force by 5,000 and the reserves by 3,000.  This will give the military additional flexibility as participation in international operations is stretching current forces.  There is some concern about how quickly the force can be increased and the effects of training on the current force.  Trainers will have to be drawn from the existing force which could put further pressures on current operations. III. MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY EXPERTS 9. The delegation also met with several academics and former military officers now resident at Center  for  Foreign  Policy  Studies  including  retired  Vice-Admiral  Duncan  Miller  and  retired Commodore  Eric  Lehre.    Some  of  them  cast  some  doubt  on  the  military’s  plans  for  additional spending  and  transformation  objectives,  noting  that  much  of  the  above  mentioned  spending increase is pushed into the last two years of the plan.  They were also critical of the procurement system and noted the very serious need to add more personnel to the armed services.   10. They   also   voiced   some  concerns  about  how  the  role  of  Canada  in  the  international environment  is  perceived  by  the  general  Canadian  public.    They  noted  the  lack  of  interest  in security issues and that NATO was for most Canadians, simply “off the radar”.  In addition, they were concerned that Canadian perceptions of their forces as peacekeepers was not in line with the reality  of  the  situation.    According  to  the  presenters,  Canadians  tend  to  think  of  their  troops  as involved mainly in peacekeeping operations that are less risky that combat operations, but these operations  in  fact  entail  significant  risks  and  can  rapidly  shade  into  combat  operations.    There were  concerns  that  this  misperception  would  impact  on  support  for  the  Canadian  mission  in Afghanistan  as  it  takes  over  some  operations  from  the  US  in  the  turbulent  southern  part  of  the country.   11. Questions  from  the  delegation  focused  on  issues  of  interoperability.    In  particular,  some members of the delegation were concerned about worrisome trends in procurement in Europe that worsened  interoperability.    Vice-Admiral  Miller  shared  those  concerns  and  noted  that  in  his experience  interoperability  is  usually  the  last  priority  in  procurement  decisions  and  is  often overridden  by  political  considerations.    He  added  that  it  took  a  complete  legislatively  mandated reorganization   of   the   US   Department   of   Defense      (Goldwater-Nicols   Act)   to   make   push interoperability  between  the  military  services  in  the  US.    As  important  as  it  is,  he  believed  that there  is  a  widespread  lack  of  political  will  to  push  interoperability  as  a  key  point  in  procurement decisions.  Commodore Lerhe added that despite this interoperability between NATO members is infinitely higher than between NATO members and non-NATO countries, and he cited his personal
200 DSCTC 05 E 3 experiences  in  exercises  with  Asian  militaries.    But  he  agreed  that  interoperability  was  at  risk, particularly as advances in network centric warfare push the US, the UK, Canada and a few other allies further ahead of the rest of the Alliance. 12. Several  experts  in  Canadian  foreign  policy  emphasized  how  Canada’s  geography  and demographics place it in a unique position.  It shares a 5000-kilometer border with the US and has a  very  large  national  territory  to  control  include  vast  coastlines.    Yet,  compared  to  this  huge territory  it  has  a  relatively  small  population.    Canada  is  also  highly  economically  interdependent with  the  US.    Most  of  its  international  trade  is  with  the  US  and  it  is  critical  to  the  Canadian economy to keep a free flow of goods and people across the border.  The US is highly dependent on trade with Canada and would suffer from delays or closures of the border, but Canada depends even more on this cross-border traffic for its economic well-being.   13. Professor   Denis   Stairs   of   Daihousie   University   gave   the   delegation   an   overview   of Canadian  foreign  policy  with  an  emphasis  on  the  driving  factors.    Canada  has  a  different perspective from that of the US.  In basic terms, Canada is not a super power and has a political orientation more like that of Europe than the US in many ways.  As a middle-sized country it has a keen interest in multilateral institutions that it can use to maximize its influence.  Regardless, the overwhelming imperative is to maintain a useful relationship with the US.  Eighty-eight percent of Canada’s trade is with the US and there is tremendous horizontal integration between businesses on both sides of the border.  The trade is in the range of 1.5 to 2 billion Canadian dollars per day. Canada’s continued economic prosperity depends on the free flow of people and goods across the border.   14. Therefore,  Canada  often  finds  itself  in  the  position  of  having  to  reassure  its  southern neighbour  that  Canada  is  doing  all  it  can  regarding  security,  particularly  regarding  counter- terrorism.    This  is  important  even  if  Canada  is  not  a  target  of  terrorist  activity.    If  there  was  a terrorist  incident  in  the  US  and  the  perpetrators  entered  the  country  through  Canada,  the  likely result would be a significant tightening of the border with serious consequences for Canada.   IV. MEETINGS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 15. Canada and the US work very closely on border security cooperation.  Greg Goetbe of the Border Security Agency described how they built a “21st century border” by focusing on potentially problematic persons or cargo and allowing the vast majority of the traffic move across the border with  minimal  inspections.      Through cooperative US-Canada programs, shipping companies and individuals can apply to be pre-cleared by both governments.  Canada and the US have integrated border  enforcement  teams  that  operate  on  each  other’s  territory  and  facilitate  cooperation  and information  sharing.    The  two  countries  are  also  taking  additional  steps  to  ensure  a  common approach  to  risk  assessment.  Part  of  this  cooperation  extends  to  Mexico  as  well,  so  there  is increasing  cooperation  on  preventing  and  responding  to  threats  in  the  broader  North  American region.   16. Michael  Eyestone  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  briefed  the  delegation  on  the  broader changes  in  Canadian  foreign  policy.    The  main  emphasis  is  on  securing  Canada’s  place  in international affairs by better focusing its limited resources.  Canada will enhance its relationships with up and coming powers such as India, Brazil and China, while at the same time adjusting its defence  policy  to  better  cope  with  new  threats.    More  funding  and  personnel  will  be  directed towards   international   affairs,   but   those   resources   will   be   better   targeted.      Diplomacy   and engagement in international forums will be more focused on securing outcomes rather than simply engaging in the process for its own sake.  Development assistance is also slated to come under better  management.    He  cited  an  increased  emphasis  on  return  on  investment  and  instead  of
200 DSCTC 05 E 4 simply measuring the volume of aid.  He also noted that no amount of aid can take the place of the private  sector  and  that  assistance  should  help  create  the  conditions  for  investment.  In the long term this will lead to sustained development.