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## **NATO Parliamentary Assembly**

### **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

**SPRING SESSION  
LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA  
MAY 2005**

**FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL SESSION  
COPENHAGEN, DENMARK  
NOVEMBER 2005**

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## **DECLARATION 333**

on

### **UZBEKISTAN\***

1. The members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are extremely troubled and concerned by recent events in Uzbekistan. They unanimously condemn the disproportionate use of force by Uzbek security forces against opposition protesters and civilians in Andijan and other places.
2. The Assembly strongly supports the United Nations' and NATO's calls for an independent international inquiry into these events. It also urges the Uzbek authorities to allow such an investigation and assist international officials in carrying it out.
3. In the event that the Uzbek government refuses an international inquiry, the Assembly recommends that:
  - a. the participation of Uzbekistan in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council be reconsidered, and
  - b. all NATO nations reconsider and eventually suspend any support to the Uzbek armed forces.

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\* presented by the Standing Committee to the Plenary Assembly and adopted (Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tuesday 31 May 2005)

**DECLARATION 334**

on

**DARFUR\***

1. The members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are deeply concerned about the security situation in Sudan's western region of Darfur, which the United Nations has described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
2. The Assembly applauds the African Union's efforts to help end the conflict in Darfur and strongly supports the international community's efforts to achieve peace there.
3. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly therefore unanimously supports the decision, on 24 May, by the North Atlantic Council on initial military options for possible Alliance support to the African Union's mission AMIS II in the Darfur region of Sudan.
4. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly welcomes the substantial financial assistance provided to the African Union mission AMIS II by the European Union.
5. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly encourages the European Union and NATO to work together in a spirit of cooperation and complementarity to provide the requisite logistical and financial support in areas such as strategic airlift; training in command and control, in operations planning, in the use of intelligence and in police.
6. The Assembly welcomes in that context the joint announcement by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, and Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the United Nations-African Union donor's conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that both the Alliance and the European Union are ready, together with other partners, to help the expansion of the African Union's presence in Darfur and calls for its speedy implementation.

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\* presented by the Standing Committee to the Plenary Assembly and adopted (Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tuesday 31 May 2005)

**RESOLUTION 335**

on

**THE PROTECTION AND INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES AS A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS\***

The Assembly,

1. **Reaffirming** its strong commitment to peace and stability in the South Caucasus;
2. **Recalling** that the Atlantic Alliance has decided at the 2004 summit of Heads of States and Government in Istanbul to put “a special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia”;
3. **Convinced** that the protection and integration of national and religious minorities is a key contribution to peace and stability;
4. **Recognizing** that the countries of the South Caucasus have undergone important demographic changes since their independence, which have sometimes led to greater vulnerability and isolation of minority populations;
5. **Commending** the encouraging measures taken by the governments and parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards the protection and integration of minorities;
6. **Noting, however,** that further efforts are needed to ensure the integration and protection of minorities in the region according to international standards;
7. **Reaffirming** that adequate protection for persons belonging to national and religious minorities is an integral part of the protection of human rights;
8. **Convinced, therefore,** that the efficient protection and integration of minorities are an important indicator of a government's commitment to democracy and political stability;
9. **Stressing** that, as major electoral processes and constitutional and political reforms are currently under way in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, measures should be taken to ensure that these processes are transparent and democratic and guarantee an adequate participation of minority groups;
10. **Insisting also** that conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are fundamental obstacles to peace and stability in the region, as well as direct or indirect sources of tension in relations between majority and minority groups;
11. **Convinced, therefore,** of the strong link between the resolution of conflicts in the three regions and the adequate protection and integration of minorities according to international standards;

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\* presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security

12. **Persuaded** that the promotion of regional and other multilateral initiatives such as the Sochi arrangements (2003) can help reinforce mutual confidence and tolerance, particularly in the case of societies that have been torn apart by conflicts, as well as address common challenges in relation to the situation of minority groups;

13. **URGES** governments and parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia:

- a. to take the necessary steps to fully implement major international instruments for the protection of minorities, including, in particular, the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages;
- b. to take the necessary steps to define, in accordance with their respective international obligations, a clear and coherent political strategy with regard to minorities in consultation with them;
- c. to adopt and implement programmes to promote the political, economic and social integration of persons belonging to religious and national minorities, and to guarantee adequate conditions for the preservation of minority cultures, religions and languages, as key factors to building peaceful, open and tolerant societies;
- d. to facilitate, in particular, the access by persons belonging to minorities to political and administrative positions in the parliament and in national and local administrations;
- e. to commit fully to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh and to support fully ongoing regional and international efforts to this effect, in particular, in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Group of Friends of the Secretary General, and the Joint Control Commission;
- f. to intensify programmes for political, legal, social and economic reform, as part of their commitments to international institutions, including NATO;
- g. to encourage initiatives to improve the condition of displaced persons and refugees in the South Caucasus region to help build confidence between societies;

14. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to encourage initiatives aiming at building confidence within and between societies in the South Caucasus region;
- b. to integrate, whenever possible, the issue of protection and integration of minorities in their bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of the South Caucasus;
- c. to support, to the extent of their possibilities and competencies, efforts undertaken by the governments and parliaments in the region, together with international institutions, for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh;
- d. to continue the fruitful dialogue within the Assembly as an excellent forum for promoting confidence and mutual trust.

**RESOLUTION 336**

on

**REDUCING NATIONAL CAVEATS\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** that national caveats are defined as restrictions placed on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation;
2. **Recalling** that national caveats may be both declared and known to commanders, or undeclared and therefore unknown to commanders until they actually assign a mission to a particular unit and discover that a caveat prevents that unit from performing that mission;
3. **Recalling** that such restrictions limited the ability of NATO forces in Kosovo to respond to civil unrest there in March 2004;
4. **Noting** that NATO has since mostly resolved this issue and the current force in Kosovo is far more flexible and capable of responding in the event of future incidents;
5. **Further noting** that although, in the case of Kosovo, many of those caveats have been eliminated, restrictions placed on the use of national military contingents in Afghanistan remain a serious issue;
6. **Concerned** that military commanders of NATO forces in Afghanistan consistently cite national caveats as a significant impediment to the planning and execution of their mission;
7. **Noting** that the issue was not resolved until a crisis occurred in Kosovo;
8. **Concerned** that the Alliance should not wait for another crisis situation to spark changes in the type and number of caveats regarding the mission in Afghanistan as this could have serious negative effects on the credibility of the Alliance;
9. **Further concerned** that existing national caveats will have a debilitating effect on ISAF as it continues to expand its presence in Afghanistan to the south and east of the country;
10. **Recognizing** that sovereign nations have the right to define the terms by which they participate in a mission;
11. **But also recognizing** that such conditions should be made known to all other participants in the mission before a deployment to avoid complicating the planning process;
12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to eliminate the use of undeclared caveats and allow the restrictions on a national contingent to be taken into consideration during the force planning process;
  - b. to minimize the use of declared caveats and regularly reconsider the specific caveats to determine which can be eliminated, given changes in the operating environment or in the available resources of the national contingent.

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\* presented by the Defence and Security Committee

**RESOLUTION 337**

on

**ENHANCED COMMON FUNDING OF NATO OPERATIONS\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recognizing** that the NATO Response Force (NRF) is composed of forces from member countries in rotation, but on a voluntary basis;
2. **Recognizing** that the Alliance relies on the national military capabilities of its members;
3. **Further recognizing** that some costs are borne jointly through the common budgets of the Alliance;
4. **Understanding** that those common budgets pay for a range of expenses and have been increased or adjusted throughout the history of the Alliance to adapt to changing circumstances;
5. **Welcoming** the recently agreed “Revised Funding Policy for Non-Article 5 NATO-led Operations”, which will enhance common funding of NATO operations;
6. **Concerned** that the current principle of “costs lie where they fall” is problematic because it leaves virtually the entire financial burden of participating in NRF operations on the member countries that are on-call at the time of the deployment;
7. **Recognizing** that this is not a fair system as the decision to deploy is taken by all 26 members of the Alliance;
8. **Concerned** that such a financial impact might further discourage participation in the NRF and other on-call forces;
9. **Further concerned** that failure to address this issue now will negatively affect NATO out-of-area operations in the future, thus undermining one of the key strategic purposes of the Alliance;
10. **But understanding** that any enhanced common funding of operations should be carefully balanced between nationally-funded items and those funded commonly by the Alliance;
11. **Further understanding** that contributions to common budgets must be seen as part of the overall burden-sharing assessment;
12. **Noting** the importance that the Secretary General of NATO has attached to this issue;
13. **Further noting** that discussions at various levels of NATO are producing potentially viable ideas for enhanced common funding of operations;

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\* presented by the Defence and Security Committee



14. **URGES** the member governments of the Alliance and their representatives at the North Atlantic Council to move forward rapidly with a concrete plan for enhancing common funding of NATO operations:

- a. that would spread in part, the burden of participation in NATO out-of-area operations, across the members of the Alliance;
- b. that would be apportioned in a manner consistent with the existing common budget formulas; and,
- c. that would specifically address the additional transportation costs incurred by national militaries as a result of their participation in NATO on-call forces.

**RESOLUTION 338**

on

**FORGING A TRANSATLANTIC POLICY TOWARDS CHINA\***

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that China's rapid development has become a critical factor in global economic growth and is changing many underlying assumptions that long shaped the post-war international system;
2. **Recognizing** that, by extension, China's economic progress is having a locomotive effect on many developing countries, particularly those in Asia;
3. **Yet, acknowledging** that some developing countries lack the capabilities to adjust to China's commercial challenge and will require increased aid and "special and differential" treatment to safeguard livelihoods and encourage growth;
4. **Understanding** that a market-oriented China has become a more open and pluralist society and that China's civil society today enjoys far greater latitude for autonomous action, at least outside the realm of politics;
5. **Yet, concerned** about the slow pace of political reform, the lack of democratic dialogue, pervasive corruption, particularly at the provincial and local levels, and ongoing human rights abuses, all of which are generating enormous social pressures that could ultimately limit China's development potential and even undermine its stability;
6. **Recognizing as well** that China's economic rise could further alter the strategic balance in East Asia, particularly if its leaders were to use their country's new found economic strength to underwrite a massive arms build-up;
7. **Lamenting** the recent transatlantic dispute over lifting the embargo on arms sales to China and the lack of a genuine transatlantic strategic dialogue on China;
8. **Applauding** China's role in the Six-Party Talks in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons programme;
9. **Commending** China's willingness to adopt a legal regime conducive to the free trade obligations it has accepted as a new member of the WTO;
10. **But, regretting** China's problems in implementing some of these obligations, particularly at the provincial and local levels;
11. **Applauding** China's recent decision to abandon the hard dollar peg, but **recognizing** that the renminbi may still be overvalued;

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\* presented by the Economics and Security Committee

12. **Noting** that China is both the world's second largest consumer of oil and producer of greenhouse gases, but that it is still significantly behind the United States in terms of overall energy use;

13. **Yet, recognizing** that China's energy consumption is expanding inexorably because it is growing so quickly, uses energy inefficiently and has embraced the norms of a mass consumer society, and will thus very likely surpass the United States in terms of absolute energy use and emissions production between 2020 and 2030;

14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to initiate a discussion that will facilitate a coherent and, when possible, co-ordinated approach on strategic, diplomatic and economic issues in which China has become an important player;
- b. to make use of the North Atlantic Council to facilitate this discussion;
- c. to acknowledge that an approach to China premised solely on a policy of military containment will be counterproductive and could even encourage the emergence of a more aggressive China;
- d. to recognize that the countries in the region and the United States are playing a critical role in preserving peace and security in a Pacific region that is gripped by a range of strategic uncertainties;
- e. to improve the transatlantic strategic dialogue on China, including a dialogue between the EU and the United States on export control;
- f. to develop further the nascent and informal NATO-China dialogue in order to build confidence and identify areas of mutual interest and possible co-operation;
- g. to encourage deeper dialogue on a range of economic governance issues with China, under the auspices of the OECD;
- h. to encourage China and its people to build a more open, pluralist and ultimately democratic political system commensurate with the ever more open society and liberal economic system that is swiftly emerging in China, and to make Western financial resources and know-how available for those purposes;
- i. to encourage China to integrate fully in the multilateral trading order and to implement its WTO obligations in areas like intellectual property rights and investment rules;
- j. to accept our own obligations to build a liberal trading order by acknowledging that Western states and industries cannot rely on protectionist tools to deal with China's competitive challenge;
- k. and thus to respond to this challenge in ways that ultimately render our own economies and societies more competitive, productive, fiscally balanced, educated, innovative and wealthy;
- l. to assist the developing world in making the difficult structural adjustments needed in a world changed by China;
- m. to engage in an energy dialogue with China to mitigate the risks associated with energy rivalry;
- n. to develop common energy strategies that will help China and the OECD countries to reduce significantly their reliance on carbon fuel, further delink economic growth from energy use, and thus meet long-term energy needs in a sustainable manner.

**RESOLUTION 339**

on

**MOUNTING AN INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AGAINST AVIAN INFLUENZA\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recognizing** that influenza poses a global threat with possible severe consequences for human health, the global economy and stability, partly, because little is known about human immunity in the face of a mutated H5N1 strain;
2. **Observing** that mutations of the H5N1 virus may create the risk of human-to-human transmission;
3. **Noting** the difficulties public health officials have encountered, in the past, in treating influenza pandemics;
4. **Considering** the acute vulnerability of the developing countries to a potential influenza pandemic;
5. **Observing** the challenges in developing a vaccine against the disease;
6. **Acknowledging** the inadequacy of current measures, particularly in terms of international co-ordination of the anti-pandemic effort and of its financing;
7. **Recognizing** the need to correct any “market failure” that could prevent pharmaceutical companies from reacting with alacrity to a potential influenza pandemic;
8. **Commending** recent US and EU efforts to forge an international response to a potential influenza pandemic;
9. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to respond to the very real threat of an influenza pandemic by:
  - a. supporting international bodies such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in their efforts to co-ordinate the world’s response to a potential influenza pandemic;
  - b. providing multiple financial resources to stimulate the speedy development of a vaccine once the influenza virus has mutated into a new strain with a pandemic potential, and a global vaccination drive;
  - c. developing national, international and multilateral public health, economic, trade, travel and military-security plans based on influenza pandemic scenarios;
  - d. addressing the range of problems related to the inadequate capacity of developing countries to deal with a potential influenza pandemic;
  - e. creating incentives for pharmaceutical companies to increase the production of the antiviral agent – Oseltamivir – and a new vaccine, should one be developed.

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\* presented by the Economics and Security Committee

**RESOLUTION 340**

on

**ADVANCING THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recognizing** that 2005 has been declared the Year of Development, during which a number of initiatives designed to pull millions of people out of poverty have been either launched or advanced;
2. **Observing** that these initiatives include: debt cancellation for the most impoverished countries, increased aid, formal commitments by developing countries to improve governance and transparency and, most importantly, the Doha Development Agenda of multilateral trade negotiations;
3. **Applauding** developed and developing country negotiators for agreeing to a trade negotiation framework, in which every topic under negotiation during the Doha Round has a vital development dimension;
4. **Acknowledging** that the successful conclusion of the Doha Agenda would also bring enormous benefit to the world's wealthier countries by lowering trade barriers, increasing market depth, triggering more efficient capital allocation, slashing prices and ultimately generating greater economic activity;
5. **Convinced** that extending greater market access to the developing world, especially in the agricultural sector, represents the greatest contribution to development that Western countries can make because 70% of the world's poor live in rural areas; because 90% of the potential gains from a Doha agreement would be generated through market access reforms; and because open trading systems usually help create growth and pull people out of poverty;
6. **Recognizing** that for many developing countries participating in the Doha negotiations, agricultural trade liberalization is the highest priority;
7. **But lamenting** the lack of progress in the current negotiations, and most notably the failure to find common ground concerning agricultural market access, tariff peaks and special and differential treatment provisions designed to ease the burden of transition for developing countries;
8. **Observing** that exempting just 2% of tariff lines for "sensitive and special products" would eliminate most of the gains developing countries might obtain from tariff reduction;
9. **Understanding** that the key to a successful negotiating round lies not only in developed country concessions on agriculture but also developing country concessions in non-agricultural sectors including manufacturing and services;
10. **Noting** that failure to make progress in these difficult areas by the time Ministers convene at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2005 would potentially undermine these negotiations, which must be concluded at the end of 2006;

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\* presented by the Economics and Security Committee

11. **CALLS** on member parliamentarians to urge their governments and trade negotiators:
- a. to extend generous agricultural market access with rapid and substantial reduction of existing tariffs and sharp limits on the designation of so-called "sensitive" goods that can enjoy higher protection rates, a practice that hitherto has hampered food exports from developing countries;
  - b. to carry out earlier commitments to ensure that the Doha Agenda results in the elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies;
  - c. to support trade facilitation policies and infrastructure projects explicitly designed to help the developing world better exploit the new opportunities that a more open trading system would bring about;
  - d. to ensure that developing countries, taking into account special and differential treatment provisions, make concessions in manufactured goods and service trading rules that will ultimately benefit developed and developing countries alike; and thus,
  - e. to make 2005 genuinely a year of development implementation and wealth creation.

**RESOLUTION 341**

on

**NATO TRANSFORMATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE\***

The Assembly,

1. **Emphasizing** the crucial role the Alliance plays for the collective defence of member countries and the security of the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole;
2. **Acknowledging** and **welcoming** the pragmatic adaptations after the end of the Cold War which have made NATO an important security provider both in and out of its traditional area;
3. **Recalling** that national caveats should be considered as exceptional measures, and that they should be justified and unambiguously known by allies and by national parliaments;
4. **Deploring** that national caveats on the use of allied forces may impede the effectiveness of joint NATO-led operations, particularly in Afghanistan, and **noting** that it is important to reach fundamental agreement on issues like the rules of engagement and detention policy;
5. **Noting** that the funding of joint operations along the "costs lie where they fall" principle is no longer appropriate and discourages participation in NATO operations, particularly those by the NATO Response Force (NRF);
6. **Criticising** the fact that some Allies have not matched political commitments with the necessary resources and **stressing** that all NATO member countries have a stake in a stable and secure Afghanistan;
7. **Affirming** that NATO in particular can generate, deploy, command and sustain large, multinational military operations but **underlining** that the Alliance depends on close and effective co-operation with other international organizations to perform the non-military functions essential to the success of post-conflict operations, including nation-building;
8. **Stressing** the importance of NATO's co-operation with the European Union, but **lamenting** that further progress in institutional co-operation is on hold because of unresolved issues arising from the recent enlargement of the European Union;
9. **Recognizing** that failing states, internationally active terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are the key threats to the security of NATO member and partner countries;
10. **Acknowledging** that there are more crises in the world than the Allies have the political will or resources to manage, and that NATO, therefore, needs to agree on priorities and on the means to tackle crises;
11. **Stressing** that NATO's potential as a forum for political and strategic dialogue and consensus building among the Allies should be used more systematically and effectively;

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\* presented by the Political Committee

12. **Praising** the initiative by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to advance NATO's political transformation to complement its ongoing military adaptation;

13. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to further improve military capabilities in order to make NATO's military forces more mobile, more effective, more interoperable and more sustainable, and to stimulate debate among national governments and parliaments on a more political role for NATO;
- b. to review urgently declared and undeclared caveats in order to minimise their use in joint operations;
- c. to urgently extend the review of pros and cons of various funding modalities for joint operations to achieve a more equitable and fair distribution of burden among the Allies;
- d. to match actual contributions to NATO operations with the political commitments made;
- e. to build and expand the role of the Alliance in humanitarian and natural disaster relief with a view to improving co-ordination of member and partner countries' activities in these areas;
- f. to improve the co-ordination among Allies and with international organizations like the European Union, the United Nations and the African Union in the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation;
- g. to use NATO as a platform and as a facilitator to make multilateral non-proliferation regimes more effective;
- h. to engage in a dialogue on NATO's role in promoting effective conflict prevention, including through training and capacity building, especially in the case of failing states, in close partnership with the European Union, the United Nations, and other regional organizations, in particular the African Union;
- i. to improve the planning and co-ordination of national contributions to the NRF, EU Headline Goal, and Battle Groups, among others, in order to avoid duplications and lack of clarity.



**RESOLUTION 342**

on

**KOSOVO\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recognizing** that Kosovo's current status quo is unsustainable and **also recognizing** that any agreement on the future status of the province will have an important impact on the stability of South-East Europe as a whole;
2. **Commending** the Alliance, and in particular the Kosovo Force (KFOR), for successfully securing and stabilising the province;
3. **Supporting** the role of the UN in further stabilising the situation in Kosovo in line with UN Security Council resolution 1244;
4. **Welcoming** the report by the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, Ambassador Kai Eide;
5. **Welcoming** the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari by the UN Secretary General as his Special Envoy on the future status of Kosovo;
6. **Recognizing** that the joint future of the province and the region lies in full European and transatlantic integration, which rules out any form of discrimination and which requires the establishment of the rule of law;
7. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to remain committed to securing peace and stability in the province and South-East Europe as a whole by ensuring an international military and civilian presence as long as the situation requires;
  - b. to monitor closely developments in Kosovo and in Serbia and Montenegro and to contribute to realizing the integration of the entire region in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, on the condition of full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
  - c. to state that the preferred outcome of negotiations is an institutional arrangement that will allow for the establishment of a stable multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and to support and monitor the further implementation of the standards established by the Contact Group to the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government;
  - d. to underline that Kosovo will continue for some time to need an international civilian and military presence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions of the Status Settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection of minorities, as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued implementation of standards;

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\* presented by the Political Committee

- e. to assist the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs to reach an agreement that allows for further decentralisation and, if necessary, municipal and administrative adjustments within Kosovo;
  - f. to assist further democratisation inside Kosovo;
8. **URGES** the government, the parliament and all political forces in Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro:
- a. to co-operate pro-actively with the international community to achieve an agreement that respects and accommodates the interests of all parties;
  - b. to respect and protect fully the rights of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, as well as the cultural and religious heritage of Kosovo;
  - c. to spare no efforts in order to rebuild mutual confidence and to create conditions that would allow displaced Serbs and other minorities to return to the province and live in peace;
  - d. to move the process of decentralisation forward.

**RESOLUTION 343**

on

**BELARUS\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** its decision of 30 March 2001 to continue the suspension of its relationship with the Parliament of Belarus, as well as the deliberations during the Assembly Seminar on Belarus that took place in Vilnius 23-24 September 2005, and **considering** that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has suspended relations with the national parliament;
2. **Stressing** that Belarus is a central part of Europe and a direct neighbour of NATO and the European Union, and that we all have a stake in reintegrating Belarus and its people into the family of European democracies, and **deeply regretting** that the policies of Mr Lukashenko's government and the way in which the parliamentary election as well as the controversial referendum on 17 October 2004, allowing the President more than two terms in office were conducted have made this objective substantially more difficult to achieve;
3. **Welcoming** the release of Prof. Bandashevsky on parole in August 2005 but **strongly condemning** all the tactics of intimidation, harassment and repression employed against opposition candidates in the election, the non-state-owned press, representatives of independent trade unions, ethnic minorities and other organizations of Belarussian civil society as well as independent national observers;
4. **Denouncing**, in particular, the difficulties experienced by the opposition in obtaining access to state-controlled media - including electronic facilities - and the presidential decrees promulgated in order to curtail the basic freedoms of expression and association;
5. **Convinced** that the provision of alternative information for the population of Belarus through external broadcasting has become a top priority, and **recommending** that such broadcasting might be done from the neighbouring countries, with involvement of the independent Belarussian journalists, and that the information should be broadcast in both the Belarussian and Russian languages;
6. **Outraged** by credible reports about the disappearance and murder of political opponents in 1999 and 2000 inspired by members of the government as stated in Resolution 1371 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe based on an investigation by Mr Pourgourides MP, Cyprus;
7. **CALLS UPON** the President of Belarus, Mr Lukashenko, and his government:
  - a. to reverse the current deteriorating trend in respect of democracy and human rights, to ensure that the presidential elections in 2006 are conducted in a free and fair manner in accordance with international standards, and to abide by its commitments in the OSCE and the UN;
  - b. to restore democracy and the rule of law in Belarus and to guarantee the protection of human rights, the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press and free enterprise;

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\* presented by the Political Committee

- c. to free all remaining political prisoners immediately and to set up promptly impartial in-depth inquiries into the fate of persons who have disappeared and to bring those responsible for the abductions and killings to justice;
  - d. to end the “militarisation” of domestic politics, i.e. to check the increase in militia forces;
  - e. to ensure that all eligible candidates are allowed to register for next year’s presidential election, to campaign freely, to enjoy equal access to state-controlled media, and to allow their representatives to participate fully in election commissions;
  - f. to issue an early invitation to a full OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, to which EU Member States are willing to contribute, in accordance with the 1990 Copenhagen document, and to allow it to operate unimpeded;
  - g. to extend the powers of parliament so that it becomes a democratic institution capable of exercising legislative authority and political control over the government in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers;
8. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to seize every possible opportunity to make clear to the Belarussian authorities that they are expected to honour all their OSCE commitments in the areas of human rights and democracy;
  - b. to increase significantly support for independent initiatives directed towards strengthening the development of civil society and the NGO sector;
  - c. to encourage bilateral contacts between NGOs in order to help overcome the country’s isolation;
  - d. to intensify people-to-people contacts by strengthening good neighbourly relations (e.g. through student and scientific exchanges, scholarships, youth travel, contacts between small- and medium-sized enterprises, training local authority officials, etc.);
  - e. to help disseminate unbiased reporting about events at home and abroad through media inside and outside Belarus in order to overcome the government’s monopoly on information;
  - f. to co-ordinate EU and US programmes for assisting the development of civil society in Belarus effectively;
  - g. to seek active backing from the Russian Government and Parliament in support of approaches aimed at requiring the Belarussian authorities to bring their legislation and practices into compliance with OSCE standards;
  - h. to emphasize to the government of Belarus that the further development of relations between NATO member and partner countries with Belarus will depend on the progress made towards democratization in the country;
9. **REITERATES**, at the same time, its willingness to have closer and better relations with Belarus and its parliament once the Belarussian authorities clearly demonstrate their willingness to respect democratic values and the rule of law.

**RESOLUTION 344**

on

**SECURITY OF WMD-RELATED MATERIAL IN RUSSIA\***

The Assembly,

1. **Concerned** by the possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
2. **Mindful** that Russia's WMD-related arsenals and stocks are one of the largest in the world, and that security upgrades of these stocks are yet to be completed, thus posing a potential proliferation and environmental threat;
3. **Conscious** that the Russian Federation is not the only country posing the threat of proliferation of WMD-related material;
4. **Welcoming** the achievements of the Russian Federation and the international community in securing WMD and related material, especially through the US-led Co-operative Threat Reduction programme, and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction;
5. **Praising** the recent decision of the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude an agreement on liability protection for US personnel working on threat reduction programmes in Russia;
6. **Regretting** nonetheless that the co-operation is still hindered by bureaucratic inertia, the unresolved question of access of international officials to sensitive sites, and the lack of mutual trust that derives from the remaining Cold War perceptions;
7. **Concerned** about the slow pace of chemical weapons destruction, which endangers the deadlines established by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW);
8. **Mindful** that Russia's decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines present serious proliferation-related and environmental threats, and that Russia is far from having the means to handle these threats without foreign assistance;
9. **Deeply concerned** that the Russian biodefence sector remains virtually excluded from co-operative threat reduction programmes;
10. **Recalling** Assembly Resolution 313 adopted in 2001, addressing the issue of safeguarding the Nuclear Complex in Russia and other Newly Independent States;
11. **CALLS UPON** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to increase efforts to assist Russia in securing its stocks of WMD and related materials by expanding and reinforcing bilateral and G8 Global Partnership programmes;

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\* presented by the Science and Technology Committee

- b. to emphasize the commonality of the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by promoting the benefits of co-operation and the equality of all involved parties;
- c. to meet the commitments under the G8 Global Partnership, particularly with respect to chemical weapons destruction and dismantlement of Russian nuclear submarines and related environmental problems;
- d. to help Russia complete the process of securing nuclear material storage sites by 2009;
- e. to develop a reliable account mechanism and eventually negotiate with Russia a verifiable agreement on the control and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons;
- f. to encourage the Russian government to expand co-operation with its partners in the international community to safeguard better the Russian biodefence sector;
- g. to expand co-operation in the international community in order to ensure full implementation and reliable control of Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions;
- h. to seek an agreement with the Russian government for the removal of unnecessary technical or bureaucratic pre-conditions that hamper the pace of chemical weapons destruction;
- i. to increase efforts to assist Russia in improving living conditions of former weapons scientists and in further promoting their redirection to peaceful activities to avoid their being tempted to take their knowledge elsewhere;
- j. to support the expansion of co-operative threat reduction initiatives to other countries by using the experience gained in Russia;
- k. to encourage Russian authorities:
  - i. to maintain favourable conditions for international assistance and access to WMD-related material storage sites that require security upgrades;
  - ii. to sustain Russia's increased financial contribution in accordance with its economic possibilities;
  - iii. to remove remaining bureaucratic obstacles and to facilitate international assistance;
  - iv. to introduce an officially approved plan for chemical weapons destruction in accordance with international agreements.

**DECLARATION 345**

on

**THE DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS IN UKRAINE\***

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** its long-standing co-operation with the Verkhovna Rada;
2. **Applauding** Ukraine's programme of wide ranging political, economic, and defence reforms and the progress being made regarding their implementation;
3. **Supporting** Ukraine's goal of Euro-Atlantic integration; and
4. **Determined** to assist Ukraine in achieving that goal;
5. **Welcoming** NATO's programme of Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine, and the further enhancement of Alliance support for Ukraine's defence and security sector reform process agreed by Defence Ministers during Informal High-Level Consultations in Vilnius, 23 and 24 October;
6. **Strongly supporting** the Alliance's €25 million commitment through its Partnership for Peace Trust Fund to assist Ukraine in disposing of stockpiles of surplus weapons and munitions in order to reduce the physical hazards and environmental threats posed by these weapons and munitions;
7. **But concerned** that this twelve-year programme represents only a partial solution to dealing with the stockpiles, which include over 1.5 million small arms, more than one million tons of munitions, and several million anti-personnel mines;
8. **And noting** that despite widespread public support for reform in Ukraine, large sectors of public opinion retain an image of NATO based on Cold War stereotypes;
9. **Convinced** that deeper Alliance involvement in assisting Ukraine to dispose of surplus weapons and munitions stockpiles would have the additional benefit of helping to promote a more positive public perception of the Alliance;
10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to examine ways in which they can provide further bilateral technical and financial assistance to Ukraine in order to accelerate the disposal of surplus weapons and munitions;
  - b. to increase their commitments to NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund dedicated to the disposal of surplus weapons and munitions.

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\* presented by the Standing Committee to the Plenary Assembly and adopted (Copenhagen, Denmark, Tuesday 15 November 2005)

**DECLARATION 346**

on

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN\***

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that the 6 November parliamentary elections represented an important test for Azerbaijan in its democratisation process;
2. **Recognizing** that, despite some progress and several demonstrations of goodwill on the part of the Azerbaijani authorities, the elections did not meet a number of international standards for free and democratic elections;
3. **Noting** that, while there were improvements in some respects, international observers signalled problems with regard to voter registration and freedom of assembly during the pre-election period;
4. **Regretting** in particular that progress noted in the pre-election period was undermined by significant deficiencies in the voting count, which international observers assessed as bad or very bad in 43% of counts, and which included tampering with results, intimidation of observers, and unauthorised persons directing the process;
5. **Commending** the work of the International Election Observation Mission co-organized by the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO PA, as well as the contribution of the members and staff of the NATO PA that participated in the mission;
6. **Praising** Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's decision to recount votes and punish anyone who committed fraud;
7. **URGES** the Azerbaijani government:
  - a. to pursue in its commitment of recounting votes and nullifying election results in constituencies where international standards have not been met;
  - b. to continue to hold talks with the opposition aimed at resolving the disputes over election results;
  - c. to work with the NATO PA and other international organizations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe on improving the electoral process in order to achieve international democratic standards;
8. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to make clear to the Azerbaijani authorities that failure to implement the above could result in consequences for the participation of Azerbaijan in Euro-Atlantic structures.

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\* presented by the Standing Committee to the Plenary Assembly and adopted (Copenhagen, Denmark, Tuesday 15 November 2005)